Introduction: Some Recent Approaches to Japanese Nationalism

Author(s): Kenneth B. Pyle

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Nov., 1971), pp. 5-16
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A Symposium
on Japanese
Nationalism
INTRODUCTION: SOME RECENT APPROACHES TO JAPANESE NATIONALISM

KENNETH B. PYLE

T HE studyof nationalism,the mostpowerfulpoliticalemotionin the modern

world,has oftenbecomeenmeshedin polemicand ideologicalcombat.In Japan
duringthepastcentury, evaluationsofthehistorical roleofnationalism havetendedto
oscillatebetweenextremes.Some of its firstseriousstudentsin the late nineteenth
century,writerslike Kuga Katsunan and Miyake Setsurei,opposingthe prevalent
Westernism, wereconvincedthatnationalismwas a necessaryingredient of Japanese
survival;and theywould have agreedwithTocqueville'saphorismthat"the inter-
estsof the human race are betterservedby givingeveryman a particularfatherland
thanby tryingto inflamehis passionsforthewhole of humanity."1 Since I945, how-
ever, in a mood of national self-alienation, many Japanesewritershave shared
Veblen's turgidconclusion,"Born in iniquityand conceivedin sin,the spiritof na-
tionalismhas neverceased to lead human institutions to the serviceof dissension
and distress.In itsmaterialeffects it is altogether
themostsinisteras well as themost
imbecileof all the institutional incumbrancesthathave come down out of the old
order."2Once seen as necessaryand beneficial, nationalismcame in thepost-warpe-
riod to be villifiedor simplyignoredamidstthe scholars'preoccupationwith their
anti-establishment liberalheroes.With some notableexceptions, nationalismhas been
slowto receivein Japanthethoughtful, dispassionate
studyit needs.
Outsideof Japan,wherea moredetachedattitudetowardJapanesenationalismis
possible,perhapsthegreatestobstaclehas beenthedifficulty of conceptualizing it and,
hence,of findinga satisfactory approachto its study.There is possiblyno more
troublesometermin social scienceto define;and thishas led some scholarsto con-
clude that nationalismis perhapsnot a fruitful problemforstudy.Thus, although
over fifteenyearshave passed sinceBrownwrotewhat he franklycalled "an intro-
ductoryhistoricalanalysis" of Japanesenationalismthat he hoped would lead
othersto seriousworkon thesubject,fewstudieshave been undertaken.!This is un-
fortunate because the developmentof nationalismis surelyone of the major organ-
izing themesof modernJapanesehistory. At our presentstageof knowledge,some
of the mostpressingquestionswe are askingabout modernJapanawait answersas
to the sources,thenature,and the effectof nationalism.Despite thisgenerallack of
specificstudies,thereis perceptible a new interest in thissubject,oftenevincedin the
courseof researchon quite different topicsthatonly"happened"to involvenational-
ism (as nearlyall topicson modernJapando). It may proveusefulby way of intro-
ductionto the essayspresentedin thissymposium, to considerthisnew interest, to

of History
KennethB. Pyle is AssociateProfessor 2 Ibid.

at the Universityof Washington. 3 Delmer M. Brown,Nationalismin Japan:An

1 Quoted in ArthurM. Schlesinger,Jr., "Na- HistoricalAnalysis(Berkeleyand Los
Introductory
tionalismand History,"Journalof Negro History, Angeles,1955).
LIV, I (I969), I9-3I.

5
 6 KENNETH B. PYLE
characterizesome of the best recentapproaches,and to see where we are in our
understanding of thesubject.

If we may be somewhatarbitrary, in therecentlitera-

it is possibleto distinguish
approachesto thedevelopment
turesix distinct ofnationalism:
i. Perhapsmostfamiliaris the approachof the pureintellectual historianwho is
concernedwithnationalismprimarilyas a set of ideas stressingthe sovereignty, the
mission,and the welfareof the nation-state. This "idea approach"is in the tradition
of the classicstudiesof nationalismby Hayes, Kohn, and others.Insofaras it is
concernedwiththedynamicsof nationalistgrowth,it tendsto focuson thetransmis-
sion of ideas,tracingtheirdiffusion and developmentfromone individualor group
to another.
In thisview,whichis entrenched in modernhistoriography, modernnationalism
is seen as emergingfrompre-i868thought.Thus Wilson,forexample,writesin the
beginningof his studyof Kita Ikki that"modernnationalconsciousnessin Japan
developedout of the ideas of laterTokugawa-periodthinkersrepresenting, in par-
ticular,the Mito, Dutch studies (rangatu), and 'practicallearning' (jitsugaku)
schoolsof thought.. ."' Similarly, MinearstressestheTokugawa intellectual heritage,
particularly Kokugaku and Mitogaku,in explainingthe originsof Hozumi Yat-
suka's nationalism.'This approachis characteristic of pureintellectual history, where
ideas have a lifeof theirown and new ideas emergeout of the womb of antecedent
ideas.
Some writershave objectedthatthe idea approachis too limitedto embracethe
phenomenonof modernnationalism,forwhile nationalismis, as Kohn definedit,
"a stateof mind,"6it is also the resultof a processof social change-a process,as I
would defineit, by which large numbersof people of all social classesare psycho-
logicallyintegratedinto activemembershipin and positiveidentification with the
nation-state. Minearhimselfseemedto sensethislimitation whenhe wrotein thecon-
clusionto his studyof Hozumi: "The problemfacingtheintellectual historianis that
he can go onlyso far: he can say what the ideologywas, but he cannotsay why it
receivedgeneralacceptance."7
historyto deal withthe activatingsocial
thisfailureof intellectual
It was precisely
forcesof nationalismthat lay behind a second approach.Deutsch objectedto the
classic studiesof nationalismin Europe because "nationalismcame to be widely
acceptedas a mere'stateof mind'withfew tangibleroots."8Johnsonin his studyof
peasantnationalismin China was evenmorecriticalof thetraditional approach:"An
exclusiveconcernwithnationalismas nationalists themselves defineit is of almostno
use forpurposesof generalanalysis;and it ignoresthe questionof timing"in the
onsetof nationalistmovements.9

4 GeorgeM. Wilson,RadicalNationalist in Japan: WesternLaw: Emperor,State, and Law in the

Kita lkki,I883-I937 (Cambridge,Mass., I969),
i. Let me stressthat many of the books and
articlesI have used as examplesactuallyemploy
several methodologicalapproaches.ProfessorWil-
son's book, for example,in additionto treating
the compositionof Kita's ideas is also concerned
withKita's politicalenvironmentand the interplay
of the two.
5 Richard H. Minear, JapaneseTraditionand
Thoughtof Hozumi Yatsuka (Cambridge,Mass.,
1970).
6 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism(New
York, 1944) p. IO.
7 Minear,p. i88.
8 Karl W. Deutsch,Nationalismand Social Com-
munication(Cambridge,Mass., I966), p. i6.
9 ChalmersA. Johnson,PeasantNationalismand
CommunistPower (Stanford,I962), p. 25.
JAPANESE NATIONALISM 7
2. We may call thissecond way of studyingnationalism, which is apparentin
some Japanesehistorians'work but so far neverpursuedin a systematic way, the
functionalor social communications approach since it is inspired,above all, by
Deutsch'sNationalismand Social Communication. This approachis less concerned
with the ideologicalcontentof nationalismthan with the dynamicsand processof
its growth.It seeksprecisionbothin identifying thepressuresthatcause populations
to formnation-states and in iso;latingthe conditionsunderwhichgroupsof human
beingsare transformed intonationalcitizens.
Deutscharguedthattheessenceof nationalismlay in "theabilityto communicate
moreeffectively, and overa widerrangeof subjects,withmembersof one largegroup
than withoutsiders."'0This abilitywhich he likenedto "mutual rapport,but on a
largerscale," is similarto what Lerner called "high empatheticcapacity"and to
what othershave called "psychicmobility.""At firstglance,this approachseems
moreapplicableto Europe whereDeutsch,findingthat"all theusual descriptions of
a people in termsof a communityof languages,of character, or memories,or past
historiesare open to exception,"neededsomeotherfactorto explaintheformation of
a nationfromdiversebackgrounds.'2 In the case of Japan,wherea strongsenseof a
commonculturalheritageexistedfromearlytimesand therefore providedan en-
duringand cohesivebasis of nationality,such "special" explanationsmight seem
unnecessary. But, on closerlook,the functionalapproachis usefulin explainingthe
timingof nationalistmovements.Afterall, the factorof culturalhomogeneity does
not help us explain,as Johnsonpointsout (with a note of hyperbole)"why,for
example,the Japanesewere more nationalisticin I930 than in I830, since at both
timestheyspoke the same language,held roughlythe same religiousviews, and
paintedthesamekindof pictures. "13
In studyingthe emergenceof national communitiesout of European feudal
society,Deutsch stressesthe growthof towns,developmentof a commercialecon-
omy, and the consequentenlargementof basic communicationsgrids. Although
many writershave alluded brieflyto factorssignificantin mobilizinga national
awarenessin Japan,we stillknow too littleabouttheprocess.Dore speaksof thecon-
tent of Tokugawa educationand its diffusionas having a "nationalizingeffect."
Literacygreatlyenhancedthe citizenry'scapacityfor empathy;samurai,whatever
theirfiefaffiliation,
came to sharea commonintellectual culture;and "thegrowthof
Confucianscholarship and theteachingprofession providednew nationalchannelsof
communication whichignoredfiefboundaries."'4
In the modernperiod,the effectiveness of both the universalcompulsoryeduca-
tionsystemand thenationalconscriptarmyin promotinga groupconsciousness that
transcended regionaland class limitationshas been noticedby manywriters.These
two institutional reforms were in partdesignedto liftloyaltiesto the nationallevel
and eventuallyboth became vehiclesfor purposefulnationalistindoctrination. But
theyalso contributed to the growthof nationalconsciousnessin unplannedways.
The army,forexample,by drawingpeasantyouthout of theirvillagesto distantgar-
risons,servedto mobilizethe less politicallyaware and to contribute to an identity
of interest.

30Deutsch, p. 97. 13 Johnson,p. 21.

11 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional 14 R. P. Dore, Education in
Tokugawa Japan
Society(Glencoe,Ill., 1958), p. 50. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, I965), pp. 296-297.
.2 Deutsch,p. 97.
8 KENNETH B. PYLE
Some attention, too, has been given to the way in which moderncommunica-
tions,by overcominglocal isolation,mobilized national consciousness.With the
developmentof railroads(nearly5,000 milesof trackhad been laid by I905) came a
new physicalmobility.Already by I890 Shimbashistationaccommodatedup to
io,ooopassengersa day;'5 and Lafcadio Hearn observedin I895 thatmobilitywas a
distinguishing featureof Japanesesociety:"Nothingis morecharacteristic of (Jap-
anese) lifethanits extremefluidity.... In theirown countrythe Japaneseare the
greatesttravelersof any civilizedpeople."'6Yanagida Kunio pointedout a dramatic
increaseduringtheMeiji periodin marriagesthatunitedmen and womenwho had
grownup greatdistancesapart.'7More important, Japanesewho did nottravelwere
increasingly able to participatevicariouslyin distantevents.This new psychicmobil-
ity was made possibleby establishment of telegraphicservice,a modern postal
system, and mediumsof mass communication-especially newspaperspublishedafter
I89o fora nationalaudience.
Anotherfactoroftenstressedin thefunctionalapproachis theimpactof theinter-
nationalenvironment. Politicalawarenesswas heightenedby Japan'semergenceas a
nation-state in competition withothernation-states. The unequal treatiesimposedin
the i85o's, theTriple Intervention in i895, and thedisarmament treatiesof the I920's
and I930's are examplesfrequently citedof the state
international system'simpinge-
menton the domesticpoliticalenvironment which mobilized nationalloyalties.The
functionof war in awakeningand stimulating nationalconsciousnesshas likewise
been recognized.Perhapsmostimpressivein thisregardwas the Sino-Japanese War
of i894-95, whichdrownedthe doubtsand dissensionsof the preceding decades in
a floodof nationalexhilaration. No less importantwas the influenceof the cultural
aspectsof theinternational environment. The influxof Westerners and theirciviliza-
tionservedas an objectof comparisonfortheJapaneseand tendedto draw attention
to the distinctive natureof theirown cultureand createdextremesensitivity to the
problemof definingJapanesecharacter.(Kuga Katsunan,one of thefirstJapaneseto
studythe natureof nationalismin the West, contrastedthe originsof European
and Japanesenationalismby emphasizingthe influenceof Napoleonicaggressionin
theformercase and theinfluxofWesternculturein thelatter.It was,he said,buryoku
in one case and bunryoku in theother.)'8

approach,"identifies
3. A thirdview,which I shall call the "structural in tradi-
tionalsocial groupscertainstructuralfeaturestogetherwith theirsupportingethics
thatwere conducive,or even tantamountto, the developmentof nationalism.Both
Benedict,who stressedthe ethicsof on and giri and the Japanese"confidencein
hierarchy,"and Bellah, who has stressedthe Japanesepatternof "particularistic
groupism,"believethatthe traditionalstructure of group lifeprovidedthe basis for
modernnationalism.19
This approach,however,is mostclearlyworkedout in thehistoricaldimensionby
15 Kat6 Hidetoshi,"Meiji nijiinendainashonari- 18 Suzuki Torao, ed., Katsunanbunroku(Toyko,
zumu to komyunikeishon," in Sakata Yoshio,ed., 1933), p. I42.
Meiji zenhankino nashonarizumu(Tokyo, I958), 19 "Japan's patternof particularistic
groupism
pp. 3II-42. not only allowed the relativelysmoothacceptance
'6Lafcadio Hearn, The Writingsof Lafcadio of more rationalizedthoughtand institutions,it
Hearn (Boston, I923), VII, 283. also providedthe motivationfor it. The constant
17 KatW,pp. 320-32I. effortto improvethe positionof one's own group
JAPANESE NATIONALISM 9

Craig. He is inclinedto downgradethe usual emphasison Kokugaku thoughtand

the comingof the West in the onsetof nationalismin the late Tokugawa period.
Insteadhe stresses"internalchangesin the natureof feudalrelations"and contends
that"much of the emperor-centered Meiji nationalismas well as Bakumatsusonno
thoughtwas essentiallya formof transmutedTokugawa loyalty."20 Tracing the
late Tokugawa developmentof an impersonalloyalty,directedmore toward the
domainthanthe personof its lord,he describesthisloyaltyas "almost,if not quite,
. . . 'han nationalism.'I say not quite because,on the one hand,thistightin-group
feelingwas limitedto thesamuraiclass and perhapsto theupperstratumof peasant
officials and, on the otherhand,becauseit was muchmore structured than the dif-
fuse feelingusuallysuggestedby the word 'nationalism.'"21 Where otherstudents
have seen a weakeningof traditionalloyaltyand the appearanceof a new national
one,Craig seesratheran intensification loyalty,
of traditional althoughbecauseit was
directedmoretowarda statusthan a person"it was potentially, at least,what may
be termedfreefloatingloyalty.It was certainlythis characterthat permittedthe
symbolicshiftfromthe daimyoto the emperorand the shiftin contentfromhan
nationalism to nationalism proper."22
It is theessenceof the structural approachthatit claimsthe similarity of nation-
alism and otherformsof group loyaltyand sees nationalloyaltiesas an outgrowth
of otherloyalties.Because in some situations,as in the case of the Satsuma Rebel-
lion, both sectionalismand nationalismwere at work and circumstances caused
them to work in opposition,historiansare prone to emphasize the antithetical
natureof different loyalties,to regardsectionalloyaltiesas conflicting with national
ones.But nationalism, as David Potterargued,"may be the terminalresultof a full
developmentof strongsectionalforces,while sectionalismmay be an emergent
nationalismwhichhas not yetmatured."23 What is stressedhereis thatstrongloyal-
ties,whatevertheirobject,are conduciveor even indispensableto the development
of nationalism."If loyaltyis a generalizedway of responding,"Harold Guetzkow
writes,"the strongerthe loyaltypatternin a given individual-no matterwhat its
From thispointof view,nationalism
object-theeasierit will be to build loyalties."24
may be seen not as breakingdown, destroying, and supplantingfamily,local, and
regionalloyaltiesbut ratherincorporating, subsuming,and even pyramidingthem.
Thus Smith speaks of the Meiji leadersusing the traditionallanguage of loyalty
and obligation"to make all littleloyaltieslead up to one great loyaltyto the
Emperor."25

relativeto otherswithinthesocietywas generalized PhilosophicalFoundationsof Meiji Nationalism,"

to a competitiveness between Japan and other
forJapan'sequalitywithor
societies.The necessity
superiority to other nationsis not a productof
modern nationalism.Concerns of this sort lie
deep in Japanesehistory.They are relatedto the
underthe emperormentioned
nationalintegration
above and helped providein Japanan apparently
easy fit with the model of the Westernnation
state,thoughin factthe basic structurewas quite
different."Robert N. Bellah, "Continuityand
Change in JapaneseSociety,"mimeo., I970, pp.
in RobertE. Ward, ed., PoliticalDevelopmentin
ModernJapan(Princeton,I968), pp. 99-I02; and
AlbertM. Craig, Chdshfiin the Meiji Restoration
(Cambridge,Mass., I96I), p. I44.
21 Craig, Choshui, p. I48.
22 Ibid., p. 149.
23 David M. Potter,"The Historian'sUse of Na-
tionalismand Vice Versa," AmericanHistorical
Review,LXVII, 4 (I962), 93I.
24 Quoted in ibid.
25 Thomas C. Smith,The AgrarianOriginsof

I0-II. Modern Japan (Stanford,1959), p. 205.

20 Albert M. Craig, "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The
10 KENNETH B. PYLE
The structural approachthereby challengesone of themostwidelyacceptedprop-
ositionsabout nationalism,which is that the growthof national loyaltydepends
upon destructionof local and regionalties.Modernnationalism, goes a typicalexpla-
nation,"cannotbe understoodexceptin termsof the weakeningand destruction of
earlierbonds,and of the attachment to the politicalstateof new emotionalloyalties
It cannotbe understood,
and identifications. thatis, apartfromthoserentsand clefts
in the traditionalstructure caused by economicand social dislo-
of human loyalties,
cation,which leftwideningmasses of human beings in a kind of psychological
vacuum."26
The structuralists,however,varyin theirunderstanding of how long traditional
loyaltypatternsremainedthe basis of nationalism.Craig, forexample,in his essay
on Fukuzawa, maintainsthatafterthe turnof the centurv"a moremodernnation-
alism" took hold. Presumably,he refersto a more diduse feeling,more widely
sharedby different sectorsof societythan the old loyaltywhich had been highly
structured and limitedprimarilyto the old samuraiclass. Diffusionof nationalism
afterI900 was achievedthrougheducation,the armed services,and "an ever more
centralizedpoliticalsystem.""But even thisnew patriotism," he concludes,"was sub-
stantiallyshapedbytheold loyalty."27
Many structuralists would argue that nationalismas a cohesivepoliticalforce
continuedto depend heavilyon the traditionalstructure of group ties-particularly
in the countryside. In partthiswas possiblebecauseindustrialization did not break
up the peasant village and values of obedienceand solidarityremainedvital in
agrariansociety.
If nationalloyaltiescould be constructedfromlesserloyalties,presumablythe
structure could also be dismantled.Thus structuralistsarguedthatafterWorld War
II, when national political institutionsand symbolswere discredited,"Japanese
nationalismwas releasedfromthe centralforcethathad untilthencontrolledit and
was automatically dispersedintoits originalsources,namelythe family,the villages,
and small local groups."28 Maruyama calls this a processof "demobilization"but
stressesthat"the spiritualstructure of past nationalismdid not becomeextinct,nor
did it undergoa qualitativechange,ratherit would be correctto say thatthechange
was quantitative:nationalistfeelingswereatomized,disappearingfromthe political
and becomingembeddedin the lower strataof nationallife."29Presumablythenit
could be arguedthatbarringsocial changeof the kind thatweakenedhierarchies of
personaland primarygroup loyalties,this structure could once again with relative
ease be "mobilized"to servenationalistends. Morris,indeed,arguesthatultra-na-
tionalistelementswere able to survivein post-warJapanbecauseof "the highlyper-
sonal basisof theirloyalties."30

4. A fourthapproachto thestudyof nationalism-perhaps it is themostcommon

one-is based on "interesttheory."That is, nationalistdoctrineis treatedas an ideo-
logical weapon used by the governmentand by the dominantsocial groupsin the
interestof theirown pursuitof power.Squaringneatlywiththe prevailingMarxist
26 Robert A. Nisbet, Communityand Power in Japan (London, I960), p. 39.
(New York, 1962) p. I64. 29 Quoted in ibid.,p. 40-
27 Craig, "Fukuzawa Yukichi,"p. I02. 8g Ibid., P. 58.
28 Ivan Morris,Nationalismand the RightWing
JAPANESE NATIONALISM 11
orientation of historiansin Japan,thisview presentsa rathersimpleand straightfor-
ward understanding of the sourcesof nationalistgrowthand, unfortunately, has
servedperhapsto diminishfurther inquiryinto the natureof modernnationalism.
The growthof nationalism is seenprimarily as theresultof indoctrination and clever
manipulation of traditional symbols to serve the of
interests the elites.Where the
structural approach has been particularlyuseful in describingaspects of nationalism in
theearlyMeiji period, interest theoryhas special applicationto the twentieth century
when government made use of education,the media,and the armedforcesto incul-
cate the nationalistorthodoxy.In additionto indoctrinating conscriptsand doctor-
ing schooltexts,the government built a networkof local organizations, underthe
controlof the Home Ministry, whichhelped Tokyo mobilizenationalistsentiment
in thecountryside. For example,theMinistry made a concertedeffort aftertheRusso-
JapaneseWar to join village youthgroupsinto a nationalorganizationunder its
control.Y
Althoughtheinterest theoryapproachputsprimeemphasison theroleofgovern-
ment,dominantsocial groupsmay also be seen as promotingnationalismin the
serviceof theirown interests. Besidesthe political,bureaucratic, and miltiaryelites,
landlordsand businessmen have also been seen as instrumental in upholdingthecol-
lectivistethicuponwhichnationalist movements werefounded.Dore and Ouchi,while
dismissing Barrington Moore'ssimpleequationof landlordswithultranationalist lead-
ership,hypothesizethattheywere nonethelessimportantin the more conservative
nationalistmovementsof the I920'S.32 Marshallshowsthatmembersof the Japanese
businesselite contributed substantially to the formulationand maintenanceof the
nationalist ideologybecausetheyfounditsthemesof self-abnegation, groupsolidarity,
and paternalistic authorityuseful in sanctioningtheirnewly acquired power and
prestige.The businessideology,in orderto ease thetraditionalstigmaon commerce
and to justifythe businessman'spositionin society,laid stresson his patrioticde-
votionand hisself-denial in thefulfillment ofdutyto thenation.?s
It may legitimately be objectedthat the interesttheoryapproachis sometimes
simplistic. One oftengetsthe impressionfromit of Japanesenationalistideologyas
somethingcooked up in the backroomby It5 and the oligarchsand fed to an
obedient,deceived citizenry.The effectiveness of governmentindoctrinationis
easily exaggeratedand the remarkablereceptivity to this officialeffortby people
outsideof the government is oftenoverlooked.The pressureto conformto the na-
tionalistorthodoxy, Jansenpointsout, came not so much fromthe governmentas
from"forceswithinJapanesesociety.Colleagues,neighbors,publicists,relatives-
thesewerethepeoplewho houndedtheKumes,thereformers, and theliberals."34
Still,if a morecomplexcausationis assumed,self-interest maybe shownto playan
importantrole in promotingthe growthof national loyalty.Nationalismamong
certaingroupsmay be prompted,in part,by theirperceptionof theirown interests
as coincidingwiththe nation's.MortonGrodzinswritesin his The Loyal and Dis-
loyalthat"populationsare loyalto thenationas a byproduct of satisfactions achieved

31 Kano Masanao,"Sengokeieito nosonky5iku," 33 ByronK. Marshall,Capitaism and National-

Shis6, 52I (I967), 42-59. ism in PrewarJapan (Stanford,1968).
32 R. P. Dore and Tsutomu Ouchi, "Rural 34Marius B. Jansen,ed., Changing Japanese
Origins of Japanese Fascism," mimeo for VI Attitudes Towards Modernization (Princeton,
Seminarof the Conference on ModernJapan. I965), pp. 8o-8I.
12 KENNETH B. PYLE
withinnonnationalgroups,because the nation is believedto symbolizeand sus-
tain thesegroups.From thispointof view,one is loyalnot to nationbut to family,
business,religion,friends.One fightsfor the joy of his pinochleclub when he is
said to fightforhis country."35
It may have been particularlytrue in Japan that nationalistsentimentoften
masked concern for self-interest for, as Maruyama points out, private interest
tendedto lack sanctions;and self-gainhad to be rationalizedwithreference to the
nation.36 One is remindedof Soseki'sironicportrayalof a businessmanin Sore kara
who was foreverjustifying his profitin termsof serviceto the nation and of his
son'swryremarkthat"if one can make as muchmoneyas Fatherhas by servingthe
nation,I wouldn'tmind servingit myself."3In arguingagainstthe conventional
interpretation of Meiji entrepreneurs as "community-centered" and as motivatedby
selflesssamuraispirit,Yamamurahas convincingly demonstrated thatmanyof them
wererelentless and even unscrupulousin theirpursuitof profit.88Nevertheless,from
our perspective here,it is probablya mistaketo regardnationalismand concernfor
self-interestas antitheticalor even easily distinguishable.The Charles E. Wilson
mentality("What is good forGM is good forthe country")is perhapseven more
pervasivein Japanthanin theUnitedStates.

5. There is a fifthway of studyingnationalismwhichgenerallyfocuseson irra-

tionalimpulsesand whichwe maycall the"straintheory"approach.It seesnational-
ism as provokedby malintegration of societyand by psychological"strain."The
rapidityof changeand theunevennessof thepace betweensectorsis seen as subject-
ing societyand the individualto severestress.In particular,the introductionof
moderntechnology and the consequenttransition froman agrarianto an industrial
societyare emphasizedas primarily responsibleforthestrainin modernJapaneselife
and forsome formsof nationalism.From this viewpoint,nationalismprovided"a
symbolicoutletforemotionaldisturbances generatedby social disequilibrium."39
The most dramaticevidenceof psychologicalstrainin modernJapan was the
rapidlyrisingsuicideratefromthe i8go's on. No one, so faras I have been able to
discover,has studiedthe relationbetweenJapan'ssuicidestatistics and her ideologi-
Is it an accidentthattimesof rapid risein the suiciderate (the turnof
cal activity.
the century, theimmediatepost-WorldWar I period,and the earlyI930's) coincide
withtimesknownforincreasednationalist activity
?40
The relationbetweensocial strainand growthof nationalismhas severaltimes
been alludedto in thewritingsof Dore. In his studyof mobilityaspirationsin mod-
ern Japan,forexample,he suggeststhatthe growthof nationalismaftertheturnof
the centuryfed on the frustrations of thosewho were unable to fulfilltheirambi-
tions."Ferventnationalism," he writes,"tookan easiergripon the nationin thatit
providedvicariousalternativesatisfactions to those who had been disappointedin
thestruggleforsuccess."He offers theexampleof theprotagonist of Tayama Katai's
35 Quoted in Potter,p. 93I. Review (Spring,I968), I44-I58.
36 Masao Maruyama,Thoughtand Behaviourin 39 CliffordGeertz,"Ideologyas a CulturalSys-
ModernJapanesePolitics(rev. ed., London,I969),
tem," in David E. Apter,ed., Ideologyand Dis-
pp. 6-7. content(New York, I964), p. 54.
37Quotedin ibid. 40For the best recentstudyof the problemof
38Kozo Yamamura,"A Re-examination of En- suicide in Japan,see K6saka Masaaki and Usui
in Meiji Japan,"EconomicHistory Jisho,eds. Nihon no jisatsu (Tokyo, I966).
trepreneurship
JAPANESE NATIONALISM 13
thebitterness
whoovercomes
Inakakyashi, ofunfulfilled
ambitions
byidentifying
withhisnation initstriumph inI905. Nationalism inthisview, isa catharsis orsafety
valvefor"internal pressure causedbytheexcess ofawakened aspirations.""41
Elsewhere, Dore elaborates on thisinterpretation. In contrast to theinterest
theory approach whichargues thatthegroups dominating thecountry politically-
thebureaucracy, thepoliticians,andthebusiness elite-were thebearers ofnational-
ism,heseesthe lesssuccessful,the frustrated,and the resentful elements of societyas
itsbearers.Rather thanthebourgeoisie, which provided thereal strength of national-
isminEuropeandAmerica, Dorecontends thatitwaslowermiddle-class groups-
shopkeepers, smallbusinessmen, gradeschoolandsecondary schoolteachers, cler-
icalworkers ingovernment andbusiness-which werethebearers ofnationalism in
Japan. Politically mobilized after theturnofthecentury, theyprovided thesupport
fortheleaders of theultra-nationalist movement whomMaruyama callspseudo-
intellectuals:spokesmen forreservist organizers
associations, ofpatriotic charities,
etc.
-men whoseroots werein localcommunities andwhobecame theopinion leaders
ofthosecommunities. Theselowermiddle-class groups "hadenough causes,"Dore
points out,"forpersonal resentment against thedominant groups (there wasonlyone
educational ladder ofsuccess andthey weretheoneswhohadrisen onlyhalfway up
it),andthey wereprovided withenough moralgrounds forexpressing their resent-
mentbytheluxury and corruption of thebusiness classes,thearrogance of the
bureaucrats, theunpatriotic concern forsectional interests of thepoliticians, and
theun-Japanese cosmopolitanism ofthem all."42
He argues thatthebourgeoisie inWestern societiesbecame thelocusofnational-
iststrength inreaction tothecosmopolitan outlookofthearistocracy. In Japan, how-
ever,thenewprofessional bureaucratic andbusiness ofwhichthemiddle-
classes,
uppergroups in society werecomposed, werethemselves cosmopolitan. Having
received a Western-style education andowingtheir socialposition tothemastery of
Western learning, they wereafflicted by"anuncertain senseofcultural identity"that,
inDore'sview, keptthem from being thebearers ofnationalism asopposed tocosmo-
politanism.
Certainly thenationalist orthodoxy didfindstrong support from thelower-mid-
dlegroups during theI920's andI930's, butit alsoshouldbe pointed outthatthe
middle-upper groups provided perhaps as muchleadership ofnationalist movements
as the"pseudo-intellectuals." It couldbe argued thattheuncertain senseofcultural
identityamongthemiddle-upper groupswas no deterrent to nationalism, that
insteadthepsychological needtoresolve thisuncertainty wasoneofthepersistent
motivating themes ofJapanese nationalism, andthatmanyoftheleading nationalist
ideologuescamefrom amongthemiddle-upper groups. Onethinks ofInoueTetsu-
jiro,
Uesugi Shinkichi,Tokutomi Soho,YokoiJikei, andmany others from themiddle-
uppergroups whodespite (or because of?) an earlysenseofcultural uncertainty
became formulators andspokesmen forthenationalist orthodoxy.
Socialdiscontent wasdoubtless oneincitement tonationalism. The contribution
ofthestrain approach,likethefunctional andinterest approaches, liesprimarilyinits
explanation ofthedynamics ofnationalist growth through elucidation ofitssocial
41 R. P. Dore, ed., Aspectsof Social Change in Encyclopedia
ModernizingSocieties,"International
Modern Japan (Princeton,I967), pp. I37-I38. of the Socia Sciences (New York, I968), X,
42 See Ronald P. Dore, "The Bourgeoisiein 402-409.
 14 KENNETH B. PYLE
sourcesand psychologicalmotivations.By firmlygroundingtheirexplanationsin
and by seeingnationalismas the resultof processesof social change,
social structure
theseapproacheshelp us understandthe springsof nationalism.Their difficulty lies
the complexrelationship
in theirshort-circuiting between the activating social forces
of nationalismand its ideologicalassertions.As Geertz writes,"the natureof the
relationshipbetweenthe sociopsychologicalstressesthat inciteideologicalattitudes
and the elaboratesymbolicstructures throughwhich those attitudesare given a
publicexistence"is oftennot adequatelyexplained.43

6. The problemof culturaluncertainty, just raised,suggestsanothermethod

whichI will call the culturalapproach.It sees culturaldisorientation as settingthe
stageand creatingtheneed fortheriseof modernnationalism;and it focusesanaly-
sis on Japaneseculturalpatternsand symbolsas theshapingforcein theformulation
of nationalistideology.Much of the recentinterestin thisapproachhas been stim-
ulatedby thewritingsof Bellah and Jansen.The former'sstudyof Watsuji Tetsur3
and otherintellectualfiguresprovideda new perspective on nationalismby relating
it to thecentralvalue systemand to theculturaltensionsgeneratedby Westernideas,
industrialization,and bureaucratization. Jansen'swritings,on the otherhand, pro-
vided a different perspective by calling attentionto a recurrent personalitytypein
Japanesehistory, theshishi,who was activein proto-nationalist and nationalistmove-
ments.
Because definitionsof cultureare bv natureinclusive,thisapproachtendsto be
pluralistand synthetic; and its comprehensiveness mayallow it to subsumeand inte-
gratesome of the diverseperspectives and insightsof the otherapproacheswe have
considered.Culturalhistoryoccupiesa mediatingpositionsomewherebetweenthe
domains of social and intellectualhistory.Kluckhohnand Kroeber identifiedthe
"essentialcore" of cultureas historicallyderived ideas "and especiallytheir at-
tachedvalues."44The culturalhistorianis therefore interested,like the intellectual
historian,in the derivationand influenceof clearlyarticulatedideas; but he is also
interested in "values,norms,tacitassumptions, ideologies,images,and myths."45 He
shareswiththesocialhistorianan interest in "theway theunstatedpresuppositions of
societyinformbehaviorand institutions and determinea society'sstyle."46 He triesto
recapture"the vitalnuancesof a stateof mind and conveya senseof the functional
interrelationship of beliefs,values,fears,aspirations, and emotionalcommitments."47
The cultural historian possesses a concern for the subtle interplaybetweensocial
forcesand processes of ideological formation that is essentialforunderstanding mod-
ernnationalism.
Like the strainapproach,the culturalapproachrecognizesthe importanceof
rapidsocial changein theonsetof nationalism, but it sees thefocusof theimpactas
primarilyculturaldisruption and dislocation, rather than sociopsychological strain.
of
Each exacerbatestheother, course, but it is above all a fundamental lack of surety,
a pervasivesense of disorientation, about once axiomaticculturalvalues thatcreates

43 Geertz, "Ideology as a CulturalSystem,"p. 45Ibid., p. 699 n.

57. 46See the review essay by ArthurSchlesinger,
44 Quoted in David Brion Davis, "Some Recent Jr.,in Historyand Thieory,VII, 2 (I968), 2I7-
Directionsin AmericanCulturalHistory,"Ameri- 224.

can HistoricalReview,LXXIII, 3 (i968), 696-707. 47 Davis, "Some RecentDirections,"p. 698.

JAPANESE NATIONALISM 15
the vacuum thatnationalismfills.This approachalso recognizesthe importanceof
increasedsocialcommunication and of theimpingement of theinternational environ-
mentwhich are factorsemphasizedby the functionalapproach,but it stressesthat
thesefactors createdculturalproblemsthat'nationalism emergedto resolve.
In thisview,modernnationalismrisesin responseto a culturalcrisisthatoccurs
when a more highlydifferentiated polity(the modernnation-state)is developing
and whentheformercentralorganizingprinciplesof politicallifebecomediscredited
and outmoded.In thefaceof radicallynew problems, receivedimagesof thepolitical
processseemno longeradequate.This culturalconfusionsetsoffan intensesearchfor
"a new symbolicframework in termsof whichto formulate, thinkabout,and reactto
politicalproblems."'48 To be successful,such a framework mustbe constructed from
symbolsand imagesthathave meaningin thenation'sculturalheritage, butthathave
beenremoldedto fita new politicalenvironment.
Liquidationof the Tokugawa politicalorderand borrowingof Westerntechnol-
ogyand institutions createda severeconfusionofvaluesbythemid-Meijiyears.Tradi-
tionalways of organizingand viewingsocial and politicallifebecame problematic
and controversial. My own studyof the new generationof intellectuals is an attempt
to understandthiscrisisby showinghow culturaltensionsand contradictions were
internalized, struggledwith and resolvedthroughnew nationalistformulations by
articulatemembersof society.49 TokutomiSoho's resolutionof thiscrisisis perhaps
representative of theway in whichJapaneseculturewas reorienting itselfat theend
of thecentury. As Duus showsin his contribution to thissymposium, thedilemmaof
tryingto reconcileculturalborrowingand nationalpride,of strivingto be both
modernand Japanesecontinuedto plague thoughtful people: it motivatedNagai
Ryuitar5 to seek a nationalmissionthatwould proveJapan'sculturalworthin the
modernworld.
This culturaldisorientation, exacerbatedby the strainof rapid social changeand
byintensification of international setthestagefortheriseof nationalistide-
rivalries,
ologiesthatwould serveas an integrative socialforceby providingculturallyaccept-
able answersto unprecedented politicalproblems."In Maruyama'sperceptivecom-
ment,the atrophyof the Confucianvalues afterthe middleof the Meiji periodand
thefailureto developalternative transcendental idealswhichmightreplacethem-an
agreedupon mandateof heavenor of history-madeit difficult to restrain,and easy
to promote, theideologiesoffamilystateand divinenation."50These ideologiessought
to put an end to culturalconfusionby reasserting traditionalvalues and by defining
a unique Japanesepoliticalorderand socialmoralitybased on immutableprinciples.
Notehelfer's essayon K6toku Shiusuiin this symposiumprovidesvaluableclues to
the culturaltensionsthatresultedwhen the social orderbegan to harden and the
dominantformsof nationalismbecamea distinctively conservative force.As a conse-
quence, Kotoku,whose backgroundhad disposedhim to regardnationalismas a
progressive, transformational force,turnedto socialism.
Eventually,afterKotoku's time,one of the main streamsof nationalistideology
developedthistransformational potential.Wilson'sstudyof Kita Ikki arguespersua-
sivelythatradicalnationalismin theTaisho periodsharedmorein commonwiththe
48 Geertz, "Ideologyas a CulturalSystem,"p. Meiji Japan:Problemsof CulturalIdentity,1885-
65. I895 (Stanford, I969).
49 Kenneth B. Pyle, The New Generationin p. BI.
50Jansen, ChangingJapaneseAttitudes,
16 KENNETH B. PYLE
socialistsand theleft-wing of thepoliticalspectrumthanit did withtheright-wing."1
Oftentimes, the revolutionarydesignsof nationalismwere cloaked in adherenceto
traditionalisticsymbols-suchas the conceptof "restoration." We have sometimes
tendedto dismissthe use of such symbolsas simplybackwardlookingand obscu-
rantistwithoutunderstanding the meaningstheyevoke in Japaneseculture.From
Najita's studyof YamagataDaini in thissymposium we acquirean understanding of
the rootsof thismode of thoughtand of its peculiarmeaningin Japaneseculture.
Moreover,his studysuggeststhatwe have a greatdeal to learnaboutothersymbols,
images,and modesof thoughtin thelanguageof modernJapanesenationalism.Too
oftenthe possibilityhas been overlookedthat nationalistideologymay draw its
power,as Geertzsays,"fromits capacityto grasp,formulate, and communicate social
realitiesthat elude the temperedlanguage of science,that it may mediate more
complexmeaningsthan its literalreading suggests."52 One deterrentto studying
modernJapanesenationalismhas beenwhat Hasegawa Nyozekancalleditsapparent
"intellectualvacuity."53He was speakingof theseemingly rudimentary thoughtproc-
essesthatcharacterized the nationalistwritingsof the I920's and I930's-their use of
figurative language,primitive rhetoric,
distortedmetaphor, and theirliteralacceptance
of Shintomythology. Only when we succeedin puttingthesewritingsin theirsocial
and culturalcontextwill theirsignificance be morefullyunderstood.
51Wilson,Radical Nationalistin Japan,ch. 5. 53 Hasegawa Nyozekan shu (Tokyo, I960),
52 Geertz,
"Ideologyas a CulturalSystem,"
p. 58. p. I29.