Tom Christensen Lise H.

Rykkja
University of Oslo, Norway Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Norway
Per Lægreid
University of Bergen, Norway

Organizing for Crisis Management:

Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy

Abstract: What makes a well-functioning governmental crisis management system, and how can this be studied using Tom Christensen is professor in the
Department of Political Science, University
an organization theory–based approach? A core argument is that such a system needs both governance capacity and of Oslo, Norway. He is also affiliated with
governance legitimacy. Organizational arrangements as well as the legitimacy of government authorities will affect University of Bergen, Norway and Renmin
crisis management performance. A central argument is that both structural features and cultural context matter, as University, China. His main research
interests deal with studies of central civil
does the nature of the crisis. Is it a transboundary crisis? How unique is it, and how much uncertainty is associated service and public sector reforms, both
with it? The arguments are substantiated with empirical examples and supported by a literature synthesis, focusing nationally and comparatively. His research
on public administration research. A main conclusion is that there is no optimal formula for harmonizing competing is theoretically based in organization
theory. He has published extensively in all
interests and tensions or for overcoming uncertainty and ambiguous government structures. Flexibility and adaptation the major public administration journals
are key assets, which are constrained by the political, administrative, and situational context. Furthermore, a future and has coauthored several textbooks and
research agenda is indicated. international edited volumes in the field.
E-mail: tom.christensen@stv.uio.no

Practitioner Points Per Lægreid is professor in the

Department of Administration and
• Both governance capacity and governance legitimacy are needed to make a well-functioning governmental
Organization Theory, University of Bergen,
crisis management system. Norway. He has published extensively on
• Organizational arrangements as well as the legitimacy of government bodies affect the performance of crisis public sector reform, public management
policy, and institutional change from a
management.
comparative perspective, applying an
• Both structural and cultural contexts matter for a well-performing crisis management system. organization theory–based institutional
• There are great variations across different types of crises, and one best system that can be applied to all types perspective. His latest publications
include articles in Governance, Public
of crises does not exist.
Administration, International Review
• Hybrid arrangements combining hierarchy and networks might be a promising way forward. of Administrative Science, Public
Administration Review, Public Management

M
ajor crises, whether they are caused by
a hurricane, a tsunami, or a terrorist
attack, have impacts on and constrain
public administration. Crisis management is a core
government responsibility that is difficult to fulfill
(Boin et al. 2005; Boin and ‘t Hart 2003). What
is more, major crises strike at the core of both
democracy and governance and hence constitute
challenges not only for capacity but also for
accountability, legitimacy, representation, and citizens’
ability to get their demands met effectively (Dahl
and Tufte 1973). Intriguingly, government capacity
for dealing with major crises is a subject that public
administration scholars have yet to explore at length
(Boin and Lodge 2013). We argue in this article that
the links between governance capacity and governance
legitimacy have received even less attention.
This article addresses the broad research question of
what makes government crisis management function
well. Our core argument is that a robust and well-
functioning crisis management system needs both
governance capacity and governance legitimacy. We
highlight the importance of building organizational
capacity by focusing on the coordination of public
resources, decision-making systems, and governance
tools, and we underscore the relevance of legitimacy
by emphasizing the importance of public perceptions,
attitudes, and trust vis-à-vis government arrangements
for crisis management. Major crises may sound a
“democracy alarm” and often result in a crisis for
democracy. A well-functioning democracy, therefore,
needs an effective administrative apparatus as well
as high levels of trust in government (Olsen 2013).
While crises always require government capacity, this
must stand in a dynamic relationship with legitimacy
and trust.
Furthermore, we argue that in order to understand
how government arrangements for crisis management
evolve, how well they perform, and what the
limitations and potential of such arrangements are,
we need to take into account both structural and
institutional elements (Christensen et al. 2007; Olsen
Review, Administration & Society, and
Financial Accountability and Management.
E-mail: per.lagreid@uib.no
Lise H. Rykkja is senior researcher
at Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Bergen,
Norway. Her research concentrates on
the development of public administration,
governance, and public policies,
oriented toward governance capacity
and organization for internal security
and crisis management. Her recent
publications include the coedited book
Organizing for Coordination in the
Public Sector (Palgrave Macmillan) and
articles in Public Administration, Public
Policy and Administration, International
Review of Administrative Sciences, Public
Management Review, and Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management.
E-mail: lise.rykkja@uni.no
Public Administration Review,
Vol. xx, Iss. xx, pp. xx–xx. © 2016 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12558.

Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy 1

2010). Such research must also take into account the type of crisis
a government faces.
The purpose of the article is twofold: First, we elucidate our
definition of crisis management as a combination of capacity and
legitimacy. Second, we present what we believe is the best approach
to studying crisis management. Our contribution enhances the
literature on crisis management by highlighting the importance of
focusing on both governance capacity and governance legitimacy
to understand crisis management performance. We postulate that
the match or mismatch between governance capacity and behavior,
on the one hand, and citizens’ expectations, on the other, will affect
perceptions of crisis management performance. The combination
of capacity and legitimacy strategies is especially important when
facing transboundary crises characterized by their unique nature and
a high level of uncertainty. Such crises are typically low-probability
and high-impact events, making them especially challenging from a
planning and governance perspective. The article substantiates our
main arguments by referring to prior relevant empirical studies. A
synthesis of the literature supports our arguments and points toward
a direction for future research.
The article is organized as follows: First, we define what we mean
by crisis, crisis management, governance capacity, and governance
legitimacy. Second, we explore the relevance of an organization-
based institutional approach to crisis management in the public
sector and formulate some propositions. Third, we elaborate
relevant crisis management research. Fourth, we discuss how to
deal with “wicked problems” and the particular challenges of
coordination capacity in crisis management. Fifth, we address the
need to focus on both governance legitimacy and the relationship
between legitimacy and capacity. Finally, we draw conclusions about
crisis management performance and the need for future research.
Conceptual Clarifications: Crisis, Crisis Management,
Governance Capacity, and Governance Legitimacy
Depending on its nature, a crisis may give rise to different types
of challenges for public administration. One broadly accepted
and useful definition of crisis comes from Rosenthal, Charles,
and ‘t Hart, who define a crisis as “a situation in which there is a
perceived threat against the core values or life-sustaining functions
of a social system that requires urgent remedial action in uncertain
circumstances” (1989, 10). This definition emphasizes that crises
happen irregularly. They differ from more routine emergencies
such as house fires or traffic accidents, as well as from “disasters,”
which involve a more normative judgment and presume a bad
outcome (Boin 2008). A crucial feature is that a crisis is a matter of
perception and hence includes a subjective element. The outcome
can be either good or bad. When the core values and pillars of
society are threatened, the government must respond firmly and
signal leadership. It must also act quickly, which limits the options
available to it. This is further complicated by the fact that the causes how people act toward government authorities in crises but also
of a crisis, the course of action chosen to deal
with it, and the consequences of that choice
may be both uncertain and complex. When the core values and
pillars of society are threatened,
A general theory of how crises should be the government must respond
managed and by what type of organization firmly and signal leadership.
does not exist. This means that we need to
2 Public Administration Review • xxx | xxx 2016
distinguish among various types of crisis. While many typologies of
crises are based on their causes (Boin 2005; Boin, McConnell, and
‘t Hart 2008, 10; Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993), we argue that two
other dimensions are crucial: first, the degree of uncertainty and
uniqueness of the crisis, and second, the degree of transboundary
features. The most demanding crises are those that transcend
administrative levels, sectors, and ministerial areas and at the
same time are unique, ambiguous, complex, and involve a lot of
uncertainty. These dimensions overlap to some extent with Gundel’s
(2005) distinction between crises that are easy or difficult to predict
and crises that are easy or difficult to influence. This approach
acknowledges that some crises are harder to predict than others and
that some are even impossible to anticipate ex ante.
By crisis management, we mean the processes by which an
organization deals with a crisis before, during, and after it
has occurred. These processes involve identifying, assessing,
understanding, and coping with a crisis. Our aim is to go beyond
the narrower instrumental understanding of crisis management to
include a broader context. Crisis management is not just a matter of
technical containment and logistics but also involves conflicts and
raises issues of power, trust, and legitimacy.
Governance capacity is an ambiguous concept. Some link it to the
“infrastructural power” of the state (Fukuyama 2013), others to the
extent to which governance resembles a Weberian bureaucracy (Evans
and Rauch 1999) or to the “quality of government” (Rothstein and
Teorell 2008). In our understanding, governance capacity includes
formal structural and procedural features of the governmental
administrative apparatus but also informal elements, that is, how
these features work in practice. One can distinguish four types of
governance capacity (Lodge and Wegrich 2014b). Coordination
capacity is about bringing together disparate organizations to engage
in joint action; analytical capacity is about analyzing information
and providing advice as well as risk and vulnerability assessments;
regulation capacity is about control, surveillance, oversight, and
auditing; and delivery capacity is about handling the crisis, exercising
power, and providing public services in practice. In this article,
we will pay special attention to coordination capacity, which has
received the most focus in the literature.
Governance legitimacy is also a complex and elusive concept. We
see it first and foremost as the relationship between government
authorities and citizens. It concerns citizens’ perceptions of whether
the actions of the authorities are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within certain socially constructed systems of norms, values, and
beliefs (Jann, 2016; Suchman 1995). Organizational legitimacy
refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization (Meyer
and Scott 1983). This kind of legitimacy may be conferred not only
if an organization is regarded as efficient but also if it conforms to
institutional myths (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Legitimacy affects
how they understand them. The relationship
might be based on pragmatism and self-
interest, on moral and normative approval, or
on cognitive taken-for-grantedness.
Governance legitimacy has several
dimensions. One essential distinction
is between input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and throughput and Rhinard 2014; ‘t Hart and Sundelius 2013). Examining crisis
legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013). This emphasizes that management in public administration using an organization
citizens’ assessment and acceptance of governance actions in crises theory approach is less common. An exception is the Analysis of
might be related to politics, participatory quality, and support for Civil Security Systems in Europe project (Bossong and Hegemann
political parties (input); to processes within the administrative 2015), which concludes that there is not one best organizational
apparatus (throughput); or to policies, means, and measures arrangement for crisis management and that it is difficult to find
(output). It is difficult to operationalize legitimacy, but proxies a strong correlation between specific structural arrangements and
such as trust, confidence, satisfaction, and reputation have been system performance. However, this project is also mainly descriptive
used. When government authorities enjoy the trust, confidence, and does not contribute significantly to theory development.
and satisfaction of other stakeholders and citizens in general,
they have a good reputation and their legitimacy is supposedly An organization theory–based institutional approach can make
high. Output legitimacy is closely related to governance capacity. a fruitful contribution to understanding how governments
However, governance legitimacy goes beyond citizens’ assessment deal with wicked crises that are transboundary, unique, and
of governance capacity to meet their expectations and also includes characterized by a high degree of uncertainty (Christensen et
their assessment of participation and the responsiveness of political al. 2007; Olsen 2010). The institutional approach assumes that
processes, as well as how fair, impartial, and open administrative political context is important (Andrew 2013). The approach
processes are. asserts that crisis management plays out in specific institutional,
political, and organizational contexts that influence performance
To understand crisis management performance, we need to look in different ways. The complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity
not only at what the government does but also at how its actions of crisis management are defined and tackled within and across
are assessed by stakeholders and citizens. The more legitimacy the organizations and sectoral/ministerial areas of responsibility and at
government authorities enjoy, the better they can perform their various administrative levels with specific characteristics.
tasks (Rothstein 1998). Overall crisis management performance
will be affected by the capacity to coordinate, deliver, regulate, and Within these contexts, crisis management is also influenced by
analyze but also by input, throughput, and output legitimacy. legitimacy issues. In a high-trust context and a state-friendly society,
citizens tend to have stronger confidence in their authorities,
A main link between governance capacity and governance legitimacy including in their ability to manage crises (Fimreite et al. 2013).
is the degree of “match” or “mismatch” between bureaucratic A high-trust context can affect the authorities’ capacity to cope
behavior, on the one hand, and citizens’ expectations, on the other with a crisis and their behavior in doing so, as well as citizens’
(Schneider 2011). When governmental preparedness and crisis perception of crisis management performance. In unsettled
management match the expectations of citizens, the response situations, often defined by a crisis, we need to go beyond a limited
process works well and governmental instrumental approach and apply a broader
performance is perceived as good. When institutional approach to understand how
there is a mismatch between capacity and The size of the gap between crisis management plays out in practice
expectations, the government response organizations’ response to a (Christensen and Lægreid, 2016). Crisis
process runs into trouble. The size of the gap crisis and citizens’ expectations management takes place in the interface
between organizations’ response to a crisis and determine the success or failure between policy areas and administrative levels
citizens’ expectations determine the success of governmental crisis manage- as well as between government authorities
or failure of governmental crisis management and citizens. Therefore, understanding
performance. The gap can be closed either
ment performance. the organizational layout of the crisis
by strengthening capacity or by reducing management field regarding different
expectations, or a combination of the two. governance capacities and investigating the basis for governance
legitimacy are of fundamental importance. Crisis management
An Organization Theory–Based Institutional Approach performance is not only a question of objective reality but also a
to Crisis Management matter of public perceptions and sentiments (Lewis 2005).
The literature on crisis management is primarily descriptive but at
times also prescriptive and normative. It is typically oriented toward Specific organizational arrangements may exacerbate crises or limit
single events and specific sectors and/or organizations or devoted to loss or damage. The many dimensions of specialization and the
the ex post evaluation of responses to specific crises. Theoretically conglomerate of semiautonomous and loosely coupled organizations
informed empirical research on core topics such as resilience is quite pose challenges for coordination, delivery, analytical, and regulatory
rare (Boin and van Eeten 2013). Generic approaches—such as capacity. The ability to exercise formal authority and responsibility
“high-reliability theory” and “normal accident theory,” which focus is constrained by basic organizational dilemmas and trade-offs (Kettl
on complexity, tight coupling, and reliability—are common (Perrow 2003), while there are permanent tensions between different values
1984; Rijpma 1997; Roe and Schulman 2008), but there is a lack of and administrative doctrines (Olsen 2010). Whether coordination
generally accepted definitions of key concepts (Boin 2004). is hierarchy, network, or market based can make a difference to
performance (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010), while multilevel
A tested general theory of crisis management does not exist. Crisis governance also influences relations between actors (Bache and
research has tended to concentrate on the technical and managerial Flinders 2004). Transboundary, ambiguous, complex, and uncertain
or strategic and political security perspective (Boin, Ekengren, situations may imply sequential attention, local rationality, biased
Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy 3
search, and constraints on information (Cyert and March 1963).
Organizational processes matter. Crisis management organizations are
semiautonomous, loosely allied bodies, each with their own operating
procedures, programs, and repertoires (Allison 1971).
Organizational changes within the public sector—brought about
by a combination of organizational constraints, cultural features,
external shocks, and deliberate executive choices—will also
influence crisis management (Christensen et al. 2007). Change
may be abrupt or incremental and may result in continuity or
discontinuity (Streeck and Thelen 2005); in addition, change
may be context related or display features of path dependency
and institutionalization (Krasner 1988; Mahoney and Thelen
2010). Bureaucratic politics matter. Different institutions may
embrace a variety of veto groups working for, or against, such
change. It follows that a core research challenge is to study the
institutionalization and organization of various crisis domains
and arrangements, the changes that these structures yield, and the
consequences and effects of such changes.
In an organization theory–based institutional approach, a central
argument is that context matters. Context provides a link between
the general and the particular, although context-based explanations
are complex as well (Pollitt 2013). The approach assumes that
organizations are embedded in institutional contexts that provide
legitimacy and seek to comply with institutional expectations
through a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989).
Based on this, we expect that crisis management performance will
be contingent on administrative culture, polity features, citizens’
expectations about government behavior, and the general public
assessment of government performance. We also expect variations
in crisis management performance depending on whether a crisis
has transboundary features as well as on the degree of uncertainty
and uniqueness. Citizens’ attitudes feed into the system, while the
system also affects citizens’ trust and behavior.
Organizational arrangements and cultures constrain and enable
actions and affect prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
Citizens’ attitudes toward governmental arrangements and their
level of trust in central institutions may influence organizational
and policy decisions as well as judgments about their success or
failure. The range of actors represented in a government structure
and effective crisis management performance will also influence
legitimacy.
Based on this approach we propose the following (see figure 1):
• Increased governance capacity will enhance crisis management
performance (P1)
• Increased governance legitimacy will enhance crisis management
performance and effective crisis management performance will
increase governance legitimacy (P2)
• The interplay between governance capacity and governance
legitimacy matters for crisis management performance (P3)
• The type of crisis matters for crisis management performance.
The more transboundary, uncertain and unique a crisis is, the less
effective crisis management performance will be (P4)
• Crisis management performance can be explained in both
structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional terms (P5)
4 Public Administration Review • xxx | xxx 2016
Governance capacity
– Coordination
– Regulative P1
– Analytical
– Deliberating Crisis
P3 management
performance
P2
Governance legitimacy
– Input
– Throughput
– Output
P4
Type of crisis
– Transboundary
– Unique, uncertainty
P5
Organization theory–based approach
– Structural/instrumental
– Cultural/institutional
Figure 1 Model of Analysis
Research on Crisis Management in Public
Administration
Dealing with crises is a core responsibility of governments and
public sector executives. Crises tend to be unpredictable, demand a
rapid response, and often spark considerable criticism and debate.
Planning and preparing for the unexpected and unknown, dealing
with ambiguity, and responding to urgency at the same time as
dealing with citizens’ expectations in the face of great uncertainty
tests the limits of what bureaucratic public administration is
designed to do (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013; Taleb 2007).
The administrative apparatus responsible for crisis management
is characterized by tensions for which there is no optimal or
general solution. Balancing the need for governance capacity
and governance legitimacy is difficult within one organizational
arrangement. There is a mixed order within and between partly
conflicting capacity dimensions, such as between horizontal and
vertical coordination; between delivery capacity and analytical
capacity; between different legitimacy dimensions such as input
(resources), throughput (procedures), and output (results); and
between capacity and legitimacy. To create a system that is lean and
purposeful, honest and fair, and robust, resilient, and flexible at the
same time is challenging (Hood 1991).
Public administration research on crisis management is scarce.
However, some notable exceptions are worth mentioning. In 1985,
Public Administration Review published a special issue on emergency
management in which crisis management was featured prominently.
The editor noted that the primary focus of research had been in
the area of human response and the application of technological
solutions, while little had been accomplished with regard to
understanding the problems of public administration and finding
solutions from a public policy or public management perspective
(Petak 1985). Complexity was a main issue, and it was emphasized
that social, technical, administrative, political, legal, and economic
factors all needed to be taken into account. Although governance
legitimacy was not explicitly mentioned, the editor highlighted the
fact that emergency management puts a lot of power into the hands
of technical experts and professional administrators who are not
directly accountable to the public. This raises accountability issues,
puts pressure on elected officials, and should be counteracted by
better communication with the public and more public scrutiny.
A special issue published in 2002 on democratic governance in the
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks focused on state
and local governance, public administration and civil liberties,
managing bureaucracies and administrative systems, organizing for
internal security, crisis management, and responsible governance
(Public Administration Review 2002). Both governance capacity
and governance representativeness were discussed. The main lesson
was that organizing for crisis management involves a lot of difficult
trade-offs and that government needed to be organized differently.
In general, September 11 revealed four kinds of failure: lack of
imagination, policy failure, capability problems, and management
problems (9/11 Commission Report 2004). This meant
consolidating efforts across the foreign/domestic divide, in the
intelligence community, in Congress, and in organizing the defense
and internal security administrations (Hammond 2007).
but learning is also impeded by political constraints, competing
advocacy coalitions, and confusion about the nature and impact
of a crisis. While there is often a strong wish to learn from a crisis,
dramatic crises may produce incremental rather than radical policy
and structural changes, owing to cultural path dependency and
resistance (Boin, McConnell, and ‘t Hart 2008).
Crises do not fit easily into established organizational contexts.
Transboundary crises increasingly cut across geographic,
administrative, infrastructural, and cultural boundaries (Ansell,
Boin, and Keller 2010; Boin et al. 2005; Head 2008). This tests
the government’s coordination, delivery, regulatory, and analytical
capacity. Working across existing organizational boundaries and
taking into account multilevel governance relations as well as
cross-sectoral problems is crucial. Transboundary crises typically
challenge existing organizational and management patterns and
reveal a mismatch between the organizational structure and the
problem structure. For this reason, crisis management can be seen
to pose a typical “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber 1973; Xiang
2013) in which coordination between actors and organizations with
differing tasks and perceptions is crucial. Public organizations face
major constraints in dealing with such complexities. Decisions on
how to organize, regulate, and prepare for crises and how to respond
to them are inherently political decisions that involve priorities and
values (Selznick 1957).

Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States, Existing public administration research points to an increased
have the potential to reveal crucial failures in crisis management focus on interorganizational coordination, network solutions, and
capacity (Waugh 2006). In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the reforms, with an emphasis on more holistic approaches, such as
failure to mitigate a hazard long recognized within the scientific whole-of-government (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). This also
and emergency management communities, a lack of preparation, affects the policy area of crisis management, where coordination
overcentralized decision making, a lack of emergency management between different policy sectors and organizational levels is
knowledge among public officials, and a lack of proactive leadership particularly important (Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). Owing to
resulted in a major disaster. Serious questions concerning the increasing complexity, political leaders, policy makers, regulators,
capacity of local, regional, and central government were raised. and administrators struggle to establish adequate administrative
There was also confusion concerning the role of different structures to facilitate a coordinated response. They try to combine
authorities. Emergency plans, communication, and decision-making organizational stability and crisis preparedness with flexibility and
processes were poorly implemented. Overall, the disaster response rapid response, revealing a common gap between central plans and
was slow and inadequate. There were capacity problems regarding local challenges (Boin 2008).
coordination, delivery, regulation, and analysis.
Governance Capacity: The Challenges of Coordination
Governance capacity and legitimacy are Wicked problems typically transcend
affected by the extent to which government organizational boundaries. They are complex
authorities are capable of adapting and Governance capacity and and involve actors from multiple levels and
learning to compensate for the uncertainty legitimacy are affected by the sectors; knowledge is uncertain, and goals and
that crises tend to produce. Governments extent to which government priorities are ambiguous. Strategies for dealing
can learn from crises, but this is not a simple
authorities are capable of adapt- with wicked problems include collaboration
and straightforward process. Experiential and coordination, new and adaptive leadership
learning amid uncertainty may not always ing and learning to compensate roles, as well as enabling structures and
be rational and may also take the form of for the uncertainty that crises processes (Head and Alford 2015). To deal
superstitious learning (March and Olsen tend to produce. wisely with wicked problems, different
1975). Crises may facilitate learning and governance capabilities are needed, such as
contribute to overcoming the organizational coordination of specialized units and delivery,
inertia that often inhibits learning under normal conditions, but analytical, and regulative capacity. These administrative capacities are
crisis situations may also create obstacles to learning (Stern 1997). crucial to overall governance crisis management capacity.
Politicization of crises may both enhance and impede crisis-induced
learning (Broekema 2015). Major crises tend to influence policy Specialization
agendas and bring about policy change (Birkland 2007). Media, Crisis management capacity has to do with specialization of the
salience, and policy domain organizations may promote learning, formal structure, whether vertical or horizontal (Egeberg 2012).
Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy 5
Vertical specialization denotes the allocation of power among the
various levels of a public organization. A ministry dealing with
crisis management often has a subordinate agency that is closer to
the operational level. In crisis situations, the degree of autonomy
of such an agency and the quality of information it provides for
making major central decisions may be crucial. Another important
vertical relationship is that between central and local authorities,
as the latter are more frequently faced with practical challenges or
the operational side of a crisis. On the one hand, a crisis underlines
the need for strong leadership and central control at the strategic
level; on the other hand, it emphasizes the need for local autonomy
and flexibility at the operational level. Local improvisation may
be difficult if central constraints are very strong, allowing the local
authorities only limited leeway. Local competence, knowledge, and
training are crucial factors, too. A key finding in the crisis literature
is that crisis management systems should be decentralized at least
to a degree, implying that political and administrative executives
should facilitate a self-organized response system rather than try to
control that system (Boin 2008; Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010).
However, the challenge is how to facilitate a decentralized response
system without diluting central responsibilities (Boin, Ekengren,
and Rhinard 2014).
Coordination
Coordination is an endemic concern in public administration and
organizational theory (Alexander 1995), and prior research on
crisis management has primarily been attentive to the coordination
dimension of administrative capacity. Coordination can be defined
as the adjustment of actions and decisions among interdependent
actors to achieve a specific goal (Koop and Lodge 2014). It is a
significant challenge and often identified as a critical area of failure
in a crisis (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010; Boin and Bynander
2014; Brattberg 2012). In the face of a crisis, coordination may
suffer from “underlap” in the exercise of authority, as well as from
information mismatches (Koop and Lodge 2014). Underlap refers
to situations when the policy area of public security falls between
the remits of different organizations so that no organization feels
responsible.
Kettl (2003) introduced the concept of “contingent coordination”
to address the need for flexible government capacity to handle
new and unpredictable problems in homeland security. A main
challenge when there are major coordination problems is to move
away from a minimalist and negative type of coordination implying
noninterference toward a more positive type of coordination in
which building coherence and improving overall performance
is the main goal (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010; Scharpf
1988). Thus, crisis coordination is not merely a technical task
but also an important political one. It involves not only structure
but also culture. Distinguishing between crisis coordination as a
process and as an outcome may prove helpful—“outcome” relates
primarily to crisis cooperation, whereas “process” is more about how
to orchestrate and achieve cooperation by connecting the different
components (Boin and ‘t Hart 2012).
Gulick (1937) emphasized the dynamic relationship between
specialization and coordination: the more specialization within a
public organization, the more pressure for increased coordination
(see also Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010). The challenges of
6 Public Administration Review • xxx | xxx 2016
structural coordination vary according to the type of specialization
(Hood and Jackson 1991). Coordination can mean different things
depending on the division of labor. It poses dilemmas and trade-
offs, as decision makers have to choose between equally attractive
but logically incommensurate alternatives and make judgments
between competing values (Lindblom 1965). When specialization
is based on purpose, the coordination challenge is generally to get
various sectoral administrations to work together on cross-sectoral,
horizontal, and “wicked” problems; when it is based on process, the
challenge is to get the various professions and experts to cooperate.
Clientele-based coordination focuses attention on certain groups
and may pose the challenge of how to balance those groups or create
a more holistic perspective. Geographically based coordination is
confronted with the major challenge of national standardization.
The unit size may influence coordination potential; smaller and
more fragmented units normally pose a challenge mainly to
central control, while larger units tend to encounter larger internal
coordination problems.
A further distinction can be made between an external/internal
and a vertical/horizontal dimension of coordination. The first
distinguishes between coordination within central government
and coordination between bodies within and outside central
government. The second distinguishes between coordination of
central government with international organizations and local and
regional government and coordination between organizations at
the same level. The vertical dimension addresses sector-specific
coordination capacity and the horizontal dimension sector-
spanning capacity. These coordination problems are attributed to a
multisectoral and multilevel system. How coordination is handled
in crises may be affected by the task structure of the organizations
involved—for example, whether that structure is regular or irregular
and whether the tasks are new or familiar (Boin and ‘t Hart 2012).
As public administration has increasingly become a multiactor and
multilevel entity, coordination across levels of government and
across policy sectors is more salient than ever (Lægreid et al. 2014).
Transboundary crises can escalate along geographic, political, and
functional lines and produce significant governance challenges
(Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010; Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard
2014). The increase in transboundary initiatives is seen as a response
to the greater need for coordination in a fragmented political-
administrative system (O’Flynn, Blackman, and Halligan 2013).
Hierarchy and Networks
In the public sector, coordination through hierarchy and network
are singled out as dominant mechanisms (Bouckaert, Peters, and
Verhoest 2010). In crisis management, hierarchy, network, and
various hybrid arrangements often exist side by side (Christensen
et al. 2015). Crisis management typically requires networks to help
mediate interdepartmental conflicts or interests cutting across policy
areas. Such networks can be more or less formalized. The prospects
for coordination through these different institutional arrangements
can be expected to depend on how culturally compatible those
arrangements are with established identities and political-
institutional legacies (March and Olsen 1989).
Partnerships and cooperation through networks often rely on
inherently soft measures devised to “nudge” different organizations
to move in the same direction (Lægreid et al. 2014). These softer analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense, which changed from
measures and the post–New Public Management emphasis on one organizational cultural assumption to another in the middle
horizontal coordination have been accompanied by centralization of the Hurricane Katrina crisis. The result is often a mixed design
efforts brought about through the introduction of more hierarchical matching an understanding of public administration as based on
instruments and a greater emphasis on vertical coordination, a large number of diverse, overlapping, and potentially competing
typically under the rubric of “reassertion of the center” (Christensen organizational dimensions (Olsen 2010).
et al. 2007; Dahlström, Peters, and Pierre 2011). Hence, there
are important dynamics between external vertical and horizontal Because there is no single, optimal way of meeting coordination
coordination efforts. challenges in a crisis, an important analytical task is to establish the
relative importance of various factors in the mix of organizational
These seemingly contradictory modes of coordination are reflected dimensions and how that mix plays out across various political-
in the way crisis management is organized in the public sector. institutional settings. Three options have been suggested (Boin and
When a crisis arises, various arrangements are introduced to respond t’ Hart 2012): (1) professional coordination based on a template,
to it. Coordination in crises often implies facilitating cooperation such as that of the U.S. Incident Command System or an expert-
between network agencies rather than directing such cooperative based crisis center such as the U.S. Federal Emergency Management
efforts (‘t Hart 2014). However, crises also tend to demand strong Agency; (2) concentrating coordination, achieved by creating and
leadership and central direction and clear-cut responsibilities and merging stronger crisis management organizations at the central
chains of command throughout the hierarchy (Rykkja and Lægreid level, such as the Department of Homeland Security in the United
2014). Actors in the various political-administrative systems may States (Hammond 2007); and (3) facilitating coordination, achieved
choose different strategies and organizational designs to handle a by enabling coordinated responses to transboundary crises through
crisis. These may be considered as an instrumental response to the multilevel organizations, exemplified by multilevel crisis governance
crisis but can also reflect perceptions of coordination quality based in the European Union (Boin, Busuioc, and Groenleer 2013).
on existing cultural traditions. How such coordination arrangements work in practice needs to be
thoroughly researched.
Networks can be important, but the
establishment of such administrative Linking Governance Capacity and
Networks can be important,
arrangements does not necessarily imply Governance Legitimacy
that hierarchies are no longer operative or but the establishment of such Crisis management performance depends
that all participants in such networks have administrative arrangements not only on governance capacity but also
an equal voice. Indeed, there are dynamics does not necessarily imply that on governance legitimacy. Much of the
between hierarchy and networks (Provan and hierarchies are no longer opera- literature on legitimacy is theoretical,
Kenis 2008). Secondary affiliations linked tive or that all participants in invoking legitimacy as an explanatory
to networks and part-time participation in concept rather than an empirical property,
such networks have an equal
such arrangements complement primary and few have considered legitimacy as a
affiliations linked to officials’ main positions voice. variable in hypothesis testing (Deephouse
in the hierarchy (Egeberg 2012). Networks and Suchman 2008). The distinction
are usually understood as loose, open-ended, and “flat” modes between the input, throughput, and output sides of legitimacy
of governance, but they are often embedded in the “shadow of and its relationship to governance capacity holds potential for
hierarchy” (Héretier and Lehmkuhl 2008). new research that may provide insights into the complexities of
crisis management in the public sector. Violating throughput
Thus, we often observe various hybrid coordination arrangements efficacy, accountability, transparency, representativeness, and
in crisis management (Moynihan 2009). One example is the inclusiveness in crisis situations might have a significant negative
establishment of a “lead agency approach” (Boin, Busuioc, and impact on legitimacy. At the same time, there might be a trade-
Groenleer 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). The notion of a lead off between input and output legitimacy, whereby less quality in
agency as an intermediate form between traditional hierarchy one dimension may be counterbalanced by better quality in the
and networks is drawn mainly from U.S. government crisis other (Schmidt 2013).
management arrangements, where a lead agency is responsible
for organizing interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct The relationship between governance capacity and governance
of policy and activities related to a particular operation. The legitimacy and the nature, problems, and interaction between input,
lead agency has network qualities in that it typically chairs an output, and throughput—in particular, output legitimacy in dealing
interagency working group established to coordinate policy. At the with crises—is underresearched. The same goes for the relationship
same time, it is associated with a traditional hierarchical approach between governance legitimacy and crisis management performance.
to coordination because its function is to impose control on others We need to examine how governments gain, maintain, and repair
within a network. Crises often require a network of responders legitimacy in crises using both an instrumental and an institutional
that need to be managed by hierarchy (Moynihan 2008). However, approach (Suchman 1995). Assuming that legitimacy affects
coordination capacity is not only about the ability to impose performance, we expect performance to be perceived favorably
actions hierarchically but also about a nonhierarchical facilitating when legitimacy is high (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). However, it
role (Lodge and Wegrich 2014a). There might also be “culture could also be the other way around, that a high level of performance
switching” during a crisis, as illustrated by Moynihan’s (2012) enhances legitimacy.
Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy 7
During and after a crisis, a key challenge is to uphold and restore
trust in the capacity of government arrangements to deal with such
situations. Social capital plays a critical role in building resilience
in postcrisis recovery (Aldrich 2012). Also, governance norms
influence the scope of government and how individual freedoms
and societal security are balanced. Without citizens’ trust in the
government bodies responsible for designing and implementing
public policy, implementation is likely to fail. Therefore, governance
capacity is not only a matter of program design or efficient
implementation bodies. It is also a matter of citizens’ attitudes to
and perceptions of the nature and tasks of the government apparatus
(Rothstein 1998). We have to ask to what degree citizens tolerate
government intervention and to what extent they cooperate to
achieve the goals set by crisis management. In general, the output
side of policy implementation by public officials is critical.
Linked to this is the question of accountability, which implies
looking back and requiring people and organizations to judge
their performance (Kuipers and ‘t Hart 2014). Officeholders are
accountable to public forums for their actions prior to, during, and
after a crisis. This means that public attitudes and reactions to crises
can constrain structural arrangements and limit the effectiveness of
available governance tools. Postcrisis accountability processes tend
to differ from accountability processes in settled situations. The
complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of crises put pressure on
accountability relations that go beyond traditional principal–agent
relations (Olsen 2013). Accountability in these situations might
be more about political communication than about learning and
improvement. Reputation management is often important because
the system is exposed, and, at the same time, lack of cultural
compatibility may hamper changes and reforms (Carpenter 2010;
Carpenter and Krause 2012; Christensen and Lægreid 2015).
Trust in government is one crucial aspect of public attitudes (Easton
1965). Therefore, analyzing trust in the government structures
and institutions responsible for crisis management is relevant for
governance legitimacy as well as for governance capacity. The same
goes for attitudes toward certain preventive measures. Trust can also
be sensitive to contextual factors. Does it matter whether we start
from a high-trust or a low-trust context? Are official risk assessments
important for public trust in government? What happens to
public trust in government and to general attitudes toward various
preventive measures postcrisis?
Restoring trust in governance capacity during and after crises is a key
challenge. Social capital also plays a critical role in building resilience
in postcrisis recovery (Aldrich 2012). Identifying factors that may
account for variations in citizens’ trust in the government’s capacity
to provide security and adequate crisis management is important.
With regard to governance representativeness, an area of interest is
how crises affect legitimacy and how responsive the various public
authorities are to citizens’ demands (Christensen et al. 2007). A key
assumption is that citizens’ attitudes are affected by perceived security
risks in their particular environment and, furthermore, by contextual
factors. Discerning which factors matter, and to what extent, would
be an important asset for future crisis management.
Finally, legitimacy is related not only to risk assessments and
the government’s ability to deal with crises. Individual rights
8 Public Administration Review • xxx | xxx 2016
and civil liberties—such as freedom of expression, religion,
mobility, assembly, and privacy, as well as due process and
nondiscrimination—are crucial political values in a democratic
society. Those rights and liberties may be in conflict with the
situational imperatives of security, especially during times of
national threat and crisis (Etzioni 2004). It is a common assumption
that when the perception of threat increases—particularly in the
aftermath of major terror attacks—liberties tend to shrink (Fimreite
et al. 2013). However, this trade-off thesis is contested. Security
and liberty might be traded in some but not all domains. Liberty
does not necessarily shrink in all respects when security increases,
and liberty does not necessarily increase when security decreases
(Waldron 2003). Whether responses to terrorism lead to a growth of
executive power and damage democratic institutions is an important
question for further research (Owens and Pelizzo 2010). Value
conflicts are core issues here and hence political concerns.
More governance capacity will not necessarily lead to better crisis
management performance. We also have to ask what citizens expect
the governance apparatus to be able to do (Lodge and Wegrich
2014a) and how what it does is presented and perceived. Citizens’
views of the legitimacy and acceptability of suggested measures
to handle crises, and their willingness to put preventive measures
on the political agenda, are generic aspects of crisis management
(Quarantelli 2000). Legitimacy is not only about effectiveness
but also about participation, impartiality, and due process. Thus,
we have to ask how trust in government in general and in crisis
management institutions in particular affects crisis management
capacity. Governance capacity can enhance or weaken democratic
legitimacy and accountability. At the same time, governance
legitimacy and trust relations may enhance or constrain governance
capacity.
Public sector crisis management addresses not only efficiency
and effectiveness but also wider issues concerning participation,
legitimacy, accountability, trust, and managing citizens’
expectations. The challenge is to move toward a (more) responsible
government that is held accountable for performance and linked
effectively to citizens demands so that it acts decisively for the public
good (Kettl 2009). Certain instruments may be efficient in terms
of which resources are used and how quickly results are achieved
but unsatisfactory from the perspective of stakeholder inclusion
and legitimacy. It is often difficult for a single arrangement to yield
positive results all round, and normally trade-offs have to be made
(see Hood 1991).
Conclusion
We argue for the need to address both governance capacity and
governance legitimacy in order to understand crisis management
performance. Not only what the state actually does but also citizens’
views and expectations regarding what it should do matter for
crisis management performance. Peoples’ acceptance, perceptions,
participation, and support are crucial and constrain capacity and
instrumental action.
In order to understand the development, functioning, and
performance of crisis management arrangements, we argue
that the organizational structure and coordination mechanisms
within government arrangements are crucial. Our suggestion is
to apply a combined structural instrumental and institutional
approach (Christensen et al. 2015). The combination of the two
perspectives implies that there is a need to study organizational
structures and various arrangements for governance capacity such
as coordination capacity but also cultural features and processes
related to input, throughput, and output legitimacy. In addition,
crisis management performance can be expected to vary according
to the type of crisis—whether it raises “wicked problems,” whether
it is transboundary in nature, whether it is unique, and the degree
of uncertainty it produces all matter. Structures and capacity
may constrain and enable performance, but they are not the
sole determinant of performance. There is always some leeway
for deliberate actions within formal arrangements, and cultural
constraints, legitimacy issues, and citizens’ expectations must also be
taken into consideration.
The future research agenda should be concerned with comparative
studies of crisis management between countries, over time, and
across different types of crises. We have to go beyond the formal-
legal arrangements and study how living organizations and
institutions work in practice in, and after, crises. We also need to go
beyond coordination capacity and address regulatory, delivering and
analytical capacity for crisis management. A major issue for further
exploration is how governance capacity for crisis management
affects legitimacy and governance representativeness and how
responsive the various public authorities are to citizens’ demands in
this area (Christensen et al. 2007).
Measuring and evaluating the impact of different capacity
arrangements on crisis management performance is important but
also difficult, and measuring the impact of different dimensions of
legitimacy even more so. Citizen surveys may prove to be one way
forward. Survey experiments, time series, and panel data might
be especially valuable. To grasp the mutual relationships between
governance capacity and legitimacy, multilevel analyses might be a
way forward to examine the coupling between the organizational/
institutional level and the individual level. So far, hard facts have
been missing and difficult to find. Information is often based on
perceived expert assessments. There is also an attribution problem,
as it is not easy to isolate the effects of formal arrangements from
other ongoing reforms and changes in public administration. This
does not mean that research should refrain from trying to address
such questions. Only by openly discussing these challenges can we
hope to move forward.
Although crises are frequently associated with damage or loss, they
also pave the way for something new and may result in social,
political, or organizational change (Kingdon 1984; ‘t Hart 2014;
Wildavsky 1988). As regards wicked problems, however, these
are by definition difficult to resolve, partly because presumed
changes in social behavior are not under the control of public
sector institutions. Such problems are typically multidimensional,
poorly bounded, vaguely formulated, and not easily broken down.
This makes it difficult to evaluate the performance of relevant
instruments. At the same time, new organizational forms pose
new challenges for accountability and, consequently, for the
legitimacy of decision making and institutions. The observation
that accountability relationships become increasingly complex
and hybrid in situations where the government acquires a more
Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy 9
horizontal and multilevel character (Michels and Meijer 2008) is
particularly relevant to the policy area of crisis management.
Our main conclusion is that there is no optimal formula for
harmonizing competing interests and permanent tensions or for
overcoming uncertainty and ambiguous government structures and
making policy choices that everyone will accept. Flexibility and
adaptation are key assets but will be constrained by the political,
administrative, and situational context. Contemporary government
systems in general and crisis management systems in particular
are characterized by interdependency and diversity. A better
understanding of governance capacity and governance legitimacy
and the interaction between them is complicated and context
dependent but should nevertheless be pursued in future research.
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