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INFORMAZIONI
TECNICO OPERATIVE
& INFORMAZIONI
PROFESSIONALI
Page 1 MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL INFORMATION SEP 2016

I.T.O. N°. 1
nuova serie
USE OF RUDDER
ON TRANSPORT--CATEGORY
AEROPLANES
INFORMAZIONI TECNICO OPERATIVE
AUGUST 2002
This publication is intended exclusively for use by Alitalia Group Flight Crew
Members and provides explanations, examples and supplementary
guidance on Company policies and procedures.
Its contents are complementary to and do not supersede nor modify current
Operations Manual (i.e. General Basic, AOM, Route Manual and Training
Manual) policies and procedures.
USE OF RUDDER ON TRANSPORT CATEGORY AEROPLANES 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 3
The NTSB Recommendation Letter (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 5
The Boeing Technical Bulletin (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 9
The Airbus Industrie FCOM Bulletin (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 17
Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

2 USE OF RUDDER ON TRANSPORT CATEGORY AEROPLANES
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Introduction
On Nov. 12, 2001 American Airlines Flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300--600 was
destroyed when it crashed shortly after take--off in day--light hours from John F.
Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Before impact, the vertical
stabilizer and rudder separated from the fuselage. The 2 pilots, 7 flight attendants, 251
passengers, and 5 persons on the ground were killed. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed.
As part of the accident investigation, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), in cooperation with the French Bureau Enquetes Accidents (BEA), issued on
Feb. 8, 2002 two Safety Recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).
In response to these safety recommendations, Boeing and Airbus Industrie issued
operational information for the proper use of rudder on transport--category
aeroplanes.
This I.T.O. contains excerpts from :
-- the NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter, dated Feb 8, 2002;
-- the Boeing Flight Operations Technical Bulletin “Use of rudder on
transport--category airplanes”, dated May 13, 2002;
-- the Airbus Industrie A318/A319/A320/A321 FCOM Bulletin n. 55/1 “Use of rudder
on transport category airplanes”, dated Jun 02.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

The NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter (excerpts)
This safety recommendation letter addresses an industry--wide safety issue involving

omissions in pilot training on transport--category airplanes. Specifically, the National
Transportation Safety Board has learned that many pilot training programs do not
include information about the structural certification requirements for the rudder and
vertical stabilizer on transport--category airplanes. Further, the Safety Board has
learned that sequential full opposite rudder inputs (sometimes colloquially referred to
as “rudder reversal”) even at speed below the design maneuvering speed 1 may result
in structural loads that exceed those addressed by the requirements. In fact, pilots
may have the impression that the rudder limiter systems installed on most
transport--category airplanes, which limit rudder travel as airspeed increases to
prevent a single full rudder input from overloading the structure, also prevent
sequential full opposite rudder deflections from damaging the structure. However, the
structural certification requirements for transport--category airplanes do not take such
maneuvers into account; therefore, such sequential opposite rudder inputs, even
when a rudder limiter is in effect, can produce loads higher than those required
for certification and that may exceed the structural capabilities of the aicraft.
The investigation is still examining many issues, including the adequacy of the
certification standards for transport--category airplanes, the structural requirements
and integrity of the vertical stabilizer and rudder, the operational status of the rudder
system at the time of the accident, the adequacy of pilot training, and the role of pilot
actions in the accident. It must be emphasized that, at this time the Board has not yet
determined the probable cause of the accident.
Further, the Board is not aware of any prior events in which rudder movements have
resulted in separation of a vertical stabilizer or rudder. Nonetheless, the investigation
has revealed this safety issue, which should be immediately addressed.
Before the separation of the vertical stabilizer and rudder, Flight 587 twice
experienced turbulence consistent with encountering wake vortices from a B747 that
departed JFK ahead of the accident aicraft. The two airplanes were separated by
about 5 statute miles and 90 seconds at the time of the vortex encounters.
During and shortly after the second encounter, the flight data recorder (FDR) on the
accident aircraft recorded several large rudder movements (and corresponding pedal
movements) to full or nearly full available rudder deflection in one direction followed by
full or nearly full available rudder deflection in the opposite direction 2.
1 The design maneuvering airspeed is the maximum speed at which the structural design limit load can
be imposed (either by gusts or full deflection of the control surfaces) without causing structural
damage.
2 Preliminary information based on FDR data and an analysis of the manner in which rudder position
data is filtered by the airplane systems indicates that within about 7 seconds, the rudder traveled 11°
right for 0.5 second, 10.5° left for 0.3 second, between 11° and 10.5° right for about 2 seconds, 10° left
for about 1 second and, finally, 9.5° right before the data became unreliable.

The subsequent loss of reliable rudder position data is consistent with the vertical
stabilizer separating from the airplane. The cause of the rudder movement is still
under investigation.
Among the potential causes being examined are rudder system malfunction, as well
as flight crew action.
Preliminary calculations by Safety Board and Airbus engineers show that large
sideloads were likely present on the vertical stabilizer and rudder at the time they
separated from the airplane. Calculations and simulations show that, at the time of the
separation, the airplane was in an 8° to 10° airplane nose--left sideslip while the rudder
was deflected 9.5° to the right. Airbus engineers have determined that this
combination of local nose--left sideslip on the vertical stabilizer and right rudder
deflection produced air loads on the vertical stabilizer that could exceed the airplane’s
design loads. The Board notes that, at the time the vertical stabilizer and rudder
separated from the airplane, the airplane was flying at 255 knots indicated airspeed
(KIAS), which is significantly below the airplane’s design maneuvering speed of 273
KIAS.
Transport--category airplanes certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
must meet the airworthiness standards in FAR Part 25, Section 25.351, titled “ Yaw
maneuver conditions”, which requires that the airplane be designed for loads resulting
from the following series of maneuvers in unaccelerated flight, beginning at zero yaw:
(1) full rudder input resulting in full rudder deflection (or as limited by the rudder limiter
system);
(2) holding this full deflection input throughout the resulting over--swing 3 and
steady--state sideslip angles; and
(3) while the airplane is at the steady--state sideslip angle, a release of this rudder
input and the return of the rudder to neutral.
The A300 was certified as having met this regulatory standard.
In other words, the airplane must be designed to withstand the results of a full rudder
input in one direction followed by (after the airplane reaches equilibrium) a release of
that rudder input.
It is noteworthy that these certification requirements do not consider a return of
the rudder to neutral from the over--swing sideslip angle, nor do they consider a full
rudder movement in one direction followed by a movement in the opposite
direction.
3 Over--swing refers to the maximum sideslip angle resulting from the airplane momentum as it yaws in
response to the rudder movement; the over--swing sideslip angle will always be greater than the
subsequent steady--state sideslip angle.

Although, as previously mentioned, most transport--category airplanes are equipped

with a rudder limiter system that limits rudder deflection at higher airspeeds, which
prevents single rudder inputs from causing structural overload, the Safety Board is
concerned that pilots have not been made aware that a full or nearly full rudder
deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the other
direction, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed, can dramatically
increase the risk of structural failure of the vertical stabilizer or the rudder.
The Safety Board is also concerned that pilots may not be aware that, on some
airplane types, full available rudder deflections can be achieved with small pedal
movements and comparatively light pedal forces. In these airplanes, at low speeds
(for example, on the runway during the early take--off run or during flight control
checks on the ground or simulator training) the rudder pedal forces required to obtain
full available rudder may be two times greater and the rudder pedal movements
required may be three times greater than those required to obtain full available rudder
at higher airspeeds.
There are several types of rudder limiter systems that operate differently. For
example, on some airplanes, full pedal travel (and corresponding pedal force) is
required to obtain full available rudder, regardless of airspeed, even though the
maximum available rudder deflection is reduced with airspeed by mechanical means.
Lacking an awareness of these differences in necessary pedal forces and movement,
some pilots, when sensing the need for rudder input at high speeds, may use rudder
pedal movements and pressures similar to those used during operations at lower
airspeeds, potentially resulting in full available rudder deflection.
Finally, notwithstanding the concerns noted above about the potential danger of large
and/or sequential rudder inputs in flight, it should be emphasized that pilots should not
become reluctant to command full rudder when required and when appropriate, such
as during an engine failure shortly after take--off or during strong or gusty crosswind
take--offs and landings. The instructions of proper rudder use in such conditions
should remain intact but should also emphasize the differences between airplane
motion resulting from a single rudder input and that resulting from a series of full or
nearly full opposite rudder inputs.
As previously noted, the Safety Board examination of the adequacy of the certification
standards is ongoing and no conclusions have yet been reached in that regard.
However, on the basis of the investigative findings to date, .... (omissis) .... the
National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation
Administration:
-- Require the manufactures and operators of transport--category airplanes to
establish and implement pilot training program that:
(1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and the vertical
stabilizer on transport-- category airplanes;
(2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a
full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain

combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in

potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below
the design maneuvering speed; and
(3) explain that, on some airplanes, as speed increases, the maximum available
rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and
small pedal deflections.
The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that
reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this
training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training
regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after take--off or
during strong or gusty crosswind take--offs or landings. (Recommendation A--02--01)
-- Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots
of transport--category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address
unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure
that flight crew are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous
combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters.
(Recommendation A--02--02).

The Boeing Flight Operations Technical Bulletin (excerpts)

Rudder Maneuvering
Jet transport airplanes, especially those with wing mounted engines, have large and
powerful rudders. These powerful rudders are necessary to provide sufficient
directional control of asymmetric thrust after an engine failure on take--off and provide
suitable crosswind capacity for both take--off and landing. As the airplane flies faster,
less rudder is needed for directional control and the available rudder deflection is
therefore reduced. This reduction in rudder deflection is achieved through rudder
limiting.
Maneuvering an airplane using the rudder will result in a yaw and roll response. The
roll response is the result of sideslip. For example, if the pilot applies left rudder the
nose will yaw left (Fig.1). This yawing response to the left will generate a sideslip (right
wing forward). The resulting sideslip will cause the airplane to roll to the left (i.e. roll
due to sideslip). The actual force on the vertical tail fin due to the rudder deflection
tends to roll the airplane right, but as the sideslip moves the right wing forward, the net
airplane roll rate is to the left (Fig. 4)
Sideslip
Flight path
angle
Fig. 1 Rudder Induced Sideslip
It is difficult to perceive sideslip and few modern transport airplanes have true sideslip
indicators. In older instrument panels the “ball” was an indicator of side force or
acceleration, not sideslip angle. Some newer models have electronic flight displays
with a slip/skid indication, which is still an indication of side force or acceleration, not
sideslip. As the pilot applies more rudder, more sideslip is generated and a greater roll
response will result. Large, abrupt rudder input can generate very large sideslip
angles, much larger than encountered in a steady state sideslip (that which is reached
with a slow pedal input and held for a period of time).

This is due to the dynamic response characteristics of the airplane (Fig.2) This “over
yaw” can amplify the roll rate. It is important to use the rudder carefully so that
unintended large sideslip angle and resulting roll rate do not develop. The amount of
roll rate that is generated by using the rudder is typically proportional to the amount of
sideslip, NOT the amount of rudder deflection.
Sideslip
Angle
Time
Fig. 2 Sideslip Response to Abrupt Steady Rudder Input
Precise roll control using rudder is difficult and therefore not recommended. Because
sideslip must build up to generate the roll, there is a time lag between the pilot making
a rudder input and the pilot perceiving a roll rate. This lag has caused some pilots to be
surprised by the abrupt roll onset and in some cases to interpret the rapid onset of roll
as being caused by an outside element not related to their rudder pedal input. If the
pilot reacts to this abrupt roll onset with another large rudder input in the opposite
direction, large amplitude oscillations in roll and yaw can result. Cyclic rudder pedal
input can result in very large amplitude sideslip oscillations. (Fig. 3)
Sideslip
Angle
Time
Fig. 3 Sideslip Response to Abrupt Cyclic Rudderl Input

The sideslip angle that is momentarily reached with such “sequential over yaw” can be
much larger than the over yaw associated with a single, abrupt rudder input (Fig. 2 and

3). When the rudder is reversed at this sequential over yaw/sideslip angle, the rudder
induced fin force is added to the sideslip induced fin force (Fig. 4 and 5).
The resulting structural loads can exceed the limit loads and possibly the
ultimate loads, which can result in structural damage.
NOTE: Limit loads are the maximum loads to be expected in service. Ultimate loads
are the limit loads multiplied by prescribed factors of safety, normally 1.5.
Sideslip
Sideslip
Flight path
Flight path
angle
angle
Sideslip
Sideslip induced
induced fin force
fin force
Rudder
Rudder induced induced
fin force fin force
Fig. 4 Rudder Induced Sideslip Forces Fig. 5 Rapid Rudder Reversal Forces
The design maneuvering speed (Va)

A structural design maneuvering speed (Va) is defined for evaluating airplane
structural design. At or below this speed, Boeing airplanes are capable of sustaining a
single input to any set of control surfaces (elevators, ailerons, rudder(s)) to their
maximum available authority (as limited by control surface limiter, blowdown, or
control stops). These control surface input are to be in one axis (not in combination)
and do not include control input reversal or oscillatory inputs. In addition, on Boeing
airplanes at speeds above Va, full rudder input is evaluated out to the maximum
operating speed, Vmo/Mmo, and for some models, out to the design dive speed,
Vd/Md (where Vd/Md is typically 30--60 knots/.05--.07 Mach higher than Vmo/Mmo).
Therefore the pilot does not have to be concerned about how fast or how hard to push
the rudder pedal in one direction, from zero to full available pedal deflection
throughout the flight envelope (from a structural capability standpoint).
The maneuver speed is provided in most FAA/JAA approved Flight Manuals in the
Section 1 Limitations, under Maximum Airspeed Limits, and is usually shown for the
most critical gross weight. The more commonly known Turbulent Air Penetration
Speed gives a rough approximation to maneuver speed. Many airplanes have
structural capability beyond that required by the minimum structural design criteria of
the FARs or JARs.

Design maneuver speed (Va) should not be confused with the “minimum” or
“recommended” maneuver speed supplied for each flap setting to be used for daily
operation. These speeds are based on aerodynamic margins: margins to stick shaker,
flap placard, and acceleration and deceleration capability during flap changes.
Structural certification requirements
The FAA and JAA have three rudder maneuver structural load design requirements
that the rudder and vertical fin must meet in order to be certified.
These requirements are met for all airspeeds up to the design maneuvering speed
(Va). In addition, newer airplane designs meet these requirements up to the design
dive speed (Vd).
NOTE: The following conditions are engineering design conditions that may be
physically impossible to fly:
1. At a zero sideslip condition, the airplane must be able to withstand a rapid rud-
der input to full rudder deflection. A safety factor of 1.5 is then applied.
This means the structure must have at least a 50% safety margin over the
maximum load generated by this maneuver.
2. Starting from a zero sideslip condition, the airplane must be able to withstand
a rapid rudder input to full deflection that is held at full deflection until the
maximum sideslip angle (over yaw) is achieved. The airplane will exceed the
maximum steady state sideslip due to the dynamic response characteristics
of the airplane. A safety factor of 1.5 is then applied.
3. Starting from a maximum steady heading sideslip condition, the rudder is
rapidly returned to neutral while maintaining the sideslip angle. A safety factor
of 1.5 is then applied.
During airplane certification, Boeing does not test these exact conditions in flight, but
gathers flight test data to validate structural loads analysis. This analysis, combined
with ground structural load testing, ensures that the structure meets design
requirements.
The FAA/JAA impose structural load design requirements in addition to these rudder
maneuver requirements. These include requirements for loads due to gusts, engine
failure dynamics, and lateral control induced rolling conditions. Boeing airplanes
vertical fin can also sustain loads if the rudder is rapidly returned to neutral from the
over yaw sideslip or the rudder is fully reversed from a full steady sideslip.
Boeing airplanes are designed to withstand the structural loads generated by a full
rudder input out to the airplane maximum operating airspeed, Vmo/Mmo.
Some Boeing airplanes meet these requirements out to the design dive speed. This
means the structure has at least a 50% safety margin over the maximum load
generated by this kind of maneuver. As previously mentioned, Boeing airplane vertical
fins can also sustain loads if the rudder is rapidly returned to neutral from the over yaw
sideslip or the rudder is fully reversed from a fully steady state sideslip.
Boeing airplanes are not designed to a requirement of fully authority rudder reversals
from an “over yaw” condition. Sequential full or nearly full authority rudder reversals

may not be within the structural design limits of the airplane, even if the airspeed is
below the design maneuvering speed. There are no Boeing procedures that require
this type of pilot input. It should also be pointed out that excessive structural loads may
be generated in other areas of the airplane, such as engine struts, from this type of
control input. In addition, large sideslip angles may cause engine surging at high
power settings.
It is important to note that use of full rudder control for engine failures and
crosswind take--offs and landings is well within the structural capability of the
airplane.
Rudder limiters on Boeing airplanes

Implementation of the rudder limiting function and associated forces vary from model
to model. The force a pilot feels when pushing on the rudder pedals of a Boeing
airplane is analogous to that of a force generated by a spring. The more the pedal is
displaced the greater the required force. All modern transport airplanes limit rudder
deflection as airspeed increases. Engine--out take--off and crosswind landing
requirements define the maximum rudder deflection (authority). As the airplane flies
faster, less deflection is needed and rudder authority is therefore reduced.
Some Boeing models (747, 757, 767, 777) have rudder limiter that reduce the rudder
authority by changing the gearing between the rudder and the rudder pedals. As the
airplane speeds up, the pilot must continue to fully deflect the rudder pedal to
command full available rudder, even though the maximum available rudder deflection
has been reduced.
This means the pilot will have to apply the same force to the rudder pedal to achieve
maximum available rudder deflection throughout the flight envelope.
On other Boeing models (707, 717, 727, 737 and former Douglas/Mc Donnell Douglas
models DC--8, DC--9, MD--80, MD--90, DC--10, MD--11), as the airplane speeds up,
the rudder authority is limited, but the gearing between the rudder and the rudder
pedal does not change.
Since rudder authority is limited, rudder pedal travel is also limited; i.e. full rudder
pedal deflection is not required to get full available rudder deflection. Rudder pedal
force is a function of rudder pedal deflection, so less force will be required to achieve
maximum available rudder deflection as airspeed increases.
The following table contains approximate values for rudder pedal force, rudder pedal
travel and rudder pedal deflection for the models listed. Three flight conditions
(airspeeds) are presented: V1 (135), 250 knots, and Mmo at FL 390.
airplanes do vary on the amount of rudder pedal force and displacement required to
achieve maximum available rudder as airspeed changes. It is important that pilots
understand their airplane feel and response characteristics to flight control inputs.
By understanding and becoming familiar with the airplane characteristics, pilots will
learn to apply the appropriate control input in response to various flight situations.

V1 (135) 250 kt Mmo (at FL 390)
Pedal Pedal Rudder Pedal Pedal Rudder Pedal Pedal Rudder

Force Travel Deflection Force Travel Deflection Force Travel Deflection
(lb) (in) (deg) (lb) (in) (deg) (lb) (in) (deg)
B747 80 4 30 80 4 12 80 4 8
B757 80 4 26 80 4 6 80 4 5
B767 80 3.6 26 80 3.6 8 80 3.6 7
B777 60 2.9 27 60 2.9 9 60 2.9 6
MD 80 75 2.6 22 60 1.1 8 30 0.4 3
MD 11 80 3.8 23 65 2.2 15 60 1.7 11
Use of rudder in unusual or emergency conditions

There may be misconceptions among transport pilots about the use of flight controls,
how transport airplanes may be maneuvered, and what are their structural load
capabilities. These misconceptions may due to previous experience with military
aircraft, small airplanes, etc.
Such misconceptions could lead transport pilots to attempt maneuvers in unusual
situations that could make the situation worse and introduce excessive risk. The issue
is further compounded by the limitations in simulator fidelity that may cause pilots to
assume some maneuvers are feasible and repeatable.
Boeing recommends that:
S Transport pilots should be made aware that certain prior experience or training in
military, general aviation or other non--transport airplanes that emphasizes use of
rudder input as a mean to maneuver in roll typically does not apply to transport
airplanes or operations.
S Transport pilots should be aware that certain prior experience or training in
military, general aviation or other non--transport airplane type emphasizing the
acceptability of unrestricted dynamic control application typically does not apply
to transport airplane or operations. Excessive structural loads can be achieved if
the airplane is maneuvered significantly different than what is recommended by
the manufacturer or the operator’s training program.
The rudder in a large transport airplane is typically used for trim, engine failure, and
crosswind take--off and landing. Only under an extreme condition, such as loss of a
flap, mid air collision, or where an airplane has pitched to a very high pitch attitude and
a pushover or thrust change has already been unsuccessful, should careful rudder
input in the direction of the desired roll be considered to induce a rolling maneuver to
start the nose down or provide the desired bank angle.

A rudder input is never the preferred initial response for events such as a wake
vortex encounter, windshear encounter, or to reduce bank angle preceding an
imminent stall recovery.
Encountering wake turbulence, normal piloting actions for roll control are sufficient for
large commercial jet transports. If a roll off does occur, the normal use of ailerons and
spoilers should be sufficient to recover. The use of rudder is not recommended. The
induced roll from the vortex will be more severe for short span airplanes (relative to the
airplane which generated the vortex) but the recovery procedures are the same.
Crews should perform the upset recovery procedures if bank angles of greater than 45
degrees are encountered.
Summary
S Jet transport airplanes have large and powerful rudder.
S The use of full rudder for control of engine failures and crosswind take--offs and
landings is well within the structural capability of the airplanes.
S As airplanes fly faster, less rudder authority is required. Implementation of the
rudder limiting function varies from model to model.
S airplanes are designed and tested based on certain assumptions about how pilots
will use the rudder. These assumptions drive the FAA/JAA certification
requirements and any additional Boeing design requirement.
S The pilot should be aware that the airplane has been designed with the structural
capability to accomodate a rapid and immediate rudder pedal input when going in
one direction from zero input to full.
NOTE: During an engine failure situation, an initial input of rudder in the wrong
direction followed by a rapid full input in the opposite direction does not result in
excessive loads being produced.
S It is important to use the rudder in a manner that avoids unintended large sideslip
angles and resulting excessive roll rates. The amount of the roll rate that is
generated by using the rudder is proportional to the amount of sideslip, NOT the
amount of rudder input.
S If the pilot reacts to an abrupt roll onset with a large rudder input in the opposite
direction, the pilot can induce large amplitude oscillations. These large amplitude
oscillations can generate loads that exceed the limit loads and possibly the
ultimate loads, which could result in structural damage.
S A full or nearly full authority rudder reversal as the airplane reaches an “over yaw”
sideslip angle may be beyond the structural design limits of the airplane.
There are no Boeing procedures that would require this type of rudder input.

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The Airbus Industrie FCOM Bulletin (excerpts)

The purpose of this FCOM Bulletin (applicable to A318/319/320/321 models) is to
re--emphasize proper operational use of the rudder, highlighting certification
requirements and rudder control design characteristics.
YAW CONTROL
General
In flight, yaw control is provided by the rudder, and directional stability is provided by
the vertical stabilizer.
The rudder and the vertical stabilizer are sized to meet the two following objectives:
-- Provide sufficient lateral control of the aircraft during crosswind take--offs and
landings, within the published crosswind limits;
-- Provide positive airplane control under conditions of engine failure and maximum
asymmetric thrust, at any speed above Vmcg (minimum control speed on
ground).
The vertical stabilizer and the rudder must be capable of generating sufficient yawing
moments to maintain directional control of the aircraft.
The rudder deflection, necessary to achieve these yawing moments, and the resulting
sideslip angles can place significant aerodynamic loads on the rudder and on the
vertical stabilizer. Both vertical stabilizer and rudder are designed to sustain loads as
prescribed in the JAR/FAR 25 certification requirements which define several lateral
loading conditions (maneuver, gust loads and asymmetrical loads due to engine
failure) leading to a required level of structural strength.
Certification requirements
For certification in accordance with JAR / FAR 25.351, loads on the vertical stabilizer
and the rudder are defined, considering yawing maneuvers as shown below, for a
range of speeds from Vmc (minimum control speed) to Vd/Md, from sea level up to
maximum altitude, and over the full range of aircraft weights and center of gravity
limits:
1. With the aircraft in unaccelerated and stabilized straight flight, the rudder pedal is
suddenly displaced to the maximum available deflection at the current aircraft
speed.
2. With the rudder deflected as shown in Fig. 6, the aircraft yaws to the resulting
overswing sideslip angle, and then stabilizes at a somewhat smaller steady--state
sideslip angle (Fig. 7).

aircraft speed
(relative to the air)
V V
Loads* (rudder deflection)

Rudder travel limiter
*Resulting loads on the fin (rudder and vertical stabilizer)
Fig. 6 Rudder pedal displaced to the maximum available deflection
Sideslip
V
Loads*
(sideslip) Loads*
(rudder deflection)
*Resulting yawing loads on the fin (both rudder and vertical stabilizer loads are opposite)
Fig. 7 Steady--state sideslip
3. With the airplane yawed to the steady--state (static) sideslip angle corresponding
to the above rudder deflection, the certification regulations assume that the
rudder pedal is released to neutral (Fig. 8).
NOTE: Because the aircraft has natural yaw stability, returning the rudder to
neutral will also result in returning the sideslip angle to neutral.

Sideslip V Sideslip V
Loads* Loads*
(sideslip) Loads* (sideslip)
(rudder deflection)
*Resulting loads on the fin (both rudder and *Resulting loads on the fin
vertical stabilizer loads are opposite)
Fig. 8 Certification of yawing maneuver design
JAR/FAR 25 requires the above yawing maneuver to be analyzed over the full range of
specified conditions. The most severe loads imposed on the vertical stabilizer and
rudder are identified.
The same analysis is performed for lateral gusts, rolling maneuvers and asymmetrical
engine failure conditions. The most severe of all these cases and associated loads
provides the design basis for the vertical stabilizer and rudder.
The above loads define the limit loads according to JAR/FAR 25 requirements. These
loads correspond to the maximum loads that may be expected in service.
According to JAR/FAR 25 requirements, the ultimate loads are defined as the limit
loads multiplied by a prescribed safety factor of 1.5 unless otherwise specified.
The aircraft structure must be able to sustain limit loads without detrimental
permanent deformation and ultimate loads without failure for at least 3 seconds.
Higher loads could lead to structural failure.
CAUTION: Sudden commanded full, or nearly full, opposite rudder movement
against a sideslip can generate loads that exceed the limit loads and possibly
the ultimate loads and can result in structural failure.
This is true even at speeds below the maximum design maneuvering speed, Va.
Certification regulations do not consider the loads imposed on the structure
when there is a sudden full, or nearly full, rudder movement that is opposite to
the sideslip (Fig. 9).

Sideslip
V
Loads
Fig. 9 Sudden full or nearly full opposite rudder movement
RUDDER CONTROL
The rudder surface is controlled by three actuators, commanded by a cable run from
rudder pedals, to which the flight control input (yaw damping and turn coordination
functions coming from the ELACs -- elevator/aileron computers-- and the FACs --flight
augmentation computers) are added.
The rudder travel limiter, controlled by the FACs, is designed to progressively reduce
the available total rudder travel depending on aircraft speed.
This provides sufficient yaw control within the entire flight envelope, including engine
failure and maximum asymmetric thrust, limiting the lateral loads on the stabilizer and
rudder so that they remain within the certification limits.
Rudder travel is limited as a function of the aircraft speed as shown below:
A318 / A319 A320 / A321
Fig. 10 Rudder travel limits
-- At low speeds, the rudder deflection required to maneuver the aircraft in yaw is
large, and so are the resulting pedal displacement and forces;
-- At high speeds, the rudder authority is limited but the gearing between the pedal
and the rudder does not change. Therefore, less force will be required to achieve
maximum available rudder deflection.

As speed increases, the rudder deflection required by any yaw maneuver (e.g. engine
failure and maximum asymmetric thrust) decreases and consequently so do rudder
pedal displacement and associated forces.
Rudder pedal displacement is almost linearly proportional to rudder deflection.
Rudder pedal force

(daN)*
MAXIMUM RUDDER DEFLECTION
Rudder deflection (degrees)

* 1daN = 2.248 lb (approx. 1kg/f, editorial note)
Fig. 11 Pedal force vs rudder deflection
Thus, to explain the two preceding graphs: the rudder pedal displacement and the
resulting pedal forces required to achieve a given rudder deflection are independent
from aircraft speed.
-- To start moving the rudder pedal from the neutral position, a minimum force of ±9
daN ( approximately ± 9 kg/f, editorial note) must be applied (”breakout force”).
-- At low speeds, i.e. up to approximately 150 kt, maximum available rudder
deflection (25° for A320/A321 and 30° for the A318/A319) is obtained by moving
the rudder pedals to their maximum travel which represents a 30 daN
(approximately 30 kg/f, editorial note) force applied on the pedals.
-- At higher speeds, for example at 350 kt, the maximum available rudder deflection
is reduced to approximately 4 degrees. It is consequently obtained with less
rudder pedal displacement which represents approximately a 13 daN force
applied on the pedals (approximately 40% of the maximum force to reach full
pedal travel).

OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to avoid exceeding structural loads on the rudder and vertical stabilizer, the
following recommendations must be observed.
1. The rudder is designed to control the aircraft in the following
circumstances:
1.1 In normal operations, for lateral control:
-- during the take--off roll, when on ground, especially in crosswind conditions;
-- during landing flare with crosswind, for decrab purposes;
-- during the landing roll, when on ground.
In these circumstances, large and even rapid rudder inputs may be necessary to
maintain control of the aircraft.
Rudder correction should always be applied as necessary to obtain the appropriate
response.
On Airbus airplanes, the rudder control system includes a turn coordination function to
achieve acceptable turn coordination.
1.2 To counteract thrust asymmetry
Full rudder authority can be used to compensate for the yawing moment of
asymmetric thrust.
NOTE: At high speed (i.e. slats retracted), thrust asymmetry (e.g. due to an engine
failure) has relatively small effect on yaw control.
The amount of rudder required to counter an engine failure and center the sideslip is
small.
1.3 In some other abnormal situations
The rudder may also be used in such abnormal situations as:
-- loss of both yaw damper systems. The rudder may be used as deemed neces-
sary, for turn coordination to prevent excessive sideslip;
-- rudder trim runaway. The rudder may be used to return the rudder to neutral;
-- landing with abnormal landing gear position. The rudder can be used for
directional control on ground.
In all of the above mentioned normal or abnormal circumstances, proper rudder
maneuvers will not affect the aircraft structural integrity.
NOTE: In the event of the rudder travel system failure, refer to the relevant RUDDER
TRAVEL LIMIT FAULT procedure
2. The rudder should not be used:

-- to induce roll, or
-- to counter roll, induced by any type of turbulence.

Whatever the airborne flight condition may be, aggressive, full or nearly full,
opposite rudder pedal inputs must not be applied. Such inputs can lead to
loads higher than the limit, and can result in structural damage or failure.
The rudder travel limiter system is not designed to prevent structural damage
or failure in the event of such rudder system inputs.
NOTE: Rudder pedal reversals must never be incorporated into airline policies.
As far as dutch roll is concerned, yaw damper action and natural aircraft damping are
sufficient to adequately dampen dutch roll oscillations. The rudder should not be used
to complement the yaw damper.
NOTE: Even if both yaw damper system are lost, the rudder should not be used to
dampen the dutch roll. Refer to the YAW DAMPER FAULT procedure.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

I.T.O. N°°. 2
nuova serie
FLIGHT AND VOLCANIC ASH
APRIL 2003
FLIGHT AND VOLCANIC ASH 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 3
1. VOLCANOES AND VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS 5

1.1 VOLCANIC ERUPTION 5
1.2 MECHANISM OF VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS 5
1.3 VOLCANIC ERUPTION CLASSIFICATION 6
1.4 TYPES OV VOLCANIC ERUPTION 6
1.5 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE VOLCANOES 7
2. THE ANATOMY OF A VOLCANIC ASH CLOUD 8

2.1 VOLCANIC ASH COLUMN CHARACTERISTICS 8
2.2 MOVEMENT OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS 9
2.3 COMPOSITION OF VOLCANIC ASH 12
2.4 AEROSOLS HAZARDS 13
2.5 ELECTRIC PHENOMENA IN VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS 13
3. OBSERVATION OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS 14

3.1 GROUND-- BASED OBSERVATION 14
3.2 AIRBORNE OBSERVATION 15
3.3 SPACE-- BASED OBSERVATION 15
3.4 FUTURE SENSOR AND SYSTEMS 16
3.5 FORECASTING THE MOVEMENT OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS 17
4. EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON AEROPLANES 18

4.1 GENERAL 18
4.2 EFFECT ON JET ENGINES 19
4.3 EFFECTS ON AIRFRAME AND EQUIPMENT 21
5. EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON AERODROME GROUND SERVICES 24
6. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 26
6.1 BEFORE FLIGHT 26
6.2 DURING FLIGHT 29
7. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH 30

7.1 EN-- ROUTE DEVIATIONS 30
7.2 INADVERTENT ASH CLOUD PENETRATION 30
7.3 OPERATIONS AT A CONTAMINATED AERODROME 33
Informazione Tecnico Operativa N° 2 APR 03

2 FLIGHT AND VOLCANIC ASH
8. SELECTED GLOSSARY OF VOLCANOLOGY & ACRONYMS 34

8.1 GLOSSARY 34
8.2 ACRONYMS 36
BIBLIOGRAPHY 37
APR 03 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N° 2

INTRODUCTION
Volcanic ashhas beenrecognized worldwideas amajor hazardfor aviationparticular-

ly for jet aeroplanes in flight. During the last two decades many instances occurredof
aeroplane encounters with ashclouds; theseriousness of some of them ledscientific
specialists, aviationindustry andallconcernedinternationalorganizations tocombine
efforts in order to reduce the risk of incidents/accidents and costly aeroplane dam-
ages.
The activities were directedto defineand implement mitigation strategies to avoidfly-
ing into volcanic ash andto establishoperating procedures and recommendations for
ground and flight operations.
Results of these efforts are testified by publication (on 2001) of the ICAO Doc 9691 -
AN/954(Manualonvolcanic ash, radioactive materialand toxic chemical clouds), es-
tablishment of theInternationalAirways Volcano Watch(IAVW) withnine regionalVol-
canic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC), and issuanceof operationaland trainingmateri-
al.
Alertness on this threat is stillvery highand actions to augment volcanic ashmonitor-
ing, to develop new volcanic ash sensors (i.e. infrared radiometers) are still in prog-
ress.
This I.T.O. is produced tocollect andpresent ina monographicalformat theoperation-
al information published in the past and what’s new on the subject.
The I.T.O. outline is comprised of the following main parts:
- volcanoes and volcanic eruptions, which describes the physics of the
eruptions and their classification;
- the anatomy of avolcanic ashcloud, whichdescribes thecharacteristics
of a volcanic ash column/cloud, movement and composition;
- observation of volcanic ash clouds, which describes methods for their
detection/observation, on ground, airborne and from the space;
- dissemination of information on volcanic ash clouds, whichdescribes
how information is diffused;
- effects of a volcanic ash on aeroplane, which describes how ash can
damage jet aeroplane engines and airframe;
- effects of volcanic ash on ground which describes problems caused by
ash fall-- out on aerodrome surfaces;
- general recommendations, which recall andcomplement theprocedures
given in the Aeroplane Operations Manuals (AOMs);
- selected glossary of volcanology, which better describes some
unfamiliar scientific terms used in this document.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

1 VOLCANOES AND VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS

1.1 VOLCANIC ERUPTION
A volcanic eruption involves the sudden release of forces which have been gradually
accumulating within a geological system as a result of slow drifting by the plates on
whichthecontinents rest. Themain elements of avolcanic systemare summarizedin
Figure 1.
Volcanic Ash Cloud Eruption Column
Ash fall-- out

and acid rain LavaBomb Pyroclastic flow
Lava Dome
Pyroclastic flow
Mudflowor“Lahar” Landslide
Lava
flow
Duct
Magmatic room
Magma
Fig. 1 A volcanic system
Every year, from 30 to 60 significant volcanic eruptions can be expected in the world
and about half of these will involve previously inactive volcanoes.
An explosive eruption consists of the explosive release of gas, pulverized rock, dust
and lapilli which are projected vertically (sometimes in an oblique direction also).
1.2 MECHANISM OF VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS

The lava originates as molten rock or “magma” deep in the earth’s mantle and is com-
prised of many chemical elements but primarily oxygen and silicon with smaller
amounts of aluminium, iron, calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium and titanium.
The magma also contains volatile constituents which are in solution under the condi-
tions of immense pressure deep in the earth. As the magma forces its way upwards

towards the surface through fissures, cracks and vents, a point is reached where the
vapour pressure of the dissolved volatileconstituents inthe magmaexceeds theam-
bient pressure and the volatile constituents boil off as gases. This phase change es-
sentially provides the energy for a volcanic eruption and the amount of dissolved
gases and viscosity of the ascending magma largely determine how explosive the
eruption will be.
Massive quantities of dissolved gases are released over a very short period of time
withtheresult that therock is pulverizedby shock waves andblasted vertically upward
as a vast column of ash-- laden gases, which in major eruptions may reach the strato-
sphere within tens of minutes. If conditions are such that the magma encounters
ground water when the dissolved gases are released, the combined explosive effect
of superheated gases and steam can cause especially impressive eruptions.
The quantity of glass particles, fragments and pulverizedrock (ash)which is expelled
duringanexplosivevolcanic eruptioncanexceedtens of cubic kilometres and inmany
cases thetopof thevolcano mountain, or agood part thereof, may be completely elim-
inated explosively or by landslides (e.g. Mt. St. Helens).
1.3 VOLCANIC ERUPTION CLASSIFICATION

Volcanic eruptions can be classified in a number of different ways, but the most rele-
vant for aviation purposes is a classification in terms of “explosivity”.
Explosivity provides some ideas of the magnitude of the eruptionand moreimportant
whether, and how much, volcanic ash is ejected into the atmosphere and the likely
height of thecolumn. Vulcanologists havedevelopeda“VolcanicExplosivityIndex”
(VEI) which ranges from 0 to 8 based on arough estimateof volumeof “ejecta”, height
of the volcanic ash column and duration of continuous eruption blast.
Toprovidesomeperspective, theMt. Galunggung eruptionin 1982which first focused
the attention of the aviation community on the volcanic ash problem was VEI = 4; the
Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980 was classified VEI = 5. The eruption of Krakatau in
Java in 1883 and Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 were both VEI = 6.
1.4 TYPES OF VOLCANIC ERUPTION

Certain“types” of eruption canbe distinguished; most of these havebeen namedafter
typical volcanoes i.e. “Hawaiian”, “Strombolian”, “Vulcanian” (some sources usePe-
leean) and “Plinian”or (”Vesuvian”), the latterbeing namedafter thePlyny theyounger
whowroteperhaps the first detailed account of anexplosive-- type eruption(Vesuvius)
in AD 79 (See ch. 8 “glossary”).
Aviation is especially interested in Plinian-- type eruptions because they eject vast
quantities of ash up to, and above, the cruising levels of international jet transport
aeroplanes.

If the volcanois situatednear approach/departurepaths, evenweaker columns could

affect aeroplane descending to or climbing from aerodromes; also groundoperations
couldbeaffectedby thevolcanic ashonground(FOD, visibility, brakingaction, etc.). A
good exampleof thelatter is Catania/Fontanarossa andSigonella aerodromes situat-
ed near Etna volcano (Italy).
1.5 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE VOLCANOES

Two thirds of volcanoes are located in the northern emisphere (85% are north of lati-
tude 10°S). There is a high concentration of volcanoes notorious for Plinianeruptions
between 20° N and 10°S, which means that vast quantities of gases and volcanic ash
are ejected from time to time into the stratosphere near the equator with important
consequences for the global climate and international air routes.

2 THE ANATOMY OF A VOLCANIC ASH CLOUD

2.1 VOLCANIC ASH COLUMN CHARACTERISTICS
A volcanic eruption column is usually divided into three dynamic regimes: “gas
thrust”, “convective thrust” and “umbrella region” (or “mushroom”) as shown in
Figure 2.
to
Umbrella
downwind
region
plume
ERUPTION
COLUMN Convective
thrust
Gas thrust
Fig. 2 Eruption column regions
The “gas thrust” region is produced by the sudden decompression of superheated

volatile constituents dissolved in the ascending magma. This produces a jet of fluid
and pulverized rock material of extremely high kinetic energy at the mouth of the vol-
cano vent. Exit vent speeds may reach supersonic speed depending on the ambient
conditions at the time. The extremely high kinetic energy at the exit vent means that
such explosive eruption columns can reach jet aeroplanes cruise levels of 30000 to
45000 ft (10 to 14 km) in five to six minutes.
The “convective thrust” region formation depends onthe quantity of surroundingair
entrained in the “gas thrust” region. If insufficient air is entrained in the “gas thrust”
region, the column remains denser than surrounding atmosphere and, as the initial
kinetic energy dissipates, the column collapses due to gravitation without forming a
“convective thrust” region.
The “convective thrust” region largely controls the ultimate height of the column and
hence is critical to the eruption’s potential concern to aviation.
The“umbrellaregion” is thetopof themushroom-- likeashcloudas its ascent begins
to slow in response to gravity and temperature inversions at the tropopause; the top
spreads at first radially and then predominantly in one or more particular directions in
response to the upper winds at different levels of the atmosphere. This is the regionof

most concern to aviation because vast volumes of airspace at normal jet aeroplane
cruising levels become contaminated with high concentrations of volcanic ash.
A volcanic cloudfollows apatternof verticaldevelopment, with thesummit oftenrising
to altitudes of 60000 ft (20000 m). The figure 3 shows a typical ash cloud formation.
The cloud breaks up rapidly as a result of horizontal pulling and stretching, and since
wind velocity increases with altitude in the troposphere, it spreads out into a fine hori-
zontal layer.
Fig. 3 Typical volcanic ash plume vertical and horizontal extension and evolution times
2.2 MOVEMENT OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS

The umbrella region of a volcanic ash column represents the beginning of the forma-
tion of a volcanic ash cloud. The extent of the cloud and its subsequent movement
away from the volcano site depend on a combination of its natural dispersion in the
atmosphere and its transport as an entity due to the upper tropospheric and strato-
spheric winds. Depending on the upper wind profile, the ash cloud may shear and
moveinmarkedly different directions at different levels of theatmosphere(See Fig. 4).
The action of very strong winds in the higher levels of the troposphereand jet streams
increases the probability of jet aeroplanes encountering volcanic ash cloud of signifi-
cant concentration hundreds of kilometres away from the volcano source.
Twent-- four hours after an eruption, an aeroplane might encounter volcanic ash
clouds at a distance of 2000 km from the volcano.

Fig. 4 May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens: trajectories of ash plume at
the 100, 70, and 50 mb levels (date and time are in UTC)

Figure 5 shows the track followed by a KLM B 747-- 400 during its encounter with the
Redoubt volcanic ash. The incident started during descent at 25000 ft and caused all
engine flame-- out. Restart of engines n.1 and 2 took place at 13000 ft after eight at-
tempts and after other attempts engines n. 3 and 4 were also restarted.
The whole phase of approach was affected by difficulties in speed indications due to
ash penetrated into pitot probes and reduction in forward visibility due to abrasion of
windshields andwindows. This incident causeddamages for80 millions of dollars and
the substitution of the four engines.
Aeroplane track
Ash cloud
limits
Anchorage
Volcano Redoubt 100 km
Fig. 5 KLM B 747 400 ash cloud encounter (14.12. 1989)

2.3 COMPOSITION OF VOLCANIC ASH

Volcanic ash clouds result fromthe pulverizationof rocks or therelease of gas intothe
magma, causingaproliferationof bubbles (pumicestone). This molten rockfoamlater
divides into small fragments containing from 40 to 60 per cent silica, calcium, potas-
sium and sodium, all of which contribute to the abrasive quality of the fine dust. The
silica is in the form of glassy silicates and underthe scanningelectron microscopere-
sembles sharp-- edged glass fragments. The glassy silicate material is very hard,
typically of hardness level 5 or 6 on the Mohs scale (similar to typical pen-- knife
blade) (See Fig. 6).
NOTE: The Mohs scale ranges from level 1 (talcum) to level 10 (diamond).
Fig. 6 The volcanic ash as seen at the microscope
Volcanic gases are released at magmatic temperatures of 1000 to 2000° C and are
made up of 60 to 99 per cent water vapour along with sulfur, chlorine, fluorine, carbon
nitrogen and about 100 other elements in smaller concentrations (bromine, sodium,
potassium, cesium, rubidium, lead, copper, zinc, chrome, bismuth, polonium, etc.).
This unique blend of halogens, metals, alkaline and radioactive elements gives the
cloud its special character as a sort of living chemical laboratory whose behaviour is
not completely understood as yet.
When the mixture of gas and ash enters the atmosphere, its compositionis alteredby
the sudden drop in temperature from 1200° C down to 20° C in the space of a few
hundred meters, and by contact with oxygen in the air.
The water condenses into droplets of corrosiveacid andthe minorelements alsocon-
dense to form a solid deposit which attaches itself to the ash particles.

Generally speaking, each cloud is unique in the composition and distribution of the
pyroclastic materials it contains, but as arule theirbehaviour is relatively similar. They
differ in size and height (features of particular concern for aviation) and in the con-
centration of tephra (particulate matter), including fresh magma and stone. Glass
fragments, crystals, pumice stone, scoria, andaggregates of these alsomake upthe
cloud, the over-- all compositionof whichdepends onthe typeof magmapresent inthe
particular volcano, and on its melting temperature.
Magma type also determines the violence of the eruptions whichincreases inpropor-
tion to silica concentration.
2.4 AEROSOLS HAZARDS

In a volcanic cloud a lot of aerosol products are present. About them one of the most
dangerous for theair navigationis thesulphuric acidbecause of its corrosiveproper-
ties.
In the stratosphere, a chemical reaction with the hydroxyl radicals (created by photo-
dissociation of water vapour) produces droplets of corrosive sulphuric acid (H2 SO4 ).
The complete transformation of sulphur gas into aerosol may take weeks or months;
new sulphuric acid droplets form while the first ones grow bigger and disappear from
the stratosphere and the cloud remains in a self-- regenerative phase for some time.
2.5 ELECTRIC PHENOMENA IN VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS

Volcanic ash columns are highly charged electrically, and the occurrence of lightning
inside them has been reported since antiquity. Moreover, one of the prime means of
recognizing that an aeroplane has encountered volcanic ash is the static electricity
discharge exhibited as St. Elmo’s fire at points onthe airframeand theglow insidethe
jet engines.
Thestatic electric charge onthe aeroplanealso creates a “shielding”effect whichmay
cause a temporary deterioration, or even complete loss, of VHF or HF communica-
tions with ground stations. There is some uncertainty regarding how such a high de-
gree of electric charge is generated.

3 OBSERVATION OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS

ICAO initiated a volcanic ash effort in 1982 after multiple ash encounters by B747
aeroplanes near Jakarta, Indonesia. The resulting organization, the Volcanic Ash
Warnings Studies Group (VAWSG), has worked since then to standardize the infor-
mationprovidedto flight crews about volcanic eruptions. In addition, ICAO formedthe
International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) in 1987.
This effort formalized international arrangements for monitoring and providing warn-
ings about volcanic ash in the atmosphere.
The IAVW is based on the cooperation of aviation and non-- aviation operational units
using information derived from observing sources and networks that are provided by
States. The watch is coordinated by ICAO with the cooperation of other concerned
international organizations.
From1995nineregionalVolcanic AshAdvisory Centers have comeinto fulloperation;
they are located in: Anchorage (USA), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Darwin (Australia),
London (UK), Montreal (Canada), Tokio (Japan), Toulouse (France), Washington
(USA) and Wellington (New Zealand).
In order to provide advisory messages theobservation, monitoringand forecastingof
volcanic ash clouds movements are based mainly on:
- ground-- based observation;
- airborne observation;
- space-- based observation.
3.1 GROUND- BASED OBSERVATION

During a volcanic eruption, observation is straightforward and the ash column and
“mushroom” associated with the “umbrella region” (refer to 2.1) are easily identified.
Once the “umbrella region” has spread at high levels, some distance from volcano, it
becomes very difficult to discriminate the ash cloud from ordinary ice cristal clouds.
Ash tends to dilute the yellowish colour of the sun, so that it appears very pale with
brownish or greyish-- tinged edges. In some cases, especially following major erup-
tions, a type of corona is visible around the sun (known as “Bishop’s ring”). Such high
level veils of ash are easily visible from the ground for what they are and can cause
many subsequent months of spectacular and unusual sunsets.
Ground observationis alsopossible by radar systems although ground-- basedradars
are optimizedto detect precipitations (weatherradar) ormoving targets (ATC andmili-
tary). They normally operate in the X, C or S bands and occasionally in L band, with
wavelengths ranging from 3 cm for X band to 77 cm for L band.
The optimal wavelength to detect volcanic ash should be between 3 mm to 3 cm(e.g.
in K band), and this is why ash has often been detected by X band weather radars

especially when they are close to the eruption (within 100 Km) and when the ash col-
umn is very dense and still loaded with the larger size particles.
3.2 AIRBORNE OBSERVATION

Past experiences showed that many volcanic eruptions in remote areas have been
first reportedby pilots duetodirect visualobservationfromtheenhanced cockpit view-
point.
Airborne observation is, on many occasions, the first real report of a volcanic ash
cloud presence which should be notified in radiotelephony to ATC centres by the ob-
serving crew as soon as practicable as a special air report (PIREP in USA) the mes-
sage should include, in addition to the routine elements such as position, time, flight
level, etc., the position (or bearing and distance from the aeroplane) of the observed
volcanic activity and supplementary information as available (brief description of ac-
tivity including vertical and lateral extent of ash cloud, horizontal movement, rate of
growth, etc.).
3.3 SPACE - BASED OBSERVATION

The use of satellites is seen as the ultimatesolution tothe remotemonitoring of volca-
noes, but, in practice there are a numberof difficulties which limit the effectiveness of
satellite monitoring of volcanic eruptions and ash cloud:
- the satellite systems available arenot optimizedto detect volcanic ashand
- generally speaking, it is stilleasiertodetect andmonitoravolcanic ashcloud
if it is already known that a volcanic eruption has occurred. Detecting the
eruption itself from current satellite data is extremely difficult and will likely
remain so for some considerable time.
The polar-- orbiting satellites gives globalcoverage, albeit only twicedaily andprovide
thehighest resolution. They are usedfor weathersensing, environmental, navigation,
search and rescue and ground mapping purposes.
Geostationary satellites provide almost continuous coverage of that part of the earth
each one views, but the resolution becomes progressively worse towards the poles.
They are used primarily for telecommunications and weather sensing.

Fig.7 EruptionofvolcanoEtna (Italy - 2002): NOAApolar satellite photoshows

the displacement of the ash cloud.
3.4 FUTURE SENSORS AND SYSTEMS

In the area of ground-- based sensors and systems, Doppler weatherradar is extreme-
ly sensitive, has agood attenuationcharacteristics andpowerful processingcapabili-
ties.
Although such radars will not generally be located conveniently to monitor volcanic
eruptions incertainareas (e.g. Alaska andJapan) futureeruptions may be bettermon-
itored and information on column vertical velocity and ashparticles fallspeeds willal-
low to validate and or update the theoretical models currently in use.
Research is proceeding rapidly on Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR) sensors
whichcandetect andmeasuretheparticlesize/density spectrum of virtually any aero-
sol including volcanic ash clouds.
In the area of airborne sensors, research is oriented in the miniaturized LIDAR and
passive infrared sensors which could detect volcanic ash ahead of the aeroplane. In-
frared sensors type is the same for windshear and clear air turbulence detection.
In the area of satellite sensors, research is oriented in installation of new sensors (in-
frared and spectrometer type) for detection of volcanic ash and dangerous aerosols.

3.5 FORECASTING THE MOVEMENT OF VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS

Themovement, spreadanddispersionof volcanic ash clouds depends ona numberof
parameters, including strength of the eruption and hence the altitude reached by the
ash particles, particle concentration and size distribution, wind shear and stability of
the atmosphere, and the scavenging of ash particles by precipitation. While in ideal
conditions regularimages of avolcanic ashcloud areavailable fromsatellite, thereare
problems in coverage and discrimination of the ash column from water vapor ice
clouds. Computer models of varyingcomplexity havebeen developedto forecast the
evolution of volcanic ash clouds. The typical output of the model provides two-- or
three-- dimensional information of the volcanic ash cloud. Work is currently underway
tocombine thepredictive capability of theatmospheric transport and dispersionmod-
els withtheactualposition of volcanic ashclouds as identified by ground, airborneand
satellite observations data. This will not be an easy task, but if successful, it should
improve the three-- dimensional estimate of the actual volcanic ash cloud and fore-
casts of its future position.
One of the purpose of producing such volcanic ash trajectories is to provide informa-
tion to Meteorological Watch Offices (MWOs) for issuance of advisories.

4 EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON AEROPLANES

4.1 GENERAL
Volcanic ash is mostly glass fragments and pulverized rock, very abrasive andbeing
largely composed of siliceous materials (as describedin para2.3), witha meltingtem-
perature below the operating temperature of jet engines at cruise thrust. The ash is
accompanied by gaseous solutions of sulphur dioxide andchlorine (referto para2.4).
It is easy to imaginethe serious hazard that volcanic ashposes toan aeroplanewhich
encounters it in the atmosphere. Volcanic ash damages the jet turbine engines,
abrade cockpit windows, airframe and flight surfaces, clogs the pitot-- static system,
penetrates into air conditioning and equipment cooling systems and contaminates
electrical and avionics units, fuel and hydraulic systems and cargo-- hold smoke--
detection systems. Moreover, the first two or three days following an explosive erup-
tionareespecially criticalbecausehigh concentrations of ashcomprising particles up
toµ10 m diameter could be encountered at cruise levels some considerable dis-
tance from the volcano. Beyond three days, it is assumed that if the ashis stillvisible
by eye or from satellite, it still presents a hazard to aeroplanes. The most serious
threat to jet transport aeroplanes is the damaging effect volcanic ash has on the en-
gines and this will be addressed first.

4.2 EFFECT ON JET ENGINES

The effect of volcanic ash on jet engines is now known in some detail, both from the
results of strip-- down inspection of jet engines which have been exposed to volcanic
ash during flight and from groundtests of jet engines into whichvolcanic ashmixtures
have been introduced through the fan (See Fig.8).
Fig. 8 Engine damages due to volcanic ash
There are basically three effects which contribute to the overall engine damage. The
first, andmost critical, is thefact that volcanic ashhas amelting point below jet engine
operatingtemperatures withthrust setting aboveidle. Beingthe volcanic ash madeup
predominantly of silicates with a melting temperature of 1100° C, while at normal
thrust the operating temperature of jet engines is 1400° C, the ash melts in the hot
section of the engine and fuses on the high pressure nozzle guide vanes and turbine
blades as shown in Figure 9. This drastically reduces the high pressure turbine inlet
guide-- vane throat area causingthe static burner pressureand compressordischarge
pressure to increase rapidly which, in turn, causes engine surge.
This effect alone can cause immediate thrust loss and possible engine flame-- out.
Earlier generations of jet engines, which operated at lower temperatures, were prob-
ably less susceptible to this effect. As each successive family of jet engines is
introduced the general tendency, however, is to increase engine operating tempera-
ture, thereby increasing thrust with improved specific fuel consumption.

Fig.9 BAB747enginehigh-- pressurenozzleguidevaneassembly damagedafter volcanic

ash ingestion. (June 24, 1982 eruption of Mt. Galunggung - Indonesia).
The melting/fusing effect of volcanic ash in jet engines will therefore, continueto bea
hazard in the future.
During the strip-- down inspections, the fused volcanic ash deposits on the high pres-
sure nozzle guide vanes were found to be very brittle at room temperature and easily
broke up and fell off the nozzle guide vanes. It seems clear that this can also happen
when contaminated engines are shut down in flight and then restarted. The sudden
thermal and pressure shocks of the ram air during the restart process, coupled with
the cooling of the fused ash deposit when the engine is reduced to idle, seem tobreak
off much of the deposit. Moreover, subsequent operation of the engine after restart in
the clearer air outside the ash cloud, also seems to further dislodge and evacuate
some of the fused ash deposits.
Thesecondeffect is concernedwith abrasivepower of volcanic ash. The volcanic ash
erodes compressor rotor paths and rotor blade tips (mostly high pressure section)
causing loss of high pressure turbine efficiency and engine thrust. The erosion also
results inadecreaseintheenginestallmargin. The mainfactors affectingthe extent of
the erosion of the compressor blades are the hardness of the volcanic ash, particle
sizeandconcentration, theashparticleimpact velocity, thrust settingandcoreprotec-
tion. Although this abrasion effect takes longerthan themelting fusionof volcanic ash
to shut down an engine, the abrasion damage is permanent and irreversible.
Reduction of engine thrust to idle slows the rate of erosion of the compressor blades
but cannot eliminate it entirely while the engine is still ingesting air contaminated by
volcanic ash.
In addition to the melting/fusing of the volcanic ash and blade erosion problems re-
ferred to above, the ash can clog flow holes in the fuel and cooling systems (the third
dangerous effect), although this particular effect appears to be rather variable. In

ground tests of jet engines subjected to forced volcanic ash ingestion, a deposit of
black carbon-- like material was found on the fuel nozzles.
Analysis confirmed that the contaminating material was predominantly carbon, and
althoughthe mainfuel nozzleappeared toremain clear, the swirlvanes whichatomize
the fuel were clogged. Such condition would render engine restart very difficult if not
impossible, becausethereseems tobeno tendency for thematerial tobreak off during
restart attempts. Inspection of the engines involved intwo flame-- out incidents (BA B
747, 1982 andKLM B 747, 1989), however, didnot infact showsuch extremeclogging
of fuel nozzles and cooling system, possibly due to insufficient exposure time topro-
duce this effect.
4.3 EFFECTS ON AIRFRAME AND EQUIPMENT

In addition to engine abrasion, volcanic ash abrades cockpit windows, the leading
edges of the flight surfaces and can “sandblast”the paint from theairframe. Any parts
protruding from the fuselage such as antennas, probes and ice detectors may beren-
dered inoperable. From the safety standpoint, the abrasionof thecockpit windows re-
duces the pilot’s forward vision and can present a serious problem during landing, as
was the case with the BA B 747 which made an emergency landing at Jakarta in1982
following its encounter with volcanic ash.
Damage to the antennas can lead to a complete loss of HF communications and a
degradationof very VHFcommunication. Damagetothevarious sensors canserious-
ly degrade the information available to the pilot through the cockpit instruments, thus
rendering control of the aeroplane more difficult.
One of the most important probes protruding from thefuselage is the pitot-- static sys-
temwhich, inaddition toabrasion, suffers blockage by volcanic ash. This canrender
the airspeed instruments unreliable and may result in a complete loss of air-
speed information in the cockpit.
Blockage of fuel and cooling system holes is possible but has not been reported fol-
lowing actual volcanic ash encounters. Certainly, fuel, oil and cooling system can be
heavily contaminated by volcanic ash, necessitating a complete cleaning and fluid
and filters replacement. Following a volcanic ash encounter, virtually the whole fuse-
lagecanbecontaminated, necessitatingathoroughcleaningof thecockpitinstrument
panel, circuit breaker panels, passenger baggage compartments, etc.
The electrical and avionics units can be so heavily contaminated that complete re-
placement is necessary, mainly due to the strong possibility that all the units could
havesufferedfromoverheating. This couldassumeincreasingimportancein thecase
of fly-- by-- wire aeroplanes in respect of the filtering of the air used in the electronic
units coolingsystems. Theashalso contaminates the cargo-- firewarning systemand
can generate nuisance fire warnings which are due to the volcanic ash in the air and
not smoke from a fire (Fig. 10).

Fig. 10 Airframe and systems damages occurred to a B 747 due to volcanic ash
All available information on past aeroplane/volcanic ash encounters was analyzed

and grouped to create a worldwide database for further studies. An ash- encounter
severity index was also formulated to qualify the effects on aeroplane engines, air-
frame and systems as a result of the encounters.
For information purpose only, theseverity index classification (reportedin ICAODoc.
9691-- AN/954) is as follows:
Class Criteria
0 - acrid odour (i.e. sulphur gas) noted in cabin
- electrostatic discharge (St.Elmo’s fire) on windshield, nose, engine cowls
- no notable damage to exterior or interior
1 - light dust in cabin; no oxygen used

- EGT fluctuations with return to normal values
2 - heavy cabin dust; “dark as night” in cabin

- contamination of air handling and air conditioning systems requiring use of
oxygen
- some abrasion damage to exterior surface of aeroplane, engine inlet and
compressor fan blades
- frosting or breaking of windows due to impact of ash

- minor plugging of pitot-- static system insufficient to affect instrument

readings
- deposit of ash in engines
3 - vibration of engines owing to mismatch; surging

- plugging of pitot-- static system to give erroneous instrument readings
- contamination of engine oil and hydraulic system fluids
- damage to electrical system
- engine damage
4 - temporary engine failure requiring in-- flight restart
5 - engine failure or other damage leading to crash.

5 EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON AERODROME GROUND

SERVICES
Operations at aerodromes locatednear avolcano (e.g. Catania/Fontanarossa andSi-

gonella - Italy) could be affected by the fall-- out of volcanic ash causing problems to
electronic, electric and to mechanical aerodrome equipments; aeroplane on ground
(parked or during taxiing) may have serious damages by the ash if due careis not tak-
en. Problems caused by volcanic ash on the runway (especially if wet) include a re-
duced runway friction coefficient for aeroplane braking action.
Deterioration in local visibility may also be caused by the ash on ground disturbed by
engines exhaust from aeroplanes taxiing, landing or taking off.
Due to these problems theaerodrome may have tobe closedcompletely toaeroplane
operations.
In case of rain, volcanic ash can easily absorb considerable amounts of water reach-
ing densities in excess of 1400 kg/m3 or more: wet ash deposited on parked aero-
planes (especially rear-- engined aeroplanes) can markedly shift the centre of gravity
and can cause the aeroplane to tip over if not secured by a tail stick.
.
Fig. 11. Shift of C.G. on a parked DC-- 10 due to wet volcanic ash deposit
In case of a contaminated aerodrome, surface winds and aeroplane ground opera-

tions maintain ash in suspension in theair; sometimes the concentrationof ashcloud
can be heavy and several medical problems (mainly of a broncho-- pulmonary and
ophthalmic nature) can be reported by personnel breathing and working in these con-
ditions.

On notificationof aneruption whichcould causevolcanic ashto fallon theaerodrome,

protective measures shouldtherefore beinitiated immediately, such as, sealing/cov-
ering of probes and parts on aeroplanes and aeroplane engines.
As soon as volcanic ashes start falling on the aerodrome dispatching as many aero-
planes as possible, is recommended before the ash seriously affects aerodrome op-
erations; local authorities should consider that continued aeroplane operations may
risk damaging aeroplanes engines andcause suchreduced localvisibility by continu-
ally stirring up ash on the runways that further operations have to wait longer and lon-
ger before the ash settles.
Ground support equipment (compressors, air conditioners etc.) often fails before
aeroplane operations become impossible.
The continuation of eruption and the extent of volcanic ash fall may require, in the
worst situation, the closure of the aerodrome.
For the post-- eruption clean-- up it is essential that the ash be removed from aero-
drome because it will not simply blow away or disappear, but will continually blow
around and re-- contaminate everything. To a limitedextent, dependingon theamount
of ash and local climatological conditions, it may be possible to accumulate the ash
cleared from runways along theadjacent grass strips but generally thereis noalterna-
tive but complete removal of the ash from the aerodrome.

6 DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
Accurateandtimely availability of informationabout volcanic eruptions andassociat-

ed ash clouds in areas where these phenomena could affect air routes and aero-
dromes is essential for flight safety, both for the planning phase and for aeroplanes in
flight.
6.1 BEFORE FLIGHT

ICAO Annex 3 and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)require todissemi-
nate information about volcanic ash to flight crews and other operations personnel in
the form of charts, SIGMET, NOTAM and a special notam form named ASHTAM as
follows:
- charts: where information on significant en-- route weather phenomena is
supplied in chart form before departure, the charts (SIGWX charts) should show,
as appropriate to the flight, among other phenomena, information on the location
of volcanic eruptions which are producing ash clouds of significance to aircraft
operations, including those producing only steam, comprising: volcanic eruption
symbol at the location of the volcano and, at the side of the chart, the volcanic
eruption symbol, the name of the volcano, its international number,
latitude/longitude, the date and time of first eruption, if known, and a reminder to
users that reference should be made to SIGMETs and NOTAM oe ASHTAM
issued for the area concerned.
NOTE 1: The volcanic eruption symbol is ( ) is to be included on low, medium and

high SIGWX charts irrespective of the height to which the ash column is reported or
expected to reach.
NOTE 2: The international volcano number is allocated by the International
Associationof Volcanology andChemistry of theEarth’s Interior(IAVCEI)andis listed
intheICAOManualonVolcanic ash, RadioactiveMaterial andToxic ChemicalClouds
(Doc 9691). Mt. Etna has been assigned no.101-- 06.

Fig. 12 Portion of a typical significant weather chart including symbol for Etna activity
In addition, ICAO recommends a volcanic ash information in dedicated graphicalfor-

mat (ICAOmod. VAG), where, foraspecific volcano, theexpectedextent andtrajecto-
ry of the ash cloud are depicted for two different forecast times (eruption + XX hours
and + YY hours) and for different atmosphere layers.
The identification label contains the originating VAAC, the volcano name and coordi-
nates, date/time of the first eruption, its duration(hours) and the top FL of the ashcol-
umn;
- sat images: meteorological satellite photographs (or mosaics thereof) shouldbe
made available.
- SIGMET: volcanic ash is a phenomenon which warrants issuance of a VA
SIGMET (for whatever flight level concerned).
In case of volcanic ash, the validity period of the SIGMET should normally be for
the maximum periodof six hours. Inaddition, becausevolcanic ash, similarly toa
tropical cyclone, could necessitate a delay in aeroplane dispatch or re-- routingat
the flight planning stage, especially for long-- haulflight, provisionhas beenmade
for addition of an “outlook” for up to a further twelve hours.

- NOTAM and ASHTAM: in case of volcanic eruption, NOTAM may be initiated by

an ACC, for example for volcanic ash affecting certain air routes, and would
normally include information on the air routes closed and alternative routing to
avoid ash clouds.
A special series NOTAM, called ASHTAM, has been introduced specifically for
volcanic activity. States may choose to use either format, but ASHTAM is
recommend by ICAO because the name immediately denotates its content and
facilitates the routing of the information quickly.
The maximum period of validity of ASHTAM is 24 hours. New ASHTAM must be
issued whenever there is a charge in the level of alert.
NOTE: A volcanolevelof alert colour codehas beendeveloped foraviation whichmay
be used by some vulcanological agencies to report volcanic activity information. In
those States where the colour code has been introduced, it is useful to include the
reportedcolourcodeinNOTAMs orASHTAMs issuedforvolcanic activity. The levelof
alert colour code is:
Level of alert
colour code Status of activity of volcano (1)
Red alert: Volcanic eruption in progress. Ash plume/cloud reported above

FL 250
or
Volcano dangerous, eruption likely, with ash plume/
cloud
expected to rise above FL 250.
Orange alert: Volcanic eruption in progress but ash plume/cloud not reaching nor
expected to reach FL 250
or
Volcano dangerous, eruption likely, but ash plume/cloud not
expected to reach FL 250
Yellow alert (2): Volcano known to be active from time to time and volcanic activity
has recently increasedsignificantly. Volcanonot currently conside--
red dangerous but caution should be exercised
or
(after an eruption, i.e, change in alert to yellow from red or orange),
Volcanic activity has decreasedsignificantly, volcanonot currently
considered dangerous but caution should be exercised.
Green alert: Volcanic activity consideredtohaveceasedandvolcanorevertedto
its normal state.
(1) Any change from a previous status of activity should be provided and reported as
e.g., “RED ALERT FOLLOWING YELLOW” or “GREEN ALERT FOLLOWING
ORANGE”.

(2) The code“yellow” may be usedin cases of “regular”or “quasi-- permanent”volcanic

eruptions that do not normally reach FL 250 and do not necessarily involve a
“significant increase in volcanic activity”.
- TAF, METARandSPECI: If volcanic ashintheatmosphereaffects thevisibility at an
aerodrome, this is alsoreported inMETAR/SPECI reports. Although less likely, if vol-
canic ash is affecting an aerodrome, the associated visibility reduction could also be
forecast, i.e. at least thevisibility values, not theoccurrence of volcanic ash, in theter-
minal aerodrome forecast (TAF) for the aerodrome.
6.2 DURING FLIGHT

Informationconcerning pre-- eruptionvolcanic activity, volcanic eruptions andvolcan-
ic ash clouds shallbe disseminatedto aeroplanes in flight by oneor moreof thefollow-
ing means as determinated by the appropriate ATS authority:
a) a directed transmission on the initiative of the appropriateATS unit to singleaero-
planes ensuring that receipt is acknowledged; or
b) general call (i.e. unacknowledged transmission) to all aeroplanes concerned; or
c) broadcast; or
d) data link
NOTE: Volcanic ash (VA) SIGMET messages should be included (as any other
SIGMET) in scheduled VOLMET broadcasts if determined by regional air navigation
agreements.
If a volcanic ash cloud is reported or forecast in a FIR, the responsible ACC will:
a) relay all information available immediately to the flights which could be af-
fected to ensure that pilots are aware of the ash cloud’s position and the
flight levels affected;
b) suggest appropriate reroutingto avoidarea of known orforecast ashclouds;
c) remind pilots that volcanic ash clouds are not detected by airborne ATC or
radar systems.

7 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO AVOID OR MITIGATE

THE EFFECTS OF VOLCANIC ASH ON FLIGHT OPERATIONS
Flying into a volcanic ash cloud can be exceedingly dangerous: any encounter
with volcanic ash must be avoided.
Unfortunately, theashplumemay not bevisible, especially in IMCor at night; andeven
if visible, it is difficult to distinguish visually between an ash and an ordinary weather
cloud. Volcanic ash clouds are normally not displayed on airborne on airborne radar
and pilots must rely on reports from air traffic controllers and other pilots todetermine
the location of the ash cloud and use that information to remain well clear of the area
and on the upwind side of the ash cloud.
7.1 EN- ROUTE DEVIATIONS

If the flight has been planned without regard for volcanic activity which may affect its
routing tactical deviations may be necessary en-- route to avoid an ash cloud whichis
in view or the position of which is known.
In areas outside the coverage of direct pilot-- controller VHF communications (e.g.
NAT), the associated manoeuvers are subject to the rules and procedures to be ob-
served for weather avoidance.
7.2 INADVERTENT ASH CLOUD PENETRATION

Depending on the density of the cloud and the time of exposure, one or more unusual
effects indicate unmistakably that the aeroplane has entered a volcanic ash cloud;
recognizable effects are:
a) at night, static electric discharges (St. Elmo’s fire) visible around the
cockpit windshield, and a bright, whitish glow in the engine inlets;
b) very fine volcanic ashparticles inthe cabin, leaving acoating oncabin
surfaces;
c) acrid odour similar to electrical discharge, possibly smell ofsulphur;
and
d) at night, landing lights cast sharp, distinct shadows on the volcanic
ash cloud as opposed to the normally fuzzy, indistinct shadows cast
on water/ice clouds.
In addition other symptoms to be considered are: engine flame out or stall, engine
parameters fluctuations, abnormaldecreasinginairspeedindications, false cargofire
warnings and abnormal operation of pressurization system.
If penetration of an ash cloud has beenascertained oris suspected, course shouldbe
immediately modifiedsoas toescapefromthe cloud, descending (altitudepermitting)
with thrust at idle: ash clouds may extend forhundrends of miles andpilots shouldnot
attempt to fly through or climb out of the cloud.

In summary:
Immediately reduce thrust to idle: this will lower EGT, which in turn will reduce
the fused ash build-- up on the turbine blades and hot-- section components. Vol-
canic ash canalso causerapid erosionand damageto theinternal components of
the engines.
Turn autothrottle off (if engaged): the autothrottle should be turned off to
prevent the system from increasing thrust above idle. Due to the reduced surge
margins, limit the number of thrust adjustments andmake changes with slowand
smooth thrust-- lever movements.
Exit ash cloud as quickly as possible: Volcanic ash may extend for several
hundred miles. The shortest distance/time out of the ash may require an
immediate descent and 180° turn, terrain permitting. Setting climb thrust and
attempting to climb above the volcanic ash cloud is not recommended due to
accelerated engine damage/flame-- out at high thrust settings.
Turn on all engine airbleeds: turn on the engine and winganti-- ice systems and
place all air conditioning packs to “on” in order to further improve the engine stall
marginby increasingthebleed-- air flow. It may be possibleto stabilizeone ormore
engines at the idle thrust setting with the EGT remaining withinlimits. Anattempt
should be made to keep at least one engine operating at idle and within limits to
provide electrical power and bleed air for cabin pressurization until clear of the
volcanic ash.
Start the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), if available: the APU can be used to
powertheelectricalsystemintheevent of amultiple-- engine powerloss. TheAPU
may also provide a pneumatic air sourcefor improvedengine starting, depending
on the aeroplane model.
Put oxygen mask on at 100% if required: if asignificant amount of volcanic ash
fills the cockpit or if there is a strong smell of sulphur, don the oxygen mask and
select 100%. Manual deployment of passenger oxygen masks is not
recommended if cabin pressureis normalbecause thepassenger oxygensupply
willbedilutedwithvolcanic ash-- filledcabinair. If the cabinaltitude exceeds 14000
ft the passenger oxygen masks will deploy automatically.
In the event of engine flame-- out:
Turn ignition on: place ignition switches to “on” as appropriate for the engine
model (position normally used for in-- flight engine start). Cycling of fuel levers
(switches) is not required. For aeroplanes equipped with autostart system, the
autostart selector should be in the “on” position. The autostart system was
designed and certified with a “hand-- off” philosophy for emergency air starts in
recognition of crew workload during this type of event.
Monitor EGT: if necessary, shut down and then restart engines to keep from
exceeding EGT limits.
Close the outflow valves: if not already closed.

Do not pull the fire switches/handles.

Leave fuel boost pump switches “on” and open crossfeed valves.
Do not use fuel heat as this would be undesirable if on suction fuel feed.
Restart engine(s) if an engine fail to start, try again immediately. Successful
engine start may not bepossible untilairspeed andaltitude arewithin theair-- start
envelope. Monitor EGT carefully. If a hung start occurs, the EGT will increase
rapidly. If the engine is just slow in accelerating, the EGT will increase slowly.
Engines are very slow to accelerate to idle at high altitude, especially in volcanic
ash and this may be interpreted as a failure to start or as a failure of the engine to
accelerate to idle or as an engine malfunction.
Monitor airspeed and pitch attitude if unreliable, or if a complete loss of
airspeed indication occurs (volcanic ash may block the pitot system), establish
the appropriate pitch attitude dictated by the AOM for “flight with unreliable
airspeed”. If airspeed indicators are unreliable, or if loss of airspeed indication
occurs simultaneously withanall-- enginethrust loss, shutdownor flame-- out, use
the attitude indicator and ground speed.
A precautionary landing at the nearest suitable aerodrome should be taken into con-
sideration if aeroplane damage or abnormal engine operation occurs due to volcanic
ash penetration; because of the abrasive effects of volcanic ash on windshields and
landing lights, visibility for approach and landing may be markedly reduced. Forward
visibility may belimitedtothat whichis availablethroughthesidewindows. Shouldthis
conditionoccur, andif theautopilot systemis operatingsatisfactorily by a diversionto
an aerodrome where an automatic landing can be accomplished should be consid-
ered. After landing, if forward visibility is restricted, consider having the aeroplane
towed to the parking gate.
Distress message
As soon as practicable, the crew of an aeroplane which has penetrated an ash cloud
shall transmit a distress message.
On receipt of a distress message (or of any other informationfrom anaeroplane that a
volcanic ash cloud has been entered and that a distress situation exists, an ACC
should:
- consider the flight to be in an emergency situation;
- do not initiate any climb clearances to turbine-- powered aeroplane until the
aeroplane has exited the ash cloud; anddo not attempt toprovide vectors without
concurrence.
Experience has shown that the recommended escape manoeuvre for the pilot of an
aeroplane which has encountered an ash cloud is to reverse its course and begin a
descent if terrainpermits. The finalresponsibility forthis decision, however, rests with
the pilot.

Volcanic ash cloud encounters shall be reported on Aeroplane Technical Logbook

(ATL) and on the Alitalia Safety Report (ASR).
7.3 OPERATIONS AT A CONTAMINATED AERODROME

Generalrecommendations foroperations at contaminated aerodromes are thefollow-
ing:
Take- offandLanding: avoidoperation invisible airborneash; ashshould beallowed
to settle prior to initiating a take-- off roll; use a rolling take-- off procedure consider re-
duced braking action for rejected take-- off and for landing (refer to AOM).
Reverse thrust: during landing, limit reverse thrust. The use of maximum reverse
thrust may impair visibility and cause ash ingestion into the engines.
Braking action: The presence of a light layer of ash sufficient to obliterate the mark-
ings on the runway could have also adetrimental effect on brakingaction. Theeffects
of a heavy layer are unknown. Exercise caution when ash become wet because sur-
faces will be especially slippery and braking less effective.
Engine thrust: avoid static operations of engines above idle setting; do not taxi with
any engine shut down: use all engines for taxi; however, follow the AOM for specific
aeroplane/engine procedures; thrust during taxi should be limited to sustain a slow
taxi speed.
APU and air conditioning: restrict use of the auxiliary power unit to engine starts;
avoid the use of air conditioning packs if re-- circulatingfans willmaintain anadequate
comfort level. If airconditioning onthe groundis necessary, operate at full coldsetting
if ash is visible and , if available at the Terminal, pre-- condition the aeroplane using a
filtered ground cart if available. Refer to AOM for air conditioning packs and engine
bleeds configurations for take-- off.

8 SELECTED GLOSSARY OF VOLCANOLOGY & ACRONYMS
8.1 GLOSSARY
active volcano - A volcano that is erupting or has erupted in recorded history.
ash - Finely fragmented particles of rocks and minerals less than 2 mm in diameter
(less than 0.063 mm diameter for fine ash) produced by explosive volcanic
eruption. Also see tephra, pyroclastic and ejecta.
ash cloud - A cloud of volcanic ash and pyroclastic fragments, often with gases and
aerosols of volcanic origin, formed by volcanic explosion that is carried by winds
away froman eruptioncolumn. Ashclouds areoften dark-- colouredbrown togrey.
Ash clouds may drift for hundreds to thousands of kilometres from their volcanic
source. As ash clouds become more diluted, they may be difficult to distinguish
from meteorological clouds. Also see eruption cloud.
ash flow - A mixture of hot gases and ash, which may move down the flanks of a
volcano or along the ground surface at high speed. Also see pyroclastic flow.
composite volcano - A steep-- sided volcano composed of many layer of volcanic
rocks, usually lava flows and ash and pyroclastic deposits; also known as
stratovolcano.
ejecta - General term for material thrownout by a volcano. Also see pyroclast and
tephra.
eruption cloud - A cloud of volcanic ash and other pyroclastic fragments, and
volcanic gases and aerosols, that forms by volcanic explosion. Eruption clouds
are often dark-- coloured brown to gray. Often used interchangeably with plumeor
ash cloud.
eruption column - The vertical pillar of ash and gase which form above the volcano
at the time of eruption. Eruption columns from energetic eruptions may rise to
altitude in excess of 100000 ft (30 km).
hawaiianeruption-- An eruptioncharacterized by the non-- explosiveeruption of fluid
lava of basaltic composition. Hawaiian eruptions generally pose no threat to
aviation safety.
lahar - Indonesian term having the same meaning of “mudflow” (see below)
landslide - A fall of earth, rock, etc fron the side of a hill, mountain or volcano.
lapilli - Pyroclasic fragments with diameters between 2 and 64 mm.
lava - Molten rock that erupts from a volcano.
magma - Naturally occurring molten rock, generated within the Earth, which can be
erupted as lava or pyroclasts.
mudflow - A general term for a flowing mass of predominantly fine-- grained earth
material mixed with water and possessing a high degree of fluidity during
movement. The Indonesian term “lahar” is often used interchangerably with
mudflow.

Plinianeruption-- A largeexplosive eruptionthat ejects a steady, turbulent streamof

fragmentedmagmaand magmatic gas toform aneruption columnthat may reach
altitude in excess of 100 000 ft (30 km).
plume-- Termoften usedto describethe elongated, downwind dispersedportion of an
eruption cloud and ash-- cloud.
pyroclast - An individual volcanic particle ejected during an eruption. For example,
ash, lapilli and volcanic bombs are pyroclasts.
pyroclastflow-- A turbulent flowingmass of fragmentalvolcanic materials mixedwith
hot gases which may move downhill at high speed. Pyroclastic flows may result
from the collapse of tall eruption columns or from spillover of ejected materials
from erupting vents. Also see ash flow.
stratovolcano - (see composite volcano).
Strombolian eruption - An eruption consisting of short, discrete explosions which
may eject pyroclasts from a few tens to a few hundreds of feet into the air. Each
explosion may last for only a few seconds and there may be paused of tens of
minutes between explosions.
tephra-- acollectivetermforallviolently ejectedmaterials from craters or vents during
volcanic eruptions. These materials are airborne momentarily or for a longperiod
of time depending primarily on the vigour of the eruption and the size of ejected
fragments. Generally, coarsertephra aredeposited closerto theerupting crateror
vent and the finer tephra are deposited farther away. Tephra includes volcanic
dust, ash, cinder, lapilli, bombs and blocks. Also see ejecta.
vesuvian eruption - (see Plinian eruption).
volcanic gas - Volatile material, released during a volcanic eruption, that was
previously dissolved in the magma. The principal volcanic gases include water
vapour, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide.
volcano - A vent or opening at the surface of the Earth throughwhich magmaerupts,
also the landform that is produced by the erupted material accumulated around
the vent.
Vulcanianeruption-- A type of volcanic eruptioncharacterized by the short duration,
violent explosive ejection of fragments of lava. Vulcanian eruption columns may
attain heights of 45000 ft (14 km) or more.

8.2 ACRONYMS
ACC Area Control Center
AFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
AOM Aeroplane Operation Manual
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ATC Air Traffic Control
CAVW Catalog of Active Volcanoes in the World
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature
FIC Flight Information Center
FOD Foreign Object Damage
HF High Frequency
IAVW International Airways Volcano Watch
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
LIDAR Light Detection And Ranging
L/E Leading edge
MEC Main Engine Control
MSL Mean Sea Level
MWO Meteorological Watch Office
P/S Pitot/Static
PSU Passenger Seat Unit
VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre
VAWSG Volcanic Ash Warning Study Group
VEI Volcanic Explosivity Index
VHF Very High Frequency
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
WMO World Meteorological Organization

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aviation Safety Journal

Boeing - AERO January 2000 No. 9
Boeing Airliner (April-- June 1990)
Franco Colombo - Cenere vulcanica: un rischio per l’aviazione
L. Giacomelli - Gruppo Nazionale di Vulcanologia - Conoscere la Vulcanologia
ICAO Journal - October 1984
ICAO Doc. 9691 AN 954
55th FSF International Air Safety Seminar

BIBLIOGRAFIA della ITO “Volcanic ash”
Aviation Safety Journal

ICAO Journal
ICAO doc. 9691
Science magazine (immagine)
NOAA sat. (foto dell’ETNA)
figura modificata tratta “Volcanoes life on the edge” - Corbis
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I.T.O. No. 4 Rev 2 2
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OXYGEN DIVERSION ROUTES
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Members and provides explanations, examples and supplementary guidance on
Company policies and procedures.
Operations Manual (i.e. General Basic, AOM, Route Manual and Training Manual)
policies and procedures.
OXYGEN DIVERSION ROUTES 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. REFERENCE INFORMATION.........................................................3
1.1. GENERAL.................................................................................3
1.1.1. OXYGEN REQUIREMENT............................................4
1.1.2. FLIGHT PROFILE..........................................................4
1.1.3. MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES ....................................6
1.1.4. OBSTACLE CLEARANCE - CABIN
PRESSURIZATION FAILURE .......................................6
1.1.5. ROUTE STUDY .............................................................7
1.2. REGULATIONS ........................................................................8

1.2.1. MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES ....................................8
1.2.2. SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN..........................................9
2. ALITALIA DOCUMENTATION ......................................................10
2.1. OM PART A - GENERAL BASIC ...........................................10
2.2. OM PART C – ROUTE MANUAL ..........................................12
2.3. OM PART B – AIRCRAFT OPERATING MANUAL .............13

2.3.1. GENERAL....................................................................13
2.3.2. ASSUMPTIONS...........................................................13
2.3.3. ESCAPE ROUTES PRESENTATION .........................14
2.3.4. USE OF ALITALIA DOCUMENTATION ......................14
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................19
Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°4 DEC 2010

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

1. REFERENCE INFORMATION
1.1. GENERAL
In case of an emergency descent that requires the use of the oxygen

the a/c has the capability of providing continuous oxygen to all persons
on board for a specific period of time. In fact oxygen is automatically
supplied to passengers through individual dispensing units, immediately
available to each occupant. The duration of passenger oxygen supply
varies, depending on the system.
As of today, two main oxygen system categories exist: Chemical
systems and Gaseous systems.
Chemical Systems
A chemical system has the following characteristics:
• There is an independent chemical generator, which is fired when
the mask is pulled. Afterwards, it's not possible to stop the
oxygen flow.
• The oxygen flow and supply pressure are independent of the cabin
altitude.
• The oxygen is supplied to passengers for a specific period of time
(typically between 12 to 22 minutes).
• A maximum flight profile is predetermined for such a system.
NOTE: Although the flow and pressure are independent of cabin
altitude, because the average request of oxygen for a person varies
with cabin altitude, there will always be a maximum flight profile that
will be determined by the characteristics of the chemical system
itself.
Gaseous Systems
A gaseous system has certain advantages, over the chemical system:
• It is customizable by selecting the number of high pressure oxygen
bottles.
• The oxygen flow and supply pressure depend on the altitude. The
flow rate is controlled by an altimetric flow regulation device in each
mask container. It enables passenger oxygen consumption to be
optimized: the lower the altitude, the lower the oxygen flow.

• The oxygen supply time depends on the flight profile, and on

the number of cylinders installed.
• There is no oxygen flow below a cabin pressure altitude of 10000
feet.
1.1.1. OXYGEN REQUIREMENT
To help operators determine their needs in terms of supplementary

oxygen, regulations provide the minimum required oxygen quantity
versus the flight altitude. This requirement is set forth for flight crew
members, cabin crew members, as well as for passengers.
Nevertheless, oxygen reserves for crew members are always much
more significant than that for passengers and, consequently, the
descent profile is always more limited by the passenger oxygen system
than by the crew oxygen systems.
Specific excerpts are given later in this document in the Regulation
section.
1.1.2. FLIGHT PROFILE
Oxygen system limitation

Following a cabin pressurization failure, the cabin pressure altitude shall
be considered the same as the aircraft pressure altitude, unless it can
be demonstrated that this is highly unlikely. In the studies, it is
conservatively always assumed that the cabin pressure altitude is the
same as the aircraft pressure altitude.
As a result, it is possible to establish a flight profile, within which the

aircraft must always remain, taking into account the oxygen
requirements. This profile depends on the installed oxygen system:
- Chemical system: Fixed profile.

- Gaseous system: Customized profile (depends on the number of
oxygen bottles and obstacle location).

This oxygen flight profile represents the maximum level that can be
flown with respect to the oxygen system's capability. As an example, the
following Figure shows the descent profile of a 22 minute oxygen
system.
For example, the above profile shows that 7 minutes after the cabin
depressurization, the aircraft must fly at or below FL250.
Performance limitation
The above descent profile only depends on the oxygen system
capability, and not on the aircraft performance capability.
Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that the aircraft is always able to follow
the oxygen flight profile, particularly in descent. As a consequence, a
performance profile must be established, and this profile must always
remain below the oxygen flight profile.
The calculation is based on the following assumptions:
- Descent phase: Emergency descent at MMO/VMO. Airbrakes can

be extended to increase the rate of descent, if necessary.
- Cruise phase: Cruise at maximum speed (limited to VMO).

As a result, for a given initial weight and flight level, the oxygen flight
profile, function of time, is transformed into a performance profile,
function of distance. The figure above shows a typical performance
profile with a 22 minute oxygen system.
NOTE: When establishing this performance profile, it is always assumed

that the aircraft is able to fly at MMO/VMO. Cases where speed should
be decreased (structural damage, turbulence) have not to be taken into
account.
1.1.3. MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
The minimum flight altitudes must be selected as described in the

Regulation section given later in this document.
1.1.4.OBSTACLE CLEARANCE - CABIN PRESSURIZATION

FAILURE
A net flight path is not required in the cabin pressurization failure case.
The net flight path shall be considered as a safety margin, when there is
a risk that the aircraft cannot maintain the expected descent
performance (engine failure case).
In case of cabin depressurization, any altitude below the initial flight

altitude can be flown without any problem as all engines are running.

Therefore, the standard minimum flight altitudes apply and the descent
profile must, clear any obstacle by at least 2000 ft (see Regulation) as
shown in figure below
1.1.5 ROUTE STUDY

As a general rule, failures (engine or pressurization) must always be
expected to occur at the most critical points of the intended route.
Nevertheless, as descent profiles differ, the critical points may differ
between the two failure cases. It is important to notice that regulations
don't require to consider performance to cope with both failures
simultaneously.
When both failure cases are dealt with separately, the number of critical
points and the specific escape routes also increase. As a result, the
complexity may engender a supplementary workload for flight crews and
a subsequent risk of error.
This is why, whenever it is possible, it must be preferred to define the
same critical points and the same escape routes, whatever the failure
case. Thus, the reaction time and the risk of mistake are reduced. In
such a case, the route study should be based on the most penalizing
descent profile.
Anyway, this kind of limitation does never occur for a/c equipped with
the fuel jettison system. In such a case, in fact, the one engine out
profile can always be adjusted according to the operational needs.

1.2. REGULATIONS
1.2.1. MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
The EU regulations (EU-OPS 1.250 subpart D) reported below

summarize the requirements for the MTCA/MGA altitudes both in terms
of concerned area's and altitude. Each information given for the MTCA
is applicable also to the MGA with the exception that the highest point is
not along the route but within the respective grid area.
Area
- Calculation of the MTCA is based on the elevation of the highest
point along the route segment concerned (extending from
navigational aid to navigational aid) within a distance of 10 NM on
either side of the track
NOTE: This distance may be reduced to 5 NM within TMA's where, due

to the number and type of available navigational aids, a high degree of
navigational accuracy is warranted.
Altitude
The MTCA is calculated by adding an increment to the elevation
specified before as appropriate:
• 1000 ft for terrain or obstructions up to 6000 ft or

• 2000 ft for terrain or obstructions above 6000 ft.
The result is adjusted to the next 100 ft.

1.2.2 SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN

Here below is reported a useful excerpt of the table summarizing the
minimum requirements for Supplemental Oxygen according to EU (EU -
OPS 1.770, Appendix 1):
SUPPLY FOR DURATION AND CABIN PRESSURE ALTITUDE
1. All occupants of Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude
flight deck seats on exceeds 13000 ft and entire flight time when the cabin
flight deck duty pressure altitude exceeds 10000 ft but does not exceed
13000 ft after the first 30 minutes at those altitudes, but in
no case less than:
i) 30 minutes for aeroplanes certificated to fly at altitudes
non exceeding 25000 ft (2)
ii) 2 hours for aeroplanes certificated to fly at altitudes
more than 25000 ft (3)
2. All required cabin Entire flight time when cabin pressure altitude exceeds
crew members 13000 ft but not less than 30 minutes (2),
and entire flight time when cabin pressure altitude is
greater than 10000 ft but does not exceed 13000 ft after
the first 30 minutes at these altitudes.
3. 100% Passengers Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude
(5) exceeds 15000 ft but in no case less than 10 minutes. (4)
4. 30% Passengers (5) Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude
exceeds 14000 ft but does not exceed 15000 ft.
5. 10% Passengers (5) Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude
exceeds 10000 ft but does not exceed 14000 ft after the
first 30 minutes at these altitudes.
(2) The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant
rate of descent from the aeroplane's maximum certificated operating altitude to
10000 ft in 10 minutes followed by 20 minutes at 10000 ft.
10000 ft in 10 minutes followed by 110 minutes at 10000 ft. (omissis)
15000 ft in 10 minutes.
(5) For the purpose of this table, passengers means passengers actually carried
and includes infants and cabin crew in addition to the minimum required.

2. ALITALIA DOCUMENTATION
Information relevant to oxygen requirements and relevant operations are
reported in the OM Part A General Basic, OM Part C Route Manual and
OM Part B of each a/c type.
Find hereafter some excerpts of the relevant documentation.
2.1. OM A - GENERAL BASIC
8.1 OPERATING PROCEDURES - FLIGHT PREPARATION

INSTRUCTIONS
1 MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
“Minimum IFR flight Altitudes” term refers to following minimum altitudes:
• Minimum Crossing Altitudes (MCA)
• Minimum Cruise Level (MCL)
• Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA)
• Minimum Grid Altitude (MGA)
• Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA)
• Minimum Terrain Clearance Altitude (MTCA)
• Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA)
Such minimum altitudes are based on OCA (Obstacle Clearance Altitude)
published by States. Appropriate safety margins are applied.
Minimum Safety altitudes and their determination criteria are described in
Route Manual General Part.
8.8 OPERATING PROCEDURES - OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
1 OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
1.1 GENERAL
The detailed instructions for use of the aeroplane oxygen systems are
given in the relevant AOMs.
1.2 FLIGHT CREW
The minimum required Flight Crew Members, when on duty on own cockpit
station, must wear the oxygen mask and breathe oxygen:
- when executing an emergency procedure that requires for it; or
- as long as the cabin altitude exceeds 10000 ft.
The above applies also for supernumerary crew members who occupy,
even if temporarily, a cockpit seat equipped with oxygen mask.
----- OMISSIS -----

1.3 CABIN CREW

The minimum required Cabin Crew Members must wear the mask and
breathe oxygen:
- when executing an emergency procedure that requires for it; or
- as long as the cabin altitude exceeds 13000 ft; or
- after 30 minutes flight with cabin altitude between 10000 and 13000 ft.
The use of oxygen by Cabin Crew Members carried in addition to the
minimum required is the same considered for passengers.
----- OMISSIS -----

1.4.1 SUPPLEMENTAL OXYGEN
For aeroplanes operating above 25000 ft a supply of supplemental oxygen
for passengers carried (including infants) is provided, to be used in case of
rapid decompression, which satisfies the following supply requirements
according to the aeroplane pressure altitude following the decompression
and relevant duration:
• altitudes above 15000 ft: for the entire time, with a minimum of 10
minutes, for 100% of passengers;
• altitudes above 14000 ft up to 15000 ft: for the entire time, for 30% of
passengers;
• altitudes above 10000 ft up to 14000 ft: after the first 30 minutes at
these altitudes, for 10 % of passengers.
The supplemental oxygen supply is provided by the oxygen system (ex.
oxygen generators) and in addition, when required, by portable oxygen
bottles.
1.4.2 FIRST AID OXYGEN

For aeroplanes operating above 25000 ft on which Cabin Crew Members
are required to be carried, an amount of first aid oxygen is provided to be
sufficient for 2 % of passengers carried (but in no case for less than one
person and with a minimum of two dispensing units) for the entire time,
where, after a rapid decompression, the aeroplane altitude remains above
8000 ft without exceeding 15000 ft.
The individual supply of first aid oxygen is intended for those passengers
who for physiological reasons would need oxygen after depletion of
supplemental oxygen, in case of decompression, or in any other
circumstances it is needed.

2.2. OM C - ROUTE MANUAL
Minimum Grid Altitude (MGA) is the lowest safe altitude to be flown off-
track. The MGA is calculated by rounding up the elevation of the highest
obstruction within the respective grid area to the next 100ft and adding an
increment of:
• 1000 ft for terrain or obstructions up to 6000 ft
e.g. 6345 ft obstacle
= 6400 ft rounded up
+ 2000 ft buffer
= 8400 ft MGA
Shown in hundreds of feet.
Lowest indicated MGA is 2000 ft.
This value is also provided for terrain and obstacles that would result in an
MGA below2000 ft. Exception is overwater areas where the MGA can be
omitted.
MGAs below 10.000 ft are shown in purple, at and above 10.000 ft in red.
----- OMISSIS -----
Minimum Terrain Clearance Altitude (MTCA) is provided for all airway

segments, for all STARs (up to IAF or equivalent end point) and as
exception for selected airports on SIDs (for segments lying outside the
coverage of the MSA). MTCAs are always shown in red italic font.
The MTCA calculated by Lido covers exclusively terrain and obstacles
relevant for air navigation with the buffers and MOC described underneath.
For SIDs and STARs the MTCA is calculated for an area of 5 NM on either
side of the centerline of each procedure segment and around a
navaid/waypoint where the MTCA is provided.
For airways the buffering area extends to 10NM on either side of the
centerline. The MTCA is calculated by rounding up the elevation of the
highest obstruction within the respective safety area to the
next 100 ft and adding an increment of
• 1000 ft for terrain or obstructions up to 6000 ft
e.g. 2345 ft obstacle
= 2400 ft rounded up
+ 1000 ft buffer
= 3400 ft MTCA
Values shown in feet.
----- OMISSIS -----

2.3. OM B – AIRCRAFT OPERATING MANUAL
2.3.1. GENERAL
Because the Alitalia network covers some routes with MTCAs that in
case of rapid decompression do not allow the a/c to continue the flight
on the scheduled route, diversion routes are computed for the various
segments involved.
NOTE: It must be noted that, according to the present network, for those
a/c that are not equipped with fuel jettison, also the obstacle clearance
for the one engine out condition must be checked, but so far no
additional limitations (decision points) have been necessary.
For each segment, the procedure, computed in compliance with the
Regulation and based on some assumptions summarized hereafter,
gives the side of turn (when necessary) and relevant level off values to
guide the pilot to the suggested airports for landing.
2.3.2. ASSUMPTIONS
The diversion routes are developed on the following assumptions:
- The level off altitude reported in the escape route may either be
based on an area of operation of 10 NM on each side of the
intended route (accounting for the deviation during the turn) and
therefore sometimes lower than the RFC's MTCA, or identical to
the RFC's ones developed on the standard method as described
in the Minimum Flight Altitudes subparagraph.
- The descent is performed according to the normal specifications
for the emergency descent profile and the level off is achieved at
the MTCA/MGA reported in the escape route for the specified
segments.
- The segment length and level off capability is computed for:
• any ISA condition (from -20 to +20),
• an average unfavourable wind component (head) of 60 kt,
• Use of the sole fixed chemical oxygen system (conservatively
the portable oxygen bottles have NOT been accounted for).

2.3.3. ESCAPE ROUTES PRESENTATION

The escape routes are presented in tabular format.
The table reports for each segment the following information:
- RFC identification,
- Airway,
- Segment identified by the name of the relevant waypoints or
specific distance from a way point (i.e. TBN - YAVUZ till 40 NM
from TBN),
- Segment length,
- Diversion route,
- Suggested airport/s.
Depending on aircraft type, slightly different formats have been
implemented, but in all cases the above mentioned information is
present and correlated to specific routings or segments of routing.
To cover particular areas where it is not possible to establish fixed

routings, special procedures have been used to provide the necessary
information.
NOTE : Since the presentation of these special procedures is strictly
related to interested area and aircraft type, it can not be described in
this document. Refer to specific information in the OM Part B.
2.3.4. USE OF ALITALIA DOCUMENTATION

This document shall always be used in accordance with the other official
ones.
In other words the emergency descent shall be performed as specified
by the Aircraft Operations Manual and the initial side of turn is subject
to local area regulations (refer to Route Manual, Part General).
For instance, if we experience a depressurization over a Russian area,
even if the procedure command a left turn, we first have to follow the
Russian rule of turning “normally” right with an angle of 30°, get off the
route for max 16 NM and descending, and only afterwards can we

execute a left turn. Obviously, the area of operation has been

determined in accordance with this course of actions.
The tables must be used together with the RFC's. In fact if a procedure
suggests a turn in whatever direction to a specific airport without giving
a route to be followed, the pilot must determine the minimum flight
altitude according to the highest MGA overflown as indicated on the
RFC.
The diversion routes shall always be considered only as a guidance
material. In other words it is always up to the Captain to decide,
according to the operational situations, to adopt another course of action
that might guarantee an higher level of safety.
A few examples of such procedures as reported in the AOM, follow:
Basic Procedure
Special Procedure - Example 1

Special Procedure - Example 2


With reference to the above Example 2, a bit of additional information on

the criteria used in developing it, is provided below.
Map
Approaching the High Terrain Area

- Airports Kxx1, Kxx2 and Kxx3 affect the chosen routes
- All three airport are suitable
- If a rapid decompression occurs :
- Outside circle (distance to the airport
greater than Max Dist), turn back
descending to 10000 ft and decide
course of action
- Inside one of the circles proceed direct
to airport on which the circle is based
descending to 17000 ft. Reaching Min
Dist descend to 14000 ft. Contact ATC
to plan a landing.
- Kxx1 not suitable evaluate a re-routing to
avoid Kxx1 circle.
- If re-routing is not possible due to airports suitability.
- Do not re-route, and consider the nearby Emergency Airports.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Airbus - Getting to Grips With Aircraft Performance

- EU-OPS
- OM Part A General Basic
- OM Part B B777
- OM Part C Route Manual
NOTE: all excerpts from above documents will non be kept up to date unless
required for change of policy.

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MESOSCALE CONVECTIVE SYSTEM
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MESOSCALE CONVECTIVE SYSTEM 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. CONVECTION................................................................................. 3
1.1. GENERAL ................................................................................ 3

1.2. PHYSICS OF CONVECTION .................................................. 3
1.3. UNORGANIZED CONVECTION.............................................. 3
1.4. ORGANIZED CONVECTION ................................................... 3
1.4.1. Squall line...................................................................... 4
1.4.2. Mesoscale Convective Complex (MCC) ....................... 9
1.4.3. ITCZ/Monsoon Trough .................................................. 9
1.4.4. Other Mesoscale Convective Systems ....................... 11
1.5. SUPERCELL .......................................................................... 11
2. HAZARDS IN A MCS .................................................................... 13

2.1. GENERAL .............................................................................. 13
2.2. HEAVY PRECIPITATION ..................................................... 13
2.3. WIND SHEAR ........................................................................ 14
2.4. LIGHTNING ............................................................................ 16
2.5. ICING .................................................................................... 17
2.6. TURBULENCE ....................................................................... 18
2.7. HAIL .................................................................................... 19
2.8. ICE CRYSTAL ICING ............................................................. 20
2.8.1. Infrared satellite imagery............................................. 24
3. AIRBORNE WEATHER RADAR SYSTEM .................................. 27

3.1. GENERAL .............................................................................. 27
3.2. ANTENNA GAIN .................................................................... 27
3.3. REFLECTIVITY ...................................................................... 28
3.4. CONVECTIVE CELL REFLECTIVITY .................................. 30
3.5. ANTENNA TILT CONTROL MANAGEMENT ........................ 31
3.6. TARGET SHAPES ................................................................. 34
3.7. PATH ATTENUATION ........................................................... 36
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. 37
Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°5 JUL 2012


1. CONVECTION
1.1. GENERAL
To improve the forecast capability of the Aeronautical Weather
Services, convection has been studied extensively in recent years,
leading to many new theories and aftermaths.
The scientific advances led to the use of new terminology which is often
unfamiliar in the aviation community.
The main purpose of this publication is to let pilots familiarise with some
of these meteorological breakthroughs and, consequently, the most
significant aspects connected to them.
1.2. PHYSICS OF CONVECTION
The study of convection deals with the vertical motions in the
atmosphere caused by temperatures or density differences, thus
inducing an unstable atmosphere. In particular, a parcel of air will rise if
it is less dense than the surrounding air mass. Warmer air is less dense
thus will rise; conversely colder air, being denser, will sink. Rising air
expands and cools. If the air cools to its dew point, condensation occurs
forming a cloud depending on both moisture presence and stability of
condensed air, as Cumulus or Cumulonimbus clouds.
From a meteorological standpoint, convection is most of the times
connected to shower precipitations and thunderstorms. These
phenomena, going through three life stages (fig.1-1), are the end
products of convective activity.
Fig. 1-1 Life stages of a convective cell

Convective formations can be divided into three main classes:

unorganized, organized and supercell. In the next paragraphs we will
take a look at this a little closer.
1.3. UNORGANIZED CONVECTION
Unorganized convection would be the typical air mass showers and
thunderstorms that develop in warm season. They have one vertical
updraft that tends to dissipate fairly quickly and rarely produce severe
weather. For aviation purposes, they usually can be avoided or waited
out. They can be found in parts of Central Europe, U.S.A., South
America, Asia, Australia and any place with warm, moist air.
Occasionally, a Pulse Storm, which is a subtype of the previous
category, can develop suddenly, without warning. It may appear benign,
but then can produce the type of extreme weather conditions more
commonly associated with classic storms. It can occur randomly in time
and space, making it difficult to forecast; the best the meteorologists
can do is to say whether the atmosphere is conductive to pulse storm
development. Early detection of the wind shear generated by such
storm and a quick relay of this information to pilots are the best
methods of preventing serious flight problems.
Both of them belong to the Single-cell Storm Type where cell refers to
central updraft of the storm. These storms size is quite small, several
nautical miles (NM) across at most and are rather short-lived, lasting an
hour or less.
1.4. ORGANIZED CONVECTION
Organized convection takes the form of a Mesoscale Convective
System (MCS), the generic name for a wide variety of multi-cell
systems, clusters or lines. MCSs size can be as large as several
hundred miles across and can persist for hours. An MCS must, by
definition, show some convection and may contain stratiform
precipitation, areas of rain and areas of cloud with no precipitation.
MCS size, duration and type of severe weather it may contain makes a
hazard for aviation.
1.4.1. Squall line
a) The most recognisable and best-known MCS configuration is the
squall line, an elongated line of severe thunderstorms, at least
initially. In such favourable conditions, the squall line can persist for
hours and evolve in a much larger and complex system (fig. 1-2).

Fig. 1-2 Squall Line
Fig. 1-3 Squall Line System

As we can see from the figure above (fig. 1-3), squall lines may be
symmetrical with the stratiform rain area just behind, to the west of
the convective line, or asymmetrical, with the convective cells more
to the south and the stratiform precipitation more northward.
In terms of aircraft operation, the entire area is to watch carefully: the
gust front preceding the main line of thunderstorms, the line of
storms themselves, the trailing stratiform rain area that still may
produce problems and the final wake low that could be accompanied
by strong, gusty winds.
There may be several lines of convection, with the strongest on the
leading edge of the system, usually the east or south side in the
northern hemisphere mid-latitudes and progressively weakening
behind it. Squall Lines mostly develop where atmospheric effects,
other than instability, result in a synoptic scale such as the warm
sector of an extratropical cyclone or low, ahead of the associated
cold front.
When some storms are separated from other storms in a nearby
Squall Line, we can refer to a Quasi-Linear Convective System
(QLCS).
b) Another indication of the presence of severe weather along a squall
line is its transformation into a Line Echo Wave Pattern, or LEWP
(fig. 1-4). A LEWP is a special configuration of a line of convective
storms that indicates the presence of a low pressure area and the
possibility of damaging winds, large hail and tornadoes. At each
kink along the LEWP there is a mesoscale low pressure area, which
could contain a tornado.

Fig. 1-4 Line Echo Wave Pattern
c) In response to very strong outflow winds behind it, a portion of the

line may bulge outward forming a Bow Echo, that is a bow-shaped
line of convective cells, often associated with swaths of damaging
straight-line winds and small tornadoes. Key structural features
include an intense rear-inflow jet impinging on the core of the bow.
Bow Echoes have been observed with scales between 10 and 100
NM and often have lifetimes between 3 and 6 hours. In the last
stage of their evolution, the northern cyclonic vortex often
dominates on the anticyclonic one, giving the convective system a
comma-shaped appearance (fig. 1-5).

Typical evolution of a thunderstorm radar echo (a) into a bow echo (b, c) and into
a comma echo (d). Dashed line indicates axis of greatest potential for downbursts.
Arrows indicate wind flow relative to the storm.
Note regions of cyclonic rotation (C) and anticyclonic rotation (A); both regions,
especially C, are capable of supporting tornado development in some cases.
Fig. 1-5 Bow Echo
d) Not really a different type of MCS, a Derecho adds a time element

to the description. It is a widespread and long-lived, violent
convectively induced straight-line windstorm, lasting for hours.
Specifically the term is defined as any family of downburst clusters
produced by an extra-tropical mesoscale convective system.
Derechos may or may not be accompanied by tornadoes and are
often associated with stationary fronts during period of extreme
heat; they have sustained winds of at least 50 knots during the
storm, high or rapidly increasing forward speed (they blow in the
direction of movement of their associated storms) and geographic
extent (about 250 NM). Derechos occur in many parts of the world
but they are most commonly found in North America. They occur
typically from May to August.

1.4.2. Mesoscale Convective Complex (MCC)

A Mesoscale Convective Complex (MCC) differs from other MCSs in
shape; it is rounded or at least elliptical shaped (fig. 1-6).
Fig. 1-6 Mesoscale Convective Complex
MCC is also large, covering thousands of square NM and can last six
hours or more. It is primarily a summer weather phenomenon that
develops in what appears to be a fairly benign environment, on the east
side of an upper-level ridge, away from any low pressure areas or
fronts.
MCC often starts as unorganized air mass convection before sunset or
early evening. These independent storms interact in forming a self-
maintaining complex that lasts through the night. The strongest
convection, as in a Squall Line, is present on the outside perimeter of
the system but often produce heavy rain in the middle.
1.4.3. ITCZ/Monsoon Through
MCSs can be found elsewhere than at mid-latitudes and there are
tropical versions too. We are referring to the forms of MCS that use
either the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) or Monsoon Troughs

as a focus for their development, generally within the warm season.
The ITCZ is the area surrounding the earth near the equator (fig. 1-7)
where winds originating in the north (northeast trade winds) and south
(southeast trade winds) hemispheres collide.
Fig. 1-7 ITCZ
Most commonly used in monsoonal regions, the Monsoon Trough is

that convergence zone, existing as a portion of the ITCZ, where
westerly monsoon winds lie in its equatorward portion while easterly
trade winds exist poleward of the trough.
Generally speaking MCSs forming along the ITCZ’s wind pattern live in
regions with very moisted air, convergent surface winds and divergent
winds aloft. This typically occurs north of the equator from Africa across
the Atlantic and Eastern Pacific Oceans as well as across the
Northwest and Southwest Pacific Oceans, Indian Ocean, Indonesia and
from Southeast Brazil into the Southern Atlantic Ocean.
As the ITCZ migrates more than 250 NM from the geographic equator
during the respective hemisphere’s summer season, following the
seasonal movement of the thermal equator (fig. 1-8), increasing Coriolis
force makes the formation of convective system activity more possible.
Sometimes these clusters of thunderstorms can become cyclones.

Fig. 1-8 ITCZ seasonal movement
1.4.4. Other Mesoscale Convective Systems

Tropical Cyclone, Mesoscale Convective Vortex (MCV), Lake-effect
Snow and Polar Low are other types of convective formations belonging
to the same scale system and producing heavy weather conditions but
generated in different parts of the world, at different times of the year
and, sometimes, in particular environmental conditions.
1.5. SUPERCELL
A Supercell storm is a large, severe, quasi-steady-state storm with wind
speed and direction that vary with height, including separate downdrafts
and updrafts. It contains also a strong, rotating upward airflow
commonly known as Mesocyclone, which is a deep, continuously-
rotating updraft (as shown in fig. 1-9).
Fig. 1-9 Mesocyclone

Among this classification of thunderstorms, the Supercell storms are the

overall least common and have the potential to be the most severe (fig.
1-10).
Fig. 1-10 Supercell
Supercells are often isolated from other thunderstorms, although they

can be embedded in a squall line and can dominate the local climate up
to 20 NM away. They may be found with Low-precipitation (LP) or High-
precipitation (HP), depending on the humidity of the climates, anywhere
in the world under the right pre-existing weather conditions.

2 HAZARDS IN A MCS
2.1 GENERAL
Mesoscale meteorology is the study of weather systems smaller than
synoptic scale systems but larger than microscale and storm-scale
cumulus systems. Horizontal dimensions range from 3 to several
hundred NM. A specific example of mesoscale weather system is the
Mesoscale Convective System (MCS) which is a complex of
thunderstoms that becomes organized being larger than an single
thunderstorm but smaller than an extratropical cyclone.
The risks and hazards associated with the MCS are similar of any other
type of convective system. Aviation weather hazards related to
convective weather include heavy precipitation, wind-shear,
downbursts, severe turbulence and icing, lightning, damaging hail and
a fairly new recognized threat defined as ice crystal icing.
According to FAA statistics, weather is the cause of approximately 70
percent of all delays. In addition, weather continues to play a significant
role in a number of aviation accidents and incidents. While the US
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports most commonly
find human error to be the direct accident cause, weather is a primary
contributing factor in 23 percent of all aviation accidents.
2.2 HEAVY PRECIPITATION
Heavy precipitation induced by a MCS could sensibly reduce visibility.

The reduction of visibility can be horizontal, due to heavy rain or snow
showers, and vertical, due to obscuring cumulonimbus or stratus
clouds. The most evident danger of such low visibilities is during the
departure and approach phases of flight.
Another major problem caused by heavy precipitation is the possible
water ingestion by turbine engines. Jet engines have a limit on the
amount of water they can ingest. Updrafts are present in many
convective cells, especially those in the developing stages. If the
updraft velocity in the thunderstorm approaches or exceeds the terminal
velocity of the falling raindrops, very high concentrations of water may
occur. It is possible that these concentrations can be in excess of the
quantity of water turbine engines are designed to ingest, which could
result in flameout and/or structural failure of one or more engines.

At the present time, there is no known operational procedure that can

completely eliminate the possibility of an engine damage/flameout
during massive water ingestion. Although the exact mechanism of these
water induced engine stalls has not been determined, it is felt that thrust
changes may have an adverse effect on engine stall margins in the
presence of massive water ingestion. Avoidance of severe storm
systems is the only measure assured to be effective in preventing
exposure to this type of multiple engine damage/flameout.
During an unavoidable encounter with severe storms with extreme
precipitation, the best known recommendation is to follow the severe
turbulence penetration procedure contained in the approved airplane
flight manual with special emphasis on avoiding thrust changes unless
excessive airspeed variations occur.
2.3 WIND SHEAR
Wind shear can be defined as a sudden change of wind direction and/or
intensity over a short distance, which results in a tearing or shearing
action (fig. 2-1).
Fig. 2-1 Wind Shear
Although wind shear can occur at any altitude, it is

particularly hazardous when it happens over a short period of time and
within 2,000 feet of the ground, during takeoff or landing.
The thunderstorm downdraft may produce the most dangerous shear

conditions associated with the outflow boundary. An outflow boundary,
also known as a gust front, is a mesoscale boundary
separating thunderstorm cooled air (outflow) from the surrounding air
(fig. 2-2).
Fig. 2-2 Thunderstorm airflow structure
The gust front frequently extends 10 to 15 NM away from the

thunderstorm. Extreme wind shears of 10 knots per 100 feet of altitude
have been measured immediately behind the gust front, while
horizontal wind shears of 40 knots per mile have been recorded across
the gust front. In addition to the tremendous speed shears reached, the
most severe thunderstorms produce directional shears of 90° to 180°.
Wind shear associated with thunderstorms is by far the most
hazardous, because of the complexity and multiplicity of the shears
within and in the vicinity of the convective cell.
Strong downdrafts form right underneath the convective cell. These
downdrafts, within a MCS, can easily turn into downbursts (fig. 2-2).
The term downburst was defined to describe a downdraft the speed of
which is equal to or greater than the average rate of descent or climb of
a jet aircraft on the final approach or takeoff at a height of about 300
feet above the ground. Downbursts appear to be frequently associated
with Mesocyclones. They can be especially dangerous on the departure

and approach to land phases of flight because of the aircraft reduced
margin on stall speeds.
2.4 LIGHTNING
Lightning bolts are high current electrical discharges caused by storm
cells. These discharges can be cloud-to-cloud, cloud-to-ground, ground-
to-cloud and within-cloud (50% of all strikes). Lightning strikes are very
difficult to predict in timing and location. If lightning hits an aircraft, it
could cause different kinds of harm. Damages can be either direct or
indirect.
Direct damage consists in puncturing of the aircraft fuselage, burning
or distorting of aircraft parts.
Indirect damage can go from the temporary blinding of the pilot to a
temporary or permanent damage to avionics and even fire in the fuel
system.
Lightning discharges, even distant ones, can disrupt radio
communications on low and medium frequencies. Though lightning
intensity and frequency have no simple relationship to other storm
parameters, severe storms, as a rule, have a high frequency of
lightning.
In the early 80’s the FAA, USAF and NASA conducted a joint study
(Storm Hazard Program) on convective system lightning. These studies
have shown that the majority of strikes (over 90%) are triggered by the
aircraft itself and that the probability of an aircraft triggering a discharge
increases with altitude. Lightning strikes at high altitudes generally
result in greater total charge transfer than strikes at lower altitude.
Lightning strikes experienced in the upper areas of thunderstorms and
in the vicinity of decaying thunderstorms most frequently occur under
conditions of little turbulence or precipitation.
This study has also shown that aircraft flying at altitudes above the
freezing level are more likely to be involved with in-cloud or inter-cloud
lightning flashes, and that aircraft flying at altitudes below the freezing
level are more likely to be involved with a cloud-to-ground lightning
event. Thunderstorm penetration studies show that lightning strikes can
be encountered at all temperatures and altitudes. In fact, they are most
likely to occur in the upper levels of mature or decaying storms near
temperatures of -40 °C. The radicated belief that lightning strikes to
aircraft occur only near the freezing level and are always associated
with turbulence and precipitation demonstrated to be false. In addition,

the studies showed most strikes occurred in regions where turbulence

intensities were light to negligible.
If the airplane is in close proximity to a convective cell, a lightning strike
can happen even though the aircraft is flying in clear air and up to 25
NM from the convective area. It would be then advisable not to fly
through a narrow clear space between active cells.
2.5 ICING
Updrafts in a convective cell support abundant liquid water with
relatively large droplet sizes. When carried above the freezing level the
water becomes supercooled, freezing on impact with the cold surfaces
of an aircraft. The abundance of large, supercooled water droplets
makes clear icing very rapid between 0 °C and -15 °C. Clear icing can
occur at any altitude above the freezing level, but at high levels icing
from smaller droplets may be rime or mixed rime and clear. When
temperature in the upward current cools to about -15 °C, the amount of
supercooled water decreases, and much of the remaining water vapor
sublimates as ice crystals (fig. 2-3).
Fig. 2-3 Icing within a convective cloud

Accumulated icing may lower aircraft performance. Infact, ice accretion

increases stall speed, destroys the optimal airflow over wings,
increases drag and decreases lift, and it could also interfere with control
surfaces and landing gear. In jet engines it can damage compressor
blades and may cause engine failures.
2.6 TURBULENCE
Turbulence, associated with a MCS, can be extremely hazardous,
having the potential to cause overstressing of the aircraft. The gust
loads can be severe enough to stall an aircraft flying at manoeuvring
speed and vertical currents may be strong enough to displace an
aircraft vertically as much as 6000 feet. The greatest turbulence occurs
in the vicinity of adjacent rising or sinking drafts. Maximum turbulence
usually occurs near the mid-level of the storm, between 12,000 and
20,000 feet, and is most severe in clouds with the greatest vertical
development.
Severe turbulence is present not just within the cloud, but it can be
expected up to 20 NM from thunderstorms. Severe turbulence is most
of the times on the downwind side of the cell, both above and below the
the anvil1.
Thunderstorms can grow as rapidly as 6,000 feet per minute. Building
thunderstorms have a turbulence bow wave that may extend several
thousand feet above the visible top of the storm. The bow wave may
cause severe turbulence but is completely invisible to radar.
It is important to note that significant turbulence may exist well above
the radar top of the thunderstorm. Serious injury and even death have
occurred due to inadvertent penetration of thunderstorm tops turbulence
bow wave that radar failed to detect (fig. 2-4).
It is recommended to clear storm tops by a height of at least 5,000 feet.
The MCS is a multi-cell convective system, with cumulonimbus clouds
at various stages of development. Note that even though small
cumulous build-ups seldom reflect radar energy, they are still
associated with light to moderate turbulence.
1
When pilots have no choice but to fly on the downwind side of a storm, it
is recommended to use a separation of one mile for every knot of wind at
the altitude

Fig. 2-4 Thunderstorm bow wave
2.7 HAIL
Hail is a form of solid precipitation; it consists of balls or irregular lumps
of ice, each of which is referred to as a hail stone. Hail competes with
turbulence as the greatest thunderstorm hazard to aircraft. Large
hailstones are an indication of powerful updraft and downdraft winds
within a thunderstorm. This is why large hail is associated with severe
thunderstorms.
Supercooled drops above the freezing level begin to freeze. Once a
droplet has frozen, other droplets latch on and freeze to it, causing the
hailstone to grow into an iceball. Eventually, the hailstones fall, possibly
some distance from the storm core. Hail may be encountered in clear
air several miles from dark thunderstorm clouds, especially on the clear
anvil side of a large cumulonimbus.
Hail is most common within mid-latitude continental MCS such as squall
lines, as hail formation is considerably more likely when the freezing
level is below the altitude of 11,000 feet. Accordingly, hail is actually
less common in the ITCZ, despite a much higher frequency of
thunderstorms. For this reason, hail in the tropics occurs mainly at
higher altitudes. Hail growth becomes vanishingly small when air

temperatures fall below −30 °C, as supercooled water droplets become

rare at these temperatures.
Due to relative velocities of the hail and aircraft, hailstones larger than
one-half inch in diameter can significantly damage windshields, nose
radome, aircraft edges and control surfaces in a few seconds. Severely
cracked windshields may implode into the cockpit because of the
aerodynamic forces involved, although windscreen manufacturers
design multilayer glass that can withstand these forces. Major dents on
the leading edges of control surfaces and wings will have an effect on
the surfaces' airfoil airflow, thus affecting aircraft lift and controllability.
The pictures below illustrate the damage an airliner has undergone due
to a hailstorm encounter in flight (fig. 2-5).
Fig. 2-5 Hail damage
2.8 ICE CRYSTAL ICING

Strong convective weather is able to lift a high concentration of moisture
at high altitudes. The moisture, when it has reached temperatures well
below freezing, can freeze into very small ice crystals. The scientists
refer to this condition as High Ice Water Content (HIWC).
Ice crystals exist at temperature down to -60° and their size is very
small (40 microns), similar to baking flour. They can stay suspended at
altitude and spread out downwind. Upper level winds can transport
them for hundreds of miles.
Many times, areas of HIWC may be associated with decaying
convective cell within a MCS. HIWC regions are typically characterized
by weak updrafts that are not strong enough to lift large ice particles,
such as hail, to high altitudes, but are able to lift high concentrations of
small ice crystals up to the tropopause. Large ice particles, such as hail,

are effective radar reflectors and show up on weather radar. However,

radar returns are not reported during ice crystal engine events, leading
meteorologists to conclude that only small ice particles can be present
during these events.
The aviation industry has now connected a number of jet engine power-
loss and damage events to the ingestion of ice particles. These events
included engine surge, stall, flameout and rollback, engine compressor
damage due to ice shedding. All have occurred during flight near
convective weather, mostly at high altitude. In all events the engines
have recovered normal thrust quickly.
Pilots typically use the term icing conditions to refer to weather
conditions usually below 22,000 feet where supercooled liquid droplets
form ice on cold airframe surfaces. On the contrary, conditions
connected to engine power loss are thought to be due to completely
frozen ice crystals (fig. 2-6).
Fig. 2-6 Jet engine icing
While ice crystals do not adhere to aircraft surfaces, heated sensing

elements, like pitot and TAT probes (fig. 2-7) and the jet engine core
show to be more vulnerable to ice crystal icing. The ice particles when

in contact with a warm surface begin melting and other incoming

crystals merge with them causing an accumulation of ice.
Fig. 2-7 Pitot and TAT probes
The accretion of ice could cause obstruction and even a complete

blockage of the inlet and drainage of the pitot tubes. Standard/elder
pitot tubes installed on aircraft are more susceptible to this condition
since they only have one drainage system, while others have two
distinct and separate ones.
The building up of ice in the TAT probe causes a complete occlusion;
the ice which accumulates inside the probe starts to melt causing a
false/erratic temperature reading of 0°C. This is what causes the TAT
anomaly which has been reported by pilots during flights in areas of
high concentrations of ice crystals.
For the engine events, the dynamics are not yet fully understood. It is
supposed that, in the engine core, the accumulated ice on the warm
first stages of the compressor can disrupt the optimal airflow causing
the engine to surge or stall. The ice eventually sheds and blows off to
downstream engine components, such as the next stages of the
compressor, causing compressor blades damage or tip curling (figg. 2-
8, 2-9).

Fig. 2-8 Alitalia B777 compressor damage due to ice crystals
Fig. 2-9 Alitalia B777 tip curl
Furthermore, the ice can reach the combustion chamber and cause the
engine to flame out. In a HIWC condition, the use of engine anti-ice
system will not be helpful, as it could make the icing situation even
worse.

In a majority of ice-crystal icing engine events, convective weather

occurs in a very warm, moist, tropical-like environment and have been
reported in MCS such as hurricanes, typhoons, squall lines and tropical
storms. The atmosphere is generally slightly unstable, resulting in light-
to-moderate turbulence. Most events occurred in tropical environments,
when flying directly over heavy rain in the glaciated cloud above. A
smaller percentage of engine events (less than 20 percent), happen in
mid-latitude continental storms.
Engine events commonly occur at altitudes of 20,000 to 35,000 feet at
temperatures ranging from -10 °C to -40° C. However events at different
ranges of altitude and temperature were also reported.
Since the ice detector will not prove any useful, pilots need to be able to
recognise a potential ice crystal icing situation. Pilot reports have
demonstrated so far to be very important. When flying near convective
weather through ice crystal conditions, pilots have reported a lack of
airframe icing or ice detection, but they do notice the appearance of rain
on the windscreen, sometimes at temperatures too cold for liquid water
to exist. It has been confirmed that the appearance of rain, but with a
different sound, is caused by small ice particles melting on impact with
the heated windscreen.
Pilots have reported the appearance of Saint Elmo’s fires on the
windscreen accompanied by light to moderate turbulence. They have
also reported a TAT anomaly (temperature reading of 0°C) on
numerous occasions.
Some pilots reported heavy precipitation below, but little or no radar
returns at cruising flight level. For this reason, flight at temperatures
below freezing in visible moisture near deep convective weather, even
without radar returns, is very likely to be in ice crystal conditions.
2.8.1 Infrared satellite imagery
The areas of abnormally high ice-crystal concentration are believed to
originate from columnar ascent air mass in cumulonimbus cloud and
can be expected to drift downwind from the main area of cloud tops.
They are an entirely different phenomenon to the more normal
occurrence of the ice crystals which give rise to high level Cirrus,
Cirrostratus and Cirrocumulus cloud which are at much lower
concentrations and do not represent a similar hazard.
With a radar reflectivity of only about 5% of equal-sized raindrops, ice
crystals will not appear on weather radar display. Since they are most
often encountered dry without any co-existing super-cooled water, they

will not activate conventional ice detectors.
To this day, the only means to detect ice-crystals is the use and
interpretation of infrared satellite data. Satellite imagery has confirmed
that areas of high concentrations of very small ice crystals may exist
within and in the vicinity of large scale convective weather systems.
In tropical latitudes these systems are the most extensive and can
produce cloud tops as high as 50,000 feet because sea surface
temperatures are at their highest and so more water is absorbed into
the developing system. These ice crystals can remain long after the
active convection which produced them has begun to decay.
Fig. 2-10 Infrared satellite imagery

Fig. 2-11 Infrared satellite imagery
The images above (figg. 2-10 and 2-11) come from satellites which
remain above a fixed point on the Earth (geostationary). The infrared
image shows the invisible infrared radiation emitted directly by cloud
tops and land or ocean surfaces. The warmer an object is, the more
intensely it emits radiation, thus allowing us to determine its
temperature. These intensities can be converted into grey-scale or
colour tones, with warmer temperatures showing as darker tones and
cooler temperatures as lighter tones/colours thus establishing the
presence of ice crystals within and in the vicinity of a convective
system. Lighter areas show where the cloud tops are cooler and
therefore where weather features like ice crystal clouds are.
The advantage of infrared images is that they can be recorded every

hour. After a short delay, they will be updated on the web site.

3 AIRBORNE WEATHER RADAR SYSTEM

3.1 GENERAL
A careful use of the on board weather radar can help pilots to avoid or
mitigate the dangers related to the MCS.
The radar is a radio-electric system that uses the properties of
electromagnetic waves to be reflected by objects or, in the case of the
aircraft weather (WX) radar system, by precipitation.
The radar system is made up by a transmitter which generates
microwave pulses at given time intervals and by an antenna which
concentrates the energy of the microwaves in a narrow and highly
directional beam. The reflected pulses (radar echoes) are then
received by the same antenna (transmitter-receiver antenna) and
further processed by a system which is able to determine the distance
of the echoes as a function of the time it takes for the pulse to travel
back to the antenna. The information is then shown on a display
available to the pilots in the cockpit.
The quality of the image displayed depends on many factors such as
the power of the transmitter, the beam width, the pulse duration and the
pulse repetition rate (PRR) which are parameters set by the
manufacturer. Pilots though can intervene to modify parameters like the
range of the display, the tilt and gain of the antenna, in order to get a
better visual perception of the radar echoes.
It also should be taken into account that the strength of radar echoes
captured by the receiver is inversely proportional to the fourth power of
the distance between the aircraft and the weather target. Accordingly,
precipitation placed at great distance reflects a much weaker signal.
3.2 ANTENNA GAIN
An important element that can be manually adjusted by the pilots is the

Antenna Gain. The term describes how much energy leaving the
antenna is focused into a particular direction.
At a basic level, weather radar measures the amount of moisture
present in the atmosphere. Calibrated gain within the weather radar’s
circuitry associates different amounts of moisture (or rainfall rates) with
a particular colour level on a weather radar display: GREEN represents
a weak rainfall rate of 0.03 to 0.15 inches/hour (in/hr), AMBER between
0.16 and 0.5 in/hr, and RED represents a rainfall rate that is greater
than 0.5 in/hr. Note that BLACK is also a colour level. BLACK on a WX
radar display does not mean that rainy weather is not present (although
this may be the case), it simply means that the rainfall rate is less than
0.03 in/hr. MAGENTA colour return does not represent a precipitation
rate. It displays turbulent airflow that, in essence, represents a raindrop
movement of greater than 5 meters/second.
Also note that each colour level represents a gain change of 10dBz.
GREEN is 20 dBz, AMBER is 30 dBz, and RED is 40 dBz or greater.
Therefore, changing the gain by 10dBz will change the display by one
colour level. It must be taken into account though that in most Rockwell-
Collins and Honeywell airborne weather radars, the full clockwise
position of the gain knob displaces the gain setting by a maximum of 16
dBz.
3.3 REFLECTIVITY
Precipitation has also its own gain, which means the quality to focus the
reflected energy towards the aircraft. This type of gain depends on the
surface, shape and structure of the precipitation and is called
reflectivity.
The radiation emitted by the aircraft radar is either partly reflected,
absorbed or refracted by the precipitation (fig 3-1).
Fig. 3-1 Water droplet reflectivity

Different types of precipitation produce echoes at different intensity (fig.

3-2).
Fig. 3-2 Precipitation reflectivity
Rain refracts only a small portion of the radiation received; it reflects

and absorbs most of it. The larger the size and amount of droplets the
greater the absorbtion.
Dry hail behaves more or less the same way.
It is important to notice that most of the radiation is instead reflected by
wet hail, thus making it difficult to identify echoes behind it, since the
first reflecting layer could not allow a further penetration of the radar
beam.
Ice crystals have completely different characteristics. They refract most
of the energy received and for this reason could not be detectable as
radar echoes.

3.4 CONVECTIVE CELL REFLECTIVITY
Convective cell reflectivity, in general, can be divided into three parts

(fig. 3-3).
Fig.3-3 Convective cell reflectivity
The bottom part of the storm is below the freezing level and, since it’s
composed entirely of water, is the part that reflects the radar energy
most efficiently. The middle part of the cell is composed mostly of
supercooled water droplets and ice crystals. Reflectivity in this area
strongly diminishes because ice crystals are very poor radar reflectors.

The top part of the cloud is composed entirely of ice crystals and is
almost invisible to radar. In addition, a growing thunderstorm may have
a turbulence bow wave above the visible portion of the storm.
Besides the single convective cell reflectivity, it is important to know that
storms reflectivity can vary dramatically depending on the different
geographic regions in which they are formed.
Recent meteorological research has shown that thunderstorm
reflectivity characteristics vary significantly depending upon location and
even time of the year. Mid-latitude land mass thunderstorms exhibit
reflectivity profiles that are quite different from equatorial land storms
which are different from equatorial oceanic storms.
Oceanic weather cells tend to have less water mass and significantly
less reflectivity than continental thunderstorms of equivalent height. For
example, oceanic convective weather is, on average, one thousand
times less reflective than storms of corresponding height that form over
land. Therefore, during oceanic flights, a higher antenna gain setting
may be required in order to adequately detect weather threats.
3.5 ANTENNA TILT CONTROL MANAGEMENT

While the pilots cannot control the radar horizontal scanning, which is
fully automatic, they can manually operate the orientation of the
antenna tilt. A proper tilt management is necessary to monitor the
convective activity in a MCS, so to avoid or reduce the risks to the
aircraft and its occupants.
During takeoff and landing, due to the increased workload of the flight
crew, a recommended method is to set a +5° of tilt angle below
10,000feet2 and +2° when above 10,000 feet. These tilt angles will
detect most weather while at the same time eliminating the majority of
ground clutter. The benefit of this method is that the tilt setting can be
set and forgotten during the critical departure and approach phases of
flight.
While convective activity may be a problem at low and mid altitudes, the
problem becomes a significant threat at high cruise altitudes. At cruise
altitudes, with tilt and gain adjusted to display en-route weather, it is not
2
1° of tilt angle yields approximately 4,000 feet of beam position change.
Tilt setting at +5° results in the centre of the beam to be at 20,000 feet.
(4,000 X 5)
uncommon for pilots to scan over the top of the reflective portion of the
thunderstorm, while the low-reflective top portion of the storm still in the
aircraft flight path goes undetected. As the aircraft approaches the non-
reflective top of the thunderstorm, and the flight crew fails to adjust the
tilt angle, the reflective portion of the storm falls beneath the radar beam
and the weather threat disappears from the display. This may cause
the pilots to erroneously believe that the convective activity is below the
aircraft or has diminished its strength (fig. 3-4).
Fig.3-4 Incorrect tilt management

If an airplane is flying IMC above the freezing level and there are
AMBER and RED radar returns in the vicinity of cloud tops up to the
tropopause, regions of HIWC may be in the area. In this scenario, the
pilot should point the radar down to look below the freezing level
applying what Boeing calls aggressive down-tilting. If AMBER and
RED areas indicating heavy rain are detected below the freezing level,
HIWC are possible above these moderate to heavy rain regions. Under
these conditions, the pilot should consider evasive action.
The illustration below is an example of the down-tilt angle needed at a
cruise altitude of 37,000 feet and with a freezing level at 16,000 feet,
which could be an average freezing level during the crossing of the
ITCZ, an ideal environment for the formation of the MCS (fig. 3-5).
Fig. 3-5 Aggressive down-tilting
When flying over oceans, in addition to the increased gain as previously

mentioned, lower than usual tilt settings may be required due to the
poor reflective nature of oceanic weather.
The table below provides tilt settings, as recommended by Rockwell-
Collins for aircraft operating over water. The recommended tilt settings
place the lower part of the antenna beam at the edge of the outer
range scale.

Altitude (feet) 40 NM 80 NM 160 NM

40,000 -7° -3° -2°
35,000 -6° -2° -1°
30,000 -4° -1° 0°
25,000 -3° -1° 0°
20,000 -2° 0° +1°
Pilots should be aware that the weather radar will not display frozen dry
top precipitation such as snow or ice crystals, due to low reflectivity.
These low reflectivity targets could be accompanied by turbulence. This
fact should be taken into account, and for this reason pilots should not
attempt to clear the top of the cloud by less than 5,000 feet.
Furthermore, if the top of the convective cell is above 25,000 feet,
overflying should be avoided due to the possibility of encountering
turbulence stronger than expected.
The height of a radar top can be estimated by raising the antenna tilt
angle until the storm disappears from the radar screen. The height of
the cloud top is then :
Aircraft Altitude + ( tilt angle x distance x 100)
3.6 TARGET SHAPES
A normal thunderstorm is circular or oval in shape (fig. 3-6)
Fig 3-6 Normal thunderstorm echo shape Fig. 3-7 Steep gradient echo
Shear conditions within the convective system can bend or deform the
normal shape of the radar echo. Distorted target shapes are a good
indication of turbulence.
Scallopes, fingers, hooks and U-shapes (fig.3-8) on weather radar

returns point the presence of shear, severe turbulence and hail within
the thunderstorm and in proximity of it.
Fig 3-8 Significant echo shapes
It is recommended to increase the weather avoidance distance by 50%

when the echoes are showing such shapes.
The pictures below are images of the cockpit radar display taken during
the encounter of a MCS in the ITCZ. High gradient and characteristic
shape patterns, as illustrated above, are clearly recognisable (fig. 3-9).
Fig. 3-9 MCS radar echo

3.7 PATH ATTENUATION
Because the weather radar display depends on signal returns, heavy

precipitation may conceal even stronger weather.
It is possible, due to a large area of heavy precipitation, for the signal to

be reflected erroneously or become absorbed by the moisture. The
major part of the signal is reflected by the frontal part of the precipitation
while the aft part returns weak signals, which are displayed as GREEN
or BLACK areas. The flight crew may interpret these as a no/small
threat areas. Most likely that could be the strongest part of the
thunderstorm. This phenomenon is called attenuation. Most radars are
equipped with a Path Attenuation function which warns pilots when a
signal attenuation occurs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology - Aviation Hazards: Thunderstorms

and Deep Convection - Commonwealth of Australia Bureau of Meteorology 2006
AC00-24B – Thunderstorms - FAA Advisory Circular, 2011
G. Kulesa - ThePotential Impacts of Climate Change on Transportation - Federal

Research Partnership Workshop, 2002
J. T. Distefano – Analysis of a Thunderstorm Downburts –Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, 1983
B.D. Fisher, G.L. Keyser Jr., P.L. Deal – Lightning Attachment Patterns and Flight
Conditions for Storm Hazards – NASA Technical Paper, 1982
J.D. Chapdelaine – Aircraft and Lightning Strikes - Jack D. Chapdelaine EMI

Consultant, 2001
M. L. Grzych, J.G. Mason – Weather Conditions Associated with Jet Engine

Power Loss and Damagedue to Ingestion of Ice Particles: What we’ve learned
through 2009 - Boeing, 2010
J. Mason - Engine Power Loss in Ice Crystal Conditions – BoeingAeromagazine

qtr04, 2007
M.L. Grzych - Avoiding Convective Weather Linked to Ice Crystal Icing Engine
Events – Boeing Aeromagazine qtr01, 2010
Jeanne Mason, Bill McKenzie – Additional figures for Alitalia Ice Crystal
Discussion - Boeing, 2011
CollinsWXR-2100MultiScan™ Radar Operator’s guide, Rockwell-Collins, 2003.
Ian Gilbert - Airborne Weather Radar Interpretation – Honeywell, 2005
Roberto Tonelli, Paolo Belli – Meteorologia Aeronautica – Hoepli, 2007
A320 family AOM – Alitalia, 2002
Ed Brotak – Convectional Wisdom - Aerosafety World – June 2011
Ed Brotak – Wasty Surprise – Aerosafety World – October 2009
American Meteorological Society (2000) - Glossary of Meteorology– Line echo

wave pattern – Retrieved 2012-01-09

American Meteorological Society (2000) - Glossary of Meteorology – Bow echo –

Retrieved 2012-01-09
American Meteorological Society (2000) - Glossary of Meteorology – Derecho –

Retrieved 2012-01-09
American Meteorological Society (2000) - Glossary of Meteorology – Mesoscale

Convective System – Retrieved 2012-01-09
Quasi-Linear Convective System Mesovorticies and Tornadoes -

www.meteor.iastate.edu
Structure and Evolution of Squall Line and Bow Echo Convective System-
www.crh.noaa.gov
High Level Ice Crystal Icing: Effects on Engine – www.skybrary.aero - 2011
Europe: Infrared Satellite Animation – www.metoffice.gov.uk - 2012
Infrared Weather Satellite Imagery Viewers from NASA –

wwwghcc.msfc.nasa.com - 2012

I.T.O. N° 6
nuova serie
IN-FLIGHT FUEL MANAGEMENT
SDT – OCT 2013

IN-FLIGHT FUEL MANAGEMENT 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 3
SCENARIO 1
DIVERSION TO THE PLANNED ALTERNATE - MINIMUM FUEL ................................ 6
SCENARIO 2
DIVERSION TO AN EMERGENCY AERODROME - EMERGENCY FUEL.................10
SCENARIO 3
COMMIT TO DESTINATION (EN-ROUTE) – MINIMUM FUEL ...................................15
SCENARIO 4
COMMIT TO DESTINATION (TERMINAL AREA) – MINIMUM FUEL .........................20
2. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 24
Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°6 OCT 2013


1. INTRODUCTION
In conformance with ICAO Annex 6 and EU-OPS provisions, Alitalia has
established policies and procedures applicable to Flight Crews for the purposes
of ensuring usable fuel remaining is monitored and appropriately managed in-
flight.
Company procedures are established to support an operational culture that
ensures (see figure 1):
- the continual validation or invalidation of assumptions made during the
pre-flight planning or in-flight re-planning;
- in-flight management, re-analysis and adjustment occurring when
necessary;
- the protection of Final Reserve fuel and safe flight completion.
In-flight fuel management policies are not intended to replace pre-flight planning
or in-flight re-planning activities but to act as controls to ensure planning
assumptions are continually validated. Such validation is necessary to initiate,
when necessary, the reanalysis and adjustment activities that will ultimately
ensure the safe completion of each flight.
In fact, these assumptions can be quickly invalidated by inconsistent Flight
Crew actions or unforeseen circumstances encountered. Given this
potential, it is essential for Flight CMs to understand their role and responsibility
related to the Company’s fuel policy. This is especially important when fuel

carriage is optimized for the route and continual re-analysis/adjustment is crucial

to ensuring the completion of the flight as planned.
This document provides four scenarios, based on Normal Fuel Planning, which
illustrate how to implement the Company policy and the procedures for in-flight
fuel management defined in the O.M. A General Basic, and include detailed
guidance on how to properly handle Normal/Abnormal Fuel states and
Emergency Fuel conditions.
RTF communication examples are included in each scenario: both ATC and
Flight Crew communications are edited for brevity and are not all inclusive radio
transmissions.
In this context, it’s to be noted that there is no specific phraseology
recommended for use with ATC in “requesting delay information” as each
situation may be very different.
The Flight Crew would use the information obtained from this request, however,
to determine the best course of action up to and including a determination of
when it would be necessary to divert to an alternate aerodrome and/or make
additional declarations related to the fuel state of the flight. Example phraseology
as well as the appropriate time to use it is contained in low fuel scenarios.
On the other hand, Annex 6 and PANS-ATM (Procedures for Air Navigation
Services - Air Traffic Management Doc. 4444) are now aligned in their guidance
regarding the definition and intent of the terms “MINIMUM FUEL” and “MAYDAY
MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL”. The low fuel scenarios highlight when to use each
term and are also provided as a means to clearly differentiate between such
declarations.
A significant element in the scenarios is that each time “MINIMUM FUEL” is
declared, the Flight Crew has already committed to land at a specific aerodrome
and is concerned that a landing may occur with less than Final Reserve fuel in
the tanks.
NOTE: Flight Crews shall refer to RM-Network-CRAR for specific state
regulations and related additional guidance with regard to the “MINIMUM FUEL”
declaration.
Flight CMs must recognize that the coordinated escalation process (with ATC)
related to the protection of Final Reserve fuel typically occurs in 3 steps. Each
situation is different, however, and may be resolved at any stage in the process.
As per Company policy, the following table summarizes the 3-steps required of
Flight Crews to protect the Final Reserve fuel.

PROTECTING FINAL RESERVE FUEL

Request delay information when unanticipated circumstances
may result in landing at an aerodrome with less than the Final
Step 1
Reserve fuel plus any fuel required to proceed to an alternate
aerodrome.
Declare “MINUMUM FUEL” when committed to land at a
Step 2 specific aerodrome and any change in the existing clearance
may result in a landing with less than Final Reserve fuel.
Declare a fuel emergency (“MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY
FUEL”) when the calculated fuel on landing at the nearest
Step 3
adequate aerodrome, where a safe landing can be made, is
less than the Final Reserve fuel.

Scenario 1: Diversion to the destination planned alternate aerodrome

“MINIMUM FUEL”
Narrative
An aeroplane arrives in the vicinity of the destination aerodrome (MMAB) with
flight planned fuel on board (i.e. Total Reserve fuel completely available) and is
asked to hold for 5 minutes due to traffic congestion. This is acceptable to the
Flight Crew as Contingency fuel (3% Trip fuel equal to 13 min of holding) was
uplifted to compensate for unforeseen factors.
Time passes and it becomes apparent that 5 minutes of holding will be
insufficient to ease the congestion.
In compliance with Company procedures, the Flight Crew requests delay
information from ATC and is informed to expect an additional 15 min delay: an
Expected Approach Time is issued accordingly.
The Flight Crew checks the fuel state: ATC is then informed that the flight cannot
hold any longer than the original 5 minutes and a clearance to the planned
alternate aerodrome (MMXZ) is consequently requested.
The flight receives a new clearance and proceeds to MMXZ which now becomes
the committed aerodrome of intended landing as most of the Contingency fuel
has been consumed and the Flight Crew is concerned that they may begin
burning into required reserves.
Meteorological conditions encountered en-route require a re-route to the
alternate which in turn requires more fuel. When the aeroplane is clear of the
meteorological conditions and is proceeding to the alternate aerodrome the Flight
Crew calculates that, barring any further delay, the flight will be landing with a
fuel quantity slightly above the Final Reserve. The Crew also notes that any
change to the current clearance to the alternate would likely result in a landing
with less than Final Reserve fuel in the tanks.
The Flight Crew informs ATC of the situation by declaring “MINIMUM FUEL”. The
Controller acknowledges the “MINIMUM FUEL” call and informs the Flight Crew
that no delay is expected.
The aeroplane proceeds to and lands at the alternate aerodrome with more than
Final Reserve fuel.
Explanation
In this scenario, the aeroplane was subject to delays that consumed most of the
planned Contingency fuel and later diverted to the planned destination alternate
aerodrome (MMXZ).
A “MINIMUM FUEL” state did not exist while proceeding to the original
destination aerodrome (MMAB) as the option to diverting to the alternate without
sacrificing required reserves was still a viable option.
When the aeroplane, however, encountered significant weather requiring a re-
route to the alternate, the remaining Contingency fuel was further eroded.
Based on the fuel used and once the aeroplane was back on course to MMXZ,
the Flight Crew determined that any further delay en-route to the alternate
aerodrome to which the flight was committed to land would result in landing with
less than Final Reserve Fuel.
The “MINIMUM FUEL” call was used appropriately in this case as it described
the fuel state of the aeroplane to the Controller clearly, succinctly and in
accordance with current regulations.
In other words, the declaration informed the Controller that additional delays
could not be accepted and the Controller responded by informing the Flight Crew
that no delay was expected.
The Controller also provided additional relevant information, kept the flight
informed of any additional delay and passed along any relevant information when
transferring the aeroplane to other ATC units. Both ATC and the Flight Crew
maintained a heightened state of fuel situational awareness and the aeroplane
proceeded to the aerodrome as cleared and landed uneventfully.
It is important to note that the “MINIMUM FUEL” phraseology was used as
intended to convey the fuel status of the aeroplane. It was neither a declaration
of urgency nor an emergency declaration and the aeroplane was treated as
cleared (i.e. without priority), keeping the same approach sequence.
However, ATC did take action to keep the Flight Crew informed of any delay or
change to the previously issued clearance and was required to coordinate with
other ATC units to ensure the “MINIMUM FUEL” state of the flight was passed
along thus preventing a potential fuel emergency situation from occurring.

RTF communications
Flight Crew ATC

MMAB Approach, AZA123, passing AZA123, MMAB Approach, hold as
FL 120, descending to FL150 published at SAURI, expect 5 minutes of
delay due to traffic congestion
Readback
AZA123, MMAB Approach, you are
number 7 in the approach, your Expected
Approach Time is 1525, continue holding
at SAURI, maintain FL 150
MMAB Approach, AZA123, unable to AZA123, MMAB Approach, cleared to

hold any longer and requesting MMXZ via direct XYZ VOR, V43 OLLIE ,
clearance to MMXZ climb to FL 200
Readback
MMAB Approach, AZA123, request AZA123, MMAB Approach, you are

to deviate 45 degrees to the right for 60 CLEARED to deviate right of course as
NM to avoid weather ahead. requested, report your heading and advise
when able to PROCEED DIRECT MMXZ
on MMXZ Approach frequency 125.500
Readback
MMXZ Approach, AZA123, ROGER AZA123, MINIMUM FUEL.

proceeding direct MMXZ and declaring Expect no further delay, continue as
MINIMUM FUEL at this time. cleared, you are number 2 for the
approach.

Outcome
The events described in this scenario are not out of the ordinary.
The Flight Crew made a sound Decision Making by initiating the diversion with
an appropriate fuel margin over the applicable MDF to take account of
existing operational conditions (i.e. expected en-route adverse weather).
The “MINIMUM FUEL” declaration was simply used by the Flight Crew to make
ATC aware that circumstances had reached a point where any further change to
the current clearance could have resulted in an emergency due to fuel.
However, the flight concluded at the planned alternate aerodrome (MMXZ),
having met all fuel requirements including the protection of Final Reserve fuel.

Scenario 2: Diversion to an emergency aerodrome

Emergency fuel (“MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL”)
Narrative
The Block Fuel uplifted for the flight allotted 30 minutes of Extra fuel for holding
upon arrival at KXYZ to compensate for anticipated adverse meteorological
conditions and consequent traffic congestion delays. The OFP also allotted
Alternate fuel for the destination alternate aerodrome (KABC) located 150 miles
north of the destination.
AZA123 arrives in the Terminal Area and is instructed to hold south of its
destination. The meteorological conditions are deteriorating rapidly in the vicinity
of the destination aerodrome with a front moving in faster than expected.
Upon initial contact with ATC, the flight is instructed to hold for 20 minutes. In the
holding pattern, the Flight Crew completes in-flight management procedures to
include re-checking the destination meteorological conditions, considering a
possible diversion at a pre-determined time as well as determining the point in
time and fuel remaining required to depart the holding pattern to start the
approach at destination.
After 20 minutes of holding, ATC directs the flight to proceed to the IAF (closer to
the destination) and clears it to descend to a lower altitude. The EAT issued at
the IAF adds 20 minutes of flight time which will totally burn the Contingency fuel
(10 min of holding, Company minimum).
The Flight Crew recalculates the expected landing fuel at destination based on
the new EAT and is concerned that they will begin burning into required reserves
(i.e. Minimum Diverting Fuel = Alternate fuel + Final Reserve fuel).
The Flight Crew requests additional delay information from ATC. ATC then
advises that they will be cleared to the destination at or before the previously
issued EAT. 5 minutes prior to the EAT, the aeroplane is issued a clearance for
the approach and is informed that no further delay is expected.
Shortly after issuing the clearance, ATC informs the Flight Crew that low level
windshear warnings were reported by several preceding aircraft on final
approach to KXYZ.
The Flight Crew elects to continue but unfortunately, the meteorological
conditions at destination continue to deteriorate, with prevailing winds and
visibility that limit arrivals to only one runway. The Flight Crew flies an approach
to the available runway and executes a missed approach due to a windshear
encounter on short final.

Aware that Contingency fuel has been nearly consumed, the Flight Crew asks
and receives a clearance to their alternate (KABC) with a minimal fuel margin
over MDF.
The Flight Crew simultaneously declares “MINIMUM FUEL” based on fuel
remaining calculations, their commitment to the alternate aerodrome and the
possibility that any delay incurred en-route may result in a landing at the
alternate with less than Final Reserve fuel remaining.
ATC advises that no further delay is expected and clears the flight to the
alternate aerodrome.
En-route, the aeroplane is advised that the runway at their alternate aerodrome
is temporarily closed due to an emergency in progress. The Flight Crew
immediately declares “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL”.
The Flight Crew rapidly recalls the on-going Decision Making process: the Crew
reviews the established back-up plan and accordingly requests to proceed to
KJKL, a military field which is the nearest adequate aerodrome, not much farther
than KABC, where a safe landing can be made.
The Flight Crew informs ATC that they will go direct to KJKL. The aeroplane is
cleared as requested and lands at KJKL with 80% of Final Reserve fuel in the
tanks, due to the proximity of the emergency divert aerodrome.
Explanation
In this scenario, when the flight is first held in the vicinity of the scheduled
destination (KXYZ), the flight could still divert to the alternate aerodrome while
maintaining the required fuel reserves, including Final Reserve fuel.
As such and at that point in the flight, a “MINIMUM FUEL” declaration would
have been inappropriate as the flight had yet to commit to an aerodrome and
there was sufficient fuel on board to protect Final Reserve fuel upon landing at
either the destination or alternate aerodrome.
The second holding clearance (EAT at the IAF), however, threatened to
consume all of the flight's Extra and Contingency fuel allocated for holding and
unforeseen events, thereby reducing the options to a landing at the destination (if
additional delays were likely) or a pre-emptive diversion to the alternate.
The potential to burn into the Alternate fuel required to divert triggered the query
regarding additional delays.
When the flight missed the approach at the scheduled destination and elected to
“commit” to the alternate, the Commander declared “MINIMUM FUEL” as Final
Reserve fuel could no longer be protected if additional delays were encountered.

Unfortunately, while en route to the alternate (KABC), additional delays were

encountered requiring the Flight Crew to declare an emergency. By broadcasting
“MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL”, the Commander utilized his/her
emergency authority to proceed to and land at a military aerodrome (KJKL) that
would have been otherwise unavailable.

RTF communications
Flight Crew ATC
KXYZ Approach, AZA123, FL 240, on AZA123, KXYZ Approach, cleared direct
course to DANYL DOOGI. Hold as published, expect 20
minutes of delay
Readback
AZA123, KXYZ Approach, direct AGORI,
descend to FL 190. Hold as published,
Expected Approach Time at 1050
Readback and (free text)… Have the
Expected Approach Times been fairly AZA123, KXYZ Approach, no further delay
accurate? expected
AZA123, KXYZ Approach, cleared ILS

Yankee Runway 08, be advised
decreasing performance windshear
has been reported at 1000 feet by a
Readback preceeding B737
KXYZ Approach, AZA123, missed AZA123, KXYZ Approach, roger, cleared to

approach requesting diversion to KABC KABC via direct ZZZ VOR J63 FRANK,
climb to FL 240, contact KABC approach on
133.150
Readback
KABC Approach, AZA123, MINIMUM AZA123, KABC Approach, roger, MINIMUM

FUEL FUEL
AZA123 , KABC Approach, be advised
that runway 27/09 is temporarily closed
due to an emergency in progress. It is
estimated to re-open in 30 minutes,
report your intentions
KXYZ Approach, AZA123, roger,
MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL,
requesting diversion to KJKL
AZA123, roger MAYDAY FUEL, turn left
heading 360 climb to FL 120
Readback

Outcome
In this scenario, when the aeroplane executed the missed approach at KXYZ and
proceeded to the alternate aerodrome (KABC), the flight was still operating as
planned.
That is to say, the Normal flight planning fuel accounted for the possibility of
missing an approach at the destination and proceeding to the planned alternate.
Due to the subsequent delays at KXYZ and a decision to divert to KABC,
however, it became apparent that little if any additional delay could be accepted,
thus triggering the declaration of “MINIMUM FUEL”.
Up to this point the flight could still be considered "routine", until the Flight Crew
was informed that the runway at KABC was temporarily closed.
This warranted the “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL” declaration as all
apparently available options would have, in the judgment of the Commander,
resulted in landing with less than the planned Final Reserve fuel.
Declaring an emergency, however, provided the flight with additional options. In
this case KJKL, a normally unavailable military field, became a viable option for
the aeroplane to able to land while protecting as much fuel remaining as
possible.

Scenario 3: “Commit” to destination - En-route

Abnormal Fuel State - “MINIMUM FUEL”
Narrative
AZA123 is flying to YSAB. The planned destination alternate aerodrome, YSXZ,
is located 180 miles south and is the only available alternate aerodrome due to a
stationary frontal system surrounding YSAB.
The Block Fuel uplifted for the flight allotted Extra fuel (20 minutes of endurance)
for anticipated adverse weather along the route to destination and from
destination to the planned alternate possibly requiring route deviations.
While taxing out for departure, the flight is subjected to extended delays due to
single runway operations, the other runway being temporarily closed due to an
emergency in progress. As a consequence, both Contingency and Extra fuel are
nearly burned before take-off.
During cruise, a number of route deviations are required (as expected) to avoid
significant weather on course to destination.
At approximately 300 NM from YSAB, Flight Crew Members are accomplishing
their in-flight fuel management duties in accordance with the Company policy
and procedure, such as checking the meteorological conditions, considering
diversion options, and completing required fuel calculations.
As a result of these duties, the Flight Crew determines that the expected usable
fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is less than the Minimum Diverting
Fuel, which puts the flight in an Abnormal Fuel State.
Since recovery to a Normal Fuel State is not practicable (e.g. re-planning
“Without Destination Alternate aerodrome” is not an option due to the destination
being provided with one runway), the Flight Crew must now decide whether to
proceed to destination or to divert to a suitable en-route alternate aerodrome,
where a safe landing can be performed with not less than the Final Reserve fuel.
A suitable en-route aerodrome (YMNM) is available and can be reached in 45
min; METAR+TREND forecast weather for the expected landing time is used, as
required by the Company policy, to assess the suitability of such aerodrome so
as to assure, to the greatest extent practicable, that a landing could be safely
accomplished.
Weather conditions at destination are good and predicted stable; for the time
being, the Flight Crew elects to proceed to destination.
Approaching the Terminal Area, with the selected en-route alternate (YMNM) still
at reach, the Flight Crew requests delay information from ATC. ATC responds

that minor delays in the YSAB terminal area are likely, given a runway change in
progress, and clears AZA123 to the IAF with instructions for a 5 minute holding.
The Flight Crew calculates that, besides the fuel required for the assigned
holding, the flight has fuel available for an additional holding of 20 min and then
would still be able to land with fuel slightly above the planned Final Reserve fuel
quantity.
The Flight Crew makes the decision to “commit” to destination maintaining the
Abnormal Fuel State and informs ATC that, while not yet ready to declare
“MINIMUM FUEL”, they are committed to a landing at YSAB.
After 5 minutes passed in the hold, ATC clears AZA123 to a lower altitude and
issues an EAT that adds 15 minutes of flight time. AZA123 acknowledges the
new clearance.
Shortly after, the Flight Crew declares “MINIMUM FUEL”: at this point the
aeroplane is estimating to land with 35 min of fuel and, in the judgment of the
Commander, any additional delay may result in a landing at YSAB with less than
Final Reserve fuel in the tanks.
What the Flight Crew did not know is that prior to the “MINIMUM FUEL”
declaration by the Commander, ATC had already intended to clear AZA123 for
the approach. The Controller asks whether an approach clearance at the
conclusion of the present orbit in the holding pattern would be acceptable to the
Flight Crew.
The Flight Crew accepts the Controller’s offer and ATC issues an approach
clearance.
The flight lands with more than the Final Reserve fuel in the tanks.
Explanation
When a flight drifts into an Abnormal Fuel State and a fuel leak or other engine
issues can be positively excluded, appropriate corrective actions must be timely
taken so as to recover to the Normal Fuel State.
Actions that can be accomplished include, in-flight re-planning (e.g. without
destination alternate aerodrome or with an alternate requiring less ALTN fuel),
and implementation of fuel saving best practices (e.g. request direct routings,
optimize the cruise FL in accordance with current conditions, fly a lower CI down
to CI=0).
En-route, while faced with an Abnormal Fuel State and deciding on the safest
course of action, the Flight Crew analyzes significant factors such as, cause of
invalidation of planning assumptions (in this scenario, unexpected departure
delays), operational and weather conditions prevailing/expected at the
destination aerodrome, at the destination alternate aerodrome, and at any other

suitable aerodrome, maximum known delay and determinability of an EAT at
destination, Company guidelines on suitability of aerodromes for diversion.
Should recovery to a Normal Fuel State prove impracticable or unsuccessful, one
Company procedural means to manage fuel at any critical point in the flight is to
use the Alternate Fuel to continue to proceed to, or hold at, the destination
aerodrome. It may be used when the Commander decides a safe landing, with
not less than Final Reserve fuel remaining, can be accomplished at the
destination aerodrome.
It’s to be noted that most decisions whether to “Commit” to the destination
or divert to an alternate imply landing without a further alternate available,
making the decision to “Commit” to destination nothing unique. It follows that
both of the above options involve reduced operational margins to assure a safe
landing while protecting Final Reserve fuel.
In this context, the availability of a suitable en-route alternate aerodrome is
required by the in-flight fuel management policy to continue as scheduled when
the flight is still too far from destination to properly evaluate existing and
expected arrival operational conditions (e.g. runway in use, delays, weather). At
this stage, an alternate means of compliance with the Company policy would
have been to plan FINRES plus 15 minutes of holding fuel (i.e. 1 ½ FINRES) as
minimum remaining fuel upon touchdown at destination where landing can be
assured.
When in the Terminal Area, with the Flight Crew now well aware of unambiguous
operational conditions (in this case considered acceptable), the events described
in the scenario had the potential to rapidly deteriorate into an emergency.
The Flight Crew and ATC were able to resolve the issue in an orderly and
uneventful manner, however, based on a common understanding of the fuel
state of the aeroplane.
When ATC informed the Flight Crew of the expected delay at YSAB (initially 5
min), the initial calculation indicated that they would land with the Final Reserve
fuel (30 min) plus 20 minutes (50 min total fuel). Although the aeroplane was
committed to land at destination, the flight still had some operational flexibility (20
min of fuel) and was not presently in a “MINIMUM FUEL” state.
When AZA123 was given an additional holding clearance, the Flight Crew
proactively informed ATC by declaring a “MINIMUM FUEL” state. ATC consulted
with the Flight Crew about the intention of issuing an approach clearance,
subsequently cleared the aeroplane for the approach and the aeroplane landed
with more than Final Reserve fuel.

RTF communications
Flight Crew ATC

AZA123, YSAB approach, be advised
we are just now switching the runway in
use due to the winds
YSAB approach, AZA123, roger, should
we expect delays?
AZA123, YSAB approach, affirmative,
hold at ROBYP as published, expect
5 minutes of delay
Readback
YSAB approach, AZA123, be advised

YSAB is our only option and we may
need to declare “MINIMUM FUEL”.
ROGER AZA123, are you declaring
MINIMUM FUEL?
YSAB approach, AZA123, negative, not

at this time
AZA123, YSAB approach, we are still
carrying out the runway inspection, your
revised Expected Approach Time is
Readback
1045
YSAB approach, AZA123, “MINIMUM

FUEL” AZA123, YSAB approach, roger
MINIMUM FUEL. Are you able to finish
the holding pattern before being cleared
for the approach ?
YSAB approach, AZA123, affirmative AZA123, YSAB approach, after ROBYP,
cleared for the ILS approach Zulu RWY
29
Readback
Outcome
The scenario, while not necessarily routine, benefited from the correct enactment
of the Company fuel policy and a common understanding of the term “MINIMUM
FUEL” that allowed the Flight Crew and ATC to appropriately manage the
situation.
The Flight Crew proactively kept ATC informed of their fuel state and ATC
shared their intentions with the Flight Crew (conclude the present hold before
proceeding with the approach clearance).
The RTF communications between the Flight Crew and ATC were concise,
focused on solutions rather than further describing the problem and in
accordance with the definition of the term “MINIMUM FUEL” as intended in the
ICAO Annex 6 provisions.

Scenario 4: “Commit” to destination - Terminal area

Abnormal Fuel state - “MINIMUM FUEL”
Narrative
AZA123 arrives in the Terminal Area of its planned destination aerodrome,
KDEN, with 25 minutes of Contingency fuel, Alternate fuel to enable the Crew to
fly to their planned alternate aerodrome (KCOS), and Final Reserve fuel intact.
After being assigned an EAT and holding for some time, thus burning most of the
planned Contingency fuel, the Crew is advised by ATC of an additional 10 min
EAT at destination due to unexpected runway closures. Specifically, ATC
advises that the primary runway is closed due to a disabled aeroplane and the
secondary runway is undergoing a standard hourly inspection which is supposed
to be completed in few minutes.
This additional delay puts the flight in an Abnormal Fuel State: the Flight Crew
must now decide whether to proceed to destination or to divert to the planned
alternate aerodrome.
The Flight Crew requests delay information from ATC. ATC advises that, at the
end of the assigned holding, AZA123 will be number five in sequence for the ILS
approach.
According to the current KCOS METAR+TREND, the weather at the planned
destination alternate aerodrome is marginal and deteriorating rapidly: the only
landing option for the current surface winds is a VOR approach procedure on a
2.400 mt runway with a 450 ft MDH and required VIS of 3.000 mt. Due to severe
meteorological conditions throughout the region, there is no other suitable
alternate aerodrome available that would allow the Flight Crew to retain both
landing options (i.e. destination and alternate aerodrome) while holding at
destination.
The Flight crew elects to continue holding maintaining an Abnormal Fuel State
thus “committing” to destination. Operating in accordance with current
regulations, the Flight Crew declares “MINIMUM FUEL” at this point as the flight
is committed to landing at destination, and any further delay from this point in the
flight may result in a landing with less than Final Reserve fuel in the tanks.
This has not yet developed into an emergency as the flight still has part of the
Alternate Fuel (15 min of holding) which adds some operational flexibility, plus
Final Reserve fuel remaining.
The Flight Crew, however, is concerned that based on the remaining fuel, very
little delay can be accepted. The Crew gains additional endurance time due to a
favorable vectoring for the approach.

They pass this information along to ATC for coordination purposes and the flight
lands uneventfully at destination with more than Final Reserve fuel remaining in
the tanks.
Explanation
It is important to note that all flights, no matter the duration, always arrive with far
fewer options than were available when they departed.
Making informed decisions based on the best information available is
essential when weighing options in the terminal area. In view of this, the
Flight Crew requests delay information from ATC when unanticipated
circumstances may result in landing at the destination aerodrome with less than
the Minimum Diverting Fuel.
Such request is not a request for assistance or an indication of urgency, but a
procedural means for the Flight Crew to determine an appropriate course of
action when confronted with unanticipated delays (e.g. divert to an alternate
aerodrome, “Commit” to destination and/or make additional declarations related
to the fuel state of the flight).
The Flight Crew makes the decision to “Commit” to destination after taking into
account the traffic and the operational conditions prevailing at the destination, at
the planned destination alternate and at any other adequate aerodrome where
landing can be assured.
This in-flight re-analysis and adjustment option simply allows converting fuel
originally allocated for a diversion to an alternate into fuel to proceed to
destination.
Furthermore, if an alternate is close to weather minimums or suffering from
extended delays, the more information available to increase the Flight Crew’s
situational awareness, the better the basis for a sound decision.
In this case, however, the flight was able to successfully continue to destination
and land without incident. The news that KDEN was just about to re-open with a
confirmed EAT and the marginal weather with only an NPA procedure available
at the planned alternate (the only available alternate) were the primary factors in
the Flight Crew’s decision to commit to a landing at destination.
The Flight Crew’s commitment to land at KDEN, the inability to accept much if
any delay, and the responsibility to protect Final Reserve fuel are the conditions
that justify the “MINIMUM FUEL” declaration.

RTF communications
Flight Crew ATC

KDEN Approach, AZA123, passing FL AZA123, KDEN Approach, roger, hold as
210, descending to FL 100, on-course to published at UBALD, Expected Approach Time
UBALD 2010
Readback
AZA123, KDEN Approach, be advised KDEN is
currently closed. There is a disabled aircraft on
Runway 34R and we are performing our
standard hourly inspection on 34L. Your
Expected Approach Time is now 2020. Please
advise intentions
KDEN Approach, AZA123, should we AZA123, KDEN Approach, expect no further

expect any further delay? delay. The runway inspection is nearly
completed. At the end of the assigned holding,
you’ll be number five in sequence for the ILS
approach to runway 34L
KDEN Approach, AZA123, roger, we AZA123, KDEN Approach, roger, MINIMUM

maintain the holding, declaring “MINIMUM FUEL. We will pass that information on to the
FUEL” at this time. next sector. Descend to altitude 6000 ft, QNH
1010, Transition Altitude 70, contact KDEN
Approach on frequency 127.625
Readback
Next Sector:
AZA123, KDEN Approach, descend 4000 ft.
You are number five for the arrival. Understand
you are “MINIMUM FUEL”
KDEN Approach, AZA123, affirmative,
“MINIMUM FUEL”. Readback.
AZA123, KDEN Approach, descend to altitude
3000 ft, turn right heading 250 to shorten,
cleared ILS Approach Zulu runway 34L, report
established
Readback

Outcome
This scenario is very straight forward and clearly illustrates the correct
application of Company procedures and the appropriate use of the “MINIMUM
FUEL” declaration.
In this case, the intent of “MINIMUM FUEL” is simply to aid the Commander in
his/her responsibility to protect Final Reserve fuel once the flight is committed to
a landing at a specific aerodrome.
It is apparent that, due to the severity of the meteorological conditions at the
alternate aerodrome in this example, the Crew’s alternatives were quite limited.
It is important to note, however, that the Commander would have been required
to declare “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL” had additional delays been
encountered as Final Reserve fuel could no longer be protected.
Furthermore, had a closer suitable alternate been available, the commitment to
destination would have likely been unnecessary.

2. CONCLUSION
The safe conclusion of any flight depends on the accuracy and completeness of
initial planning as well as the intelligent use of on-board resources including the
usable fuel supply.
The best fuel planning in the world cannot ensure a safe outcome, if the
execution of the plan is faulty or invalidated planning assumptions go
undetected. As such, flight planning activities must be complemented by
proper in-flight fuel management.
Factors which are essential to suitably manage Normal/Abnormal Fuel States
and Emergency Fuel conditions are:
 thorough knowledge of the in-flight fuel management Company policy
(GB 8.3.7), including the additional requirements in which “Committing” to
destination is permitted (GB 8.9.6);
 understanding the use of the term “MINIMUM FUEL”, i.e.:
 the commitment to an aerodrome with no other alternatives available;
 protecting Final Reserve fuel by ensuring to the extent practicable, that
no additional delay will be encountered;
 affording the Commander and ATC the opportunity to work together to
protect Final Reserve fuel and perhaps preclude an emergency from
developing;
 recognizing that the Commander always maintains his/her ability to exercise
emergency authority at any time. An emergency declaration would include
priority handling and afford the Commander the ability to proceed to the
nearest adequate aerodrome available, where a safe landing can be made,
should the conditions warrant such action.
It’s important to note the key difference between in-flight re-planning conditions
when an alternate aerodrome is not required and the conditions in which
“Committing” to destination is permitted.
When re-planning “Without destination alternate aerodrome”, the stringent
regulatory requirements (i.e. remaining flight time, number of runways, weather
conditions and Additional fuel) compensate for the risk associated with the
commitment to destination whereas the “Commit” to destination in-flight fuel
management policy recognizes when a Flight Crew’s assessment of the traffic
and meteorological conditions may be more accurate for the destination than for
any alternate aerodrome.

The first option may be exercised anytime after dispatch, even considerably far
from destination (up to 6 hours, e.g. while taxing out for departure) whereas
“committing” to destination requires information that can only be obtained when
relatively closer, no more than 2 hours prior to the Estimated Time of Arrival, so
as to meet Company requirements to “assure” a safe landing.
Nevertheless, although the implementation of either option is permitted (rather
than required) by the in-flight fuel management policy, both options should only
be exercised by the Flight Crew when considered suitable for the current
operational conditions.
In addition, Flight Crews must recognize that the Alternate fuel indicated on the
OFP for a specific aerodrome (and thus MDF) shall be constantly revised in
accordance with current operational conditions such as, start point of diversion
profile in relation to the geographical position of the alternate, expected weather
en-route, applicability of the OFP diversion profile in terms of cruise
FL/routing/duty runway, expected arrival delays, etc.
Another essential element of the Company’s fuel policy, and the foundation of
continuous improvement initiatives, is the collection and analysis of operational
data. For this purpose:
 “MINIMUM FUEL” declarations must be recorded in the Remarks section of
the OFP;
 an ASR shall be completed when:
 “MINIMUM FUEL” is declared;
 “committing to destination” (i.e. landing at destination with ALTN Fuel not
available).


INFORMAZIONE TECNICA OPERATIVA N. 41
TEMPERATURE INVERSION
TAKE OFF
DIR. OP. VOLO

DECEMBER 1984
INDEX
TEMPERATURE INVERSION AT TAKEOFF ..................................................Page 3

STATIC AND IN-FLIGHT TAKEOFF THRUST SETTINGS..............................Page 3
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ..............................................................Page 7
RECOMMENDED ACTION ............................................................................Page 8
AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS ........................................Page 8
EXAMPLE........................................................................................................Page 9
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................Page 10
APPENDIX 1 ................................................................................................Page 10
DEFINITIONS................................................................................................Page 11
TEMPERATURE INVERSION AT TAKEOFF
Temperature lapse rate in the standard atmosphere is approximately 2°C every 1000 ft in the
altitude range comprised between SL and 36. 000 ft.
All airplane performance calculations are therefore based on the assumption that air
temperature behaviour is coincident with (or close to) the standard.
If air temperature decreases by less than 2°C every 1000 ft of altitude or even increases, this
falls under the definition of “temperature inversion”. If the tem perature inversion is
significant, it has a detrimental effect on the airplane ta keoff and/or climb performance, in that
it affects both the engine thermodynamic parameters (and eventually its thrust) and the
airplane aerodynamic characteris tics. Furthermore, in some cases temperature inversion may
be unexpected and no appropriate corrective actions can be undertaken during flight planning.
The purpose of the present document is to provide crews with sufficient back ground
information to cope with temperature inversion during the takeoff phase.
STATIC AND IN-FLIGHT TAKEOFF THRUST SETTINGS

Since the most significant effect of an air temperature inversion at takeoff is a decrease in
engine thrust and a partial loss in the expected airplane performance, obviously the most
instinctive action for a pilot is to attempt a thrust recovery.
Advancing the throttle levers would indeed clear the thrust loss, but on the other hand may
have negative effects on the engines (such as an abnormally high EGT).
It is therefore deemed necessary to review in brief the major aspects of takeoff thrust settings.
********
Two families of engine takeoff thrust setting curves are provided by each engi ne manufactu-
rer, respectively the “static” takeoff N 1 (EPR) limit and the “In flight” takeoff N 1 (EPR) limit,
the latter being better known as the “Go-Around” setting.
I n f . Te c . Op. 41/3
FIG 1 TYPICAL THRUST/EGT T.O.RATINGS
Typical today’s jet engines are certified according to a “flat” thrust rating criterion.
This means that, at a given pressure altitude, a constant takeoff thrust is deli vered by
the engine within a certain OA T range, not exceeding a “maximum flat rating tempe -
rature” value that changes with engine models (graphics 1A and 1B#. Above this tem -
perature (*) the engine is no more capable of producing its full thrust and a thrust limit
decrease is imposed to prevent an EGT limit exceedan ce (graphics 1C and 1D).
I n f . Te c . Op. 41/00
The reason for providing two different takeoff settings is that during takeoff three basic
parameters are affected:
A) Air intake pressure increases with airspeed.
B) Ambient air pressure and
C) Ambient air temperature are both affected by the altitude increase.
Variations in the air intake compression effect are significant when the airspeed exceeds 60-
80 kts and have an immediate influence both on the engine thrust and engine parameters (EPR
drop being more noticeable than N1 drop).
Takeoff thrust setting must therefore be accomplished before 60 - 80 kts (depending on the
engine and nacelle type) because above this speed the “static” takeoff setting is no longer
applicable.
Airplanes equipped with an ATS certified for takeoff have a “throttle freezing” provision that
jams throttle setting above this critical speed, and some thrust rating computers (DC10, A300)
freeze their takeoff thrust indication as well.
Restoring the nominal “static” takeoff N1 (or EPR) above 60 - 80 kts is there fore not correct
as it implies an engine overboosting condition.
Engine overboosting may not be always evident through the usually displayed engine
parameters (EPR, Nl, N2, EGT) but it certainly would occur in terms of internal engine stress.
Hence the need for providing a dynamic takeoff thrust setting (Go- Around setting) .
This virtually represents the continuation of the static takeoff setting, taking into account the
appropriate thrust decay due to the alteration of parameters A, B and C mentioned above, and
is the only means to obtain a takeoff thrust in the appropriate dynamic conditions.
In case of temperature inversion, any attempt to restore the engine thrust to a higher setting
impacts against the question: which rating should be used?
In
I nf .f .Te
Tecc. .Op.
Op. 41/00
41/4
Fig. 2 shows in full line the thrust behaviour in standard conditions, and the dashed line shows
the deviation from this condition due to a given air tempera ture inversion occuring after
liftoff.
This thrust loss is directly proportional to the magnitude of the temperature in version
encountered.
A step-by-step examination of the phenomenon would show the following behaviours:
1) Air temperature (SAT) increases abnormally (or it does not decrease with the standard rate).
2) Air density in the inversion layer is lower than expected. This causes both the engine
thrust and the airplane lift to decrease.
3) During takeoff, throttle position is constant. Since N2 RPM depends mainly on throttle
position, this parameter is slightly affected .
4) F /F decreases significantly due to the engine control unit restoring the appropriate
fuel-to-air ratio.
5) N 1 RPM (EPR) shows an appreciable decrease, reflecting the actual thrust decrease
induced by the F/F reduction.
6) EGT remains approximately constant (in spite of F /F reduction) or even shows a slight
increase due to the higher temperature of the ingested air (that causes a higher turbine
inlet temperature).
IInnff.. Te
Tecc.. Op.
Op. 41/00
41/6
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Generally speaking, the Go-Around thrust setting is the only appropriate and available
reference to obtain the maximum thrust from the engines in dynamic environmental
conditions.
This is also valid in a temperature inversion condition; however this is an abnormal situation
and some other considerations apply.
What should be clear is that the engine, starting from the standard thrust level at which it was
running immediately before the temperature inversion is en countered (any point along
the continuous curve in Fig. 1) decreases sponta neously its thrust to cope with the reduced
air density in the abnormal layer.
Since the static takeoff thrust setting cannot be restored in flight, in principle two possibilities
exist to face the thrust loss:
1) If the takeoff was performed at reduced thrust, in case of thermal inversion a thrust
recovery is feasible by applying an N1 (or EPR) increase equivalent to the initial ▲ N1
(or ▲ EPR), that is the difference between the full N1 (or EPR) takeoff limit and
the reduced limit.
In other words, the initial takeoff thrust reduction could be recovered in case of
temperature inversion, and this ▲ N1 (or ▲ EPR) would represent a re fe rence
for a pilot to restore thrust without overboosting the engines.
Another possibility to obtain the maximum thrust available in these condi tions is
offered by a cross-check between the actual N1 (EPR) and the Go Around limit.
If a takeoff at reduced thrust was performed, this cross-check would show the possibility
to increase N1 (or EPR) by an amount very close to ▲ N1 (or ▲EPR).
If full takeoff thrust was applied on the ground, the possibility to recover a thrust loss may still
exist, depending on the available EGT margin,which in turn depends on the OAT range.
Since both the Nl and the EPR rated engines are EGT limited in the OAT range above the
“flat rating” maximum temperature for a given P . A., if the temperature inversion involves an
exceedance of this temperature,the rnaximum applicable N1 (EPR) will be limited by EGT.
Therefore only a partisl or even no thrust recovery will be possible in this condition.
IInnff.. Te
Tecc.. Op.
Op. 41/00
41/7
RECOMMENDED ACTION
In,. any case, the recommended action to minimize the effects of an encounter with a
temperature inversion is the following:
- Disengage ATS (if applicable)
- Select Go-Around mode on thrust Rating Computer (or read charts, as applicable )
- Compare Go-Around Limit with actual Nl (EPR) indication and determine which is higher
- If Go-Around limit is higher than the actual N1 (EPR) re-engage ATS in the
Go-Around mode (or apply Go-Around thrust manually)
- If Go-Around limit is lower than the actual N1 (EPR), this actual N1 (EPR) can
be maintteined if deemed necessary provided that no EGT limit exceedance takes place.
AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS

For a large turbofan engine (such as the CF6), temperature inversion causes approximately a
1% thrust loss per degree centigrade, that means about -400 lbs / °C .
In most cases, temperature inversions do not exceed 10°C, and usually are well below this figu-
re, although in very few cases values above 20°C were recorded.
However, only rare instances are known of significant temperature inversion occuring above
30°C. This means that in most cases, the associated thrust loss can be recovered since it takes
place within the flat rating range.
If the inversion occurs suddenly, there is a slight loss in indicated airspeed; an airplane
acceleration to recover this speed further reduces the rate of climb.
Due to the relatively small effects of this temporary acceleration, this is not considered in the
following example, that represents the approximate loss of a turbojet airplane performance
expressed in terms of climb gradient and ▲ rate of climb.
The data are based on the following assumptions:
• 10°C of temperature inversion;

• Takeoff weight equal to the second segment limited weight;
• No thrust recovery;
• V2 + 10 for the all engine case and V2 for one engine out.
IInnff.. Te
Tecc.. Op.
Op. 41/00
41/8
EXAMPLE
The loss of rate of climb, for all aircraft types, is approx 300 - 400 ft/min for all
engines case and 150 - 250 ft/min for one engine out case.
IInnff.. Te
Tecc.. Op.
Op. 41/00
41/9
CONCLUSIONS
If a significant thermal inversion is reported or anticipated, a performance margin can be

introduced by avoiding the use of a reduced takeoff thrust and by determining the maximum
takeoff weight at a higher temperature (actual OAT + anticipated T).
If OAT is higher than the maximulll flat rating temperature, the MTOW penalties are
significantly greater than in the lower temperature range.
No correction should be applied for V1 ,VR and V2, that should be determined for the actual
OAT.
In any case, when a thermal inversion is experienced, the Go-Around thrust should be
promptly set whenever its value is higher than the actual thrust.
For extremely critical situations, (i.e. ground proximity with inadequate rate of climb) do not
hesitate to advance the throttles (or to apply full throttle if necessary) until a recovery from
the critical situation is attained.
I n f . Te c . Op. 41/00
41/10
Appendix 1
DEFINITIONS
SURFACE INVERSION
An inversion of temperature through an atmospheric layer extending upwards from the earth’s
surface.
This is frequently a “Radiation Inversion”, but it may form also as the result of air drifting over
a colder surface (advection).
RADIATION INVERSION
An inversion of temperature through an atmospheric layer extending upwards from the earth’s
surface; such a condition develops in the course of a “Radiation Night” over a land surface as
a result of radiational cooling of the surface. The depth of the inversion layer increases in the
course of the night owing to downward conduction of heat from the atmosphere.
RADIATION NIGHT
A night characterized by absence of cloud and wind, on which there is a mark ed radiational
cooling of the ground and, by conduction of heat from air to ground, of the surface layers of
air.
Absence of cloud ensures that there is a relatively little compensating radiation directed
downward to ground.
Absence of wind confines cooling to a shallow layer near the ground and produces a low
minimum surface temperature.
Other factors which favour a low temperature minimum on a radiation night are relatively dry
air, low heat conductivity of the ground, and long hours of darkness. Inversions of this type are
frequent not only on calm and clear nights, but they are also frequent over the polar ice fields
in all seasons and over cold continents in winter.
I n f . Te c . Op. 41/00
41/11
SUBSIDENCE
This term is used to denote the slow downward motion of the air. In stationary unchanging
anticyclones the subsidence is due to the very slow outward air flow at the earth’s surface.
The subsiding air is warmed dynamically (adiabatic) and the downward movement, and
consequent warming j increase with height, so that the lapse rate of temperature is decreased
and inversions are often developed .
Subsidence inversions reach down to the ground on the slopes of hills and mountains and along
subtropical coasts.
I n f . Te c . Op. 41/00
41/12
GruppoAilitalia INFORMAZIONE TECNlCOOPERATIVA N. 48
INDICE
VISUAL ILLUSIONS
DIR. OP. VOLO

JULY 1988
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Premessa . . . . . . 3
Introduction 7
PART 1 - Sensing and Perceiving
The difference between sensing and perceiving
Visual perception during approach and landing,

t h e j u d g m e n t of d i s t a n c e , a l t i t u d e a n d s p e e d 10
T h e v i s u a l c u e s of t h e a p p r o a c h a n d l a n d i n g ,
t h e j u d g e m e n t of d i s t a n c e a n d a l t i t u d e ........ 15
T h e j u d g e m e n t of a l i g n e m e n t 17
P A R T 2 - S o u r c e s of e r r o r 21
L a c k of s t i m u l u s i n f o r m a t i o n 21
Seat position 21
Rain 22
Snow 23
Night 23
Fog, Smog, Smoke, Haze 23
Scud 23
Distraction, Fascination, overload 23
Complacency, inattention or overconfidence 24
Incorrect perception 24
Mental s e t 24
Illusions 24
- Geometric illusions 24
"- T h e B l a c k Hole I l l u s i o n 30
- Autokinetic Effect 30
- Flickering Lights 30
- F i c t i t i o u s Horizon.. 30
- Fog illusion 34
- Sloping Runways 35
- Sloping Terrain 35
- Runway size 36
- Runway Contrast 36
- Runway Lighting 36
- The "White-out" 36
Conclusions 39
Bibliography 41
PR EMESSA ,,
T u t t i noi a b b i a m o c o s c i e n z a del m o n d o r e a l e e r i u s c i a m o a d o r g a n i z z a r v i il n o s t r o
c o m p o r t a m e n t o in modo c o e r e n t e e p r o d u t t i v o a t t r a v e r s o la P E R C E Z I O N E c h e n e
a b b i a m o , cio~ s e c o n d o come r i u s c i a m o a r a p p r e s e n t a r c e l o e d a c a p i r l o a p a r t i r e
dai dati che cadono sotto i n o s t r i s e n s i .
S c h e m a t i z z a n d o il p r o c e s s o , si p o s s o n o d i s t i n g u e r e t r e fasi principali neUa c o s t r u -

zione della realtY.
La prima ~ costituita dalla RECEZIONE, cio~ dalla rilevazione attraverso i sensi

degli stimoli provenienti dal mondo esterno. A questo livello sono le capacit~ fi-
siologiche e. l'idoneit~ del mezzo di trasmissione a determinate la possibilit~ di di-
sporre dei dati di realtY. Possiamo chiamarlo liveUo di scoperta. Le alternative
possibili sono del tipo "SI-NO"; vale a dire che si pub solo avere o non avere la
possibilit~ di e s t r a r r e le caratteristiche deU'informazione a prescindere da signifi-
cato, v.alore, importanza, grado di interesse che il segnale ha per il soggetto.
Nella seconda fase, invece si passa ad una alternativa "GIUSTO-SBAGLIATO". II

segnale a questo livello viene identificato a seconda delle caratteristiche degli sti-
moli, dell'intenzionalit~ d'uso, deUe motivazioni e atteggiamenti. In questo liveUo,
detto della DISCRIMINAZIONE, entrano in gioco sia fattori d'esperienza, sia fatto- .
ri pifl specificatamente personali.
Un terzo livello, infine, definibile come INTERPRETAZIONE, ~ caratterizzato dalla

formazione della "rappresentazione mentale", cio~ di una costruzione selettiva e
strutturante.
Selettiva in quanto la rappresentazione mentale sar~ "pulita" da tutti gli elementi

di "rumore" o irrilevanti per il fine perseguito; s t r u t t u r a n t e in quanto molti ele-
menti possono essere rappresentati o associati mentalmente per la costituzione del
rapporto con la realtY.
Le alternative possibili che ne risultano, sono per la rappresentazione mentale

"CORRETTA- SCORRETTA".
Un esempio per chiarire queste tre fasi della percezione che, peraltro, non vanno
considerate tre tempi distinti, ma come tre diversi livelli d'analisi •
- U D I R E UN SUONO livello della scoperta;

possibile se il recettore uditivo ~ integro;
ambito esclusivamente fisiologico.
- C L A S S I F I c A R L O COME " A C U T O " livello d e U ' i d e n t i f i c a z i o n e ;

"CONTINUO", "PROVENIENTE" p o s s i b i l e s e l ' i n t e r e s s e ~ c a n a l i z z a t o in q u e
DAL R A D I o A L T I M E T R O " , " S E - s t o s e n s o ( i n t e n z i o n a l i t ~ d ' u s o ) , s e il s e -
GNALE D ' A L L E R T A " , e c c . gnale ~ sufficientemente prolungato, forte,
d i s c r i m i n a b i l e ( c a r a t t e r i s t i c h e dello stimolo)
se la c a p a c i t ~ a t t e n t i v a n o n ~ c o m p l e t a m e n -
te a s s o r b i t a d a a l t r i compiti ( m o t i v a z i o n i ,
atteggiamenti).
- 3-
- [NTERPRETARLO COME "AEREO Livello della rappresentazi(,ne mentale;
VICINO AL TERRENO" II segnale non ~ pi~ importante in s~- la
rappresentazione mentale b dedicata alla po
sizione del velivolo nello spazio.
Possibile se il dato d'esperienza (ahneno
teorica) b gi~ presente nel repertorio del
percipiente, se Io stato de~ sistema (sogget
tivamente concepito) ~ coerente, se il dato
b finalizzato alle mete immediate o differite
del soggetto in quel momento, ecc.
A l t r o i m p o r t a n t e a s p e t t o della p e r c e z i o n e - i n t e g r a t i v o delle a n a l i s i gi~ e s p o s t e -

la modalit~ di e l a b o r a z i o n e dei s e g n a l i .
In una prima modalit~, questi possono venir attivamente ricercati in base ad una
finalit~ cosciente e mediante un processo di attenzione esplorativa.
In questo caso Pinformazione viene elaborata a partite da C O N C E T T I (necessaria-

mente gi~ presenti nella struttura cognitiva del percipiente) e si inquadra in "im-
magini operative" attraverso le quali il soggetto si prefigura i cambiamenti di sta-
to del sistema. U n a gran parte delPattivit~ volontaria viene praticata attraverso
questa modalit~- la ricerca visiva delle luci d'avvicinamento della pista, la iettura
dei parametri strumentali, il saggio tattile della temperatura dei finestrini ecc.
Nel caso invece di una attenzione non focalizzata, l'intervento di un elemento nuo-
vo nel campo assume valore significativo ai fini dell'attivazione di un determinato
comportamento, solo se tale elemento pub essere decodificato; solo se, cio~, se ne
conosce il significato. In questo caso l'informazione viene elaborata partendo ap-
punto da S E G N A L I . Esempi di questa modalit~ sono tutte le pratiche innescate da
!
u n segnale noto- ii suono deIPOuter Marker, I accensione di una luce-avviso, un
callout, l'odore di ~umo, ecc.
U n a terza modalit~ elaborativa, infine, consente l'attivazione di sequenze d'azione

a partite dai segnali di avvio di modelli formalizzati, cio~ sequenze operative di
passaggi obbligati che conducono a risultati certi. E', quest'ultimo il caso dei ri-
flessi condizionati, o anche, se vogliamo, IVapplicazione diretta delle "Do Lists" nel_
le procedure, specie d'emergenza.
Da quanto detto fin qui risulta chiaro come la percezione si presenti come una i-
stanza di "problem solving". Si ~ visto che uno strumento fondamentale nella co-
struzione individuale del reale ~ la "memoria operativa". Essa consente un'utile ri
duzione della realt~ 9 semplificandola e rendendola riconoscibile perch~ inquadrabi-
le in s c h e m i noti.
Si ~ anche visto perb the vari fattori intervengono a modificare il dato sensoriale
nel suo percorso dal recettore al processo centrale.
~ 4 Q
T u t t o q u e s t o e o n f i g u r a l ' i n s i d i a l e g a t a alla p e r c e z i o n e nelle o p e r a z i o n i di volo co-
me u n e e c e s s o di s e m p l i f i c a z i o n e , di r e s t r i n g i m e n t o della r e a l t h a t t u a t o p e r molte
r a g i o n i e s u almeno t r e d i v e r s i p i a n i • quello f i s i e o , quello fisiologico e quello
psicolog'ico.
T u t t i gli e f f e t t i i l l u s o r i d e s c r i t t i nel t e s t o che s e g u e sono r i c o n d u c i b i l i a q u e s t a

c a t a l o g a z i o n e r f f e r i t a aUa loro c a u s a p r i m a , m e n t r e i raeccanismi d i s t o r c e n t i fin qui
d e s c r i t t i o p e r a n o in modo i n t r e c c i a t o s u t u t t i i p i a n i .
-5-
INTRODUCTION
, ,
Human e r r o r a n d a p p r o a c h a nd l a n d i n g a r e two p h r a s e s w h i c h are f r e q u e n t l y in-

v o l v e d in d e s c r i b i n g the c a us e s of a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t s .
The predominant area of incidents and accidents seems to be the non-precision

approach. This involves the pilot reverting to a visual approach between 1000
and 400 feet altitude. The pilot is back to recognizing, adjusting and flying a
stabilized approach path largely on the basis of exterior visual cues f r o m that
point. Accidents in which Pilots survived reveal that the crew often never lost
contact with approach lights and didn't perceive anything unusual with the flight
path.
Another delicate area is the transition from instrument to visual flight during low
visibility approaches.
Human e r r o r in a p p r o a c h and l a n d i n g a c c i d e n t s is p r o b a b l y th e r e s u l t of some

f o r m of problem in p r o c e s s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . Man's p r i m a r y role in f l i g h t is the
s e n s i n g and p r o c e s s i n g of information in o r d e r to make d e c i s i o n s .
We will review some of the sources of information processing error durin~ the
approach and landing.
Fortunately, man's information processing .is usually quite reliable. Unfortunately,

his typically good performance can lead to an overdependence or overconfidence
in his abilities. There are numerous potential sources of error, some of which ori
ginate from limitations in our senses and perceptual mechanisms.
Let us take a close examination at the problem.
- 7 -
- Part 1 -
SENSING AND PERCEIVING
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSING AND PERCEIVING
Scientists distinguish between a sensation and a perception. Our senses receive

p h y s i c a l stimuli a n d e n c o d e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . P e r c e p t i o n i n t e r p r e t s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
a n d a t t a c h e s m e a n i n g to it. P e r c e p t i o n d e p e n d s l a r g e l y u p o n t h e b r a i n . A l t h o u g h
some of t h e h i g h e r o r d e r p r o c e s s i n g is i n n a t e , m u c h of t h e m e a n i n g of s t i m u l u s
i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h is i n v o l v e d in p e r c e p t i o n is l e a r n e d .
T h e f a c t t h a t s e n s a t i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n a r e d i f f e r e n t is i l l u s t r a t e d in F i g u r e 1. If
o n e is n o t f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s f i g u r e , it will p r o b a b l y a p p e a r as a g r o u p of m e a n -
i n g l e s s F o l y g o n s . As it is v i e w e d , h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e p a r a t i o n will e v e n -
t u a l l y s u d d e n l y o c c u r . It is t h e w o r d " F L Y " . T h e same s e n s o r y i n f o r m a t i o n or
s e n s a t i o n can b e p e r c e i v e d in at l e a s t two d i f f e r e n t w a y s . B o t h i n n a t e a n d l e a r n -
e d p r o c e s s e s a r e i n v o l v e d in m a n y of t h e e r r o r s o u r c e s d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . The
l e a r n e d relations can be possibly c h a n g e d b y r e t r a i n i n g , although with consider-
a b l e d i f f i c u l t y . I n n a t e limitations will p r o b a b l y h a v e to b e o v e r c o m e b y a c h a n g e
in s y s t e m d e s i g n . .
Perception then is the "seeing of things". As a matter of fact, it is very difficult

for us not to see; through long years of organization and learning we inevitably
make something out of every thing which creates an image on the retina. Another
unavoidable tendency is to attach meaning or interpretation to all that we see
through integrating these "now" perceptions with the vast filing cabinets of our
memory.
-9-
To f u r t h e r d e v e l o p t h i s i d e a of p e r c e p t i o n , l e t ' s c o n s i d e r t h i s : We look a t a w o r l d
of t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s w h i c h c a s t s i m a g e s of two d i m e n s i o n s u n t o o u r r e t i n a Which
a r e in t u r n r e l a y e d to t h e b r a i n w h e r e we s e e o r p e r c e i v e in t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n .
In o t h e r w o r d s , we look at a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l w o r l d filled w i t h o b j e c t s p o s s e s s i n g
height, width, and distance. However, our eyes register these three-dimensional
o b j e c t s o n l y in t w o - d i m e n s i o n , h e i g h t a n d w i d t h . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is t h e n t r a n s -
w i t t e d to t h e b r a i n w h e r e we s e e o r p e r c e i v e in t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n . How d o e s it
happen?
It b e g i n s to h a p p e n in i n f a n c y - t h r o u g h o u r f o r m a t i v e y e a r s we l e a r n to p e r c e i v e
o r " s e e " in t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n f r o m a t w o - d i m e n s i o n r e t i n a l image p l u s c e r t a i n o t h e r
v i s u a l c u e s . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is l e a r n e d a n d s t o r e d in o u r f i l i n g c a b i n e t s of memo-
ry for instant recall.
To a s s i s t t h e v i s u a l i n p u t , t h e b r a i n h a s o t h e r f i l i n g c a b i n e t s of s t o r e d i n f o r m a -
tion f r o m o t h e r s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e s , s u c h as h e a r i n g , t a s t i n g , t o u c h i n g a n d o u r
i n n e r e a r o r g a n s of b a l a n c e . T o g e t h e r , in a h i g h l y i n t e g r a t i v e m a n n e r , t h e y p r o -
v i d e u s w i t h t h e s e n s o r y i n p u t n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n o u r o r i e n t a t i o n on t h e
g r o u n d o r in t h e a i r .
To f u r t h e r complicate t h e s i t u a t i o n , we look a t o u r t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l w o r l d n o t
w i t h o n e e y e r e g i s t e r i n g in t w o - d i m e n s i o n , b u t o b v i o u s l y w i t h two e y e s w h i c h
a r e a b o u t 7 cm a p a r t , b o t h r e g i s t e r i n g in t w o - d i m e n s i o n a n d b o t h t r a n s -
m i t t i n g t h e s e t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l stimuli to t h e b r a i n w h e r e we s e e o n l y one t h r e e -
d i m e n s i o n a l p i c t u r e . A n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s is b e y o n d t h i s v e r y s u p e r f i c i a l c o n s i o
d e r a t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t . In p a s s i n g we c a n s a y t h e b r a i n in some w a y f u s e s t h e
s e p a r a t e i m a g e s i n t o o n e , a n d f r o m p a s t e x p e r i e n c e a d d s t h e t h i r d d i m e n s i o n of
d e p t h o r d i s t a n c e f r o m c e r t a i n v i s u a l c u e s we s h a l l n o w d i s c u s s .
VISUAL PERCEPTION DURING THE APPROACH AND LANDING

THE JUDGEMENT OF DISTANCE, ALTITUDE AND SPEED
T h e v i s u a l c u e s u s e d to f l y a n a i r c r a f t a r e n o t y e t c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e
is a wide d i v e r g e n c e of o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g v i s u a l c u e s n e c e s s a r y f o r l a n d i n g .
Someone f o r e x a m p l e , s t a t e s t h a t p e r i p h e r a l c u e s a r e p r o b a b l y n o t i m p o r t a n t , b u t
o t h e r s claim t h a t p i l o t s u s e p e r i p h e r a l v i s i o n to d e t e r m i n e w h e n t h e y a r e at t h e
p r o p e r h e i g h t to i n i t i a t e t h e l a n d i n g f l a r e .
V e r y little empirical e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e to s u p p o r t e i t h e r v i e w . In t h e n o r m a l
v i s u a l e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e r e a r e p r o b a b l y e n o u g h r e d u n d a n t c u e s to e n a b l e r e l i a b l e
j u d g e m e n t s e v e n if some a r e m i s s i n g . D i f f e r e n t p i l o t s may d e p e n d more on some
cues than others.
- 1 0 -
O n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t a b i l i t i e s f o r f l y i n g is t h e a b i l i t y to a c c u r a t e l y judge dis
tanee or depth.
T h e v i s u a l c u e s of d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n c a n b e c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two b r o a d a r e a s . T h e
f i r s t a r e b i n o c u l a r o r t w o e y e d c u e s , a n d a r e a v a i l a b l e to u s t h r o u g h t h e s i m u l t a -
n e o u s u s e of b o t h e y e s . T h e o t h e r s e t of c u e s a r e m o n o c u l a r o r one e y e d in t h a t
t h e y m a y b e p e r c e i v e d e q u a l l y well w i t h o n l y o n e e y e .
B i n o c u l a r Cues ( T w o Eyes) -
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t b i n o c u l a r f a c t o r i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n of s p a c e is c r e a t e d b y t h e
7 em s e p a r a t i o n of o u r e y e s .
T h e s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t r e t i n a l i m a g e s w h i c h e a c h e y e s e e s a r e c o m b i n e d i n t o one
b y t h e b r a i n w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e o b s e r v e r is a w a r e of a s i n g l e t h r e e - d i m e n s i o
n a l p i c t u r e . T h i s p r o c e s s is k n o w n a s s t e r e o p s i s a n d is e x t r e m e l y h e l p f u l f o r s h o r t
d i s t a n c e s u p to 12-15 m e t r e s .
A s e c o n d b i n o c u l a r f a c t o r of i m p o r t a n c e f o r o b j e c t s close to t h e o b s e r v e r is c o n -
v e r g e n c e . As we f i x o u r v i s i o n on o b j e c t s close to u s t h e e y e s t u r n i n w a r d or
c o n v e r g e . S e n s a t i o n s f r o m t h e m u s c l e s of t h e e y e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n v e r g e n c e
( s o s a i d - p r o p r i o e e p t i o n ) a r e e a s i l y n o t i c e a b l e w h e n t h e o b s e r v e d o b j e c t is close.
V a r i a t i o n s in t h e m u s c u l a r s e n s a t i o n i n v o l v e d in c o n v e r g e n c e p r o v i d e c u e s f o r t h e
d i s t a n c e of t h e v i s u a l s t i m u l i .
In s u m m a r y , t h e b i n o c u l a r v i s u a l c u e s f o r d e p t h o r d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n a r e most
u s e f u l f o r r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t d i s t a n c e s ; h o w e v e r , t h e y c e a s e to be i m p o r t a n t for
great distances. For the purpose-of flying an airplane, the binocular cues have
l e s s v a l u e t h a n h a s f r e q u e n t l y b e e n s u p p o s e d . T h e r e a r e m a n y f u n c t i o n s in f l y i n g
w h i c h i n v o l v e s h o r t d i s t a n c e s a n d u t i l i z e t h e u s e of b i n o c u l a r d e p t h p e r c e p t i o n .
T h e s e i n c l u d e s u c h t h i n g s as r e a c h i n g For c o n t r o l s a n d s w i t c h e s on t h e flight
d e c k o r o b s e r v i n g t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of o b j e c t s a n d t h e i r d i s t a n c e w h i l e t a x i i n g
on t h e g r o u n d . H o w e v e r , w h e n we o b s e r v e o b j e c t s s u c h as t h e r u n w a y a t m u c h
g ~ e a t e r d i s t a n c e , we a r e more d e p e n d e n t u p o n m o n o c u l a r v i s u a l c u e s o f d e p t h
or distance.
M o n o c u l a r Cues (One Eye) •
T h e m o n o c u l a r v i s u a l c u e s of d e p t h o r d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n i n c l u d e a v a r i e t y of
v i s u a l stimuli f a m i l i a r to all of u s . A l t h o u g h some a r e i n f r e q u e n t l y u s e d b y p i l o t s
d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h a n d l a n d i n g , all t h e m o n o c u l a r c u e s will be m e n t i o n e d and
b r i e f l y e x p l a i n e d . L a t e r , a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h o s e c u e s u t i l i z e d b y pilots
d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h a n d l a n d i n g will b e p r e s e n t e d .
- ll -
1. S u b t e n s e (Subtended Visual A n g l e o r R e t i n a l Image Size) : ~-
o
T h e l i n e a r d i m e n s i o n s of a n y size a n d s h a p e o b j e c t c a n b e r e l a t e d to a n a n g u -
l a r o n e . T h i s is d o n e b e c a u s e v i s u a l a c u i t y is b e s t m e a s u r e d in t e r m s of t h e
a n g l e a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s u b t e n d s o r c a s t s on t h e r e t i n a to p r o d u c e a n i m a g e .
V i s u a l l y , s i z e a n d d i s t a n c e a r e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . In o r d e r to j u d g e e i t h e r , the
a c t u a l d i m e n s i o n of one m u s t be k n o w n to t h e o b s e r v e r .
2. G e o m e t r i c a l Or L i n e a r P e r s p e c t i v e :
T h i s is t h e a p p a r e n t t a p e r i n g in t h e d i r e c t i o n a w a y f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r d u e to
t h e a p p a r e n t c o n v e r g e n c e of all s e t s of p a r a l l e l lines w h i c h p r o c e e d t o w a r d a
v a n i s h i n g p o i n t on t h e h o r i z o n . In r e a l i t y , t h i s is a f o r m of s u b t e n s e s i n c e ,
for instance, the constant distance between parallel railroad tracks subtends a
s m a l l e r a n g l e w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e in d i s t a n c e .
3. A e r i a l P e r s p e c t i v e •
T h i s is t h e name g i v e n to t h e b l u i s h c o l o r a t i o n a n d h a z y , indistinct appearance
of v e r y d i s t a n t o b j e c t s .
It is c a u s e d b y t h e r e f r a c t i o n of l i g h t p a s s i n g t h r o u g h w a t e r v a p o r a n d i m p u -
r i t i e s in t h e a i r , a n d from it we h a v e a cue to d i s t a n c e . T h e o p p o s i t e is t r u e
in c o n d i t i o n s of c l e a r , b r i g h t v i s i b i l i t y . T h e a b s e n c e of a e r i a l p e r s p e c t i v e is
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a p p a r e n t n e a r n e s s of the m o u n t a i n s a t p l a c e s w h e r e the
a i r is c l e a r a n d d r y .
4. I l l u m i n a t i o n P e r s p e c t i v e "
A l t h o u g h sometimes subtle, shadows and highlights or accents cast b y objects
u p o n o t h e r o b j e c t s a r e i m p o r t a n t c u e s to d e p t h o r r e l a t i v e d i s t a n c e .
5. O v e r l a p Or t h e I n t e r p o s i t i o n of O b j e c t s •
If one o b j e c t h i d e s o r o v e r l a p s a p o r t i o n of a n o t h e r , it m u s t o b v i o u s l y b e t h e
n e a r e r of t h e t w o . T h i s is a n o t h e r c u e to r e l a t i v e d i s t a n c e j u d g e m e n t .
6. Nearness to H o r i z o n -
T h i s is a p o w e r f u l c u e f o r d i s t a n c e . More d i s t a n t o b j e c t s a r e s e e n n e a r e r t h e
h o r i z o n a n d w i t h more e l e v a t i o n of t h e v i s u a l a x e s o r line of s i g h t , while n e a r -
e r o b j e c t s in t h e f o r e g r o u n d a r e s e e n l o w e r w i t h a d o w n w a r d g a z e .
7. Motion P a r a l l a x -
T h i s r e f e r s to t h e " a p p a r e n t " r e l a t i v e motion of s t a t i o n a r y o b j e c t s in t h e field
of v i s i o n . Since t h e p a r a l l a x is g r e a t e r f o r n e a r e r o b j e c t s a n d less f o r f a r t h e r
o n e s , a l a t e r a l m o v e m e n t of t h e h e a d o r e y e s c a u s e s an a p p a r e n t " w i t h " s ~ t
of a n y o b j e c t f a r t h e r t h a n t h e f i x a t i o n of f o c u s p o i n t , a n d an " a g a i n s t " m o v e -
ment of a n y o b j e c t n e a r e r t h a n t h e f i x a t i o n p o i n t . T h i s allows us to p e r c e i v e
relative distances.
- 12-
8. Movement P e r s p e c t i v e "
T h i s r e f e r s to t h e a p p a r e n t motion o r m o v e m e n t of o b j e c t s in t h e v i s u a l field
of a m o v i n g o b s e r v e r . At a c o n s t a n t s p e e d t h i s s o - c a l l e d " s t r e a m i n g e f f e c t " is
a d i r e c t f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e .
9. Texture gradient
It consists in the apparent increase in density of surface texture or pattern
with increasing distance.
F i g u r e s 2 to 6 i l l u s t r a t e some m o n o c u l a r c u e s .
In summary, the monocular visual cues are the real key to understanding the
visual perception of depth or distance. As indicated, it is these learned visual
stimuli which allow for our three-dimensional world as seen by the eye in only
two-dim,_~nsion to be perceived again b y the brain in three-dimension.
FIGURE 2. SHADOW CONTRIBUTES TO THE PERCEPTION OF DEPTH
oo0°o
A. SUPERPOSITION B. RELATIVE SIZE
4
C. HEIGHT OF PLANE D. GRADIENT OF TEXTURE
FIGURE 3. MONOCULAR CUES TO DEPTH PERCEPTION
- 13-
FIGURE 4. VARIOUS OBJECTS CAN SUBTEND THE SAME VISUAL ANGLE
FIGURE 5. OBJECTS OF A GIVEN VISUAL ANGLE CAN BE SEEN AS MUCH LARGER

IF OTHER CUES SUCH AS PERSPECTIVE INDICATE THEY ARE
FARTHER AWAY
- 1 4 -
/
EAcH ARROW INDICATES THE RELATIVE VELOCITY

O F T H A T P O S I T I O N IN T H E V I S U A L F I E L D
FIGURE 6. MOTION P A R A L L A X
THE VISUAL CUES OF THE APPROACH AND LANDING
THE JUDGEMENT OF DISTANCE AND A L T I T U D E
Despite the advances of flight automation, see-to-land or pilot vision of the run-
way environment still is, and will be for some time, necessary in most landings.
During an approach the degree of pilot visual surveillance of the approach and
runway environment depends on a number of variable factors such as visibility,
available electronic guidance instrumentation, both in the airplane and on the
ground, ground visual guidance systems and pilot experience.
Regardless of to what degree this visual surveillance of the runway environment

exists during the initial approach, pilot visualization of the runway is required
to effect a safe final approach and landing.
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x t e r n a l v i s u a l c u e d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h is t h e s i z e a n d s h a p e
o r s l a n t a p p e a r a n c e of t h e r u n w a y o r t h e r u n w a y l i g h t s a t n i g h t . On a n a v e r a g e
2½ - 3 ° glide p a t h a p p r o a c h to l a n d i n g at a r u n w a y of a v e r a g e ] e n g t h a n d w i d t h
d i m e n s i o n , a p i l o t l e a r n s w i t h e x p e r i e n c e to percei~ve h o r i z o n t a l , v e r t i c a l , and
• s l a n t r a n g e d i s t a n c e f r o m t h e a p p a r e n t s i z e , s h a p e a n d s l a n t a p p e a r a n c e of t h e
runway (runway perspective).
- 15-
A s e c o n d a p p r o a c h visual cue of d i s t a n c e a n d p o s i t i o n a l j u d g e m e n t u t i l i z e d b y
pilots is motion p a r a l l a x . If an a i r c r a f t is d e s c e n d i n g a t a c o n s t a n t s p e e d a n d
c o n s t a n t r a t e of d e s c e n t , t h e t a r g e t t o u c h d o w n p o i n t will be s t a t i o n a r y in t h e
p i l o t ' s v i s u a l field. This is t r u e b e c a u s e a m o v i n g o b s e r v e r looking at a s t a t i o n a -
r y object will p e r c e i v e no movement of t h a t object ff t h e a p p a r e n t d i s t a n c e e q u a l s
t h e real d i s t a n c e . On final a p p r o a c h t h e d i r e c t i o n a n d v e l o c i t y of a n y a p p a r e n t
movement of t h e s t a t i o n a r y r u n w a y d e p e n d on t h e d i r e c t i o n , m a g n i t u d e a n d r a t e
of v e r t i c a l d e v i a t i o n from t h e glide p a t h . With e x p e r i e n c e , t h e s e visual c u e s r e -
l a t e d to motion p a r a l l a x a s s i s t the pilot in j u d g i n g glide p a t h position a n d s l a n t
d i s t a n c e to t o u c h d o w n (a w a y to d e t e r m i n e t h e a / c f l i g h t p a t h is k e e p i n g t h e
aiming p o i n t s t a t i o n a r y in t h e w i n d s h i e l d a n d c h e c k i n g t h e r e s u l t a n t r a t e of
descent).
A t h i r d v i s u a l cue i n v o l v e s pilot utilization of object s i z e . Familiar object a l o n g t h e

a p p r o a c h t e r r a i n , s u c h as b u i l d i n g s , r o a d s , t r e e s , a u t o m o b i l e s , etc. h a v e long
p r o v i d e d p i l o t s c u e s to d i s t a n c e j u d g e m e n t s . T h e u s e of this cue e s t a b l i s h e s the
f u n d a m e n t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n r e t i n a l image object size a n d t h e object d i s t a n c e .
In o r d e r to s u c c e s s f u l l y p e r c e i v e d i s t a n c e , t h e pilot m u s t know the a c t u a l size
of t h e o b s e r v e d o b j e c t . T h e s e familiar o b j e c t s of k n o w n size a r e utilized f o r v e r -
tical a n d s l a n t d i s t a n c e j u d g e m e n t s . In low v i s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s the l e a r n e d ( b y
e x p e r i e n c e ) r e c i p r o c a l d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n l i g h t s , VASIs e l e m e n t s , e t c . , a r e utilized
a c c o r d i n g to t h i s c a p a b i l i t y .
A n o t h e r c u e r e l a t e d to t h e t e r r a i n a n d u t i l i z e d b y pilots is motion p e r s p e c t i v e .
A t t h e a v e r a g e jet t r a n s p o r t a p p r o a c h s p e e d a n d a b o u t 2000 feet a n d s e v e n to
e i g h t miles from t o u c h d o w n , a p p a r e n t m o v e m e n t of o b j e c t s a n d lights in t h e p e r i -
p h e r a l v i s i o n a l o n g t h e a p p r o a c h p a t h a s s i s t s t h e pilot. T h i s so-called " s t r e a m i n g
effect" is a n o t h e r v e r y h e l p f u l cue to t h e j u d g e m e n t of a l t i t u d e , s p e e d a n d to a
l e s s e r d e g r e e , d i s t a n c e . Pilots l e a r n to j u d g e a l t i t u d e a n d s p e e d from t h e i n c r e a s -
i n g r a t e of t h e " s t r e a m i n g effect" d u r i n g t h e final a p p r o a c h a n d l a n d i n g .
In s u m m a r y , s p a t i a l o r i e n t a t i o n d u r i n g t h e a p p r o a c h a n d l a n d i n g i n v o l v e s t h e c o r -
r e c t j u d g e m e n t of h o r i z o n t a l , v e r t i c a l , a n d s l a n t d i s t a n c e from the r u n w a y ' . This
is d o n e t h r o u g h t h e pilot"~ p e r c e p t i o n of t h e m o n o c u l a r v i s u a l cues of r u n w a y
size - s h a p e , a n d s l a n t a p p e a r a n c e ( r u n w a y p e r s p e c t i v e ) , r u n w a y motion p a r a l l a x ,
size of familiar objects in t h e r u n w a y e n v i r o n m e n t a n d a p p r o a c h t e r r a i n movement
perspective.
- 16 -
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- 8I -
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uo!snjuoo e eaetI~ ' s u o ! ~ ! p u o o A~!I!q!s!A ~oI Aq p e ~ o ! I d t u o o aetI~anj s! ~ I s ~ eq&
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e u o a o ' e u o u '~Iu~q ~ u e a e j ~ p e q ~ . ~ u ~ a p u e e q eAcH PInoo ~. "3!j $o s e q ~ e ~ l s
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H e r e t h e a / c is a t t h e " d e c i s i o n h e i g h t " w i t h 350 m of r e p o r t e d RVR, a n d is d i s -
p l a c e d one t h i r d of d o t r i g h t of l o c a l i z e r , w i t h 5 d e g r e e s c r o s s w i n d correction
to t h e l e f t .
Notice t h a t t h e two a c t i o n s t e n d to c a n c e l e a c h o t h e r o u t a n d p r o v i d e c u e s s i m i l a r
to t h e p e r f e c t l y a l i g n e d view.
- 1 9 -
- Part 2 -
SOURCES OF ERROR
LACK OF STIMULUS INFORMATION

. . . . . . . .
If a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n does not r e a c h t h e s e n s e s , t h e h u m a n o b v i o u s l y c a n n o t
r e l i a b l y a c t on it. T h e r e a r e a n u m b e r of r e a s o n s a c r e w may not r c e i v e s u f -
f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r a c t i o n . Some of t h e s e a-re d i s c u s s e d in t h i s s e c t i o n .
M a n y v a r i a b l e s a r e i n v o l v e d in w h a t can be s e e n . W e a t h e r , r u n w a y l i g h t i n g , d o w n
v i s i o n a n g l e ( d e f i n e d b y w i n d s h i e l d s t r u c t u r e , a i r c r a f t a t t i t u d e , pilot e y e p o s i -
t i o n ) , s e n s o r y t h r e s h o l d s , a m b i e n t l i g h t i n g , e t c . E a c h of t h e s e v a r i a b l e s can
h a v e a p r o f u n d e f f e c t a n d when more t h a n one f a c t o r is less t h a n o p t i m u m , as
it u s u a l l y i s , t h e c o m b i n e d e f f e c t can make r e l i a b l e l a n d i n g s d i f f i c u l t .
S e t P o s i t i o n . A s s u m i n g Cat. If c o n d i t i o n s of 1200 ft r u n w a y v i s u a l r a n g e ( R V R )
a n d 100 ft d e c i s i o n h e i g h t (D H ) , a g r o u n d s e g m e n t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 600 f t can
n o m i n a l l y be s e e n if t h e a i r c r a f t is a p p r o a c h i n g w i t h a 4,5 ° p i t c h a n g l e on a 3 °
g l i d e slope a n d h a s 15,5 ° of vision o v e r t h e n o s e . Many p i l o t s , h o w e v e r , do not
s i t w i t h t h e i r e y e s at t h e nominal or e y e r e f e r e n c e p o s i t i o n ( E R P ) . T h e y p r e f e r
to s i t lower b e c a u s e it is e a s i e r to see t h e f l i g h t d i r e c t o r . F o r e v e r y i n c h his
e v e s a r e below t h e ERP, vision is r e d u c e d b y 3,25 ° .
T h u s , if t h e p i l o t ' s eye is one i n c h below t h e ERP t h e v i s u a l g r o u n d s e g m e n t is
reduced to 340 f e e t . (See F i g u r e 9 a n d F i g u r e 10). Of c o u r s e , c h a n g e s in p i t c h
angle or o v e r t h e nose vision will m o d i f y t h i s , b u t it o b v i o u s l y is i m p o r t a n t to
have the s e a t of t h e c o r r e c t h e i g h t .
~-4 5-DEGREEPITCH ANGLE

15.~DEGREE DOWN VISION / "
(REFERENCE EYE POSITION) ~ ~ _ . . . ~ ~
- 340 FT - -I~-- 26()"i~r -'

I. . . . I : 32S-Oe REE REDUCTION
;. . . . . . eoorr . . . . . . ;
1200 FT RVR
FIGURE 9 EFFECT OF PILOT'SSEAT POSITION
- 21 -
6OO 3.0
5OO 2.5
2.0 TIME TO
VISIBLE
4OO
\ COVER
GROUND \ 1.5 VISIBLE
SEGMENT 300
GROUND
(FT) SEGMENT
200 L 1.0
(SECONDS)
100 .... 03
I
l
.... e L . I 0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
INCHES BELOW EYE REFERENCE POINT (ERP)
FIGURE 10 RELATIONSHIP OF SEAT HEIGHT TO CATEGORY II (RVR 1200)

VISUAL GROUND SEGMENT (NOMINAL FORE-AFT SEAT POSITION)
Rain. Rain can a t t e n u a t e v i s i o n r e d u c i n g t h e b r i g h t n e s s a n d c l a r i t y of t h e v i s u a l

i n f o r m a t i o n . It. can a l s o , if h e a v y e n o u g h , o v e r p o w e r the r a i n r e m o v a l s y s t e m a n d
r e d u c e v i s i o n t o almost n o t h i n g . While s u c h h e a v y r a i n is g e n e r a l l y of s h o r t d u -
r a t i o n , it can c a u s e p r o b l e m s . L i g h t s may s e e m f u r t h e r a w a y l e a d i n g the c r e w to
t h i n k t h e y a r e too h i g h . If h e a v y e n o u g h to c a u s e r i p p l e s on t h e w i n d s h i e l d , r a i n
can make l i g h t s " b r e a k u p " i n t o m u l t i p l e l i g h t s o r p e r h a p s e v e n r e f r a c t t h e l i g h t
d i s t o r t i n g t h e a p p a r e n t p o s i t i o n of t h e l o c a t i o n of the r u n w a y . Some a u t h o r s claim
t h a t a n e r r o r of as much as 5 ° may r e s u l t .
T h i s a m o u n t s to a d i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e r u n w a y of 200 ft in h e i g h t e a c h h a l f mile.
Rain c a n d e s t r o y t h e p o s i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of o b j e c t s m a k i n g u p t h e a i r p o r t mo-
saic a n d p o s s i b l y c o n t r i b u t e to v a r i o u s i l l u s o r y p h e n o m e n a .
- 22 -
Snow. If snow c o v e r s t h e r u n w a y it can r e d u c e t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e r u n -
w a y a n d the s u r r o u d i n g a r e a . T h i s c a n r e d u c e t h e a c c u r a c y of d e p t h p e r c e p t i o n .
( S i m i l a r e f f e c t s m a y be s e e n if t h e r u n w a y is c o n c r e t e s u r r o u n d e d b y s a n d o r
a s p h a l t s u r r o u n d e d b y d a r k f o l i a g e ) . L a n d i n g in t h e A r c t i c r e g i o n s on snow co-
v e r e d fields is f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d b y lack of o t h e r c u e s s u c h as t e x t u r e ~ d i e n t ,
s i z e of t r e e s , e t c . a n d can b e h a z a r d o u s e v e n w i t h c r e w s e x p e r i e n c e d in t h o s e
c o n d i t i o n s . F a l l i n g s n o w can c a u s e a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t u r b i n g e f f e c t . Due to w i n d
a n d a / c motion it is v i s i b l e in t h e f o r m of d i a g o n a l l i n e s , w h i c h can c a u s e , s p e -
cially at night with landing lights on, disorientation or vertigo.
T h e w h i t e o u t p h e n o m e n o n will b e a d d r e s s e d later.
Niqht- D a r k n e s s o b v i o u s l y r e d u c e s o r eliminates m a n y of t h e e x t e r n a l c u e s u s e d
f o r t h e j u d g e m e n t of d i s t a n c e o r d e p t h . In t h e a b s e n c e of t h e s e c u e s t h e pilot
m u s t r e l y on t h e r e t i n a l image size of t h e r u n w a y . T h i s can r e s u l t in an i n a c c u -
r a t e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e m e n t of d i s t a n c e o r a l t i t u d e . Most pilots t e n d to j u d g e t h e i r
p o s i t i o n to be h i g h e r t h a n t h e t r u e a l t i t u d e . T h i s h e i g h t illusion r e s u l t s in a low
o r b e l o w glide p a t h a p p r o a c h . T h i s c o n d i t i o n is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r o u b l e s o m e if t h e
a p p r o a c h is o v e r w a t e r o r a v i s u a l l y i m p o v e r i s h e d , l i g h t l e s s t e r r a i n , a c o n d i t i o n
w e l l - k n o w n to most p i l o t s as t h e " b l a c k h o l e " , w h i c h will be d i s c u s s e d more in
depth later.
F o q , S.moq. S m 0 k e , .. Haze - T h e s e f o r m s of m e t e o r o l o g i c a l o b s c u r a t i o n r e d u c e f o r -
w a r d v i s i b i l i t y a n d in g e n e r a l c r e a t e an illusion o r f a l s e p e r c e p t i o n of d i s t a n c e
a n d h e i g h t . A r u n w a y o b s e r v e d t h r o u g h each a p p e a r s to be f a r t h e r t h a n its r e a l
o r a c t u a l d i s t a n c e . T h e r e is also a t e n d e n c y f o r a r e l a t e d h e i g h t i l l u s i o n .
F o g i l l u s i o n will b e a d d r e s s e d l a t e r .
Scud • R e l a t i v e l y small, b r o k e n c l o u d s can be a f a c t o r in limiting v i s i b i l i t y .

T h e i n t e r m i t t e n t v i s u a l s c e n e is o n l y p a r t , a n d p e r h a p s not the most i m p o r t a n t
p a r t , of t h e p r o b l e m . At n i g h t p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e a p p a r e n t l y r a n d o m i n t e r r u p t i o n
of v i s i o n c r e a t e s a p r o b l e m b y m a k i n g it d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e pilot to remain VMC.
If he a t t e m p t s to t r a n s i t i o n b a c k a n d f o r t h , eye a c c o m m o d a t i o n time can s e r i o u s -
ly r e d u c e t h e q u a l i t y a n d / o r a m o u n t of v i s u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . Accommodation time
h a s b e e n m e a s u r e d at a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,6 s e c o n d s f o r t r a n s i t i o n i n g from n e a r to
f a r v i s i o n f o r y o u n g p i l o t s a n d can b e 5 s e c o n d s o r l o n g e r f o r o l d e r p i l o t s . T h a t
m e a n s g o i n g from o u t s i d e to i n s i d e to o u t s i d e will t a k e a minimum of 3 s e c o n d s
for good acuity.
DI.STRACTI.ON; FASCI.NATION,...OVERLOAD
T h e s e f a c t o r s a r e r e l a t e d to t h e f a c t t h a t man p r o b a b l y h a s a single c h a n n e l .
In o t h e r w o r d s he p r o b a b l y can o n l y a t t e n d to one t h i n g at a time. Stimuli not
a t t e n d e d p r o b a b l y do not get to t h e h i g h e r p r o c e s s i n g c e n t e r s of the n e r v o u s
s y s t e m ( b r a i n ) a n d t h u s , u n l e s s a h i g h l y l e a r n e d , almost a u t o m a t i c r e s p o n s e is
a v a i l a b l e , do not g e t a c t e d u p o n . T h e y a r e p r o b a b l y not " p e r c e i v e d " a l t h o u g h
- 23 -
: h e y a r e s e n s e d . T h e r e is" some d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s s i n g l e c h a n n e l t h e o r y , but
".vt~-ie t h e r e may be e x e e p t i o n s , man o f t e n b e h a v e s as if he o n l y h a s a s i n g l e
channel.
An e x p e r i m e n t w h i c h i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s is c a l l e d d i e h o t i c l i s t e n i n g .
A s u b j e c t is a s k e d to l i s t e n to i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t e d on a n e a r p h o n e to o n e e a r .
T h e o t h e r e a r r e c e i v e s d i f f e r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e s u b j e c t is able to p e r f o r m t h i s
q u i t e well. When a s k e d to r e p e a t w h a t was p r e s e n t e d in t h e o t h e r e a r , he is a t
a l o s s . He h a s n ' t p e r c e i v e d o r a t l e a s t c a n n o t r e m e m b e r a n y t h i n g , e v e n t h o u g h
g r o s s c h a n g e s m a y h a v e o c c u r r e d like t h e s p e a k e r c h a n g i n g from E n g l i s h to
French.
If a c r e w m e m b e r g e t s d i s t r a c t e d a n d f o c u s e s a t t e n t i o n on s o m e t h i n g i n a p p r o p r i a -
te o r less c r i t i c a l t h a n his a p p r o a c h t a s k s , he may n o t r e c e i v e c r i t i c a l a p p r o a c h
and landing information. A systematic scan and crew discipline are required.
COMPLACENCY. INATTENTION OR OVERCONFIDENCE

T h e s e f a c t o r s t e n d to go t o g e t h e r a n d a r e o f t e n f o u n d in a c c i d e n t s g e n e r a l l y
a t t r i b u t e d to " H u m a n f a c t o r s " . T h e d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l of t h e s e t h r e e " e v i l s "
s p a n s o v e r a wide a r e a of h u m a n a c t i v i t i e s , i n c l u d e d t h o s e of p e r c e p t i o n a n d
m u s t be c a r e f u l l y g u a r d e d a g a i n s t .
INCORRECT PERCEPTION
P e r c e p t i o n c a n be i n f l u e n c e d b y m o t i v a t i o n a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d
to t h e q u a l i t y of t h e v i s u a l i m a g e s f a l l i n g on t h e r e t i n a . I l l u s i o n s can o c c u r in
s t r o n g , r i c h v i s u a l s c e n e s . Of c o u r s e , t h e s u b t l e i n f l u e n c e s of m o t i v a t i o n , s e t
a n d i l l u s o r y p h e n o m e n a can become much more i m p o r t a n t if t h e s e n s o r y s c e n e is
impoverished.
Mental set" S e t r e f e r s to a d j u s t m e n t s of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g s y s t e m c a u s e d
b y f a c t o r s s u c h as i n s t r u c t i o n s , l e a r n e d p r o b a b i l i t i e s , t h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t of
t h e s i t u a t i o n , o n e ' s v a l u e s y s t e m , a n d / o r f a m i l i a r i t y . A "13" , f o r e x a m p l e , can
be s e e n as a B o r a 13 d e p e n d i n g u p o n w h e t h e r it is i m b e d d e d in a s e r i e s of
l e t t e r s o r n u m b e r s . Set can a f f e c t o u r p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h e p r o b a b i l i t y a g i v e n
r e s p o n s e will o c c u r .
Set is o f t e n a u s e f u l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . T h e b r a i n g e n e r a l l y t r i e s to find m e a n i n g in
t h e s e n s o r y w o r l d . In o r d e r f o r it to f i n d m e a n i n g , i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s m u s t be
e x t r a c t e d from t h e p h y s i c a l s t i m u l u s . W r i t t e n t e x t may- be i n d i s t i n c t a n d w o r d s
may be m i s p r o n o u n c e d or d i s t o r t e d t h r o u g h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m . T h e s e major
v a r i a t i o n s c a u s e o n l y minor d i f f i c u l t y . In o r d e r to a c c o m p l i s h t ~ s f e a t , w h i c h ma-
c h i n e s h a v e not y e t b e e n able to a c c o m p l i s h to a n y g r e a t d e g r e e , we p r o b a b l y
e x t r a c t f e a t u r e s and identify them by matching general learned c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
In o r d e r to do t h i s we combine o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of w h a t we t h i n k s h o u l d be
o c c u r i n g w i t h w h a t a c t u a l l y does o c c u r . What we p e r c e i v e may d e p e n d as m u c h
on what we e x p e c t to see as w h a t is a c t u a l l y t h e r e . T h i s p r o c e s s g e n e r a l l y
allows us to w o r k more e f f i c i e n t l y b u t it c a n l e a d to e r r o r , p a r t i c u l a r l y if t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n o r time is limited.
- 24 -
An e x p e r i m e n t f u r t h e r d e m o n s t r a t e s t h i s . N o n s e n s e w o r d s ( w o r d s s u c h a s c h a c k ,
s a e l , w h o r l ) w e r e d i s p l a y e d , one a t a time, to two g r o u p s of s u b j e c t s f o r 1 / 1 0
s e c o n d . A f t e r e a c h p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e s u b j e c t s w e r e a s k e d to w r i t e d o w n w h a t
t h e y s a w . One g r o u p w a s t o l d t h e w o r d s w o u l d h a v e to do w i t h a n i m a l s o r b i r d s ;
the o t h e r that t h e y would deal with t r a v e l or t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . The s u b j e c t t e n d e d
to i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d s in line w i t h t h e s e t g i v e n t h e m b y t h e i n s t r u c t o r .
T h a t is, "chack" was s e e n a "chick" b y the animal g r o u p a n d "check" b y the
t r a v e l g r o u p . S i m i l a r l y " s a e l " was s e e n a s " s e a l " a n d "sail" , while " w h o r l " w a s
s e e n as "whale" or " w h a r f " .
A u t o m a t i c s y s t e m s m a y a c c e n t u a t e t h e e f f e c t s of s e t . F i r s t , it t e n d s to d e g r a d e
a w a r e n e s s of t h e s y s t e m . T h i s , of c o u r s e , is more p e r t i n e n t to a t t e n t i o n that
s e t . B u t , it also c a n l e a d a pilot to a c c e p t i n f e r i o r o r e v e n w r o n g p e r f o r m a n c e .
We m a y e x p e c t , b e c a u s e of t h e s y s t e m ' s u s u a l h i g h r e l i a b i l i t y , t h e s y s t e m to b e
r i g h t . S e v e r a l c a s e s m a y be c i t e d in w h i c h p i l o t s d e l a y e d a c t i o n to c o r r e c t the
p e r f o r m a n c e of a n a u t o m a t i c s y s t e m . D u r i n g one a p p r o a c h , a b e n d in t h e GS
b e a m a t 500 f e e t c a u s e d a v e r y m a r k e d p i t c h d o w n . A n e x c e s s i v e s i n k rate
f o l l o w e d . T h e p i l o t , t h o u g h f u l l y a w a r e of t h e p r o b l e m , d i d n ' t r e a c t u n t i l t h e
s i t u a t i o n was c r i t i c a l . In a n o t h e r c a s e e n r o u t e , t h e a u t o p i l o t was in t h e Nay
mode. The aircraft turned the wrong way over a checkpoint. The incorrect
o p e r a t i o n was i m m e d i a t e l y n o t i c e d b y t h e pilot b u t t h e a i r c r a f t was a l l o w e d to
t u r n more t h a n 45 ° b e f o r e t h e pilot t o o k a c t i o n .
In l a n d i n g , o r a t a n y o t h e r time, t h e pilot h a s c e r t a i n d e s i r e s a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s .
He is t u n e d to s e e c e r t a i n r e a d i n g s on i n s t r u m e n t s a n d to h e a r c e r t a i n p h r a s e s
on t h e h e a d s e t . When s o m e t h i n g is w r o n g it may still b e t a k e n at t h e v a l u e t h e
p i l o t w a n t e d o r e x p e c t e d to s e e .
l l l u s i o n s • All of u s a r e s u b j e c t e d to i l l u s i o n s of o n e t y p e o r a n o t h e r . Most p i l o t s
h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d s p a t i a l d i s o r i e n t a t i o n . While m a n y of t h e s e d i s o r i e n t a t i o n s may
h a v e r e s u l t e d from a c c e l e r a t i o n f o r c e s in d e p r i v e d v i s u a l e n v i r o n m e n t s more com-
mon in m i l i t a r y f l y i n g , v i s u a l i l l u s i o n s can be e q u a l l y d i s o r i e n t i n g . M o r e o v e r ,
c o m m e r c i a l p i l o t s a r e n o t immune to a c c e l e r a t i o n i l l u s i o n s . T h e o e u l o g r a v i e i l l u s i o n ,
in w h i c h a l i n e a r a c c e l e r a t i o n followed b y a r o t a t i o n s u c h as o c c u r s a t t a k e o f f r e -
s u l t s in t h e f e e l i n g of b e i n g p i t c h e d u p too h i g h , h a s b e e n i m p l i c a t e d in more
t h a n o n e major j e t t r a n s p o r t a c c i d e n t . It is p o s s i b l e t h a t a similar c o n d i t i o n c o u l d
a l s o o c c u r d u r i n g a m i s s e d a p p r o a c h m a n e u v e r . Coriolis i l l u s i o n s , o f t e n c a l l e d
v e r t i g o b y p i l o t s , c a n b e e x p e r i e n c e d w h e n e v e r y o u r h e a d is t i l t e d off a x i s w h i l e
t h e a i r c r a f t is in a t u r n . L e t u s r e v i e w some i l l u s i o n s .
Geometric lllusions- Psychologists have experimented with illusions for m a n y years

in hope that the study of the illusions would reveal something about perceptual
processes. Illusions can occur in all of our senses. For example, small objects
feel up to 50% heavier than large objects of equal weight.
- 25 -
S c i e n t i s t s still don Vt know t he mechanism f o r i l l u s i o n s . T h e p r o c e s s b y w h i c h
t h e b r a i n i n t e r p r e t s v i s u a l d a t a is complex a n d p o o r l y u n d e r s t o o d . P s y c h o l -
o g i s t s a n d o t h e r s h a v e a d v a n c e d h y p o t h e s e s b u t little a g r e e m e n t has b e e n
o b t a i n e d e v e n f o r t h e simplest i l l usio n s . It is p r o b a b l e t h a t d i f f e r e n t i l l u s i o n s
a r e c a u s e d b y d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s . R e p e a t e d e x p o s u r e ( l e a r n i n g ) may r e d u c e
t h e m a g n i t u d e of some illusions b u t o t h e r s h a v e e x h i b i t e d no c h a n g e o r e v e n
increased their effect,
Some of t h e more common geometric illusions a r e i l l u s t r a t e d in F i g u r e s 11 t h r o u g h
18. Many o t h e r s e x i s t . T h e s e geometric illusions d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t all of u s c a n be
d e c e i v e d b y i l l u s i o n s . M a n y visual "illusions" may also be e n c o u n t e r e d in f l i g h t .
T h e f l i g h t illusions a r e of t e n c a u s e d b y th e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s b e i n g d i f f e r e n t
in one or more r e s p e c t s t h a n the most familiar c o n d i t i o n s . Deviations in c u e s
a s s o c i a t e d wi t h t h e l e a r n e d d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n c u e s seem to be a p a r t i c u l a r
problem.
T H E TWO S H O R T L I N E S A
FIGURE 11. A CONTRAST ILLUSION
ALL THREE CURVES HAVE

THE SAME RAOIUS OF C U R V A T U R E
FIGURE 12. A CURVATURE ILLUSION
- 26 -
HEIGHT AND WIDTH ARE ACTUALLY EQUAL
FIGURE 13. TOP HAT ILLUSION
090
009OO
E TWO CENTRAL CIRCLES ARE EQUAL IN D I A M E T E R
FIGURE 1/4. A CONTRAST ILLUSION FOR SIZE
- 27 -
T H E O B L I Q U E L I N E S , IF
EXTENDED, COINCIDE
FIGURE 15. THE POGGENDORF ILLUSION
~<C~ < ( I ) ~~ > ~
A |
C D
AFTER HILGARD AND ATKINSON, 1967
FIGURE 16. MORE ILLUSIONS
- 28 -
(IF S M A L L E R A N G L E S A R E D E F I N E D B Y T H E S E C T O R S ,
THE TRIANGLE A P P E A R S T O BE C O N C A V E )
FIGURE 1 7 . THE ILLUSORY T R I A N G L E
THE HORIZONTAL
BARS ARE EQUAL
i A B
ILLUSTRATION F R O M P S Y C H O L O G Y TODAY,
1 9 7 2 , B Y P E R M I S S I O N OF T H E P U B L I S H E R .
FIGURE 18. THE PONGO ILLUSION
- 29 -
The Black Hole Illusion': K r a f t a n d E l w o r t h p e r f o r m e d some simulation s t u d i e s to
i n v e s t i g a t e c a u s e s of a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t s . O n e of t h e q u e s t i o n s t h e y t r i e d to
a n s w e r was how a c c u r a t e l y pilots c o u l d f l y a n i g h t , s t r a i g h t - i n v i s u a l a p p r o a c h .
T h e s i m u l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s i n v o l v e d a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c l e a r n i g h t a n d no
v i s i b l e g r o u n d t e x t u r e ( l i g h t s ) in t h e t e r r a i n o v e r w h i c h t h e a p p r o a c h was mad,
but city lights were visible behind the a i r p o r t .
T w e l v e of B o e i n g ' s most e x p e r i e n c e d p i l o t s p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e s t u d y . The

a v e r a g e a g e was 44. T h e a v e r a g e n u m b e r of f l i g h t h o u r s l o g g e d b y t h e g r o u p
was 1 0 . 7 0 0 . An a i r s p e e d i n d i c a t i o n a n d r a t e of climb m e t e r w e r e p r o v i d e d b u t n
f l i g h t d i r e c t o r o r a l t i m e t e r w e r e a v a i l a b l e . E v e n s o , all of t h e pilots b e l i e v e d it
would be "no s w e a t " . E l e v e n of t h e t w e l v e c r a s h e d e v e n t h o u g h t h e y w e r e
a w a r e t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e was b e i n g m o n i t o r e d . E v i d e n t l y , a c c o r d i n g to t h e
r e s e a r c h e r s ' a n a l y s i s , p i l o t s u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t e n d to f l y an a r c of a circ]
w h o s e c e n t e r is h i g h a b o v e t h e c i t y l i g h t s a n d w h o s e c i r c u m f e r e n c e i n t e r s e c t s
t h e g r o u n d s h o r t of t h e a i r p o r t . T h i s p a t h is a p p a r e n t l y s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e it
maintains a constant visual angle s u b t e n d e d b y the stimuli, particularly the
n e a r a n d f a r p o i n t s of t h e c i t y l i g h t s . ( f i g . 19).
VISUAL A N G L E S NO. I A N D NO. 2

I~ ARE EQUAL CENTER OF
VISUAL ANGLE NO. I PAT7 ERN
-- = ,= ~ ~--vISUAL
/ ~' ~ , . ~ ~ ~ANGLE NO. 2
i--
20 16 12 8 4 0
DISTANCE - MILES
Fig. 19- For any s t a r t i n g altitude and distance

from the c i t y , t h e r e is a aspecific path in which
the" angle subtended at the pilot's eye remains
constant. This angle should not be confused
with G/S angle even t h o u g h the values are
sometimes similar.
Fig. 19
- 30 -
Aut0kineti c Effect" If a s t a t i o n a r y l i g h t is s t a r e d at in an o t h e r w i s e d a r k room,
a f t e r a few s e c o n d s it will a p p e a r to move. This is k n o w n as t h e a u t o k i n e t i c
illusion. This illusion o c c u r s in all s u b j e c t s a n d is difficult to a b o l i s h . T h e
a p p a r e n t p a t h of t h e light may be in a n y d i r e c t i o n . The c a u s e of t h i s i l l u s i o n ,
like many o t h e r s , has not b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . Numerous i n c i d 2 n t s have d e m o n s t r a -
t e d its h a z a r d p o t e n t i a l in f l i g h t .
F l i c k e r i n g Lights- F l a s h i n g l i g h t s a r e u s e d in a n u m b e r of a p p l i c a t i o n s in aviation.
A p p r o a c h s t r o b e l i g h t s and a n t i - c o l l i s i o n b e a c o n s a r e two examples. E x p o s u r e
to f l a s h i n g lights at c e r t a i n f r e q u e n c i e s a n d h i g h b r i g h t n e s s , c o n t r a s t , and
d i f f u s i o n can i n d u c e d a n g e r o u s r e a c t i o n s e v e n f o r some a p p a r e n t l y normal
p e o p l e . Effects can r a n g e from d r o w s i n e s s , n a u s e a a n d d i s o r i e n t a t i o n to
c o n v u l s i o n s and e p i l e p t i c t r a n c e s . T h e s e e f f e c t s a r e a p p a r e n t l y c a u s e d b y the
s t r o n g lights i n f l u e n c i n g the b r a i n r h y t h m . F r e q u e n c i e s a p p r o x i m a t i n g t h e alpha
w a v e (9-12 Hz) or a multiple t h e r e o f a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d a n g e r o u s .
Fictitious Horizons- The horizon is not always a s h a r p , d i s t i n c t line. B u t pilots

l e a r n to r e l y on t h e a p p a r e n t a n g l e of t h e field below t h e h o r i z o n , i n d i s t i n c t
t h o u g h it may b e , f o r j u d g i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n on t h e glide slope.
Fig. 20 i l l u s t r a t e s how the pilot j u d g e s his d e s c e n t p a t h in a p p r o a c h .
The angle remains constant as the a/c

descends at a constant angle toward
the target area (as depicted in A)
and varies with deviation above and
below the desired descent path (as
illustrated in B).
60O"
__I__
400" 200'
Figures 20
- 31 -
If f o r some r e a s o n t h e a p p a r e n t h o r i z o n is d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e a c t u a l h o r i z o n , a
s e r i o u s e r r o r in p e r c e p t i o n may r e s u l t . Of c o u r s e , at n i g h t t h e h o r i z o n may not
be v i s i b l e . Pilots may a s s u m e , w i t h o u t b e i n g aware of i t , t h a t o t h e r c u e s r e p r e -
s e n t t h e h o r i z o n . L i g h t s on a hill b e h i n d the a i r p o r t c a n make t h e a p p r o a c h
s e e m too h i g h . ( S e e f i g u r e 21 a ) .
APPARENT \ I/
H O ~
PROJECTEDHORIZON
I I
~ .e.e_
~.::.-:.::::':':~
t~.::.'.'::::.'.-:::::::.Ie
9;.-:::::.-:::..:.'.'.':::::I)
::::::::::::::::::::::
*:::::!::.~-~:'::.:i:i:i~
~.:~.~:.::.:!:::.:....::.$
::::::::::::::::::::::::::
================================
~:!:~:i~:~:!:i:~:i::::::~:i:i~
A. A FALSEFORWARDHORIZON
• T.uE.o,,zo. ...... "-.
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B. A FALSE UlffERAL HORIZON
FIGURE 21. FICTITIOUS HORIZONS
F a r t h e r o u t , on a d a r k n i g h t d u r i n g w h i c h s u r f a c e l i g h t s
.....
are few a n d far
b e t w e e n , if a s t e a d y light comes into view s u d d e n l y , it can dominate a p i l o t ' s
v i s i o n . It can a p p e a r to be a s t a r or p l a n e t . T h e pilot may h a v e an o v e r w h e l m i n g
c o n v i c t i o n that the l i g h t is a b o v e the h o r i z o n and t h a t t h e n o s e of the a i r c r a f t
s h o u l d be p o i n t e d below the l i g h t . If l i g h t s are off to th~ s i d e , it may r e s u l t in
a b a n k b e i n g a c c e p t e d for a w i n g s - l e v e l a t t i t u d e ( f i g . 2 1 b ) . One w i n g low may
also r e s u l t in the f e e l i n g of b e i n g too h i g h or too low d e p ~ i d i n g on w h i c h w i n g
is d o w n . Pilots f u r t h e r m o r e t e n d to become u s e d to s e e i n g r u n w a y Lights in a
p a r t i c u l a r part of t h e w i n d s c r e e n .
In f i g u r e 22 and 23, t h e d i v e r g i n g a r r o w s y m b o l is u s e d to d e n o t e the aiming
s e c t i o n of the w i n d s h i e l d , located a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e i n c h e s a b o v e the bottom
of t h e w i n d s h i e l d w h e n t h e f l a p s a n d a i r s p e e d are s e t f o r a p p r o a c h and t h e
p i l o t ' s e y e is in the e y e r e f e r e n c e p o s i t i o n .
THREE
INCHES
,, , . • , , . . . . . , t , ,.
B O T T O M OF W I N D S H I E L D
F igure 2Z
- 32 -
As i l l u s t r a t e d in Fig. 22, a s s u m i n g f l a p s a n d a i r s p e e d a r e s e t as p r e s c r i b e d
f o r a p p r o a c h , t h e aiming section r e m a i n s s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n th e t a r g e t a r e a of
t h e r u n w a y d u r i n g d e s c e n t on t h e c o r r e c t glide s l o p e .
l THREE
INCHES
BOTTOM OF WINDSHIELD
Figure 23
F i g u r e 23 a s s u m e s t h a t the a i r c r a f t is s t a b i l i z e d in t h e a p p r o a c h flap a n d a i r -
s p e e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n a n d is in t h e normal a p p r o a c h a t t i t u d e . With t h e a i r c r a f t
too low (left side of f i g u r e ) the aiming sectio n is below t h e t a r g e t a r e a .
C o n v e r s e l y , with t h e a i r c r a f t too h i g h ( r i g h t side of f i g u r e ) t h e aiming s e c t i o n
is a bove t h e t a r g e t a r e a .
With t h e a i r c r a f t h i g h , the obv io u s c o r r e c t i o n is to lower t h e nose of t h e a i r -
c r a f t s u f f i c i e n t l y to place t he p r o j e c t e d impact p o i n t ( a n d aiming s e c t i o n ) below
(i. e. s h o r t of) t h e t a r g e t a r e a . C o n v e r s e l y , to c o r r e c t f o r d e v i a t i o n below t h e
d e s i r e d d e s c e n t p a t h , a p i t c h u p is r e q u i r e d to p o s i t i o n t h e p r o j e c t e d impact
p o i n t ( a n d aiming s e c t i on) above ( i . e . b e y o n d ) t h e t a r g e t a r e a .
T h u s , t h e aiming s e c t i o n comes to be u s e d as a g l i d e s l o p e i n d e x .
It is i m p o r t a n t to realize t h a t th is meth o d of a s s e s s i n g t h e d e s c e n t p a t h is
d e p e n d e n t on h a v i n g the c o r r e c t p i t c h a t t i t u d e , a n d is h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e to
wind v e l o c i t y a n d wind s h e a r f a c t o r s , which a f f e c t p i t c h a t t i t u d e a n d s i n k r a t e .
F u r t h e r m o r e c h a n g e s in p i t c h a t t i t u d e t e n d to be c o n f u s e d with c h a n g e s of
slope b y r e p o s i t i o n i n g the fights in t h e w i n d s h i e l d .
T h e s e p r o b l e m s become e ve n more a c u t e in low v i s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , w h e r e
onl y a p a r t of t h e r u n w a y is visible on b r e a k o u t .
T h i s may lead to an i m p r e s s i o n of b e i n g too h i g h b e c a u s e t h e h o r i z o n seems to
be low, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e the c e n t e r of the r u n w a y a n d / o r a p p r o a c h l i g h t s a r e
all in the lower p a r t of the w i n d s h i e l d . (See fig. 24).
- 33 -
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A. RUNWAY ON A CLEAR NIGHT B. RUNWAY WITH PROJECTED HORIZON
( A D A P T E D FROM: SCHIFF, WHEN SEEING IS

NOT B E L I E V I N G . AOPA PILOT, FEBRUARY
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C. RUNWAY BREAKOUT WITH

LIMITED RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE
FIGURE 2/4' EFFECTS OF FOG ON PERCEPTION OF POSITION OF HORIZON
A u s e f u l t e c h n i q u e is to image the i n v i s i b l e r u n w a y l i g h t s p r o j e c t e d onto the

w i n d s h i e l d . Where t h e l i g h t s meet at t h e a p e x is t h e location of t h e r e l i a b l e
horizon.
Foq A related illusion occurs if a shallow fog is suddenly entered.
illusion"
This condition can lead to an illusion of suddenly pitching up. This may have
happened in one accident. The investigation revealed that the pilot flew cor-
rectly and on visual cues until six seconds before impact. A localized fog bank
was entered. At this time, the rate of descent was increased from 625 to 2000
feet per minute and the crash resulted. Surface visibility was measured at
1-1/2 miles. Also, flying into a gradually thickening fog may lead one to conclude
he's climbing.
Fog also tends to make things look larger and farther away. This probably is
a result of aerial perspective. The significance of this for distance and size
judgments was "recently measured. Stable fog conditions in England facilitated
some experiments. Targets were placed on a lawn and students were asked to
estimate their size and distance in the fog. Later tests were conducted in clear
conditions. Objects actually 25 m away were seen as being 30 m away in fog but
only 14 m away in clear conditions. Figure 25 presents the results.
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I- FOG = // 281 ] FOG~ ; 5 1' t '
"-' 25 -~ i ~" 261 ' : ~/] [ ! . ]
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OL" 20
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WN 24l
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, , ~ , . . LEAR 16l . / - : / j ' i ' I
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
TRUE DISTANCE (METRES) TRUE SIZE (CM)
FIGURE 25 RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT INVESTIGATING INFLUENCE OF FOG ON

ESTIMATES OF TARGET SIZE AND DISTANCE
- 34 -
Slopinq R.unways" Pilots are used to m a k i n g a 2,5 ° - 3 ° a p p r o a c h . If the r u n w a y
is not level, p e r c e p t i o n c a n be a c c u r a t e b u t i n a p p r o p r i a t e . T h a t i s , t h e p i l o t
may t r y to a p p r o a c h so t h e r u n w a y p e r s p e c t i v e l o o k s t h e same as it n o r m a l l y
d o e s b u t a p p r o a c h e s too low or too h i g h . If t h e t e r r a i n s l o p e s up a n d a w a y from
him, t h e a p p r o a c h will a p p e a r too s t e e p a n d he will t e n d to go l o w e r . If t h e
r u n w a y s l o p e s d o w n a n d a w a y from him, t h e a p p r o a c h will a p p e a r too s h a l l o w .
R u n w a y s with s l o p e s of 12 ° are k n o w n to e x i s t . R u n w a y s w h i c h hump up in t h e
m i d d l e ( t h e middle is h i g h e r t h a n e i t h e r e n d ) can a p p e a r s h o r t e r t h a n t h e y a r e ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r t o u c h i n g d o w n . F i g u r e 26 i l l u s t r a t e s s l o p i n g r u n w a y p r o b l e m s .
.,.,..-
VIEW OF LEVEL RUNWAY ~~..'.~! !.'~.-. .:
ON CORRECT GLIDESLOPE • i~ " ":
' F ' - ~ o',,GE. . . . . !

PILOT'S NATURAL TENDENCY IS TO CORRECT |
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VIEW OF RISING SLOPE RUNWAY
ON CORRECT GLIDESLOPE
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DANGER
PILOT'S NATURAL TENDENCY IS TO CORRECT
UPWARDS TO INTERCEPT HIS'NORMAL" . ...- "ailll~l~ ~
ANGLE OF APPROACH. o-° ''~.,..--
VIEW OF DESCENDING SLOPE

RUNWA o . o..E T .
. . . . . - _
FIGURE 26 SLOPING RUNWAYS
Slopinq T e r r a i n - T h e r u n w a y may be l e v e l , b u t if t h e t e r r a i n u n d e r the a p p r o a c h

p a t h s l o p e s , i l l u s i o n s can still be a p r o b l e m . T h i s is b e c a u s e the pilot may
i n t e g r a t e many c u e s i n c l u d i n g his a p p a r e n t h e i g h t in a d d i t i o n to r u n w a y p e r s p e -
c t i v e . If the a p p r o a c h t e r r a i n is s l o p i n g a w a y from t h e r u n w a y ( a p p r o a c h i n g
o v e r a v a l l e y ) , the a p p r o a c h may a p p e a r too h i g h , while if the a p p r o a c h t e r r a i n
s l o p e s down to t h e r u n w a y ( t h e r u n w a y is in a v a l l e y ) , t h e a p p r o a c h may s e e m
too low. ( S e e f i g . 2 7 ) .
WHEN THERE IS AN UPSLOPE UNDER THE APPROACH
PATH, THE AIRCRAFT MAY APPEAR TO BE ABOVE .//~,~//~~~
THE N O R M A L GLIDE PATH. THE RESULTING
TENDENCY IS TO FLY LOW. APPARENT HEIGHT I
,
-~~'~: ~ ACTUAL HEIGHT
1__ _".. _..:_.J --- ,_
RUNWAY-- NO SLOPE TERRAIN__ Up~ ~ ~ ~ = : ~ ~ = ~ ~

WHEN THERE IS A DOWNSLOPE UNDER THE APPROACH ACTIIAI NI~I~NT
PATH. THE PILOT WILL BELIEVE THE AIRCRAFT TO
BE ON A LOW. FLAT APPROACH. ASSUMING THE A # .
SLOPE IS NOT READILY DISCERNIBLE. THE RESULTING d/~~~/.~

TENDENCY IS TO FLY HIGH. - ----AppARENTH E I G H T
RUNWAY -- NO SLOPE TERRAIN -- DOWN SLOPE
(ADAPTED FROM: "'SEEING IS DECEIVING." INTERCEPTOR. OCTOBER 1972)
FIGURE 27 SLOPING T E R R A I N UNDER THE APPROACH PATH
- 35 -
R u n w a y Size" If t he r u n ' r a y is w i d e r t h a n the one the pilot is familiar w i t h , it wil
seem c l o s e r t h a n it a c t u a l l y is. The p i l o t , as a c o n s e q u e n c e , may t e n d to believe
he is too h i g h a n d go lower t h a n t h e p r e s c r i b e d glide p a t h . A w i d e r t h a n normal
r u n w a y may also lead t h e pilot into an e a r l y f l a r e since he is able to see r u n w a y
e d g e s with p e r i p h e r a l vision h i g h e r t h a n he u s u a l l y d o e s . Similarly, if t h e r u n w a y
is n a r r o w e r t h a n normal, t h e r u n w a y could a p p e a r to be f u r t h e r away a n d t h e
pilot would t e n d to go h i g h .
A pilot u s e d to l a n d i n g o v e r l a r g e t r e e s might h a v e t r o u b l e if he was s u d d e n l y
r e q u i r e d to land w h e r e t r e e s may look t h e same b u t t e n d to be much smaller.
R u n w a y C o n t r a s t " A t m o s p h e r i c a t t e n u a t i o n s o f t e n s c o n t o u r s . R u n w a y s not o n l y
a p p e a r smaller as y o u go a w a y from t h e m , t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e r u n w a y
a n d t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t e r r a i n is r e d u c e d . A n y t h i n g t h a t r e d u c e s r u n w a y c o n t r a s t ,
t h e r e f o r e , will t e n d to make t h e r u n w a y a p p e a r f u r t h e r a w a y . Notable examples
of t h i s a r e snow , c o n c r e t e r u n w a y s s u r r o u n d e d b y d e s e r t , a n d a s p h a l t (macadam)
r u n w a y s e m b e d d e d in d a r k foliage or v e g e t a t i o n . Du sk a n d o v e r c a s t d a y s may
also c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s f a c t o r in a d d i t i o n to eliminating s h a d o w s , a n o t h e r v a l u a b l e
cue.
.Runway Liqhtinq" An i n - f l i g h t e x p e r i m e n t was c o n d u c t e d u s i n g as a s u b j e c t an

e x p e r i e n c e d pilot who had not b e e n b r i e f e d . Earlier made a r r a n g e m e n t s w e r e
made with the c o n t r o l l e r to c o o p e r a t e . A l i g h t a i r c r a f t was u s e d . As the v i s u a l
a p p r o a c h was s t a r t e d t he l i g h t s w e r e s e t at dim. The d e s c e n t was s t a r t e d late.
As t h e pilot s t a y e d h i g h , t h e m i c r o p h o n e b u t t o n was p u s h e d twice which was a
s i g n a l to t h e c o n t r o l l e r to t u r n the b r i g h t n e s s of the l i g h t s up g r a d u a l l y .
T h e pilot s t r a y e d u n c o m f o r t a b l y low. T h e d e v i a t i o n became more a p p a r e n t as the
a p p r o a c h l i g h t s w e r e n e a r e d , t he c o n f u s e d pilot a d d e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p o w e r and
b a c k p r e s s u r e on t h e s t i c k to d r a g in o v e r t h e l i g h t s . If one row of r u n w a y
l i g h t s is b r i g h t e r t h a n the o t h e r , t h e pilots may feel t h e y a r e in a b a n k w h e n
t h e y a r e a c t u a l l y in a w i n g s - l e v e l a t t i t u d e .
The "White-out"
T h e p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n as "White-out" o c c u r s p a r t i c u l a r l y in th e p o lar r e g i o n .
T h i s p h e n o m e n o n is p a r t i c u l a r l y common at dawn an d t w i l i g h t . The horizon
d i s a p p e a r s completely; the snow c o v e r a n d th e clouds melt into a single mass
of g r e y i s h w h i t e , f o r m i n g a c o n t i n u o u s b a c k g r o u n d , completely d e s t i t u t e of
s h a d i n g , detail or p e r s p e c t i v e . The l i g h t r e f l e c t e d b y t h e snow is of r o u g h l y
the same i n t e n s i t y as t h a t coming from t h e s k y . Objects do not cas t a n y s h a d o w .
It is impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h e i t h e r t h e horizc;n or a n y detail on the s u r f a c e or
in th~ s k y . A g r e y gloom c o v e r s the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d is p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o n u n c e d
wtlen the s k y is c o v e r e d in t h i c k cloud. The r e s u l t i n g loss of s h a d o w - p e r c e p t i o n
b r i n g s with it loss of d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n . What looks like flat t e r r a i n may in
f a c t b e a hill or a g u l l y .
A s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e of this is t h a t t h e pilot may b eliev e he is f l y i n g in VMC
c o n d i t i o n s , with no o b s t r u c t i o n s a h e a d , while a c t u a l l y f l y i n g into them.
o 36 -
T h e f i r s t field s t u d i e s of t h e p h e n o m e n o n a g r e e d in a t t r i b u t i n g it to a c o m b i n a -
tion of two e l e m e n t s - t h e s k y c o v e r e d b y low s t r a t u s a n d t h e s n o w - c o v e r e d
g r o u n d . T h e l a t e s t r e s e a r c h s h o w s t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s may also i n t e r v e n e . T h u s
f i v e t y p e s of w h i t e - o u t may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d :
1. In o v e r c a s t s k y , w h e n t h e c l o u d c o v e r is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p h e n o m e n o n ;
2. In wet f o g , w h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o n is d u e to t h e s u s p e n s i o n of d r o p s of
s u p e r c o o l e d w a t e r in t h e a i r ;
3. In ice f o g , w h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o n is d u e to t h e s u s p e n s i o n of ice c r y s t a l s
in t h e a i r ;
4. In d r i v i n g s n o w , w h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o n is c a u s e d b y p a r t i c l e s of s n o w e i t h e r
d r a g g e d or d r i v e n by the wind;
5. In p r e c i p i t a t i o n , w h e n w h i t e - o u t is c a u s e d b y a fall of snow.
T h e main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s p h e n o m e n o n a r e as follows-
Physical characteristics
( a ) A b s e n c e of s h a d o w s c o m b i n e d w i t h d i f f u s e d i l l u m i n a t i o n . It is a c c e n t u a t e d b y
t h e u n i f o r m d i s p e r s i o n c a u s e d b y t h e s u s p e n s i o n of p a r t i c l e s in t h e a i r -
p a r t i c u l a r l y s n o w or ice c r y s t a l s . Where t h i s o c c u r s , o b j e c t s a r e d i f f i c u l t
to d i s t i n g u i s h a n d may c a u s e o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s , e v e n w h e n t h e y p r e s e n t
contrasts.
( b ) R e d u c t i o n of h o r i z o n t a l v i s i b i l i t y w h e n t h e d i f f u s i v e l a y e r is in c o n t a c t w i t h
t h e g r o u n d - h o w e v e r , r e s e a r c h h a s n o t r e v e a l e d t h e p r e s e n c e of " e d g e e f f e c t "
i . e . t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t v i s i b i l i t y loss is g r e a t e r at t h e e d g e s of a n o b j e c t
t h a n at t h e c e n t r e .
( c ) An a p p a r e n t i n c r e a s e in l u m i n a n c e . A c t u a l l y , it is v e r y d i f f i c u l t to a s s e s s
v a r i a t i o n s in l u m i n a n c e in t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e c u s t o m a r y d i r e c t i o n a l illu-
mination to t h e d i f f u s e i l l u m i n a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of w h i t e - o u t ; while lumi-
n a n c e i n c r e a s e s in c e r t a i n d i r e c t i o n s , it is r e d u c e d in o t h e r s a n d t h e o v e r a l l
e f f e c t is d e c e p t i v e .
Physiological c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
,
( a ) Illumination of t h e r e t i n a . V i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n of a c l e a r object is o b s c u r e d if
t h e d e g r e e of illumination is h e i g h t e n e d at p o i n t s close to its image on t h e
r e t i n a ( t h a t of a d a r k o b j e c t is likewise o b s c u r e d if t h e amount of l i g h t in
its v i c i n i t y is r e d u c e d ) . T h u s , t h e r e t i n a loses i t s s e n s i t i v i t y if a s u f f i c i e n t
d e g r e e of c o n t r a s t is not m a i n t a i n e d b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t and its e n v i r o n m e n t .
(b) E m p t y - f i e l d m y o p i a . T h i s is a t t r i b u t e d to d e f o c a l i z a t i o n of t h e r e t i n a l image
Due to d i f f u s i o n of t h e l i g h t , as a r e s u l t of w h i c h t h e l a t t e r is i n c a p a b l e
of p r o v i d i n g t h e s t i m u l a t i o n n e c e s s a r y to c o r r e t t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e e y e .
The a b s e n c e of r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t a n d the o b s e r v e r is said
to be p a r t i c u l a r l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s t y p e m y o p i a .
- 37 -
(c) A p p e a r a n c e of c e r t a i n " m i n o r d e f e c t s of v i s i o n , as y e t u n s u s p e c t e d in t h e
s u b j e c t ( f l o a t i n g s p e c k s b e f o r e t h e e y e s d u e to o p a c i t i e s of t h e v i t r e o u s
h u m o u r , r u n n i n g s c i n t i l l a t i o n in t h e c a s e of a h i g h level of b r i g h t n e s s ) .
I
Psychological aspects
(a) L o s s of v e r t i c a l s e n s e . W h i t e - o u t i m p o s e s i n s t r u m e n t f l i g h t c o n d i t i o n s on t h e
p i l o t . I n d e e d , it d e p r i v e s him of all s e n s e of a n g u l a r momentum a n d e x p o s e s
him to v e r t i g o . T h i s e f f e c t , w h i c h is v e r y d a n g e r o u s e v e n f o r a man m o v i n g
on t h e s u r f a c e , is e v e n more so f o r a n a v i a t o r .
( b ) L o s s of s e n s e of d i r e c t i o n . T h e s e n s e of d i r e c t i o n is b a s e d e s s e n t i a l l y on
t h e e x i s t e n c e of v a r i o u s stimuli in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , s u c h as v i s u a l l a n d m a r k s ,
a w i n d of s t a b l e d i r e c t i o n o r a l o c a t a b l e s o u n d . In t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h d a t a ,
a p e r s o n e n d e a v o u r i n g to follow a s t r a i g h t line t e n d s in f a c t to v e e r to t h e
r i g h t a n d t r a c e a c i r c l e . T h e d a n g e r is g r e a t e s t f o r a pilot who p a s s e s
a b r u p t l y from a zone of v i s u a l r e f e r e n c e s to a ~vhite-out zone a n d t r i e s to
make a h a l f t u r n , b e c a u s e in t h i s c a s e loss of t h e s e n s e of d i r e c t i o n is
aggravated by loss of awareness of the aircraft's attitude.
(c) Loss of distance perception. This sense normally stems from an unconscious
and subjective judgment, based on certain acquired habits and factors such
as knowledge of the dimensions of familiar objects, assessment of atmosphe-
ric disturbance, the existence of differences between the images supplied by
each eye, the more or less blurred character of the retinal images, knowled-
ge of the convergence of the eyes...All these elements are somewhat impre-
cise and laboratory measurements have shown that they evaluate the distances
of objects between each other rather than distance between them and the
observer. It therefore appears that the distance of an object from the
observer is obtained from intermediate objects and the texture of the terrain.
Moreover, the relationship between the perceived distance and the actual
distance of objects is not constant; it depends on the direction of the eye's
rays, and the number and dimensions of the objects. Generally speaking,
the perceived distance is less than the actual distance and the underestima-
tion error, increases in proportion to this distance.
- 38 -
CONCLUSIONS
A hiffh p r o p o r t i o n of all a p p r o a c h and l a n d i n g a c c i d e n t s have as casual factors

visual p e r c e p t u a l misjudgment of d i s t a n c e , a l t i t u d e , or s p e e d . Pilot judgment of
d i s t a n c e and altitude d u r i n g the a p p r o a c h and l a n d i n g is a highly i n t e g r a t i v e
v i s u a l p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s which utilizes the e x t e r n a l visual cues of r u n w a y
p e r s p e c t i v e , motion p a r a l l a x , t e r r a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and familiar objects, and
motion p e r s p e c t i v e . An analysis of a p p r o a c h and l a n d i n g a c c i d e n t s shows that
v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n or illusions c a u s i n g misjudgment of d i s t a n c e , s p e e d , and alti-
t u d e can be causally r e l a t e d to four conditions: (1) R e d u c e d visibility, including
n i g h t time, (2) u n u s u a l r u n w a y conditions, (3) u n u s u a l r u n w a y environment
c o n d i t i o n s , and (4) a complex i n t e r a c t i o n of all the a b o v e .
T h e p r e v e n t i o n of pilot visual p e r c e p t u a l misjudgment involves (1) a p p r o p r i a t e
u s e of flight deck i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , (2) emphasis on crew coordination and
discipline, (3) pilot knowledge of human f a c t o r s visual limitations in c e r t a i n
a p p r o a c h and landing conditions. This can be realized t h r o u g h t r a i n i n g and
simulated familiarization.
- 39 -
VISUAL ILLUSIONS
I1 titolo "Visual Illusions" ~ Stato a d o t t a t o p e r semplicit~ di linguaggio in luogo di

quelli, pif~ a d e g u a t i al contenuto del documento, di "Visual Perception" o di "Human
information p r o c e s s i n g " .
II problema delle iUusioni visive in particolare, se p u r ben noto in campo aeronau=

tico, ~ u n argomento che merita di essere periodicamente riportato aUVattenzione
degli equipaggi, onde essi m a n t e n g a n o costantemente elevato il liveUo di vigilanza.
U n a serie di incidenti tenderebbe a dimostrare quanto i piloti continuino ad essere

vulnerabili sotto questo aspetto, in particolare in presenza di fattori che distolga o
no Itattenzione dal controUo strumentale in condizioni di volo neUe quali la visio-
ne esterna sia tale da generare u n (falso) senso di sicurezza.
La presente Informazione Tecnico Operativa b intesa a richiamare alla memoria gli

aspetti p.~incipali delle illusioni visive e le loro cause, ed a ricordare come la sta
bilizzazione degli avvicinamenti, IVapplicazione degli standards operativi di volo ed
il continuo riferimento alle indicazioni strumentali siano fattori fondamentali per m i
nimizzarne gli effetti.
BIBLIOCRAPHY
R.F. GABRIEL • Some p o t e n t i a l e r r o r s in h u m a n i n f o r m a t i o n

processing during approach and landing
R.H. RIORDAN • Visual perception and approach and landing

accidents
J.L. DECELLES, E . J . BURKE,

J.H. O'BRIEN • Warning ..... approach l i g h t s in s i g h t .
ICAO • C i r c u l a r 96 - AN 79
R. LAMI • C o l l i m a t e d h e a d - u p d i s p l a y s o l u t i o n s to h a n d l i n g
problems
IATA • A i r l i n e g u i d e to h u m a n f a c t o r s
- 41 -
PILOT GUIDE TO AIRPLANE UPSET RECOVERY 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword ....................................................................................................................3
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................3
2. Causes of Airplane Upsets....................................................................4

2.1 Environmentally Induced Airplane Upsets ..........................................5
Turbulence ............................................................................................5
Clear air Turbulence..............................................................................5
Mountain Wave ....................................................................................5
Windshear..............................................................................................5
Thunderstorms ......................................................................................6
Microburst ............................................................................................7
Wake Turbulence ..................................................................................7
Airplane Icing........................................................................................9
2.2 Systems Anomalies Induced Airplane Upsets ......................................9
Flight Instruments ..............................................................................10
Autoflight Systems..............................................................................10
Flight Control and Other Anomalies ..................................................10
2.3 Pilot-Induced Airplane Upsets............................................................10
Instrument Cross-Check......................................................................11
Adjusting Attitude and Power ............................................................11
Inattention............................................................................................11
Distraction From Primary Cockpit Duties ........................................11
Vertigo or Spatial Disorientation ........................................................11
Pilot Incapacitation..............................................................................12
Improper Use of Airplane Automation ..............................................12
2.4 Combination of Causes ......................................................................12
3. Swept-Wing Airplane Foundamentals ................................................13

3.1 Flight Dynamics..................................................................................13
3.2 Energy States ......................................................................................13
3.3 Load Factors ......................................................................................14
3.4 Aerodynamic Flight Envelope ............................................................17
3.5 Aerodynamics......................................................................................18
3.5.1 Angle of Attack and Stall ..................................................................18
3.5.2 Camber................................................................................................21
3.5.3 Control Surface Foundamentals ........................................................22
Spoiler-Type Devices..........................................................................22
Trim ....................................................................................................23
3.5.4 Lateral and Directional Aerodynamic Considerations ......................24
Angle of Sideslip ................................................................................24
Wing Dihedral Effects ........................................................................25
Pilot-Commanded Sideslip..................................................................26
3.5.5 High-Speed, High-Altitude Characteristics........................................26
3.5.6 Stability ..............................................................................................27
I n f o rmazione Tecnico Operativa Nr. 5 7

2 PILOT GUIDE TO AIRPLANE UPSET RECOVERY
3.5.7 Maneuvering in Pitch ..........................................................................28

3.5.8 Mechanics of Turning Flight ..............................................................30
3.5.9 Lateral Maneuvering ..........................................................................32
3.5.10 Directional Maneuvering ....................................................................33
3.5.11 Flight at Extremely Low Airspeeds ....................................................34
3.5.12 Flight at Extremely High Speeds........................................................34
4. Recovery from Airplane Upsets..........................................................35

4.1 Situation Awareness of an Airplane Upset..........................................35
4.2 MIscellaneois Issues Associated With Upset Recovery......................35
4.2.1. Startle Factor ......................................................................................35
4.2.2 Negative G. Force................................................................................36
4.2.3. Use of full Control Inputs ..................................................................36
4.2.4. Counter - Intuitive Factors ..................................................................36
4.2.5 Prevoius Training in Nonsimilar Airplanes ........................................36
4.2.6 Potential effects on Engines................................................................36
4.3 Airplane Upset Recovery Techniques ................................................36
4.3.1. Stall......................................................................................................37
4.3.2. Nose-High, Wings-Level Recovery Techniques ................................37
4.3.3. Nose-low, Wings-Level Recovery Techniques....................................38
4.3.4. High Bank Angle REcovery Techniques ............................................39
4.3.5 Summary of Airplane Recovery Techniques ......................................39
5. Glossary - Acronyms ..........................................................................40
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................42
Questionnaire ............................................................................................................43

Foreword While specific values may vary among airplane

models, the following unintentional conditions
An “Airplane Upset Recovery” Team comprising generally describe an airplane upset:
representatives from airlines, pilot associations, airpla- • Pitch attitude greater than 25° nose up.
ne manufacturers, and government aviation and regula- • Pitch attitude greater than 10° nose down.
tory agencies developed the techniques presented in • Bank angle greater than 45°.
this training aid • Within the above parameters, but flying
airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.
1. Introduction
Available sarety data suggest that loss of control is a
problem that deserves attention. Figure shows that loss
of control on flight accounted for many fatalities
during the indicated time period.
Terrns such as “unusual attitude,” “loss of con The objectives of this guide are to provide pilots with:
trol”,”airplane upset”,”and others are used within the • Knowledge to recognize situations that may
industry. “Airplane upset” was thought appro priate for lead to airplane upsets so that they may be
this training aid. An airplane upset is defined as an air- prevented.
plane in flight unintentionally exceeding the pararne- • Basic airplane aerodynamic inforrnation.
ters norrnally experienced in line operations or trai- • Airplane flight maneuvering information and
ning. techniques for recovering airplanes that have
been upset.

2. Causes of Airplane Upsets Figure 2 shows incidents and causes from NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) re ports.
The National Transportation Safety Board analysis of
Airplane upsets are not a common occurrence. This
20 transpo:#-category loss-of-control accidents from
may be for a variety of reasons. Airplane design and
19#6 to 1996 indicates that the majority were caused
certification methods have improved. Equipment has
by the airplane sta}ling (Fig. 3). This section p}ovides
become more reliable. Perhaps training programs have
a review of the most prevalent causes for airplane
been effective in teaching pilots to avoid situations that
upsets.
lead to airplane upsets. While airplane upsets seldom
take place, there are a variety of reasons why they
happen.

2.1 Environmentally Indu ced of area or time. In general, areas of turbulence

associated with ajet stream are from 100 to 300 mi
Air plane Upsets long, elongated in the direction of the wind; 50 to
100 mi wide ; and 2000 to 5000 ft deep . These
The predominant number of airplane upsets are areas may persist from 30 min to 1 day. CAT near
caused by various environmental factors (Fi,_ 2). the jet stream is the result of the difference in
Unfortunately, the aviation industry has the least wind speeds and the windshear generated between
amount of influence over the environment when points . CAT is considered moderate when the
compared to human factors or airplane-anomaly venical windshear is 5 kn per 1000 ft or greater
caused upsets. The industry recognizes this di and the horizontal shear is 20 kn per 150 nm, or
lemma and resorts to training as a means for avoi- both. Severe CAT occurs when the venical shear is
ding environmental hazards. Separate educa tion 6 kn per 1000 ft and the horizontal shear is 40 kn
and training aids have been produced through an per 150 nm or greater, o#r both.
industry team process that addresses turbu lence,
windshear, and wake turbulence. Mountain Wave
Mountains are the greatest obstructions to wind
Turbulence
flow. This type of turbulence is classified as “me
Turbulent atmosphere is characterized by a large chanical” because it is caused by a mechanical
variation in an air current over a short distance. disruption of wind. Over mountains, rotor or len
The main causes of turbulence are jet streams, ticular clouds are sure signs of turbulence. How
convective currents, obstructions to wind flow, ever, mechanical turbulence may also be present
and windshear. Turbulence is categorized as in air too dry to produce clouds. Light to extreme
“light,” “moderate,” “severe,” and “extreme.” turbulence is created by mountains.
Only limited information is presented in this sec-
tion for a short review of the subject. Severe turbulence is defined as that which causes
large, abrupt changes in altitude or attitude. It
Knowledge of the various types of turbulence usually causes large variation in indicated air
assists in avoiding it and, therefore, the potential speed. The airplane may be momentarily out of
for an airplane upset. control. Severe turbulence can be expected in
mountainous areas where wind components ex
In one extreme incident, an airplane encountered ceeding 50 kn are perpendicular to and near the
severe turbulence that caused the number 2 engi- ridge level; in and near developing and mature
ne to depart the airplane. The airplane entered a thunderstorms; occasionally, in other towering
roll 50 deg left, followed by a huge yaw. Several cumuliform clouds; within 50 to 100 mi on the
pitch and roll oscillations were reported. The crew cold side of the center of the jet stream; in troughs
re covered and landed the airplane. aloft; and in lows aloft where venical windshears
exceed 10 kn per 1000 ft and horizontal wind-
Clear Air Ibrbulence shears ex ceed 40 kn per 150 mi.
Clear air turbulence (CAT) is defined as high level
turbulence (normally above 15.000 ft above sea Extreme turbulence is defined as that in which the
level) not associated with cumuliform cloudiness, airplane is violently tossed around and practically
including thunderstorms. impossible to control. It may cause structural dam
age. Extreme turbulence can be found in moun
Although CAT can be encountered in any layer of tain-wave situations, in and below the level of
the atmosphere, it is almost always present in the well-developed rotor clouds, and in severe thun-
vicinity of jet streams. A number of jet streams derstorms.
(high-altitude paths of winds exceeding velocities
of 75 to 100 kn) may exist at any given time, and Windshear
their locations will vary constantly. CAT becomes Wind variations at low altitude have long been
particularly difficult to predict as it is extremely recognized as a serious hazard to airplanes during
dynamic and does not have common dimensions takeoff and approach. These wind variations can

result from a large variety of meteorological con are usually very turbulent. and they can create a seri
ditions, such as topographical conditions, tem perature ous airplane upset. especially during takeoff and
inversions, sea breezes, frontal systems, strong surface approach.
winds, and the most violent forms of wind change— Frontal thunderstorms are usually associated with
thunderstorms and rain showers. Thunderstorms and weather systems line fronts. converging wind, and
rain showers may produce an airplane upset, and they trou,#hs aloft (Fig. 5). Frontal thunderstorms form in
will be discussed in the following section. squall lines; last several hours; generate heavy rain#
and possibly hail; and produce strong gusty winds, and
Thunderstorms possibly tornadoes. The principal dis tinction in forma-
tion of these more severe thunder storms is the presen-
There are two basic types of thunderstorms: airmass ce of large, horizontal wind changes (speed and direc-
and frontal. Airrnass thunderstorms appear to be ran- tion) at different altitudes in the thunderstorm. This
domly distributed in unstable air, and they develop causes the severe thun derstorm to be vertically tilted.
from localized heating at the Earth’s sur face (Fig. 4). Precipitation falls away from the heated updraft, per-
The heated airrises and cools to form cumulus clouds. mitting a much longer storm development period.
As the cumulus stage continues to develop, precipita- Resulting air flows within the storm accelerate to much
tion forms in high portions of the cloud and falls. higher vertical velocities, which ultimately results in
Precipitation signals the beginning of the mature stage higher horizontal wind velocities at the surface. The
and the presence of a downdraft. After approximately downward moving column of air, or downdraft, of a
an hour, the heated updraft creating the thunderstorm is typical thunderstorm is fairly large, about 1 to S miles
cut off by rainfall. Heat is removed and the thunder- in diarneter. Resultant outflows may pro duce large
storm dissipates. Many thunderstorms produce an changes in windspeed.
associated cold air gust front as a result of the down-
flow and outrush of rain-cooled air. These gust fronts

Microbursts when exiting the microburst. Windspeeds inten sify for

about 5 min after a microburst initially contacts the
Identification of concentrated, more powerful down- ground and typically dissipate within 10 to 20 min after
drafts—known as microbursts—has resulted from the ground contact.
investigation of windshear accidents and from meteo- It is vital to recognize that some microbursts cannot
rological research. Microbursts can occur anywhere be successfully escaped with any known techniques.
convective weather conditions occur. Observations
suggest that approximately 5% of all thunderstorms
produce a microburst. Downdrafts associated with Wake Turbulence
microbursts are typi cally only a few hundred to 3000 Wake turbulence is the leading cause of airplane
ft across. When a downdraft reaches the ground, it upsets that are induced by the environment. The
spreads out horizontally and may form one or more phenomenon that creates wake turbulence results
horizontal vortex rings around the downdraft (Fig. 6). from the forces that lift the airplane. High-pressure
Microburst outflows are not always symmetric. air from the lower surface of the wings flows
Therefore, a significant airspeed increase may not around the wingtips to the lower pressure region
occur upon entering outflows, or it may be much less above the wings. A pair of counter-rotating vorti-
than the subsequent airspeed loss experienced

ces are thus shed from the wings: the right wing vortex in Figure 8.
rotates counterclockwise. and the left wing vortex rota- An encounter with wake turbulence usually results in
tes clockwise (Fig. 7). The region of rotating air behind induced rolling or#pitch moments; however, in rare
the airplane is where wake turbulence occurs. The instances an encounter could cause structural damage
strength of the turbulence is determined predominantly to the airplane. In more than one instance, pilots have
by the weight, wing span. and speed of the airplane. described an encounter to be like “hit ting a wall.” The
Generally. vortices descend at an initial rate of about dynamic forces of the vortex can exceed the roll or
300 to 500 ft/min for #ab.out 30 sec. The descent rate pitch capability of the airplane to overcome these for-
decreases and eventually approaches zero at between ces. During test programs, the wake was approached
500 and 900 ft below the flight path. Flying at or above from all directions to evalu ate the effect of encounter
the flight path provides the best method for avoidance. direction on response. One item was common to all
Maintaining a vertical separation of at least 1000 ft encounters: without a concerted effort by the pilot to
when crossing below the preceding aircraft may be reenter the wak e, the airplane would be expelled from
considered safe. This vertical motion is illustrated the wake and an airplar.e upset could occur.
Figura 8 - Vertical Motion Out of Ground Effect

Counter-control is usually effective and induced roll is 2.2 Systems Anomalies-lnduced

minimal in cases where the wingspan and ailerons of
the encountering airplane extend be yond the rotational Airplane Upsets
flowfield of the vortex (Fig. 9). It is more difficult for Airplane designs, equipment reliability, and flight crew
airplanes with short wing span (relative to the genera- training have all improved since the Wright brothers’
ting airplane) to counter the imposed roll induced by first powered flight. Airplane certifica tion processes
the vortex flow. and oversight are rigorous. Airlines and manufacturers
closely monitor equipment fail ure rates for possible
Avoj51ing wake turbulence is the key to avoiding many redesign of airplane parts or modification of mainte-
airplane upsets. Pilot and air traffic control procedures nance procedures. Dissemi nation of information is
and standards are designed to accom plish this goal, but rapid if problems are detected. Improvement in airpla-
as the aviation industry ex pands, the probability of an ne designs and equipment components has always been
encounter also increases. a major focus in the aviation industry. In spite of this
continuing effort, there are still failures. Some of these
Airplane Icing failures can lead to an airplane upset. That is why fli-
ght crews are trained to overcome or miti gate the
Technical literature is rich with data showing the adver-
impact of the failures. Most failures are survivable if
se aerodynamic effects of airfoil contamina tion. Large
correct responses are made by the flight crew.
degradation of airplane performance can result from
the surface roughness of an ex tremely small amount of
An airplane was approaching an airfield and ap peared
contamination. These detrimental effects vary with the
to break offto the right for a left downwind to the oppo-
location and roughness, and they produce unexpected
site runway. On downwind at approxi mately 1500 ft,
airplane handling characteristics, including degrada-
the airplane pitched up to nearly 60 deg and climbed to
tion of maximum lift capability, increased drag, and
an altitude of nearly 4500 ft, with the airspeed deterio-
pos sibly unanticipated changes in stability and con
rating to almost 0 kn.
trol. Therefore, the axiom of “Keep it clean” for criti-
The airplane then tail-slid, pitched down, and seem
cal airplane surfaces continues to be a univer sal requi-
ingly recovered. However, it continued into an other
rement.
steep pitchup of 70 deg. This time as it
Figura 9 - Induced Roll

tail-slid, it fell off toward the right wing. As it pitched mined that the anomalies corresponded to conditions
down and descended again. seemingly recovering, the equal to an obstruction in the Captain’ s airspeed sen-
airplane impacted the ground in a flat pitch. slightly sors (pitot head).
right wing down. The digital flight data recorder indi-
cated that the stabilizer trim was more than 13 units Autoflight Systems
nose up. The flight crew had discussed a trim problem
during the descent but made no move to cut out the Autoflight systems include the autopilot, autothrottles,
electric #m or to manually trim. The accident was sur- and all related systems that perforrn flight management
viv able if the pilot had responded properly. and guidance. The systems integrate information from
a variety of other air plane systems. They keep track of
Flight Instruments altitude, head ing, airspeed, and flight path with unflag-
ging accuracy. The pilot community has tended to de
The importance of reliable flight instruments has been velop a great deal of confidence in the systems, and
known from the time that pilots first began to rely on that has led to complacency in some cases. As reliable
artificial horizons. This resulted in con tinual improve- as the autoflight systems may be, they can. and have,
ments in reliability, design, redun dancy, and informa- malfunctioned. Because of the integra tion of systems,
tion provided to the pilots. it may even be difficult for the pilot to analyze the
However. instrument failures do infrequently occur. All
cause of the anomaly, and airplane upsets have occur-
airplane operations manuals provide flight instrument
red. Since advanced automation may tend to mask the
system information so that when failures do happen,
cause of the anomaly, an important action in taking
the pilot can analyze the impact and select the correct
control of the airplane is to reduce the level of automa-
procedural alternatives. Air planes are designed to
tion. Disengaging the autopilot, the autothrottles, or
make sure pilots have at least the minimum informa-
both, may help in analyzing the cause of the anomaly
tion needed to safely control the airplane.
by putting the pilot in closer touch with the airplane
In spite of this, several accidents point out that pilots
and perhaps the anomaly.
are not always prepared to correctly analyze the alter-
natives, and an upset takes place. During the takeoff
roll, a check of the airspeed at 80 kn revealed that the
Flight Control and Other Anomalies
Captain’ s airspeed was not func tioning. The takeoff
Flight control anomalies, such as flap asymmetry, spoi-
was continued. When the airplane reached 4700 ft,
ler problems, and others, are addressed in airplane ope-
about 2 min into the flight, some advisory messages
rations manuals. While they are rare events, airplane
appeared inform ing the crew of flight control irregula-
rities. Com ments tòllowed between the pilots about certification requirements ensure that pilots have suffi-
confusion that was occurring between the airspeed cient information and are trained to handle these
indication systems from the left-side airspeed indica- events. However, pilots should be prepared for the
tion sys tem, affecting the indication of the left-side air unexpected, especially during takeoffs. Engine failure
speed autopilot and activation of the overspeed war- at low altitudes while the airplane is at a low-energy
ning. The airplane continued flying with the autopilot condition is still a demanding maneuver for the pilot to
connected and receiving an erroneous indication in the handle. An erroneous stall warning on takeoff or shor-
Captain’s airspeed. Recorded sounds and flight data tly after takeoff could be a situation that allows the air-
indicated extreme condi tions of flight, one correspon- plane to become upset.
ding to overspeed and the other to slow speed (stick
shaker). The Captain initiated an action to correct the 2.3 Pilot-lnduced Airplane Upsets
overspeed, and the copilot advised that his airspeed
indicator was decreasing. The airplane had three air- We have known for many years that sensory inputs can
speed indi cating systems, and at no time did the flight be misleading to pilots, especially when they cannot
crew mention a comparison among the three systems. see the horizon. To solve this problem, airplanes are
The flight recorders indicated the airplane was out equipped with flight instruments to provide the neces-
of control for almost 2 min until impact. Experts deter- sary information for controlling the airplane.

Instrument Cross-Check one throttle remained at idle and the other compen
sated by going to a high power setting. The result ing
Pilots must cross-check and interpret the instru ments asymmetric thrust exceeded the autopilot authority and
and apply the proper pitch. bank, and power adjust- the airplane began to roll. At ap proximately 50 deg of
ments. Misinterpretation of the instruments or slow bank, full pro-roll lateral control wheel was applied.
cross-checks by the pilot can lead to an airplane upset. The airplane rolled 168 deg into a steep dive of 78 deg.
An important factor influencing cross-check tech nique nose low, and crashed.
is the ability of the pilot: “All pilots do not interpret
instrument presentations with the same speed; some Distraction From Primary
are faster than others in understand ing and evaluating Cockpit Duties
what they see. One reason for this is that the natural “Control the airplane first” has always been a guiding
ability of pilots varies. Another reason is that the expe- principle in flying. Unfortunately, it is not always fol-
rience levels are different. Pilots who are experienced
lowed. In this incident, both pilots were fully qualified
and fly regu larly will probably interpret their instru-
as pilot-in-command and were su pervising personnel.
ments more quickly than inexperienced pilots.” Source:
The Captain left the left seat, and the copilot set the air-
Instrun#enl Flight Procedures. Air Force Manual 11-
plane on autopilot and went to work on a clipboard on
217,Vol. 1(1 April 1996).
his lap. At this point the autopilot disenga#ed, possibly
with no annun ciator light warning. The airplane ente-
Adjusting Attitude and Power
red a steep, nose-down, right spiral. The copilot’s
A satisfactory instrument cross-check is only one part instrument panel went blank, and he attempted to use
of the equation. It is necessary for the pilot to make the the pilot’ s artificial horizon. However, it had tumbled.
correct adjustments to pitch, bank, and power in order In the meantime, the Captain returned to his station and
to control the airplane. Airplane upsets have occur red recovered the airplane at 6000 ft using needle and ball.
when the pilot has made incorrect adjustments. This This is just one of many incidents where pilots have
can happen when the pilot is not familiar with the air- become distracted. Many times, the distraction is cau-
plane responses to power adjustments or control inputs. sed by relatively minor reasons, such as caution lights
There have also been instances when two pilots have or en#ine performance anomalies.
applied opposing inputs simultaneously.
Vertigo or Spatial Disorientation
Inattention
Spatial disorientation has been a significant factor in
A review of airplane upsets shows that inattention or many airplane upset accidents. The definition of spatial
neglecting to monitor the airplane performance can disorientation is the inability to correctly orient oneself
result in minor excursions from normal flight regimes
with respect to the Earth surface. A flight crew was
to extreme deviations from the norm. Many of the
climbing to about 2000 ft at night during a missed
minor upsets can be traced to an improper instrument
approach from a second ILS approach. The weather
cross-check; for example, neglecting to monitor all the
was instrument meteo rological conditions (IMC) - cei-
instruments or fixat ing on certain instrument indica-
ling: 400 ft, visibi lity: 2 mi, rain, and fog. The airpla-
tions and not de tecting changes in others. Some instru-
ne entered a spiral to the left. The Captain turned the
ment indications are not as noticeable as others. For
example, a slight heading change is not as eye catching controls over to the First Of ficer, who was unsucces-
as a 1 000-ft/min change in vertical veloc ity indica- sful in the recovery at tempt. The airplane hit trees and
tion. was destroyed by ground impact and fire.
There are many extreme cases of inattention by the fli- [NTSB/AAR-92-05]
ght crew that have resulted in airplane upset accidents. All pilots are susceptible to sensory illusions while
In one accident, a crew had discussed a recurring flying at night or in certain weather conditions. These
autothrottle problem but continued to use the autoth- illusions can lead to a conflict between actual attitude
rottle. On level-off from a descent, indications and what the pilot “feels”

is the correct attitude. Disoriented pilots may not they must be prepared to recover the airplane if it enters
always be aware of their orientation error. Many air- into an upset.
plane upsets occur while the pilot is busily engaged in
some task that takes attention away from the fli8ht Improper Use of Airplane
instruments. Others perceive a conflict between bodily Automation
senses and the flight in struments but allow the airpla-
ne to become upset because they cannot resolve the The following incident describes a classic case of
conflict. Unrecog #zed spatial disorientation tends to improper use of airplane automation. “During an
occur dunng task-intensive portions of the flight, while approach with autopilot I in command mode, a missed
recog nized spatial disorientation occurs during attitu- approach was initiated at 1500 ft. It is undetermined
de changing maneuvers.
whether this was initiated by the pilots; however, the
pilot attempted to counteract the autopilot-commanded
There are several situations that may lead to visual illu-
pitchup by pushing for ward on the control column.
sions and then airplane upsets. A pilot can experience
Normally, pushing on the control column would disen-
false vertical and horizontal cues. Fly ing over sloping
gage the autopilot, but automatic disconnect was inhi-
cloud decks or land that slopes gradually upward into
bited in go around mode in this model airplane. As a
mountainous terrain often compels pilots to fly with
their wings parallel to the slope, rather than straight result of the control column inputs, the autopilot trim-
and level. A related phenomenon is the disorientation med the stabilizer to 12 deg, nose up, in order to main-
caused by the Aurora Borealis in which false vertical tain the programmed go-around profile. Mean while,
and hori zontal cues generated by the aurora result in the pilot-applied control column forces caused the ele-
atti tude confusion. vator to deflect 14 deg, nose down. The inappropriate
pilot-applied control column forces resulted in three
It is beyond the scope of this training aid to expand on extreme pitchup stalls before control could be regained.
the physiological causes of spatial disorienta tion,other The airplane systems operated in accordance with desi-
than to alert pilots that it can result in loss of control of gn speci fications.” [FSF, Flight Safety Digest 1/92]
an airplane. It should be empha sized that the key to
success in instrument flying is an efficient instrument The advancement of technology in today’s mod ern air-
cross-check. The only reli able aircraft attitude infor- planes has brought us flight directors, auto pilots,
mation, at night or in IMC, is provided by the flight autothrottles, and flight management systems. All of
instruments. Any situation or factor that interferes with these devices are designed to reduce the flight crew
this flow of information, directly or indirectly, increa- workload. When used prop erly, this technology has
ses the potential for disorientation. The pilot’s role in made significant contri butions to flight safety . But
preventing airplane upsets due to spatial disorien tation technology can include complexity and lead to trust
essentially involves three things: training, good flight and eventual compla cency. The systems can someti-
planning, and knowledge of proce dures. Both pilots mes do things that the flight crew did not intend for
must be aware that it can happen. and they must be pre-
them to do. Industry experts and regulators continue to
pared to control the airplane if the other person is diso-
work together to find the optimal blend of hardware,
riented.
software, and pilot training to ensure the highest possi-
ble level of system performance—which cen ters on
Pilot Incapacitation
the human element.
A First Officer fainted while at the controls en route to
the Azores, Portugal. He slumped against the controls, 2.4. Combination of Causes
and while the rest of the flight crew was removing him
from his flight position,the airplane pitched up and rol- A single cause of an airplane upset can be the initiator
led to over 80 deg of bank. The airplane was then reco- of other causes. In one instance, a possible inadvertent
vered by the Captain. While this is a very rare occur- movement of the flap/slat handle re sulted in the exten-
rence. it does happen, and pilots need to be prepared to sion of the leading edge slats. The Captain’ s initial
react properly. Another rare possibility for air reaction to counter the pitchup was to exert forward
plane upset is an attempted hijack situation. Pilots may control column force; the control force when the auto-
have very little control in this critical situa tion, but pilot disconnected re-

sulted in an abrupt airplane nose-down elevator com- will be in a position to know instantly what options
mand. Subsequent commanded elevator move ments to they may have to maneuver their airplane. The three
correct the pitch attitude induced several violent pitch sources of energy available to the pilot are
oscillations. The Captain’s com manded elevator move-
ments were greater than necessary because of the air- • Kinetic energy, which increases with increasing
plane’s light control force characteristics. The oscilla- airspeed.
tions resulted in a loss of 5000 ft of altitude. The maxi- • Potential energy, which is proportional to altitude .
mum nose down eitch attitude was greater than 20 deg,
• Chemical energy, from the fuel in the tanks.
and the maximum normal accelerations were greater
than 2 g and less than 1 g.
The airplane is continuously expending energy; in fli-
ght, this is because of drag. (On the ground, wheel
This incident lends credence to the principle used
throughout this training aid: Reduce the level of auto - brakes and thrust reversers, as well as fric tion, dissipa-
mation while initiating recovery; that is, dis connect te energy.) This dr ag energy in flight is usually offset
the autopilot and autothrottle, and do not let the reco- by using some of the stored chemical energy—by bur-
very from one upset lead to another. ning fuel in the engines.
3. Swept-Wing Airplane Fundamentals During maneuvering, these three types of energy can
be traded, or exchanged, usually at the cost of additio-
nal drag. This process of consciously ma nipulating the
3.1 Flight Dynamics energy state of the airplane is re ferred to as “energy
management.” Airspeed can be traded for altitude, as in
In understanding the flight dynamics of large, swept- a zoom-climb. Altitude can be traded for airspeed, as in
wing transport airplanes, it is important to first under- a dive. Stored energy can be traded for either altitude or
stand what causes the forces and mo ments acting on
airspeed by advancing the throttles to command more
the airplane and then move to what kinds of motion
thrust than required for level flight. The trading of
these forces cause. Finally, with this background, one
energy must be accomplished, though, with a view
can gain an understanding of how a pilot can control
these forces and moments in order to direct the flight toward the final desired energy state. For example,
path. while altitude can be traded for airspeed by diving the
Newton’s first law states that an object at rest will tend airplane,-care must be taken in selecting the angle of
to stay at rest, and an object in motion will tend to stay the dive so that the final desired energy state will be
in motion in a straight line, unless acted on by an exter- captured.
nal force. This definition is funda mental to all motion,
and it provides the founda tion for all discussions of fli- This becomes important when the pilot wants to gene-
ght mechanics. A careful examination of this law rate aerodynamic forces and moments to ma neuverthe
reveals an impor tant subtlety, which is the reference to airplane. Only kinetic energy (airspeed) can generate
motion in a straight line. If an airplane in motion is to aerodynamic forces and maneuver capability. Kinetic
deviate from a straight line, there must be a force, or a energy can be traded for poten tial energy (climb).
combination of forces, imposed to achieve the desired Potential energy can only be converted to kinetic
trajectory. The generation of the forces is the subject of energy. Chemical energy can be converted to either
aerodynamics (to be discussed later). The generation of
potential or kinetic energy, but only at specified rates.
forces requires energy.
These energy relation ships are shown in Figure 10.
3.2 Energy States
Hi#h-performance jet transport airplanes are de signed
A pilot has three sources of energy available to mana- to exhibit very low drag in the cruise con figuration.
ge or manipulate to generate aerodynamic forces and This means that the penalty for trading airspeed for
thus control the flight path of an airplane. altitude is relatively small. Jet trans port airplanes are
The term “energy state” describes how much of each also capable of gaining speed very rapidly in a descent.
kind of energy the airplane has available at any given The pilot needs to exer cise considerable judgment in
time. Pilots who understand the airplane energy state making very large

energy trades. Just as the level flight acceleration capa- airplane and the magnitude of the applied forces, and it
bility is limited by the maximum thrust of the engines, is also governed by Newton ‘ s laws. Airplanes of lar-
the deceleration capability is limited by the ability to ger mass generally take longer to change orientation
generate very large drag increments. For high-perfor- than do smaller ones. The longer time requires the pilot
mance jet transport airplanes, the ability to generate to plan ahead more in a lar#e-mass airplane and make
large decelerating drag incre ments is often limited. sure that the ac tions taken will achieve the final desi-
The pilot always should be aware of these limitations red energy state.
for the airplane being own. A very clean airplane ope-
rating near its limits can easily go from the low-speed 3.3 Load Factors
boundary to and through the high-speed boundary very
Load factor in the realm of flight mechanics is a mea-
quickly.
sure of the acceleration being experienced by the air-
plane. By Newton’s second law,
The objective in maneuvering the airplane is to mana-
ge energy so that kinetic energy stays be tween limits force = mass x acceleration
(stall and placards), the potential energy stays within since the airplane has mass, if it is being acceler ated
limits (terrain to buffet alti tude), and chemical energy there must be a force acting on it. Conversely, if there
stays above certain thresholds (not running out of fuel). is a force acting on an airplane, it will accelerate. In
This objective is especially important during an inad- this case, acceleration refers to a change in either
vertent upset and the ensuing recovery. magnitude or direction of the velocity. This definition
of acceleration is much more broad than the common-
In managing these energy states and trading be tween place reference to acceleration as simply “speeding
the various sources of energy, the pilot does not direc- up.” Accelera tion has dimensions (length/time2). It is
tly control the energy. The pilot controls the orientation conve nient to refer to acceleration by comparing it to
and magnitude of the various forces acting on the air- the acceleration due to gravity (which is 32.2 ft/s’ or
plane. These forces result in accel erations applied to 9.81 m/s2). Acceleration is expressed in this way as
the airplane. The result of these accelerations is a chan- units of gravity (g).
ge in the orientation of the airplane and a change in the
direction or magni tude, or both, of the flight path vec- In addition, the acceleration (or load factor in g’s) is
tor. Ultimately, velocity and altitude define the energy typically discussed in terms of components relative to
state. the principal axes of the airplane:
• Longitudinal (fore and aft. typically thought of
This process of controlling forces to change accel era- as speed change).
tions and produce a new energy state takes time. The • Lateral (sideways).
amount of time required is a function of the mass of the • Vertical (or normal).

Frequently, load factor is thought of as being only per- acceleration due to gravity, or 1.0 (Fig. 11). This means
pendicular to the floor of the airplane. But the force, that the wing is producing lift equal to 1.0 times the
and thus the acceleration, may be at any orientation to weight of the airplane, and it is oriented in a direction
the airplane, and the vertical, or normal, load factor opposed to the gravity vector. In a pull-up,the load fac-
represents only one compo nent of the total accelera- tor is above 1.0 (Fig. 12).
tion. In sideslip, for ex ample, there is a sideways acce-
leration, and the pilot feels pushed out of the seat In the example in Figure 12. the load factor is 2.0. That
sideways. In a steep climb or a rapid acceleration, the is, the force 8enerated by the airplane (wings, fuselage,
pilot feels fo}ced back into the seat. etc.) is twice that of gravity. Also note
In level flight, the vertical load factor is one times the

that the flight path is now curved. Newton s first law If it were anything but zero, the flight path would not
says that an object will continue in a straight line unless be a straight line (Fig. 13b).
acted on by a force. In this case, the lift force is acting
in a perpendicular direction to the velocity, and the Note that the acceleration is a result of the sum of all
resulting flight path is curved. forces acting on the airplane. One of those forces is
always gravity. Gravity always produces an accelera-
In a sustained vertical climb along a straight line, the tion directed toward the center of the Earth. The airpla-
thrust must be greater than the weight and drag. The ne attitude determines the direc tion of the gravitational
load factor perpendicular to the airplane floor must be force with respect to the airplane. Aerodynamic forces
zero (Fig. 1 3a). are produced as a result of orientation and magnitude
of the velocity

vector relative to the airplane, which is reduced into Pilots should be aware of the various weight, configu-
angles of attack and sideslip. (Refer to Sec. 3.5, ration. altitude. and bank angle specifics of the dia-
Aerodynamics, for a detailed discussion.) It is the grams for the particular airplane they fly and of the
direction and speed of the airplane through the air that limitations imposed by them.
results in aerodynamic forces (e.g., straight ahead or
sideways, fast or slow). It is the orientation of the air- 3.4 Aerodynamic Flight Envelope
plane to the center of the Earth that determines the
orientation of the gravity vector. Airplanes are designed to be operated in well defined
envelopes of airspeed and altitude. The operational
Current jet transport airplanes are certificated to with- limits for an airplane—stall speeds, placarded maxi-
stand normal vertical load factors from -1.0 to 2.5 g in mum speeds and Mach numbers. and maximum certifi-
the cruise configuration. Figure 14 is a typical v-n dia- cated altitudes—are in the Airplane Flight Manual
gram for a transport airplane (“v” for velocity, “n” for (AFM) for each indi vidual airplane. Within these
number of g’s acceleration). In addition to the strength limits,the airplanes have been shown to exhibit safe fli-
of the structure, the han dling qualities are demonstra- ght characteristics.
ted to be safe within these limits of load factor. This Manufacturing and regulatory test pilots have evalua-
means that a pilot should be able to maneuver safely to ted the characteristics of airplanes in condi tions that
and from these load factors at these speeds without include inadvertent exceedances of these operational
needing exceptional strength or skill. envelopes to demonstrate that the air -

planes can be returned safely to the operational envelo- surfaces that result in turn trom the air flowing over
pes. Figure 15 depicts a typical flioht enve lope. M DF,o them. A brief review of basic fundamental aerodyna-
and V,10 are the operational limitations, but the figure mic principles will set the stage for dis cussion of air-
also shows the relationship to MDF and VDF, the plane upset flight dynamics.
maximum dive speeds demonstrated in flight test.
These are typically 0.05 to 0.07 Mach and 50 kn hioher 3.5.1 Angle of Attack and Stall
than the operational limits. In the reoion between the
operational envelope and the dive envelope, the airpla- Most force-generating surfaces on modern jet trans
ne is required to exhibit port airplanes are carefully tailored to generate lifting
safe characteristics. Although the characteristics are forces efficiently. Wings and tail surfaces all produce
allowed to be deoraded in that recion from those within lift forces in the same way. Figure 16 shows a cross
the operational flight envelope, they are shown to be section of a lifting surface and the familiar definition of
adequate to return the airplane to the operational enve- angle of attack. The lift force in pounds generated by a
lope if the airplane is outside the operational envelope. surface is a function of the angle of attack. the dynamic
pressure (which is proportional to the air density and
3.5 Aerodynamics the square of the true airspeed) of the air moving
around it. and the size of the surface.
Aside from gravity and thrust tòrces# the other tòrces It is important to understand the dependence of lift on
acting on an airplane are generated as a result of the angle of attack. Figure 17 shows how lift varies
changing pressures produced on the

with angle of attack for constant speed and air density. are the consequences: exceed the critical angle of
Important features of this dependency include the fact attack and the lifting surfaces and wind will separate.
that at zero angle of attack, lift is not zero. This is resulting in a loss of lift on those surfaces. Fre quently
because most lifting surfaces are cambered. Further. as
the term “Airplane Angle of Attack” is used to refer to
angle of attack is increased, lift increases proportional-
ly, and this increase in lift is normally quite linear. At the angle between the relative wind and the longitudi-
higher angles of attack, however, the lift due to angle of nal axis of the airplane. In flight dynamics, this is fre-
attack hehaves differently. Instead of increasing with quently reduced to simply “angle of attack.”
an increase in angle of attack, it decreases. At this
critical angle of attack, the air moving over the upper Angle of attack can sometimes be confusing be cause
surface can no longer remain attached to the surface,
there is not typically an angle-of-attack indicator in
the flow breaks down, and the surface is considered
stalled. most commercial jet transport air planes. The three
angles usually referred to in the longitudinal axis are
It is necessary to understand thatthis breakdown of the • Angle of attack.
flow and consequent loss of lift is dependent only on • Flight path angle.
the angle of attack of the surface. Exceed the critical • Pitch angle.
angle of attack and the surface will stall, and lift wiU
These three angles and their relationships to each other
decrease instead of increasing This is true regardless
of airplane speed or attitude. In order to sustain a lif- are shown in Figure 18.
ting force on the aerodynamic surfaces, the pilot must
ensure that the surfaces are flown at an angle of attack Pitch attitude, or angle, is the angle between the longi-
below the stall angle, that is, avoid stalling the airpla- tudinal axis of the airplane and the horizon. This angle
ne.
is displayed on the Attitude Indicator or artificial hori-
Depending on the context in which it is used, aerody- zon.
namicists use the term “angle of attack” in a number of
ways. Angle of attack is always the angle between the The flight path angle is the angle between the flight
oncoming air or relative wind, and some reference line path vector and the horizon. This is also the climb (or
on the airplane or wing. Sometimes it is referenced to descent angle). On the newest generation jet transports,
the chord line at a particular location on the wing,
this angle can be displayed on the Primary Flight
sometimes to an “average” chord line on the wing
other times it is referenced to a convenient reference Display (PFD), as depicted in Figure 18.
line on the airplane, like the body reference x axis. Flight path angle can also be inferred from the Vertical
Regardless of the reference, the concept is the same as Speed Indicator (VSI) or altimeter, if

the ground speed is known. Many standard instru ment These characteristics are usually accompanied by a
departures require knowledge of flight path angle in continuous stall warning. A stall must not be confused
order to ensure obstacle clearance. with an approach-to-stall warning that occurs before
the stall and warns of an approach ing stall. An approa-
Angle of attack is also the difference between the pitch ch to stall is a controlled flight maneuver. However, a
angle and the flight path angle in a no-wind condition. full stall is an out-of-con trol conditiom but it is
The angle of attack determines whether the aerodyna- recoverable.
mic surfaces on the airplane are stalled or not.
The important point is that when the angle of attack is Stall speeds are published in the AFM for each tran-
above the stall angle# the lifting capability of the sur- sport airplane. giving the speeds at which the airplane
face is diminished. This is true regardless of airspeed. will stall as a function of weight. This information is
An airplane wing can be stalled at any airspeed. An air- very important to the pilot, but it must be understood
plane can be stalled in any attitude. If the angle of that the concept of stall speed is very carefully defined
attack is greater than the stall angle, the surface will for specific conditions:
stall. Figure 19 indicates that regardless of the airspeed • Trim at 1.3 Vs.
or pitch attitude of the airplane. the angle of attack • Forward CG.
determines whether the wing is stalled. • Low altitudes.
• Deceleration rate of I kn/s.
A stall is characterized by any or a combination of the • Wings level.
following: • Approximately l-g flight.
• Buffeting, which could be heavy. Under norrnal conditions, the wings are level or near
• Lack of pitch authority. level,and the normal load factor is very near 1.0. Under
• Lack of roll control. these conditions, the published stall speeds give the
• Inability to arrest descent rate. pilot an idea of the proximity to

stall. In conditions other than these. however. the speed

at stall is not the same as the “stall speed.” The angle of attack at which a wing stalls reduces with
Aerodynamic stall depends only on angle of at tack, increasing Mach so that at high Mach (nor mally, high
and it has a specific relationship to stall speed only altitude), an airplane may enter an accelerated stall at
under the strict conditions previously noted. Many an angle of attack that is less than the angle of attack
upsets are quite dynamic in nature and involve elevated for stalling at lower Mach numbers.
load factors and large speed change rates. Pilots should
not expect the airplane to remain unstalled just becau- 3.5.2 Camber
se the indicated airspeed is higher than AFM chart
Camber refers to the amount of curvature evident in an
speeds, because the conditions may be different.
airfoil shape. Camber is illustrated in Figure 20. The
mean camber line is a line connect ing the midpoints of
All modern jet transports are certified to exhibit
upper and lower surfaces of an airfoil. In contrast, the
adequate warning of impending stall, to give the pilot
chord line is a straight line connecting the leading and
opportunity to recover by decreasing the angle of
trailing edges.
attack. Whether this warning is by natural aerodynamic
Technical aerodynamicists have defined camber in a
buffet or provided by a stick shaker or other warning
variety of ways over the years, but the reason introdu-
devices, it warns the pilot when the angle of attack is
cing cambel has remained the same: airfoils with
getting close to stall. More over, the warning is requi-
camber are more efficient at produc ing lift than those
red to be in a form other than visual. The pilot need not
without. Importantly, airfoils with specific kinds of
look at a particular instrument, gauge, or indicator. The
camber at specific places are more efficient than those
warning is tactile: the pilot is able to feel the stall war-
ning with enough opportunity to recover promptly. Pi of slightly different shape .
lots need to be especially cognizant of stall warn ing Airplanes that must produce lift as efficiently up as
cues for the particular airplanes they fly. The onset of well as down, such as competition aerobatics air
stall warning should be taken as an indica tìon to not planes, usually employ symmetrical airfoils.
continue to increase the angle of attack. These work well, but they are not as efficient for
cruise flight. Efficient, high-speed airplanes often em-

ploy exotic camber shapes because they have been increased lift at constant angle of attack is a reduced
tòund to have beneficial drag levels at high speeds. angle of attack for stall. Note that for larger deflections.
Depending on the mission the airplane is intended to even though the lift is greater. the stall angle of attack
fly. the aerodynamic surfaces are given an optimized is lower than that at no deflection.
camber shape. While both cambered and uncambered The important point is that increasing camber
surfaces produce lift at angle of attack. camber usually (downward deflection of ailerons. for example) lowers
produces lift more efficiently than angle of attack the angle of attack at which stall occurs. Large
alone. downward aileron deflections at very high angles of
attack could induce air separation over that portion of
3.5.3 Control Surface Foundamentals the wing. Reducing the angle of attack before making
large aileron deflections will help ensure that those sur-
Trailing edge control surfaces such as ailerons. rud- faces are as effective as they can be in producing roll.
ders. and elevators provide a way of modulat ing the lift
on a surface without physically chang ing the angle of Spoiler-Type Devices
attack. These devices work by altering the camber of
the surfaces. Figure 21 shows undeflected and deflec- Spoilers, sometimes referred to as “speedbrakes” on
ted control surfaces. large transport airplanes. serve a dual purpose of “spoi-
The aerodynamic effect is that of increasing the lift at ling” wing lift and generating additional drag.
constant angle of attack for trailing edge down deflec- By hinging upwards from the wing upper surface,
tion. This is shown in Figure 22. The price paid for this they generate an upper surface disconti

nuity that the airflow cannot negotiate, and they sepa- Trim
rate. or stall, the wing surface locally. Figure 23 depicts
spoiler operation with both flaps up and flaps down. Aerodynamicists refer to “trim” as that condition in
The effectiveness of spoiler devices depends on how which the forces on the airplane are stabilized and the
much lift the wing is generating (which the spoiler will moments about the center of cravity all add up to zero.
“spoil”). If the wing is not producing much lift to begin Pilots refer to “trim” as that condition in which the air-
with, spoiling it will not produce much effect. If the plane will continue to fly in the manner desired when
wing is producing large amounts of lift, as is the case the controls are released. In reality, both conditions
with the flaps extended and at moderate angles of must be met for the air plane to be “in trim.” In the
attack, the spoilers become very effective control devi- pitch axis, aerody namic, or moment. trim is achieved
ces because there is more lift to spoil. by varying the lift on the horizontal tail/elevator com-
bination to balance the pitching moments about the
Because spoilers depend on there being some lift to center of gravity. Once the proper amount of lift on the
“spoil” in order to be effective, they also lose much of tail is achieved, means must be provided to keep it con-
their effectiveness when the wing is in a stalled condi- stant. Traditionally, there have been three ways of
tion. If the flow is already separated, putting a spoiler doing that: fixed stabilizer/trim tab, all-flying tail. and
up will not induce any more separation. As was the trimmable stabilizer.
case with aileron control at high angles of attack, it is
important to know that the wing must be unstalled in In the case of the fixed stabilizer/trim tab configu
order for the aerody namic controls to be effective. ration, the required tail load is 8enerated by de flecting
the elevator. The trim tab is then deflected

in such a way as to get the aerodynamics of the tab to Angle of Sideslip

hold the elevator in the desired position. The airplane is
then in trim (because the required load on the tail has Just as airplane angle of attack is the angle between the
been achieved) and the column tòrce trim condition is longitudinal axis of the airplane and the rela tive wind
met as well (because the tab holds the elevator in the as seen in a profile view, the sideslip angle is the angle
desired position). One side effect of this configuration between the longitudinal axis of the airplane and the
is that when trimmed near one end of the deflection relative wind. seen this time in the’plan view (Fig. 25).
range. there is not such more control available for It is a measure of whether the airplane is flying straight
maneuvering in that direction (Fig. 24). into the relative wind.
In the case of the all-flying tail, the entire stabilizer With the exception of crosswind landing consider
moves as one unit in response to column com mands. ations requiring pilot-commanded sideslip, com mer-
This changing of the angle of attack of the stabilizer cial transport airplanes are typically flown at or very
adjusts the tail lift as required to balance the moments. near zero sideslip. This usually results in the lowest
The tail is then held in the desired position by an irre- cruise drag and is most comfortable for passengers, as
versible flight control system (usually hydraulic). This the sideways forces are minimized.
configuration requires a very powerful and fast-acting For those cases in which the pilot commands a sideslip,
control system to move the entire tail in response to the aerodynamic picture becomes a bit more complex.
pilot inputs, but it has been used quite successfully on Figure 25 depicts an airplane in a
commercial jet transport airplanes.
In the case of the trimmable stabilizer, the proper pit-
ching moment is achieved by deflecting the elevator
and generating the required lift on the tail. The stabili-
zer is then moved (changing its angle of attack) until
the required tail lift is generated by the stabilizer with
the elevator essentially at zero de flection. A side effect
of this configuration is that from the trimmed condi-
tion, full elevator deflec tion is available in either direc-
tion, allowing a much largerrange of maneuvering
capability. This is the configuration found on most
high-perfor mance airplanes that must operate through
a very wide speed range and that use very powerful
high lift devices (flaps) on the wing.
Knowing that in the trimmed condition the eleva tor is

nearly faired or at zero deflection. the pilot instantly
knows how much control power is avail able in either
direction. This is a powerful tactile cue, and it gives the
pilot freedom to maneuver without the danger of beco-
ming too close to sur face stops.
3.5.4 Lateral and Directional Aerodynamic

Considerations
Aerodynamically, anti-symmetric flight. or flight in

sideslip can be quite complex. The forces and moments
generated by the sideslip can affect mo tion in all three
axes of the airplane. As will be seen, sideslip can gene-
rate strong aerodynamic rolling moments as well as
yawing moments. In
particular the magnitude of the coupled roll-due to-
sideslip is determined by several factors.

commanded nose-left sideslip. That is, the velocity airplane components, such as rudder and wing sweep.
vector is not aligned with the longitudinal axis of the In other words, the term “dihedral effect” is used when
airplane. and the relative wind is coming from the describing the effects of wing sweep and rudder on
pilot`s right. lateral stabil ity and control.
One purpose of the vertical tail is to keep the nose of A swept-wing design used on jet transport air planes is
the airplane “pointed into the wind” or make the tail beneficial for high-speed flight, since higher flight
follow the nose. When a sideslip angle is developed, speeds may be obtained before com ponents of speed
the vertical tail is at an angle of attack and generates perpendicular to the leading edge produce critical con-
“lift” that points sideways, tending to return the airpla- ditions on the wing. In other words, wing sweep will
ne to zero sideslip. Commercial jet transport airplanes delay the onset of com pressibility effects. This wing
are certificated to exhibit static di Tectional stability sweep also contrib utes to the dihedral effect. When the
that tends to return the airplane to zero sideslip when swept-wing airplane is placed in a sideslip, the wing
controls are released or returned to a neutral position. into the wind experiences an increase in lift. since the
In order to hold a sideslip condition, the pilot must effective sweep is less, and the wing away from the
hold the rudder in adeflected position (assuming wind produces less lift, since the effective sweep is
symmetrical thrust). greater (Fig. 25). The amount of contribution, or dihe-
dral effect, depends on the amount of sweepback and
Wing Dihedral Effects lift coefficient of the wing. The effect becomes greater
with increasing lift coeffi cient and wing sweep. The
Dihedral is the positive angle formed between the late- lift coefficient will increase with increasing angle of
ral axis of.an airplane and a line that passes through the attack up to the critical angle. This means that any side-
center of the wing, as depicted in Figure 26. Dihedral slip results in more rolling moment on a swept-wing
contributes to the lateral sta bility of an airplane, and airplane than on a straight-wing airplane. Lateral con-
commercial jet transport airplanes are certificated to trols on swept-wing airplanes are powerful enough to
exhibit static lateral stability. A wing with dihedral will control large sideslip angles at operational speeds.
develop stable rolling moments with sideslip. If the
relative wind comes from the side, the wing into the Rudder input produces sideslip and contributes to the
wind is subject to an increase in lift. The wing away dihedral effect. The effect is proportional to the angle
from the wind is subject to a decrease in angle of attack of sideslip. (That is, roll increases with sideslip angle;
and develops a decrease in lift. The changes in lift therefore, roll increases with in creasing rudder input.)
effect a rolling moment, tending to raise the wind ward When an airplane is at a high angle of attack, aileron
wing; hence. dihedral contributes a stable roll due to and spoiler roll con trols become less effective. At the
sideslip. Since wing dihedral is so powerful in produ- stall angle of attack, the rudder is still effective; the-
cing lateral stability, it is used as a “common denomi- refore, it can produce large sideslip angles, which in
nator term” of the lateral sta bility contribution of other turn pro duces roll because of the dihedral effect.

Pilot-Commanded Sideslip ron/spoiler effectiveness and allow recovery. This

action may not be intuitive and will result in a loss of
It is important to keep in mind that the rudders on altitude.
modern jet transport airplanes are usually sized to
counter the yawing moment associated with an engine Note: The previous discussion refers to the aero dyna-
failure at very low takeoff speeds. This very powerful mic effects associated with rudder input; how ever,
rudder is also capable of generating large sideslips similar aerodynamic effects are associated with other
(when an engine is not failed). The large sideslip angles surfaces.
generate large rolling moments that require significant
lateral control input to stop the airplane from rolling. In 3.5.5 High-Speed, High-Altitude
maneuvering the airplane, if a crosswind takeoff or
Characteristics
landing is not involved and an engine is not failed.
keeping the sideslip as close to zero as possible ensu-
Modern commercial jet transport airplanes are
res that the maximum amount of lateral control is avai-
designed to fly at altitudes from sea level to more than
lable for maneu vering. This requires coordinated use
40,000 ft. There are considerable changes in atmosphe-
of both aileron/spoilers and rudder in all maneuvering.
ric characteristics that take place over that altitude
One way to determine the sideslip state of the airplane range, and the airplane must accom modate those
is to “feel” the lateral acceleration; it feels as if the pilot changes.
is being pushed out of the seat sideways. Another way
is to examine the slip-skid indicator and keep the ball One item of interest to pilots is the air temperature as
in the center. Pilots should develop a feel for the parti- altitude changes. Up to the tropopause (36,089 ft in a
cular airplanes they fly and understand how to minimi- standard atmosphere), the standard tempera ture
ze sideslip angle through coordinated use of flight decreases with altitude. Above the tropo pause, the
controls. standard temperature remains relatively constant. This
is important to pilots because the speed of sound in air
Crossover speed is a recently coined term that descri- is a function only of air temperature. Aerodynamic
bes the lateral controllability of an airplane with the characteristics of lift ing surfaces and entire airplanes
rudder at a fixed (up to maximum) deflec tion. It is the are significantly affected by the ratio of the airspeed to
minimum speed (weight and configu ration dependent) the speed of sound. That ratio is Mach number. At high
in a l-g flight, where maximum aileron/spoiler input altitudes, large Mach numbers exist at relatively low
(against the stops) is reached and the wings are still calibrated airspeeds.
level or at an angle to maintain directional control. Any
additional rud der input or decrease in speed will result As Mach number increases, airflow over parts of the
in an unstoppable roll into the direction of the deflec- airplane begins to exceed the speed of sound. Shock
ted rudder or in an inability to maintain desired head waves associated with this local supersonic flow can
ing. Crossover speed is very similar in concept to
interfere with the normally smooth flow over the lifting
Vmca, except that instead of being Vmc due to a thru-
surfaces, causing local flow separation. Depending on
st asymmetry, it is Vmc due to full rudder input. This
the airplane, as this separa tion grows in magnitude
crossover speed is weight and configu ration depen-
with increasing Mach number, characteristics suchas
dent. However, it is also sensitive to angle of attack.
pitchup, pitchdown, or aerodynamic buffeting may
With weight and configuration held constant, the cros-
sover speed will increase with increased angle of attack occur. Transport category airplanes are certificated to
and will decrease with decreased angle of attack. Thus. be free from characteristics that would interfere with
in an airplane upset due to rudder deflection with large normal piloting in the normal flight envelope and to be
and increasing bank angle and the nose rapidly falling safely controllable during inadvertent exceedances of
below the horizon, the input of additional nose-up ele- the normal envelope, as discussed in Section 3.4,
vator with already maximum input of aileron/ spoilers “Aerodynamic Flight Envelope.”
will only aggravate the situation. The correct action in
this case is to unload the airplane The point at which buffeting would be expected to
occur is documented in the Airplane Flight Manual.
to reduce the angle of attack, which will regain aile- The BuffetBoundary or Cruise Maneuver

Capability charts contain a wealth of information about For example, the pilot of Airplane A in the figure has a
the high-altitude characteristics of each air plane. broad speed range between high- and low speed buffet
A sample of such a chart is shown in Figure 27. onset at I g and the current altitude, with only a nomi-
The chart provides speed margins to low-speed nal g capability. Airplane B has by comparison a much
(stall-induced) and high-speed (shock-induced) buffet smaller speed range be tween high- and
at I g, normal load factor or bank angle to buffet at a low-speed buffet onset, but a generousg capability at
given Mach number, or altitude capabil ity at a given the current Mach number. Airplane C is cruising much
Mach number and I g. The buffet boundaries of various closer to the high speed buffet boundary than the
airplanes can differ signifi cantly in their shapes, and low-speed bound ary, which lets the pilot know in
these differences con tain valuable information for the which direction (slower) there is more margin
pilot. Some airplanes have broad speed margins, some available.
have abrupt high-speed buffet margins, some have nar
row, “peaky” characteristics, as depicted notion ally in 3.5.6 Stability
Figure 28. Pilots should become familiar with the buf-
fet boundaries. These boundaries let the pilot know Positive static stability is defined as the initial tendency
how much maneuvering room is available, and they to return to an undisturbed state after a disturbance.
give clues for successful strat egies should speed chan- This concept has been illustrated by the “ball in a cup”
ges become rapid or atti tude or flight path angles model (Fig. 29).
become large.

All transport airplanes demonstrate positive sta bility in sustained pull force to remain at elevated load
at least some sense. The importance here is that the factors—as in a steep turn.
concept of stability can apply to a number of diftèrent
parameters all at the same time. Speed stability, the One important side etfect of stability is that it allows
condition of an airplane returning to its initial trim air- for some unattended operation. If the pilot releases the
speed after a distur bance, is familiar to most pilots. controls for a short period of time, stability will help
The same concept applies to Mach number. This stabi- keep the airplane at the condition at which it was left.
lity can be independent of airspeed if. for example, the
air plane crosses a cold front. When the outside air
Another important side effect of stability is that of tac-
temperature changes, the Mach number changes. even
tile feedback to the pilot. On airplanes with static lon-
though the indicated airspeed may not change.
gitudinal stability. for example, if the pilot is holding a
Airplanes that are “Mach stable`’will tend to return to
the original Mach number. Many jet transport airplanes sustained pull force. the speed is probably slower than
incorporate Mach trim to provide this function. the last trim speed.
Similarly. commercial airplanes are stable with respect
to load factor. When a gust or other disturbance gene- 3.5.7 Maneuvering in Pitch
rates a load factor, the airplane is certificated to be sta-
ble: it will return to its initial trimmed load factor Movement about the lateral axis is called “pitch,” as
(usually 1.0). This “maneuvering stability” requires a depicted in Figure 30.

Controlling pitching motions involves controlling is the wing lift times the distance between the center
aerodynamic and other moments about the center of of gravity and the center of the wing lift. Since wei#ht
gravity to modulate the angle of attack. Aside from the acts through the center of gravity, there is no moment
pitching moment effects of thrust when engines are off- associated with it. In addition, there is a moment asso-
set from the center of gravity (dis cussed below), the ciated with the fact that the wing is usually cambered
pilot controls the pitching mo ments (and therefore the and with the fact that the fuselage is flying in the
angle of attack) by means of the stabilizer and elevator. wing’s flowfield. This wing-body moment does not
The horizontal stabi lizer should be thought of as a have a force associated with it; it is a pure torque.
trimming device, reducing the necd to hold elevator
deflection, while the elevator should be thought of as Figure 31 shows many of the important compo nents of
the primary maneuvering control. This is true because
pitching moment about the center of gravity of an air-
the horizontal stabilizer has only limited rate capa
plane. Weight acts through the center of gravity and
bility—it cannot change angle very quickly. Ma neuve-
always points toward the center of the Earth. In steady
ring, or active pilot modulation of the pitch controls, is
(unaccelerated) flight, the moments about the center of
usually accomplished by the elevator control, which is
gravity, as well as the forces, are all balanced: the sum
designed to move at much faster rates. To get a better
understanding of how these components work together, is zero. Since, in general, there is a pitching moment
the following discus sion will examine the various due to the wing and body and the lift is not generally
components of pitch ing moment. aligned with the center of gravity—and the thrust of the
engines is also offset from the center of gravity— there
“Moments” have dimensions of force times dis tance. is usually some load on the horizontal tail required to
Pilots are familiar with moments from work ing weight balance the rest of the moments, and that load is gene-
and balance problems. In the case of pitching rally in the downward direction. as shown in the figu-
moment, we are concerned with moments about the re.
center of gravity. Essentially, the pilot controls the amount of lift genera-
So the pitching moment due to wing lift, for example, ted by the horizontal tail (by moving the

elevator), which adjusts the angle of attack of the wing capable of 8enerating 2.5 times the airplane weight. In
and therefore modulates the amount of lift that the contrast, engine thrust is typically on the order of 0.3
wing generates. Similarly. since engines are rarely ali- times the airplane weight at takeoff weights.
gned with the center of gravity. chang ing the thrust
will be accompanied by a change in the pitching To get an appreciation for the magnitude of the weight
moment around the center of gravity. The pilot then vector and the importance of its orienta tion. consider
adjusts the lift on the tail (with the elevator) to again the very simple example of Figure 32.
balance the pitching moments.
In a nose-up pitch attitude, the component of the
As lon8 as the angle of attack is within unstalled limits weight vector in the drag direction (parallel to the
and the airspeed is within limits. the aerody namic airplane longitudinal axis) equals the engine thrust at
controls will work to maneuver the airplane in the pitch about 20 deg nose-up pitch attitude on a takeoff climb.
axis as described. This is true regard less of the Conversely, at nose-down pitch attitudes. the weight
attitude of the airplane or the orientation of the weight vector contributes to thrust. Since the magnitude of the
vector. weight vector is on the order of 3 times the available
Recall that the object of maneuvering the airplane is to thrust, pilots need to be very careful about making
manipulate the forces on the airplane in order to mana- large pitch attitude changes. When procedures call for
ge the energy state. The aerodynamic forces are a func- a pitch attitude reduction to accelerate and clean up
tion of how the pilot manipulates the controls. chan- after takeoff, one aspect of that maneuver is getting rid
ging angle of attack, for ex ample. Similarly, the thrust of the weight com ponent in the drag direction allowing
forces are commanded by the pilot. The weight vector the airplane to gain speed.
always points toward the center of the Earth. The orien-
tation with respect to the airplane, though. is a function 3.5.8 Mechanics of Ihrning Flight
of the airplane attitude. The weight vector is a very
powerful force. Recall that transport airplanes are cer- Recalling that Newton’s laws dictate that an object in
tificated to 2.5 g. That means that the wing is motion will continue in a straight line unless

acted on by an external force, consider what is required than the weight of the airplane. and the amount is a
to make an airplane turn. If a pilot wants to change the function of bank angle (Fig. 34).
course of an airplane in flight, a force perpendicular to All of this is well known, but it bears reiteration in the
the flight path in the direction of the desired turn must context of recovery from extreme airplane upsets. If the
first be generated. Usually this is accomplished by objective is to arrest a descent, maneuvering in pitch if
banking the airplane. This points the lift vector off to the wings are not level will only cause a tighter turn
the side. generating a horizontal component of lift (Fig. and, depending on the bank angle, may not
33). This is not the only way to generate a sideways- contribute significantly to generating a lift vector that
pointing force, but it is the typical method. points away from the ground. Indeed , Figure 34 indi-
cates that to main tain level flight at bank angles
When the lift vector is tilted to generate the hori zontal beyond 66 deg requires a larger load factor than that for
component, the vertical component gets smaller. Since which transport airplanes are certificated.
the acceleration due to gravity still points toward the
earth, there is now an imbalance in the vertical forces. In early training, many pilots are warned about the
Unless the lift vector is increased so that its vertical “Graveyard Spiral.” The Graveyard Spiral maneu ver is
component equals the weight of the airplane, the air- one in which the airplane is in a large bank angle and
plane will begin to accelerate toward the earth—it will descending. The unknowing pilot fix ates on the fact
begin to de scend. To maintain altitude in a banked that airspeed is high and the airplane is descending. In
turn, the lift produced by the airplane must be more an attempt to arrest both

the speed and sinkrate. the pilot pulls on the col umn buted outboard along the wings, tend to have very
and applies up-elevator. However at a large bank angle. much larger inertias than airplanes with engines loca-
the only effect of the up-elevator is to further tighten ted on the fuse lage. This also applies to airplanes in
the turn. It is imperative to get the wings close to level which fuel is distributed along the wing span. Early in
before beginning any aggres sive pitching maneuver. a flight with full wing (or tip) tanks, the moment of
This orients the lift vector away from the gravity vec- inertia about the longitudinal axis will be much larger
tor so that the forces acting on the airplane can be than when those tanks are nearly empty. This greater
managed in a con trolled way. inertia must be overcome by the rolling moment to pro-
Knowledge of these relationships is useful in other duce a roll acceleration and result ing roll angle, and
situations as well. In the event that the load factor is the effect is a “sluggish” initial response. As discussed
increasing, excess lift is being generated, and the pilot before. airplanes of large mass and large inertia requi -
does not want speed to decrease. bank angle can help re that pilots be pre pared forthis longerresponse time
to keep the flight path vector below the horizon. getting and plan appro priately in maneuvering.
gravity to help prevent loss of airspeed. In this situa-
tion, the excess lift can be oriented toward the horizon From a flight dynamics point of view, the greatest
and, in fact, modu lated up and down to maintain air- power of lateral control in maneuvering the
speed. airplane—in using available energy to maneuver the
flight path—is to orient the lift vector. In particular,
3.5.9 Lateral Maneuvering pilots need to be aware of their ability to orient the lift
vector with respect to the gravity vector. Upright with
Motion about the longitudinal axis (Fig. 35) is called wings level, the lift vector is opposed to the gravity
‘roll.” Modern jet transport airplanes use combinations vector, and vertical flight path is controlled by longitu-
of aileron and spoiler deflections as primary surfaces to dinal control and thrust. Up right with wings not level,
generate rolling motion. These deflections are control- the lift vector is not aligned with gravity, and the flight
led by the stick or wheel, and they are designed to pro- path will be curved. In addition, if load factor is not
vide precise maneu vering capability. On modern jet increased beyond 1.0, that is, if lift on the wings is not
airplanes, the specific deflection combinations of aile- greater than weight, the vertical flight path will beco-
rons and spoilers are usually designed to make adverse me curved in the downward direction, and the airplane
yaw virtually undetectable to the pilot. Even so, coor will begin to descend. Hypothetically, with the airplane
dinated use of rudder in any lateral maneuvering inverted, lift and gravity point in the same direction:
should keep sideslip to a minimum. down. The vertical flight path will be
As described before;trailing edge control surfaces lose

effectiveness in the downgoing direction at high angles
of attack. Similarly, spoilers begin to lose effectiveness
as the stall angle of attack is exceeded.
Transport airplanes are certificated to have posi tive

unreversed lateral control up to a full aerody namic
stall. That is, during certification testing, the airplane
has been shown to have the capability of producing and
correcting roll up to the time the airplane is stalled.
However, beyond the stall angle of attack, no generali-
zations can be made. For this reason it is critical to
reduce the angle of attack at the first indication of
stall so that control surface effectiveness is preserved
The apparent effectiveness of lateral control, that is, the

time between the pilot input and when the airplane
responds, is in part a function of the airplane’s inertia
about its longitudinal axis. Air planes with very long
wings. and# in particular, airplanes with engines distri-

come curved and the airplane will accelerate lo ward very powerful and has the capability to generate very
the earth quite rapidly. In this case, the pilot must find large yawing moments. When the rest of the airplane
a way to orient the lift vector away from eravity. In all is symmetric, for example, in a condition of no engi -
cases, the pilot should ensure that the angle of attack is ne failure, very large yawing moments would result in
below the stall angle and roll to upright as rapidly as very large sideslip angles and large structural loads,
possible. should the pilot input full rudder when it is not nee -
ded. Pilots need to be aware of just how powerful the
3.5.10 Directional Maneuvering
rudder is and the effect it can have when the rest of the
airplane is symmetric. Many modern airplanes limit the
Motion about the vertical axis is called “yaw” (Fig.
36). The character of the motion about the vertical axis rudder authority in parts of the flight envelope in which
is determined by the balance of mo ments about the large deflections are not re quired, forexample, athigh
axis (around the center of gravity). The principal con- speeds. In this way, the supporting structure can be
troller of aerodynamic moments about the vertical axis made lighter. Pilots also need to be aware of such
is the rudder, but it is not the only one. Moments about “rudder limiting” systems and how they operate on
the vertical axis can be generated or affected by asym- airplanes.
metric thrust, or by asymmetric drag (generated by
ailerons, spoilers, asymmetric flaps, and the like). There are a few cases,however, when it is neces sary to
These asymmetric moments may be desired (designed generate sideslip. One of the most common is the cros-
in) or unde sired (perhaps the result of some failure). swind landing. In the slip-to-a-landing technique,
simultaneous use of rudder and aileron/ spoiler aligns
Generally, the rudder is used to control yaw in a way the airplane with the runway centerline and at the same
that minimizes the angle bf sideslip, that is, the angle
time keeps the airplane from drifting downwind. The
between the airplane’s longitudinal axis and the relati-
airplane is flying “sideways” and the pilot feels the
ve wind. For example, when an en gine fails on takeoff,
lateral acceleration.
the object is to keep the airplane aligned with the
runway by using rudder.
Static stability in the directional axis tends to drive the
On modern jet transports with powerful engines loca- sideslip angle toward zero. The vertical fin and rudder
ted away from the centerline, an engine failure can help to do this. The number of times the airplane oscil-
result in very large y awing moments, and rudders are lates as it returns to zero sideslip depends on its dyna-
generally sized to be able to control those moments mic stability. Most of the dynamic stability on a
down to very low speeds. This means that the rudder is modern transport comes. not from the natural aerody-
namics. but from an active stability augmentation
system: the yaw damper. If disturbed with the yaw
damper off, the inertial and aerodynamic characteri-
stics of a mod ern jet transport will result in a rolling
and yawing motion referred to as “dutch roll.” The yaw
damper moves the rudder to oppose this motion and
damp it out very effectively. Transport airplanes are
certificated to demonstrate positively damped
dutch-roll oscillations.
The installed systems that can drive the rudder surface

are typically designed in a hierarchical manner. For
example, the yaw damper typically has authority to
move the rudder in only a limited deflection range.
Rudder trim, selectable by the pilot, has authority to
command much larger rud der deflections that may be
needed for engine failure. In most cases. the pilot. with
manual con trol over rudder deflection. is the most
powerful element in the system. The pilot can com-
mand deflection to the limits of the system, which may
be surface stops. actuator force limits, or any others
that may be installed (e.g., rudder ratio changers).

3.5.11 Flight at Extremely Low Airspeeds 3.5.12 Flight at Extremely High Speeds
Stall speed is discussed in Section 3.5.1. It is possible Inadvertentexcursionsintoextremelyhighspeeds. either

for the airplane to be flown at speeds below the defined Mach number or airspeed, should be treated very
stall speed. This regime is out side the certified flight seriously. As noted in the section on high speed.
envelope. At extremely low airspeeds. there are several high-altitude aerodynamics (Sec. 3.5.5), flight at very
important effects for the pilot to know. high Mach numbers puts the airplane in a region of
reduced maneuvering envelope (closer to buffet boun-
Recall from the discussion of aerodynamics that the daries). Many operators opt to fly at very high altitu-
aerodynamic lift that is generated by wings and tails des, because of air traffic control (ATC) and the greater
depends on both the angle of attack and the velocity of efficiencies afforded there. But operation very close to
the air moving over the surfaces. Angle of attack alone buffet-limiting alti tudes restricts the range of Mach
determines whether the surface is stalled. At very low numbers and load factors available for maneuvering.
airspeeds, even far below the strictly defined stall During certifi cation, all transport airplanes have been
speed, an unstalled surface (one at a low angle of shown to exhibit safe operating characteristics with
attack) will produce lift. However, the magnitude of the inad vertent exceedances of Mach envelopes. These
lift force will probably be very small. For a surface in exceedances may be caused by horizontal gusts, pene-
this conditiom the lift generated will not be enough to tration of jet stream orcold fronts, inadvertent control
support the weight of the airplane. In the case of the lift movements, leveling off from climb, de scent from
generated by the tail, at very low airspeeds, it may not
Mach-limiting to airspeed-limiting al titudes, gust
be great enough to trim the airplane, that is, to keep it
upsets, and passenger movement. This means that the
from pitching.
controls will operate normally and airplane responses
are positive and predictable for these conditions. Pilots
With small aerodynamic forces acting on the air plane.
need to be aware that the maneuvering envelope is
and gravity still pulling towards the earth, the trajectory
small and that pru dent corrective action is necessary to
will be largely ballistic. It may be difficult to command
avoid ex ceeding the other end of the envelope during
a change in attitude until gravity produces enough air-
recovery. Pilots should become very familiar with the
speed to generate suf ficient lift—and that is only pos-
high-speed buffet boundaries of their airplane and the
sible at angles of attack below the stall angle. For this
combinations of weights and altitudes at which they
reason, if airspeed is decreasing rapidly it is very
operate.
important to reduce angle of attack and use whatever
aerody namic forces are available to orient the airplane
so that a recovery may be made when sufficient forces Flight in the high-airspeed regime brings with it an
are available. additional consideration of very high control power. At
speeds higher than maneuver speed (Fig. 14), very
When thrust is considered, the situation becomes only large deflection of the controls has the poten tial to
slightly more complicated. With engines off set from generate structural damage. While prompt control
the center of gravity, thrust produces both forces and input is required to reduce speed after an inadvertent
moments. In fact, as airspeed decreases, enginethrust- exceedance, care must be taken to avoid damage to the
generallyincreasesforagiventhrottle setting. With engi- airplane. Pilots should be knowledgeable of the load
nes below the center of gravity, there will be a nose-up factor envelope of their airplane.
moment generated by engine thrust. Especially at high
power settings, this may contribute to even higher In either the Mach or airspeed regime, if speed is
nose-up atti tudes and even lower airspeeds. Pilots excessive, the first priority should be to reduce speed to
should be aware that as aerodynamic control effective- within the normal envelope. Many tools are available
ness diminishes with lower airspeeds, the forces and for this, including orienting the lift vector away from
moments available from thrust become more evi dent, the gravity vector; adding load factor, which increases
and until the aerodynamic. control surfaces becomeef- drag; reducing thrust; and adding drag by means of the
fective,thetrajectorywilldependlargely on inertia and speedbrakes. As demonstrated in Section 3.5.8,
thrust effects. “Mechanics of Turning Flight,” the single most
powefulforce the pilot has available is the wing lift
force.The

second largest force acting on the airplane is the weight upset# the airspeed normally is decreas ing, altitude is
vector. Getting the airplane maneuvered so that the lift increasing, and the VSI indicates a climb. Cross-check
vector points in the desired direction should be the first other attitude sources, for ex ample. the Standby
priority. and it is the first step toward managing the Attitude Indicatorand the E#ilot Not Flying (PNF)
energy available in the airplane. instruments.
Pitch attitude is determined from the ADI Pitch
4. Recovery From Airplane Upsets Reference Scales (sometimes referred to as Pitch
Ladder Bars). Most modern airplanes also use colors
Previous sections review the causes of airplane upsets (blue for sky, brown for ground) or ground perspective
to emphasize the principle of avoiding air plane upsets. lines to assist in determining whether the airplane pitch
Basic aerodynamic information indicates how and why
is above or below the horizon. Even in extreme attitu-
large, swept-wing airpla nes fly. That information
des, some portion of the sky or ground indications is
provides the foundation of knowledge necessary for
usually present to assist the pilot in analyzing the situa-
recovering an airplane that has been upset. This section
tion.
highlights several issues associated with airplane upset
reco very and presents nbasic recommended airplane
The Bank Indicator on the ADI should be used to deter-
recovery techniques for pilots. There are infinite
potential situations that pilots can experience while mine the airplane bank.
flying an airplane. The techniques presented in this
section are applicable for most situations. Situation analysis process:
• Locate the Bank Indicator.
4.1 Situation Awareness of an • Determine pitch attitude.
Airplane Upset • Confirm attitude by reference to other
indicators.
It is important that the first actions for recovering from • Assess the energy.
an airplane upset be correct and timely. Guard against
letting the recovery from one upset lead to a different Recovery techniques presented later in this section
upset situation. Troubleshoot ing the cause of the include the phrase, “Recognize and confirm the
upset is secondary to initiating the recovery. situation.” This situation analysis process is used to
Regaining and then maintaining control of the accomplish that technique.
airplane is paramount.
4.2 Miscellaneous Issues Associated
It is necessary to use the primary flight instruments and With Upset Recovery
airplane performance instruments when ana lyzing the
upset situation. While visual meteoro logical condi- Several issues associated with recovering from an upset
tions may allow the use of references outside the air- have been identified by pilots who have experienced an
plane, it normally is difficult or impossible to see the
airplane upset. In addition, obser vation of pilots in a
horizon. This is because in most large commercial air-
simulator trainint environ ment has also revealed useful
planes the field of view is restricted. For example, the
information associated with recovery.
field of view from an airplanethatexceeds 25-deg,
nose-up attitude prob ably is limited to a view of the
4.2.1 Startle Factor
sky. Conversely, the field of view is restricted to the
ground for a nose down pitch attitude that exceeds 10
deg. In addi tion, pilots must be prepared to analyze the It has already been stated that airplane upsets do not
situation during darkness and when instrument meteo- occur very often and that there are multiple causes for
ro logical conditions (IMC) exist. Therefore, the At these unpredictable events. Therefore# pilots are usual-
titude Direction Indicator (ADI) is used as a primary ly surprised or startled when an upset occurs. There can
reference for recovery. Compare the ADI informa tion be a tendency for pilots to react before analyzing what
with performance instrument indications be fore initia- is happening or to fixate on one indication and-fail to
ting recovery. For a nose-low upset. properly diag nose the situation. Proper and sufficient
normally the airspeed is increasing, altitude is decrea- training is the best solution for overcoming the startle
sing# and the VSI indicates a descent. For a nose-high factor.

The pilot must overcome the surprise and quickly shift altitudes. If the air plane is stalled while already in a
into analysis of what the airplane is doing and then nose-down attitude. the pilot must still push the nose
implement the proper recovery. Gain control of the down in order to reduce the angle of attack. Altitude
airplane and then determine and eliminate the cause cannot be maintained and should be of secondary
of the upset. Importance.
4.2.5 Previous Training in
4.2.2 Negative G Force Nonsimilar Airplanes
Airline pilots are normally uncomfo rt able with Aerodynamic principles do not change, but air plane
aggressively unloading the g forces on a large passen- design creates different flight characteristics.
ger airplane . They habitually work hard at being very Therefore, training and experience gained in one model
smooth with the controls and keeping a positive l-g or type of airplane may or may not be transferable to
force to ensure flight attendant and passenger comfort another. For example, the handling characteristics of a
and safety. Therefore, they must overcome this inhibi- fighter-type airplane cannot be assumed to be similar to
tion when faced with having to quickly and sometimes those of a large, commercial, swept-wing airplane.
aggressively unload the airplane to less than 1 g by
pushing down elevator. 4.2.6 Potential Effects on Engines
Note: It should not normally be necessary to obtain less Some extreme airplane upset situation may affect engi-
than 0 g. ne performance. Large angles of attack can reduce the
flow of air into the engine and result in engine surges
While flight simulators can replicate normal flight pro- or compressor stalls. Additionally, large and rapid
files, most simulators cannot replicate sus tained nega- changes in sideslip angles can create excessive internal
tive-g forces. Pilots must anticipate a significantly dif- engine side loads, which may damage an engine.
ferentcockpitenvironmentduring less-than- I -g situa-
tions. They may be floating up against the seat belts 4.3 Airplane Upset Recovery
and shoulder harnesses. It may be difficult to reach or Techniques
use rudder pedals if they are not properly adjusted.
Unsecured items such as flight kits, approach plates, or Use of both primary and secondary flight con trols to
lunch trays may be flying around the cockpit. These are effect the recovery from an upset are discussed The
things that the pilot must be prepared forwhen recove- Airplane Upset Recovery Team strongly recommends
ring from an upset that involves forces less than l-g fli- that procedures for initial recovery emphasize the use
ght. of primary flight controls (aileron, elevator, and
rudder). However, the application of secondary flight
4.2.3 Use of Full Control Inputs controls (stabilizer trim, thrust vector effects, and
speedbrakes) may be considered incrementally to
Flight control forces become less effective when the supplement primary flight control inputs after the
airplane is at or near its critical angle of attack or stall. recovery has been initiated.
Therefore, pilots must be prepared to use full control
authority, when necessary. The ten dency is for pilots
not to use full control authority because they rarely are
required to do this. This habit must be overcome when
recovering from severe upsets.
4.2.4 Counter - Intuitive Factors
Pilots are routinely trained to recover from approach to

stalls. The recovery usually requires an increase in
thrust and a relatively small reduc tion in pitch attitude.
Therefore, it may be counter intuitive to use greater
unloading control forces or to reduce thrust when reco-
vering from a high angle of attack, especially at lower

For instructional purposes, several different air plane

upset situations are discussed. These characteristics are usually accompanied by a
These include the following: continuous stall warning.
• Nose high, wings level.
• Nose low, wings level. A stall must not be confused with stall warning that
- Low airspeed. occurs before the stall and warns of an approach ing
- High airspeed. stall. Recovery from an approach to stall warn ing is
• High bank angles. not the same as recovering from a stall. An approach to
- Nose high. stall is a controlled flight maneuver. A stall is an out-
- Nose low. of-control condition. but it is recov erable.
To recover from the stall, angle of attack must be
This provides the basis for relating the aerody namic
reduced below the stalling angle—apply nose-down
information and techniques to specific situ ations. At
pitch control and maintain it untill stall recovery.
the conclusion of this recovery techniques section,
Under certain conditions, on air planes with
recommended recovery tech niques are summarized
underwing-mounted engines it may be necessary to
into two basic airplane upset situations: nose-high
and nose-low. Con solidation of recovery techniques reduce thrust to prevent the angle of attack from conti-
into these two situations is done for simplification and nuing to increase. If the airplane is stalled, it is
ease of retention. necessary to f rst recover from the stalled condition
♦ Following several situations, where appropriate, before initiating upset recovery techniques.
abbreviated techniques used for recovery are indicated
by the solid diamond shown here. 4.3.2 Nose-High,Wings-Level Recovery Techniques
Airplanes that are designed with electronic flight con- Situation: Pitch attitude unintentionally more than
trol systems, commonly referred to as “fly-by wire” 25 deg, nose high, and increasing.
airplanes, have features that should mini mize the pos-
sibility that the airplane would enter into an upset and Airspeed decreasing rapidly.
assist the pilot in recovery, if it becomes necessary.
But, when fly-by-wire air planes are in the degraded Ability to maneuver decreasing.
flight control mode, the recovery techniques and
aerodynamic principles discussed in this training aid Start by disengaging the autopilot and autothrottle and
are appropriate. Some environmental conditions can recognize and confirm the situation. Next, apply nose-
upset any airplane. But the basic principles of recogni- down elevator to achieve a nose-down pitch rate. This
tion and recov ery techniques still apply, independent may require as much as full nose down input. If a
of flight control architecture. sustained column force is required to obtain the desired
response, consider trimming off some of the control
Airplane autopilots and autothrottles are intended to be
force. However, it may be difficult to know how muc h
used when the airplane is within its normal flight regi-
trim should be used; therefore, care must be taken to
me. When an airplane has been upset, the autopilot and
avoid using too much trim. Do not fly the aurplane
autothroffle must be discon nected as a prelude to ini-
using pitch trim, and stop trimming nose-down as the
tiating recovery tech niques. Assessment of the energy
required el evator force lessens. If at this point the pitch
is also required.
rate is not immediately under control, there are several
4.3.1 Stall additional techniques that may be tried. The use of
The recovery techniques assume the airplane is not- these techniques depends on the circumstances of the
stalled. An airplane is stalled when the angle of attack situation and the airplane control characteristics .
is beyond the stalling angle. A stall is characterized by
any of, or a combination of, the following: Pitch may be controlled by rolling the airplane to a
a. Buffeting, which could be heavy at times. bank angle that starts the nose down. The ang!e of bank
b. A lack of pitch authority. should not normally exceed approximately 60 deg.
c. A lack of roll control. Continuous nose-down elevator pressure
d. Inability to arrest descent rate.

will keep the wing angle of attack as low as possible, • Check airspeed, adjust thrust.
which will make the normal roll controls effective. • Establish pitch attitude.
With airspeed as low as the onset of the stick shaker, or
lower, up to full deflection of the ailerons and spoilers 4.3.3 Nose-Low, Wings-Level Recovery Techniques
can be used. The rolling maneuver changes the pitch
rate into a turning maneuver, allowing the pitch to Situation: Pitch attitude unintentionally
decrease. (Refer to Fig. 33.) In most situations, these more than 10 deg, nose low.
techniques should be enough to recover the airplane Airspeed low.
from the nose-high, wings-levelupset. However, other- Recognize and confirm the situation. Disengage the
tech niques may also be used to achieve a nose-down autopilot and autothrottle. Even in a nose-low, low-
pitch rate. speed situation, the airplane may be stalled at a relati-
vely low pitch. It is necessary to recover from the stall
If altitude permits, flight tests have shown that an effec- first. This may require nose-down elevator, which may
tive method for getting a nose-down pitch rate is to not be intuitive. Once recov ered from the stall, apply
reduce the power on underwing-mounted engines. thrust. The nose must be returned to the desired pitch
(Refer to Sec. 3.5.11, “Flight at Ex tremely Low by applying nose-up elevator. Avoid a secondary stall,
Airspeeds.”) This reduces the up ward pitch moment. as indicated by stall warning or airplane buffet.
In fact. in some situations for some airplane models, it Airplane limita tions of g forces and airspeed must be
may be necessary to reduce thrust to prevent the angle respected. (Refer to Sec. 3.2, “Energy States.”)
of attack from continuing to increase. This usually
results in the nose lowering at higher speeds, and a mil- Situation: Pitch attitude unintentionally more
der pitchdown . This makes it easier to recover to level than 10 deg, nose low.
flight.
Airspeed high.
If control provided by the ailerons and spoilers is inef-
fective, rudder input may be required to induce a rol- Recognize and confirm the situation. Disengage the
ling maneuver for recovery. Only a small amount of autopilot and autothrottle. Apply nose-up el evator.
rudder input is needed. Too much rudder applied too Then it may be necessary to cautiously apply stabilizer
quickly or held too long may result in loss of lateral trim to assist in obtaining the desired nose-up pitch
and directional control. Caution must be used when rate. Stabilizer trim may be necessary for extreme
applying rudder be cause of the low-energy situation. out-of-trim conditions. Reduce thrust, and, if required,
(Refer to Sec. 3.5.10, “Directional Maneuvering.”) extend speedbrakes. The recovery is completed by
establishing a pitch, thrust, and airplane configuration
To complete the recovery. roll to wings level, if neces- that corresponds to the desired airspeed. (Refer to Sec.
sary, as the nose approaches the horizon. Recover to 3.2, “Energy States.”) Rememberthat a very clean air-
slightly nose-low attitude to reduce the potential for plane can quickly exceed its limits. When applying
entering another upset. Check air speed, and adjust nose up elevator, there are several factors that the pilot
thrust and pitch as necessary. should consider. Obviously, it is necessary to avoid
impact with the terrain. Do not enter into an accelera-
Nose-high, wings-level recovery: ted stall by exceeding the stall angle of attack. Airplane
• Recognize and confirm the situation. limitations of g forces and air speed should also be
• Disengage autopilot and autothrottle. respected.
• Apply as much as full nose-down elevator. Nose-low, wings-level recovery:
• Use appropriate techniques: • Recognize and confirm the situation.
• Roll to obtain a nose-down pitch rate. • Disengage autopilot and autothrottle.
• Reduce thrust (underwing-mounted • Recover from stall. if necessary.
engines). • Recover to level flight:
• Complete the recovery: • Apply nose-up elevator
• Approaching horizon, roll to wings level. • Apply stabilizer trim, if necessary.

4.3.4 High-Bank-Angle airplane has exceeded 90 deg of bank, it may feel like
Recovery Techniques “push ing” in order to unload. It is necessary to
unload to improve roll control and to prevent pointing
Bank angles can exceed 90 deg. In high-bank situa- the lift vector towards the ground. Full aileron and
tions, the primary objective is to roll the airplane in the spoiler input may be necessary to smoothly estab lish a
shortest direction to near wings level. However, if the recovery roll rate toward the nearest horizon. It is
airplane is stalled, it is first necessary to recover from important that positive g force not be increased or that
the stall. nose-up elevator or stabilizer trim be used until the air-
plane approaches wings level. If the application of full
Situation: Bank angle greater than 45 deg. lateral control (ailerons and spoilers) is not satisfactory,
it may be necessary to apply rudder in the direction of
Pitch attitude gnater than 25 deg. the desired roll. As the wings approach level, extend
nose high. speedbrakes, if required. Complete the recovery by
establishing a pitch, thrust, and airplane drag device
Airspeed decreasing. configura tion that corresponds to the desired airspeed.
In Iarge transport-category airplanes, do not attempt to
A nose-high, high-angle-of-bank attitude requires deli- roll through (add pro-roll controls) during an upset in
berate flight control inputs. A large bank angle is help- order to achieve wings level more quickly. Roll in the
ful in reducing excessively high pitch atti tudes. (Refer shortest direction to wings level.
to Sec. 3.5.8, “Mechanics of Turning Flight.”)
Recognize and confirm the situation. Disengage the 4.3.5 Summary of Recovery Techniques
autopilot and autothrottle. Unload (reduce the angle of
attack) and adjust the bank angle, not to exceed 60 deg, These summaries incorporate high-bank-angle
to achieve a nose down pitch rate. Maintain awareness techniques.
of energy management and airplane roll rate. To com-
plete the recovery, roll to wings level as the nose ap NOSE-HIGH RECOVERY:
proaches the horizon. Recover to a slightly nose low • Recognize and cónfirm the situation.
attitude. Check airspeed and adjust thrust and pitch as • Disengage autopilot and autothrottle.
necessary. • Apply as much as full nose-down elevator.
• Use appropriate techniques:
Situation: Bank angle greater than 45 deg. • Roll (adjust bank angle) to obtain a nose down
Pitch attitude lower than 10 deg, pitch rate.
nose low. • Reduce thrust (underwing-mounted engines).
• Complete the recovery:
Airspeed increasing. • Approaching the horizon, roll to wings level .
• Check airspeed, adjust thrust.
A nose-low, high-angle-of-bank attitude re q u i re s • Establish pitch attitude.
prompt action, because altitude is rapidly being
exchanged for airspeed. Even if the airplane is at an NOSE-LOW RECOVERY:
altitude where ground impacf is not an immedi ate con- • Recognize and confirm the situation.
cern, airspeed can rapidly increase beyond airplane • Disengage autopilot and autothrottle.
design limits. Recognize and confirm the situation. • Recover from stalh if necessary.
Disengage the autopilot and autothrottle. Simultaneous • Roll in the shortest direction to wings level— bank
application of roll and adjustment of thrust may be angle more than 90 deg: unload and roll.
necessary. • Recover to level flight:
It may be necessary to unload the airplane by decrea - • Apply nose-up elevator.
sing backpressure to improve roll effectiveness. If the • Apply stabilizer trim. if necessar y.

5. GLOSSARY - ACRONYMS Flight Management Systems

A computer system that uses a large database to allow
Airplane Upset routes to be programmed and fed into the system by
An airplane in flight unintentionally exceeding the means of a data loader. The system is constantly upda-
parameters normally experienced in line ope rations or ted with respect to position accu racy by reference to
training: conventional navigation aids. The sophisticated pro-
• Pitch attitude greater than 25° nose up. gram and its associated data-base ensures that the most
• Pitc#h attitude greater than 10° nose down. appropriate aids are automatically selected during the
• Bank angle greater than 45°. information up-date cycle.
• Within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds
inappropriate for the conditions.
Angle of Attack (AOA) Flight Path

The angle between th oncoming air or relative wind, The actual direction and velocity an airplane fol
and some reference line on the airplane or wmg. lows.
Autoflight Systems Flight Path Angle

The autopilot, authothrottle, and all related systms that The angle between the flight path vector and the hori-
perform flight management and gui dance. zon.
Camber
The amount of curvature evident in an airfoil shape. Fly-by Wire Airplanes Airplanes
that have electronic flight control systems.
Clear Air Turbulence (CAT)
High-level turbulence (normally above 15,000 ft above
sea level) not associated with cumuliform cloudiness, International Civil Aviation Organization
including thunderstoms. A specialized agency of the United Nations whose
objectives are to develop the principles and techniques
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) of international air navigation and foster planning and
An event where a mechanically normally functio ning development of international civil air transport.
airplane is inadvertently flown into the ground, water,
or an obstacle.
Load Factor
Dihedral A measure of the acceleration being experienced by the
The angle formed between the lateral axis of an airpla- airplane.
ne and a line that passes through the center of the wing.
Energy Maneuver
The capacity to do work. A controlled variation of the flight path.
Energy State
How much of each kind of energy (kinetic, poten tial,
or chemical) the airplane has available at any given
time.

Mountain Wave Trim

Severe turbulence advancing up one side of a mountain That condition in which the forces on the airpla ne are
and down the other. stabilized and the moments about the cen ter of gravity
all add up to zero.
Newton’s First Law
An object at rest will tend to stay at rest, and an object VMCA
in motion will tend to stay in motion in a straight #ne The minimum flight speed at which the airplane is con-
unless acted on by an external force. trollable with a maximum of S bank when the critical
engine suddenly becomes inoperative with the remai-
Newton’s Second Law ning engine at takeoff thrust.
The acceleration of an object is directly propor tional to
the force acting on the object and inver sely proportio- Wake Turbulence
nal to the mass of the object: The condition in which a pair of counter-rotating vorti-
Acceleration = force x 1 ces is shed from an airplane wing, thus cau sing turbu-
mass lence in the airplane’s wake.
Pitch Windshear (Low Level)

Movement about the lateral axis. Wind variations at low altitude.
Pitch Attitude Yaw

The angle between the longitudinal axis of the airplane Motion about the vertical axis.
and the horizon.
Roll
Motion about the longitudinal axis.
Sideslip Angle
The angle between the longitudinal axis of the airplane
and the relative wind as seen in a plan view.
Stability
Positive static stability is the initial tendency to return
to an undisturbed state after a disturbance.
Stall
An airplane is stalled when the angle of attack is
beyond the stalling angle. A stall is characterized by
any of or a combination of, the following:
a. Buffeting, which could be heavy at times.
b. A lack of pitch authority.
c. A lack of roll control.
d. Inability to arrest descent rate.

Acronyms
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator ILS Instrument Landing System

AFM Airplane Flight Manual IMC Instrument meteorological conditions
ACL Above ground level
AOA Angle of attack kn Knots
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System MAC Mean aerodynamic chord
ATC Air traffic control MSL Nautical mile(s)
CAT Clear air turbulence NASA Mean sea level National Aeronautics
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain Space
CG Center of gravity NTSB Administration National
ECAMS Electronic Centralized Aircraft Transportation Safety Board
Monitoring System PF Pilot flying
EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew PFD Primary Flight Display
Alerting System PNF Pilot not flying
FAA Federal Aviation Administration RTO Rejected takeof
ICAO International Civil Aviation VMC Visual meteorological conditions
Organization VSI Vertical Speed Indicator
Acknowledgements
The following organizations participated in the

development of this training aid:
A.M. Carter Associates (Institute for Simulation Continental Airlines, Inc.

& Training) Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Air Transport Association Deutsche Lufthansa AG
Airbus Industrie Federal Aviation Administration
Air Line Pilots Association Flight Safety Foundation
Alaska Airlines, Inc. Flight Safety International
All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. International Air Transport Association
Allied Pilots Association Japan Airlines Co.,
Aloha Airlines, Inc. Ltd. Lufthansa Gerrnan Airlines
American Airlines, Inc. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.
American Trans Air Inc. National Transportation Safety Board
Ansett Australia Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Bombardier Aerospace Training Center SAS Flight Academy
(Regional Jet Training Center) Southwest Airlines
British Airways The Boeing Company
Calspan Corporation Trans World Airlines Inc.
Cathay Pacific Airways Limited United Air Lines, Inc.
Cayman Airways, Ltd. US Airways, Inc.
Civil Aviation House

Questionnaire
These questions are based on the material in the “Pilot Guide to Airplane Upset Recovery” where the answer to
each question can be found. The questions are all multiple choice.
1. The predominant number of airplane upsets are caused by

a. Environmental factors.
b. Airplane system anomalies.
c. Pilot-induced factors.
2. Most of the multiengine turbojet loss-of-control incidents that are caused by environmental factors are
because of
a. Microbursts.
b. Windshear.
c. Airplane icing.
d. Wake turbulence.
3. Technology in modern airplanes reduces the flight crew workload. Therefore, while initiating the
recovery from an airplane upset, the pilot should
a. Verify that the autopilot and autothrottles are still engaged.
b. Engage the autopilot and autothrottles, if disengaged.
c. Reduce the level of automation by disengaging the autopilot and autothrottles.
d. Ask the other pilot “What is it doing now?”
4. Which of the following statements regarding energy is true?

a. Kinetic energy decreases with increasing airspeed.
b. Poterial energy is approximately proportional airspeed.
c. Chemical energy remains constant throughout a flight.
d. Kinetic energy can be traded for potential energy, and potential energy can be traded for kinetic
energy.
5. The objective in maneuvering the airplane is to manage energy so that

a. Kinetic energy stays between limits (stall and placards).
b. Potential energy stays between limits (terrain to buffet altitude).
c. Chemical energy stays above certain thresholds (not running out of fuel).
d. All of the above.
6. The airplane angle of attack is the angle between the airplane longitudinal axis and the oncoming
air.
a. True. b. False.
7. Exceed the critical angle of attack and the surface will stall, and lift will decrease instead of
increasing. Thls is true
a. Unless the airplane is in a nose-down pitch attitude.
b. Only if the airspeed is low.
c. Only if the airplane is in a nose-high pitch attitude.
d. Regardless of airplane speed or attitude.
8. The angle of attack at which a wing stalls reduces with

a. Decreasing Mach.
b. Increasing Mach.
9. Airplane stall speeds are published in the Airplane Flight Manual for each airplane model.
These speeds are presented as a function of airplane weight. Theretòre, if a pilot maintains airspeed
above the appropriate speed listed for the airplane weight, the airplane will not stall.
a. True. b. False.

10. Large downward aileron deflections

a. Could induce air separation over that portion of the wing at very hi8h angles of attack.
b. Should never be used when recovering from an airplane upset.
c. Are more effective at high angles of attack.
I l . Dihedral is the angle formed between the lateral axis of an airplane and a line that passes through the
center of the wing. Which of the following statement is incorrect?
a. Dihedral contributes to airplane lateral stability.
b. Tbe- term “dihedral effect” is used when describing the effects of wing sweep and rudder on
lateral stability.
c. A wing with dihedral will develop stable rolling moments with sideslip.
d. If the relative wind comes from the side of an airplane that has dihedral-designed wings, the wing
into the wind is subject to a decrease in lift.
12. Rudders on modern jet transport airplanes are usually designed and sized to
a. Create large sideslip capability during recovery from stall.
b. Counter yawing moment associated with an engine failure at very low takeoff speeds.
c. Counter relling moment created by ailerons and spoilers.
13. While already ay high speed, what happens if Mach is allowed to increase?
a. Airflow over parts of the airplane begins to exceed the speed of sound.
b. Shock waves can cause local airflow separation.
c. Characteristics such as pitchup, pitchdown, or buffeting may occur.
14. Positive static stability is defined as the initial tendency to return to an initial undisturbed state after a
disturbance.
a. True. b. False.
15. Movement about the airplane lateral axis is called

a. Yaw.
b. Roll.
c. Pitch
d. Sideslip
16. Which of the following statements is always true?

a. Weight points 90 deg from the airplane longitudinal axis.
b. Lift must always be aligned with the center of gravity.
c. Weight always point to the center of the Earth.
d. The center of gravity never changes in flight.
17. If the engines are not aligned with the airplane center of gravity, a change in engine thrust will
a Have no effect on pitching moment.
b. Be accompanied by a change in pitching moment.
18. To maintain altitude in a banked turn, the lift produced by the airplane must be
a. Greater than the airplane weight, and the amount is a function of bank angle.
b. Greater than the airplane weight, and the amount is a function of altitude.
c. Equal to the weight of the airplane.
19. During lateral maneuvering, aileron and spoiler effectivness

a. Increases with increasing angle of attack.
b. Decreases will increasing angle of attack.
c. Is a function of the airplane inertia about its vertical axis.

20. Which of the following statements about recovering from large airplane bank angles is true?
a. The effect of up-elevator is to tighten the turn.
b. The bank should be reduced to near level before initiating aggressive pitch maneuvering.
c. The lift vector should be oriented away from the gravity vector.
e. Only answers a and b.
21. If a pilot inputs full rudder in a normal symmetric airplane situation, it will result in very large sideslip
anglesa.nd large structural loads.
a. True. b. False
22. Stability in the vertical axis tends to drive the sideslip angle toward zero. The most dynamic stability
about the vertical axis on modern jet transports is from
a. The vertical fin.
b. The rudder.
c. An active stability augmentation system/yaw damper.
d. Pilot roll input.
23. With insufficient aerodynamic forces acting on the airplane (airplane stalled), its trajectory will be
mostly ballistic and it may be difficult for the pilot to command a change in attitude until
a. Full nose-up elevator is applied.
b. Full rudder input is applied.
c. Gravity effect on the airplane produces enough airspeed when the engle of attack is reduced.
d. Arriving at a lower altitude.
24. During a situation where the high-speed limitation is exceeded, recovery actions should be careful and
prompt and may include
a. Orienting the lift vector away from the gravity vector.
b. Reducing thrust.
c. Adding drag.
25. Which of the following statements regarding recovering from an airplane upset are correct?
a. The actions should be correct and timely.
b. Troubleshooting the cause of the upset is secondary to initiating recovery.
c. Regaining and maintaining control of the airplane is paramount.
26. A good analysis process of an airplane upset should include

a. Locating the Bank Indicator.
b. Determining the pitch atittude.
c. Confirming attitude by referring to other indicators.
d. Assessing the airplane energy.
e. All of the above.
27. During recovery from an airplane upset

a. Pilots must be very careful to maintain at least l-g force
b. Altitude should always be maintained.
c. Training and experience gained from one airplane may always be transferred to another.
d. Pilots must be prepared to use full control authority.

28. A stall is usually accompanied by a continuous stall warning, and it is characterized by

a. Buffeting, which could be heavy.
b. A lack of pitch authority.
c. A lack of roll authority.
d. The inability to arrest descent rate.
e. All of the above.
29. Which of the following statements is true?

a. A stall is a controlled situation.
b. An approach to stall warning is an uncontrolled situation.
c. Recovery from approach to stall warning is the same as recovery from a stall.
d. To recover from a nose-low stall, angle of attack must be reduced.
30. When initiating recommended airplane upset recovery techniques, the first two techniques are
a. Maintain altitude and apply additional thrust.
b. Reduce the angle of attack and maneuver toward wings level.
c. Recognize and confirm the situation and disengage the autopilot and authothrottles.
d. Determine the malfunction and disengage the autopilot and autothrottles.
31. In a nose-high, wing-level airplane upset, after accomplishing the first two recommended techniques
a. Apply up to full nose-down elevator and consider trimming off some control force.
b. Immediately roll into a 60-deg bank.
c. Maintain at least l-g force.
d. Immediately establish sideslip in order to maintain at least 1-g force.
32. In a nose-high, wings-level airplane upset, when it is determined that rudder input is required because
roll input is ineffective
a. Only a small amount should be used
b. Do not apply rudder too quickly.
c. Do not hold rudder input too long.
d. Improper use of rudder may result in loss of lateral and directional control.
e. Extreme caution must be used because of the low-energy situation.
f. All of the above.
33. During recovery from a nose-low, wings-level, high-airspeed airplane upset

a. The airplane cannot be stalled.
b. Use of stabilizer trim is always optional, but never required.
c. The recovery is completed by establishing a pitch, thrust, and airplane configuration that corre
sponds to th desired airspeed.
34. During recovery from a nose-low, high-bank-angle airplane upset

a. If 90 deg of bank is exceeded, continue the roll to wings level.
b. It may be necessary to unload the airplane by decreasing backpressure.
c. Increase elevator backpressure while beginning to roll toward wings level.
Answers
1.a (ref.2.1) 12.b (ref.3.5.4.) 23. c (ref.3.5.11.)
2.d (ref.2.1) 13.d (ref.3.5.5) 24.d (ref.3.5.11)
3.c (ref.2.4) 14.a (ref.3.5.6) 25.d (4.1)
4.d (ref.3.2) 15.c (ref.3.5.7) 26.e (4.1)
5.d (ref.3.2) 16.c (ref.3.5.7) 27.d (ref.4.2.3)
6.d (ref.3.5.1.) 17.b (ref.3.5.7) 28.e (ref.4.3)
7.d (ref.3.5.1) 18.a (ref.3.5.7) 29.d (ref.4.3.1.)
8.b (ref.3.5.1. 19.b (ref.3.5.9) 30.c (ref.4.3.)
9.b (ref.3.5.1.) 20.d (ref.3.5.8.) 31.a (ref.4.3.2.)
10.a (ref.3.5.3) 21.a (ref.3.5.10) 32.f (ref.4.3.2.)
11.d (ref.3.5.4.) 22.c (ref.3.5.10) 33.c (ref.4.3.3.)
34.b (ref.4.3.4)

Gruppo SDT
THE WORLD GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984 (WGS - 84)
n. 4 Nuova Serie
I.P. 4 -- Giugno 2004

NUOVA SERIE
WGS--84
Le ”Informazioni Professionali” integrano quanto contenuto nella documentazione

tecnico--operativa ufficiale di Compagnia.
Gli argomenti trattati riguardano specifici aspetti di cultura professionale ritenuti
meritevoli di approfondimento che, per semplicità e rapidità di edizione, vengono
divulgati nella presente veste.
Il Personale Navigante, destinatario delle ”I.P.”, farà cosa gradita se segnalerà
specifici argomenti o spunti, con valenza professionale, da sviluppare mediante
questo genere di informativa.
THE WORLD GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984 (WGS--84)
L’adozione su scala mondiale del sistema di coordinate WGS--84 si è resa ne-

cessaria in considerazione dell’uso del GPS e delle esigenze della naviga-
zione d’area (RNAV). Alla data odierna non tutti gli Stati aderenti all’ICAO
hanno modificato le proprie coordinate geografiche di interesse aeronautico;
tali Stati sono segnalati nel Route Manual, Part 1, Special Instructions.
Le norme operative per la condotta della navigazione con FMS o IRS in aree
non WGS--84 verranno precisate nell’O.M. GB.
2 INFORMAZIONE PROFESSIONALE
WGS--84
1. Definition
WGS--84 (World Geodetic System--1984) is a global reference system origi-
nally designed for the U.S. satellite positioning systems GPS (See Note 1).
To facilitate calculations on the surface of the earth, an ellipsoid of revolution
is used. It has its central point at the earth centre of gravity and it is dimen-
sioned to fit the form of the earth in the best way possible. WGS--84 gives geo-
graphical coordinates in the same reference system all over the world for all
international aviation activities involving positioning.
Such coordinates of interest regard:
-- area/en--route points:
ATS/RNAV routes significant points
Holding points
En--route radio navigation aids
Restricted/prohibited/danger areas boundaries
Obstacles
FIR, CTA and CTZ boundaries
Other significant points
-- aerodrome points:
Aerodrome reference points
Runway thresholds
Terminal radio navigation aids
FAF, FAP and other instrument approach procedures essential points
Extended runway centre line points
Aircraft stand points
Aerodrome obstacles
2. WGS--84 adoption
The implementation of RNAV and the fast development of satellite technology
led ICAO to adopt, from Jan.1st ’98, the World Geodetic System--1984
(WGS--84) as the standard geographical coordinates reference system for in-
ternational civil aviation.
The relevant Annexes (4, 11, 14 and 15) have been consequently amended
so that “the published [by member States] geographical coordinates, indicat-
ing latitude and longitude, shall be expressed in terms of the WGS--84 refer-
ence datum”. See Note 2.
Implementation by ICAO member States of WGS--84 involved, among other
things, the readjustment of existing coordinates and reference datum to
WGS--84.
INFORMAZIONE PROFESSIONALE 3
WGS--84
3. Before WGS--84
Before the adoption of WGS--84 there were many geodetic reference datums
in use throughout the world providing references for the charting of particular
areas. Each datum was produced by fitting a particular mathematical earth
model (ellipsoid) to the true shape of the earth (geoid) in such a way as to
minimize the differences between the ellipsoid and the geoid over the area of
interest. Most of such ellipsoids were derived in the last century and were nor-
mally referenced to a local observatory. These different datums and ellipsoids
produce different latitude and longitude grids and, hence, different sets of geo-
graphical coordinates. Different countries developed their own geodetic da-
tums. See Note 3.
This has led to a situation where a particular position had different coordinates
depending on the reference datum in use. Furthermore, the national reference
frames were often determined using techniques which, by modern standards,
are of relatively low accuracy.
In the past these differences in coordinates were often neither significant nor
relevant. With the increasing accuracy of navigation required by communica-
tions, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) sys-
tems using satellite technology, and for area navigation (RNAV), these dis-
crepancies have become important.
The solution was to adopt a common world geodetic reference system, such
as WGS--84.
4. The WGS--84 coordinates
With the WGS--84 ellipsoid, geographical (geodetic) latitude and longitude
are defined; a vertical coordinate (i.e. height above ellipsoid) is introduced for
points in space (not considered in this I.P.).
The latitude ( φ, N or S) of a point P is the angle in the meridian plane of P,
between the equatorial plane and the perpendicular, through P, to the ellipsoid
surface.
The longitude ( λ, E or W) is, as before, the angle in the equatorial plane be-
tween the zero meridian and the meridian plane of P.
WGS--84
Perpendicular to
ellipsoid surface
Zero meridian
P latitude (φ)
P
λP
Equatorial plane
P longitude (λ)
5. Navigational implications
As explained in par. 3 above, non WGS--84 adjusted coordinates have been
determined by States with measurements and calculations on mathematical
reference models. These models represent the shape of the earth in a particu-
lar geographic region and are called geodetic datums. Each of these datums
uses a different mathematical model that provides the best representation of
the earth shape in that specific geographic region. It is common practice for a
State to use a specific datum for all mapping, charting and geodetic activities.
The mathematical parameters of these datums differ, as differs the location of
the centre of each datum and, except for those countries which have already
converted to an earth--centred datum, none of the datum centres coincides
with the centre of gravity of the earth.
Where VORs/NDBs are primary means of navigation for short/medium range
flights, different reference datums for geographical coordinates do not have
significant effects since the relevant published coordinates in adjacent
countries do not affect the track flown.
WGS--84
Navigation system--derived coordinates, on the other hand, are generated by

the airborne systems from accelerometers and up--dated through ground--
based or satellite--based signal and are earth--centred.
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) use accelerometers on a stabilized platform
to sense movement and determine aircraft position. The alignment of the plat-
form relates to the earth centre of mass and rotation, resulting in INS--gener-
ated coordinates that are referenced to the earth centre. This means that pub-
lished coordinates as referenced to local geodetic datums will not compare,
directly, with INS--generated coordinates. Because INS is normally aligned
with local coordinates before take--off, it is the most accurate within the area
defined by the local datum. The “coordinate shift” flying from one local datum
to a different one is small compared with the drift of the INS in the en--route
phase of long--distance flights.
Coordinates derived from signals received from satellites are earth--centred
because satellites operate with an earth--centred reference model, i.e.
WGS--84.
GPS coordinates will not compare with coordinates based on local geodetic
datums except in areas where coordinates have been readjusted to an earth--
centred datum. This means that the difference between the coordinates of
a point referenced to a local geodetic datum and the coordinates of that
same point referenced to the earth--centred WGS--84 datum has to be
taken into account. Such difference may sum up to several hundred metres
of circular error. States where WGS--84 has not been implemented yet are
indicated in the Route Manual Part 1.
WGS--84
NOTES
1. The abbreviation GPS (Global Positioning System) is used to denote the US

satellite navigation system. GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) is the
ICAO abbreviation to denote a world--wide satellite system which includes
one or more satellite constellations.
The use of GPS is, in the meantime, encouraged by ICAO; provided
augmentation systems by other orbiting or geostationary satellites, ground
reference stations, differential techniques, either as individual items or in
combination) are employed, GPS is considered a GNSS.
2. In Italy “IFR reporting points and radioaids coordinates interested by ATS
route/procedures are expressed in WGS--84 being in accuracy range as per
ICAO Annex 11” (AIP Italia, Part RAC 4).
3. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, Newton demonstrated that the
concept of a truly spherical earth was inadequate as an explanation of the
equilibrium of the ocean surface. He argued that because the earth is rotating,
the forces created by its own rotation would tend to force any liquid on the sur-
face to the equator. He showed, by means of a simple theoretical model, that
hydrostatic equilibrium would be maintained if the equatorial axis of the earth
were longer than the polar axis. This is equivalent to the statement that the
earth is flattened towards the poles i.e. that the earth may be closely approxi-
mated by an ellipsoid of revolution, created by rotating the ellipse around its
minor axis.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ellipsoids were defined which
were best fitted to a certain region of the earth. These local ellipsoid still pro-
vide the geometrical reference for the geographical coordinates of various
national geodetic (triangulation) networks.
Ellipsoid
Earth surface
Geoid
WGS--84
Laplace (1802), Gauss (1828), Bessel (1837) and others had already recog-
nized that the assumption of an ellipsoidal earth model was not tenable when
compared to high--accuracy observations. One could no longer ignore the
deflection of the physical plumb line, to which measurements refer, from the
ellipsoidal normal (deviation of the vertical, see figure) and contradictions
arose which exceeded by far the observational accuracy.
Helmert (1880, 1884) made the transition to the current concept of the figure
of the earth as a geoid, which is meant as the equipotential surface of the
earth gravity field which would coincide with the ocean surface if the earth
were undisturbed and without topography.
Perpendicular to Perpendicular Geoid

geoid (plumbline) to ellipsoid undulation
Mean sea surface

(geoid)
SDT
Informazioni
Professionali
RNAV (GNSS) / RNAV (GPS)

Non Precision Approach
Implementation
I.P. 8 – Maggio 2012

NUOVA SERIE
RNAV (GNSS) - RNAV (GPS) NPA
Le "Informazioni Professionali" integrano quanto contenuto nella

documentazione tecnico-operativa ufficiale di Compagnia.
Gli argomenti trattati riguardano specifici aspetti di cultura professionale
ritenuti meritevoli di approfondimento che, per semplicità e rapidità di
edizione, vengono divulgati nella presente veste.
Il Personale Navigante, destinatario delle "I.P." farà cosa gradita se segnalerà
specifici argomenti o spunti, con valenza professionale, da sviluppare
mediante questo genere di informativa.
RNAV (GNSS) / RNAV (GPS) Non Precision Approach

Implementation
Alitalia ha richiesto l’autorizzazione ad effettuare procedure di avvicinamento

Non-Precision RNAV(GNSS) / RNAV(GPS) senza guida verticale (minimi
LNAV).
Dal mese di Gennaio 2012 è iniziato l’addestramento degli equipaggi di Lungo
Raggio della Compagnia per la necessaria qualificazione ad effettuare tali
procedure. L’addestramento verrà in seguito esteso anche agli equipaggi di
Medio Raggio.
L’OM C Route Manual (parte Network) contiene già da tempo le Instrument
Approach Chart (IAC) per tali procedure.
Il GB e gli AOM degli aa/mm interessati riportano le procedure per
l’esecuzione di questo tipo di avvicinamenti e restano il riferimento
ufficiale unico.
RNAV(GNSS) - RNAV (GPS) NPA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 FOREWORD ............................................................................................................. 5
2 SCOPE ..................................................................................................................... 5
3 DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................... 5
4 RNAV (GNSS) – RNAV (GPS) NPA......................................................................... 7
4.1 Procedures .............................................................................................................. 10
4.2 Missed Approach .................................................................................................... 11
4.3 Contingency Procedures ......................................................................................... 11
5 UNAUTHORIZED RNAV APCH PROCEDURES................................................... 11
6 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 12
1 FOREWORD
The continuing growth of aviation increases demands on airspace capacity therefore emphasizing
the need for optimum utilization of available airspace. Improved operational efficiency derived from
the application of area navigation (RNAV) techniques has resulted in the development of navigation
applications in various regions worldwide and for all phases of flight.
The implementation of the new RNAV Approach Procedures constitutes an important step towards
improving the flight operations safety, the efficiency of the ATM system and reducing fuel burn and
CO2 emissions.
At present, the RNAV (GNSS/GPS) Non Precision Approach is a stand-alone procedure. The
advantage is that there are no expenses for installation and maintenance of ground equipment.
Therefore, RNAV (GNSS/GPS)-NPAs will be implemented step by step and will replace conventional
NPAs.
Alitalia is in the process of obtaining operational and airworthiness approval by the national
Authority to conduct RNAV (GNSS) Approach operations without vertical guidance (NPA), based on
EASA criteria (AMC 20-27).
2 SCOPE
This document is aimed at improving knowledge of the RNAV Approach concept and defines the
operational criteria related to the RNAV NPA.
3 DEFINITIONS
ABAS (Aircraft Based Augmentation System): An augmentation system that augments and/or
integrates the information obtained from the other GNSS elements with information available on
board the aircraft. The most common form of ABAS is Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM).
APV (Approach Procedure with Vertical guidance): An instrument approach procedure which
utilises lateral and vertical guidance but does not meet the requirements established for precision
approach and landing operations.
Accuracy: The degree of conformance between the estimated, measured, or desired position and/or
the velocity of a platform at a given time, and its true position or velocity. Navigation performance
accuracy is usually presented as a statistical measure of system error and is specified as predictable,
repeatable and relative.
ANP (Actual Navigation Performance): A measure of the current estimated navigational
performance.
AR (Authorization required): Aircraft and Flight Crew must be authorized for this approach. Every
approach is handled separately and needs specific authorization.
Availability: An indication of the ability of the system to provide usable service within the specified
coverage area and is defined as the portion of time during which the system is to be used for
navigation.
BARO VNAV (BAROmetric Vertical NAVigation): is a navigation system that presents to the pilot a
computed vertical guidance based on barometric altitude.
Continuity of Function: The capability of the total system (comprising all elements necessary to
maintain aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform its function without non scheduled
interruptions during the intended operation.
Cross-track (XTK) error/deviation: The difference between the RNAV system computed path and the
aircraft position relative to the path.
Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE): FDE is a receiver processing scheme that autonomously
provides integrity monitoring for the position solution, using redundant range measurements. The
FDE consist of two distinct parts: fault detection and fault exclusion. The fault detection part detects
the presence of an unacceptably large position error for a given mode of flight. Upon the detection,
fault exclusion follows and excludes the source of the unacceptably large position error, thereby
allowing navigation to return to normal performance without an interruption in service.
GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) sensor: A GNSS system incorporating only the GNSS
receiving and positioning part. It doesn’t incorporate the navigation capability and the navigation
data base.
LPV (Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance): Approach similar to LNAV/VNAV except is more
precise (40mt lateral limits) as a result of GNSS signal augmentation.
NSE (Navigation System Error): The difference between true position and estimated position.
On board Monitoring and Alerting function: This function is the main element which determines if
the navigation system complies with the necessary safety level associated to a RNP application; it
relates to both lateral and longitudinal navigation performance. Onboard performance monitoring
and alerting allows the flight crew to detect that the RNAV system is not achieving the navigation
performance required. Onboard performance monitoring and alerting is concerned with the
monitoring of all type of errors which may affect the aircraft ability to follow the desired flight path.
TSE (Total System Error): The difference between true position and desired position. This error is
equal to sum of the Flight Technical Error (FTE), Path Definition Error (PDE), and Navigation System
Error (NSE).
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM): A technique whereby a GNSS receiver
/processor determines the integrity of the GNSS navigation signals using only GPS signals or GPS
signals augmented with altitude. This determination is achieved by a consistency check among
redundant pseudo-range measurements. At least one satellite in addition to those required for
navigation should be in view for the receiver to perform the RAIM function.
RNAV System: A navigation system which permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path
within the coverage of station referenced navigation aids or within the limits of the capability of self
contained aids, or a combination of these. A RNAV system may be included as part of a Flight
Management System (FMS).
RNAV (GNSS) approach: A GNSS RNAV approach promulgated by a State and designed in accordance
with PANSOPS Criteria Doc 8168 (Basic GNSS). Such approach should be flown by using an airborne
RNAV system approved for RNP APCH operations.
RNP APCH: An RNP approach as defined in the ICAO Performance Based Manual (PBN) manual.
RNAV (GNSS) or (GPS) approaches are included in the ICAO definition of RNP APCH.
RNP (Required navigation Performance): A navigation specification based on an area navigation

that includes the requirement for performance monitoring and alerting, designated by the prefix
RNP (e.g. RNP 5, RNP 1).
RNP System: A RNAV system which supports on-board performance monitoring and alerting.
SAAAR (Special Aircraft and Aircrew Authorization Required): SAAAR is the respective term used in
the U.S. in lieu of AR. Special aircraft and aircrew authorization required.
Vertical Navigation: A method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on a vertical flight
profile using altimetry sources, external flight path references, or a combination of these.
4 RNAV (GPS) - RNAV (GNSS) NPA

RNAV (GPS) and RNAV (GNSS) APCH without vertical guidance (LNAV minima) are Non Precision
Approaches (NPA).
RNAV approach procedures are based on the use of RNAV systems that may exist in different
avionics implementations, ranging from either a basic GNSS stand-alone receiver to a multi sensory
RNAV system that utilizes information provided by a basic GNSS sensor (e.g. FMS).
RNAV-NPAs are authorized provided:
• Flight CMs have undergone specific training as detailed in the TM;
• a published RNAV (GNSS/GPS) procedure is available;
• all approach waypoints are stored in the FMS database;
• the GNSS sensor is used for position computations (e.g. “GPS Primary” mode).
Route Manual RNAV IACs are labelled either RNAV (GPS) or RNAV (GNSS). This difference is due to
AIP sources using either the description GPS referring to the US based Global Positioning System or
the newer more generic description GNSS comprising all satellite based navigation systems.
The final approach path generally consists of only 2 waypoints: the Final Approach Waypoint (FAWP,
comparable to the Final Approach Fix - FAF) and the Missed Approach Waypoint (MAWP,
comparable to the Missed Approach Point - MAPt). More waypoints on the final descent path, e.g.
final fixes, are optional. The lateral approach path is maintained exclusively by means of position
calculation of the NAV computer, based on signals from GPS satellites.
The MDA is indicated in the RM-IAC under LNAV minima and must not be confused with the VNAV
minima (DA) which is related to APV BARO – VNAV procedures (currently not authorized).
The FMS navigation accuracy (ANP) must be verified within the Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) for each specific phase of flight (see table below). Such default RNP values are automatically
loaded by the FMS.
4.1 Procedures
The following instructions are provided as generic guidance only. For detailed operating procedures,
refer to the GB and AOM.
Planning
During planning, sufficient means must be available to navigate and land at the destination or at an
alternate aerodrome in the case of loss of RNAV APCH airborne capability. As per Company policy,
planning is not currently predicated on the application of RNAV NPA minima.
Flight Crews must verify that the FMS navigation data base is current and includes the applicable
RNAV approach procedure.
The instrument approach chart shall be clearly identified (e.g. RNAV GNSS RWY 16R).
Flight Crews must consider any NOTAM or briefing material that could adversely affect the aircraft
system operation, the availability or suitability of the procedure at the landing airport.
If the missed approach procedures are based on conventional means (VOR, NDB), the appropriate
airborne equipment required to fly this procedure must be installed in the aircraft and must be
operational. The associated ground-based navaids must also be operational.
Any MEL restriction shall be observed.
Prior to Commencing the Procedure
The Flight Crew must validate the procedure loaded from the FMS database by comparison with the
appropriate IAC as detailed in the AOM.
The Crew must verify that the GNSS sensor is the only source used for position computations.
For those GNSS systems relying on RAIM, its availability should be verified by the Flight Crew.
Systems providing RNP alerts that reflect loss of GNSS integrity are considered acceptable;
accordingly the RAIM availability check is not required.
As applicable for other NPA procedures, Flight CMs must consider required cold temperature
compensations to relevant published altitudes (refer to RM-GEN-LAT and specific instructions on the
AOM).
ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, “direct to” clearances
which bypass the initial legs of an approach, interception of an initial or intermediate segment of an
approach, or the insertion of waypoints loaded from the database. In complying with ATC
instructions within terminal areas, the Flight Crew must be aware that:
• manual entry of coordinates into the RNAV system for operation is not permitted;
• “Direct to” clearances may be accepted to the Intermediate Fix (IF) provided that the
resulting track change at the IF does not exceed 45°;
• modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach course prior to the FAF is
acceptable for Radar Vectored arrivals or other times with ATC approval, provided that the
resulting track change to intercept the final approach course does not exceed 30°;
• the final approach course must be intercepted before the FAF (or FAWP) in order for the
aircraft to be properly established on final before starting the descent.
During the Procedure
The use of FMS lateral guidance coupled to the flight director and/or autopilot is mandatory.
In accordance with the AOM, appropriate displays must be selected so that the following
information can be monitored:
• the RNAV computed desired path (DTK);
• the aircraft position relative to the lateral path (XTK - Cross Track Error) for FTE monitoring.
Cross-track error/deviations shall be limited to ± 1/2 of the RNP associated with the procedure
phase (i.e., 0.5 NM for the Initial and Intermediate segments, 0.15 NM for the Final Approach
segment, and 0.5 NM for the Missed Approach segment). Brief deviations from this standard (e.g.
overshoots or undershoots) during and immediately after turns, up to a maximum of the RNP value
(i.e. 1.0 nm for the Initial and Intermediate segments) are considered acceptable.
0.30/0.05NM
0.30NM
The vertical profile control on final track must be ensured by means of a continuous descent
approach technique, using the vertical guidance functions as specified by the AOM (e.g. FPV, V/S,
VNAV), down to the published Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA): Crews shall verify that the vertical
speed is consistent with the VNAV angle to be flown. Published altitudes and speed constraints must
be complied with.
4.2 Missed Approach

The procedure must be discontinued whenever any of the following occurs:
• RNAV failure annunciation (e.g. warning flag);

• RNP alert annunciation (ANP>RNP);
• Excessive cross-track (XTK) error.
The missed approach must be flown in accordance with the published procedure (either RNAV or
conventional). Use of the RNAV system during missed approach is acceptable provided the RNAV
system is operational (i.e. no loss of function or failure indications).
In the event of a missed approach due to RNAV system failure or significant performance
degradation, if the missed approach procedures are not based on conventional means (VOR, NDB) or
dead reckoning, the Flight Crew must immediately climb to the applicable MSA while notifying ATC
of intentions.
4.3 Contingency Procedures
The Crew must notify ATC of any loss of the RNP Approach capability together with the proposed
course of action.
NOTE: The loss of RNP Approach capability includes any failure or event causing the aircraft to no
longer satisfy the RNP Approach requirement of the procedure.
The standard radio communication phraseology has to be used.
In case of communication failure, the Flight Crew must continue with the approach in accordance
with the published lost communication procedure.
5 UNAUTHORIZED RNAV APCH PROCEDURES

The following approaches are not authorized:
• RNAV (VOR/DME) and RNAV (DME/DME);
• RNAV (GNSS) with LNAV-only guidance based on Localizer Performance (LP);
• RNAV (RNP), RNAV (RNP) AR and RNAV (RNP) SAAAR;
• NDB (GPS) and VOR (GPS);
• RNAV (GPS) and RNAV (GNSS) without official instruction concerning the usability with LNAV
only, or with LNAV/VNAV guidance (i.e. no indication on the System line of the related RM IAC
minima section).
6 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
- ICAO Doc 9613 Performance Based Navigation Manual (PBN);
- EASA AMC 20-27 Airworthiness Approval and Operational Criteria for RNP APPROACH (RNP
APCH) Operations including APV BARO-VNAV Operations;
- OM part A General Basic:
• 8.1 Flight Planning Instructions;
• 8.3 Flight Procedures;
• 8.4 All Weather Operations;
- OM part C Route Manual.
END

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Page 1 MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL INFORMATION SEP 2016

INFORMAZIONI TECNICO OPERATIVE

The NTSB Recommendation Letter (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 5

The Boeing Technical Bulletin (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 9

The Airbus Industrie FCOM Bulletin (excerpts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pag. 17

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

The NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter (excerpts)

This safety recommendation letter addresses an industry--wide safety issue involving

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Although, as previously mentioned, most transport--category airplanes are equipped

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

The Boeing Flight Operations Technical Bulletin (excerpts)

Fig. 1 Rudder Induced Sideslip

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

Fig. 3 Sideslip Response to Abrupt Cyclic Rudderl Input

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

The design maneuvering speed (Va)

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Rudder limiters on Boeing airplanes

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

V1 (135) 250 kt Mmo (at FL 390)

Pedal Pedal Rudder Pedal Pedal Rudder Pedal Pedal Rudder

B767 80 3.6 26 80 3.6 8 80 3.6 7

B777 60 2.9 27 60 2.9 9 60 2.9 6

MD 80 75 2.6 22 60 1.1 8 30 0.4 3

MD 11 80 3.8 23 65 2.2 15 60 1.7 11

Use of rudder in unusual or emergency conditions

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

The Airbus Industrie FCOM Bulletin (excerpts)

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

Loads* (rudder deflection)

*Resulting loads on the fin (rudder and vertical stabilizer)

Fig. 6 Rudder pedal displaced to the maximum available deflection

Fig. 7 Steady--state sideslip

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Fig. 8 Certification of yawing maneuver design

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

Fig. 9 Sudden full or nearly full opposite rudder movement

A318 / A319 A320 / A321

Fig. 10 Rudder travel limits

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Rudder pedal force

MAXIMUM RUDDER DEFLECTION

Rudder deflection (degrees)

Fig. 11 Pedal force vs rudder deflection

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

2. The rudder should not be used:

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1 AUG 02

AUG 02 Informazione Tecnico Operativa N°. 1

FLIGHT AND VOLCANIC ASH

INFORMAZIONI TECNICO OPERATIVE

1. VOLCANOES AND VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS 5