FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 213 SCRA Perla v CA G.R. No.
Perla v CA G.R. No. 96452 May 7, 1992
493, September 2, 1992 NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
On October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation with his parents,
spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. While
said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted
by one of the three (3) unidentified men. Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written notice of
claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which rendered a favorable
response for the respondent. The appellate court ruled likewise. Petitioner filed this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the appellate court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance policy, since death
resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured
was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent
which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the insurer is liable for the payment of the insurance premiums
HELD:
Yes, the insurer is still liable. Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.
Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. The terms "accident" and
"accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and
common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design,
and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's
voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the
protection of the policies insuring against death or injury from accident. In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died
in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. Neither can it be said that
where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home after
attending a festival. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten (10)
circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a
result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of " expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing — is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly included in the
enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the
petitioner insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner
insurance company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it
did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Facts:
The Lim spouses opened a chattel mortgage and bought a Ford Laser from Supercars for Php 77,000 and insured it with Perla Compania
de Seguros. The vehicle was stolen while Evelyn Lim was driving it with an expired license. The spouses requested for a moratorium on
payments but this was denied by FCP, the assignee of rights over collection of the mortgage amount of the car. The spouses also called on
the insurance company to pay the balance of the mortgage due to theft but this was denied by the company due to the spouses’ violation of
the Authorized Driver clause stating (driving with an expired license before being carnapped):
Any of the following: (a) The Insured (b) Any person driving on the Insured's order, or with his permission. Provided that the person
driving is permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations, to drive the Scheduled Vehicle, or has been permitted
and is not disqualified by order of a Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf.
Since the spouses didn’t pay the mortgage, FCP filed suit against them. The trial court ruled in its favor ordering spouses to pay.
The appellate court reversed their decision. FCP and Perla appealed to the SC.
Issues:
1.Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in holding that private respondents did not violate the insurance
contract because the authorized driver clause is not applicable to the "Theft" clause of said Contract?
2. Whether or not the loss of the collateral exempted the debtor from his admitted obligations under the promissory note particularly the
payment of interest, litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
Held: No, No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. The car was insured against a malicious act such as theft. Therefore the “Theft” clause in the contract should apply and not the
authorized driver clause. The risk against accident is different from the risk against theft.
The appellate court stated: The "authorized driver clause" in a typical insurance policy is in contemplation or anticipation of accident in
the legal sense in which it should be understood, and not in contemplation or anticipation of an event such as theft. The distinction —
often seized upon by insurance companies in resisting claims from their assureds — between death occurring as a result of accident and
death occurring as a result of intent may, by analogy, apply to the case at bar.
There was no connection between valid possession of a license and the loss of a vehicle. Ruling in a different way would render the policy a
sham because the company can then easily cite restrictions not applicable to the claim.
2. The Supreme Court stated:
“The chattel mortgage constituted over the automobile is merely an accessory contract to the promissory note. Being
the principal contract, the promissory note is unaffected by whatever befalls the subject matter of the accessory contract. Therefore, the
unpaid balance on the promissory note should be paid, and not just the installments due and payable before the automobile was
carnapped, as erronously held by the Court of Appeals.”
The court, however, construed the insurance, chattel mortgage, and promissory note as interrelated contracts, hence eliminating the
payment of interests, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees stated in the promissory note. The promissory note required securing
a chattel mortage which in turn required opening an insurance contract. The insurance was made as an accessory to the principal contract,
making sure that the value in the promissory note will be paid even if the car was lost. The insurance company promised to pay FCP for
loss or damage of the property.
CA didn’t err in requiring Perla to pay the spouses, but the spouses must pay FCP for the balance in the note.
 Nostradamus Villanueva vs. Priscilla R. Domingo, et al.
[G.R. No. 144274, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 485]

Facts: A car driven by Renato Ocfemia hit a car driven by Leandro Domingo. The registered owner of Ocfemia’s vehicle
was Nostradamus Villanueva, although Villanueva has traded/swapped the vehicle for a Pajero owned by Albert
Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange.

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila recommended the filing of an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property and physical injuries.

The trial court found Villanueva liable and ordered him to pay damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court but deleted the award for attorney’s and appearance fees.

Villanueva files a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a registered owner of a vehicle may be held liable for damages arising from an accident involving the said
vehicle while it was being operated by the employee of the vehicle’s buyer without the latter’s consent and
knowledge

Held/Ratio: Yes, a registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily liable to the public and third persons while it is
being operated. The petition for review is denied and the Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

The public has a right to assume that the registered owner is the actual owner, to make it easier for them to
enforce actions for injuries caused to them by vehicles negligently operated. However, the registered owner may
recover from the person to whom he had sold, assigned, or conveyed the vehicle via a third-party complaint.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should be primarily responsible to the
public or third persons while the vehicle is being driven on the streets.

The main aim of registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, responsibility can be fixed on
a definite individual–the registered owner. The primary purpose is to make certain that the violator shall not
escape because of lack of means to discover him.

The law, with its aim in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law places upon him as an
incident or consequence of registration. If a registered owner is allowed to prove who the supposed transferee is,
it would be easy for him to escape responsibility and transfer it to an indefinite person or to one who possesses no
property with which to respond financially for the injury or damage.

Whether the driver is authorized by the actual owner is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered
owner. To require so would defeat the purpose of the enactment of motor vehicle registration.

The registered owner is the operator with respect to the public and third persons. The owner of record is the
employer of the driver, the actual owner being considered merely as his agent.