PEOPLE vs MANANQUIL, September 28, 1984

 In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, VALENTINA
MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and
deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with whom she was united in lawful
wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo
was working as a security guard; and the said accused, having in her possession a bottle
containing gasoline suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on the person of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo
suffered burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.

Contrary to law 2

 Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and thereafter sentenced
to reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay
costs.
 From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which referred the
appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, assailing her aforesaid
conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting her solely on the basis of the
alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia was a complication of the burns
sustained by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to have cause the death of the deceased; and 4) in not
acquitting her at least on ground of reasonable doubt.

The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:

On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just
purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue
which she placed in a coffee bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a
mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA
Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted
at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14,
Id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox and set
the polo shirt of the victim a flame. (Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.)

The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written
statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having burned the victim.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to
the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p.
208, rec.) due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3

Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:

It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her
grandson and put him to bed. After filing the tank with water, she remembered that the next
day was a Sunday and she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline
with which to clean them. Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby
gasoline station and bought ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she remembered that her
husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place of work. (p. 13, Ibid.)

Appellant saw her husband inside a bonding of the NAWASA standing by the window. As the
iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but
when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had brought the gasoline
which he needed for his lighter, but Elias, who was under the influence of liquor, cursed her
thus: "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". Elias continued shouting and cursing even as
appellant told him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted. Appellant
trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling
the gasoline on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while.
Then she remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she went home leaving her
husband who was walking to and fro and not paying attention to her. (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2,
March 20, 1969)
 She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to apologize to
her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that police officers were
present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he saw her he
chased her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife of Elias. When
she replied in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of burning her husband. She
denied the accusation. But the police took her to the headquarters, and prepared a written
statement, Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was made to sign said statement upon a promise that she
would be released if she signed it. Although she did not know the contents, she signed it
because of the promise. (pp. 14-16. Id.; p. 5, March 20,1969) 4

 Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed
to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.
 Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay City. She
was thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who took her statement in
Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into writing. 5 After Sgt. Garcia was
through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal Paredes who asked her questions regarding
the said statement and its execution and before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by
her. In that investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and
thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement-

T Ano ang nangyari at iyong binuksan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na si Elias
Day?

S Dahil may sala siya, at sinunog niya ang aking mga damit, at may babae pa,
at saka lahat ng aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.

T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa iyong
asawa?

S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong

buhusan ng gasolina, kaya ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng halagang 10
sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa Tall Avenue at inilagay ko sa isang boti.

T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa Taft

Avenue dito sa Pasay City, ay ano ang ginawa mo?

S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at pagdating

ko nuon ay kumatok ako sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang marinig niya ang
aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan niya ang pintuan, at pagkabukas ng pintuan
ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay minura ng puta putan Ina mo,
lalakad ka ng gabi, at namumuta raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay mamura ay
hinahabol pa ako ng suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po kinuha ko ang aking
dalang bote na may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa kanyang katawan at aking
kinuha ang posporo at aking sinindihang at hangang magliyab ang suot niyang
polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.

T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa kanginang

humigit kumulang na mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo 6, 1965?

S Opo, aking sinunog ang aking asawa. (Exhs. A & A-1 Emphasis supplied)

 She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she did not
understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached only the primary
grades; and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely upon the promise of the
policemen that she will later be released.
 We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as true. For the
truth is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a Tagala, having stayed in
Manila since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning incident in question for which she was
investigated. During this period of almost fourteen years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs
communicating with them in Pilipino. This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which
runs thus-

Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you litem
been living here in Manila?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak
Tagalog?
 A Yes.

Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?

A Yes,

Q And you can also read Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q You can read?

A Yes, but I do not litem interest to read. TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).

All through shout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant A as before Fiscal Paredes, before
whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of an what appeared in her statement, 6 no denunciation of any
sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by
her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she
will be released later. We therefore find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere concoction. For why
will the police still resort to such trickery when the very sworn statement given by her proved by its contents
that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact, almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said
statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of
her declarations contained therein. Moreover, We find said statement replete with details which could not litem
been possibly supplied by the police investigators who litem no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with
her and the victim, especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal
incident that brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's
pronouncement that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its
contents; and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.

Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when taken
without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction. 8 It is presumed
to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of proof is upon the person who gave the confession. 9
That presumption has not been overcome in the instant case.

Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in
assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then, she had yet no time to
concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath consequences of her criminal design she must
litem been motivated by no other purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took
the witness stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January 13,
1969 . . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit of too many
consultations.

That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she went to the latter's
place of work on that fatal night and intended an the consequences of her nefarious act finds clearer
manifestation and added support in her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate
that had befallen the victim . . . her husband . . . especially at times when he needed her most. Being the wife,
she must be the closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not authored the same nor
voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably expected to come to his succor and alleviate him
from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her husband even once while the latter
lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death. Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she
ever present during the wake while the victim's remains lay in state. That she was under detention does not
excuse nor justify those glaring and significant omissions. For she could litem asked the court's permission for
any of the enumerated undertakings which we believe would not litem been denied. But she did not even
attempt.

Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more convinced of the falsity and
incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her purpose in buying gasoline at so an unholy
hour of the night, past ten o clock in the evening, solely for the purpose of cleaning her shoes which she would
wear in going to church the following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her
husband's place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose except to deliver to him gasoline
for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . . more so if we litem to consider the
previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that fatal day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband died of
pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report indicating presence of alcohol in
the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on fire, she is not criminally liable for her husband's
death.

We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination

The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to exculpate the
appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol,
according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce an almost comatose condition would not
cause suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen content of the body. 10 In fine, as correctly pointed out
by the Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause of his death
which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after the burning.

The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There
is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about
62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns
sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that
this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly
so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory.
We agree.

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. 11

The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs.
Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as follows —

One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to
the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the
deceased might litem recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to
the death, or that death was men." caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal
application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person
inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows
as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves consequences of the
criminal act, must in law be deemed to litem been among those which are in contemplation of
the guilty party and for which he must be responsible The rule has its foundation on a wise
and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of medical
men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it
would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death,
and thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment.

In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against
appellant.

It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court recommends her
for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with
a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of Justice.

SO ORDERED.
QUINTO vs ANDRES, March 16, 2005

 At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary
school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay
San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of
a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system.2
 Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the
drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with
water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the
drainage system and left4 without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside,
and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s
lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother,
and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent
Andres followed her.7

The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The police authorities
of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.

Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators took the
sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he
had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that
he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.

On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an
autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the following postmortem
findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and dark pants and
placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.

Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.

Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.

Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous containing muddy particles with bloody path.

Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody froth.

Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.

Stomach – partly autolyzed.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9

The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two.

An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents
with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:

That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three
were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct examination
that the hematoma at the back of the victim’s head and the abrasion on the latter’s left forearm could have
been caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea
also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the lumina of the
larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be caused when a person is
put under water by pressure or by force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on
the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could
have hit a blunt object.

Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could have rendered
the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by drowning.

In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion
on the right side of Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement,
or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was
no sign of strangulation.12

After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted the pictures showing the
drainage system including the inside portions thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.

The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for
damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.

The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the case was
concerned. In her brief, she averred that –

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT
EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM
WILSON QUINTO.14

The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows:

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-
appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled
jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action
arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts
imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15

The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH
IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16

The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and speculations when it held
that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage system since the
culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,
causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some
ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution
failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that
respondent Andres even informed her of Wilson’s death.

The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the
nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well as the
locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime
betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring
out Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only when he saw Garcia
seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.

The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that either or both the
respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not
criminally and civilly liable for the latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability of such person established in
Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused,
and indemnification for consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action,
the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. 20

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual
or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the
accused for damages and/or restitution.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action
that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23

Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 24 "Natural" refers
to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be
the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately,
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.25

There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being
the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed
because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones
patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical
condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions,
such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions
supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.26

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:

(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the
active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or

(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows
as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that
other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.28 A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.29
This Court has emphasized that:

… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause
of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction
and punishment. …30

In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:

… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the present, the
following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act – and in this case, the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be
judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound
which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being
able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc. 32

In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People v. Delim,33 the Court
delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first,
the criminal act and second, defendant’s agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti
includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident,
natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other
words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34

Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to
adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of the defendants’.35

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence is determined:

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the
case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.36

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.

It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an
eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.

We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased
sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr.
Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a
hard object:

COURT:

The Court would ask questions.

Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused on the back of the head might be due to the
victim’s falling on his back and his head hitting a pavement?

A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong enough and would fall from a
high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is possible.

Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the pavement, the injury
might be caused by that slipping?

A It is also possible.

Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken
in some mud or what?

A Yes, Sir.

Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?

A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that the victim was still alive
when he was placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim’s face could have been caused by
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:

Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by the face rubbing against a
concrete wall or pavement?

A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.

Q Rough surface?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the victim was strangled?

A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have slipped, causing the
latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:

Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the victim fell down and that
portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling
down?

A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.39

The trial court took into account the following facts:

Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones inside the
culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the
pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside
from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take
in some amount of water and drown.40

The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion based on the said findings.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings,
affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.
The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial
and appellate courts.

That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the drainage
culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco
inside.41 Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion on the left forearm of
the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim
were made ante mortem or post mortem.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents hit the
deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have
been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all. 42
However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that
no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of
any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with
her son before the latter’s death:

Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?

A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from her mother who is gambling,
Sir.

Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?

A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43

When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out the
deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of
her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:

Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?

A He went with me, Sir.

Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with you?

A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the culvert, I ran immediately. He
[was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.

Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres also came or arrived?

A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44

In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based
on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs QUIANZON, Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum to fourteen years, seven months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan Quianzon
appeal to this court for the review of the case.

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the house
of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual
attendance of the relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges took place between
3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third
time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took
hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded
and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel.
Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident.

There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing facts. The question to be
determined is who wounded Aribuabo. The prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it,
called Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to the witness stand.

The first witness, Simeon Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of Andres Aribuabo in the abdomen
by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent and
contradictory that we consider meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of the lower court to
have taken it into consideration in formulating the findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the
testimony of the other witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said gathering, testified that
he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of Andres Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward
the place where the witness and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded and was going to
die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him. He also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon
being asked immediately by him about the incident, admitted to him attacked Aribuabo with a bamboo spit.
Gregorio Dumalao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being informed of the incident, forthwith conducted an
investigation, questioned Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded him. He
likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that he had wounded the deceased with a
bamboo spit. Upon being brought before Juan Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon
confessed to Llaguno that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had later wounded him with a
bamboo spit. Before the chief of police could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the later retracted,
denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit Exhibit B the fact of having applied a
firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears admitted by Quianzon but not of having wounded the deceased with a
bamboo spit.
The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the prosecution, Bagabay, Dumalo and Llaguno, is not
questioned by the defense. Neither the accused, in his testimony, nor his counsel, in the brief filed by him in
this court, was able to assign any unlawful, corrupt or wicked motive that might have actuated them to testify
falsely in this case and knowingly bring about the imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is not even a
relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio lieutenant, is a nephew of the accused. Llaguno, chief of police of
Paoay, is an officer of the law whose intervention of this case was purely in compliance with his official duties.
All the appellant has been able to state in his brief to question the credibility of these witnesses is that they
were contradicted by Simeon Cacpal, the other witness for the prosecution, who testified that he had not seen
them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to Quianzon in the afternoon of the crime. But the position of the defense
in invoking Simeon Cacpal's testimony for the purpose of discrediting the other witnesses for the prosecution
is untenable, after having vigorously impeached said testimony, branding it as improbable, incongruent and
contradictory. If Cacpal is a false witness — and the court believes this claim of the defense as true — , none of
his statements may be taken into account or should exert any influence in the consideration of the other
evidence in the case.

After discharging testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence presented by the prosecution relative to the
appellant's criminal liability for the death of Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement
immediately after receiving the wound, naming the accused as the author of the aggression, and the admission
forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him,
besides, with a bamboo spit. Both statements are competent evidence in the law, admissible as a part of the
res gestae (section 279 and 298, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs.
Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the extrajudicial confession of the accused to the barrio
lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that he was
the author of Aribuabo's wound and that he had inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit. Inasmuch as this
confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly corroborated and appears to have been made by the accused
freely and voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his liability as author of the crime charged
(U.S. vs. so Fo, 23 Phil., 379; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U.S. vs. Jamino, 3 P.R.A., 52; Francisco's
Quizzer on Evidence).

The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had wounded the deceased and that he had
confessed his guilt to the witnesses Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the
adverse testimony of these three veracious and disinterested witnesses, all the more because neither the
accused nor any other witness for the defense has stated or insinuated that another person, not the accused,
might be the author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because it is admitted by the
defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been pestering with request for food, who attacked the
latter, burning his neck with a firebrand, afetr which Aribuaboappeared wounded in the abdomen, without the
accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and by whom the aggression had been made.

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which
resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries
because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice
removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection. This contention is
without merit. According to the physician who examined whether he could survive or not." It was a wound in
the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter
from the large intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that the patient
might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that the act of the patient
was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact
that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable
act of the accused.

One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes
contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.)

Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the
knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the
strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his
pathological condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical
pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum.
"When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a perforation of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it
is indicated by violent shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen, extending later to the entire
abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming unbearable
upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives frequent paroxysms.
The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter, which are very annoying and terribly
painful, take from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-America Encyclopaedic
Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that the
victim in this case was mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes more evident that the
accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch
as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act — and in this case the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant
inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its
effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."

In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal wound was less serious than that received by
Aribuabo in this case, as it was not penetrating, merely involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of
the victim was due to a secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours after the wound had been inflicted,
because of the "bodily movements of the patient, who was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting
up and pacing about the room, as as a consequence of which he internal vessels, already congested because of
the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced caused his death." The court in deciding the question
stated that "when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about
against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to increase the criminal liability of his
assailant, but because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is
homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound
might have healed in seven days."

The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows:

While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to be settled rule of the common
law that on who inflicts an injury on another will be held responsible for his death, although it may
appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to
a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to
the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and
lies at the foundation of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate
and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a
deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this
felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its
unskillful and improper treatment, which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which
might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in
contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however, this may
be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt
as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
highest crime might escape conviction and punishment.

Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's testimony, there is no evidence of record that the crime
charged was committed by means of the knife, Exhibit A, and we only have the extrajudicial admission of the
accused that he had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with which the wound of the deceased might
have been caused because, according to the physician who testified in this case, it was produced by a "sharp
and penetrating" instrument.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong
as the committed should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating
circumstances adverse to him, we modify the appealed judgment by sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty with a minimum of four years of prision correccional and a maximum of a eight years of prision mayor,
affirming it in all other respect, with cost to said appellant.

URBANO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, January 7, 1988

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and
there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening
of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet
long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo,
causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced
and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters
away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven
but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis,
the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated
September 28, 1981) which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married,
residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the
following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence,
right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to
me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88,
Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied
by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio
recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before
this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for
they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment,
and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to
harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was
given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde
are as follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

 02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the
then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered
confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of
his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an
affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to
the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17,
1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates
the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to
the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became
shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary
Perfecto Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died
of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability
shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
(People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day
after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day,
November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence
of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
 The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused
his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered
lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which
he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5,
1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got
infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072;
People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he
went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his
own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are

encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in
the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is
quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
 Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as
the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a
poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms
with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction
of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation
period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14,
1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it
is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99
Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the
records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities
of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed
the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of
Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal
aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
 xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does
not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained
by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from
a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00.
However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for
fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs DOMASIAN, March 1, 1993

The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his parents received the ransom
note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused. 1

The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the incident in question. The accused
were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's
parents. They were represented by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with
a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested
his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the
man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the
certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying
or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time
bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney
driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a
tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused
the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The man
said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences
between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two barangay
tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the
man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their
pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on
his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him. 2

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would
be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the
hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder
of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the
picture of Pablito Domasian. 5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. 6

The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he was
watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction
of his eyeglasses. 7 Dr. Tan for his part said he was in Manila. 8

After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr.
and Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.

In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any participation in the incident in
question. They belittle the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are
more believable. Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew the opposite findings of the
PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the ransom note. He maintains that in any case, the crime
alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it
should be denominated and punished only as grave coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that there
is no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to make them criminally liable in equal degree.

First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the first instance by the trial judge, whose finding
in this regard is received with much respect by the appellate court because of his opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.

In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the victim himself, who positively
identified Domasian as the person who detained him for three hours. The trial court observed that the boy was
"straight-forward, natural and consistent" in the narration of his detention. The boy's naivete made him even
more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate and also his age, pointed to Domasian with equal certainty,
as the man who approached Enrico when they were walking together that morning of March 11, 1982. Grate,
the tricycle driver who suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him, was also positive in identifying
Domasian. All these three witnesses did not know Domasian until that same morning and could have no ill
motive in testifying against him. By contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can hardly be
considered a disinterested witness because she admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.

The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public places if the intention was to kidnap and
detain him. That is for Domasian himself to answer. We do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational
conduct of an accused. The more important question, as we see it, is why Domasian detained Enrico in the
first place after pretending he needed the boy's help. That is also for Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's
alleged willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested only at the beginning, when he believed the man
sincerely needed his assistance. But he was soon disabused. His initial confidence gave way to fear when
Domasian, after taking him so far away from the hospital where he was going, restrained and threatened him if
he did not stop crying.

Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone the
contradictions made by his corroborating witness, Dr. Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical
clinic and the manner of his payment for the refraction. 9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The circumstance
that he may have been in Manila at the time of the incident does not prove that he could not have written the
ransom note except at that time.

Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
 The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person and has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.

Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom note
and the standard documents were written by one and the same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who
expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert because his examination and
analysis "was more comprehensive than the one conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who virtually
limited his reliance on the perceived similarities and dissimilarities in the pattern and style of the writing,
thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone
feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that identify."

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing,
which is impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself permanent. 13

Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar, the Court feels that the scales
should tilt in favor of the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra,
who believed that the ransom note was written by Tan, with whose handwriting he was familiar because they
had been working in the hospital for four years and he had seen that handwriting every day in Tan's
prescriptions and daily reports. 14

Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that case involved a forgery or the deliberate imitation of
another person's signature. In the case before us, there was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note
writer's penmanship to prevent his discovery.

As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; of if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the
victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from
going home and dragged him first into the minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca,
thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente. The detention was committed by
Domasian, who was a private individual, and Enrico was a minor at that time. The crime clearly comes under
Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.

Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible
crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or
property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.

Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
 Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

xxx xxx xxx

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the
ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical volition of
one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. 17

It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case,
the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the
writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to
each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1
million in exchange for Enrico's life.

The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before
the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment
and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to
help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.

The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this case. His claim that he was
arrested without warrant and then tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does not
vitiate his conviction. He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the documents
used for comparison with the ransom note was made without a search warrant, it suffices to say that such
documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI agents or other police authorities. We held in the
case of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals,
being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon
them by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-appellants.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation of the alleged violation
of the constitutional rights of Pablito Domasian.

SO ORDERED.

JACINTO vs PEOPLE, July 13, 2009

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming
petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH
DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust
and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account,
Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De
Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was
payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of
Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of
Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory
clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle
of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks
payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH.
Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch,
who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO
check deposited in his account had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter
to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca
explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a
phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle
at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the
advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega
Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to
tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam
P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank
account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his
house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange
for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the
woman who rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to
pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby
Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed
to meet again on August 21, 2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline
Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle
decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband,
Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only
Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting
cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00
marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the
jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI
agents, who had been watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder
on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the
marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was
later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed
that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from
the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house,
where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house.
Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to
hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She
allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of
Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents
arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It
was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21,
1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the
house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-
examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They
then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her
in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so
she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita
Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY
(20) DAYS, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7

The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion
of which reads, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:

(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;

(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.

(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale
Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;

2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and

3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8

The petition deserves considerable thought.

The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of
qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the
taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the
customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged
to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking
was done with intent to gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact
that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the
owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's
customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the
customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of
confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.

However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the
thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed
on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime
of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused,
intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not
home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But
upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in
paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual
impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:

Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

xxxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims
sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for
the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act
intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person
are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger
and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons
or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent
impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further
explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility,
or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible
crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

xxxx

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the
pocket is empty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this case,
petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.1avvphi1

The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was
the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of
execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another." Elucidating further, the
Court held, thus:

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided
in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latter’s consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of
the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had
it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked
money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or
covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could
have been another possible source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto
mayor, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.