PCIB vs ESCOLIN

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo
City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should
her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a
motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada
manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to
have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same
estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted.
Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her
will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall
be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time
of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law
applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.

FERNANDEZ vs DIMAGIBA

Facts: Ismaela Dimagiba respondent submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes
executed on 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.

Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes, and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia all claiming to be
heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked theCourt of First Instance and found that the will was genuine
and properly executed. Tthe oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

Appellate Court held that the decree but deferred resolution on the questions of esto... mitting the will to probate, had become final
for lack of opportune appeal and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon... the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it failed
to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition.

Issues: W/N the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal

Ruling: The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time; the same had become final and conclusive.

It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable

BELEN vs BPI

Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.

FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled
each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING: No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and
those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse)
is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court
held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971

FACTS: The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la
Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los
Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la
Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE: What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the deceased?

RULING The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person.” Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof
and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true
heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement
the right to have its terms enforced.

Ofelia Hernando Bagunu v. Pastora Piedad

G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000

FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of
the decedent. Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Piedad.

ISSUE: Whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding
which would justify her intervention.

RULING: No. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, “raised to the same place
and degree” of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes
of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would
have succeeded. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when
such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to “other collateral relatives within the
fifth civil degree” (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly,
the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among
collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule.

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila at the age of seventy-seven years. His will was probated in the CFI.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were
o (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco,
o (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco,
o (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and
o (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. (†)

A project of partition was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed
by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will does not contain an
institution of heir.

The Probate court approved the project of partition. Appeals were taken by Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangcobut were dismissed after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements.

In the compromise the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, peaches, the heirs of Isabel
Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus (Tomas Corpus). Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement and received from the
Yangco estate P2,000as settlement of his full share.

But, subsequently, Tomas Corpusfiled an action to recover her (Juanita’s) supposed share in Yangco intestate estate.
He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions are void since it was a perpetual prohibition on alienation and an intestacy be
declared.

TC dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches.

CA endorsed the case to the SC since it covers real property valued at more than 50k.

Issue: WON Tomas Corpus may inherit from TeodoroYangco [NO, because his mother (Juana Corpus does not have the right to
inherit via intestacy from his half-blood brother]

Ruling:

Trial Court: Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child. Itwas proven in the statement in the
will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco.

Court presumed that there was a marriage between Ramona and Tomas (first family).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of
Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco
because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

OCC 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives"

article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue,
either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters."

Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco'shalf brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the
rules of intestacy.

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother

Sayson v. CA
GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel. Upon
the death of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The
plaintiffs filed for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging
their successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation
because of Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter.

The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from E and R by right of representation. The CA found De and E disqualified from
inheriting from E and R.

ISSUE: Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation

RULING: As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of T and thus granddaughter of E and R. She has right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.

As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that
the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relative of either party.

Manuel v. Ferrer
G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995

FACTS: The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling. During his marriage
with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from which Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel,
the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a
parcel of land was registered in his name. He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were
not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own “daughter”.
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also
passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the
three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over
the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con
Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial
Court, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had the legal personality to contest the actions of Modesta.

RULING: No. Petitioners, not being the real “parties-in-interest” in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to
initiate the complaint.

Although inn her answer to the complaint, Modesta admitted that she was not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel because she was
adopted without the benefit of formal or judicial adoption and therefore was neither a compulsory nor a legal heir, the court still
reiterated the following rules:
a. where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former’s inheritance
b. the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child
c. a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent
d. the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father
e. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father

Pascual vs. Pascual- Bautista

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse
of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term
“illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”) .

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Can Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased?

Yes, Because the art. 992 of the Civil Code explicitly states that:

“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

In applying the above doctrine to the case at bar respondents did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, since under Art 176 of the
Family Code all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, whether spurious or not.

HELD: PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DATED
APRIL 29,1988 IS AFFIRMED

Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, 16 June 2010

FACTS Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of
the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in
their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of
administration.

ISSUE Whether or not the illegitimate child may inherit from the grandparent, who treated the former like his own son,
notwithstanding Article 992 of the Civil Code.

RULING YES. The factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico,
who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the
Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Santillon vs. Miranda

Facts:
Pedro Santillon died intestate and the principal parties of his estate are his only son Claro Santillon and his wife Perfecta Miranda.
Four years after his dead Claro petitioned for letters of administration but was opposed by the widow Perfecta on the grounds that
the properties were conjugal, that she conveyed ¾ of her undivided share to spouses Benito and Rosario, that the administration of
the estate was not necessary due to a pending case for partition of the property and she be the one better qualifiedas administrator.
Claro motioned to declare the share of heirs where he invokes that Art. 892 of the New Civil Code where after deducting ½ from the
conjugal property for Perfecta’s share, theremaining ½ must be ¼ for her (widow) and ¾ for him (only child). Perfecta, on the other
hand, claimed that under Art. 996 she is entitled to ½ of the estate after her conjugal property.
Issue:Whether or not a surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child is entitled to ½ of the intestate estate?

Held: Yes. Art 892 falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession while Art 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate
Succession. It is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art 892 because it merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art 888 the
legitime of children in testate succession, it does not fix the amount of the shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when
intestacy occurs

Bicomong v. Almanza
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas and were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic,
and Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of
this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic and Silvestra Glorioso died. Ignacio
Bagsic died leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio
Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died and was survived by her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio
Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the
other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was
filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese and her father
Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5)
parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on
December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c)
Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants
Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

ISSUE: WON the nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right.

RULING:Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil
Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic
died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned
nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right.

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or
paternal line and without preference as towhether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is
provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece
of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood.

Bacayo vs Borromeo
Facts: Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives,
namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,
Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia’s only brother of full blood,
Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).

Issue: Whether or not nephews and nieces exclude aunts and uncles?

Held: Yes. Art 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. The Supreme Court ruled that under our laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed.