Civil Law
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 127263.
April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at the Church of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After
some time, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his
father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal
separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains and granted the custody
of their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the
different parts of her body and was even
choked by him when she started spanking
their son when the latter ignored her while
she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight
physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied
her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no
marriage license during their marriage.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license
at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time of
said marriage celebration to warrant a
declaration of its absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent. The
pieces of evidence on record showed that on
the day of the marriage ceremony, there was
no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage
license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on
September 17,1974, almost one year after
the ceremony took place on November 15,
1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil
Code. those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character, are void ab initio. This is clearly
applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological
incapacity of private respondent need no
longer detains the Court. It is mooted by the
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized.
Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
AM No. MTJ 02-1309,
April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged
respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the
presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized
the marriage of Aranes and Dominador
Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s
residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction and without
the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and
Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped
that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but
neither of them claimed it. In addition, no
record also appeared with the Office of the
Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony,
he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and
advised them to reset the date considering
the absence of the marriage license.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized
the marriage on the assurance of the couple
that they will provide the license that same
afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the
couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of
solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside
his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His
act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him
to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage”.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador
M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733.
January 27, 2006.
Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of
Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of
Administration of the estate of deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively).
Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia,
a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they
should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The
trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a
legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in
the case as she claimed that she possessed
the status of an acknowledged legitimate
natural child, hence, she should be the sole
heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said
that the spouses were living together without
marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was
substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in
this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as
the administrator of the estates of the
deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole
administrator of the estate noting that Josefa
and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.
Ruling:
The Court held, through the testimonies of
the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa
and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is
presumed that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, such testimonies shall prevail.
Since, no marriage had occurred between
the two, the estate must be settled in different
proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot
be appointed as the sole administrator of the
estate of the deceased.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL,
ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for annulment of
marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living
together as husband and wife for at least five
years exempts them from obtaining a
marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead
Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and
Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be
computed based on cohabitation as
“husband and wife” where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the
years immediately before the day the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years, and continuity—
that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. Consequently, void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either
party, but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329.
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers
that she was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out of that marriage. On
22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand,
claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married,
he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
Issue:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in
solemnizing the marriage valid?
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides
“No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other.
Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the
Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license.
It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the
impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Carlos vs Sandoval
Ponente: REYES, R.T., J.:
FACTS:
● Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia
died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
● During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he
agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share
of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.
● Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land
were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the
name of petitioner.
● On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He
was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon
Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
● petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of
the absence of the required marriage license
. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos
II.
● Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of
the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real
properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued
in the name of respondents. He argued that
the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.
● Evidence used by respondents for
existence marriage:
o affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage.
o Certificate of Live Birth of respondent
Teofilo II. → late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as
parents
● Petitioner presented a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan,
certifying that there is no record of birth of
respondent Teofilo II.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not a party outside of marriage
can file for nullity of marriage
2. Whether or not Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriage is
applicable in this case
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
● (1) it depends:
o General rule: A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by
the husband or wife.
o Exceptions:
▪ (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” (March
15, 2003)
▪ (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
o Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole
right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
▪ Reason:
● they do not have a legal right to file the
petition.
● Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
● State’s concern is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.
o husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
marriage. They are the only ones who can
decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone
are the engineers of their marital life. They
are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence,
they alone can and should decide when to
take a cut, but only in accordance with the
grounds allowed by law.
o beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse.
But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights
▪ They can still protect their succession
alright, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can
still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for
declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
● (2) No.
o Petitioner commenced the nullity of
marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962.
o the marriage having been solemnized prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void.
Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage?
o True, under the New Civil Code which is
the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest”can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a
cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog,
the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights
o ***Court strictly instructed RTC to dismiss
the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause
of action if it is proven by evidence that
Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner.
o only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional
rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law.
o Upon Teofilo’s death in 1992, all his
property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance are transmitted
to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the
surviving spouse and child, respectively.
o Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who
are compulsory heirs, to wit:
▪ (1) Legitimate children and descendants,
with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
▪ (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
▪ (3) The widow or widower;
▪ (4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction;
▪ (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code
o brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs.
▪ If respondent Teofilo II is declared and
finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to
seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right
over the estate if the decedent dies without
issue and without ascendants in the direct
line.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity
or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the
late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the
legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action
for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of
action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8
of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY,
respondent.
G.R. No. 152577.
September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16,
1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children.
After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
“hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children to the care of respondent
Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by
Fely to their children, that Fely got married to
an American, with whom she eventually had
a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but
never met Crasus. Also, she had been
openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the USA.
Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of
marriage on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she
did file for divorce from respondent Crasus,
she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign
the enclosed divorce papers. After securing
a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent
Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the
marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab
ignition on the ground of psychological
incapacity. One factor considered by the
RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married
another man and has established another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous
situation, wherein he is married to a wife who
is already married to another man in another
country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual
infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by
Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the
trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the
guidelines established by the cases of
Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found
that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is
no basis for declaring their marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2,
refers to a special situation wherein one of
the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen
and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and
literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was
not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States
in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on
May 24, 1981.They were blessed with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few
years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for
review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can
remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in
holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine
law.
The article should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later, one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained
a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time
the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing
in the US. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to
prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was
still barred from remarrying.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, – versus – MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221029
24 April 2018
Facts:
On January 20, 2012, respondent Marelyn
Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue
of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court. The petition was later
amended and captioned as a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
The petition alleged, among others, that:
Petitioner is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHIDO MINORO;
Recently, a case for divorce was filed by
petitioner in Japan and after due proceeding,
a divorce decree was rendered by the
Japanese Court;
The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for
lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article
15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
“does not afford Filipinos the right to file a
divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another
country” and that unless Filipinos “are
naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipino family rights and duties,
together with determination of their condition
and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, including marriages”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even
if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against
her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v.
Exec. Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)]
ruling that the meaning of the law should be
based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article
26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer
married to her. For the appellate court, the
fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential.
Issue:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has
the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26
(2) of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a
divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading
of the provision, it only requires that there be
a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it is
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address the anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to remarry under
the laws of his or her country. Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband
or a wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and
in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien-initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both
instances, it is extended to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree
on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law.
There is no real and substantial difference
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance
of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them
are based merely on superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed,
the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has
the capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26
(2) of the Family Code.
REPUBLIC vs COTE, GR. No. 212860,
March 14, 2018
Facts:
Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and
respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote
(Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the
time of their marriage, the spouses were both
Filipinos and were already blessed with a
son, Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was
born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of
America Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit of
Hawaii Seven years later, Florie commenced
a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
granting the divorce before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the
cancellation of her marriage contract RTC
RULING: granted the petition and declared
Florie to be capacitated to remarry.
Issue:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC 12 applies in a case involving
recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
Held:
It bears stressing that as of present, our
family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino husbands and
wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent
our family courts from recognizing divorce
decrees procured abroad by an alien spouse
who is married to a Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states: Art. 26.
All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specially for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense. petition is hereby DENIED.
SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs.
SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S.
Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first
with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had
two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with
Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no
children in their almost ten-year cohabitation.
In 1988, Santiago passed away under the
care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical
and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government
agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total
of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of
P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection
of sums of money against Nicdao,
contending that the marriage of the latter with
Santiago is void ab initio because their
marriage was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay
Yee half of acquired death benefits. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago
Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does
not fall within any of those exceptions and a
marriage license therefore was
indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao
and Carino has been sufficiently overcome
and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and
Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of
judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino
and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The
marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of
the Family Code, properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. The
decision of the trial court and Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for
a while but after receiving a card from
Barrete and various exchanges of letters,
they became sweethearts. They got married
in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce
in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there
was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was
then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question in
the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was
void ab initio. Petitioner contented he
contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration
for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete
before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab
initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract. The
petitioner does not need to file declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he contracted
his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in
the case filed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio
Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The
petition prayed that respondent’s wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the
petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist
the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not
possess a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead; and second,
Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a
cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a
seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
England during one of his ship’s port calls.
From that chance meeting onwards, Janet
Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco
on his ship for six months until they returned
to respondent’s hometown of San Jose,
Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January
1982, respondent married Janet Monica
Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as
a seaman and left his wife with his parents in
San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January
1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his
son. The same letter informed him that Janet
Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to
look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also
stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of
the bar where he and Janet Monica first met,
were all returned to him. He also claimed that
he inquired from among friends, but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition
hereby declaring the presumptively death of
Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without
prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals contending that the trial court erred
in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent
Nolasco had failed to show that there existed
a well-founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a
belief that his absent spouse had already
died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent
Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give
rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is
dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code, a marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present
had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would
sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead is hereby reversed and
both Decisions are hereby nullified and set
aside.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio versus
Calisterio
G.R. No. 136467.
April 6, 2000
Facts:
On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate
leaving parcel of land with an estimated
value of P 604,750 Teodorico was survived
by his wife respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was second husband of Marietta
who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at
Caloocan City. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later without court
declaration that James presumptively dead.
On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas
y Calisterio a surviving sister of Teodorico,
filed a petition entitled “In matter of Intestate
Estate of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio,
claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage
between the latter and respondent Marietta
being bigamous and thereby null and void.
On January 17, 1996, the lower court handed
down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia. On appeal the Court of Appeal
rendered decision in favor of Marietta
declaring her marriage to Teodorico valid
and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.
Issue:
Whether the marriage of Marietta between
the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn
would determine her right as surviving
spouse.
Held:
The marriage of Marietta having contracted
during the regime of the Civil Code should be
thus deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of judicial declaration of marriage of
presumptive death of James Bounds. The
conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta,
upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should be rightly
divided one portion to the surviving spouse
and the other portion to the estate of the
deceased spouse.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614.
December 9, 2005.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a
petition in the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton. At the hearing, Alan
adduced evidence that he and Lea were
married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan,
Samar. He testified that, on February 6,
1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening
and he berated her for being always out of
their house. He told her that if she enjoyed
the life of a single person, it would be better
for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not
reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported
for work the following day, Lea was still in the
house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan
thought that Lea merely went to her parents’
house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan,
Samar. However, Lea did not return to their
house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s
whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to
Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked
him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come
home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However,
Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila
on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in
Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was
staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth
told him that she had not seen her. He failed
to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his
repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to
work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free
time, he would look for Lea in the malls but
still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in
1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s
disappearance to the local police station. The
police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on
July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s
disappearance to the National Bureau of
Investigation on July 9, 2001. On January 8,
2002, the court rendered judgment granting
the petition. The OSG appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals which rendered
judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of
presumptive death of the wife is valid
Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of
proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of one’s spouse, the degree of due
diligence set by the Court in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. It is the policy of the
State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an
inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s
failure to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead and that
he exerted the required amount of diligence
in searching for his missing wife, the petition
for declaration of presumptive death should
have been denied by the trial court and the
Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose
of contracting the subsequent marriage, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The
spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove
that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes
that “es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court
finds and so holds that the respondent failed
to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the trial court,
that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was
already dead. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside.
SSS v.Jarque, G.R. No. 165545,
March 24, 2006
FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and
Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970,
Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a
petition to declare Alice presumptively dead.
On December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the
petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice
was declared presumptively dead or on
August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage
with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon.
She was designated as SSS beneficiary of
Bailon. SSS cancelled the claim of
respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly
pension for death benefits on the basis of the
opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s
marriage with Alice. Teresita protested the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits asserting that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of
justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it
remained valid and subsisting for all legal
intents and purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of
Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita
Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance
of the absent spouse of Bailon
HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person
with an absent spouse endures until
annulled. It is only the competent court that
can nullify the second marriage pursuant to
Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which
action for annulment may be filed. The two
marriages involved here falls under the Civil
Code. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage being voidable, it is terminated by
final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage. Under the Family
Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent
marriage shall be automatically terminated
by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless
there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the
absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee‘s
mere reappearance will not terminate such
marriage. Since the second marriage has
been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues in spite of the
spouse‘s physical reappearance. In the case
at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon
& Jargue’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed
to be rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863,
September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in
January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed and did not
bring home any money. In March 1972, the
latter left their house. Angelita and her child
waited until in May 1972, they decided to go
back to her parent’s home. 3 years have
passed without any word from Sofio until in
October 1975 when he showed up and they
agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time
they saw each other and had never heard of
ever since. Believing that Sofio was already
dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in
June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
naturalization in US was denied because
petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner
filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with
Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the
presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary
because Civil Code governs during 1971 and
not Family Code where at least 7
consecutive years of absence is only
needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
valid.
Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos
(G.R. No. 136490)
FACTS:
Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in
1982 and they had five children. Alleging that
the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda
filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on
the ground that Wilson Marcos has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared
the marriage null and void under Article 36
which was however reversed by the Court of
Appeals
ISSUES:
1. Whether personal medical or
psychological examination of the respondent
by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent should be examined by
a physician or a psychologist as a condition
since qua non for such declaration. Although
this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost
his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced
only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the
marriage for failure of petitioner to show that
the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in
Molina.
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 -
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY
GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.
FACTS: On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary
Grace, then 25 and 23 years old,
respectively, got married in civil rites held in
Lipa City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already
pregnant then. The infant, however, died at
birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was
caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and
smoking during her pregnancy. Sometime in
March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home
which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace
went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant
petition was filed, Mary Grace had not
returned yet. On February 18, 2009, Glenn
filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged
that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely
jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave
the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night
life and drank and smoked heavily even
when she was pregnant. Further, Mary
Grace refused to perform even the most
essential household chores of cleaning and
cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace
had not exhibited the foregoing traits and
behavior during their whirlwind courtship. Dr.
Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality
through the data she had gathered from
Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo
(Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back
in college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace
to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s
relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to
each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended
the propriety of declaring the nullity of the
couple’s marriage. On January 29, 2010, the
RTC rendered its Decision declaring the
marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as
null and void on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On appeal before
the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
evidence exists proving that Mary Grace
indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling
her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC
decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary
Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not
state its own findings and merely relied on
Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
RTC resorted to mere generalizations and
conclusions Sans details. Besides, what
psychological incapacity contemplates is
downright incapacity to assume marital
obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s
petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to
assume her marital duties, but this does not
translate into a psychological illness.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the
herein assailed decision reversing the RTC
ruling and declaring the marriage between
Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and
subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sufficient evidence exist
justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Mary Grace.
RULING:
NO. The lack of personal examination or
assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage. "If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to." In the instant petition,
however, the cumulative testimonies of
Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the
documentary evidence offered do not
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with
the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible,
but it was never proven to be rooted in some
psychological illness.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will"
on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due
to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not
personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there
arose a greater burden to present more
convincing evidence to prove the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of the
former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in
this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in
material details. Rodelito, on the other hand,
is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
statements are hardly objective. Moreover,
Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary
Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a
proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s
alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that,
six months before they got married, they saw
each other almost every day. Glenn saw "a
loving, caring, and well-educated person" in
Mary Grace. We cannot help but note that Dr.
Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the
petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty
attendant to obtaining the statements of
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence
of a person’s psychological incapacity, but
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner
from complying with what the law requires.
While the Court also commiserates with
Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate
basis for the Court to conclude that Mary
Grace is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her obligations
as Glenn’s spouse
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896.
October 27, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel
were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973
and before the Catholic Church on August
11, 1973. After discovering that they could
not have a child of their own, the couple
decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who
they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four
(24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of
its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged
that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him. In her Answer,
petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent
Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented
malicious stories against her so that he could
be free to marry his paramour.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity against petitioner
Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
HELD:
The petition for review is hereby granted. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage. “Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio”. In the case at bar, respondent
Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession
with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature, and her inability to endear
herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these
“defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. In fact, the psychiatrist reported
that petitioner was psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is
respondent Manuel’s own evidence,
contains candid admissions of petitioner
Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled
the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that respondent Manuel’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child
of his own flesh and blood. In herein case,
respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to
have a child at that particular point
The psychological report of respondent
Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that
the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s
behavior is traceable – not from the inception
of their marriage as required by law – but
from her experiences during the marriage,
e.g., her in laws’ disapproval of her as they
wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husband’s philandering, admitted no less by
him, and her inability to conceive. Thus, from
the totality of the evidence adduced by both
parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived
therefrom a simple case of a married couple
drifting apart, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband consequently falling
out of love and wanting a way out. An
unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a
null and void marriage. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS
and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL
January 29, 2004
Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were
married on September 28, 1996 and May
20,1967 in a civil and church wedding,
respectively. They had four children. David
instituted a case for the nullity of their
marriage on account of Sharon’s
psychological incapacity to perform basic
marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon
had extra-marital affairs with several men
including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in
the Presidential Security Command, and a
Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by
a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her
illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom
she married and with whom she had two
children. When the Jordanian national left the
country, Sharon returned to David bringing
along her two children by the Jordanian
national. David accepted her back and even
considered the illegitimate children as his
own. However, Sharon abandoned David to
join the Jordanian national with her two
children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions.
Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of
David and found him to be conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to
the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra.
Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity;
that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse even bringing
with her the two children of the Jordanian to
live with David. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like
her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of
the said disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. The trial court
declared their marriage null and void on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of
Sharon to perform the essential obligations
of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set
aside the trial court’s judgment and ordered
the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is
equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
Held:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to
psychologically incapacity. As held in Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological
incapacity” should refer to no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity that causes
a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The law intended to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
of inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality, which make the
respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity. At best, the
circumstances relied upon by David are
grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code not for declaring a
marriage void. The grounds for legal
separation, which need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity, include physical
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
Decision affirmed. Petition denied.
Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019
January 4, 1995
Note: This was the first case where the term
“psychological incapacity” was discussed by
the Supreme Court.
Facts:
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met
Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In
September 1986, they got married. The
couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia
gave birth to their son in 1987. Their
marriage, however, was marred by the
frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as
averred by Leouel. The couple also
occasionally quarreled about as to, among
other things, when should they start living
independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988,
Julia went to the US to work as a nurse
despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later,
she and Leouel got to talk and she promised
to return home in 1989. She never went
home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the
chance to be in the US due to a military
training. During his stay, he desperately tried
to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in
an effort to at least have his wife come home,
filed a petition to nullify their marriage due to
Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity.
Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to
return home or at least communicate with
him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia filed an
opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained
that there is no collusion between the two.
Leouel’s petition is however denied by the
lower and appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is
attendant to the case at bar.
HELD:
No. Before deciding on the case, the SC
noted that the Family Code did not define the
term “psychological incapacity”, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But
basing it on the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee, the provision in
PI, adopted with less specificity than
expected, has been designed to allow some
resiliency in its application. The FCRC did
not give any examples of PI for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the close to the standard required to decree a
FCRC would like the judge to interpret the nullity of marriage.
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may
be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. The
term “psychological incapacity” defies any
precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of PI to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands
aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed
because the alleged PI of his wife is not
clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come