21 Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs.
Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Dumaguete City (G.R. No.
724
155 SCRA 421 – Political Law – Inquiry in Aid of
Legislation – LGUs
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in
connection with pending legislation related to the
operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing
were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo
Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and
Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they
alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the
improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the
National Electrification Administration (NEA); and
neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the
[old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that
inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for
contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the
1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses
and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the
exercise of these powers, the only possible justification
for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment
of non-members for contumacious behavior would be
for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory
grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt
power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere
incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies
to exercise these powers without express statutory
basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly
granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to
punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even
less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for
being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be
exercised where the subject matter of the investigation
is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
21 Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (G.R.
No. 89914, November 20, 1991)92, November 5,
1987)
Aimee N. Calo
Political Law
Bengzon v. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914
November 20, 1991
Facts:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin
Romualdez, et al. for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. The Senate
Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege"
before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over
of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila
Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa"
and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible
violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard
to Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee[SBRC])
started its investigation on the matter. SBRC
subpoenaed the petitioners and Lopa for their
attendance on the matter to testify on what they know
about the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Romualdez. Lopa and Romualdez refused to testify,
invoking their rights to due process, and that their
testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan. SBRC
rejected the petitioner’s plea to be excused from
testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation on
the matter. The petitioners filed for prohibition with a
prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that
the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. The Supreme Court intervened upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by one of the
defendants of the civil case.
Issues:
Is the matter being investigated one on which no valid
legislation could possibly be enacted?
Is Congress encroaching on terrain which the
Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of
another branch of government?
Is Congress violating the basic liberties of an
individual?
Ruling:
No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or
investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend
to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in
Congress and/or in the Senate alone. It appears,
therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Lopa had violated Section 5 RA
No. 3019, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on
the subject of the privilege speech of Sen. Juan Ponce
Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)
corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa
Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Sen. Enrile did not
indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Lopa nor
the herein petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.
Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. It should be emphasized
that the constitutional restriction does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a
violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires
that in the course of the proceedings, the right of
persons should be respected. What the majority
opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a
witness testifying at all, simply because he is already
facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind,
the Constitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when
he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to
refuse to take the witness stand completely.
22 Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the
Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project).
On September 28, 2005, the President then issued
Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes,” which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof,
took effect immediately.
ISSUES:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress;
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern; and
Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD:
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power
to legislate. The matters which may be a proper
subject of legislation and those which may be a proper
subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures
of information in investigations in Congress necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being
presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be
a matter of public concern.
Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct
effect on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Due process requires that
the people should have been apprised of its issuance
before it was implemented.
23 Araneta vs. Dinglasan (84 Phil. 369)
ARANETA v. DINGLASAN84 PHIL 368
FACTS:The five cases are consolidated for all of them
present the same fundamental question. Antonio
Aranetais being charged for violating EO 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings.Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero
seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of
hismanufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio
Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from
disbursingfunds pursuant to EO 225, while another is
of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226 which
appropriatedfunds to hold the national elections. They
all content that CA 671 or the emergency Powers Act
isalready inoperative and that all EOs issued under said
Act also ceased
ISSUE:Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has
ceased to have any force and effect
HELD:CA 671 does not fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought
for in itsnature, object to be accomplished, the
purpose to be subserved and its relation to the
Constitution.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law
passed by virtue thereof should be “for a
limitedperiod”. It is presumed that CA 671 was app
roved with this limitation in view. The opposite
theorywould make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature isdeemed to have full knowledge of the
Constitutional scope of its power. CA 671 became
inoperativewhen Congress met in regular session of
May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
wereissued without authority of law. In a regular
session, the power if Congress to legislate is
notcircumscribed except by the limitations imposed by
the organic law
24 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (G.R. No. 115544,
August 25, 1994)
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 249 SCRA 635
FACTS:Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,
Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the
Court’s previous ruling dismissing the
petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Petitioners contend tha
t the R.A. did not “originate exclusively” in the HoR as
required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The Senate allegedly did not pass it onsecond and
third readings, instead passing its own version.
Petitioners contend that it shouldhave amended the
House bill by striking out the text of the bill and
substituting it with the textof its own bill, so as to
conform with the Constitution.ISSUE:
W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having
“originated” from the Senate, and not the HoR.
HELD:Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the
Senate bill has not been the first instancewhere the
Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose
amendments to bills (required tooriginate in the
House), passed its own version. An amendment by
substitution (striking out thetext and substituting it), as
urged by petitioners, concerns a mere matter of form,
andconsidering the petitioner has not shown what
substantial difference it would make if Senateapplied
such substitution in the case, it cannot be applied to
the case at bar. While the
aforementioned Constitutional provision states that
bills must “originate exclusively in theHoR,” it also
adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” The Senate may
then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute
measure. Petitioners erred in assuming theSenate
version to be an independent and distinct bill. Without
the House bill, Senate could nothave enacted the
Senate bill, as the latter was a mere amendment of the
former. As such, it didnot have to pass the Senate on
second and third readings.Petitioners question the
signing of the President on both bills, to support their
contention thatsuch are separate and distinct. The
President certified the bills separately only because
thecertification had to be made of the version of the
same revenue bill which AT THE MOMENTwas being
considered.Petitioners question the power of the
Conference Committee to insert new provisions.
The jurisdiction of the conference committee is not lim
ited to resolving differences between theSenate and
the House. It may propose an entirely new provision,
given that such are germaneto the subject of the
conference, and that the respective houses of
Congress subsequentlyapprove its report.Petitioner
PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by
the withdrawal of itsexemption from VAT is not
expressed in the title of the law, thereby violating the
Constitution.The Court believes that the title of the
R.A. satisfies the Constitutional Requirement
24 Alvarez vs. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, January 31,
1996)
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City
of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No.
8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On
March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon
being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved
the amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue:
Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own
version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be
said to have originated in the House of
Representatives as required?
Held:
Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim
of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot
be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in
the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement
that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate
does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
25 Araullo vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287 July 1, 2014
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of
Powers – Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects
to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared
as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then
be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out
that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for
the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of
the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the Constitution (power of the President to augment),
Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed
funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It
is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law
would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power
to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless
there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because
what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government)
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus,
no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what
was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as “savings” by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be
used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on
the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors,
implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
Belgica vs. Ochoa (G.R. No. 208560, November 11,
2013)
Belgica et. Al., vs Ochoa et. Al., GR 208566 November
19, 2013
710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local
Government – Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of
Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493
and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in
the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork
Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act(GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects”
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to –
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to
– P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide
for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds
into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged
by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel
funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of
Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system
is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government
units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule
on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this
power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of
the members of the house of representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as
his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and
this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all
that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,
among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to
a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement
of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado (G.R. No.
105371, November 11, 1993
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
The Philippine Judges Association, etc., petitioners
vs Hon. Pete Prado, etc., respondents
Ponente: Cruz
Facts:
The petitioners are members of the mower courts who
feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the Section 35 of RA No. 7354 through
Circular No. 92-98 withdrawing the franking privilege
from the SC, CA, RTC, MTCs and Land Registration of
Deeds and other government offices.
Petitioners assails the constitutionality of RA No. 7354
on the grounds: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue: the independence of the Judiciary.
Held:
(1) We are convinced that the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A.
No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said law.
(2) Applying these principles, we shall decline to look
into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(3) The respondents counter that there is no
discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection
clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the
Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office; etc.
(4) We are unable to agree with the respondents that
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise
of discretion by the Legislature under the police
power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to
be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.
It is unconstitutional.
26 Philconsa vs. Gimenez (G.R. No. L-23326, December
18, 1965)