T3.

1 Ong Ching Po vs CA 239 SCRA 341

FACTS: Soledad Parian bought a parcel of land evidenced by a Deed of Sale. She entrusted the
administration of the lot and building to Ong Ching Po (her brother-in-law) when she and her
husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because
she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.
Soledad filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po. However, the
case was dismissed. It appears that the Deed of Sale was in the name of Ong Ching Po but the
seller have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in favor of
Soledad Parian for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of
Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino.
This appeal to the SC was filed in 1993. Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.

ISSUE: Whether there is express or implied trust existed between Ong Ching Po and Soledad.

RULING: There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong
Ching Po as trustor and private respondent as trustee. The oral testimony to prove the existence
of the express trust will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No
express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence."
Petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an
implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution,
because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated. It cannot be made to rest on vague and
uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Petitioners do not claim that
Ong Yee (husband of Soledad) was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce
the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching Po,
admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and
was engaged in business.
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts,
deed of sale and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, Soledad explained that she
and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo. It is
markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of Soledad and her husband. The rental
receipts were also in the name of her husband.

T3.2 Pangan vs CA 166 SCRA 375

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their names by virtue of
their continuous and exclusive possession thereof since 1895. No opposition, therefore, approved.
2 months after, private respondent filed a petition to set aside the said decision, which the
trial Court granted, admitting at the same time her opposition to the application alleging that the
land was inherited by Leon Hilario's three children, but the son, Felicisimo, waived his right thereto
and thereby made his two sisters, Silvestra and Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's
daughter, she was entitled to one-half of the property, the other half going to Silvestra's heirs, the
petitioners herein and the latter's grandchildren.
 The trial judge issued an order dismissing the opposition reasoning that whatever rights
Teodora might have had over the property had been forfeited by extinctive prescription because
she had left the land in 1942 and had not since then asserted any claim thereto until 1966. This
decision was reversed by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teodora Garcia, by her failure to assert her right, allowed the statutory
period to lapse, thus enabling the petitioners to perfect their claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription and so exclude her from her share in the subject property.

RULING: No, the prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. There was no adequate notice by the
petitioners to the private respondent of the rejection of her claim to her share in the subject
property. Noticeably absent here is a categorical assertion by the petitioners of their exclusive
right to the entire property that barred her own claim of ownership of one-half thereof nor is there
any explanation as to why they said she had no right to a share.

DISCUSSION: It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as adverse
to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long as his co-ownership
is recognized, an action to compel partition will not prescribe and may be filed at any time against
the actual possessor by any of the other co-owners. However, if the co-owner actually holding the
property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule
is that he can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that
moment, the question involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere partition.
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that
he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised
of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal
notice has been given that the period of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners
and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust;
and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.