Criminal Law Arts.
312-318 w/ bp22
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139603 July 14, 2000
CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep. by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision, dated 14
January 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern
Samar finding herein petitioner Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of
Usurpation of Real Property. Likewise sought to be reversed is the Resolution, dated 30 June
1999, of the appellate court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Information filed against petitioner and Cases read as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of February, 1993, at about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, more or less, at Sitio Bagacay, Bgy. Petong, Lapinig, Northern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to gain, with
the use of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously usurped [sic] and occupied [sic] a real property owned by FRANCISCO F.
DEL MONTE, and while there gathered 12,000 coconuts and converted it into copra
[sic] and sold the same in the amount of P14,580, to the damage and prejudice to the
said owner in the total amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
(P14,580.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
At the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The facts established
during the trial are as follows:
As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private complainant are claiming
ownership over the land in question. Private complainant Francisco Delmonte
submitted and offered in evidence Tax Declaration No. 1202 (Exh. "D") in the name of
Petre Delmonte, the predecessor-in-interest of complainant. This Tax Declaration No.
1202 cancels Tax Declaration No. 18612 which shows that the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1202 is the same land litigated and awarded to the predecessor-in-
Page 1 of 91
interest of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561. The decision in Civil Case No.
3561 shows that the land being claimed by the accused was already litigated and
awarded to the parents of the complainant in Civil Case No. 3561.
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh.
"1") in the name of Lorenzo Cases Leoniso dated January 25, 1993. He alleged that
the land being claimed by the complainant in the present criminal case is different
from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and that the land subject of Civil Case
No. 3561 which came from Angel Pelison is now in the possession of the complainant.
The parties presented witnesses during the hearing of the case to buttress their
claims. Complainant's witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2,
1993 at around 9 o'clock in the morning while he was busy working in the
agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte,
accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close
relatives suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the
same is their inheritance from their ascendants and while there, accused
immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly
driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will
try to return to the land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was
thus forced to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.
Complainant's witness further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in
question was Angel Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre
Delmonte. The land is situated at Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar with
an area of 9 ½ hectares, bounded on the East by the properties of Roman Vernas and
Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the West by Alcantara and
on the South by Bagacay group (tsn, pp. 31-32, April 20, 1994)
Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified for the defense. They claimed
that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases; that during the lifetime of their
grandfather, he acquired the real property in question and declared the same in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1"); that the land has an area of 6
hectares, 34 centares and 28 ares and is devoted to rice and coconut; that they are in
actual possession of the land and paid realty taxes thereon; that the father of
accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land is
located in Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as
follows: on the North: Dimas Moscosa; on the East: Petre Delmonte; on the South:
Ananias Delmonte; and on the West: Bagacay River.2
The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both accused guilty of
the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property, defined and penalized under Art.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
312 of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences both
of them jointly and severally, to pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred Seventy
Four Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which amount is
equivalent to the gain which said accused have obtained in a period of almost three
(3) years from the time they forcibly took possession of this land belonging to
Francisco Delmonte computed at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from
the produce of the land as alleged in the Information.
The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this property
rightfully adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and
they are ordered under pain of imprisonment for Contempt of Court, to Cease and
Desist forever from disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet possession and
ownership of the herein private offended party over the property subject of litigation.
The Chief of Police of the PNP, Lapinig, Northern Samar, is hereby ordered to assist
the private offended party in his possession of the herein property and see to it that
he is not disturbed or molested in such state, and in implementing this directive, the
Chief of Police may, in his discretion, use reasonable force necessary to carry out this
decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chief of Police of Lapinig, N.
Samar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Upon a notice of death filed only on 25 September 1997, it was learned that accused Cases
died on 9 April 1995.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof but the CA
denied the same.
Before this Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA raising the following issues:
I property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO IS A WOMAN OF AN
ADVANCE AGE COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF
REAL PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF THE BARE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY AND
WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES;
II
Page 2 of 91
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH TOOK
PLACE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY WILL
SUFFICE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO CLAIMS TO BE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF USURPATION OF HER OWN
PROPERTY.4
The petition is bereft of merit.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of
the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and
conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law.
Article 312 of Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real
property as follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any
person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him
shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall
be imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property
or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was
committed with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to
sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real
person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or
violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.5 1avvphi1
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,6 the Court stated that the elements of the offense are
(1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another
person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in
usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.7
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the
elements of the crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she maintains that she owns
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the property involved herein. The matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however,
had long been settled when, in Civil Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the
predecessors-in-interest of private complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First
Instance of Samar, Branch III, Thirteenth Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot to private
complainant's predecessors-in-interest.8
Further, as established by the commissioner appointed by the trial court to look into
petitioner's defense, i.e, she owns the lot subject of this criminal case, the area being claimed
by petitioner is the same area adjudicated in Civil Case No. 3561. Deputy Sheriff A. Anacta,
as commissioner, made the following the report:
Taking the matter in relation to the order of the Honorable Court dated February 1,
1994 which is the basis of this commission, which merely directs the undersigned to
find out if the area claimed by by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs,
then, based from the above findings and the herein sketch, it is indeed very clear that
the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.9
The foregoing findings of the commissioner was adopted by the trial court and the latter
subsequently convicted petitioner for the crime of usurpation of real property. This findings of
the commissioner was affirmed by the CA stating, thus:
Based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the
disputed land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within the boundary of the
land awarded to the complainant in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue
of ownership over the land in question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516
[should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be disturbed.
The accused has to respect the findings of the court.10
We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue of the
ownership of the lot involved in this case. The evidence on record sufficiently refuted
petitioner's claim of ownership.
The next issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the usurpation of
real property are attendant in this case. These two (2) other requisites are: the employment of
violence in acquiring possession over the real property or in usurping the real right and
accused was animated by intent to gain.11 On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in
the affirmative citing the testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte as follows:
x x x Complainant's witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993
at around 9 o'clock in the morning while he was busy working in the agricultural
land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused
Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives
suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation,
usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered
Page 3 of 91
coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the
accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the
land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek
assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.12
It is well settled that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even
more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court."13 Petitioner
failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to deviate from this salutary principle.
Finally, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge who penned
the decision does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier
presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual
findings reached by him."14 There is no such showing in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 is affirmed in toto.
G.R. No. 203466 February 25, 2015
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated August 31, 2011 and
the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00722-MIN which sustained the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Facts
Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc.,
Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or accept loan
payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts therefor,4 accomplish a cash
transfer s lip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has
received, and remit such payments to Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.5
Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions for
the period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and certain
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of some loan
payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its account
officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional
receipts.6Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of
₱470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and, more significantly, the
corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on file.7
Thus, in a memorandum8 dated July 13, 2001, Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain,
among others, the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she had issued and the
unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand upon her to return
the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation9 dated July 18, 2001, Benabaye
claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to
whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding
provisional receipts.
Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum10 dated July 13, 2001 to Tupag requiring
him to explain, among others, the same discrepancies between the provisional receipts and
daily collection reports that were submitted to him; it further demanded the return of the
amount involved. In his written explanation11 dated July 16, 2001, Tupag admitted his
accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy to the acts which
resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.
Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank Terminated12 the employment of
both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case for Estafa before the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4 (RTC), docketed as Crim. Case No. 9344, against
them. On March 5, 2002, they were charged in an Information13which reads:
That sometime between the period from December 1, 2000 up to June 15, 2001, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Siam
Bank, Inc. in the following manner, to wit: the said accused being then employed as Micro
Finance Unit Supervisor and Loans Bookkeeper, respectively of Siam Bank, Inc.-Iligan
Branch and authorized to collect and receive payments of loans, did collect and receive
payments from the bank's borrowers or clients in the total amount of ₱688,833.00, under the
express obligation on the part of said accused to remit the amount collected to the bank, but
once in possession of said amount and far from complying with their obligation, said accused
converted, misapplied said amount to their own use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands, they failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the said amount of
₱688,833.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said Siam Bank, Inc. in the aforesaid
amount of ₱688,833.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.14
Page 4 of 91
In her defense, Benabaye reiterated15 the contents of her written explanation dated July 18,
2001 that she remitted the provisional receipts together with the corresponding amounts
collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag, at the end of each
banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1) copy of the daily cash
transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the possession of Tupag.16 She
asseverated, however, that when she was allowed to inspect the files of the bank after the
audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several provisional receipts, for which she had
previously issued provisional receipts, which were unremitted to the bank.17 At the dorsal
portion of the reissued provisional receipts, Tupag had annotated the numbers of the
unremitted ones that she had issued.18 She also claimed that other Siam Bank employees
were authorized to issue provisional receipts, e.g. their janitor, the bank manager, and even
on-the-job trainees (OJTs), asserting that it was the bank's standard operating procedure.19
As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his testimony.20
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision21 dated July 31, 2000, the RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b ), and sentenced each of them
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They were
likewise ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the total amount of ₱688,833.00 as actual
damages.22
In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged have been established,
to wit: (a) that any goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property to the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.23 From the evidence presented, the RTC
found that both Benabaye and Tupag held.the loan payments of Siam Bank's clients in trust
for the latter, with the obligation to remit it to the Bank, in the total amount of ₱688,833.00
insofar as Benabaye is concerned and ₱25,955.00 on the part of Tupag.24 However, they
misappropriated the same to the damage and prejudice of Siam Bank, and despite demand,
failed to account for the money. As for Benabaye, while she claimed that she remitted the
loan payments to Tupag, she failed to offer evidence that Tupag had actually received the said
amount.25
Dissatisfied, Benabaye appealed26 her conviction to the CA, maintaining her innocence on the
grounds that: (a) her possession of the money comprising the loan payments of Siam Bank's
clients was merely material, not juridical, hence, she cannot be validly indicted for Estafa; ( b)
the R TC erred in holding that the acts described in the Information constituted only one (1)
single offense; and ( c) there was no conspiracy between her and Tupag.27
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
On the other hand, Tupag likewise appealed28 his conviction, but was however denied by the
RTC in an Order29dated October 9, 2009. The RTC held that Tupag lost his remedy to appeal
under Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 12030 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Records of this case were then elevated to the CA.31
The CA Ruling
In a Decision32 dated August 31, 2011, the CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto,
similarly finding that all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation have been
established. It ruled that Benabaye, together with Tupag, held the money collected in trust for
Siam Bank.33 Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853 unremitted provisional
receipts involved in this case, Benabaye's "continuing intention to commit Estafa constituted
a single intention although committed on different dates."34 Thus, her crime was a
"continuing offense" as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a "single criminal
design."35 Finally, the CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and Tupag was sufficiently
established, considering that both had access and facility to determine if payments made by
Siam Bank's clients were properly remitted.36 As such, if there were unremitted payments,
both of them would likewise be aware thereof. Moreover, while Benabaye claimed that she
remitted the provisional receipts and corresponding payments to Tupag, she however failed to
show, through sufficient evidence, that Tupag actually received the same.37
Benabaye moved for reconsideration,38 which the CA denied m a Resolution39 dated
September 6, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
Benabaye's conviction for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and
prosecuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of pr is ion correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
Page 5 of 91
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property[.]
The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or
other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money
or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.40
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by
the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.41
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.42 The material possession of
an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical
possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did
not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise.43 Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere
material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the
same property constitutes Estafa.44
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through misappropriation
has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was
merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime.45
The Court agrees.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients.1âwphi1 At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments
received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag.46 As
such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the
duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary
cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller,47 she had no juridical possession over
the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.
In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-
Burce) of Estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was absent. As a bank
cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over the missing funds.
Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA,49 where a travelling sales agent was convicted of the crime
o f Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the goods he was
commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the distinction between the
possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability for
Estafa, viz.:
There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third
persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of
the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal,
an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of
the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and
indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who
could have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired
material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of
the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Benabaye
should come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charge against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.
Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye's supervisor and co-accused in this case,
Tupag, who likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and thus had no juridical
possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of the same Estafa charge in view of
Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
Page 6 of 91
the latter. While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal, the
rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties.51 Considering that under Section 11 (a),
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment,
as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from
their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory,52 Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note
that the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without prejudice to the
filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be warranted under the
circumstances pertinent to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2011 and the
Resolution dated September 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal charges against petitioner Cherry Ann
M. Benabaye and her co-accused, Jenkin U. Tupag, in Crim. Case No. 9344, are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188052 April 21, 2014
JEAN D. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Petitioner Jean D. Gamboa (Gamboa) beseeches us in this appeal by certiorari for reprieve
from the concurring convictions by the lower courts, specifically, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 145, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 00-526,1 and the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR. No. 30354,2 finding her guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Gamboa was charged in an Information dated 18 February 2000, which reads:
That on or about the month of February, 1999 or prior thereto, at Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[Gamboa], being then employed as Liaison Officer of complainant TFS Pawnshop, Inc.
represented by its Operations Manager Felicidad Samson and as such is authorized among
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
others to secure and/or renew municipal/city licenses and permits for TFS Pawnshop
branches received in trust from complainant the total amount of ₱78,208.[9]5 with the
obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for the renewal of licenses and
permits for all complainant’s brancheslocated in Manila, but [Gamboa], once in possession of
the said amount, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to her own personal use
and benefit said amount of ₱78,208.95 as a consequence thereof[,] complainant paid the total
amount of ₱85,187.00 for the renewal of the licenses and permits of its branches in Manila
and that [Gamboa] refused and/or failed and still refuses and/or fails to account or return
said amount despite demand from complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the total amount of ₱163,395.95.3
Upon arraignment on 28 September 2000, Gamboa pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: (1) Felicidad Samson (Samson),
Operations Head of (private complainant) Tambunting Finance Services Pawnshop, Inc. (TFS);
(2) Knestor Jose Y. Godino (Godino), the Human Resource Manager of TFS at the time of the
incident in question subject of this criminal case; (3) Estrella Cuyno, Liaison Officer of TFS;
and (4) Liberty Toledo, formerAssistant City Treasurer – Chief of the License & Permit
Division of the Cityof Manila, now the City Treasurer of Manila. The following facts were
testified to:
Gamboa’s job function, as the liaison officer of TFS, included the processing and securing of
the necessary government permits and licenses of all branches of TFS in Metro Manila. In
that regard, Gamboa received from TFS the money allotment therefor in the total amount of
247,117.25. The money allotment included the sum of ₱81,000.00 to cover the renewal and
processing of government licenses and permits of twelve (12) of TFS’ branches in the City of
Manila.
Gamboa’s receipt of the amount of ₱81,000.00 was evidenced by a Request for Payment dated
18 January 1999 signed by her and approved by TFS President, a certain Ongsiako. Witness
Samson, Operations Head of TFS, likewise presented in evidence a notebook which she kept
for recording purposes and which contained Gamboa’s signature next to a written entry
corresponding to Gamboa’s receipt of the amount of ₱81,000.00.
TFS, through Samson, a Mrs. Tan and Godino, TFS’ Human Resource and Management
Development (HRMD)Manager, made several demands for Gamboa to render a proper
liquidation report of the various money allotments she had received for the renewal of the
government permits and licenses of the twelve (12) TFS branches. However, the demands
went unheeded.
TFS’ HRMD issued HRMD Memorandum No. 036 dated 25 February 1999 notifying Gamboa
of her violation of company rules and regulations for failing to liquidate the sum of
₱249,117.27. On the same date, Gamboa had an altercation with some of TFS’ officers.
Page 7 of 91
In response to HRMD Memorandum No. 036, Gamboa submitted a letter dated 27 February
1999, explaining that: (1) the money allotment constituting her cash advances were
distributed to her staff for the delegated assignment of renewal of the required government
permits and licenses for TFS’ branches all over Metro Manila; (2) she has surrendered all the
necessary liquidation papers; and (3) as scheduled, all of the required licenses of TFS’
branches were already fully paid on 20 January 1999 and no additional penalty was incurred
therefor.
Notwithstanding her letter-explanation, Gamboa was placed under preventive suspension via
Memorandum No. 037 dated 1 March 1999 which also notified Gamboa of another failure on
her part to liquidate the amount of ₱50,809.85 as of 26 February 1999.
On 9 May 1999, Gamboa was terminated from employment.
Apparently, contrary to Gamboa’s claim, payment for the permits and licenses of all of TFS’
branches in Manila for the year 1999 was never made.4
Subsequently, TFS, through, Samson, filed the criminal complaint charging Gamboa with the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code for
misappropriating, misapplying or converting the following amounts: (1) ₱78,208.95 for the
renewal of permits and licenses of the twelve (12) branchesin Manila; (2) ₱85,187.00
representing the permits and license fees including surcharges which TFS paid because of
Gamboa’s failure to do so; and (3) ₱25,213.58 comprising of previous cash advances to
Gamboa.
Gamboa denied that she misappropriated, misapplied or converted the various unliquidated
amounts insisted upon by TFS. On the whole, albeit belatedly, and only at the trial stage
before the RTC, Gamboa claimed that for the year 1999, upon the instruction of her superior,
Estrella Cuyno (Cuyno), she transacted with a Joselito "Lito" Jacinto, a casual employee of
the Office of the City Mayor of Manila, concerning the processing and renewal of TFS’
branches’ business permits and licenses.
As part of her transaction, Gamboa admitted receipt of the amount of ₱45,587.65 evidenced
by Request for Payment dated 18 January 1999. Gamboa likewise admitted receipt of the
amount of ₱24,000.00 representing a mobilization fee of ₱2,000.00 per TFS branch evidenced
by Request for Payment also dated 18 January 1999. These Requests for Payment were duly
signed and approved by TFS Vice-President Ramon Luis Carlos Tambunting, and the
amounts represented therein admittedly received by Gamboa.
Gamboa claimed she turned over the monies to Lito Jacinto as instructed by Cuyno. In
support of the claim, Gamboa presented as documentary evidence, a photocopy of a receipt
covering the amount of ₱45,587.65 signed by Lito Jacinto. The original of this receipt
designated during trial as Exhibit "6" was purportedly lost in an occasion when Gamboa rode
a taxi cab.5
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Gamboa further claimed that two others were present when she handed the monies as
payment to LitoJacinto: one of TFS’ messengers, a certain Jayson, and Carmencita "Menchie"
Cornejo, an officemate of Lito Jacinto.
As is routine, Gamboa followed up on the renewal permits with Lito Jacinto who told her that
the permits were still being processed.
After Gamboa received Memorandum No. 036 dated 25 February 1999 notifying her of her
supposed violation of TFS’ company policies for failing to liquidate the amounts representing
the renewal of TFS’ branches’ permits and licenses, she learned from Lito Jacinto’s
officemates that the latter did not remit the monies she had handed over to him as supposed
payment for TFS’ renewal permits and licenses.
Consistent with her story, Gamboa claimed that she filed an administrative complaint by way
of a letter dated 9 March 1999 against Lito Jacinto before the Office of the City Mayor of
Manila. In conjunction with the administrative complaint, Gamboa purportedly filed a
criminal complaint against Lito Jacinto before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. However,
this same criminal complaint was subsequently dismissed upon Gamboa’s motion to
withdraw the complaint.
To corroborate her claim that she handed the monies representing payment of TFS’ renewal
permits and licenses for its branches in Manila, Gamboa presented the testimony of
ReyMarquez (Marquez), also a liaison officer of Tambunting Puyat Pawnshop,Inc. (TPP), a
sister company of TFS. Marquez testified that in 1999,he likewise transacted with Lito Jacinto
for the renewal of TPP’s business permits and licenses. Specifically, on 15 January 1999,
Marquez and Gamboa both transacted with Lito Jacinto on behalf of their respective
companies. Marquez himself had handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to Lito Jacinto for the
processing of the renewal of TPP’s business permits and licenses. Lito Jacinto also absconded
with the money so Marquez likewise filed anadministrative complaint dated 15 March 1999
before the Office of the City Mayor.
On 18 May 2006, the RTC convicted Gamboa of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code for misapplying and/or converting the amount of ₱81,000.00 which
she had received in trust for the specific purpose of the renewal of TFS’ branches’ business
permits and licenses. The trial court found credible the testimony of Samson as to Gamboa’s
receipt of the amount of ₱81,000.00. On the other hand, the trial court found Gamboa’s
defense, that asinstructed, she handed the monies, ₱45,587.65 and ₱24,000.00, respectively,
to Lito Jacinto to facilitate the renewal of TFS’ business permits and licenses, as an
afterthought, and this defense directly contradicted her categorical statement that the
licenses and business permits of TFS had already been paid as of 20 January 1999. The trial
court extrapolated, thus:
Anent to her defense that she merely acted as messenger upon the instruction of her
supervisor Ms.Cuyno to give the amount of ₱45,587.65 to Lito Jacinto, thus, she should not
Page 8 of 91
be accountable for the same, this contention is unavailing, given the oral as well as
documentary evidence of the prosecution.
For one thing, this defense appears to be contrived as it was never raised in her reply to the
memorandum [of] TFS x x x asking her to liquidate her cash advances. On the contrary, she
pithily claimed that all municipal licenses for all branches were completely paid as of January
20, 1999 as per schedule, thereby making it appear to her employer TFS that she has nothing
to account for.
For another, this actuation is palpably contrary to logic and common sense since if she
already knew that Lito Jacinto had converted to his benefit the sum of 45,587.65, then she
should not have incessantly asserted that the licenses and permits of all the branches of TFS
in the City of Manila had already been paid for as of 20 January 1999.
This inconsistency is also evident in the Counter-Affidavit and Supplemental Counter-
Affidavit, which she submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City during the
preliminary investigation, when she egregiously failed to aver any transaction she had with
Lito Jacinto and that the latter should be solelyres ponsible for the loss of the aforementioned
amount. Verily, and as observed earlier, this defense is clearly an afterthought and does not
deserve faith and credit.
Additionally, on the assumption that she indeed turned over the amount of ₱45,587.65 to
Jacinto, she failed to establish the fact that she is authorized to do so by private complainant
TFS. This notwithstanding however, insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned,
she is only to be held accountable of ₱81,000.00 proven to be received by her. The amount of
₱74,690.00 subsequently paid by TFS to the City Government of Manila for its licenses and
permits cannot be charged to the accused as she did not benefit from this and it is the
obligation of TFS to pay its licenses and permits fees in order to legally operate its business.
xxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment under an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years[,] two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by
law. She is further ordered to pay the private complainant TFS Pawnshop Incorporated the
sum of ₱81,000.00 representing the amount misappropriated by her plus interest at the rate
of six (6%) to be reckoned from the rendition of the judgment until fully paid (Article 2211,
NCC). Costs against [Gamboa].6
At the appeal stage before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
joined Gamboa’s stance of innocence and prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the trial
court’s judgment of conviction. The OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief
arguing the absence of the element of misappropriation because Gamboa simply followed
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
instructions when she gave the monies to Lito Jacinto for the renewal of TFS’ branches’
business permits and licenses. Ultimately for the OSG, the fact that the business licenses
and permits were apparently not paid does not establish misappropriation or conversion by
Gamboa of the monies allotted therefor.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC. Extensively delving on Gamboa’s
defense that there was no misappropriation since she turned over the amount of ₱45,587.65
and ₱24,000.00 to Lito Jacinto as instructed by her superior, the Court of Appeals reviewed
the case, thus:
It likewise bears stressing that prior to the filing of the instant estafa case, [Gamboa] was
requested inseveral instances by TFS, oral and written, to liquidate the cash advances made
by her, but, she failed to do so.
In [Gamboa’s] effort to exculpate herself from criminal liability, she belatedly claimed during
her direct examination in court that she gave the amount of ₱45,587.65 as payment for the
renewal of the business permits and licenses and ₱24,000.00 as mobilization fee to one Lito
Jacinto, allegedly an employee of the Office of the City Mayor of Manila who was assigned at
the Mayor’s Permits and License Division, in order to expedite the processing thereof. This
was allegedly upon the express instruction of her superior, Estrella Cuyno, that she deal
directly with Lito Jacinto, TFS’ contact person in Manila City Hall. To prove the actual receipt
of the said amount by Lito Jacinto, she presented a document marked as Exhibit "6." The
said document was prepared by [Gamboa] herself, which is just a reproduction of Exhibit "5"
or the Request of Payment dated January 18, 1999 in the sum of 45,587.65 signed and
approved by TFS VP Tambunting, except that the signatory in Exhibit "6" was one Lito
Jacinto.
We agree with the court a quoin not giving probative value to Exhibit "6" of the defense.
A perusal of Exhibit "6" shows that the same is merely a photocopy of the original. This was
pointed out by private prosecutor Atty. Marcelo and was admitted by defense counsel Atty.
Matula during the cross-examination of [Gamboa]. x x x.
xxxx
Notably, [Gamboa] testified that she herself prepared Exhibit "6," which allegedly contained
the signatureof Lito Jacinto as having received the amount of ₱45,587.65. However, she lost
the original copy thereof in a taxi on May 17, 2001 as evidenced by a Certification of even
date issued by Chief Inspector Vicente Dizon Flores of the PNP Makati Police Station
indicating therein that she left her folder containing documents vital to the instant estafa
case. Such being the case, [Gamboa] failed to clearly establish as to how she got hold of the
photocopy of the original thereof.
Page 9 of 91
A perusal of Exhibit "6" further shows that it is a "certified xerox copy (from the original)" and
the same was signed by one Othelo V. Salvacion, Administrative Officer IV of the City of
Manila with O.R. No. 1101860 dated February 11, 2002. Considering that Exhibit "6" is a
private document, it was not shown how the original thereof came under the custody of Mr.
Salvacion. Neither was Mr. Salvacion also presented on the witness stand to testify as to his
alleged signature appearing on the purportedly certified true copy of the original of Exhibit
"6."
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo
for marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during
the direct examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit
"6" as a defense by passing the blame to oneLito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at
the earliest opportunetime when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further,
she again failed to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati City
during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged,
ordinary human behavior dictates that she should have divulged the said information to her
superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so casts serious
doubt on her credibility.
As to [Gamboa’s] administrative complaint filed before the Office of the City Mayor against
Lito Jacinto, [Gamboa] did not make any follow-up on the status of the case nor take any
further action in connection therewith. And, as to [Gamboa’s] criminal complaint for estafa
against Lito Jacinto which was filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, the same was
dimissed upon [Gamboa’s] motion to withdraw the same without prejudice. No further action
was likewise taken by [Gamboa] to pursue her claim against Lito Jacinto.
Thus, the asseveration of the OSG that [Gamboa] should be acquitted because she was able
to prove the fact of receipt of the money by Lito Jacinto, must necessarily fail.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated May 18, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, Makati City in Criminal Case
No. 00-526 is AFFIRMED with modification in that [Gamboa] is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.7 (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, this appeal by certiorari assigning the following errors in the appellate court’s ruling:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINED [GAMBOA’S] CONVICTION BY
FOCUSING ON THE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER THAN BASING IT ON THE
STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE[.]
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE MANIFESTATION IN
LIEU OF APPELLANT’S BRIEF OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNSEL, THE OSG, WHICH PRAYED
FOR [GAMOBA’S] ACQUITTAL[.]8
In essence, Gamboa asks for her acquittal since the prosecution did not prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Gamboa, backed by the OSG, maintains that the element of
misappropriation or conversion in the crime of Estafaunder paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code was not met: she turned over the monies for the processing of the
renewal of TFS’ business permits and licenses to Lito Jacinto as has been the practice in the
Tambunting Group of Companies.
While the Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief of the OSG did call for attention, we remain
unconvinced.
The pass on arguments of the OSG follows:
The critical issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether [Gamboa] misappropriated the
cash she received from TFS intended for payment of the latter’s business permits.
As previously mentioned, [Gamboa] does not deny receiving such amount. She contends,
however, that she delivered it to Lito Jacinto, the TFS contact person in the City Hall of
Manila who absconded with the money instead of paying it in behalf of TFS.
It must be noted that delivery to a third person by an agent of the thing entrusted to her, by
itself, does not constitute misappropriation. In the following case, the High Court extensively
discussed the rationale behind such principle:
Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a subagent for sale on commission basis. We are
unable to agree with the lower courts’ conclusion that this fact alone is sufficient ground for
holding that petitioner disposed of the jewelry "as if it were hers, thereby committing
conversion and clear breach of trust."
It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by
an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary
between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of Labrador as
petitioner’s sub-agent was not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the acknowledgement
receipt, Exhibit B, does not contain any such limitation. Neither does it appear that petitioner
was verbally forbidden by Quilatan from passing on the jewelry to another person before the
acknowledgement receipt was executed or at any other time. Thus, it cannot be said that
petitioner’s act of entrusting the jewelry to Labrador is characterized by abuse of confidence
because such an act was not proscribed and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.
Page 10 of 91
xxxx
Thus, the next question that must be settled is whether the evidence upholds [Gamboa’s]
claim of delivery by her to Lito Jacinto of the money intended to be paid to secure permits
and licenses from the City of Manila, or at least create a reasonable doubt that she
misappropriated the money given to her by TFS.
Notably, in the instant case, [Gamboa] is claiming that not only is she not prohibited from
delivering the amount to Lito Jacinto, but under TFS practice and as well as by direct orders
of her superiors, she is actually mandated to give such amount to him for the release of TFS
business permits. x x x. Thus, she should not be held liable for Lito Jacinto’s failure to remit
such amount to the City Government of Manila.
Apart from her testimony, [Gamboa] presented various documentary evidences. Exhibit "5" x
x x, for instance, is a TFS voucher denominated as Request for Payment, dated January 18,
1999, wherein the company vice president, Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting, signed his
approval for the release of 45,587.65 to [Gamboa] for payment of business permits for TFS
branches in Manila. Exhibit "5" contains detailed information as to the original assessment,
the amount compromised and the resulting amount to be paid for each branch in Manila.
[Gamboa] likewise presented Exhibit "6" x x x, the same Request for Payment Form as in
Exhibit "5" but without the signature of Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting. Instead the
purported signature of Lito Jacinto appears therein acknowledging the receipt of ₱45,526.65
[sic] to be paid for the release of business permits of TFS.
There seems to be no doubt that TFS deals with contact persons within the City Government
of Manila such as Lito Jacinto to facilitate the release of its business permits for some
consideration which TFS terms as "Mobilization Fee." Exhibit "27" x x x is a request for
payment form dated January 18, 1999 signed by Ramon Louis Carlos Tambunting
authorizing the release to [Gamboa] of the amount of ₱24,000.00 or ₱2,000.00 per TFS
branch in Manila as "Mobilization Fee."
The prosecution never challenged the authenticity of Exhibits "5," "6" or "27," thereby giving
plausibilityto [Gamboa’s] claim that she paid such amounts to Lito Jacinto as sanctioned by
TFS officials. There is no doubt that Lito Jacinto exists and that TFS has dealings with him. 9
In sum, the OSG ascribes great weight to Gamboa’s belated testimony that she turned over
the monies, ₱45,587.65 and ₱24,000.00,respectively, to Lito Jacinto to process and facilitate
the renewal of TFS branches’ business permits and licenses such that the prosecution failed
to discharge the requisite burden of proof in criminal cases, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court reciting constitutional mandate, exacts acquittal
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. The universal test is moral certainty in ascertaining
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the guilt of the accused, obtained only by proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
In this case, the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code sought to be established by the prosecution are as follows:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to 2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.10
The first and fourth elements were readily admitted by Gamboa while she categorically
disputed the second and third elements by declaring in her letter-explanation to TFS dated
27 February 1999, and at the stage of preliminary investigation, that:
1. her cash advances were distributed to her staff for purposes of processing the
renewal of the required permits and licenses;
2. she [had] surrendered all the necessary liquidation papers; and
3. all of TFS branches’ licenses were already completely paid on 20 January 1999 as
per schedule, hence, no additional penalty was incurred therefor.11
It was only during trial, specifically at her direct examination, that Gamboa raised the
defense of her handing over the monies to Lito Jacinto, as instructed by her superior, Cuyno.
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the trial judge, who
has the direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe at close range their conduct and
deportment on the witness stand. The general rule is that findings of fact of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court
utmost respect, if not conclusive effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it
overlooked, ignored, misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.12
We do not find the testimony of Gamboa credible because it is riddled with inconsistencies
and consists of documentary evidence which cannot be authenticated.
Page 11 of 91
We quote with favor the disquisition thereon of the appellate court:
Notably, [Gamboa] testified that she herself prepared Exhibit "6[,]" which allegedly contained
the signature of Lito Jacinto as having received the amount of 45,587.65. However, she lost
the original copy thereof in a taxi on May 17, 2001 as evidenced by a Certification of even
date issued by Chief Inspector Vicente Dizon Flores of the PNP Makati Police Station
indicating therein that she left her folder containing documents vital to the instant estafa
case. Such being the case, [petitioner] failed to clearly establish as to how she got hold of the
photocopy of the original thereof.
A perusal of Exhibit "6" further shows that it is a "certified xerox copy (from the original)" and
the same was signed by one Othelo V. Salvacion, Administrative Officer IV of the City of
Manila with O.R. No. 1101860 dated February 11, 2002. Considering that Exhibit "6" is a
private document, it was not shown how the original thereof came under the custody of Mr.
Salvacion. Neitherwas Mr. Salvacion also presented on the witness stand to testify as to his
alleged signature appearing on the purportedly certified true copy of the original of Exhibit
"6[.]"
Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo
for marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during
the direct examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit
"6" as a defense by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense
at the earliest opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances.
Further, she again failed to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of
Makati City during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime
charged, ordinary human behavior dictates that she should have divulged the said
information to her superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to
do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.13
Moreover, we scoured the OSG’s Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief and Gamboa’s
petition and these do not offer any plausible reason that will explain the significantly long
delay in raising such a plausibly turning point of his defense considering that the alleged
turnover of funds was routine part of her work.
The OSG simply makes a throw-away assertion:
x x x The record shows, however, that [Gamboa] only knew of Lito Jacinto’s failure to deliver
the payment sometime in March 9, 1999, while her memorandum to the TFS was given on
February 27, 1999. It is also possible that [Gamboa] did not mention Lito Jacinto in her
counter and supplemental affidavits because the complaint affidavit of Felicidad Samson was
vague, as [Gamboa] was being made to account for various amounts of money. In fact, the
investigating prosecutor initially agreed with [Gamboa] that there was no certainty as to the
amount demanded from her and he even recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against [Gamboa] x x x.14
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
We cannot subscribe to the OSG’s reasoning. Q. In all these works, do you use records?

During the preliminary investigation stage Gamboa stated under oath that: A. Yes, Ma’am.

It is not true that I was not able to pay for the Mayor’s permit for different branches and the Q. How?
documents are with me. The truth of the matter is that all payments have already been made
as of January 20, 1999 and some permits are awaiting release.15 A. I have my own notebook for the Petty Cash.

Contrary to the OSG’s assertion, Gamboa was not confused on what she was being made to Q. Do you know x x x Jean Gamboa?
account for, as she categorically denied that: (1) she failed to pay the Mayor’s permit for
different branches; (2) the documents attesting to the fact that its payment are in her
possession; and (3) some of the permits are only yet to be released. A. Yes, Ma’am.

Again, we refer to the appellate court’s solid reasoning: xxxx

Neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of Exhibit "6" before the court a quo A. For every transaction that she has[,] she will consult me.
for marking during the pre-trial held on November 14, 2000. In addition, it was only during
the direct examination of [Gamboa] on July 30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit xxxx
"6" as a defense by passing the blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense
at the earliest opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. A. If ever she needs money to pay the permits and licenses[,] she has to go to me to get for the
Further, she again failed to raise the said defense before the Office of the Prosecutor of cash advances.
Makati City during the preliminary investigation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime
charged, ordinary human behavior dictates that she should have divulged the said
information to her superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to xxxx
do so casts serious doubt on her credibility.16
Q. I am showing to you Mrs. Witness a document entitled Request for Payment Form, will you
The lack of certainty in the amount demanded by TFS merely puts into question the actual please examine this and tell the Court what is the relation of that to the Request for Payment
amount that was misappropriated and the damage on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboa’s Form which Jean Gamboa usually handed to you when she asked for cash disbursement?
misappropriation. However, we still find, as the lower courts did, that the amount of
₱81,000.00 was sufficiently established by the prosecution through the positive testimony of A. This is a Request for Payment form.
Samson backed by documentary evidence:
xxxx
ATTY. MARCELO
A. This refers to her cash advances intended for the permits and licenses for the Manila
xxxx branches.

A. All the cash that have to be disbursed comes from me [sic].
Q. And the Petty Cash?
A. All the expenses in the office like the transportation of the messenger and all the needs in
the office I was the one who prepared the payments.
Q. This Request for Payment Form has been approved by the authorized signatory, were you
able to give that amount to her as requested?
A. Yes, Ma’am.
Q. What proof do you have that you were able to give Jean Gamboa this amount?

Page 12 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
A. She has a signature in my Petty Cash notebook. xxxx

Q. Where is that notebook? Q. What happened to this amount of ₱81,000.00, was she able to liquidate?

INTERPRETER A. No, Ma’am.

Witness is handling a notebook with a caption school notes. Q. Why did you say so?

ATTY. MARCELO A. No, Ma’am, because when we checked at the City Treasurers Office, we were able to verify
that the licenses and permits within the City of Manila were not able to pay (sic).
Q. You have handed to me a notebook, where in particular is this entry for ₱81,000.00?
Q. Mrs. Witness, in the answer of the accused in her Counter Affidavit she stated that she
A. This is the one, Ma’am. already liquidated that. In fact, that appears also in your notebook this liquidation, what can
you say about that?
INTERPRETER
A. Because the receipts which she submitted according to the City Treasurers of Manila were
not valid, these are assessment only.17
Witness is pointing to the entry ₱81,000.00 after which the name Jean Gamboa, her
signature and the date January 19, 1999.
On the imposable penalty, the appellate court modified the penalty imposed by the trial court
from "four (4) years[,] two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional[,] as minimum[,]
ATTY. MARCELO to twelve (12) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum,"18 to "four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
Q. In this entry, whose handwriting is this[?] maximum."19

A. Jean Gamboa’s handwriting. We again quote with favor the computation of the appellate court on the imposable penalty,
applying therein the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the corresponding award of civil
Q. How about this signature? indemnity:

A. This is her signature. Under Article 315 of the RPC, the penalty for estafa is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over ₱12,000.00
but does not exceed ₱22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
Q. Why do you say so? provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000.00; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
A. Because I am familiar with her handwritings and signatures. years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should
range from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
Everyday we are together in the office. correccional in its minimum and medium periods. On the other hand, the maximum
imposable penalty is the maximum range of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period, which is six (6) years, one (1) month and twenty-one (21)
xxxx days to eight (8) years plus one(1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, since the amount
involved in the instant case is more than ₱22,000.00 or ₱81,000.00 to be exact.
Q. x x x how did you enter the transaction in this notebook?
Accordingly, this Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
A. I entered the transaction in pencil. After receiving the amount[,] she will place her name, months of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as
the date, her signature or her initial. maximum.1âwphi1
Page 13 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The court a quo likewise correctly awarded by way of civil indemnity the sum of ₱81,000.00 Factual Antecedents
plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) to be reckoned from the rendition of the judgment
until fully paid in view of existing jurisprudence in that the quantification of the amount On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the following
misappropriated was only reasonably ascertained during the trial of the instant case.20 Information:

The minimum penalty imposed by the appellate court is within the maximum term of six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor and the
maximum penalty imposed resulted in a total of five (5) years, an additional one (1) year for
each additional ₱10,000.00 in excess of the ₱22,000.00, for a total of thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal.
We note that the appellate court’s award of civil indemnity plus interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) reckoned from the rendition of judgment until fully paid remains correct with
the advent of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 79921 pegging the rate of interest
allowed in judgments back to six percent (6%).
That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused being then the Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit, Phils.
for management, care and custody the following company properties:
a) Electric transformer worth ₱16,500.00
b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer boxes worth
₱490,000.00

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. c) Machine spare parts consisting of
No. 30354 dated 30 January 2009 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Jean D. Gamboa is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of - set of rack and pinion
prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
SO ORDERED.
- pair of meter gears 42 teeth
G.R. No. 174181 June 27, 2012
- set of gears 32 teeth
ANDRE L. D' AIGLE, Petitioner,
vs. - gear bith bearing inserted
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
- 3 SL 20 bearings "V" plate
DECISION
- one-way clutch
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
- one-way bearing CSK 20HC5
The "failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation."1 - 8 of LJ 34 bearings "V" type

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court - roller bearing 1 x 0
seeking a reversal of the Decision2 dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated January 15, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL - 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of ₱12,765.35
convicting petitioner Andre L. D’Aigle of the crime of Estafa. Likewise assailed is the CA
Resolution4 dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion for Reconsideration5 thereto. d) [Equipment] and raw materials – valued at ₱162,400.00

Page 14 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
PESOS & 35/100 (₱681,665.35)
under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that is, exclusively for
the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from complying with his obligation with grave
abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate
properties to his own personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon him,
accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or account for the same to the
damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils., represented by its President, Mr. Arturo Parducho, in
the aforesaid sum of ₱681,665.35.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and trial on
the merits.
During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho (Parducho),
Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation primarily engaged in the
manufacture of underwires for brassieres. According to him, petitioner was the former
managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the company as well as the
management, care and custody of SPI’s personal properties. At the time that he was holding
said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of TAC Manufacturing
Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire bending machine similar to
that being used by SPI.7
Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities as
SPI’s managing director8due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this, Parducho
conducted an audit and inventory of SPI’s properties and reviewed its financial statements,
vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed some of SPI’s
employees.9 These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire materials, electronic
transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare parts, while still under the
management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were left unaccounted
for.10 Further investigation revealed that some of SPI’s wire bending machines, computer and
electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a
former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that TAC copied the wire bending machines of
SPI.11
In a letter dated January 14, 1997,12 SPI’s counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to turn
over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand, petitioner was
thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against him for the recovery
of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of the Writ of
Replevin,13 an electronic box found inside TAC’s premises was recovered from petitioner while
a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.
Page 15 of 91
In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts for SPI
on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPI’s machines. He
also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support SPI’s operation
until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10% share in SPI, TAC
would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each so that he could get
additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would provide the micro stepping
motors and motor drives as well as the control panels. However, petitioner was not able to
finish fabricating the bending machines as he was dismissed by SPI. As a consequence, he
filed a labor case against it before the Department of Labor and Employment.
Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of its
machines. While he admitted that SPI’s electronic transformer, computer boxes and motor
drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned out that he
did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise his right of lien
over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI, collectibles
amounting to ₱900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary of ₱80,000.00. Finally, he denied
having appropriated the computer boxes for his own benefit.14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner for the
crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 31515 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It
ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to SPI, upon
demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is sufficient evidence
of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision16rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D’ AIGLE to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days
of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusio[n] temporal as maximum;
to indemnify private complainant in the amount of ₱191,665.35 and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision18 dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the trial court’s Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna (Branch 93),
dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL, is modified to the effect that
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration20 was likewise denied in a Resolution21 dated August
17, 2006.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
I Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming the said RTC
The Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner-accused’[S] Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of valid reasons/justification.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the lower court, (RTC-Branch 93, San
Pedro, Laguna), and at the same TIME modifying the extent of the penalty [imposED] for the
crime allegedly committed.22
Our Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the petitioner vis-à-
vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in the light of the
practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this Court finds the
instant petition partly meritorious.
Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain petitioner’s
claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration without valid
reason or justification. The reason for the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a thorough evaluation of the issues
and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA found that same were already passed
upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is very plain from the contents of the
August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Undoubtedly, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied due to a valid reason and
justifiable cause.
Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision did
not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just because of
the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive portion. The
ratio decidendi of the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt of the petitioner and no
Page 16 of 91
scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts below. Indeed, petitioner’s
guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any event, a judgment of conviction,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states: "1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; 2) the participation
of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." We
find that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial court’s Decision.
Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the prosecution failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He argues that Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was given juridical possession of
the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of the things
allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPI’s properties was only by virtue of his
official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose behalf he has acted, that
has the juridical possession of the said properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters that the
prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged. Based on
SPI’s records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several occasions for the
sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after the conduct of an
audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.
Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade.
Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.23
All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business transaction
with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the latter. Under
their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used in the fabrication as
well as the electronic devices while work would be done at petitioner’s premises. Pursuant to
this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic transformer, electronic box
and a computer box.24 When petitioner, however, was not able to finish the work allegedly due
to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the return of its properties. However,
petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept the properties as lien for his claims
against SPI.25
From petitioner’s own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned
elements is very clear. SPI’s properties were received by the petitioner in trust. He received
them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare
parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioner’s alleged
dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.
The Court cannot agree with petitioner’s postulation that he did not acquire juridical
possession of SPI’s properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue of his
official function as SPI’s corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the equipment subject
matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in the
fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use them
without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only physical
possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held in Chua-
Burce v. Court of Appeals:26
When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the offender from the
offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to
prove this through circumstantial evidence. "Misappropriation or conversion may be proved
by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence."27 The "failure to account
upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation."28 As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the
properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner’s own personal use.
Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien
over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to return upon demand the
properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his
own personal use. As correctly noted by the CA:
We are not impressed by appellant’s excuse. We note that SPI’s demand for the return of the
properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant was no
Page 17 of 91
longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on
November 19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPI’s demand for the return of its
equipment and materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said properties
and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the presumption of
misappropriation and conversion. x x x29
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioner’s failure to return SPI’s properties valued at ₱191,665.35
caused damage and prejudice to the latter.
In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy between him and
SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a stockholder of the latter.
Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioner’s stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court consider
the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As correctly pointed
out by the CA:
Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support appellant’s
allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate acts. His allegation without
more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie Kelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellant’s)
share in SPI would be increased to 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give
his act of retaining the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also no evidence
that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much less of SPI. Premises
considered, we do not agree that appellant’s actuation should be considered as a corporate
act, for which he claims he could not be held personally liable. x x x30
Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses to be
credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for its part,
did not disturb the trial court’s appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched doctrine
"that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties."31Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them
obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the Court
accords deference to the trial court’s appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly, the RTC’s
finding of petitioner’s guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.
The proper imposable penalty
The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount of
the fraud is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds
the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no
case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which is
₱191,665.35.1âwphi1 Since said amount is in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable
should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days to eight (8) years of prision mayor.32 "[A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case
shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years."33 Hence, sixteen (16)
years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision mayor. And since same
exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in
its minimum is prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods. "Thus, the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x."34
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged the
penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but erred in imposing
the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is beyond the
lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149354 January 18, 2008
ROLAND V. VELOSO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, are the Decision1 dated March 2, 2001 and Resolution2 dated August
10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59239.
Page 18 of 91
Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City, is a
restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy
Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming
to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the
restaurant.
Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said
restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet between
petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator.
Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both
agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results
showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet.
On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuenco’s secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo
(Eva), the restaurant’s assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table
corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he
would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner.
However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four additional
tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramon’s account. The Sales Invoice for the
additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00.
When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a
guest of Ramon. Due to petitioner’s stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should
send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuenco’s office as he was
always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office.
Hence, the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but
still, he refused to pay.
The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail.
Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 31, Quezon City. The Information reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the SHANGRI-LA RESTAURANT,
located at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, this City, represented by Eva Anne
Nanette Sto. Domingo, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, said accused, pretending that he has the money to pay, ordered that
five (5) tables be prepared for his guests with the total costs of P11,391.00, Philippine
currency, but said accused and his guests after consuming the foods, with intent to
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
defraud, refused to pay for the bills despite demand, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended party.
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision dated July 6, 1999 finding petitioner
guilty of the crime charged and imposing upon him the corresponding penalty, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Roland V. Veloso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article
315, paragraph 2nd, sub-paragraph 2-(e), of the Revised Penal Code, and, in default of
any modifying circumstance in attendance, hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor as minimum,
to One (1) Year and Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision
Correccional as maximum, with the accessories provided by law; to indemnify the
offended party, Developers Group of Companies, Inc., owner and operator of the
Shangri-La Finest Chinese Cuisine Restaurant, in the amounts of P11,391.00, with
interests thereon at the legal rate per annum from August 23, 1995 until fully paid,
and P10,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and to pay the
costs."
SO ORDERED.3
On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City, in its
Decision dated April 7, 2000, affirmed the MeTC judgment, holding that all the issues being
raised by petitioner have been thoroughly considered and passed upon by the MeTC. His
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On March 2, 2001, the
appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC, ratiocinating as
follows:
x x x To quote the trial court, "having observed the demeanor of the witnesses who
paraded before the Court, we are of the considered view that, between the
affirmations of the witness for the prosecution and the denials of the accused, the
choice is not difficult to make" – and gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence. The
RTC sustained the MTC’s assessment, and so must We. The credibility of witnesses is
a matter best assessed by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.
The inconsistencies and contradictions cited by petitioner in the testimony of Sto.
Domingo are on minor details which do not impair her trustworthiness. If any, they
indicate that she is not a tutored witness. Truthful witnesses are seldom perfect
witnesses.
Page 19 of 91
Petitioner’s argument that he was not prevented from leaving the Shangrila
Restaurant even after he refused to pay the bill for four tables, does not serve him
any. Compelling him to stay because of his failure to pay for his food would have
exposed the person enforcing it to possible criminal charge of coercion. The victim
would then become the villain.
xxx
In sum, as aptly defined by the MTC and RTC – the issue boils down to credibility.
The case law is that the assessment of the trial court on this matter is entitled great
weight and persuasion and at times conclusive to the appellate courts.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC
Decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.
The issue involves the correctness of the MeTC’s findings of fact, which findings were affirmed
by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty
of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment whether or not it is an assigned
error.4
Appellant insists that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt.
We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four
tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere
guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon
was that the latter would pay for only one table.
We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner employed fraud
in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then illegally refusing to
pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.5
After a careful review of the records of the case, we found no reversible error in the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court thus adopts its findings of fact and conclusion of
law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59239 finding petitioner Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
G.R. No. 168217 June 27, 2006
014357 June 5, 1994 22,000.00

JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner, 014358 July 5, 1994 22,000.00

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 014359 August 5, 1994 22,000.00

014360 September 5, 1994 22,000.00

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Joint Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25983, affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Cases Nos. 2750-M-94, 2751-M-
94 and 2807-M-94 for estafa.
As synthesized by the appellate court, the antecedents are as follows:
with the total amount of P132,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said
checks to the complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she
obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued
that her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much
that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and
inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P132,000.00, the
said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G.
Floro in the said amount of P132,000.00.

In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Contrary to law."
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless
bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, B. Six (6) PCI Bank Checks
the accusatory portions of which read, thus:

Crim. Case No. 2807-M-94

A. Six (6) Unitrust Checks

Crim. Case No. 2750-M-94
"That sometime in the second week of December, 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust, Makati
Commercial Center Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare,
draw, make and issue the following postdated checks, to wit:
"That sometime in the second week of December 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the PCI Bank,
Makati-De La Rosa Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare,
draw, make and issue the following postdated checks, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

053051982A March 28, 1994 ₱13,000.00

053051983A April 28, 1994 13,000.00

Check No Date Amount 053051984A May 28, 1994 13,000.00
014355 April 5, 1994 ₱22,000.00 053051985A June 28, 1994 13,000.00
014356 May 5, 1994 22,000.00 053051986A July 28, 1994 13,000.00

Page 20 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued
053051987A August 28, 1994 13,000.00
that her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much
that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
with the total amount of P78,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and
to the complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P600,000.00, the
from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that her said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G.
representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that Floro in the said amount of P600,000.00
upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and Contrary to law."
inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P78,000.00, the
said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent
Floro in the said amount of P78,000.00. Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. She
regularly conducts business at her residence located at No. 51 Interior, Poblacion,
Contrary to law. Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, though, it was Floro who would personally visit her
customers to show and offer them the pieces of jewelry. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner
C. Six (6) Prudential Bank Checks Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro by
the latter’s cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of December 1993, became her customer.
Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo
Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94 went to the house of Floro in Meycauayan, Bulacan and purchased from her two pieces of
jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond round stone in white gold setting worth P220,000.00
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1994, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused pesos.
Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent
manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Prudential Bank, Legaspi For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and
Village Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust
and issue the following postdated checks, to wit: Development Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six (6) postdated checks, to wit:
Checks Nos. 014356, 014357, 014358, 014359 and 014360 are subject of Criminal Case No.
2750-M-94. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to
complainant then and there ten (10) postdated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00
drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Dela Rosa Branch. Six of those checks are subject of
Check No. Date Amount Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, to wit: Checks Nos. 053051983A, 053051984A, 053051985A,
053051986A and 053051987A, subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
0011783 March 13, 1994 P100,000.00

0011784 April 13, 1994 100,000.00 In yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo
once again proceeded at Floro’s house in Meycauayan, Bulacan and bought another set of
0011785 May 13, 1994 100,000.00 jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven
(7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated
0011786 June 13, 1994 100,000.00 checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00
representing the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos (Checks Nos.
0011787 July 13, 1994 100,000.00 100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788, Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94,
pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
0011788 August 13, 1994 100,000.00

Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
with the total amount of P600,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the
checks to the complainant witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she different drawee banks on their respective maturity dates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks

Page 21 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
were all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of jewelry
still unpaid, Floro, through counsel, made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay the
amounts represented by the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151).
Floro’s efforts to obtain payment, though, only proved futile as Requerdo continuously
refused to pay the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry.
Upon her arraignment on March 1, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, and on April 4,
1995 in Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2751-M-94, Recuerdo, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty. (Record, Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, p. 40; Criminal Case No.
2750-M-94, p. 58). Considering the identity of the parties concerned, and the nature of the
transactions from which the charges of Estafa trace its roots, the three criminal cases were
consolidated. Joint trial then ensured. Recuerdo, on separate dates, posted three Personal
Bail Bonds to obtain provisional liberty (Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, p. 21; 2807-
M-94, p. 27; 2751-M-94, p. 17).
By way of defense, Recuerdo posited the theory that the trial court of Malolos, Bulacan is
devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal cases against her, insisting that all
the essential elements of the crime of Estafa involving the bad checks occurred at the City of
Makati, in that, all her business transactions with Floro, to wit; the purchase of the pieces of
jewelry and the subsequent issuance of and delivery of the subject bank checks in payment
thereof which eventually bounced, all took place and were executed at her Dental Clinic
located at the Medical Towers at Suite 306, Herrera corner Ormaza Streets Legaspi Village
Makati City. Furthermore, Recuerdo argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks
does not constitute the offense of Estafa considering that the subject checks were not issued
and delivered to Floro simultaneous to the purchase of the pieces of jewelry, but only several
days thereafter, when she had already thoroughly examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied
of its fine quality (TSN, Joy Lee Recuerdo, January 16, 1996, pp. 3-18).2
On July 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting petitioner Joy Lee
Recuerdo of two counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused JOY LEE RECUERDO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2[b] (sic) of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2807-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prison
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount
of P210,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until fully paid;
and
2. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
Page 22 of 91
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity
the amount of P600,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until
fully paid.
In both cases, accused shall pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA on the following assignment of errors:
I.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch I did not pass upon the merits of the criminal cases filed against the
petitioner by confining and limiting itself merely to the dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision dated 28 January 1998 rendered by the latter court, instead of reading the
Joint Decision as a whole to get its true meaning and intent.
II.
The Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by
the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II which is in derogation of
the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy considering that the latter was
previously acquitted of the same criminal cases by the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I.
III.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that all proceedings in the court a quo have
been made in the presence and with the authority of the public prosecutor, in the
face of the undisputed fact that the appeal initiated by the private respondent is
fatally defective because it was filed without the concurrence, permission and
authority of the public prosecutor, in this case, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan.4
Petitioner averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged because
the crimes were committed in Makati City and not in Malolos, Bulacan where the
Informations were filed. The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of deceit
because she drew and delivered the postdated checks to the private complainant after the
jewelries had been delivered. Moreover, she was denied the right to due process.
On August 23, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of
the RTC as to the penalty meted on the appellant. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
insisting that based on the evidence on record, out of the 17 subject checks, nine were
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
honored by the drawee banks. Moreover, she made partial payments of the amounts of the
subject checks while the case was pending in the CA. Contrary to the finding of the trial court
and the appellate courts that she acted with deceit when she drew and delivered the checks
in payment of the pieces of jewelry she purchased from the private complainant, she in fact
acted in good faith; hence, should be acquitted based on the decision of this Court in People
v. Ojeda.5 The CA denied the motion on May 20, 2005.
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH –
A. THE BENEFICENT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. CORA ABELLA OJEDA (G.R. NOS. 104238-58, JUNE 3, 2004) WHERE IT
HELD THAT A DEBTOR’S OFFER TO ARRANGE A PAYMENT SCHEME WITH HIS CREDITOR
AND PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION INDICATE GOOD FAITH THAT SUCCESSFULLY
REBUTS THE PRESUMPTION OF DECEIT.
B. WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN
BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE V. CLORES, ET AL., PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
AND PEOPLE V. BENITO GO BIONG, JR. DIRECTING THAT IN CRIMINAL CASES, ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHICH HOLDS THAT WHEN FACED WITH TWO
PROBABILITIES, ONE CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND THE OTHER WITH INNOCENCE, THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE SHOULD TILT IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE.
D. THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH DIRECTS THAT IN
ESTAFA CASES, IT IS OF PRIMORDIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THE EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION AND THE EXACT DATE OF THE ISSUANCE OF
THE CHECKS.6
Petitioner avers that she acted in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the
private complainant to settle her obligations. She points out that she made monthly cash
payments to lessen her civil liability and later on, for convenience, deposited the monthly
payments at the private complainant’s bank account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
She continued to make payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA, and
continues to make deposits to private complainant’s bank account.
Petitioner asserts that her efforts to settle her civil obligations to the private complainant
indicate that she has no intention of duping the latter, as well as the absence of deceit on her
part. That she failed to comply with her obligations by failing to make good the checks as they
Page 23 of 91
fell due does not suggest deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil
obligations. Thus, there is no factual and legal basis to convict her of estafa. Petitioner insists
that criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect
of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
Petitioner further avers that she should be benefited by the Court’s ruling in People v.
Ojeda,7 considering that the facts therein are parallel if not almost identical to this case, the
only difference being that, in the Ojeda case, the accused-appellant was able to fully settle
her civil obligations. Petitioner points out that she is still paying her obligations to the private
complainant and further argues that:
[i]n Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, the petitioner issued ten (10) postdated Unitrust
Development Bank checks to the private complainant for the purchase of a 2.19 carat
diamond stone in white gold setting. Out of the ten (10) checks, four checks were duly funded
when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, the petitioner
issued ten (10) post-dated PCI Bank checks to the private complaint for the purchase of a
1.55 carat marquez loose diamond. The first four (4) checks were duly funded when
presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, the petitioner
issued seven (7) post-dated Prudential Bank checks to the private complainant for the
purchase of a pair of diamond earrings. The amount covered by the first check was paid and
settled. The rest bounced.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the act of the petitioner --- OF DULY FUNDING
SOME OF THE POST-DATED CHECKS WHICH SHE ISSUED, SPECIFICALLY THOSE WHICH
BECAME DUE FIRST OR EARLIER – is and should be considered in law as, a
CIRCUMSTANCE INDICATING GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF DECEIT.8
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts:
In the case of Ojeda, the prosecution failed to prove deceit. Ojeda never assured Chua the
checks were funded. Chua knew that the checks were issued to guarantee future payments.
Furthermore, Ojeda did not only make arrangements for payment but she fully paid the
entire amount of the dishonored checks.
In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage were established by convincing
evidence. Petitioner Recuerdo issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of
jewelry simultaneous to the transactions, that is, on the very same occasion when the pieces
of jewelry were bought. The issuance of the check by Recuerdo was the principal inducement
to private complainant to part with the subject jewelries (CA Decision, pp. 12-13). In addition,
petitioner only promised to replace the dishonored checks but she did not settle her
obligations with private complainant. Assuming that there was an offer to settle her
obligations, this will not overturn the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to
the presence of deceit.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the
following basic elements:
Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at
the time the check was issued;
The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and
Damage to the payee thereof (Justice Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Thirteenth
Edition 1993, Book Two, p. 693; People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354).
The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the
prosecution through convincing evidence, warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of
Estafa.
The trial court found private complainant Floro’s testimony that petitioner issued the subject
checks as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to
be categorical and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that
the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the pieces of jewelry
given to her on two separate occasions.
The issue of deceit raised by petitioner is a factual issue and must be proved by evidence. The
finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the issuance of petitioner was tainted
with fraud or deceit is a factual finding that binds this Honorable Court (Jose R. Guevarra vs.
The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100894, prom. January 26, 1993).9
In reply, petitioner avers that she is a dentist/orthodontist with a fairly established practice
at the Medical Towers, Ibarra St., Legaspi Village, Makati City. She did not move out of her
office because she had no intention to renege on her obligations to the private complainant.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
Page 24 of 91
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.10 It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of
a debt.11 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by
false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.12 Concealment which the law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to
hide facts which the other party ought to have.13 The postdating or issuing of a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited
therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent
act.14
There is no false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation.15As the Court emphasized in Timbal v. Court of Appeals:16
x x x In order to constitute Estafa under the statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation;
accordingly, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. In fine, the
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance, whether postdated or not, of the check. It must be shown that the person to whom
the check is delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
issuance of the check by the other party.
Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa
under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice and specific intent to
defraud are required.
General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to
deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act
for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by
intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some
particular thing.
The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any
general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the accused.
Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be proved
by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature
of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the
motive of the accused.17
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The law provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof that
the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. A prima
facie evidence need not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of
greater weight. The evidence of the accused which equalizes the weight of the People’s
evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go
forward with the proof. Should it happen that, at the trial the weight of evidence is equally
balanced or at equilibrium and the presumption operates against the People who has the
burden of proof, it cannot prevail.18
There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates malice
and deceit.19 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good
faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another.20 In People v. Gulion,21 the Court held that:
Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested
by the accused’s offering to make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of
payment or, as in the present case, averring that his placing his signature on the questioned
checks was purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that
he himself became a victim of the trickery and manipulations of accused-at-large.22
In the present case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the petitioner of the crime charged. The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the
evidence of the People and disbelieved that proferred by the petitioner.
Petitioner’s insistence of her good faith and her reliance on the ruling of this Court in the
Ojeda case were raised as a mere afterthought in a last ditch effort to secure her acquittal, as
these arguments were invoked only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. In
Pascual v. Ramos,23 this Court held that if an issue is raised only in the motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, it is as if it was never raised in that court at
all.
Petitioner’s defense of good faith is even belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her
own evidence. When the postdated checks issued by petitioner were dishonored by the
drawee banks and the private complainant made demands for her to pay the amounts of the
checks, she intransigently refused to pay; she insisted that she issued and delivered the
postdated checks to the private complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had been
delivered to her. Petitioner never offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was
informed by the private complainant that they had been dishonored by the drawee banks, the
private complainant thus charged her with estafa before the RTC. It was only during the
Page 25 of 91
period of January 4, 2005 to June 27, 2005, after the CA promulgated its decision affirming
the decision of the trial court, that petitioner made several payments to the private
complainant. While petitioner appended the deposit slips24 to her motion for reconsideration
in the CA and her petition in this Court, there is no showing as to which checks they were
made in payment for. In fine, it was the spectre of a long prison term which jolted petitioner
into making remittances to the private complainant, after the CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court and increased the penalty meted on her, and not because she had acted in good
faith in her transactions with the private complainant. To reiterate, petitioner rejected the
demands of the private complainant to pay the amounts of the dishonored checks.
While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to the
private complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a circumstance is not a
justification for her acquittal of the charges relative to the dishonored checks. The
reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner
does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil
liability.25Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or
damage suffered by the offended party.26 The consent of the private complainant to
petitioner’s payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an
acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already
incurred.27 Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and
the private complainant on the former’s civil liability.28
Petitioner cannot find solace in the Court’s ruling in the Ojeda case. The CA correctly refuted
the submission of the petitioner in its decision, thus:
This Court is in full agreement with the position advanced by the Office of the Solicitor
General that on account of the glaring dissimilarities between the factual backdrop of the
case of Ojeda, on one hand, and the material facts obtaining in the case at bench, on the
other, the doctrine in the former case may not be applied to benefit accused-appellant.
Indeed, even accused-appellant herself was quick to admit that the facts of her case are not
entirely on all fours with those that obtained in the case of Ojeda. At the outset, emphasis
must be made of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in the Ojeda case was brought
about by a combination of reasons not obtaining in the present case. First, the Supreme
Court ruled out the existence of deceit and intent to defraud in the case of Ojeda in view of
the fact that the accused therein performed extraordinary efforts to gradually pay and settle
her monetary obligations with the private complainant, and this convinced the High Court
that the acts of the accused were not tainted with malice, bad faith and criminal intent.
Verily, the accused in the Ojeda case not only made determined and honest arrangements to
pay the private complainant, but was likewise able to actually satisfy with completeness the
sums she owed the latter, and this was evidenced by an affidavit of desistance where the
private complainant categorically declared that the accused already paid in full her monetary
obligations. The facts in the instant case, however, are totally different. Contrary to the
contention of accused-appellant, she never made a determined and earnest effort to arrange
and settle with Floro with the end in view of paying her monetary obligations. In truth,
accused-appellant simply promised to pay Floro the value of the dishonored checks that were
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
issued in payment for the pieces of jewelry. However, that was all there was to it, and
lamentably said promise turned out to be an empty one as accused-appellant never made
good her commitment to pay for the value of the dishonored checks. Accused-appellant never
arranged a payment scheme with Floro, and as the facts of the case would disclose she never
made any gradual payment to Floro as shown by the fact that the value of the dishonored
checks remained unpaid, in direct contrast with the facts of the Ojeda case where the
accused was able to pay in full. Suffice it to say that accused-appellant failed to perform any
concrete act to show that she had the intention of paying Floro for the value of the purchased
pieces of jewelry, in order to somehow rebut the fact duly established by the prosecution that
deceit attended her business dealings with Floro. It must be reiterated that We have found
that accused-appellant issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry
simultaneous with her transactions with Floro, and that was, on the very same occasion
when the pieces of jewelry were purchased, first, on the second week of December 1993, and
subsequently, on February 7, 1994. It being clear that the subject bank checks were issued
simultaneous with said transactions, it likewise became evident that deceit attended accused-
appellants’ dealings with Floro for the same only goes to show that the bum checks were
issued to Floro in order to induce her to part with the pieces of jewelry in favor of accused-
appellant.
In addition to the foregoing, the High Court likewise found in the Ojeda case that the
prosecution miserably failed to adduce evidence to establish that the indispensable element
of notice of dishonor was sent to and was received by the accused therein. In the case at
bench, however, it is undisputed that after the dishonor of the subject bank checks Floro,
through counsel, made repeated formal demands requiring accused-appellant to pay for the
value of the bum checks, perforce the notice of dishonor which is required to properly
prosecute and eventually convict an accused of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has been sufficiently met.29
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136388 March 14, 2006
ANICIA RAMOS-ANDAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Page 26 of 91
For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the
Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18379, entitled
"People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, versus Anicia Ramos-Andan and Potenciana Nieto,
accused, Anicia Ramos Andan, accused-appellant."
On February 4, 1991, Anicia Ramos-Andan, herein petitioner, and Potenciana Nieto
approached Elizabeth E. Calderon and offered to buy the latter’s 18-carat heart-shaped
diamond ring. Elizabeth agreed to sell her ring. In turn, Potenciana tendered her three (3)
postdated checks. To evidence the transaction, the parties prepared and signed a receipt
which reads as follows:
February 4, 1991
Received from Mrs. Elizabeth Eusebio Calderon the heart-shaped diamond ring which in
return Mrs. Potenciana Nieto and Mrs. Annie Andan had given the checks dated June 30,
1991 worth P23,000.00, August 30, 1991 worth P25,000.00, and Sept. 30, 1991
worth P25.000.00 as full payment of the said jewelry.
(Sgd.) DIGNA G. SEVILLA (Sgd.) ANICIA ANDAN
Witness Signature
_______________________
Witness2
Inasmuch as the three checks (PDB Check Nos. 14173188, 14173189, and 14173190) were
all payable to cash, Elizabeth required petitioner to endorse them. The latter complied.
When Elizabeth deposited the checks upon maturity with the drawee bank, they bounced for
the reason "Account Closed." She then sent Potenciana a demand letter to pay, but she
refused.
On July 10, 1997, Elizabeth filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan a
Complaint for Estafa against petitioner and Potenciana. Finding a probable cause for Estafa
against them, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information for Estafa with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan. Subsequently, petitioner was
arrested but Potenciana has remained at large. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty to the charge.
During the hearing, petitioner denied buying a diamond ring from Elizabeth, maintaining that
she signed the receipt and the checks merely as a witness to the transaction between
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Elizabeth and Potenciana. Thus, she could not be held liable for the bounced checks she did
not issue.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and
imposing upon her an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify Elizabeth E. Calderon in the amount of P73,000.00
representing the purchase price of the diamond ring.
The trial court held that while it was Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was
petitioner who induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same. Accordingly,
petitioner cannot escape liability.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated July 16, 1998 affirming with
modification the RTC Decision. The maximum penalty imposed was increased to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and the indemnity was
reduced to P23,000.00 considering the RTC’s finding that:
Complainant, however, was able to present in Court only Planters Development Bank (Check)
No. 14173188, dated June 30, 1991, in the amount of P23,000.00 and the fact of its being
dishonored. The other two checks were neither presented nor the fact of being dishonored
proven. Likewise, the two checks were not mentioned in the demand letter marked as Exhibit
‘C.’ Although, therefore, it is clear from the records, in fact admitted by the accused, that the
total amount of P23,000.00 as purchase price of the diamond ring has not been paid, the
accused should only be held liable for the dishonor of the check above-stated as the dishonor
of the two other checks was not proven in Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following basic issues:
(1) Whether the prosecution has proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2)
whether she is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that not being the drawer of the checks, she cannot be
held criminally liable.
The Solicitor General counters that this issue is not novel, having long been resolved by this
Court in Zagado v. Court of Appeals,3 thus:
The contention of the petitioner that he did not commit estafa because he did not issue or
indorse the postdated checks is devoid of merit. While it is true that he did not issue or
indorse the postdated checks, his and Montuerto’s concerted acts with common design and
Page 27 of 91
purpose in encashing the questioned checks indicate the presence of conspiracy as charged
in the information filed against them.
But as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, even without discussing the existence of
conspiracy, appellant cannot escape liability by the fact alone that he did not ascertain
whether or not Montuerto had sufficient funds to cover the check (Decision, CA-G.R. No.
02173, p. 4, citing People vs. Isleta, 61 Phil. 332 [1935]).
It must be noted that when the petitioner was in need of money, he asked the financial
assistance of his friend Montuerto, and the latter issued the two postdated checks. Since the
petitioner could not encash the postdated checks at the banks, he and Montuerto went to
another friend, Apolinario Mercado. Mercado brought and introduced the petitioner and
Montuerto to complainant Josephine Serrano at the latter’s office. Petitioner and Montuerto
requested the complainant and her husband to exchange with cash the two postdated checks
which they had in their possession. At first, the Serranos hesitated but with the assurance of
Mercado and the petitioner to the complainant that the checks will be funded when
encashed, the latter exchanged the two postdated checks with cash which she handed to the
petitioner.
This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court in People v. Isleta and Nuevo (61 Phil.
334 [1935]) where appellant without having issued or indorsed the checks in question was
held liable because of his guilty knowledge that his co-accused had no funds in the bank
when he negotiated the checks.
In the present case, while Potenciana, who remains at large, was the drawer of the checks,
however, it was petitioner who directly and personally negotiated the same. It was she who
signed the receipt evidencing the sale. It was she who handed the checks to Elizabeth and
endorsed them as payment for the ring. It is thus clear that petitioner and Potenciana acted
in concert for the purpose of inducing and defrauding Elizabeth to part with her jewelry.
The elements of the offense as defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are:
(1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued;
(2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the
offender had no funds or insufficient funds.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution proved that the checks were
issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation, i.e., the checks were issued in payment for
the ring. The checks bounced when Elizabeth deposited them for the reason "Account
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Closed." There is no showing whatsoever that before petitioner handed and endorsed the
checks to Elizabeth, she took steps to ascertain that Potenciana has sufficient funds in her
account. Upon being informed that the checks bounced, she failed to give an adequate
explanation why Potenciana’s account was closed. In Echaus v. Court of Appeals,4 we ruled
that "the fact that the postdated checks…were not covered by sufficient funds, when they fell
due, in the absence of any explanation or justification by petitioner, satisfied the element of
deceit in the crime of estafa, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code."5
On the second issue, petitioner claims that she is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Petitioner employed fraud, the reason why Elizabeth parted with her ring worth P73,000.00.
Obviously, such mitigating circumstance has no place here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. We AFFIRM the assailed Decision and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18379. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149472 August 18, 2004
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 6,
2003,1 seeking reversal of the Court's Decision2 affirming his conviction by the Court of
Appeals3 for estafa under Article 315, par. (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor
General, in his Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,4 joined petitioner's reiterated plea
for acquittal. In light of the joint pleas of petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), and considering that the right to liberty of an individual is involved, we deem it wise to
re-examine our Decision convicting petitioner of estafa.
In our Decision, we stated the facts of the case as follow:
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. ("Skiva") is a New York-based corporation
which imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier
(Philippines) Inc. ("Olivier"). Aurora Manufacturing & Development Corporation
Page 28 of 91
("Aurora") and Uni-Group Inc. ("Uni-Group") are domestic corporations which supply
finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and
Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of
Uni-Group and a consultant of Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from
Aurora and Uni-Group. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier,
issues to the local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a "Purchase Contract" and Olivier
issues to Skiva a "Sales Contract." In these transactions, payment is usually made by
way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is paid only upon the presentation of the
proper shipping documents to the designated bank.5
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered
sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms.
Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the jeans.6 Thus, a
Purchase Contract dated December 18, 1985 was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group
wherein Uni-Group was to supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of "Ladies
Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans" payable by means of a letter of credit at
sight.7 The Purchase Contract was confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30,
1985.8 A Sales Contract was also issued by Olivier to Skiva containing the same
terms and conditions as the Purchase Contract and was confirmed by Mr. Jack
Chehebar of Skiva.9
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group
the amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate
of P20.59 to US$1.00) as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure
raw materials to manufacture the jeans.10 It was also agreed that the amount
advanced by Skiva represents advance payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies
jeans.11Skiva then issued a check in the said amount payable to Uni-
Group.12 However, due to the length of time needed for the check to be cleared, the
parties made arrangements to remit the funds instead by way of telegraphic
transfer.13 Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr. Lettmayr14 and as
agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in New York, the Israel
Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs.
Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.15
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of
the said joint account, withdrew the amount of US$21,675.2116 and on January 22,
1986, petitioner withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00.17 The prosecution also
presented evidence that subsequent to said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70
and US$63.99 were deducted from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee and
commission for the remittance of the funds to another account.18
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the
production of the jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
of Litton fabrics required for the order were purchased from Litton Mills by the
petitioner.19 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics are enough to produce only 200 dozens of
ladies jeans - an amount insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva of 700 dozens of
ladies twill jeans.20 Upon inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that
the query be directed to petitioner as petitioner is in charge of securing the
materials.21 However, Ms. Tujan could not locate the petitioner.22
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon
Aurora/Uni-Group through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money
advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00.23
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the
US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms.
Tujan, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After
preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr.
Lettmayr and an information was filed against petitioner.24
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum and to pay Uni-Group and Aurora the amount of
P595,259.00.25 On March 13, 1997, the lower court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.26 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.27
The Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 18,
2002.
In his Second Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner raises the following arguments:
I. In a pure contract of sale, failure of the seller to deliver the goods purchased will
not give rise to criminal liability.
xxx
II. The assailed Decision states that the property rights of Aurora was disturbed by
the petitioner and that the trust and confidence that Aurora reposed on the petitioner
were betrayed despite the fact that Aurora never claimed so.
xxx
III. The demand made by Skiva to Aurora could never be treated as a demand to the
petitioner because such demand was not relayed to the petitioner.
Page 29 of 91
xxx
IV. The case of Saddul, Jr. vs. CA (192 SCRA 277) squarely applies to the instant
case.28
On the other hand, the OSG, in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, contends:
I. The transaction between Skiva and Aurora was one of sale. Thus, if the transaction
fails, the obligation to return the advance payment is of civil nature only. Moreover,
as correctly held, petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
xxx
II. Aurora/Uni-Group never claimed it was damaged by the petitioner simply because
funds were duly accounted for. Raw materials were bought and the jeans were
manufactured. Delivery was delayed because of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner turned over the rest of the money to Uni-
Group/Aurora.
xxx
III. No evidence to prove that petitioner defrauded Aurora; prosecution witness, Mr.
Lettmayr, admitted that all the required raw materials had been purchased; jeans
were not shipped on account of intervening events.
xxx
IV. Testimonial and documentary evidence confirm that Aurora asked for offsetting,
Skiva having unpaid accounts with the former.
xxx
V. Absent intent, no criminal act is committed. Likewise, without abuse of
confidence, no estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed.
xxx
VI. The evidence presented does not prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.29
We find merit in the new motion.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the
following: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is
demand by the offended party to the offender.
We reiterate that the contract between Skiva and Aurora was one of sale. After the perfection
of the contract of sale, Mr. Werner Lettmayr, representing Aurora/Uni-Group, requested
Skiva for advance payment in order to procure the raw materials needed for the 700-dozen
ladies' jeans. It was also Mr. Lettmayr who suggested that the advance payment be made to
the joint account of himself and his wife, together with petitioner and his wife. As requested,
$41,300.00 was transmitted by Skiva as advance payment. Despite the payment, there was
delay in the performance of contract on the part of Aurora/Uni-Group. Petitioner and the
OSG contend that under these facts, Skiva has no cause to complain that petitioner
committed estafa. We agree. In Abeto vs. People,30 we held that "an advance payment is
subject to the disposal of the vendee. If the transaction fails, the obligation to return the
advance payment ensues but this obligation is civil and not of criminal nature." In fine,
the remedy of Skiva against Aurora/Uni-Group for breaching its contract is a civil, not a
criminal suit.
The next question is the liability of petitioner, if any, to Aurora/Uni-Group. We shall now re-
examine the specific acts of petitioner alleged to be constitutive of estafa by the prosecution.
The evidence shows that petitioner is a part owner of Aurora, and its Vice President and
Treasurer. Its President was Mr. Lettmayr. Petitioner and his wife, and Mr. and Mrs. Lettmayr
maintained a joint account. The facts reveal that it was Mr. Lettmayr who suggested to Skiva
that its advance payment should be transmitted to this joint account in order to facilitate
payment.31 Petitioner was able to withdraw from the joint account $21,675.21 on January
16, 198632 and $20,000.00 on January 22, 1986.33The dollars were remitted abroad,
converted into pesos and transmitted to petitioner. According to the OSG, the rationale
behind the exchange of dollars into pesos was to pay local salaries and Litton Mills in
pesos as per their contract.34 It appears that petitioner used part of the money when he
purchased 3,000 meters of textile from Litton Mills, which was good for the production of 200
dozens of ladies' jeans. Petitioner claimed that he returned the balance of the money to the
accountant of Aurora.35
Given these facts, we cannot hold that the acts of petitioner constitute misappropriation or
conversion of the advance payment to Aurora/Uni-Group. First, petitioner had nothing to do
with the transmittal of the advance payment to the joint account held by him and his wife
together with Mr. and Mrs. Lettmayr. It was Mr. Lettmayr himself who suggested the
transmittal to the joint account in order to facilitate payment. The transmittal to the joint
account cannot therefore be considered as a scheme to get the money and later
misappropriate it. Second, the remittance abroad of the money and its conversion into pesos
were also properly explained by the parties. Petitioner stated that the dollars were converted
into pesos "because that was the contract with Litton Mills."36 Petitioner claims his act was
Page 30 of 91
done with the authority of Aurora/Uni-Group and in line with his duty as Vice- President and
Treasurer of Uni-Group. The Solicitor General affirmed the claim of petitioner.37 Third, the
evidence also shows that petitioner used part of the advance money to purchase 3,000 meters
of textile from Litton Mills and returned its balance to the accountant of Aurora. There is no
question that the use of the money to purchase textile materials from Litton Mills is in accord
with the contract of sale by and between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group. The evidence,
however, is not too certain on whether petitioner returned the remainder of the money to
Aurora/Uni-Group, thru its accountant. Petitioner stated that he could not produce the
receipt of its turn over as he no longer had access to the records of Aurora/Uni-Group after
the labor strike in 1986 and after he fell out of the graces of Mr. Lettmayr. We note that the
prosecution could have easily rebutted these claims of petitioner thru the presentation of the
accountant or other officers of Aurora/Uni-Group. Unfortunately, the prosecution utterly
failed to make this rebuttal. With this failure, the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner
misappropriated for himself the advance money to the prejudice of Aurora/Uni-Group stands
on sinking sand.
In truth, the evidence shows that Aurora/Uni-Group has not claimed that it was damaged by
the acts of petitioner. It did not even blame petitioner for their delay in delivering the
complete order of Skiva. In his Counter-Affidavit,38 Mr. Lettmayr himself enumerated the
following causes that brought about the delay, viz:
b. When mass production started, Skiva/Olivier changed the styling and assembly of
the waist band, and consequently, mass production had to be stopped and 50% of
the work force had to go on [un]scheduled leave, and when Skiva/Olivier approved
the corrected samples, 90% of the work force could not immediately come back
because of the snap presidential election and Aurora was given an extension of the
delivery date to February 25, 1986;
c. On February 21 to 25, the revolution took place, the employees did not return to
work until March 3, but this was followed by a strike without notice which remains
unresolved up to the present;
d. Also, Mr. Salazar informed that Litton Mills had sold part of the fabrics for
Aurora/Uni-Group, no fabrics were immediately available for production.39
In light of these facts, we hold that petitioner could not be held guilty of estafa under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. In joining petitioner's plea for acquittal, the OSG
deserves commendation for once again, it has shown fealty to the ideal that its duty is to
prosecute but to prosecute only those whose guilt can be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, its greatest victory is achieved not only in securing the conviction of the guilty
but in preventing the incarceration of the innocent when the evidence is scarce.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's Decision of December 18, 2002 is set aside and petitioner is
acquitted of the charge of violation of Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
G.R. No. 146211 August 6, 2002 The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15798 for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 reads as follows:
MANUEL NAGRAMPA, petitioner,
vs. That on or about the 28th day of July, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of FEDCOR TRADING
DECISION CORPORATION represented by FEDERICO A. SANTANDER a check numbered 473478 drawn
against the SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Escolta Branch, a duly established
domestic banking institution, in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, postdated
DAVIDE, JR., J.: September 30, 1989 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well that at the time of issue
that she/he did not have ANY funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check; that
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails his conviction for estafa in Criminal upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the
Case No. Q-90-15797 and for two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing reason that the drawee bank of accused MANUEL NAGRAMPA did not have ANY funds
Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-15798 and Q-90-15799. therein and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said FEDCOR
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15797 for estafa reads TRADING CORPORATION in the amount aforementioned and in such other amount as may
as follows: be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

That on or about the 28th day of July 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain by means
of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud FEDCOR
TRADING CORPORATION represented by FEDERICO A. SANTANDER by then and there
making, drawing and issuing in favor of the latter the following checks, to wit:
Contrary to law.2
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-90-15799 is similarly worded as in Criminal Case No.
Q-90-15798 except as to the date and number of the check.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

CHECK NOS. AMOUNT POSTDATED At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented Federico Santander, President of Fedcor
Trading Corporation (hereafter FEDCOR), and Felix Mirano, signature verifier of the Escolta
473477 P75,000.00 August 31, 1989 Branch of the Security Bank and Trust Company.

473478 P75,000.00 September 30, 1989

drawn against the SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY in payment of an obligation,
knowing fully well at the time of issue that he did not have any funds in the bank or his
funds deposited therein was not sufficient to cover the amount of the checks that upon
presentation of said checks to the said bank for payment, the same were dishonored for the
reason that the drawer thereof, accused MANUEL NAGRAMPA did not have any funds therein
and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to redeem or make good said checks, to the damage and prejudice of the said FEDCOR
TRADING CORPORATION in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Page 31 of 91
Federico Santander testified that on 28 July 1989, Corseno Bote, FEDCOR’s Sales Manager,
brought to FEDCOR petitioner Manuel Nagrampa (hereafter NAGRAMPA), General Manager of
the Nagrampa Asphalt Plant in Montalban, Rizal. NAGRAMPA purchased a Yutani Poclain
Backhoe Excavator Equipment for P200,000 from FEDCOR and paid in cash the down
payment of P50,000. To cover the balance of P150,000, he issued Check No.
4734773 postdated 31 August 1989 and Check No. 4734784 postdated 30 September 1989 in
the amount of P75,000 each. The checks were drawn against the Security Bank and Trust
Company. Upon the assurance of FEDCOR’s salesman that the checks were good, FEDCOR
delivered to petitioner the equipment.5
Santander further testified that FEDCOR presented the checks for payment on 22 February
1990; however, they were dishonored on the ground that petitioner’s account with the drawee
bank, Security Bank, had already been closed. In a letter6 dated 19 March 1990, sent through
registered mail, FEDCOR demanded payment from petitioner; but the latter failed to pay.
Hence, the above cases were filed against petitioner with the trial court.7 During his cross-
examination, Santander denied that the equipment was returned to FEDCOR. Ronnie Bote,
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
son of Corseno Bote, was not an employee of FEDCOR but was merely its sales agent with no
authority to receive returned equipment.8
Felix Mirano, the second prosecution witness, testified that he had been a signature verifier of
Security Bank for twelve years. His duty was to verify the signatures of the clients of the
bank. He brought with him the signature card for Account No. 0110-4048-19, petitioner’s
account against which the subject checks were drawn. He identified the signatures appearing
on Checks Nos. 473477 and 473478 to be those of the petitioner. When asked about the
status of said account, he answered that the account had been closed in May 1985 yet.9
For his part, petitioner testified that on 28 July 1989, he bought from Corseno Bote a
backhoe and paid P50,000 cash, as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt10 signed by
Corseno Bote. In addition, he issued and handed to Corseno Bote two checks in the amount
of P75,000 each, dated 31 August 198911 and 30 September 1989.12 The agreement with
Corseno Bote was that petitioner would replace the two checks with cash if the backhoe
would be in good running condition. The backhoe was delivered at petitioner’s jobsite on 29
July 1989. After five to seven days of use, the backhoe broke down. Such fact was reported to
Ronnie Bote, and the backhoe was thus repaired. After one day of using it, the backhoe broke
down again. Petitioner again reported the matter to Ronnie Bote, who told him that the
equipment should be brought to the latter’s office for repair. As evidence of the return of the
equipment, petitioner presented a letter dated 3 October 198913 addressed to Electrobus
Consolidated, Inc., requesting the release of the backhoe to Ronnie Bote for repair, with the
alleged signature14 of Ronnie Bote appearing at the bottom thereof to attest to his receipt of
the equipment. After a week, petitioner demanded from Ronnie Bote the return of the
backhoe, the P50,000 cash and the two postdated checks, but to no avail.15 On cross-
examination, he admitted that during the pendency of the case he paid, upon the advice of
his counsel, the amount of P15,000, which he handed to FEDCOR’s counsel Atty. Orlando
Paray.16
On 30 September 1993, the trial court rendered a decision17 finding petitioner guilty of two
counts of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
for two years and pay FEDCOR P150,000, with legal interest thereon from 9 October 1990 up
to the time of full payment.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR. No. 18082. Upon noticing that the 30 September 1993 Decision of the trial court did not
resolve the issue of petitioner’s liability for estafa, the Court of Appeals issued on 19 May
1998 a resolution18 ordering the return of the entire records of the case to the trial court for
the latter to decide the estafa case against petitioner.
On 8 February 1999, the trial court rendered a decision19 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of seven years and
four months of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and six months of reclusion
temporal as maximum. As might be expected, petitioner also appealed said decision to the
Court of Appeals.
Page 32 of 91
On 21 July 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision20 affirming in toto the decision of
the trial court finding petitioner guilty of estafa and violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. It
also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision.21 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that he is not guilty of estafa because no damage was caused to FEDCOR,
considering that the backhoe became unserviceable a few days after delivery and was
eventually returned to FEDCOR through the latter’s sales agent Ronnie Bote. He also asserts
that he did not violate B.P. Blg. 22 either. The two checks issued by him were presented for
payment only on 22 February 1990, or after more than five months from the date of the
checks. Under Sections 1 and 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 FEDCOR, as payee, had the duty or obligation
to encash or deposit the checks issued in its favor within ninety days from the date of issue.
Since FEDCOR deposited the checks after this period, he cannot be faulted for their
subsequent dishonor.
Alternatively, petitioner prays that in the event that his conviction for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 is sustained, the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals22 and Lim v. People23 should
be given retroactive effect in his favor so that only a fine may be imposed on him as penalty.
In arguing that petitioner’s conviction for two counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is correct, the
Office of the Solicitor General relies heavily on the testimony of Felix Mirano that the account
of petitioner had been closed way back in May 1985, or four years prior to the issuance of the
subject checks to FEDCOR. The date when the checks were encashed or deposited is
immaterial because there was no more existing bank account against which they were drawn,
and their dishonor was therefore certain even if the checks were presented for payment
within the 90-day period from their issuance. With respect to petitioner’s plea to impose on
him the penalty of fine in the event that his conviction is affirmed, the OSG maintains that
the penalty of imprisonment is appropriate considering petitioner’s act of issuing worthless
checks which showed his culpable violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner’s argument that the element of damage to private complainant FEDCOR is lacking
is disputed by the OSG by pointing out petitioner’s failure to prove the return of the backhoe
to FEDCOR. Ronnie Bote, the person to whom the backhoe was allegedly returned, was not
presented as a witness to corroborate petitioner’s testimony. But even granting arguendo that
the backhoe was indeed received by Ronnie Bote, there is no showing that he acted for, and
on behalf of, FEDCOR in doing so considering that he was not an employee of FEDCOR.
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. -- Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit or to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
Two distinct acts are punished under the above-quoted provision:
(1)The making or drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank; and
(2)The failure to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.24
In the first situation, the drawer knows of the insufficiency of funds to cover the check at the
time of its issuance; while in the second situation, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time
of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety days from the
date appearing on the check. The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of
issuance, since the drawer has neither sufficient funds in, nor credit with, the drawee bank
at the time; while that involved in the second offense is good when issued, as the drawer has
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank when issued. In both instances, the
offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.25
It can be gleaned from the allegations in the information that petitioner is charged with the
first type of offense under B.P. Blg. 22.
The elements of the first type of offense are as follows:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
Page 33 of 91
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.26
Petitioner admitted that he issued the two postdated checks worth P75,000 each. He did not
deny that the same were dishonored on the ground that the account from which they were to
be drawn was already closed at the time the checks were presented for payment. Neither did
he rebut the prosecution’s evidence that the account against which he drew his two
postdated checks had been closed in May 1985 yet, or more than four years prior to the
drawing and delivery of the checks.
The fact that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided in Section 2 of
B.P. Blg. 22 is of no moment. We held in Wong v. Court of Appeals27 that the 90-day period is
not an element of the offense but merely a condition for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; thus:
That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the
offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the
account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the
drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay."
By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180
days.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,28 we ruled that such prima facie presumption is intended to
facilitate proof of knowledge, and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also
prove such knowledge; thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for
payment within the 90-day period is that there arises no prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds.29 The prosecution may still prove such knowledge
through other evidence.
In this case, FEDCOR presented the checks for encashment on 22 February 1990, or within
the six-month period from the date of issuance of the checks, and would not therefore have
been considered stale had petitioner’s account been existing. Although the presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise, such knowledge was sufficiently proved by
the unrebutted testimony of Mirano to the effect that petitioner’s account with the Security
Bank was closed as early as May 1985, or more than four years prior to the issuance of the
two checks in question.
Thus, we find no error in the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the trial court’s decision
convicting petitioner of violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Petitioner’s alternative prayer for the modification of penalty by retroactively applying Vaca v.
Court of Appeals30 and Lim v. People31 must likewise be denied. We quote Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 clarifying Administrative Circular No. 12-2000; thus:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
not be deemed a hindrance.
In this case, when petitioner issued the subject postdated checks even though he had no
more account with the drawee bank, having closed it more than four years before he drew
and delivered the checks, he manifested utter lack of good faith or wanton bad faith. Hence,
he cannot avail himself of the benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.
We likewise sustain petitioner’s conviction for the crime of estafa.
The crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, has the following elements: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.32
Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should
be either prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain
money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, or the
person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property
had there been no check issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued
as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property, and not
in payment of a pre-existing obligation.33
The existence of the first two elements in the case at bar is not disputed. Petitioner maintains
that the third element is not present.
Page 34 of 91
Damage as an element of estafa may consist in (1) the offended party being deprived of his
money or property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right; or (3)
temporary prejudice.34
In this case, the deprivation of the property of FEDCOR is apparent.1âwphi1 Undoubtedly,
the reason why FEDCOR delivered the backhoe to petitioner was that the latter paid the
P50,000 down payment and issued two postdated checks in the amount of P75,000 each.
Petitioner’s claim that he returned the equipment was not duly proved; he never presented as
witness the agent who allegedly received the equipment from him. Moreover, he admitted that
he never wrote FEDCOR about the return of the allegedly defective backhoe to Ronnie Bote;
neither did he go to FEDCOR to claim the return of the equipment or of the cash down
payment and the two checks.35 Such admissions belie his allegation that he returned the
equipment to FEDCOR. Besides, on cross-examination he admitted that during the pendency
of the case, he paid Santander, through FEDCOR’s lawyer, on two separate occasions in the
total amount of P15,000 upon the advice of his own lawyer that he had to pay because he
was guilty; thus:
Q During the pendency of this case you paid Engr. Santander cash, is that correct?
A I paid the amount of P10,000.00 and then another P5,000.00 because according to my first
lawyer I have to pay this because I am guilty and this is B.P. case [sic].
Q You delivered the money to Engr. Federico Santander?
A To you Atty. Paray.
Q And I was the lawyer of Engr. Federico Santander?
A Yes, sir.36
If indeed petitioner returned the backhoe to Ronnie Bote and yet the latter did not heed his
demands for the return of his cash payment and the checks, he (petitioner) should have, at
the very least, gone to or written FEDCOR itself about the matter. Instead, he again paid
FEDCOR the amount of P15,000 during the pendency of the case. Such payment to FEDCOR
negates his claim that he returned the backhoe; it may even be tantamount to an offer of
compromise. Under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, an offer of compromise
in criminal cases is an implied admission of guilt.
Finally, by appealing his conviction, petitioner has thrown the whole case open for
review.1âwphi1 It becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the
appealed judgment, even though it was not made the subject of assignment of errors.37 This
Court finds to be erroneous the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime of estafa, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which is seven years and four months of prision mayor as
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
minimum to twelve years and six months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The penalty for
estafa committed by means of bouncing checks has been increased by Presidential Decree No.
818, which took effect on 22 October 1975. Section 1 thereof provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua….
Petitioner NAGRAMPA defrauded FEDCOR in the amount of P135,000 (P150,000 [value of the
checks] minus P15,000 [payment made by petitioner during the pendency of these cases]).
Applying P.D. No. 818 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, plus one year for each additional P10,000 of the
amount of the fraud; and the minimum shall be prision mayor, which is the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense without first considering any modifying circumstances
or the incremental penalty for the amount of fraud in excess of P22,000.38
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
upholding the decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-90-15797, Q-90-15798 and Q-90-15799 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that petitioner Manuel Nagrampa is hereby sentenced to suffer (1) an
imprisonment of one year for each of the two counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22, and (2) an
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-
eight years, four months and one day of reclusion perpetua as maximum for the crime of
estafa; and to pay private complainant Fedcor Trading Corporation the amount of P135,000,
plus legal interest thereon from 9 October 1990 up to the time of full payment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145872 February 4, 2002
GLORIA OCAMPO-PAULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
Page 35 of 91
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated October 26, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 224371 affirming petitioner Gloria Ocampo-Paule’s conviction for the crime of
estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 49.
During the period August, 1991 to April, 1993, petitioner received from private complainant
Felicitas M. Calilung several pieces of jewelry with a total value of One hundred Sixty Three
Thousand One hundred Sixty Seven Pesos and Ninety Five Centavos (P163,167.95). The
agreement between private complainant and petitioner was that the latter would sell the same
and thereafter turn over and account for the proceeds of the sale, or otherwise return to
private complainant the unsold pieces of jewelry within two months from receipt thereof.
Since private complainant and petitioner are relatives, the former no longer required
petitioner to issue a receipt acknowledging her receipt of the jewelry.
When petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry or to return the unsold
pieces to private complainant, the latter sent petitioner a demand letter. Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letter, petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or to return
the unsold pieces of jewelry. Private complainant was constrained to refer the matter to the
barangay captain of Sta. Monica, Lubao, Pampanga.
During the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner acknowledge having received from
private complainant several pieces of jewelry worth P163,167.95. Both parties eventually
executed an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Bayaran," whereby petitioner promised to pay
private complainant P3,000.00 every month to answer for the jewelry which she received from
the latter.
When petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduan sa Bayaran, private
complainant sent her another demand letter dated March 9, 1994 but she still failed to
comply with her obligation.
Private complainant then filed a criminal complaint against petitioner in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. The Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of a criminal case
against petitioner. Consequently, an information charging petitioner with estafa was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. The information stated:
That in or about the period comprised from August 1991 to April 1993, in the Municipality of
Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court,
the above-named accused GLORIA OCAMPO-PAULE received from Felicita[s] M. Calilung
various pieces of jewelry with a total value of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE (sic) THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (P163,347.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency for purposes of
selling the same under the express obligation of turning over and accounting for the proceeds
of said jewelry if not sold, to the said Felicita[s] U. Calilung within two (2) months from receipt
hereof, once in possession of the said jewelry and far from complying with her obligation
aforesaid, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
misappropriate, misapply and convert the said amount to her own personal use and benefit
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the total sum of P163,347.00, Philippine
currency.
All contrary to law.2
Petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the charge. After trial, the lower court rendered a Decision on
August 17, 1998 finding petitioner guilty of estafa.
Petitioner appealed the lower court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in its Decision dated October 26, 2000.3 The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in finding that petitioner had converted or
misappropriated the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry, since the persons to whom she
delivered the pieces of jewelry had not yet paid for the same. Petitioner insists that not having
received the payment for said pieces of jewelry, she had nothing to misappropriate.5
Petitioner further argues that the Kasunduan executed by her and private complainant,
which stipulate that she was to pay for the pieces of jewelry received by her in monthly
installments of P3,000.00 resulted in the novation of her obligation and extinguished her
criminal liability.6
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that during the trial of the criminal case for
estafa, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had committed the crime
charged, and that her criminal liability was not extinguished by the execution of
the Kasunduan sa Bayaran. It is further contended that the petition raises questions of fact
which may not be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari.7
There is no merit in petitioner’s arguments.
Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 315. Swindling. (estafa).—any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
Page 36 of 91
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money goods or other property.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under this paragraph are: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
of the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender.8
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that all the elements of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) are present in this case. In its Decision, the appellate court
affirmed the finding of the trial court stating that:
These elements were amply and clearly established in this case, First, accused received the
jewelry for the purpose of selling the same under an express obligation to remit to
complainant the proceeds thereof or to return those she is unable to sell thereby creating a
fiduciary relationship between the[m]. Second, accused misappropriated the jewelry as shown
by the fact that she failed to return the same or the proceeds thereof despite demand and
Third, the misappropriation prejudiced the private complainant.9
The rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties on and
this Court, and carry even more weight when the appellate court affirms the factual findings
of the trial court.10 The Court finds no reason to depart from the foregoing rule, considering
that the evidence on record supports the conclusion of both the trial and the appellate courts
that petitioner is liable for estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise untenable is petitioner’s argument that there was a novation of her criminal liability
when she and private complainant executed the Kasunduan sa Bayaran. It is well-settled
that the following requisites must be present for novation to take place: (1) a previous valid
obligation; (2) agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) extinguishment of the old
contract; and (4) validity of the new one.11
In Quinto vs. People,12 the Court had occasion to discuss the concept of novation, as follows:
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory.1âwphi1 It is
extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes
the place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the
extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. xxx
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must
appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation
which may be effected either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the
contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing the new contract is
to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied
novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two
contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be
a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the touchstone for contrareity, however,
would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligations.
xxx The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each
one having its independent existence.1âwphi1 If they cannot, they are incompatible and the
latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be
essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of
the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions
thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to
extinguish the original obligation.13
The execution of the Kasunduan sa Bayaran does not constitute a novation of the original
agreement between petitioner and private complainant. Said Kasunduan did not change the
object or principal conditions of the contract between them. The change in manner of
payment of petitioner’s obligation did not render the Kasunduanincompatible with the
original agreement, and hence, did not extinguish petitioner’s liability to remit the proceeds of
the sale of the jewelry or to return the same to private complainant. As this Court held
in Velasquez vs. Court of Appeals:14
An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated, in a new instrument wherein the old is
ratified, by changing only the terms of payment and adding other obligations not
incompatible with the old one, or wherein the old contract is merely supplemented by the new
one.15
In any case, novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
guishment of criminal liability.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22437 is AFFIRMED.
Page 37 of 91
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109595 April 27, 2000
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present appeal by certiorari is the decision dated November 27, 1992 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 12037, (a) affirming in toto the trial court's decision
finding petitioner guilty of estafa and (b) denying her Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated March 25, 1993. The Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 40, rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315, par.
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. C-2313, and likewise found petitioner
liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in Civil Case No. R-3733. Only the criminal case is
before us for review.
The uncontroverted facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peñaflor, Assistant
Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total
P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of
fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One
Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of
P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a total shortage of P150,000.00.
The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records
and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of
P150,000.00.
The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora,
the Manager. The second was by the bank's internal auditors headed by Antonio
Batungbakal. Then, the bank's Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent
investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All
of these investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person
primarily responsible was the bank's Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein
accused.
On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the
accused's service with the bank was terminated.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a 1. That the evidence already adduced by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-
Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment 3733 will be adopted by the prosecution as its evidence in Criminal Case No.
docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. C-2313;

Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was filed against 2. That the evidence to be adduced by the defendant in Civil Case No. R-3733
petitioner: will also be adopted as evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No. C-2313.

That on or about the 16th day of August 1985, and for a period prior and subsequent WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is prayed that the foregoing pre-trial
thereto, the above-named accused, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, and agreement be admitted in compliance with the Order of this Court dated April 19,
with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, in her 1988.
capacity as Cash Custodian of the Metrobank, Calapan Branch, take from the Bank's
Vault the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, which RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
is under her direct custody and/or accountability, misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit, without the knowledge and consent of the offended
party, despite repeated demands for her to account and/or return the said amount, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, August 20, 1990.
she refused and failed, and still fails and refuses to the damage and prejudice of the
Metrobank, Calapan Branch, in the aforementioned amount of ONE HUNDRED CRISTETTA CHUA-BURCE (sgd.)
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS.
Accused
Contrary to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Assisted By:
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, November 27, 1985. 1

RODRIGO C. DIMAYACYAC (sgd.)

Both civil and criminal cases were raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. Defense Counsel

Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the San Vicente, Calapan
existence of a prejudicial question, viz., that the resolution of the civil case was determinative
of her guilt or innocence in the criminal case. 2The trial court, over the vehement opposition
of the private and public prosecutors, granted the motion and suspended the trial of the Oriental Mindoro
criminal case. 3 On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled
that there was no prejudicial question. 4 IBP O.R. No. 292575

Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. 5 While May 11, 1990
the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time
of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial Quezon City
conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the
civil case as their respective evidence in the criminal case. 6 The trial court ordered the parties
to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of With Conformity:
Court. 7Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with the conforme of the public
prosecutor, entered into the following pre-trial agreement: 8 EMMANUEL S. PANALIGAN (sgd.)
Prosecuting Fiscal
COMES NOW, the accused, assisted by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully submits this Pre-Trial agreement:

Page 38 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt
Evidence. 9 Both the pre-trial agreement and said Motion were granted by the trial court. 10
On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision 11 finding petitioner (a)
guilty of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in the criminal case, and
(b) liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in the civil case. The dispositive portion of decision
provides —
In Criminal Case No. C-2313 —
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Cristeta Chua-Burce guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, punishable under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes a penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period but considering that the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total
amount not to exceed twenty years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be one degree
lower as minimum of arresto mayor with a penalty range of One Month and One Day
to Six Months, as minimum to prision mayorin its maximum period, as maximum, or
a penalty of Six years to Twelve Years. Considering the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the court hereby imposes upon the accused to suffer
imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, in its minimum period, as
maximum. The civil liability shall not be imposed in this case due to a separate civil
action.
In Civil Case No. R-3733 —
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metrobank,
ordering defendants Cristeta Chua-Burce and Antonio Burce, spouses, to pay
Metrobank the amount of P150,000.00 representing the amount misappropriated
with the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from August 15, 1985 until fully
paid and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction in the criminal case to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a separate appeal in the civil case.
In a decision dated November 27, 1992, 12 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision in toto. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. 13 Hence, the
recourse to this Court.
Page 39 of 91
Petitioner raises the following issues: 14
1. IS THE RESULT OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?
2. CAN THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ADMIT IN
EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS ALREADY DENIED ADMISSION IN THE
ORDER OF THE FORMER JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT?
3. DOES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION
EXISTS (sic) AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHEN THERE WERE OTHER PERSONS
WHO HAD DIRECT AND GREATER ACCESS IN THE CASH-IN-VAULT?
4. IS RULE 111 SECTION 2 (a) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE APPLICABLE IN (sic) THE CASE AT BAR?
5. WAS THERE A VALID PROCEEDING WHEN THE FISCAL WAS NOT ACTUALLY
PRESENT AND DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTION OF THE
CASE?
In gist, (1) petitioner contends that the trial court erred in taking into account the results of
the polygraph examination as circumstantial evidence of guilt considering the inherent
unreliability of such tests, and the fact that the previous trial judge who handled the case
already ruled such evidence as inadmissible; (2) petitioner insists that there can be no
presumption of misappropriation when there were other persons who had access to the cash
in vault; and (3) petitioner questions the validity of the trial of criminal case considering that
the pre-trial agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public prosecutor in a full-
blown trial of the criminal case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the guilt of petitioner has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt by the following facts which were duly established during
trial — first, petitioner was the cash custodian who was directly responsible and accountable
for the cash-in-vault. Second, the other persons who had access to the vault facilities never
used the duplicate keys to open the safety deposit boxes and the cash safe from where the
P100.00 bill denominations were located. In fact, the duplicate keys were offered in evidence
still in their sealed envelopes. Third, alterations and superimposition on the cash-in-vault
summary sheet were made by petitioner to cover the cash shortage. Lastly, there was a valid
joint trial of the civil and criminal cases.
The crucial issues, in our mind, are (1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case,
and (2) whether the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First, petitioner assails the validity of the proceedings in the trial court on the ground that the
public prosecutor did not intervene and present any evidence during the trial of the criminal
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
case. The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner with
the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum
for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110 15 requires that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale
behind the rule is "to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private
persons." 16 The records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in the
prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when
the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This
is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court 17 which provides that during
pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118, 18 reduced to writing
such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement.
Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its
contents. 19
On the second issue. Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b)
of the Revised Penal Code. 20 In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. 21 Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of confidence, since the
breach of confidence takes the place of the fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the
other estafas. 22
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code are: 23
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent.
When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the
offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires
both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. 24 Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. 25 In this case, petitioner
was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of
Page 40 of 91
the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees.
In People v. Locson, 26 the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by
him for the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of
the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that —
The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and
the possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant,
with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own
use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking
or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft. 27
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 28 a travelling sales agent
misappropriated or failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was
commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315
(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained
the distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining
criminal liability —
The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson. 57 Phil. 325), in support of
its theory that appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was
selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case the receiving
teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held
guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a
receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent
who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his
principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the
bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An
agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an
independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in consequence of
the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made,
and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil
Code: Article 1730, old).
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing
funds.1âwphi1 Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be
convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED
from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. No costs.1âwphi1.nêtSO
ORDERED.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial)
Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set
aside the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M.
Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was
authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding
premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency
agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her
transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent
located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which
showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in
Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the
respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.
which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of
petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in
Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu
City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature
because the fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving
the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction
complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial
of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned
by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered
(See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to
Page 41 of 91
enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that
it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a
trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take
cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to
be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept.
30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in
order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the
punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is
filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People
v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by
Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the
Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio
Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as
insurance agent of said corporation, among whose duties
were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to
account for and turn over the same to the said Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez,
as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected
and received the amount of P368,850.00 representing
payments of insurance premiums from customers, but
herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to
do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted
the said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal used
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of
P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal — prosecutions
the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein
the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to
June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila
has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at
the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential
elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has
its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the
insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private
respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it
to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Page 42 of 91
G.R. No. 146424 November 18, 2005
ALBINO JOSEF, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES* and AGUSTIN ALARILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
no. 23234,2 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan
convicting Albino Josef of 26 counts of violation of BP 22, also known as the Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law.3
By way of a preliminary clarification, this is a petition for review of the CA’s decision affirming
Albino Josef’s conviction for 26 counts of violation of BP 22. It is therefore a criminal case
and the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as a respondent in line with Section 2,
Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.4Nonetheless, petitioner, in filing this
petition, incorrectly entitled it Albino Josef v. Agustin Alarilla. In accord with Section 6, Rule 1
of the Rules of Court,5 we have allowed petitioner Josef to subsequently implead the People of
the Philippines as respondent in this case.
Now, the facts.
From June to August, 1991, petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes,
purchased materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of leather products from
Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which the former issued a total of 26 postdated checks against his
account with the Associated Bank and Far East Bank & Trust Company (Marikina Branches).
When private respondent presented these checks for encashment, they were dishonored
because the accounts against which they were drawn were closed. Private respondent
informed petitioner of the dishonor and demanded payment of their value. After some
negotiations, petitioner drew and delivered a new set of postdated checks in replacement of
the dishonored ones. Private respondent, in turn, returned to petitioner the originals of the
dishonored postdated checks but retained photocopies thereof. When private respondent
deposited the replacement checks in his account with the Westmont Bank, these were also
dishonored by the drawee bank. As a result, the private respondent filed criminal complaints
against petitioner for violation of BP 22 with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor filed 26 Informations
against petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan for violation of BP 22, entitled People v. Josef,
Criminal Case Nos. 2113-M-93 to 2138-M-93, for the original 26 postdated checks.6
The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts and imposed the penalty of six months for
each conviction. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, affirmed the trial court.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored checks. However, he claims the following
defenses: 1) he has already paid private respondent the amount of the checks in cash; 2) the
trial court was incorrect to accept as evidence photocopies of the original checks and 3) he
acted in good faith. He likewise adopts the dissenting opinion of CA Justice Martin Villarama,
Jr.,7 which states that the penalty of imprisonment was incorrectly imposed on petitioner in
the light of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.8
The petition is without merit.
The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.9
All three elements are present here.
Petitioner categorically admits the fact of issuance of the checks and their dishonor,10 the
first and third elements. He has likewise failed to rebut the statutory presumption11 of
knowledge of insufficient funds, the second element, which attaches if the check is presented
and dishonored within 90 days from its issuance.12 While petitioner alleges to have paid
private respondent the amount of the checks, he failed to specify if he had done so within five
banking days from receiving notice of the checks’ dishonor and to present any evidence of
such payment. In addition, his unsubstantiated claim of cash payment contradicts his earlier
defense that he had replaced the checks.
Moving onto the procedural aspects of the case, petitioner claims that, under the Best
Evidence Rule, the trial court should not have admitted in evidence the photocopies of the
checks until after he had been given reasonable notice to produce the originals. The Court of
Appeals, in disposing of this contention, said:13
However, in the light of the factual milieu in the present recourse, (we) find and so declare
that the Court a quo did not commit any reversible error in admitting in evidence the
photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of the originals thereof in the possession of
the [Petitioner]. It bears stressing that the raison d’etre of the proscription against the
admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original thereof is to prevent
the commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession of the best evidence
but, in lieu thereof, adduced secondary evidence:
Page 43 of 91
xxx xxx xxx
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the originals of the checks
and even marked the same in evidence as Exhibits "1" to "21", except five (5) of the subject
checks, which he claimed as missing and the Prosecution even adopted the original checks as
its evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the subject checks
were in his possession. The [Petitioner] never alleged that the photostatic copies of the
checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were not faithful copies of
the originals of the checks. In point of fact, when he testified in the Court a quo, he was
shown, by his counsel, the photostatic copies of the subject checks… and admitted that the
originals of said checks were in his possession on his claim that he had paid the Private
Complainant the amount of ₱600,000.00 in cash and the balance in the form of checks which
he drew and issued to the Private Complainant by way of replacement of the aforesaid other
checks:
xxx xxx xxx
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic copies of the
checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were the faithful
reproductions of the originals of the checks in his possession. Hence, the Prosecution
may mark and offer in evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the checks admitted in
evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful reproduction of the original copies in his
possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting that the originals were in his possession
and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured whatever flaw might have existed in
the prosecution’s evidence. The fact that these originals were all stamped "account closed"
merely confirmed the allegations of the respondent that the checks were dishonored by
reason of the account being closed. Because they were entirely consistent with its main
theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these originals as its own evidence. In addition, by
petitioner’s own admission, five of the original checks were lost, thus rendering the
photocopies thereof admissible as exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.14
Regarding petitioner’s allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is
immaterial, the offense in question being malum prohibitum.15 The gravamen of the offense is
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the issuance of a bad check and therefore, whether or not malice and intent attended such The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
issuance is unimportant.16 violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

In invoking of A.C. No. 12-2000, petitioner adopts the interpretation of Justice Villarama to
the effect that the circular mandates judges to impose fines rather than imprisonment on
violators of BP 22. In affirming the sentence imposed by the trial court, the majority pointed
out that it is only under certain conditions that trial court judges may impose fines rather
than imprisonment. The Circular provides, in part:
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court (Second Division) per
Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by
deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount
double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably
contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all
good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Otherwise they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing
the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a
fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty
to impose on each of the petitioners.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not to be deemed a hindrance (emphasis ours).
Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within the sound
discretion of the judge trying the case, based on his assessment of the offender and the facts.
Justice Villarama premised his dissent on the absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000
between which offenders deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a fine and which deserve
imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13-2001 states, the application of the circular is selective and it is
entirely up to the trial court judge to make that distinction, given the circumstances
obtaining. This brings us to the factual issue of petitioner’s worthiness of the lighter penalty.
On this, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23234 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court en banc, SO ORDERED.
applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the
bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., ₱200,000, and
concluded that "such would best serve the ends of criminal justice."

All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the
Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

Considerable confusion arose as a result of this circular. Like Justice Villarama, many came
to believe that the policy enunciated in this circular was to altogether remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty for violation of BP 22. The circular created so much confusion, in
fact, that less than three months later, we had to issue yet another circular, Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001,17 for the specific purpose of clarifying exactly what the implications of
A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In order to put all doubts to rest, the second circular provides:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

Page 44 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142762. March 04, 2005
LILANY YULO y BILLONES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
January 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513 and its Resolution2 dated March 16, 2000.
The facts, as culled from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals
are:
Sometime in August 1992, Lilany B. Yulo, petitioner, and Josefina Dimalanta went to the
house of Myrna Roque, private complainant, in Caloocan City. Josefina, introduced to Myrna
petitioner Yulo as her best friend and a good payer. Josefina told Myrna that petitioner
wanted her checks encashed. In view of Josefina’s assurance that petitioner is trustworthy,
Myrna agreed to encash the checks. Petitioner then issued to Myrna three checks: (a)
Equitable Bank (EB) Check No. 237936 in the amount of ₱40,000.00, postdated September
30, 1992; (b) EB Check No. 237941 in the amount of ₱16,200.00; and (c) Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 656602 in the amount of ₱40,000.00, postdated November
18, 1992.
When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks, they were dishonored.
The EB checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds," while the BPI check was stamped
"Account Closed."
As Myrna did not know petitioner’s address, she immediately informed Josefina about the
dishonored checks. The latter told Myrna not to worry and repeated her assurance that
petitioner is her best friend and a good payer. Myrna tried to get petitioner’s address from
Josefina, but the latter refused and instead made the assurance that she will inform
petitioner that the checks were dishonored.
When no payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
Page 45 of 91
On August 23, 1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan City Prosecutor with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, same city, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774, 44775, and 44776.
When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charges. The cases were then consolidated and jointly heard.
Petitioner admitted having issued the checks in question but claimed that she merely lent
them to Josefina. In turn, Josefina delivered the checks to her friend who showed them to a
jeweler as "show money." It was understood that the checks were not to be deposited.
Petitioner vehemently denied having any transaction with Myrna.
Petitioner also claimed that that when she issued the checks, she knew she had no funds in
the banks; and that she was aware that the checks would be dishonored if presented for
payment.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused LILANY YULO y BILLONES, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced as
follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-44774, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to indemnify the
offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of ₱16,200.00, representing the face value of
Equitable Bank Check No. 227941, and to pay the costs;
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-44775, to an to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to
indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of ₱40,000.00, representing the
face value of Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 656602, and to pay the costs;
(3) In Criminal Case No. C-44776, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to indemnify the
offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of ₱40,000.00, representing the face value of
Equitable Bank Check No. 237936, and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Rule 114, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, as amended, the bail bond of the
accused is cancelled and the accused is hereby committed to the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.3
Upon appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
Decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignments of error:
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF CASES;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. EVEN IF THE REQUISITES THEREFORE
ARE NOT COMPLETE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH THE LATTER’S DECISION WAS BASED ON THE
UNCORROBORATED, INCREDIBLE, AND UNNATURAL STATEMENTS OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND ALTHOUGH THE TESTIMOMY OF THE ACCUSED WAS SUPPORTED BY
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE.4
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals violated petitioner’s right
to a speedy trial; and (2) whether the same court erred in holding that the prosecution has
proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolved her motion for
reconsideration only after three (3) years from its filing. Such inaction violates her right to a
speedy disposition of her case.
In his comment, the Solicitor General counters that the Appellate Court has explained
satisfactorily why petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not resolved immediately.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:
SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all officials
tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of
speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.5 A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.6 In applying the Constitutional
guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,7 is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.8 To determine whether the right has been violated, the following factors may be
considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.9
Page 46 of 91
In the instant case, we agree with the Solicitor General that the delay was sufficiently
explained by the Court of Appeals. The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513,
Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the pendency of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997. However, the case was assigned to Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on February 28, 2000 and brought to her attention on March 2,
2000. We note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the
motion. Clearly, she did not incur any delay. We, therefore, rule that there has been no
violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.
On the second issue, petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Not all the elements of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
were adequately established. For one, Myrna Roque, private complainant, did not send her
any notice of dishonor. It was Josefina whom Myrna contacted, not her. For another,
petitioner merely lent the checks to Josefina to be shown by her friend to a jeweler.
Petitioner’s arguments are simply untenable.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution has proved all the elements of the
offense.
Petitioner admitted having issued the three dishonored checks for value. Her purpose was to
encash them. She also admitted that at the time she issued the checks, she was aware that
she had only ₱1,000.00 in her account with the Equitable Bank and that her BPI account
was already closed. Significantly, what Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 penalizes is the issuance of a
bouncing check. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the
act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment.11 The
purpose for which the check was issued and the terms and conditions relating to its issuance
are immaterial. What is primordial is that the issued checks were worthless and the fact of
worthlessness was known to the petitioner at the time of their issuance, as in this case. This
is because under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.12
We likewise find no reason to sustain petitioner’s contention that she was not given any
notice of dishonor. Myrna had no reason to be suspicious of petitioner. It will be recalled that
Josefina Dimalanta assured Myrna that petitioner is her "best friend" and "a good payer."
Consequently, when the checks bounced, Myrna would naturally turn to Josefina for help.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
We note that Josefina refused to give Myrna petitioner’s address but promised to inform
petitioner about the dishonored checks.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of the trial court which have been affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and will not be disturbed absent any
showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could
substantially affect the outcome of the case.13 This exception is not present here. That Myrna
was the sole witness for the prosecution is of no moment. There is no law requiring that the
testimony of a single witness must be corroborated. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the
testimony of witnesses is weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness, if
found trustworthy and credible, as in this case, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.14
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
31, 1997 and its Resolution dated March 16, 2000, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, sustaining the
Joint Decision of the trial court in Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774, C-44775, and C-44776 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93695 February 4, 1992
RAMON C. LEE and ANTONIO DM. LACDAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SACOBA MANUFACTURING CORP., PABLO GONZALES,
JR. and THOMAS GONZALES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
What is the nature of the voting trust agreement executed between two parties in this case?
Who owns the stocks of the corporation under the terms of the voting trust agreement? How
long can a voting trust agreement remain valid and effective? Did a director of the corporation
cease to be such upon the creation of the voting trust agreement? These are the questions the
answers to which are necessary in resolving the principal issue in this petition forcertiorari —
whether or not there was proper service of summons on Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA,
for short) through the petitioners as president and vice-president, allegedly, of the subject
corporation after the execution of a voting trust agreement between ALFA and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for short).
From the records of the instant case, the following antecedent facts appear:
Page 47 of 91
On November 15, 1985, a complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. against the private respondents who, in turn, filed a third party
complaint against ALFA and the petitioners on March 17, 1986.
On September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint
which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated June 27,
1988.
On July 18, 1988, the petitioners filed their answer to the third party complaint.
Meanwhile, on July 12, 1988, the trial court issued an order requiring the issuance of
an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of the petitioner's letter
informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them
considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP.
In a manifestation dated July 22, 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive
summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a
separate and distinct corporate personality and existence.
On August 4, 1988, the trial court issued an order advising the private respondents to take
the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA.
On August 16, 1988, the private respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for the
Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on August 17, 1988.
On September 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that
Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of another mode of
service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper
service upon ALFA.
In their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1988, the private
respondents argued that the voting trust agreement dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the
petitioners of their positions as president and executive vice-president of ALFA so that service
of summons upon ALFA through the petitioners as corporate officers was proper.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA
through the petitioners, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring
ALFA to filed its answer through the petitioners as its corporate officers.
On January 19, 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers
and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes
for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, the petitioners
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA
(the petitioners included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the
management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP.
On April 25, 1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated
January 2, 1989 and declared that service upon the petitioners who were no longer corporate
officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA.
On May 15, 1989, the private respondents moved for a reconsideration of the above Order
which was affirmed by the court in its Order dated August 14, 1989 denying the private
respondent's motion for reconsideration.
On September 18, 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by the private
respondent before the public respondent which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course
thereto on September 21, 1989.
On October 17, 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the pending petition
for certiorari with public respondent issued an Order declaring as final the Order dated April
25, 1989. The private respondents in the said Order were required to take positive steps in
prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to
dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on October 25, 1989 the private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action.
On March 19, 1990, after the petitioners filed their answer to the private respondents'
petition for certiorari, the public respondent rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the orders of respondent judge dated
April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989 are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent
corporation is ordered to file its answer within the reglementary period. (CA
Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 24)
On April 11, 1990, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the public
respondent which resolved to deny the same on May 10, 1990. Hence, the petitioners filed
this certiorari petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondent in reversing the questioned Orders dated April 25, 1989 and
August 14, 1989 of the court a quo, thus, holding that there was proper service of summons
on ALFA through the petitioners.
In the meantime, the public respondent inadvertently made an entry of judgment on July 16,
1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration
has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its
Resolution dated January 3, 1991, the public respondent set aside the aforestated entry of
judgment after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions
Page 48 of 91
of the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to us
pursuant to our ruling in the case of Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539 [1989]. (CA Rollo, pp. 249-250)
In their memorandum, the petitioners present the following arguments, to wit:
(1) that the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholders
whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee
deprives the stockholders of his position as director of the corporation; to
rule otherwise, as the respondent Court of Appeals did, would be violative of
section 23 of the Corporation Code ( Rollo, pp. 270-3273); and
(2) that the petitioners were no longer acting or holding any of the positions
provided under Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court authorized to
receive service of summons for and in behalf of the private domestic
corporation so that the service of summons on ALFA effected through the
petitioners is not valid and ineffective; to maintain the respondent Court of
Appeals' position that ALFA was properly served its summons through the
petitioners would be contrary to the general principle that a corporation can
only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of its officers' or
agents' authority (Rollo, pp. 273-275)
In resolving the issue of the propriety of the service of summons in the instant case, we dwell
first on the nature of a voting trust agreement and the consequent effects upon its creation in
the light of the provisions of the Corporation Code.
A voting trust is defined in Ballentine's Law Dictionary as follows:
(a) trust created by an agreement between a group of the stockholders of a
corporation and the trustee or by a group of identical agreements between
individual stockholders and a common trustee, whereby it is provided that
for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a certain event, or until
the agreement is terminated, control over the stock owned by such
stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all purposes, is to be lodged
in the trustee, either with or without a reservation to the owners, or persons
designated by them, of the power to direct how such control shall be used.
(98 ALR 2d. 379 sec. 1 [d]; 19 Am J 2d Corp. sec. 685).
Under Section 59 of the new Corporation Code which expressly recognizes voting trust
agreements, a more definitive meaning may be gathered. The said provision partly reads:
Sec. 59. Voting Trusts — One or more stockholders of a stock corporation
may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or
trustees the right to vote and other rights pertaining to the share for a period
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
rights pertaining to the shares for a period not exceeding five (5) years at any
one time: Provided, that in the case of a voting trust specifically required as a
condition in a loan agreement, said voting trust may be for a period
exceeding (5) years but shall automatically expire upon full payment of the
loan. A voting trust agreement must be in writing and notarized, and shall
specify the terms and conditions thereof. A certified copy of such agreement
shall be filed with the corporation and with the Securities and Exchange
Commission; otherwise, said agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. The
certificate or certificates of stock covered by the voting trust agreement shall
be cancelled and new ones shall be issued in the name of the trustee or
trustees stating that they are issued pursuant to said agreement. In the
books of the corporation, it shall be noted that the transfer in the name of
the trustee or trustees is made pursuant to said voting trust agreement.
By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the voting rights of a
stockholder from his other rights such as the right to receive dividends, the right to inspect
the books of the corporation, the right to sell certain interests in the assets of the corporation
and other rights to which a stockholder may be entitled until the liquidation of the
corporation. However, in order to distinguish a voting trust agreement from proxies and other
voting pools and agreements, it must pass three criteria or tests, namely: (1) that the voting
rights of the stock are separated from the other attributes of ownership; (2) that the voting
rights granted are intended to be irrevocable for a definite period of time; and (3) that the
principal purpose of the grant of voting rights is to acquire voting control of the corporation.
(5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law on Private Corporations, section 2075 [1976] p.
331 citingTankersly v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538)
Under section 59 of the Corporation Code, supra, a voting trust agreement may confer upon a
trustee not only the stockholder's voting rights but also other rights pertaining to his shares
as long as the voting trust agreement is not entered "for the purpose of circumventing the law
against monopolies and illegal combinations in restraint of trade or used for purposes of
fraud." (section 59, 5th paragraph of the Corporation Code) Thus, the traditional concept of a
voting trust agreement primarily intended to single out a stockholder's right to vote from his
other rights as such and made irrevocable for a limited duration may in practice become a
legal device whereby a transfer of the stockholder's shares is effected subject to the specific
provision of the voting trust agreement.
The execution of a voting trust agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the
equitable or beneficial ownership of the corporate shares of a stockholders, on the one hand,
and the legal title thereto on the other hand.
The law simply provides that a voting trust agreement is an agreement in writing whereby one
or more stockholders of a corporation consent to transfer his or their shares to a trustee in
order to vest in the latter voting or other rights pertaining to said shares for a period not
exceeding five years upon the fulfillment of statutory conditions and such other terms and
conditions specified in the agreement. The five year-period may be extended in cases where
Page 49 of 91
the voting trust is executed pursuant to a loan agreement whereby the period is made
contingent upon full payment of the loan.
In the instant case, the point of controversy arises from the effects of the creation of the
voting trust agreement. The petitioners maintain that with the execution of the voting trust
agreement between them and the other stockholders of ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as
the other party, the former assigned and transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as
trustee. They argue that by virtue to of the voting trust agreement the petitioners can no
longer be considered directors of ALFA. In support of their contention, the petitioners invoke
section 23 of the Corporation Code which provides, in part, that:
Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the
corporation of which he is a director which share shall stand in his name on
the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner of at
least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a
director shall thereby cease to be director . . . (Rollo, p. 270)
The private respondents, on the contrary, insist that the voting trust agreement between
ALFA and the DBP had all the more safeguarded the petitioners' continuance as officers and
directors of ALFA inasmuch as the general object of voting trust is to insure permanency of
the tenure of the directors of a corporation. They cited the commentaries by Prof. Aguedo
Agbayani on the right and status of the transferring stockholders, to wit:
The "transferring stockholder", also called the "depositing stockholder", is
equitable owner for the stocks represented by the voting trust certificates and
the stock reversible on termination of the trust by surrender. It is said that
the voting trust agreement does not destroy the status of the transferring
stockholders as such, and thus render them ineligible as directors. But a
more accurate statement seems to be that for some purposes the depositing
stockholder holding voting trust certificates in lieu of his stock and being the
beneficial owner thereof, remains and is treated as a stockholder. It seems to
be deducible from the case that he may sue as a stockholder if the suit is in
equity or is of an equitable nature, such as, a technical stockholders' suit in
right of the corporation. [Commercial Laws of the Philippines by Agbayani,
Vol. 3 pp. 492-493, citing 5 Fletcher 326, 327] (Rollo, p. 291)
We find the petitioners' position meritorious.
Both under the old and the new Corporation Codes there is no dispute as to the most
immediate effect of a voting trust agreement on the status of a stockholder who is a party to
its execution — from legal titleholder or owner of the shares subject of the voting trust
agreement, he becomes the equitable or beneficial owner. (Salonga, Philippine Law on Private
Corporations, 1958 ed., p. 268; Pineda and Carlos, The Law on Private Corporations and
Corporate Practice, 1969 ed., p. 175; Campos and Lopez-Campos, The Corporation Code;
Comments, Notes & Selected Cases, 1981, ed., p. 386; Agbayani, Commentaries and
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines,Vol. 3, 1988 ed., p. 536). The
penultimate question, therefore, is whether the change in his status deprives the stockholder
of the right to qualify as a director under section 23 of the present Corporation Code which
deletes the phrase "in his own right." Section 30 of the old Code states that:
Every director must own in his own right at least one share of the capital
stock of the stock corporation of which he is a director, which stock shall
stand in his name on the books of the corporation. A director who ceases to
be the owner of at least one share of the capital stock of a stock corporation
of which is a director shall thereby cease to be a director . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a director, strictly speaking, cannot be
adversely affected by the simple act of such director being a party to a voting trust agreement
inasmuch as he remains owner (although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of
the voting trust agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor
of the trustee is required (section 36 of the old Corporation Code). No disqualification arises
by virtue of the phrase "in his own right" provided under the old Corporation Code.
With the omission of the phrase "in his own right" the election of trustees and other persons
who in fact are not beneficial owners of the shares registered in their names on the books of
the corporation becomes formally legalized (see Campos and Lopez-Campos, supra, p. 296)
Hence, this is a clear indication that in order to be eligible as a director, what is material is
the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of, the stock as appearing on the books of the
corporation (2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, section 300, p. 92
[1969] citingPeople v. Lihme, 269 Ill. 351, 109 N.E. 1051).
The facts of this case show that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement
executed in 1981 disposed of all their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the
DBP, as trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in
their names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code.
They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of the enterprise. The
petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the petitioners' shares to the DBP
created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares
from the stockholder of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust agreement
as evident from the following stipulations:
1. The TRUSTORS hereby assign and deliver to the TRUSTEE the certificate
of the shares of the stocks owned by them respectively and shall do all things
necessary for the transfer of their respective shares to the TRUSTEE on the
books of ALFA.
2. The TRUSTEE shall issue to each of the TRUSTORS a trust certificate for
the number of shares transferred, which shall be transferrable in the same
Page 50 of 91
manner and with the same effect as certificates of stock subject to the
provisions of this agreement;
3. The TRUSTEE shall vote upon the shares of stock at all meetings of ALFA,
annual or special, upon any resolution, matter or business that may be
submitted to any such meeting, and shall possess in that respect the same
powers as owners of the equitable as well as the legal title to the stock;
4. The TRUSTEE may cause to be transferred to any person one share of
stock for the purpose of qualifying such person as director of ALFA, and
cause a certificate of stock evidencing the share so transferred to be issued in
the name of such person;
xxx xxx xxx
9. Any stockholder not entering into this agreement may transfer his shares
to the same trustees without the need of revising this agreement, and this
agreement shall have the same force and effect upon that said stockholder.
(CA Rollo, pp. 137-138; Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal
ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter became the
stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing
that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose
of qualifying as directors of ALFA, the petitioners can no longer be deemed to have retained
their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting
trust agreement. There appears to be no dispute from the records that DBP has taken over
full control and management of the firm.
Moreover, in the Certification dated January 24, 1989 issued by the DBP through one Elsa A.
Guevarra, Vice-President of its Special Accounts Department II, Remedial Management
Group, the petitioners were no longer included in the list of officers of ALFA "as of April
1982." (CA Rollo, pp. 140-142)
Inasmuch as the private respondents in this case failed to substantiate their claim that the
subject voting trust agreement did not deprive the petitioners of their position as directors of
ALFA, the public respondent committed a reversible error when it ruled that:
. . . while the individual respondents (petitioners Lee and Lacdao) may have
ceased to be president and vice-president, respectively, of the corporation at
the time of service of summons on them on August 21, 1987, they were at
least up to that time, still directors . . .
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The aforequoted statement is quite inaccurate in the light of the express terms of Stipulation
No. 4 of the subject voting trust agreement. Both parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at
the time of the execution of the agreement that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to
the DBP, all the directors of ALFA were stripped of their positions as such.
There can be no reliance on the inference that the five-year period of the voting trust
agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the
said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners
pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code which reads:
Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall
automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust
certificate as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or
trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall
be reissued in the name of the transferors.
On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement between
ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the fulfillment of
certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. This is shown by the following portions of the
agreement.
WHEREAS, the TRUSTEE is one of the creditors of ALFA, and its credit is
secured by a first mortgage on the manufacturing plant of said company;
WHEREAS, ALFA is also indebted to other creditors for various financial
accomodations and because of the burden of these obligations is
encountering very serious difficulties in continuing with its operations.
WHEREAS, in consideration of additional accommodations from the
TRUSTEE, ALFA had offered and the TRUSTEE has accepted participation in
the management and control of the company and to assure the aforesaid
participation by the TRUSTEE, the TRUSTORS have agreed to execute a
voting trust covering their shareholding in ALFA in favor of the TRUSTEE;
AND WHEREAS, DBP is willing to accept the trust for the purpose
aforementioned.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
6. This Agreement shall last for a period of Five (5) years, and is renewable
for as long as the obligations of ALFA with DBP, or any portion thereof,
remains outstanding; (CA Rollo, pp. 137-138)
Page 51 of 91
Had the five-year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not
have transferred all its rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the
national government through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a
Certification dated January 24, 1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts
Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had
handled APT's account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management agreement
by and between the DBP and APT (CA Rollo, p. 142) Hence, there is evidence on record that at
the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on August 21, 1987, the
voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks
of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.
In view of the foregoing, the ultimate issue of whether or not there was proper service of
summons on ALFA through the petitioners is readily answered in the negative.
Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. (See Sulo ng Bayan Inc. v. Araneta,
Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]; Osias Academy v. Department of Labor and Employment, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 83257-58, December 21, 1990). Thus, the above rule on service of processes of a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court
processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering
the existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it.
The rationale of the aforecited rule is that service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. (Far
Corporation v. Francisco, 146 SCRA 197 [1986] citing Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor
Corp. 81 SCRA 303 [1978]).
The petitioners in this case do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of
summons upon ALFA, through the petitioners, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as
correctly argued by the petitioners, will contravene the general principle that a corporation
can only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's
authority. (see Vicente v. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210 [1973]).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision
dated March 19, 1990 and the Court of Appeals' resolution of May 10, 1990 are SET ASIDE
and the Orders dated April 25, 1989 and October 17, 1989 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 58 are REINSTATED.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
SO ORDERED. 6. Crim. Case No. 19473 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
G.R. No. 134172 September 20, 2004
7. Crim. Case No. 19474 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
MIRIAM ARMI JAO YU, petitioner, Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱350,000.00;
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. 8. Crim. Case No. 19475 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱385,000.00;
DECISION
9. Crim. Case No. 19476 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;

May an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 221 be made to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the trial court for such
violations? This is the lone issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari.2
On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with 19 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 19468 to 19486.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing, the trial court
rendered a Decision finding her guilty of the charges and imposing upon her the following
penalties:
10. Crim. Case No. 19477 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
11. Crim. Case No. 19478 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
12. Crim. Case No. 19479 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
13. Crim. Case No. 19480 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱450,000.00;

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Miriam Armi Jao Yu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and sentencing her as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. 19468 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱300,000.00;
2. Crim. Case No. 19469 – to pay a fine of ₱150,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱150,000.00;
3. Crim. Case No. 19470 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱200,000.00;
4. Crim. Case No. 19471 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱385,000.00;
5. Crim. Case No. 19472 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
14. Crim. Case No. 19481 – to pay a fine of ₱25,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱25,000.00;
15. Crim. Case No. 19482 – to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱500,000.00;
16. Crim. Case No. 19483 – to pay a fine of ₱17,500.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱17,500.00;
17. Crim. Case No. 19484 – to pay a fine of ₱13,475.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱13,475.00;
18. Crim. Case No. 19485 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;
19. Crim. Case No. 19486 – to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of ₱15,000.00;

Page 52 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine in each of
the above-entitled cases and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." (Underscoring ours)
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated May 29, 1998.
In the instant petition, petitioner contends that Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, which
reads:
"Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail
to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check
in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act." (Underscoring ours)
provides only the imposition of imprisonment or fine, or both, in cases of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Thus, she should not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-
payment of the fines imposed by the trial court.
The Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and prays that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals be affirmed.
Page 53 of 91
The petition must fail.
The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and 39 of
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
"ART. 38. Pecuniary liabilities – Order of payment. – In case the property of the
offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the
same shall be met in the following order:
1. The preparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings. (Underscoring ours)
"ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the
fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the
following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine,
he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-
third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more
than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the
prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days,
if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a
penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during
the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve." (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which provides:
"ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or
in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary." (Underscoring ours)1awphil.net
As early as 1959, this Court, in People vs. Cubelo,3 held:
"Appellant’s contention that the trial court committed error in ordering him to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of fine with the reason
that Act No. 4003, which prohibits fishing with the use of explosive, fails to provide
for such subsidiary imprisonment, and that being a special law, it is not subject to
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, is untenable. The second paragraph of
Article 10 of the said Code provides that ‘this Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.’ Articles 100 (civil
liability) and 39 (subsidiary penalty) are applicable to offenses under special laws
(People vs. Moreno, 60 Phil. 178; Copiaco vs. Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil. 184)."
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations.
It bears stressing that on February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
clarifying the imposition of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the fine he is
sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the Circular states
that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court, "there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment."
The full text of the Circular reads:
"Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
To : All Judges
subject : clarification of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on the penalty for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Otherwise known as the bouncing checks law
Page 54 of 91
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding the
operation of Administrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000. In
particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty
of violating the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is
sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the
rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998,
298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18
September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of
penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary
imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused’s inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment
for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the
law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances
of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered
as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice;
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En Banc in
A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session of 13 February 2001.
The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court Administrator shall
immediately cause the implementation of this Administrative Circular.
This Administrative Circular shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
not later than 20 February 2001.
Issued this 14th day of February, 2001.
(Sgd.)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in an
Information, to wit:
That on or about the 20th day of August 1992, in the Municipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check
No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00)
Philippine Currency, drawn against the PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, Candelaria, Quezon,
payable to "Cash" and give the said check to one Dolores Evangelista in exchange for cash
although the said accused knew fully well at the time of issuance of said check that he did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment, the same was
dishonored and refused payment for the reason that the drawer thereof, the herein accused,
had no sufficient funds therein, and that despite due notice said accused failed to deposit the
necessary amount to cover said check, or to pay in full the amount of said check, to the
damage and prejudice of said Dolores Evangelista in the aforesaid amount.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Contrary to law.1

Chief Justice" (Underscoring ours)
In Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines promulgated on
August 7, 20034 – a case which involves the application of penalties for violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 – we did not only modify the amount of the fines imposed by the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Cases Nos. D-8137, D-8176 and D-8177, but also imposed "subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code"
in each case.
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 and our Decision in Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines should now lay to rest the controversy at
bar.lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
After trial, petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch
55, in a Decision rendered on November 20, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused
Leodegario S. Bayani, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 1, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences him to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and a fine
of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He
shall likewise pay the complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, the sum of ₱10,000.00, the
value of Check No. 054924 he issued and drew against PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, which
was subsequently dishonored by the said drawee bank for insufficiency of funds.
The accused Leodegario Bayani is further ordered to pay Dolores Evangelista the amount of
₱5,000.00 representing attorney's fees. He shall also pay double the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.2

G.R. No. 155619 August 14, 2007 In convicting petitioner, the trial court made the following findings of facts:

LEODEGARIO BAYANI, Petitioner, 1. That the Philippine Savings Bank, Candelaria Branch, has issued to the accused
vs. check booklet (Exh. "C") on December 12, 1991, with the Check No. 054924 as one of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. those included in said booklet of checks;

DECISION 2. That the said Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, was drawn and issued
payable to Cash in the amount of ₱10,000.00; said drawn check was made to apply
Page 55 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
to the account of the accused, Leodegario S. Bayani whose name appears therein in
bold print at the upper portion of the said check;
3. That said Check No. 054924, is a post-dated check, was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank, PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, for insufficiency of funds;
4. That the checking account of the accused Leodegario S. Bayani with PS Bank,
Candelaria Branch, was closed on September 1, 1992 (Exh. "B-3"), which at the time
had only remaining deposit in the amount of ₱2,414.96 (Exh. "B-4").3
The trial court also made the following findings:
The check in question is postdated, issued and drawn on August 20, 1992, and dated August
26, 1992. It was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by
Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was deposited with the bank, it was
returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds (Exh. "A-5"). Thereafter, she pursued the
following events to demand payment of the value of the check:
xxxx
After the confrontation at the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista has had another
confrontation with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia at Candelaria municipal building
before Brgy. Captain Nestor Baera, but again the accused and Rubia pointed to each other for
the settlement of the amount involved in the check in question.
Of these two (2) confrontations Evangelista had with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia,
including the chances to have met or known the complaining witness Evangelista since 1977
up to the filing of the instant case in the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, all what the
accused Leodegario Bayani could say were flat denials of having talked with, or otherwise met
Evangelista, regarding the latter’s claim of payment of the value of Check No. 054924,
admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused Bayani issued by PS Bank, Candelaria
Branch.4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)5
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. The CA’s
Decision dated January 30, 2002 provides for the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, and it appearing from the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
which does not indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact in accordance with the
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Page 56 of 91
Thus, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACQUIT THE
ACCUSED DESPITE THE CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS UTTERLY BASED ON
HEARSAY EVIDENCE;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE
CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECK WAS NOT DULY ESTABLISHED;
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN THEY CONVICTED THE
ACCUSED BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE LATTER'S EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE
STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE;
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALED (sic) ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED SOLELY ON THE BASES OF PRESUMPTIONS.7
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, argues
that: (1) petitioner’s denial of his liability for Check No. 05492 cannot overcome the
primordial fact that his signature appears on the face of such check; (2) want of consideration
is a personal defense and is not available against a holder in due course; and (3) the
constitutional presumption of innocence was overcome by the requisite quantum of proof.8
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA
are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case. Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated
from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the CA, whose factual
findings are conclusive and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of
the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.9
The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the RTC.
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the evidence
pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on hearsay evidence, to wit:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Under the above rule, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some
other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the
former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.10
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached by Alicia
Rubia who told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for
cash, as he needed money badly.11 Obviously, Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she
had no personal knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the
check exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner supposedly
made this request. What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from
her own perception but from Rubia’s.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista’s testimony even
if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial court
shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the same
Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time
the witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted."12 Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made – from the time her testimony was offered13 and up
to the time her direct examination was conducted14 – then petitioner has effectively
waived15 any objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her
testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that
the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence.16 In this regard, it has been held that although hearsay evidence may
be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value,17 unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exception to the hearsay evidence rule.18
In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant
statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or
the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.19When Evangelista
said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for
cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish
the truth or veracity of Rubia’s statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not
presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making
of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the
statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the
Page 57 of 91
existence of that fact.20 Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista’s statement
is relevant to the issues of petitioner’s falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and
consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.
In any event, petitioner’s conviction did not rest solely on Evangelista’s testimony. There are
other pieces of evidence on record that established his guilt, to wit: the subject check was
included in the booklet of checks issued by the PSBank to petitioner; the subject check was
made to apply to the account of petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion of the
said check; and most telling is that petitioner never categorically denied that the signature
appearing on the check was his. What petitioner claimed was that the signature on the check
was similar to his signature, although there were "differences," viz.:
Q: I am showing to you a certain document purpurting (sic) to be PSB Check No.
054924, will you please look at this particular document and tell this Honorable
Court if this particular check is one of those issued to you by the Philippine Saving’s
Bank?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, there appears a signature above a line located at the bottom of the said
check which appears to be Leodegario Bayani, please tell this Honorable Court if you
know this particular signature?
A: Although it is similar to my signature I could not tell if this is my signature, sir.
Q: Please explain to this Honorable Court why is it so?
A: Because there are some differences, sir.
Q: Please tell this Honorable Court the particular differences you are referring to?
A: At the middle of the signature I usually put my middle initial and also the
beginning of my family name is almost connected with each other, sir.21
Neither did petitioner claim that the signature was a forgery. Had he done so, then a forensic
examination of the signature in appearing on the check and his signature would have been
made in order to determine the genuineness or authenticity of the signature appearing on the
check.
All these pieces of evidence, taken together, inevitably support the finding of petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Petitioner also argues that he cannot be convicted due to the prosecution’s failure to prove
that the subject check was issued to apply on account or for value.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are:
After going over the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense in this case, the
Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, as the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are SO ORDERED.
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and G.R. No. 137191 November 18, 2002

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of BEN B. RICO, petitioner,
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid vs.
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.22 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

As regards the first element, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks and in the absence DECISION
of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.23 Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquired the
same for a consideration or for value.24 In alleging that there was no consideration for the QUISUMBING, J.:
subject check, it devolved upon petitioner to present convincing evidence to overthrow the
For review on certiorari is the decision1 dated June 15, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
presumption and prove that the check was issued without consideration. G.R. CR No. 19764, affirming the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City which
found the petitioner guilty of five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing
Checks Law), and the resolution3 dated January 7, 1999 denying petitioner’s motion for
Valuable consideration may consist either of some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to reconsideration.
the party who makes the contract; or some forbearance, detriment, loss of some responsibility
to act; or labor or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to
do or not to do, in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or Petitioner Ben Rico was a "pakyaw" contractor who used to purchase construction materials
indorser.25 It was shown in this case that the check was issued and exchanged for cash. This on credit from private complainant Ever Lucky Commercial (ELC), represented by Victor
was the valuable consideration for which the check was issued. Chan, Manager. Petitioner made payments either in cash or by postdated checks. On several
occasions, he issued checks to ELC, which were dishonored by the bank upon presentment
for payment for "insufficiency of funds" or "closed account", as follows:
At any rate, what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The law
does not make any distinction on whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in DATE OF REASON FOR
payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law is to CHECK NO. DATE DISHONOR DISHONOR AMOUNT
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.26
04142 Nov. 5, 1990 Nov. 13, 1990 Insufficient funds P 81,800.00
Thus, the Court cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt. As ruled in Lee v. Court of Appeals: 1759806 Apr. 19, 1990 Apr. 20, 1990 Insufficient funds 25,000.00

1759808 Apr. 20, 1990 Apr. 23, 1990 Account Closed 4,834.00
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty.1awphi1 Suffice it to say
the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in a 1759810 Apr. 11, 1990 Apr. 16, 1990 Insufficient funds 39,000.00
prejudiced mind.27
1759812 Apr. 11, 1990 Apr. 16, 1990 Insufficient funds 15,250.00

Page 58 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The five informations were consolidated by the lower court. Upon arraignment, petitioner
1759811 May 2, 1990 May 3, 1990 Account Closed 12,550.00
pleaded not guilty to all the charges, and trial on the merits ensued.

TOTAL P178,434.00
===========
Consequently, petitioner was charged under several informations docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 5796, 5797, 5798, 5799 and 5800 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The
information in Criminal Case No. 5796 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 1990, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue Check No. 04142 in the amount of Eighty
One Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P81,800.00), dated November 5, 1990, drawn against
the Philippine Commercial and International Bank, Laoag City Branch, in favor of the Ever
Lucky Commercial, as payee, in payment of construction materials which he purchased on
credit from the said Ever Lucky Commercial, located at Brgy. No. 12, Gen. Segundo Ave.,
Laoag City, of which Mr. Victor Chan is the Gen. Manager, knowing fully well that he had no
sufficient funds deposited with the drawee bank to cover the payment thereof, as in fact it
was dishonored when presented for payment to the drawee bank on November 13, 1990, on
the ground that it was drawn against insufficient funds, and the accused, despite due notice
to him of the dishonor of said check had not paid the amount thereof nor had he made
arrangements for its payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, to the damage and prejudice of the Ever Lucky Commercial
in the amount of P81,800.00, Philippine Currency.
The prosecution established that petitioner, who used to purchase construction materials on
credit from ELC, issued the above-cited checks as payment for the materials and that they
were dishonored upon presentment for payment to the bank either for "insufficient funds" or
"account closed". After the checks were dishonored, ELC demanded payments from petitioner,
who failed to make good his undertaking to replace the checks. No formal written demand
letter or notice of dishonor, however, was sent to the petitioner. It was also established by the
prosecution that ELC, through its manager, issued several receipts covering several payments
in various amounts made by petitioner as replacement of some dishonored but returned
checks as well as for payment of materials purchased. No official receipts covering the
materials purchased, however, were presented in court as evidence.5
In his defense, petitioner did not deny that he issued the subject checks and that they were
dishonored upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank. He claimed, however, that
he already paid the amounts covered by the checks, totalling P284,340.50, including interest.
In support thereof, he submitted as evidence the following official receipts issued by ELC6
OFFICIAL
RECEIPT NO. DATE AMOUNT
3290 Apr. 24, 1990 P 65,000.00
3298 Apr. 27, 1990 90,733.50

3411 May 3, 1990 10,000.00

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
3683 Sept. 4, 1990 68,607.00
The other informations are similarly worded, except for the check number and their amounts
and the dates of issue which are hereunder itemized as follows: 3866 Jan. 5, 1991 50,000.00

CRIMINAL TOTAL P284,340.50

CASE NO. CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

5797 1759806 Apr. 19, 1990 P 25,000.00

According to petitioner, the difference between the total amount as reflected in the receipts
5798 1759808 Apr. 20, 1990 P 4,834.00 and the total amount covered by the subject checks represented interest.7 He also admitted
that he did not retrieve the dishonored checks as they were not yet fully paid.8
5799 1759810 Apr. 11, 1990 P 39,000.00
On March 13, 1996, the trial court rendered its judgment as follows:
1759812 Apr. 11, 1990 P 15,250.00

5800 1759811 May 2, 1990 P 12,550.00 (1) In Criminal Case No. 5796, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty

Page 59 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P81,800.00;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 5797, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P25,000.00;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 5798, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of THREE (3) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P4,834.00;
(4) In Criminal Case No. 5799, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of ONE (1) YEAR Imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P54,250.00; and
(5) In Criminal Case No. 5800, the accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of BP Bilang 22. He is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P12,550.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
In convicting petitioner, the trial court noted that petitioner had admitted the issuance and
dishonor of the subject checks, and he could not escape criminal liability as it found his
defense of payment off-tangent.10 It ruled that the alleged payments do not apply to the
subject checks but for the other materials purchased, and granting they were applicable, they
could only affect his civil liability.11 Further, the trial court concluded that a mathematical
computation of the payments made by the petitioner vis-a-vis the subject checks did not give
credence to the stance of petitioner. The trial court found it illogical for petitioner to have paid
more than the amounts covered by the subject checks without a single alleged payment
matching any of the amounts written in the subject checks, and with petitioner paying more
than his outstanding liabilities at some point.12
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court’s decision. The Court of Appeals found petitioner’s defense of payment untenable and
not proven by clear and convincing evidence. It further stated that even if there were
payment, petitioner failed to prove that it was made within five days from receipt of notice of
dishonor.13 In relation thereto, it ruled that the testimonial evidence of private complainant
declaring that immediate demands to pay were made on petitioner is in themselves notices of
Page 60 of 91
dishonor.14Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January
7, 1999.
Hence, this petition raising issues based on the alleged errors of the appellate court.
MAIN ISSUE:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IN THE FIVE (5) CRIMINAL CASES IS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE VIOLATION OF BP BILANG 22 AND SENTENCING
HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY IMPOSED THEREIN.
SUB-ISSUES
I
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN SHIFTING UNTO THE PETITIONER THE BURDEN OF
PROVING HIS OWN INNOCENCE INSTEAD OF LAYING THE BURDEN UPON THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENSE OF PAYMENT BY
PETITIONER DID NOT OVERTHROW THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS AND THAT
THE DEMANDS FOR PAYMENT MADE TO PETITIONER ARE IN THEMSELVES NOTICES OF
DISHONOR.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE
PAYMENTS MADE BY THE PETITIONER TO THE EVER LUCKY COMMERCIAL (ELC) AS
EVIDENCED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPT ISSUED BY ELC REFER TO OTHER TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND ELC AND NOT TO THE DISHONORED CHECKS.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S ANALYSIS
DEBUNKING PETITIONER’S DEFENSE OF PAYMENTS.15
In our view, the principal issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioner’s guilt has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Petitioner contends that he should be acquitted of all charges because he already paid his
obligations to Ever Lucky Commercial. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to
establish all the elements of the crime, particularly that he had knowledge of the insufficiency
of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks. This failure, according to
petitioner, can be traced to the prosecution’s inability to prove that notices of dishonor were
sent to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for appellee, argues that the payments made by
petitioner refer to different transactions and not to those covered by the checks subject
matter of this case. The OSG also avers that the verbal demands made by private
complainant are more than enough to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in the bank at the time he issued the checks.
At the outset, we must stress that as a general rule, the factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded respect and finality, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or palpable error,16 or when the trial court failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the
case.17 We find that the exceptions rather than the general rule apply in this case. We also
find the petition meritorious.
The law enumerates the elements of violation of B.P. 22, namely (1) the making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.18
The first and third elements of the offense are present and proved in these consolidated
cases. But we find that the second element was not sufficiently established.
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check
upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense.19 In several cases,20 we have
ruled that to hold a person liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check
was dishonored upon presentment. It must be shown further that the person who issued the
check knew at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. Because this
element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a
prima facie presumption of such knowledge.
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment
Page 61 of 91
in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee." (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In King vs. People,21 we held:
… The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also provides that
the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes
arrangement for its payment within five banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.
Thus, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and
that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment.22
Here, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court relied solely on the testimony of
prosecution witness Danilo Cac to the effect that private complainant immediately demanded
payment of the value of the checks after they were dishonored. Aside from this self-serving
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the giving and receiving of such notice.
The nature and content of said demands were not clarified. Even the date when and the
manner by which these alleged demands were made upon and received by petitioner were not
specified. Worse, the records do not show that formal and written demand letters or notices of
dishonor were ever sent to petitioner.
Where the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds does not arise due to the
absence of notice of dishonor of the check, the accused should not be held liable for the
offense defined under the first paragraph of Section 1 of B.P. 22.23
As held in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals24 a notice of dishonor personally sent to and
received by the accused is necessary before one can be held liable under B.P. 22. In that case,
we stated thus:
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the prima
facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of
BP Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing,
making, and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of
the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the
drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated." xx xx The absence of a notice of
dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness
require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under BP Blg. 22. (Underscoring supplied.)
In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption of knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot arise,
since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period.25
As stated earlier, the prosecution not only failed to prove the receipt by petitioner of any
notice of dishonor, the records are also bereft of any indication that written formal demand
letters or notice of dishonor were actually sent to petitioner. In recent cases, we had the
occasion to emphasize that not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand
letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also be proof of
receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return
receipt.
Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals,26 while Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does
not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with
Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such
drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal".
A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the
law. In our view, both the spirit and the letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the act
to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but
also that the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The
consistent rule is that penal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. In Victor Ting vs. Court of Appeals,27 we stated that when
service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that conditions exist on
which the validity of such service depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish
the fact of service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves
prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by petitioner of the
requisite written notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five banking days within
which to settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.
However, while petitioner is acquitted for violation of B.P. 22, he should be ordered to pay the
face value of the five dishonored checks plus legal interest in accordance with our ruling in
Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals.28 There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish a
case to warrant conviction, but clearly proved petitioner’s failure to pay a just debt owing to
the private complainant. Thus, petitioner was ordered to pay the face value of the check with
12 percent legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information until the
finality of the decision. It is well settled that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
Page 62 of 91
the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There appears to be no sound reason to
require that a separate civil action be still filed considering that the facts to be proved in the
civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. To require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money
on the part of all concerned.29
Finally, we agree that petitioner’s alleged prior payment is untenable. As found by the trial
court and by the Court of Appeals, it is unnatural and illogical for petitioner to have paid
more than his outstanding obligations. It is also unlikely that he would pay substantial
amounts of interest when nothing had been agreed upon on this matter. It is quite striking
how he could have generously paid more than what was due from him when he could hardly
pay private complainant in cash, and had to issue post-dated checks. Moreover, he could
have asked for the return of the checks as a matter of sound business practice and procedure
if indeed he already paid all the dishonored checks. The fact that these checks remained in
the possession of private complainant contradicts petitioner’s allegation of payment.30
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19764 is MODIFIED.
Petitioner BEN RICO is ACQUITTED of the charge for violation of B.P. 22 on the ground of
reasonable doubt. However, he is ordered to pay private complainant the face value of the
checks in the total amount of P178,434.00, with 12 percent interest per annum, from the
filing of the informations until the amount due is fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129764 March 12, 2002
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL D.L.
VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision1 dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision2 finding petitioner Geoffrey
F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks
Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals' resolution3 dated July 8, 1997
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard,
Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard,
Inc., issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986
for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986
for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.4
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to
be given not later than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986,
Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and
irrevocable.5
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on
May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had
earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.6
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R.
Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard
warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told
Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed "in our compound and under our
custody."7
On June 2, 1986,8 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps
Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand
letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to
fund them within the time prescribed by law.9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks
but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln's inability to fund said checks
Page 63 of 91
due to the strike.10Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard
that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and
auction sale on June 20, 1986,11 despite Lincoln Gerard's protest.12
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
73260 and 73261 were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his petition for review filed before
the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.1âwphi1.nêt
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 55276 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps
Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction sale.13 On July 19, 1991, the trial
court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds
thereof to Lincoln Gerard's arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln
Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess.14 The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount
of P254,600 as a result of the invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be
applied to the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant
corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes the defendant
corporation the amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order to get the true and
real damages that defendant corporation should pay the plaintiff corporation, the
balance of the rental arrears should be deducted from the amount of P1,120,540.00,
the total value of the items belonging to the plaintiff corporation and sold by the
defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and
executory.16
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were
remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that
expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty
on both counts for violation of B.P. 22,17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six
months on each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F.
GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law on two counts.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of
SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in
Criminal Case No. 41679, both of which shall be served consecutively.
Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the
Regional Trial Court Branch 69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court
has no record, this Court shall not resolve the same because they are either "Res
Judicata" or "Pendente Litis".
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision
dated March 14, 1997, the appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under
consideration is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate
court in a resolution dated July 8, 1997.20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA
decision and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN MAGNO V.
COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT LAID DOWN THE
DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE BASED ON AN
INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL
FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER
B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN
THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS
Page 64 of 91
AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980) INVOLVING THE
SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME TRANSACTION SUBJECT
OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE CASE
OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, ARE
CONTRAY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.21
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance.
Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless
checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the
second check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of
B.P. 22 with said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent.
Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated check would be
dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional
proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be
punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an obligation
when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the
notarial foreclosure and auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation
of B.P. 22 are present in this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the
five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided by the law and thus did not
extinguish petitioner's criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge,
through the note on the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered
with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was "final and irrevocable".22 The
OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one
that is not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient
funds and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since
according to the OSG, what B.P. 22 penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check that is dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the failure to pay a debt.23
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodge's notarial
foreclosure of Lincoln Gerard's properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since
damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made only after
the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period,
from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln
Gerard, Inc., has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on two counts and sentence of six
months imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was
upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. But private respondent appears to have collected more than the value of the two
checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the case for violation of B.P. 22.
Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced. To resolve this
issue, we must determine whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years
prior to the filing of the information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case,
however, does not appear to us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported
constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if essential to the decision of a
case and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well
to remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis
mota of a case.24
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments
incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of
Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each check that the check was
not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a
specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor
strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the company's inability to fund its checks.
Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if
written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks
would be presented for payment. "This is final and irrevocable", according to the note that
was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were
dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner.
But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks,
with more than one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of
Lincoln Gerard's properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or encourage
those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose
of the law.26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a
Page 65 of 91
policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment
to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution,27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and
potential wrongdoers".28 Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against
petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to
fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that
Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially
declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property for cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy
Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodge's custody
earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The
obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was only P301,953.12.30 Thus,
by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect
the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by
Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when,
almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of
B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.
was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as
involuntary.31 That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already
collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal
charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was
ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We
cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioner's conviction and sentence could be
upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge
has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and
auction sale as its chosen remedy.
That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in
deciding the petition for Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R.
SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioner's motion to quash the charges herein before
they were tried on the merits.32
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S.
Isnani:
"…We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both
charges in Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision
rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a
formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with the findings therein
made that the sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had
no justification under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in the said sale
should be deducted from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12
may only be the rentals in arrears which Lincoln should pay, computed at
P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as the trial
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in EVANGELINE DANAO, petitioner,
damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been deducted the amount of P47,953.12 vs.
representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently, there is COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
absolutely no consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks."33
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated
on procedural grounds because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
the proper remedy.34 In a petition for certiorari, only issues of jurisdiction including grave Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15031, "The People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline Claire Danao,"
abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and its Resolution denying her motion for
review. reconsideration.

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the On December 18, 1992, Evangeline Danao was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8385 and
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we 92-8386 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) before the
should not apply penal laws mechanically.35We must find if the application of the law is Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City. Except as to the numbers, amounts and dates
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When of the two (2) checks issued by Evangeline, the two (2) Informations in said criminal cases are
the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the similarly worded, thus:
law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization
would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already
more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of "That on or about the 23rd day of December 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
or equitable considerations. or draw and issue to Luviminda Macasieb, to apply on account or for value, the
checks described below:
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already
been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in Crim. Case Crim. Case
this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or No. 92-8385 No. 92-8386
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the
number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated Check No. 128796 130851
and other kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the Drawn Against PCI Bank PCI Bank
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.
In the Amount of P14,500.00 P15,000.00

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- Dated/Postdated Jan. 23, 1992 Jan. 24, 1992
G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, Payable to Cash Cash
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges
of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, accused did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
Costs de officio. amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored
SO ORDERED. by the drawee bank for the reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and, despite receipt of notice
of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said
G.R. No. 122353 June 6, 2001 check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice.

"Contrary to law."1

Page 66 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Upon arraignment on January 27, 1993, Evangeline pleaded "not guilty" to both charges.
Trial ensued thereafter.
The respective versions of the prosecution and the defense are summarized by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision as follows:
"Private complainant Luviminda Macasieb is in the business of rediscounting checks.
Arturo Estrada, the branch manager of the Monte de Piedad bank at Pasay City was
one of her agents, authorized to transact rediscounting business with any person for
and in behalf of the private complainant.
"Sometime in December 1991, appellant (Evangeline Danao) went to see Arturo
Estrada at his office to seek an additional loan, being a depositor and borrower of the
bank. Estrada had to refuse appellant's request, considering that her existing loan
had not yet been fully liquidated.
"Appellant then asked Estrada if he knew a private lender. Estrada informed
appellant that he knew one who lends money with postdated checks as security.
Appellant agreed to the arrangement, Estrada phoned private complainant Luviminda
Macasieb and told her of appellant's desire to get a loan with postdated checks as
security. Macasieb talked with appellant over the phone and explained that the
checks would be subject to a 10% interest every month. After the telephone
conversation with appellant, Macasieb instructed Estrada to release the amount of
P29,750.00 (Exh. "A") from the petty cash fund entrusted by her to Estrada. After
appellant received the said amount from Estrada, she issued two postdated checks in
the total amount of P29,750.00. The checks were Monte de Piedad Check No. 128796
dated 25 January 1992 in the amount of P14,750.00 (Exh. B); and the other check
No. 130851 dated 24 January 1992 in the amount of P15,000.00 (Exh. C).
"On the maturity dates of the two checks, private complainant deposited the same at
the PCIB Branch at Heroes Hill, Quezon City. However, the checks were dishonored
for the reason that the account of appellant had already been closed. Macasieb later
received check slips (Exhs. D and E) together with the returned checks. The returned
checks bear the stamped words "ACCOUNT CLOSED". Estrada informed appellant of
the dishonor of the checks and asked her to redeem the same but to no avail. A letter
was sent by Atty. Jose S. Padolina, counsel for private complainant, demanding that
appellant settle her obligation (Exh. F, p. 62, rec.). Appellant, however, failed to heed
the demand letter.
"The appellant does not deny that she issued the two postdated checks. She claims,
however, that she has fully paid private complainant."2
The trial court did not give credence to Evangeline's defense. On August 3, 1993, the trial
court convicted her as charged, thus:
Page 67 of 91
"V
"ADJUDICATION
"26. The PROSECUTION has proven beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of DANAO of
the crime charged in each of the INFORMATIONS. Her constitutionally-presumed
innocence has been overcome.
"27. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"27.1. The accused EVANGELINE CLAIRE DANAO is found guilty to violation of
Section 2, B.P. 22 in each of the above-entitled cases:
"27.2. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced in:
CRIM. CASE NO. 92-8385
"27.2.1. To suffer the penalty of imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) day
and a fine of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P14,750.00)
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
"27.2.2. To indemnify the private offended party, LUVIMINDA MACASIEB, the sum of
FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P14,750.00).
"27.2.3. To pay the said offended party damages at the rate of six (6) percent per
annum on the P14,750.00 from December 18, 1991 until the said amount is fully
paid.
CRIM. CASE NO. 92-8385
"27.2.4. To suffer the penalty of imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) day
and a fine of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
"27.2.5. To indemnify the private offended party, LUVIMINDA MACASIEB, the sum of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00).
"27.2.6. To pay the said offended party damages at the rate of six (6) percent per
annum on the (P15,000.00) from December 18, 1991 until the said amount is fully
paid.
xxx xxx x x x"3
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 15031, rendered its Decision4 on April
19, 1995 affirming in toto the trial court's Decision. Evangeline filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 28,
1995.
Hence the instant petition wherein Evangeline contends that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred -
"A.
x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF BOUNCING CHECK LAW
VIOLATION IS ABSENT, BECAUSE THE PRESUMPTION OR PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS DID NOT ARISE,
SINCE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE EVANGELINE'S RECEIPT OF, AS
WELL AS THE DATE WHEN SHE RECEIVED, THE COMPLAINANT'S LETTER OF
DEMAND.
"B.
x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED EVANGELINE HAD ALREADY PAID
THE SUBJECT ACCOUNT EVEN BEFORE THE COMPLAINANT'S LETTER OF
DEMAND, AS SHOWN BY COMPLAINANT'S STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT, EXH. "1".
"C.
x x x IN REJECTING AS EVIDENCE THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT, EXH. "1", ON
THE GROUND THAT IT IS INCOMPETENT, THAT IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT AND OF SECONDARY
EVIDENCE, DESPITE AND IN SPITE OF THE COMPLAINANT'S ADMISSION, IN OPEN
COURT UNDER OATH, THAT SHE WROTE IT IN HER OWN HANDWRITING AND
THAT ITS CONTENTS ARE TRUE.
"D.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT, EVEN IF THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT, EXH. "1", WERE
COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE, IT APPLIED TO OTHER ACCOUNTS, DESPITE AND
IN SPITE OF THE COMPLAINANT'S ADMISSION, IN OPEN COURT UNDER OATH,
THAT THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE THE ONLY LOAN TRANSACTION BETWEEN
THE COMPLAINANT AND THE ACCUSED EVANGELINE, AND NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT UNDER THE LAW THE APPLICATION OF PAYMENT SHOULD BE TO THE
SUBJECT ACCOUNT.
"E.
Page 68 of 91
x x x IN FURTHER ANCHORING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED EVANGELINE
TO PATENT CONJECTURES, UNWARRANTED INFERENCES AND PALPABLE NON-
SEQUITURS THAT CANNOT CURE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE
KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE, NOR NEGATE THE LEGAL EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECT
ACCOUNT BY THE ACCUSED BEFORE DEMAND.
xxx xxx xxx"5
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even finality on
appeal, except when it has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if
taken into account, would materially affect the result of the case. This exception is present
here.
We find that the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner's conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense.
The Information in each of the two criminal cases charges that petitioner Evangeline issued
the subject check, "knowing that at the time of issue thereof," she "did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of the
check upon its presentment," and that "despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the said accused
failed to pay the payee the face amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice."
Petitioner was specifically charged with violation of the first paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg.
22, which provides:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court." (Italics supplied)
The elements6 of the offense under the abovequoted provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In King vs. People,7 this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a
person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew
'at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.' Because this element involves a state
of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption
of such knowledge, as follows:
'SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.'’’
Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that
the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a
notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment."8
Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution."9 This
opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez,10 serves to "mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application."
In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg.
22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the
checks was ever presented during the trial. As found by the trial court itself, "(t)he evidence
however is not clear when Macasieb (private complainant) made the demands. There is no proof
of the date when DANAO received the demand letter (Exh. F)."11
Page 69 of 91
Obviously, in the instant case, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period
prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or prima
facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the
times she issued the checks did not arise.
It is clear that the essential element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit on the
part of petitioner is absent in the case at bar, not having been proved by the prosecution. On
this ground alone, petitioner should be acquitted.
Again, the ruling of this Court in King12 bears repeating:
"Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that
the accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish
that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or
she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the
check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof
that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law cannot prosper."
In the same vein, we clarified in Lao vs. Court of Appeals13 that "(a)lthough the offense
charged is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not thereby excused from its responsibility
of proving beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense, one of which is knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds."
The remaining assigned errors raised by petitioner are closely interrelated since they pertain
to her payment of the amounts of the subject checks even prior to complainant’s letter of
demand. We shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that while the demand letter is dated June 17, 1992 (Exh. "F"), the
Statement of Account (Exhs. "1" & "1-A") shows that as of June 5, 1992, she had paid to
complainant Macasieb P30,514.00, thus covering the amount of P29,500.00 of the two
checks.
We find that the payment made by Evangeline in the total amount of P30,514.00 has been
sufficiently and convincingly established by the very testimony of complainant herself. The
respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued that petitioner's payments were for "other
accounts". But that is not so, as can be clearly gleaned from the following testimony of
complainant Macasieb:
"Q: Regarding those other transactions, was Evangeline Danao ever able to make
good those other transactions as you mentioned several transactions?
"A: I do not think so because what she is using is the check of her mother. I
forgot the name - Samonte I think."14
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
"Q: How much was the partial payment? transactions" or checks are in the names of the latter's mother, clients or customers. There
can be no other conclusion then than that petitioner's payment of P30,514.00 pertains only
"A: More or less I think P30,000.00 something but that is for the other accounts to the subject checks.
with me using the other checks of her clients."15
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt the
"Q: You mean to say, after filing these cases or before filing these cases and after guilt of herein petitioner for violations of B.P. 22.
the first transaction was not made good you still continue doing business with her in
the rediscounting business? WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Danao is ACQUITTED of
"A: Not anymore because what she was furnishing before are I think the checks the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two counts for insufficiency of evidence. No
of the customers and through the checks of the customers I accepted."16 pronouncement as to costs.

"Q: Going back to this particular transaction - is this the only transaction of SO ORDERED.
Evangeline Danao which is under her name made between you and her?
G.R. No. 139292 December 5, 2000
"A: Yes, sir."17
JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG, petitioner,
"Q: But you still remember that statement of account in your own handwriting vs.
which was given to her? THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

"A: Yes, Attorney. This is my handwriting because sometime in June 1992 she DECISION
asked for an audience with me. This is the statement of account and these are the
payments that she was able to make from February to June. VITUG, J.:

"Q: Under your oath you will affirm that you have issued this statement of Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of having
account? violated Batas Pambansa ("B.P.") Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18) counts,
and sentenced to "suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for each count (eighteen
"A: Yes. [18] counts)." Petitioner was likewise "ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of
P573,800.00."1 The judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No.
"Q: And to the total amount of P30,514.00? 18497), was affirmed in toto by the appellate court.

"A: Yes. It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice
President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner
and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner issued and
"ATTY. DY: delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the
checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for
I am presenting this as evidence for the accused. I request that the same be this reason: "Account closed." The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up
marked as Exh. 1 for the accused and then the amount of P30,514.00 be petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks,
enclosed in parenthesis and to be marked as our Exh. 1-A."18 (Emphasis the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of
supplied) demand but that the latter ignored the demand.

It is plain that complainant established by her own admission that the subject checks are the On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before the
only particular transactions between her and petitioner and that the so-called "other Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. The Information read:

Page 70 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, No. 161177 September 18, 1991 100,000.00
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,000.00
complainant Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr., to apply on account or for value the dated
check/described below: No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00

"Check No. : 149900
No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00
Drawn Against : Traders Royal Bank
No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00
In the Amount of : P50,000.00
No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00
Dated/Postdated : June 24, 1991
No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00
Payable to : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.
No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00

"said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have sufficient funds No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00" 3

the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason `ACCOUNT
CLOSED' and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee
the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later consolidated and jointly tried following
banking days after receiving notice. the "not guilty" plea of petitioner when arraigned on 02 November 1992.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."2 On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of court,
premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment
but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans obtained by
Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-4466 to No. 92-4482, inclusive, petitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial
similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-4465 except as to the dates, the number, and court.1âwphi1 In the hearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner, through counsel, waived her
the amounts of the checks hereunder itemized - right to present evidence in her defense. Relying solely then on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, the lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The decision, as
heretofore stated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 15 February 1999.
"Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount
Reconsideration was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the appellate court.

TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991
TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991
No. 182074 July 30, 1991
No. 182084 August 30, 1991
No. 182078 September 15, 1991
No. 161183 September 18, 1991
P6,000.00 Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the following issues for resolution by the
Court -
3,000.00
"1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient to convict herein
29,700.00 petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22;
9,300.00
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it
6,000.00 affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, on the ground that a
written notice of dishonor is not necessary in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg.
6,000.00 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Lao vs. Court
of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572; (and)
Page 71 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering the alleged
written demand letter, despite failure of the prosecution to formally offer the same."4
The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks Law," provide:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. – It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check,
when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be
written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for
drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the
notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence
of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written
thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima
facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for
the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
Page 72 of 91
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice
that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such
check, if such be the fact."5 (Underscoring supplied.)
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance of
any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.6
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or
issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the
dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or
drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.
The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which
involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish.7 The presumption does not hold,
however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such
check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,8 this Court explained:
"x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the
mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to
pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment
in full by the drawee of such check.
"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator `a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.’ This was also compared `to certain
laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally
possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.’ In this light,
the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice
of dishonor is a `complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner
has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require – that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22."9
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the conviction of petitioner on the
supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor of the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial.15 Without the written notice of dishonor,
the checks and demanding payment therefor. The appellate court said: there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for establishing the
presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."16
"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his check (People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not require a written The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case to warrant conviction,
notice of the dishonor of such check. however, it has clearly proved petitioner's failure to pay a just debt owing to the private
complainant. The total face value of the dishonored checks, to wit-
"In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks were dishonored by the bank
when complainant Garcia made several oral demands upon her to pay the value of the checks 1âwphi1
in the amount of P573,800.00. Despite said demands, appellant failed and refused to pay the
"Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount
same. Moreover, complaining witness further testified that his lawyer made a written demand
upon appellant but the latter ignored said demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this
connection, appellant waived her right to present evidence or rebut complainant's testimony
that he made oral demands upon appellant to make good the dishonored checks and his TRB – No. 149900 June 24, 1991 P50,000.00
lawyer wrote her a demand letter.
TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991 6,000.00

"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the complainant's testimony with TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991 3,000.00
regard to the written demand by moving that it be stricken off the record for being hearsay,
hence, the same is admissible evidence. In the case of People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, the No. 182074 July 30, 1991 29,700.00
Supreme court ruled:
No. 182084 August 30, 1991 1,300.00
"`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below objected to the No. 182078 September 15, 1991 6,000.00
admission of the testimonies which are now being assailed as hearsay. This is fatal to
defendant-appellant's present posture since the failure to object to hearsay evidence No. 161183 September 18, 1991 6,000.00
constitutes a waiver of the x x right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence,
rendering the evidence admissible.'"10 No. 161171 September 18, 1991 100,000.00

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal.1âwphi1 The Court No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,900.00
agrees.
No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00
writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00
stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,"11 a mere oral notice or demand to pay would
appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00
spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished
No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00
thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.12 The consistent rule is No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00
that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.13 No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00

Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00
demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the
prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00" 17

evidence only those which are formally offered14 for judges must base their findings strictly on
Page 73 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be made good by petitioner. This amount, with 12% legal
interest per annum from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision, must
be forthwith settled.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Josephine
Domagsang is acquitted of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. She is ordered, however,
to pay to the offended party the face value of the checks in the total amount of P563,800.00
with 12% legal interest, per annum, from the filing of the informations until the finality of this
decision, the sum of which, inclusive of the interest, shall be subject thereafter to
12%, perannum, interest until the due amount is paid. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140665 November 13, 2000
VICTOR TING "SENG DEE" and EMILY CHAN-AZAJAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the February 12,
1999 decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch 45) finding petitioners guilty of seven (7)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Petitioners' version of the background events is as follows:
From 1991 to 1992, Juliet Ting "Chan Sioc Hiu" obtained loans, in the aggregate amount of
P2,750,000.00, from private complainant Josefina K. Tagle for use in Juliet's furniture
business. As payment thereof, Juliet issued eleven (11) post-dated checks which, upon
maturity, were dishonored for reasons of "Closed Account" or "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds." Juliet was subsequently prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Due to her financial difficulties, Juliet requested her husband Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and her
sister Emily Chan-Azajar (petitioners herein) to take over her furniture business, including
the obligations appurtenant thereto. Agreeing to Juliet's request, petitioners issued nineteen
(19) checks in replacement of the eleven (11) checks earlier issued by Juliet. The planned
take-over, however, never materialized since the Naga Hope Christian School, petitioner Emily
Chan-Azajar's employer in Naga, refused to let her resign to attend to her sister's business.
Since the planned take-over did not take place, petitioners requested Juliet to reassume her
Page 74 of 91
obligation to private complainant Tagle by replacing the checks they had previously issued to
the latter. Thus, Juliet replaced the nineteen (19) checks issued by petitioners with twenty-
three (23) Far East Bank checks in favor of Tagle. Petitioners then requested private
complainant Tagle to return the nineteen (19) checks they had issued to her. Instead of
returning the checks, Tagle deposited seven of the checks with MetroBank where they were
dishonored for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds."
On the other hand, private complainant Tagle alleged that sometime in April 1993, petitioners
obtained a loan of P950,000.00 from her, issuing several post-dated checks in payment
thereof. When the checks were deposited by Tagle with MetroBank, they were dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Tagle alleged that despite verbal and written
demands, petitioners failed to pay her the value of the dishonored checks.
Consequently, seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against
petitioners. Said informations are similarly worded except with respect to the check number,
the amount involved, and the date the check was issued. The information in Criminal Case
No. 94-131945 (the other cases are Criminal Case No. 94-131946, Criminal Case No. 94-
131947, Criminal Case No. 94-131948, Criminal Case No. 94-131949, Criminal Case No. 94-
131950, and Criminal Case No. 94-131951) charged:
That sometime prior to May 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
JOSEPHINE K. TAGLE, to apply on account or for value Producers Bank of the
Philippines, Check No. 946072 dated May 27, 1993 payable to CASH in the amount
of P250,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said JOSEFINA K. TAGLE the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
(p. 2, Original Records.)
Criminal Cases No. 94-131945 to 94-131951 were consolidated and jointly tried. When
arraigned, petitioners, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. During trial, the prosecution
presented only one witness, the private complainant, the testimony of Producer's Bank
representative Ferdinand Lazo being dispensed with after counsel for petitioners admitted the
dishonor of the checks subject matter of the action.
On March 16, 1995, the trial court found petitioners guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 in each of the seven cases, disposing as follows:
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused VICTOR TING and EMILY CHAN
AZAJAR are hereby found "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges
contained in Criminal Case Nos. 94-131945; 94-131946; 94-131947; 94-131948; 94-
131949; 94-131950 and 94-131951 and for each count, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment; to pay Josefina K. Tagle the total
amount of P950,000.00; and to pay the cost.
(p. 294, Rollo.)
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was docketed therein
as C.A.-G.R. No. 18054. However, the appellate court, on February 12, 1999, affirmed.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied for lack of merit. Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court,
given the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt or in the presence of facts creating
reasonable doubt.
The petition has merit.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law,
provides:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail
to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Page 75 of 91
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be committed, the following elements
must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon is presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (Sycip, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 125059, March
17, 2000).
An analysis of the evidence presented, however, shows that not all the aforementioned
elements have been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
That the seven checks in question were issued by petitioners is beyond dispute. Not only were
the dishonored checks presented in court, but petitioners even admitted signing the checks
and issuing them to private complainant. From the evidence on record, it is clear that
petitioners signed and issued the seven checks in question.
That the checks were dishonored is also clearly established. Section 3 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 provides that "the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the
reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said
check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and
that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by the
drawee on such dishonored check." In the instant case, the fact of the checks' dishonor is
sufficiently shown by the return slips issued by MetroBank, the depository bank, stating that
the checks had been returned for the reason "DAIF — Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Not
only are these check return slips prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the
checks, but the defense did not present any evidence to rebut these documents. In fact,
counsel for petitioners even admitted the fact of the checks' dishonor, agreeing to dispense
with the presentation of the bank representative who was supposed to prove the fact of
dishonor of said checks (p. 162, Rollo.).
However, for liability to attach under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is not enough that the
prosecution establishes that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently
dishonored. The prosecution must also prove the second element, that is, it must further
show that the issuer, at the time of the check's issuance, had knowledge that he did not have
enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. Since the
second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to verify, Section 2 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present (Magno v. People, 210 To prove that petitioners received a notice of dishonor, the prosecution presented a copy of
SCRA 471 [1992]). Section 2 provides: the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioners through registered mail and its corresponding
registry receipt. Private complainant Josefina Tagle, the sole witness for the prosecution,
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.— The making, drawing, and testified thus:
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from Q: Now, when these seven (7) checks bounced for insufficiency of funds, what
the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency step did you take?
of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check A: I demanded the return of my money from them.
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee."
Q: Now, what was the reply of the two accused?
In truth, this Court declared in King v. People (G.R. No. 131540, December 2, 1999) that "the
prima facie presumption arises when the check is issued. But the law also provides that the A: They kept on promising that they will pay but up to now they have not
presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes paid any single centavo.
arrangement for its payment 'within five banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.' Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy Q: What other step did you take?
the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution… This opportunity, however,
can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor." Thus, the presumption A: I requested my lawyer to write a demand letter.
that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after
it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonorand that, within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its Q: And that demand letter was sent to the accused?
payment.
A: Yes, Sir.
King v. People, decided by this Division, involves a set of facts similar to the case at bar. In
said case, the accused therein was proven to have issued eleven checks, all of which were Q: In what manner?
duly filled up and signed by her. It was also clearly established that these eleven checks were
dishonored, as shown by the checks themselves which were stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED" A: By registered mail.
and further supported by the return tickets issued by PCI Bank stating that the checks had
been dishonored. Yet, even if the prosecution had already established the issuance of the
checks and their subsequent dishonor, this Court still required the prosecution to show that Q: Now, was that demand letter received by the two accused?
the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds by proving that he or she received a notice of
dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or A: Yes, Sir.
make arrangement for its payment.
Q: What is your evidence?
Moreover, in Lina Lim Lao v. CA (274 SCRA 572 [1997]), we emphasized that "the full payment
of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a A: The return card.
'complete defense.' The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
Q: If you are shown anew the copy of the demand letter which is already
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to
marked as Exhibit B, would you be able to recognize the same?
demand — and the basic postulate of fairness require — that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under
BP 22." A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Is that the one that you are referring to?

Page 76 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
A: Yes, Sir. existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice,
§ 18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was
Q: How about the return card, is that correct? sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil
cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section
A: Yes, Sir, this is the one. 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the
registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be
Q: Now, upon receipt of this letter by the two accused, did the two accused presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt
pay the amount of the said check? alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present
the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter
A: No, Sir. was sent.

Q: So what did you do next?
A: I told my lawyer to file charges against them.
Q: You mean the present charge?
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. Acuesta:
That is all, Your Honor.
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand letter by the
prosecution. As can be noticed from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the
demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove mailing, it presented a copy of the demand
letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was made to show that the
demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry
return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of
private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact,
the prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return receipt was proof enough
that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same was actually
received by petitioners or their agents.
As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that
the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must
prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon
the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of
notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by
mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had
Page 77 of 91
Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135,
Rollo.). Given petitioners' denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to
present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the
same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it
merely presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the
same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners.
Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be
properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central Trust Co. v.
City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).
Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a
duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that
"[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the
addressee's written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressee's
name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it." In the case at
bar, no effort was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their
agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence
that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners
or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible
that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however,
cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners
received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the
insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.
As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000), "penal statutes must be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused." Likewise, the
prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense to make up for its
own blunders in prosecuting an offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense,
petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
That petitioners are civilly liable to private complainant is also doubtful. Private complainant
claims that petitioners borrowed Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) Pesos from her
on or about the end of April 1993, in payment of which petitioners issued several post-dated
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
checks in her favor. The seven checks issued by petitioners as payment for the amount
borrowed add up to P950,000.00. If private complainant is the businesswoman that she
claims to be, she should be collecting interest on the loan she granted to petitioners. In other
words, the amount to be repaid by petitioners should be more than P950,000.00, to account
for interest on the loan. The checks issued by petitioners, however, do not provide for
interest. It is thus more credible that the seven checks involved in this case form part of
nineteen checks issued to replace the checks issued by Juliet Ting to private complainant.
This conclusion is bolstered by private complainant's admission in her reply-affidavit that
more than seven checks were issued by petitioners (p. 11, Original Records). In said reply-
affidavit, private complainant states that "respondents issued and delivered to me in Manila
several checks, which partially include their seven (7) bouncing checks herein. I say 'partially'
because I will have to file additional bouncing check cases against them, as these other
checks likewise bounced." Furthermore, in the same reply-affidavit, private complainant
claims that the checks in question were not replaced, allegedly because the replacement
checks must first be cleared, which did not happen in this case. By implication, had the 23
Far East Bank checks issued by Juliet Ting to replace the nineteen checks issued by
petitioners been cleared, then private complainant would have considered the checks in
question as having been replaced. This only supports our conclusion that it was Juliet Ting
who owed money to private complainant, not petitioners.
Moreover, the original debtor Juliet Ting was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila
in Criminal Cases 93-126581-91 for eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
These eleven bouncing check cases involved the same obligation being sued upon by private
complainant Tagle herein. The trial court expressly acknowledged in said cases that nineteen
(19) checks were issued by petitioners as payment for Juliet Ting's obligation. In its August 7,
1997 decision convicting Juliet Ting for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the trial court
declared that "to cover the additional loans, accused (Juliet Ting) delivered 19 post-dated
checks issued by Victor Ting and Emily Azajar (p. 55, Rollo.)." The trial court's decision
further provides:
Since she could not fund the other checks (Exhs. B to K), she replaced the same with
19 post-dated checks of her husband Victor Ting and her sister Emily Azajar totaling
P2,450,000.00. They issued the checks as they would take over her furniture
business. The intended partnership of Victor and Emily was aborted as the latter was
not allowed to resign from her teaching post in Naga City. She then replaced the
checks issued by Victor and Emily with her own checks – 23 FEB post-dated checks
per list (Exh. 9) prepared by Suzanne Azajar.
Despite receipt of the replacement checks, complainant refused to return the checks
of Victor and Emily and even filed cases against them.
(p. 56, Rollo.)
Not having borrowed the amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00) from private
complainant, petitioners may not thus be held liable therefor.
Page 78 of 91
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999 REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Victor Ting "Seng Dee" and Emily Chan-Azajar are hereby ACQUITTED of the
charges against them for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence
to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No special pronouncement is made
as to costs.
G.R. No. 131540 December 2, 1999
BETTY KING, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the
accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also established that the
accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount
due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received
such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Check Law cannot prosper.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the January 30, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CR No.
18226 and its November 5, 1997
Resolution 3 denying reconsideration. The CA affirmed the June 14, 1994 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila 5 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3335 to 93-
3345 which convicted petitioner of 11 counts of violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Check Law.
On April 28, 1993, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime A. Adoc filed against
petitioner eleven separate Informations, 6 which are identically worded, except for the check
number, the amount and the date, as follows:
That in or about the month of January, 1992 in the Municipality of Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to EILEEN FERNANDEZ herein
represented by ________ to apply on account or for value the check described
below:
EQUITABLE BANK
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Check No. 021711
In the amount of P50,000.00
Postdated July 24, 1992
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of
the face amount of such check upon their presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account
Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor the accused failed to
pay the face amount thereof or make arrangement for the full payment
thereof within five (5) working days after receiving notice. 7
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution
presented its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without
leave of court, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The trial court denied the Demurrer in its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence without prior
leave of court is DENIED for lack of merit.
Since accused has waived her right to present evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the eleven (11) above-entitled cases and is
ordered to:
1. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3335;
2. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3336;
3. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3337;
4. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P64,200.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P64,200.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3338;
Page 79 of 91
5. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P66,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P66,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3339;
6. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P100,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P100,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3340;
7. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3341;
8. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3342;
9. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3343;
10. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3344; and,
11. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of
P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3345. 8
As already stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in this wise: 9
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed [I]N TOTO. Costs
against appellant.
Hence, this Petition. 10
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General 11 summarized the facts, as viewed by the prosecution, in
this wise:
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
On several occasions in January, 1992, at Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
petitioner discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable
Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of
P1,070,000.00 in exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When
the checks were deposited for payment, they were dishonored by the drawee
bank because they were drawn against an account without sufficient funds.
Petitioner failed to make good the checks despite demand. (Memorandum
dated April 7, 1993 of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor)
During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the
prosecution offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Petitioner admitted
the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented.12
Evidence for the Defense
As noted earlier, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In doing so,
she waived her right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of
the documentary exhibits adduced by the
prosecution. 13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution proved all the
elements of the crime. The CA also pointed out that the failure of petitioner to sign the
pretrial order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her conviction was based on the
evidence presented during the trial.
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
I
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
admitting in evidence all the documentary evidence of the prosecution
though their due execution and genuineness were not duly established in
evidence pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence;
II
Page 80 of 91
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
declaring that Rule 118, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the
case of Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 446, which states that no
agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall
be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by him and his counsel, is inapplicable in the case at bar;
III
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
ruling that the burden of evidence has already been shifted from the
prosecution to the defense despite the definite factual issues in the pre-trial
order; and
IV
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
albeit the prosecution did not produce any evidence. 14
In the main, the resolution of the Petition hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
This Court's Ruling
The Petition has merit insofar as it contends that the elements of the crime charged have not
all been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Documentary Evidence
Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same
matter, they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution during pretrial are inadmissible, because she did not
sign the pretrial agreement as required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court. 15 Hence, she argues that there is no basis for her conviction.
True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction of
petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial,
all of which were admitted without any objection from her counsel. During the hearing on
September 17, 1993, the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the return
check tickets addressed to private complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
petitioner that the checks had been dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice September 1992, showing that the said letter was dispatched
had been returned to sender. Petitioner's counsel did not object to their admissibility. This is properly by the Central Post Office of Makati;
shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on September 17,
1993: Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post Office
dated 21 September 1992;
COURT:
Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central Post
You have no objection to the admissibility, not that the Court Office letter dated 24 September 1992, addressed to this
will believe it. representation showing that there were 3 notices sent to the
herein accused who received the said letter.
ATTY. MANGERA
COURT:
No, Your Honor.
Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the third
COURT: slip?

Exhibits "A" to "A" to "K" are admitted. ATTY. MANGERA:

ATTY. MAKALINTAL: We have no objection as to the due execution and

authenticity.
We offer Exhibit "L", the return-check ticket dated July 27,
1992, relative to checks No. 021745 and 021746 indicating COURT:
that these checks were returned DAIF, drawn against
insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July Admitted.
28, 1992, relative to Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720
likewise indicating the said checks to have been drawn ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
against insufficient funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned
check ticket dated July 29, 1992, relative to Check Nos.
021749 and 021748, having the same indications; We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the purpose of
showing that there was demand duly made on the accused
and that the same had been appropriately served by the
Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992 Central Post Office Services of Manila.
relative to Check Nos. 021750 and 021753, with the same
indications;
ATTY. MANGERA:
Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, 1992
relative to Check No. 021752, having the same indication as We admit as to the due execution and authenticity only as to
being drawn against insufficient funds; that portion, Your Honor.

Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by Atty. COURT:

Horacio Makalintal dated August 3, 1992;
We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In other
Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification addressed to the words, at this point, he makes an offer and the Court will
Postmaster General sent by the same law office dated 17
Page 81 of 91
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
either grant admission, [admit] it in evidence or deny it. It
can deny admission if it is not properly identified etcetera.
ATTY. MANGERA:
I think it is already provided.
COURT:
So, admitted.
ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the prosecution
rests. 16
From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered
and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of
Appeals 17 would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted
during which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based
solely on the stipulation of facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not
signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in
evidence under Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt.
In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented during trial,
and not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during
the trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of
Rule 129 which reads:
Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said
documentary evidence.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements
of the offense. After a careful consideration of the records of this case, we believe and so rule
Page 82 of 91
that the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner's conviction for
violation of BP 22.
Sec. 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:
Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than
one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues
a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be
liable under this Act.
Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows: 18
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value.
2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned elements
which the trial and the appellate courts relied upon.
Issuance of the Questioned Checks
Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that
she merely signed the questioned checks without indicating therein the date and the amount
involved. She adds that they were improperly filled up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she
concludes, she did not "issue" the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, which defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in
form to a person who takes it as a holder." 19
Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A"
to "K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted
that she signed those checks. On the other hand, no proof was adduced to show that
petitioner merely signed them in blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of the
former's instructions or their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that
petitioner issued eleven checks, all of which were duly filled up and signed by her.
Checks Dishonored
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no evidence on record
that the subject checks were unpaid and dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to
pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid,
shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such
dishonored check."
In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the
checks themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was
further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI Bank, the depository bank,
stating that the checks had been dishonored.
Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored
the checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution's claim.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check
knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element
Page 83 of 91
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows: 21
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing
and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check
or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity
to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held
in Lozano v. Martinez, the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in
its application." 22 This opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused
of a notice of dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court in Lina Lim Lao v. Court of
Appeals: 23
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the
violator a "compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates
to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is
abated." This was also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal possessors
of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed
firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability." In this
light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense." The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner
has a right to demand — and the basic postulates of fairness require — that
the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22.
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency
of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five
banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment.
To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented
Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make good said checks . . .. Appellant failed
to pay the face value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full payment thereof
within 90 days after receiving the notice." 24
Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the checks had
been dishonored.
True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the
latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not
receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter addressed to complainant's counsel
certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 . . ..
" 25
Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the prosecution failed to
adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused
to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of
dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that
petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from
complainant by staying in different address. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot
take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the
evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that
the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the
insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil liability,
for the issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us.
We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. 26 Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall
on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the
defense.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of the crimes charged. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 84 of 91
G.R. No. 162822 August 25, 2005
JAIME GUINHAWA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles, including
Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display
room for cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as
his sales manager.
On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van with
Motor No. 4D56A-C8929 and Serial No. L069WQZJL-07970 from the Union Motors
Corporation (UMC) in Paco, Manila. The van bore Plate No. DLK 406. Guinhawa’s driver,
Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was
traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack.
The van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched
into the canal parallel to the highway.1 The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be
replaced.
The incident was reported to the local police authorities and was recorded in the police
blotter.2 The van was repaired and later offered for sale in Guinhawa’s showroom.3
Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo wanted to buy a new van
for their garment business; they purchased items in Manila and sold them in Naga
City.4 They went to Guinhawa’s office, and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on
display. The couple inspected its interior portion and found it beautiful. They no longer
inspected the under chassis since they presumed that the vehicle was brand new.5 Unaware
that the van had been damaged and repaired on account of the accident in Daet, the couple
decided to purchase the van for ₱591,000.00. Azotea suggested that the couple make a
downpayment of ₱118,200.00, and pay the balance of the purchase price by
installments via a loan from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Naga Branch, with
the L-300 Versa Van as collateral. Azotea offered to make the necessary arrangements with
the UCPB for the consummation of the loan transaction. The couple agreed. On November 10,
1995, the spouses executed a Promissory Note6 for the amount of ₱692,676.00 as payment of
the balance on the purchase price, and as evidence of the chattel mortgage over the van in
favor of UCPB.
On October 11, 1995, the couple arrived in Guinhawa’s office to take delivery of the van.
Guinhawa executed the deed of sale, and the couple paid the ₱161,470.00 downpayment, for
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
which they were issued Receipt No. 0309.7They were furnished a Service Manual8 which
contained the warranty terms and conditions. Azotea instructed the couple on how to start
the van and to operate its radio. Ralph Silo no longer conducted a test drive; he and his wife
assumed that there were no defects in the van as it was brand new.9
On October 12, 1995, Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda Pingol, went to Manila on
board the L-300 Versa Van, with Glenda’s husband, Bayani Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip
to Manila was uneventful. However, on the return trip to Naga from Manila on October 15 or
16, 1995, Bayani Pingol heard a squeaking sound which seemed to be coming from
underneath the van. They were in Calauag, Quezon, where there were no humps along the
road.10 Pingol stopped the van in Daet, Camarines Norte, and examined the van underneath,
but found no abnormalities or defects.11 But as he drove the van to Naga City, the squeaking
sound persisted.
Believing that the van merely needed grease, Pingol stopped at a Shell gasoline station where
it was examined. The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had been
welded. When Pingol complained to Guinhawa, the latter told him that the defects were mere
factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that Guinhawa change
the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles within a week or two, with the additional costs
to be taken from their downpayment. Meanwhile, the couple stopped paying the monthly
amortization on their loan, pending the replacement of the van. Guinhawa initially agreed to
the couple’s proposal, but later changed his mind and told them that he had to sell the van
first. The spouses then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for
examination. Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr., the mechanic, examined the van and discovered that
it was the left front stabilizer that was producing the annoying sound, and that it had been
repaired.12 Raquitico prepared a Job Order containing the following notations and
recommendations:
1. CHECK UP SUSPENSION (FRONT)
2. REPLACE THE ROD END
3. REPLACE BUSHING
NOTE: FRONT STEP BOARD HAS BEEN ALREADY DAMAGED AND REPAIRED.
NOTE: FRONT LEFT SUSPENSION MOUNTING IS NOT ON SPECIFIED
ALIGNMENT/MEASUREMENT13
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of their money
before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and
Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC before it was
sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew
their complaint from the DTI.
Page 85 of 91
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph 1,
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code against Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Naga City. After the requisite investigation, an Information was filed against Guinhawa in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City. The inculpatory portion reads:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City accuses Jaime Guinhawa of the crime of
OTHER DECEITS defined and penalized under Art. 318, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
"That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being a motor vehicle dealer using the
trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and a dealer of brand
new cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud private complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said
accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said private
complainant, as brand new, an automobile with trade name L-300 Versa Van colored beige
and the latter paid for the same in the amount of ₱591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the
same was not brand new because it was discovered less than a month after it was sold to
said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had defects in the underchassis and
stepboard and repairs had already been done thereat even before said sale, as was found
upon check-up by an auto mechanic; that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa
Van to the accused and demanded its replacement with a new one or the return of its
purchase price from said accused but despite follow-up demands no replacement was made
nor was the purchase price returned to private complainant up to the present to her damage
and prejudice in the amount of ₱591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus other damages that
may be proven in court."14
Guinhawa testified that he was a dealer of brand new Toyota, Mazda, Honda and Mitsubishi
cars, under the business name Guinrox Motor Sales. He purchased Toyota cars from Toyota
Philippines, and Mitsubishi cars from UMC in Paco, Manila.15 He bought the van from the
UMC in March 1995, but did not use it; he merely had it displayed in his showroom in Naga
City.16 He insisted that the van was a brand new unit when he sold it to the couple.17 The
spouses Silo bought the van and took delivery only after inspecting and taking it for a road
tests.18 His sales manager, Azotea, informed him sometime in November 1995 that the
spouses Silo had complained about the defects under the left front portion of the van. By
then, the van had a kilometer reading of 4,000 kilometers.19 He insisted that he did not make
any false statement or fraudulent misrepresentation to the couple about the van, either
before or simultaneous with its purchase. He posited that the defects noticed by the couple
were not major ones, and could be repaired. However, the couple refused to have the van
repaired and insisted on a refund of their payment for the van which he could not allow. He
then had the defects repaired by the UMC.20 He claimed that the van was never involved in
any accident, and denied that his driver, Olayan, met an accident and sustained physical
injuries when he drove the van from Manila to Naga City.21 He even denied meeting Bayani
Pingol.
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
The accused claimed that the couple filed a Complaint22 against him with the DTI on January
25, 1996, only to withdraw it later.23 The couple then failed to pay the amortizations for the
van, which caused the UCPB to file a petition for the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and
the sale of the van at public auction.24
Azotea testified that he had been a car salesman for 16 years and that he sold brand new
vans.25 Before the couple took delivery of the vehicle, Pingol inspected its exterior, interior,
and underside, and even drove it for the couple.26He was present when the van was brought
to the Rx Auto Clinic, where he noticed the dent on its front side.27 He claimed that the van
never figured in any vehicular accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte on March 17,
1995.28 In fact, he declared, he found no police record of a vehicular accident involving the
van on the said date.29 He admitted that Olayan was their driver, and was in charge of taking
delivery of cars purchased from the manufacturer in Manila.30
On November 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Guinhawa. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the accused,
JAIME GUINHAWA, guilty of the crime of Other Deceits defined and penalized under Art.
318(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment from 2
months and 1 day to 4 months of Arresto Mayor and a fine of One Hundred Eighty Thousand
Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos (₱180,711.00) the total amount of the actual damages
caused to private complainant.
As to the civil aspect of this case which have been deemed instituted with this criminal case,
Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
"In case of fraud, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation."
"Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant."
Thus, accused is condemned to pay actual damages in the amount of One Hundred Eighty
Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos (Php180,711.00), which represents the 20%
downpayment and other miscellaneous expenses paid by the complainant plus the amount of
Page 86 of 91
Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty-One (Php19,241.00) Pesos, representing the 1st
installment payment made by the private complainant to the bank. Accused is, likewise,
ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php100,000.00) in view of the moral pain suffered by the complainant; for exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) to serve as
deterrent for those businessmen similarly inclined to take undue advantage over the public’s
innocence. As for attorney’s fees, the reasonable amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php100,000.00) is hereby awarded.
SO ORDERED.31
The trial court declared that the accused made false pretenses or misrepresentations that the
van was a brand new one when, in fact, it had figured in an accident in Labo, Daet,
Camarines Norte, and sustained serious damages before it was sold to the private
complainant.
Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in
which he alleged that:
1. The lower court erred in its finding that the repair works on the left front portion and
underchassis of the van was the result of the accident in Labo, Camarines Norte, where its
driver suffered an attack of hypertension.
2. The lower court erred in its four (4) findings of fact that accused-appellant made
misrepresentation or false pretenses "that the van was a brand new car," which constituted
deceit as defined in Article 318, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant civilly liable to complainant Josephine
Silo. But, even if there be such liability, the action therefor has already prescribed and the
amount awarded was exhorbitant, excessive and unconscionable.32
Guinhawa insisted that he never talked to the couple about the sale of the van; hence, could
not have made any false pretense or misrepresentation.
On August 1, 2002, the RTC affirmed the appealed judgment.33
Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), where he averred that:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF OTHER
DECEITS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF TWO MONTHS AND ONE
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
DAY TO FOUR MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF
₱180,711.00.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
₱180,711.00 AS DOWNPAYMENT, ₱19,241.00 AS FIRST INSTALLMENT WITH UCPB NAGA,
₱100,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES, ₱200,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
₱100,000.00 AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.34
On January 5, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of
the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby partially granted insofar as
the following are concerned: a) the award of moral damages is hereby REDUCED to
₱10,000.00 and b) the award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages are
hereby DELETED for lack of factual basis. In all other respects, We affirm the decision under
review.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.35
The CA ruled that the private complainant had the right to assume that the van was brand
new because Guinhawa held himself out as a dealer of brand new vans. According to the
appellate court, the act of displaying the van in the showroom without notice to any would-be
buyer that it was not a brand new unit was tantamount to deceit. Thus, in concealing the
van’s true condition from the buyer, Guinhawa committed deceit.
The appellate court denied Guinhawa’s motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file the
present petition for review on certiorari, where he contends:
I the material averments of the Information, the petitioner was charged with other deceits
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INFORMATION CHARGED
AGAINST PETITIONER DID NOT INFORM HIM OF A CHARGE OF OTHER DECEITS.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER EMPLOYED FRAUD OR
DECEIT AS DEFINED UNDER ARTICLE 318, REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
Page 87 of 91
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES POINTING TO
THE INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER.36
The issues for resolution are (1) whether, under the Information, the petitioner was charged
of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether
the respondent adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the petitioner’s guilt for the crime
charged.
The petitioner asserts that based on the allegations in the Information, he was charged
with estafa through false pretenses under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering the allegation that the private complainant was defrauded of ₱591,000.00, it is
the RTC, not the MTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner
maintains that he is not estopped from assailing this matter because the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction can be assailed at any time, even on appeal, which defect cannot even be cured
by the evidence adduced during the trial. The petitioner further avers that he was convicted
of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a crime for which
he was not charged; hence, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the charge against him. And in any case, even if he had been charged of other
deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318, the CA erred in finding him guilty. He insists that
the private complainant merely assumed that the van was brand new, and that he did not
make any misrepresentation to that effect. He avers that deceit cannot be committed by
concealment, the absence of any notice to the public that the van was not brand new does
not amount to deceit. He posits that based on the principle of caveat emptor, if the private
complainant purchased the van without first inspecting it, she must suffer the consequences.
Moreover, he did not attend to the private complainant when they examined the van; thus, he
could not have deceived them.
The petitioner maintains that, absent evidence of conspiracy, he is not criminally liable for
any representation Azotea may have made to the private complainant, that the van was brand
new. He insists that the respondent was estopped from adducing evidence that the vehicle
was involved in an accident in Daet, Camarines Norte on March 17, 1995, because such fact
was not alleged in the Information.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that, as gleaned from
under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC. The petitioner was correctly charged and convicted, since he falsely
claimed that the vehicle was brand new when he sold the same to the private complainant.
The petitioner’s concealment of the fact that the van sustained serious damages as an
aftermath of the accident in Daet, Camarines Norte constituted deceit within the meaning of
paragraph 1 of Article 318.
The Information filed against the petitioner reads:
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being a motor vehicle dealer using the
trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and dealer of brand
new cars, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud private complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said
accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said private
complainant, as brand new, an automobile with trade name L-300 Versa Van colored beige
and the latter paid for the same in the amount of ₱591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the
same was not brand new because it was discovered less than a month after it was sold to
said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had defects in the underchassis and
stepboard and repairs have already been done thereat even before said sale, as was found
upon check-up by an auto mechanic; that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa
Van to the accused and demanded its replacement with a new one or the return of its
purchase price from said accused but despite follow-up demands no replacement was made
nor was the purchase price returned to private complainant up to the present to her damage
and prejudice in the amount of ₱591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus other damages that
may be proven in court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.37
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the Information must
allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
The real nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts alleged in the body of
the Information and the punishment provided by law, not by the designation or title or
caption given by the Prosecutor in the Information.38 The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged.39
As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged the essential elements of the
crime under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new
(when, in fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads:
Page 88 of 91
Art. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount
of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any
person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
This provision was taken from Article 554 of the Spanish Penal Code which provides:
El que defraudare o perjudicare a otro, usando de cualquier engaño que no se halle expresado
en los artículos anteriores de esta sección, será castigado con una multa del tanto al duplo del
perjuicio que irrogare; y en caso de reincidencia, con la del duplo y arresto mayor en su grado
medio al máximo.
For one to be liable for "other deceits" under the law, it is required that the prosecution must
prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other
than those in the preceding articles;
(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party
suffered damage or prejudice.40 It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to
part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles
315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code.41 It is intended as the catchall provision for that
purpose with its broad scope and intendment.42
Thus, the petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
misplaced. The said provision reads:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new,
is not the deceit contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a
statement ascribes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic
character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those
particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary.43
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be conferred by the will of
the parties, nor diminished or waived by them. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the filing of the criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides that
the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six years, irrespective of the amount of the fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor, the MTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense lodged against the petitioner.
On the merits of the petition, the Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that there is
no evidence on record that he made direct and positive representations or assertions to the
private complainant that the van was brand new. The record shows that the private
complainant and her husband Ralph Silo were, in fact, attended to by Azotea. However, it
bears stressing that the representation may be in the form of words, or conduct resorted to by
an individual to serve as an advantage over another. Indeed, as declared by the CA based on
the evidence on record:
Petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal representation that the herein
subject van was brand new for the simple reason that nowhere in the records did he ever
refute the allegation in the complaint, which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It
has thus become admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles – a fact
which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when private
complainant went to petitioner’s showroom, the former had every right to assume that she
was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned
out, not only did private complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also
earlier figured in a road accident when driven by no less than petitioner’s own driver.44
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Indeed, the petitioner and Azotea obdurately insisted in the trial court that the van was brand
new, and that it had never figured in vehicular accident. This representation was accentuated
by the fact that the petitioner gave the Service Manual to the private complainant, which
manual
contained the warranty terms and conditions, signifying that the van was "brand new."
Believing this good faith, the private complainant decided to purchase the van for her buy-
and-sell and garment business, and even made a downpayment of the purchase price.
As supported by the evidence on record, the van was defective when the petitioner sold it to
the private complainant. It had ditched onto the shoulder of the highway in Daet, Camarines
Norte on its way from Manila to Naga City. The van was damaged and had to be repaired; the
rod end and bushing had to be replaced, while the left front stabilizer which gave out a
persistent annoying sound was repaired. Some parts underneath the van were even welded
together. Azotea and the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the private
complainant when she bought the van, obviously so as not to derail the sale and the profit
from the transaction.
The CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may be committed by omission. As the Court
held in People v. Balasa:45
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including
all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious
means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
it to his legal injury.46
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the law
denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party
sought to know.47 Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose
may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to
deceive.48 Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is
equivalent to a false representation.49 Moreover, a representation is not confined to words or
positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to
mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.50
Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent
concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made
when opportunity to speak and inform was presented, and that the party to whom the duty of
disclosure, as to a material fact was due, was induced thereby to act to his injury.51
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
Article 1389 of the New Civil Code provides that failure to disclose facts when there is a duty
to reveal them constitutes fraud. In a contract of sale, a buyer and seller do not deal from
equal bargaining positions when the latter has knowledge, a material fact which, if
communicated to the buyer, would render the grounds unacceptable or, at least,
substantially less desirable.52 If, in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly allowed the
vendee to be deceived as to the thing sold in a material matter by failing to disclose an
intrinsic circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing that the vendee is acting upon
the presumption that no such fact exists, deceit is accomplished by the suppression of the
truth.53
In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van had figured in an accident,
was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom,
thus making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner and
Azotea even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the vehicle did not
figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the van was brand new,
knowing that the private complainant was going to use it for her garment business. Thus, the
private complainant bought the van, believing it was brand new.
Significantly, even when the petitioner was apprised that the private complainant had
discovered the van’s defects, the petitioner agreed to replace the van, but changed his mind
and insisted that it must be first sold.
The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful concealment of material
facts, even if the private complainant made a visual inspection of the van’s interior and
exterior before she agreed to buy it and
failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the vendee made only a partial
investigation and relies, in part, upon the representation of the vendee, and is deceived by
such representation to his injury, he may maintain an action for such deceit.54 The seller
cannot be heard to say that the vendee should not have relied upon the fraudulent
concealment; that negligence, on the part of the vendee, should not be a defense in order to
prevent the vendor from unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud.
In one case,55 the defendant who repainted an automobile, worked it over to resemble a new
one and delivered it to the plaintiff was found to have warranted and represented that the
automobile being sold was new. This was found to be "a false representation of an existing
fact; and, if it was material and induced the plaintiff to accept something entirely different
from that which he had contracted for, it clearly was a fraud which, upon its discovery and a
tender of the property back to the seller, [it] entitled the plaintiff to rescind the trade and
recover the purchase money."56
On the petitioner’s insistence that the private complainant was proscribed from charging him
with estafa based on the principle of caveat emptor, case law has it that this rule only
requires the purchaser to exercise such care and attention as is usually exercised by
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ordinarily prudent men in like business affairs, and only applies to defects which are open
and patent to the service of one exercising such care.57 In an avuncular case, it was held that:
… The rule of caveat emptor, like the rule of sweet charity, has often been invoked to cover a
multitude of sins; but we think its protecting mantle has never been stretched to this extent.
It can only be applied where it is shown or conceded that the parties to the contract stand on
equal footing and have equal knowledge or equal means of knowledge and there is no relation
of trust or confidence between them. But, where one party undertakes to sell to another
property situated at a distance and of which he has or claims to have personal knowledge
and of which the buyer knows nothing except as he is informed by the seller, the buyer may
rightfully rely on the truth of the seller’s representations as to its kind, quality, and value
made in the course of negotiation for the purpose of inducing the purchase. If, in such case,
the representations prove to be false, neither law nor equity will permit the seller to escape
responsibility by the plea that the buyer ought not to have believed him or ought to have
applied to other sources to ascertain the facts. …58
It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every opportunity to reveal to the private
complainant that the van was defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the
prejudice of the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had no special
knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the surrounding circumstances, she relied on
her belief that the van was brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioner’s
fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment.
The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on his general
manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective fraudulent silence. Case law
has it that wherever the doing of a
certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the performance of certain business is
confided to an agent, the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often
referred to, carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts which are
the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.59
The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from two months and one day, as
minimum, to four months of arresto mayor, as maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty
imposed by the trial court. This is erroneous. Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides that the law will not apply if the
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year:
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted
of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at
Criminal Law Arts. 312-318 w/ bp22
the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act
No. 4225.)

In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was four months
and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC was proscribed from imposing an
indeterminate penalty on the petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the
minimum of the penalty is
one year or less, and the maximum exceeds one year. For example, the trial court may
impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, since the maximum term of
imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the trial court opts to impose a penalty of
imprisonment of one year or less, it should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but a
straight penalty of one year or less instead. Thus, the petitioner may be sentenced to a
straight penalty of one year, or a straight penalty of less than one year, i.e., ten months or
eleven months. We believe that considering the attendant circumstances, a straight penalty of
imprisonment of six months is reasonable.

Conformably with Article 39 in relation to paragraph 3, Article 38 of the Revised Penal Code,
the petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment if he has no property with which to pay
the penalty of fine.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding
circumstances of the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of
six (6) months imprisonment. The petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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