CNR

G.R. No.
104988 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigations
Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P.
PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and Third
Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a
Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber
dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its
permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time
material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of
the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent
it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.1 The team was not
able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board
feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders.5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April
1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of
lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents
being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under seizure.6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for
operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned
specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-
322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to submit
documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if
the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for
transport lumber using "recycled" documents.7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No.
NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit
should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had
already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April
and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the
approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard.9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The
case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the
said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued
by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan
of different sizes and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April
1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series
of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had
already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the team went inside and
saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber
loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the
transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the
wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's
photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing
or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a
constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by
issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and
general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11whose dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against

respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as
amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal
documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task
Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as
follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and
vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft.
of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3
May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of
Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized from the Lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990
(Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report and bring
to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the
said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as
directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court
regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck
bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus
oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks
mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner is withheld in this
case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber, shorts and
sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's
truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional
mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and
accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the
seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled
that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17 And, although the search
warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is
settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the
search.18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized
articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued
by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered
moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner
admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed
the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings
based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even grantingarguendo that lumber falls within
the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an
illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then
pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of
lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required by
forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit
the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues
raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession
of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D.
No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has always been
foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is
important to consider is that when appellant was required to present the valid documents showing its
acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March
1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which
was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies;
(b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still
under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack
of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the
definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building
purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved in a
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even without warrant any
person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He
shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing
the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the
offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal
of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the
petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424

The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge
an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in
the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized
under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an
exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject
matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent, without the required
legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the
"lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction
"and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. --
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private respondents
obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68,
the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four
corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of
the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint
Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to
infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads
of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa which are classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the
basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against

respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and
supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion
that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without
the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said
section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest
products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition
of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." 32Simply put,
lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the
petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid
exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No.
1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence
of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days.
Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one
day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day
period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor
included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible error
has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents
to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to
25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to
Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and
ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber
dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling attempts to block the
serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to
the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to
violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or
her successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the petitioner
to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions
of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August 1991
Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has
charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry
Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in
his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the facts comprising the
charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question, private respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in
a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to
quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal
documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber"
defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was
denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition
of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa
included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included)
punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by
DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped
outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to
accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are both within the greater
Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from
the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal
documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989,
that defines "lumber" to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise
through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December
1987, to be --
. . . any piece of wood having an average diameter of at least 15 centimeters and at 1.5 meters long,
except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard tools
in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80,
Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall include
logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as
well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its
finished form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR
Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is
merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show any
CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the presumption that the lumber has
been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648
sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the possession without required legal
documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer
to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that
only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance --
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,3 subscribed
and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the latter recommended the filing
of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency
continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later
on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx
"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr.
Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended
by Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products
without the required documents."4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside
the compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other
things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required documents.6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran, authorized the
confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks
of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the
Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of lauan and almaciga
lumber without required legal documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the
possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was
covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber" should be
held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the
standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should,
however, be no serious objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in
the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People
vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the
judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they
were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and
the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled
into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from
making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that
the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those
admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan,
or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has undergone processing. In
defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer to --
. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be --
except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products"
shall include "lumber --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called
upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or
construction is congruous with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but
it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in nature, of
extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the
well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever
remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of
lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage
of remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The prosecution seeks, in its petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 106424, the annulment of the 16th August 1991
Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of private respondent Ri Chuy Po to quash the information that has
charged him with the Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry
Reform Code, as amended by Executive Order ["EO"] No. 2771) and the 18th October 1991 Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The information of 04 June 1991, containing the alleged inculpatory facts against private respondent, reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor hereby accuses RI CHUY PO of the crime of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in
his possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Private respondent, on 10 July 1991, moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the facts comprising the
charge did not amount to a criminal offense, or in the alternative, to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question, private respondent having formally challenged the legality of the seizure of the lumber in question in
a civil case before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 35, and now pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, the trial court promulgated its now questioned order granting the motion of private respondent to
quash the information. It ruled that, unlike the possession of "timber or other forest products" (without supporting legal
documents), the mere possession of "lumber" had not itself been declared a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration insisting that lumber should be held to come within the purview of "timber"
defined by Section 2.26 (b) of DENR Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986. The motion for reconsideration was
denied; hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the prosecution before this Court.
Private respondent maintains (1) that PD 705 distinguishes "timber" and "other forest products," on the one hand, from
"lumber" and "other finished wood products," on the other, and that the possession of lumber of any specie, size or
dimension, whether it be lauan, tanguile, apitong, almaciga, supa, or narra, is not under that law declared a criminal
offense; (2) that DENR Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1987, totally bans the cutting, handling and disposition
of almaciga trees but that possession of almaciga lumber is not considered illegal; (3) that while under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, the cutting or gathering of narra and other premium hardwood species (supa
included) is prohibited, it does not, however, make possession of premium hardwood lumber (narra and supa included)
punishable by mere inference; and (4) that Bureau of Forest Development Circular No. 10, Series of 1983, clarified by
DENR Memorandum No. 12, Series of 1988, requires a certificate of lumber origin ("CLO") only on lumber shipped
outside the province, city or the greater Manila area to another province or city or, in lieu of a CLO, an invoice to
accompany a lumber shipment from legitimate sources if the origin and destination points are both within the greater
Manila area or within the same province or city, and not, like in the instant case, where the lumber is not removed from
the lumber yard.
Petitioner counters (1) that the almaciga, supa and lauan lumber products found in the compound of Mustang Lumber,
Inc., are included in Section 68, PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, the possession of which without requisite legal
documents is penalized under Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989, dated 17 March 1989,
that defines "lumber" to be a --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise
through a standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;
and "timber," under Section 1.11 of DENR Administrative Order No. 80, Series of 1987, dated 28 December
1987, to be --
except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size;
which may either be --
a) Squared timber (or) timber squared with an ax or other similar mechanical hard tools
in the forest and which from the size of the piece and the character of the wood is
obviously unfit for use in that form (Sec. 1.10 DENR Administrative Order No. 80,
Series of 1987, dated December 28, 1987); or
b) Manufactured timber (or) timber other than round and squared timber shall include
logs longitudinally sawn into pieces, even if only to facilitate transporting or hauling, as
well as all sawn products, all timber hewn or otherwise worked to approximate its
finished form, such as house posts, ship keels, mine props, ties, trolly poles, bancas,
troughs, bowls, cart wheels, table tops and other similar articles (Sec. 2.26, DENR
Administrative Order No. 50, Series of 1986, dated November 11, 1986) --
(2) that to exclude "lumber" under Section 68 of PD 705 would be to defeat the purpose of the law, i.e., to stop or
minimize illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of forest resources; (3) that the claim of private
respondent that a CLO is required only upon the transportation or shipment of lumber, and not when lumber is
merely stored in a compound, contravenes the provisions of Section 68 of PD 705; (4) that the failure to show any
CLO or other legal document required by administrative issuances raises the presumption that the lumber has
been shipped or received from illegal sources; and, (5) that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 90-53648
sustaining the legality of the seizure has rendered moot any possible prejudicial issue to the instant case.
The real and kernel issue then brought up by the parties in G.R. No. 106424, as well as in the two consolidated cases
(G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784), is whether or not the term "timber or other forest products" the possession of
which without the required legal documents would be a criminal offense under Section 68 of PD 705 also covers
"lumber".
Prefatorily, I might point out that the information, charging private respondent with the possession without required legal
documents of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa, . . ." has failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer
to "timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before the Court, however, would indicate that
only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment. For instance --
(a) The pertinent portions of the joint affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng,3 subscribed
and sworn to before State Prosecutor Claro Arellano, upon which basis the latter recommended the filing
of the information, read, as follows:
"That during the weekend, (April 1 and 2, 1990) the security detail from our agency
continued to monitor the activities inside the compound and in fact apprehended and later
on brought to the DENR compound a six-wheeler truck loaded with almaciga and lauan
lumber after the truck driver failed to produce any documents covering the shipment;
xxx xxx xxx

"That we are executing this affidavit in order to lodge a criminal complaint against Mr.
Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber for violation of Section 68, P.D. 705, as amended
by Executive Order 277, having in its possession prohibited wood and wood products
without the required documents."4 (Emphasis supplied)
(b) The resolution, dated 14 May 1991, issued by Investigating Prosecutor Arellano, approved by
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, confirmed that --
" . . . On April 1 and 2 1990, the security detail continued to monitor the activities inside
the compound and in fact apprehended a six-wheeler truck coming from the compound of
Mustang loaded with almaciga and lauan lumber without the necessary legal documents
covering the shipment."5
(c) The 23rd April 1990 Order of then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, suspending the Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469 of Mustang Lumber, Inc., was issued because of, among other
things, the latter's possession of almaciga lumber without the required documents.6
(d) The subsequent 03rd May 1990 Order, likewise issued by Secretary Factoran, authorized the
confiscation of approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks
of various sizes and dimensions owned by Mustang Lumber, Inc.7
(e) The complaint filed on 27 July 1990 by Vincent A. Robles, Chief, PIC/SAID, DENR, before the
Department of Justice, Manila, against private respondent was for possession of lauan and almaciga
lumber without required legal documents,8 in violation of P.D. 705, as amended by EO 277.
(f) The prosecution, in its opposition to private respondent's motion to quash, sought to argue that the
possession of "almaciga, supa and lauan lumber found in the compound of Mustang Lumber, Inc.,9 was
covered by the penal provisions of P.D. 705, as amended, pursuant to Section 32 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 19, Series of 1989.
Indeed, the instant petition itself questions the quashal order of the court a quo solely on the thesis that "lumber" should be
held to be among the items that are banned under Section 68 of PD 705.
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the
standing rule that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be challenged, there should,
however, be no serious objections to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in
the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. As early as the case of People
vs. Navarro, 10 reiterated in People vs. Dela Rosa, 11 the Court has had occasion to explain --
. . . It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the
judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they
were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and
the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled
into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from
making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that
the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those
admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.
And now on the main substantive issue.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any
I agree with the court a quo that the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, is explicit, and it is confined to
"timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest product" to mean --
(q) . . . timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan,
or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands (emphasis supplied);
and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3(aa) of the law, from that which has undergone processing. In
defining a "processing plant," this section of the decree holds it to refer to --
. . . any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products (emphasis supplied).
In fine, timber is so classified, under Section 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been
categorized, under Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.
The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:
(1) Section 1.11 of the DENR Order No. 80, dated 28 December 1987, Series of 1987, which defines "timber" to be --
except all mangrove species which in all cases, shall be considered as timber regardless of size; 12
(2) Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, dated 17 March 1989, Series of 1989, stating that "lumber"
includes --
. . . solid wood not further manufactured other than sawing, resawing, kiln-drying and passing lengthwise through a
standard planing machine, including boules or unedged lumber;" and
(3) DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, dated 06 May 1988, to the effect that the term "forest products"
shall include "lumber --
cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.
While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called
upon to implement the enactment, 13 the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such interpretation or
construction is congruous with the governing statute. 14 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect 15 but
it would be legal absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those which are penal in nature, of
extending the scope of the law or its plain
mandate. 16
Accordingly, and with respect, I vote to deny the petition in G.R. No. 106424, to grant the petition in G.R. No. 104988
and to require comment on the petition in G.R. No. 123784. I must hasten to add, nevertheless, that I do appreciate the
well-meant rationale of DENR Memorandum Order No. 36, Series of 1988, for, indeed, the need for preserving whatever
remains of the country's forest reserves can never now be fully emphasized. Until properly addressed and checked, the
continued denudation of forest resources, already known to be the cause of no few disasters, as well as of untold loss of
lives and property, could well be on end the expected order of the day. I, therefore, join ail those who call for the passage
of remedial legislation before the problem truly becomes irreversible.
G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS
FLORES, respondents.
Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon in
Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo, Arrozal, Luis Flares and twenty other John
Does," dismissing the information filed therein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which
read:
That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, Municipality
of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with twenty (20) other John Does
whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion
Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title
No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent
of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60)
logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including
government charges, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.
Contrary to Law.
Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo).
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo), The
reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p.42, Rollo).
On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following questions of law: (1) whether or
not the information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and the opinion of the trial
court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section
68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question
was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut,
gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease,
license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the
information that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or
permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
We agree with the petitioner.
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.— Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117,
Sec. 2 [a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162
[1958]; People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or
other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the
government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority
under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:
. . ., it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the logs were
done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that timber is a forest
product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the taking was without the
consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective. (p. 39, Rollo)
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the
logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of
complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or
lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those
produced in private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA
349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber in private lands. This Court held therein:
The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber
which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the
latter having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.
The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, which reads;
"Sec. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land
containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the
same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the
boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of
Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may
require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such
land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its
registration in the Bureau of Forestry."
In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that non-compliance with the requirement
would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership would be
transferred to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the
plaintiff under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license issued by the
Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also ownership of everything found on its
surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code).
Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to
exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266
of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:
"Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered
private lands. — The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products
cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which is not registered with
the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law; Provided, however, That in the
absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and
other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry
Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the other forest
products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting,
gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the
charges prescribed in such cases in this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a
private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he
still retained his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) — the very rights
violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company.
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not
follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in
private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its
surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking
was without any authority or license from the government.
Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender
in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver
within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products,
tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.
If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be done within
a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized
products, materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry
administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.
The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency,
barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or
authority provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials,
shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall
file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the
violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau
of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the
offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed
in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.
In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The
alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to
any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party
to the fiscal.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree
with the observation of the Solicitor General that:
. . ., the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the
commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of Section 80
may be considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer
assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development, or any of
the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence. Such
interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80 deals precisely with the
authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute criminal actions involving offenses
defined in the Decree. (p. 26, Rollo).
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative
Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime.
Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. — A provincial fiscal shall have
authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor.
To this end, he may summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear and testify upon oath before
him. . . .
With the exception of the so-called "private crimes" 1 and in election offenses, 2 prosecutions in Courts of First Instance
may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D.
705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority. Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of
preliminary investigations. In both cases under said Sec. 80 namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for
offenses committed in his presence); or 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the
decree (for violations not committed in his presence) — he is still required to file the proper complaint with the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section should not be
interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the
decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to arrest and investigate
offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the information is SET
ASIDE. Criminal Cases No. 1591 is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 27, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a
total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the
City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the
following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate place
within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within
forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and protected
to ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by
E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and regulations shall
render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with
existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as the
herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.[4]
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and
Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They
proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising
the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site,
together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees
cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market
value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng,
Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market price as P182,447.20
(Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25
or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.[6]
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing
stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit.
He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he
was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He
stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that
the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the
trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior,
Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees
without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL
CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS
of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25,
representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay
their proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are
acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional
liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and
February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further
ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago
and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found
guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the
cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court
of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court
of Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because
petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners
contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down
the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the
prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago
because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not
questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[10] For questions to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.[11] The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.[12]
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case,
petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered,
collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut
trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy
to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was
covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really
intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to
convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership,
association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

ANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable of
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City,
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended.Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B.
Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain
Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged
with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.[7]
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996
recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against
petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through
a Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo
and Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being
the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position
and committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all private individuals,
namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and mutually helping one another did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes
belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet
valued at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint
Affidavit[13]of the personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned Villarin as one of
the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the
affiants. They also asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like
Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its Order[14] dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac,
and Baillo to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the
Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but same was, however, denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not based on newly
discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon, prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public
utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons,
one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10
to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor
Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19] Being then the
president of a community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain
Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber was already
placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the
timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and Boyatac
delivered the timber.[23]
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac
bought a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and
covered the pile with coconut leaves.[24]
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning, prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of
RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a
bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong
flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26]and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that
the timber was already delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for the
confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City,
Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge.The project was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability
of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo
and Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the
timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the security
guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of Boyatacs demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act
on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners
and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion
of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[29]
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de
Oro City, was the one who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac
mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The
accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for the repair of
the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The
Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the
bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[30]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the
RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants
Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68
of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22, 2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME
COURT;
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME

COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY

THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING]
VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As
Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike
Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who
appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary
investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the
prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had
no intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the
prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38]The said complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither
was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-
affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities
do not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the
accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.[39] They knew
about the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity
to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating prosecutor of their innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying
Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation
was properly conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who
is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his
affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of
Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses.[41]
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the
trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which,
necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well
as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation.[42]
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However,
when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed
the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the
alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he
is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a principal in the commission of the offense. However, whether
Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in
questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March 13,
1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.[45]
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs.Notwithstanding the
incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally
[46]
Sheet to prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and
appraised value of said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated
timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the timber
taken by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that
Latayada and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned the procurement of the timber[51] for the repair of
the Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac
later informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his possession thereof was legal
and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the incident on December 31, 1995
that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not only by one but several persons from
Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken
when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally
cut lumber?
A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain of
Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to be used to build his house and he told
me he will sell it for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials for the repair of the bridge in
Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications.
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those specification?

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and he let me sign it.
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber
flitches you ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

A Boyatac.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.

A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada the compensation for the delivery of
those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?

A To Latayada.
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

A No, Sir.
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to
Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. GALARRITA:
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How much?
A P2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?

A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?

A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting of lumber from
Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is

malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the timber.[53] Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where
it is found.[54]
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin
and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent
authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally
cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus delicti had not been established. They assert that the
failure to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber. Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation.
The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they
were charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established that factual findings of a trial court are binding
on us, absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[57] The legal precept
applies to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]
The Proper Penalty
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of timber without the requisite legal documents
measuring 4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among
others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range
of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310
of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be deducted from P108,150.00, which results
to P86,150.00. This remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8)
years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty should be taken anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the
penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.
Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22,
2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano
Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano
Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

104988 June 18, 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The material operative facts are as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against

WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:

5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 106424

(1) almaciga and lauan; and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed against

G.R. No. 104988

G.R. No. 123784

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

xxx xxx xxx

And now on the main substantive issue.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:

The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:

cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.

VITUG, J., dissenting:

which may either be --

xxx xxx xxx

And now on the main substantive issue.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO No. 277, reads:

The various DENR issuances, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit:

cannot, in my view, go beyond the clear language of the basic law.

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for private respondents.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Lucena City, 7 January 1977. (p.17, Rollo).

We agree with the petitioner.

xxx xxx xxx

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

ERNESTO AQUINO, G.R. No. 165448

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and G.R. No. 175289

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Version of the Prosecution

The filing of the aforestated Information followed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.

In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was denied by the

RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF PRELIMINARY

2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE SUPREME

3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY