Thea Faye B.

Cahuya JD-1A

EDCEL LAGMAN, ET AL VS. AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, ET AL

G.R. No. 235935/236061/236145/236155, February 6, 2018

Facts:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao
for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the
Maute and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, the President submitted to the Senate and
the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him
to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 3883 while the
House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the
Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same. On July 18, 2017, the President requested
the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July
22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216
until December 31, 2017. In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP
Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January
1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.” On the same basis,
Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the President. The President, in a letter,
asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may
determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4

Issues:
1. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for
extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216.

Ruling:
1. No. The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress
in the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted
rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.
Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its
rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or
publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to
the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as
urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This
Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the
President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.
Furthermore, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the rules that
governed the Joint Session were in fact adopted, without objection, by both Houses of Congress
on December 13, 2017. 107 So also, the Transcript of the Plenary Proceedings of the Joint Session
showed that Members of Congress were, upon request, granted extension of their time to
interpellate.
 2. Yes. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for
the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.
A. Rebellion persists
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that
the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its
"remnants" have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on
through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued attacks. The AFP General Guerrero cited, among others, the
continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies and the AFP’s data
showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members
of the Dawlah Islamiyah. These accounts ineluctably show that the rebellion that spawned the
Marawi crisis persists, and that its remaining members have regrouped, substantially increased in
number, and are no less determined to tum Mindanao into a DAESH/ISIS territory. The
termination of armed combat in Marawi does not conclusively indicate that the rebellion has
ceased to exist. It will be a tenuous proposition to confine rebellion simply to a resounding clash
of arms with government forces. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots." Accordingly, it would be error to
conclude that the rebellion ceased to exist upon the termination of hostilities in Marawi.
B. Public safety requires the extension
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the
extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public. The
information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the
Executive Department. Thus, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the
Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the
scrutiny of the Court. The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP
gave its "briefing" or "presentation" during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been
vetted by the NICA, "based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground," from personalities
they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified official documents, and
intelligence obtained by the PNP.175 According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for
updates, was given to the Congress. 176 As it stands, the information thus presented has not been
challenged or questioned as regards its reliability. The facts as provided by the Executive and
considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is
significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for
the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4.
Thea Faye B. Cahuya JD-1A

EDCEL LAGMAN, ET AL VS. AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, ET AL

G.R. No. 235935/236061/236145/236155, February 6, 2018

Dissenting Opinion of J. LEONEN

Facts: See majority decision.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for
extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216.

Opinion:
1. Yes. Court may look in the manner in which the Congress deliberated on the
President’s request for extension of martial law as long as the Congress gravely abused its
discretion. Congress may provide for oversight in the exercise of powers by the President as
Commander-in-Chief. Such oversight may be to ensure that the fundamental rights of citizens are
guaranteed even under a state of martial law or with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The possible abuse of discretion in the lack of oversight exercised by Congress is
not in issue in this case but, in my view, should likewise be justiciable due to the extraordinary
nature of these Commander-in-Chief prerogatives.
Both the President and Congress also gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to make public the powers that are to be exercised by the military, the remedies, and the
strategy. Public participation in quelling the Congress gravely abused its discretion in that it
extended the proclamation of a state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus (a) without a proper presentation of all the facts in their proper context; (b)
without examining the basis of the conclusions inherent in the allegations of facts by the military;
( c) without knowing the powers that will be exercised that are unique to the declaration of a state
of martial law; and ( d) without ascertaining why there needed to be a longer extension in the same
area even with the declaration of continued victories by the military. All these were unexamined
because of the existence of the fifth ground that rendered the extension unconstitutional. There
was (e) a lack of deliberation. The deliberation was hobbled by the late request submitted by the
President to extend the declaration and the rules of Congress which unconstitutionally restricted
discussion. Each representative of each district and each nationally elected Senator were given
only three minutes to interpellate, clarify, and express their dissent, if any.

2. No. the sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of the proclamation of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus consists of two (2)
elements. Both elements must prove rebellion and the necessity of the extraordinary powers for
public safety purposes.
The facts even only as alleged by the government, assuming them to be true, do not
adequately show that there is the kind of rebellion that requires a declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. First, by the Executive's own admission, the neutralization
of at least "920 DAESH-inspired fighters" as well as their leaders fast-tracked the clearing of
Marawi City, hastened its liberation, and paved the way for its rehabilitation.86 The numbers of
the purported DAESH-inspired groups have gone down and as a result, "remnants" of these groups
are now only in the process of rebuilding through recruitment operations. In other words, the
government, in so far as the purpose for declaring martial law through Proclamation No. 216,
Series of 2017 is concerned, already achieved its target.
The absence of the public safety necessity for a declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ is clear from the documents presented. Marawi City has
been liberated and is undergoing rehabilitation. Moreover, by President's own admission, the AFP
"has achieved remarkable progress in putting the rebellion under control." Strangely, the President
sought the extension of martial law not just for public safety but for other objectives as well. In his
Letter to Congress, he stated that "public safety indubitably requires such further extension, not
only for the sake of security and public order, but more importantly to enable the government and
the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable
socio-economic growth and development."64 Certainly, these objectives could be achieved
through the ordinary efforts of the local government units concerned. These are not bases for the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law. These statements are a
grave cause for concern as they imply sinister motives to use martial law to undermine the legal
order.
Both the President and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Guerrero confirmed
to assert that the recruitment "pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders the
speedy rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment of
lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao." Again, apart from
being simply allegations, early recovery is clearly not a constitutional basis for the use of
Commander-in-Chief’s powers. If it is, then logically the labyrinth of our procurement law,
misunderstanding among local government officials, and corruption can also be basis for a future
declaration of martial law.
In addition, there is absolutely no basis for the extension of martial law in the area
requested, that is, the entire Mindanao region. The on-going recruitment operations and
reorganization efforts alleged to be "geared towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed
public uprisings" are admittedly being carried out only in Central Mindanao, particularly "in the
provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan." This is not yet the
area of operations but merely the recruitment areas. The President and his advisers also failed to
explain why Congress should "further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year"
or from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Likewise, there is no explanation why the original
period of 60 days was insufficient. There was likewise no explanation why the first extension of a
few months was also not enough.
Thea Faye B. Cahuya JD-1A

EDCEL LAGMAN, ET AL VS. AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, ET AL

G.R. No. 235935/236061/236145/236155, February 6, 2018

Dissenting Opinion of J. CARPIO

Facts: See majority decision.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial
review.
2. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The concurrent power of the legislative and the executive to extend the
proclamation or suspension is circumscribed by the clause "if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it." To give effect to this clause, paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution vests the Court with the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
extension. In other words, mere concurrence of the two political branches is not enough. The Court
is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of the extension.

2. Justice Carpio vote to grant the consolidated petitions for three reasons. First, the
Maute rebellion, which was the basis of Proclamation No. 216, already ceased with the death of
its leader Isnilon Hapilon and the liberation of Marawi City. The government did not present any
evidence of an ongoing rebellion by the Maute group in other places of Mindanao outside of
Marawi City to justify the extension of Proclamation No 216. In various media appearances,
representatives from the government and the army confessed that Marawi City was already
contained and under control. Second, threats to security posed by remnants of the defeated rebel
groups do not constitute an actual rebellion. Respondents cannot rely on the capability of the
remnants of the defeated rebels to deprive duly constituted authorities of their powers as a
justification for the extension of the state of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
To emphasize, capability to rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to extend
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. To allow martial law on
the basis of an imminent danger or threat would unlawfully reinstate the ground of "imminent
danger" of rebellion or invasion, a ground that was intentionally removed from the 1987
Constitution. Third, neither can the NPA rebellion justify the extension of Proclamation No. 216,
considering that the NPA rebellion was not the same rebellion that led to the initial martial law
declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ under Proclamation No. 216. Even the
ponencia concedes that Proclamation No. 216 did not contemplate the NPA rebellion as factual
basis.· For one, the NPA merely "took advantage of the situation and intensified their decades-
long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist attacks x x x, as well as guerilla
warfare," all of which suggests that the perceived "intensified" insurgence happened after the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216. For another, when Proclamation No. 216 was issued, the
government and the NPA were undergoing peace negotiations. Hence, to belatedly expand the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216 as to include the NPA rebellion will violate Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, Joint Resolution No. 4 lacks sufficient factual basis, thereby
making it unconstitutional.