Economía de la

Regulación
Guía de
ejercicios

Monopolio natural
1. Considere un monopolista que enfrenta la siguiente demanda:

D(p) = 100 p

La tecnología de producción del monopolista presenta retornos constantes a escala;

el costo marginal de producción es $20.

a) Plantee el problema del monopolista y compute el precio y la cantidad

óptimos para él.

b) Plantee el problema de un plani…cador que maximiza el bienestar social y encuentre

precio y cantidad socialmente óptimos.

c) Calcule la pérdida de bienestar bajo el monopolio.

2. El costo de producir dos tipos de productos x e y está descripto por la función

de costos C (x; y). Determine si la industria es un monopolio natural en cada uno de los
siguientes casos:

a) C (x; y) = x + y:

b) C (x; y) = (xy)1=2

c) C (x; y) = (xy)1=2 + 1

d) C (x; y) = 6x + 8y 0:2xy + 80
1 1 1 1
e) C (x; y) = x 2 + y 2 + x 4 y 4

3. Dada la siguiente función de costos:

1
C (q1 ; q2 ) = q1 + q2 (q1 q2 ) 3

a) Muestre que el costo medio por rayo es creciente para todo par (q1 ; q2 ), con q1 ; q2 >

0. b) Determine si existen economías de alcance.

c) Determine si la función es subaditiva. ¿Es la industria un monopolio natural?

Precios de Ramsey

1
 1. (Sappington 2005). A regulated …rm produces two products. The demand curve
for product i is:

2
 Q(pi ) = ai bi pi for i = 1; 2

where ai > 0 bi > 0 are constants, and pi is the price charged for product i, i = 1; 2.
The …rm’s marginal cost of producing product i is ci > 0. The …rm also incurs …
xed
costs of production F > 0.
The regulated …rm is required to supply all demand that is forthcoming at the prices

3
 established by the regulator. It is assumed that > ci , i = 1; 2.
ba
i
i

a) Characterize completely the (Ramsey) prices that maximize the sum of consumers’
surplus and pro…t, while ensuring the regulated …rm non-negative pro…t.

b) Suppose the regulated …rm is a monopoly supplier of both products A and B. In

this setting, suppose that the demand for product A is less price elastic than the demand
for product B.
Suppose the regulator is observed to set the price of product A below its marginal
cost of production and the price of product B above its marginal cost of production
in this setting. Could these prices possibly be socially optimal prices in the sense of
maximizing a social welfare function while ensuring nonnegative pro…t for the …rm?
Justify your answer.

2. (Train 1991 ) Considere una …rma regulada que produce dos bienes. Suponga que
las demandas respectivas son p1 = 50 0:0075q1 y p2 = 40 0:0045q2 . La …rma
incurre en costos …jos de $19; 800 y costos marginales de $20 para cada unidad de
cualquiera de los dos bienes.
Maximice el bienestar social (de…nido como la suma del excedente de los consumidores
en cada mercado y los bene…cios de la empresa) sujeto a que la …rma obtenga bene…cios
no negativos, y obtenga los precios de Ramsey. Calcule el bienestar social a dichos
precios.

3. (Urbiztondo y Cont 2003 ) Supongamos que una compañía que provee TV por cable
y banda ancha es un monopolio natural en alguna ciudad. Esta compañía tiene costos
…jos de operación por $1 millón de pesos por día sin importar el número de suscriptores
que tenga cada servicio.
El número de suscriptores a la TV por cable es q1 = 2 p1 y el número de suscriptores
a la banda ancha es q2 = 1 41 p2 . (q está medido en millones y p en pesos por día).

a) Encuentre las curvas de demanda inversas y el excedente total del consumidor

como función de los precios.

b) Encuentre los precios de Ramsey y el excedente del consumidor asociado.

4. (Sappington 2005) A regulated …rm is a monopoly producer of two products, labeled

product 1 and product 2. Consumers of type 1 only purchase product 1. Consumers of
type 2 only purchase product 2. The demands for the two products are independent. The
regulator sets a unit price for each product. In designing these two prices, the
regulator seeks to maximize a weighted average of the surplus derived by the two
consumer types and the surplus (pro…t) earned by the regulated …rm. ! i > 0
denotes the weight the regulator places on the surplus derived by type i consumers ( i
= 1; 2). ! F > 0 denotes

4
the corresponding weight placed on the …rm’s pro…t. The regulator is not required
to ensure non-negative pro…t for the monopoly supplier.
The demand function for the ith product is Qi (pi ), where pi is the price of the ith
product. The …rm’s total cost of producing q1 units of product 1 and q2 units of
product
2 is C (q1 ; q2
).
a) Characterize the optimal prices, p1 and p2 , in terms of relevant marginal
production costs, price elasticities of demand and welfare weights.
b) Provide a su¢cient condition for both prices to optimally be set equal to the …
rm’s relevant marginal cost of production.
c) Suposse consumer demands are constant elasticity demands (so Qi (pi ) = ki p "i for
i = 1; 2, where "i > 0 and ki > 0). Also suppose the …rm’s cost function is C (q1 ; q2 ) =
c1 q1 + c2 q2 + F , where F 0 is a …xed cost of production. If the regulator cares
equally about the welfare of the two types of consumers and if the demand
elasticities are the same for the two products, when (if ever) will the regulator
optimally set p1 above p2 ?
d) Returning to the original problem, suppose only that the …rm’s cost function
is C (q1 ; q2 ) = c1 q1 + c2 q2 (so the …rm incurs no …xed cost of production). A consumer
ad- vocate recommends that the price of each product be set equal to the …rm’s
corresponding marginal cost of production (i.e., pi = ci for i = 1; 2). You are hired as an
advisor by the regulator. Would you advise the regulator to follow the recommendation
of the consumer advocate? Why or why not?
e) Now suppose a new unregulated supplier begins to supply a new product that type
1 consumers view as a substitute for product 1 supplied by the regulated …rm. Type 2
consumers have no access to a substitute for product 2. All else equal, how would
the presence of this substitute for product 1 a¤ect the optimal relative prices por
products 1 and 2?

Tarifas no lineales
1. (Urbiztondo y Cont 2003 ) Un monopolista natural tiene costos totales
descrip- tos por la siguiente ecuación: C (Q) = 400 + 25Q y enfrenta una demanda de
mercado Q = 200 2P . Obtenga las ganancias del monopolista, la producción de
equilibrio y el excedente del consumidor cuando:

a) El precio es igual al costo marginal.

b) El precio es igual al costo medio.

c) El precio se …ja en dos partes. Ahora el monopolista …ja un precio igual al costo
marginal y cobra además un cargo …jo por consumidor. Suponga que la demanda proviene
de 10 consumidores idénticos. ¿Qué cargo …jo elegiría un monopolista maximizador
de bene…cios?

2. (Sappington 2005 ) A regulated …rm produces a single product. The …rm’s produc-
tion costs are known to be given by the function: C (q) = cq + F , where q is the
number of units of output produced by the …rm, and where c > 0 and F 0 are
constants.
Consumers di¤er in their valuation of regulated product. The utility that a
consumer of type derives from units of regulated product is given by the function:
 U (q; ) = (a + )q 0:5bq 2 ,
where a and b are strictly positive constants. Consumer types are distributed on
the interval ; , according to the density function g( ) and corresponding distribution
function G( ).
Each consumer purchases only the amount of the regulated product that (s)he
con- sumes (i.e., there is no resale or storage of the regulated product).
The …rm’s cost function and the functional form of U (:) are common knowledge.
However, only the individual consumer knows his own type . In particular, the
regulator and the …rm cannot distinguish among consumer types ex ante.
The regulator seeks to maximize a weighted average of consumers’ surplus S(:)
and pro…t (:). is the weight placed on consumers’ surplus and (1 ) is the weight
placed on the pro…t of the regulated …rm.
The regulator can set only a single two-part tari¤ that is o¤ered to all customers.
The two-part tari¤ consists of an entry fee, E, and a constant price, p, for each unit
of the regulated product.

a) Provide a formal statement of the regulator’s problem. Call this problem [P

]. b) Specify the necessary conditions for a solution to [P ].

c) Characterize completely the solution to [P ] under the following assumptions:

; = [0; 1] and g(:) = 1 for all 2 [0; 1]

Precios estacionales
1. (Sappington 2007 ) A telephone company produces day-time and night-time
tele- phone calls. The day-time and night-time periods are each 12 hours long. The
inverse demand curve for day-time calls is P1 (q1 ) = 9 0:2q1 , where q1 is the number of
day-time calls. The inverse demand curve for night-time calls is P2 (q2 ) = 8 0:2q2 ,
where q2 is the number of night-time calls.
Each phone call (whether it occurs in the day-time or the night-time) costs the …rm
$1 to supply, provided su¢cient capacity is in place. Each unit of capacity costs the …rm
$5. The number of calls that the …rm supplies in either the day-time or the night-
time cannot exceed the amount of the …rm’s installed capacity.
a) How much capacity should the …rm install in order to maximize the sum of
con- sumers’s surplus and pro…t?
b) What prices should the …rm charge for day-time and night-time telephone calls in
order to maximize the sum of consumers’s surplus and pro…t?

c) Illustrate your answer with a …gure that includes the inverse demand curves
for day-time and night-time calls and the …rm’s marginal cost of production.
2. (Viscusi et al. 1995 ) In a certain city where all parking is controlled by the
city, it is possible to provide parking facilities in the downtown area at a constant
marginal capital investment of $10.000 per space. Costs of operation can be neglected.
There are three equal periods during the day of each hours each, and spaces are
rented only for complete eight-hour periods. During the peak period of each of 250
days per year, the demand for parking is given by P = a bQ , where P is the price per
period for a parking space. During the other two o¤-peak periods of those 250 days,
the spaces demanded
are half that in the peak period, for each possible price. On other days demand is zero.
Assume that the interest rate is 10 percent and the facilities do not depreciate.
a) If a = $16, b = 0; 08 and existing spaces are 120, what would be the socially
optimal prices during the three periods?
b) What is the optimal number of spaces and what are the corresponding prices?
c) The above case is a so-called …rm peak case, with peak demanders paying all capital
costs. Now suppose that a = $5 and b = 0; 08. If peak demanders pay all capital costs,
what quantity is demanded by peak demanders? If o¤-peak demanders pay zero, what is
their quantity demanded? (Fractions of spaces are legitimate.) This is the shifting-
peak case.
d) For the demand curves in c), …nd the optimal number of spaces and the correspond-
ing prices.

Mecanismos de subsidio del excedente

1. (Viscusi et al. 1995 ) Assume a natural monopoly with total cost 500 + 20Q
facing a demand of Q = 100 P .
a) Find the price that enables the monopolist to break even. Call this price P .
b) Loeb and Magat show that if the monopolist is allowed to choose its own price and
to have the regulatory agency subsidize the …rm by an amount equal to consumer surplus
at the selected price, the monopoly will select price equal to marginal cost. What is
the price and amount of government subsidy?
c) Loeb and Magat also note that a bidding process for the monopoly franchise would
enable the government to recover some of the subsidy. What is the amount recovered
and what is the net subsidy after bidding?
d) An alternate proposal would make use of two-part tari¤s. For example, assume
that the current regulated price is P . Now assume that the regulatory agency o¤ers
the
…rm the right to select any two-part tari¤ that it wishes as long as the consumer
continues to have the option of buying at P . (For simplicity, assume a single consumer.)
What is the two-part tari¤ that the monopolist will choose and what is its pro…t?
What is the deadweight loss?
e) Assume that the government uses a bidding process to eliminate the monopoly
pro…t in d). The bid is in the form of a single price, like P , that the consumer will
always have as an option to the two-part tari¤. That is, the same rules are in e¤ects as
in d), except that now the bidding is for the right to o¤er a two-part tari¤ optional to
some P that the bidding will determine. What is the low bid?
f ) Compare the Loeb and Magat proposal in c) with the proposal in e). Do both
proposal give e¢cient prices? Are there any substantive di¤erences?
2. Un monopolista natural tiene costos totales descriptos por la siguiente ecuación:
C (Q) = 25Q y enfrenta una demanda inversa de mercado P = 100
Q.

a) Obtenga la solución de monopolio y compare con la que corresponde al primer

mejor.
 b) Suponga que un regulador implementa el esquema de subsidio del excedente prop-
uesto por Sappington y Sibley (1988). Plantee el problema del monopolista en ese
con- texto; obtenga precio y cantidad de equilibrio y bene…cios.

c) Ahora suponga que el regulador implementa el esquema de subsidio del excedente

propuesto por Finsinger y Vogelsang (1981, 1982, 1985). Plantee el problema del
monop- olista en ese contexto; obtenga precio y cantidad de equilibrio y bene…cios.

3. (Sappington 2007 ) A regulator and the regulated …rm both know the demand
curve (Q(p)) facing the …rm. In contrast, while the …rm knows its cost function (C
(Q(:))) perfectly, the regulator knows virtually nothing about the …rm’s cost function
other than that costs are independent in each year of …rm’s operation. (In other words,
expenditures in one year do not in‡uence the minimum possible cost of operating in
any other year). It is common knowledge that the …rm’s demand function and cost
function are stationary (i.e., do not change over time), and that the …rm produces only a
single product.
Although the regulator cannot observe the …rm’s cost function, she can observe the
…rm’s expenditures each year. Expenditures in year t are the sum of the minimal possible
operating costs ( C (Q(pt ))) and any wasteful expenditures (Wt 0) that the …rm
chooses to undertake. Wasteful expenditures provide no direct value to the …rm. In
principle. though, wsteful expenditures might be pro…table if they relax the regulatory
constraint, and thereby enable the …rm to earn higher pro…t.
The regulator decides to implement the following regulatory policy in this
setting. The …rm is permitted to set any price that it desires for its product each
year, and is permitted to change the price from one year to the next if it so desires.
The …rm also receives a subsidy (s) each year that is equal to the increment in
consumer’s surplus that its pricing decision generates in that year compared to the
preceding year (i.e., st = S(pt ) S(pt 1 ) ). In addition, the …rm must pay a tax (T ) in
each year that is equal to the di¤erence between the …rm’s revenues and expenditures in
the preceding year (i.e., Tt = pt 1 Q(pt 1 ) C (Q(pt 1 )) Wt 1 ).
The regulator makes a binding commitment to this regulatory policy in year 1, and
ensures that the policy is enforced in every subsequent year (t = 1; 2; :::; 1). After
learning of the regulatory policy i year 1, the …rm chooses prices and wasteful
expenditures in years 1; 2; :::; 1 to maximize the present discounted value of its pro…
ts. The …rm’s price in the year before this regulatory policy is imposed (year 0), is p0
(which might be the monmopoly price, for example). The …rm engages in no wasteful
expenditures in year 0. The …rm’s discount factor is 2 (0; 1).
a) Specify the price the …rm will set in each of years 1; 2; :::; 1.
b) Specify the wasteful expenditures the …rm will undertake in each of years 1; 2; :::; 1.

c) Specify the pro…t the …rm will earn in each of years 1; 2; :::; 1.
[Note: prices, wasteful expenditures and pro…t may or may not vary across time periods] :
d) List (and explain very brie‡y) three practical problems with a regulatory policy
of this sort.
 Regulación por tasa de retorno - regulación por precios máximos - cali-
dad
1. (Simon y Blume 1994 ) Un monopolista natural está sujeto a un esquema de
regulación por tasa de ganancia. Sea y = f (x1 ; x2 ) la cantidad de producto producida
con x1 unidades de capital y x2 unidades de trabajo. Suponga que la producción requiere
cantidades positivas de los dos factores, de manera que y = 0 si x1 = 0 o x2 = 0.
Sea p(y) la función de demanda inversa y R(y) = p(y)y el ingreso obtenido de la venta
de y unidades de producto. Sea r1 el costo de oportunidad del capital. Suponga que
el regulador decide que la tasa de retorno sobre el capital no puede ser mayor que s1 .
a) Formule el problema del monopolista y derive las condiciones de primer orden.
b) Muestre que s1 debe ser mayor que r1 para que la …rma obtenga bene…cios positivos
(Ayuda: trabaje directamente con la función de bene…cios).
c) Usando las condiciones de primer orden, muestre que en este contexto tiene lugar
el efecto Averch-Johnson (Ayuda: considere que si es el multiplicador asociado a la
restricción sobre la tasa de ganancia en el problema planteado en a), resulta 0 < 1).
2. (Urbiztondo y Cont 2003 ) Supongamos que en el marco de una renegociación de
contratos, el regulador decide de común acuerdo regular a Kilogas S.A. por medio de
una tasa de retorno. Teniendo en cuenta la misma, la empresa puede invertir en
capital productivo K (que entra en la función de producción) y capital improductivo U (
que no entra en la función de producción, pero que entra en la restricción sobre la tasa de
retorno y, por supuesto, en el costo de oportunidad). Sea s la tasa de retorno máxima
sobre el capital.
a) Demuestre que un monopolista no regulado elige no utilizar capital improductivo.
b) Encuentre las condiciones de primer orden de la maximización de bene…cios
para
un monopolista regulado.
c) Evalúe el resultado de Averch-Johnson en este contexto. En particular, (i)
(K +U )
analice el efecto de s > r sobre la relación
L , y (ii) calcule el nivel de capital
improductivo que elige óptimamente el monopolista regulado. Explique intuitivamente
sus resultados.
3. Suponga que una …rma que utiliza capital y trabajo para producir un bien está
regulada por precios máximos (P max = P < P M , donde P M es el precio elegido por
un monopolista no regulado). Muestre que en este contexto el monopolista minimiza
costos.

4. (Armstrong et al. 1994 ) Suponga que un monopolista regulado por precios máximos
enfrenta una demanda inversa dada por p(q; s), donde s representa el nivel de calidad del
bien provisto por el monopolista. Sea EC (p ; s) el excedente del consumidor cuando
el precio es el precio máximo y s es el nivel de calidad. Análogamente, sean (p ; s)
los bene…cios del monopolista.
a) Plantee el problema del monopolista regulado y el problema de un regulador
que maximiza el bienestar social de…nido como la suma del excedente del consumidor
y los bene…cios. Obtenga la condición de primer orden para el nivel de calidad
para cada problema.
 b) Usando las condiciones de primer orden, muestre que bajo monopolio hay subpro-
visión de calidad.

Yardstick competition
1. (Sappington 2005 ) Suppose there are N 2 identical …rms, each of whom serves as
a monopolist in a separate, independent market. Customer demand for the …rm’s
product in each market is Q(pi ) = 20 pi , where pi is the unit price charged for the
product in market i. Each …rm is able to reduce its constant marginal cost of
production from its initial level, 10, to a lower level, c < 10, via expending R(c) =
2(10 c)2 dollars. The
…rms incur no oher …xed costs of production.
The regulator can observe the realized marginal production cost (ci ) of each monop-
olist. The regulator can also observe the total expenditure (Ri ) each monopolist incurs
in reducing its production cost. The regulator can base both the unit price (pi ) that …
rm i can charge and the transfer payment (Ti ) it receives from consumers in market
i on realized costs (c) and expenditures (R) in all markets.
Demand functions are common knowledge, as is the fact all …rms are identical. Each
…rm knows precisely the expenditure required to reduce operating costs to any speci…
ed level (i.e., each …rms knows R(c) ), but the regulator does not share this privileged
infor- mation. The regulator seeks to maximize the total welfare (i.e., the sum of
consumers’ surplus and pro…t) achieved in all markets. Consumers’ surplus is the
area under the demand curve, less all payments from consumers to the …rm.
a) What level of marginal cost and what price would the regulator dictate in each
market if she knew that R(c) = 2(10 c)2 ?
b) Prove that the regulator can induce the marginal costs identi…ed in your answer
to part 1 as a Nash equilibrium by implementing the following pricing and transfer
payment rules:
 1
P 1
P
Ti = N 1 j=i Rj and pi = N 1 j=i cj

Costo de capital
1. A usted, como economista, se lo contrata para que calcule el costo del capital
de una empresa de agua en la Argentina regulada por precios máximos. Las empresa
posee las siguientes características:
a. Cotiza en bolsa, y posee un beta igual a 0,8.
b. La concesión es por 10 años.
c. Deuda=$30; Capital propio=$70
d. Intereses pagados: $1,5
e. Costo marginal de endeudamiento: 6%.
f. Costo promedio de endeudamiento de las empresas de agua en la Argentina:
7%. g. Alícuota impuesto a las ganancias: 35%.

Para que pueda realizar su tarea se le brinda la siguiente información (esta es toda la
información que dispone, y usted debe hacer lo mejor posible con esta información):
 Prima de riesgo promedio del mercado (E.E.U.U.)
Período Aritméticos Geométricos
1850-2004 8,97% 7,14%
1950-2004 7,65% 6,34%
2000-2004 5,40% 4,22%

TIR bonos seleccionados

TIR Maduración
Letras del Tesoro USA 3,80% 5 años
Nota del Tesoro USA 4,00% 10 años
Bono del Tesoro USA 4,40% 30 años
Bono en pesos ARG 14,00% 10 años
Bono en dólares ARG 10,00% 10 años
Bono en dólares ARG 16,00% 30 años

No olvide discutir cada una de sus elecciones. ¿Cuánto cree que sería el costo
de capital si la empresa estuviese regulada por tasa de ganancia?
2. A usted, como economista, se lo contrata para que calcule el costo del capital
propio de una empresa de agua en la Argentina. Las empresa posee las siguientes
características:
a. Cotiza en bolsa, y posee un beta igual a 0,8.
b. Se encuentra regulada por Price Cap.
c. La concesión es por 10 años.
d. Deuda=$30; Capital propio=$70.

Para que pueda realizar su tarea se le brinda la siguiente información (esta es toda la
información que dispone, y usted debe hacer lo mejor posible con esta información):

Prima de riesgo promedio del mercado (E.E.U.U.)

Período Aritméticos Geométricos
1850-2004 8,97% 7,14%
1950-2004 7,65% 6,34%
2000-2004 5,40% 4,22%

TIR bonos seleccionados

TIR Maduración
Letras del Tesoro USA 3,80% 5 años
Nota del Tesoro USA 4,00% 10 años
Bono del Tesoro USA 4,40% 30 años
Bono en pesos ARG 14,00% 10 años
Bono en dólares ARG 10,00% 10 años
Bono en dólares ARG 16,00% 30 años

No olvide discutir cada una de sus elecciones.

Un diputado argumenta que el beta estimado es incorrecto, dadas las limitaciones
del mercado en el que cotiza la empresa, y propone como alternativa utilizar el beta de
una empresa de agua de Estados Unidos, que se encuentra regulada por tasa de
ganancia.
¿Qué opinión le merece la propuesta del diputado? ¿Qué intereses cree usted que
está defendiendo?