Sei sulla pagina 1di 3

Presumption of Innocence

The starting point is the presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which is a right safeguarded both
Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent
on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Presumption in Law vs Presumption of Innocence


The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on
constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage
of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when
certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused
and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.

Corporations—Presumption of Innocence
Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only
to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

Equipoise Rule
"If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction."

Duty of the Trial Court when an Accused appears with no counsel


Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would
be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

NO LAWYER= DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

Accused pleads guilty to a capital offense without proper assistance of a counsel


What the trial court did was only to ask the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they had
affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea.

The Court has uniformly stressed the importance of the trial court's receiving evidence notwithstanding the plea of
guilty in order that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused. The
Court has time and time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when
an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of inevitable conviction. Herein,
the trial court did not even ascertain for itself whether the accused completely understood the precise nature of the
charge and the meaning of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having
attended the commission of the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood
the nature and gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty.
In short, the trial court did not even inform the accused that their plea of guilty might mean death for all of them.

Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting
of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
compliance with the Court's injunctions.

Counsel: I think I know the case; Accused was not presented to testify for his case and got convicted for murder
with death penalty
A counsel de oficio’s appointment as counsel for the accused is sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional guarantee of
the accused’s right to counsel is not enough. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a just and fair proceeding, he is
entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be duly represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed
de oficio, one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious manner and would not readily
assume that he need not bother himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the case. For only
in such a way may there be an intelligent defense.

A lot of reasonable postponements vs speedy disposition of the case


No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. It would have thus
been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception
of Moslares' evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of postponements, the requirements of substantial
justice mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have
been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case but at the
expense of a fundamental right.

No arraignment; case was tried in absentia and found the accused guilty of slight physical injuries
An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of
the cause he is required to meet." Upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules
of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This
duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." No such duty, however,
is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those
are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in the
arraignment the court must act of its own volition, as arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal
prosecution." What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the
crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.

Accused is suffering from unsound mental condition. Court proceeded with the case; did it amount to waiver?
The failure of Arnel’s counsel de parte to ask for the suspension of his arraignment on the ground that Arnel was
suffering from an unsound mental health did not amount to a waiver of such right. Unfortunately, Arnel was apparently
deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by Arnel at the time
of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers
that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate
the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention
until his faculties are recovered.

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights
carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to
effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or
exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the
trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives.

Foreign girls were drugged, raped and robbed in Baguio


Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense
may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their behalf. However, it becomes
altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.

Sufficiency of the information


The information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular
section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may
be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged should be mentioned in the information. What identifies
the charge is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It is not even
necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that
the accused be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.

The main purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting an offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his defense.

The fact, however, is that it is the prosecution which determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual
elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. It is not for the accused, usually a layman, to
speculate upon the purposes and strategy of the prosecution and be thereafter prejudiced through erroneous guesswork.
Thus, since the People dictate what he should be charged with, fairness demands that he should not be convicted of a
crime with which he is not charged or which is not necessarily included therein.

APARENTE VS PEOPLE, 205695, SEPT. 27, 2017


LEONEN, J.
 Flicking transparent sachet with the street light
 Aparente: illegal warrantless arrest; no proper chain of custody
 It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the
arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.
 what must be resolved is whether or not the police had probable cause for the arrest when the search was
made
 Probable cause = reasonable grounds for suspicion =suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, based on ACTUAL FACTS (supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested) + GOOD FAITH of the peace
officers making the arrest
 Reliable info not enough. accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
 Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two (2) acts were
substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause.
 Here, the arresting officers saw a man hand petitioner a small plastic sachet, which petitioner then inspected
by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley. Upon the officers' approach, these two (2) men fled.
These overt acts and circumstances were observed personally by the arresting officers and, taken together,
constitute reasonable suspicion that these two (2) men were violating Republic Act No. 9165, Thus, that the
search preceded the arrest does not render invalid the search and arrest of petitioner.

MANALILI VS COURT OF APPEALS, 280 SCRA 400


PANGANIBAN, J.

Potrebbero piacerti anche