103.
GR 189176 | BARRY LANIER and PERLITA LANIER
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The police operatives conducted a test-buy at
petitioners’ residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay
Island where they were able to purchase P5,000.00
worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from
petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy operation,
they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC
of Aklan.
A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1
Nathaniel A. Tan, but petitioners refused to sign the
same. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an
Information charging the petitioners. The petitioners
filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the RTC
of Kalibo but the RTC denied the motion and remanded
the case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary
investigation. The prosecutor upheld the Information
and directed the return of the records to the RTC for
disposition.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ.
The Sec. of Justice favored the petitioner on the belief
that the evidences seized were planted. The secretary,
in a Resolution, directed the prosecutor to withdraw
the Information before the RTC. RTC then granted the
Motion to Withdraw Information by the prosecutor.
OSG filed to the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA found
probable cause to sustain the petitioners’ indictment
and reinstated the Information against the petitioners.
CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolution and the
Order of the RTC.
Issues:
WoN the CA erred in reversing the DOJ resolution
which nullified the prosecutor’s resolution finding
probable cause to indict petitioners for illegal
possession of prohibited drugs and the RTC Order
granting the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Ruling:
No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.
In Crespo v Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal
Complaint or Information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, dismissal, acquittal or
conviction rests within the exclusive jurisdiction,
competence, and discretion of the trial court. The rule
applies to a Motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss
the case even before or after the arraignment of the
accused.
When the Secretary of Justice made a determination
and concluded that the evidences were planted, he
Page 1 of 18
went into the merits of the defense and exceeded his
jurisdiction.
On the part of the RTC, it having acquired jurisdiction
over the case, is not bound by the Resolution of the
DOJ but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the Secretary’s ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
2. GR 188191 | ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME,
CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and
ANTONIO P. MATIAS
3. GR 170701 | RALPH P. TUA vs. HON. CESAR A.
MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-
TUA
4. 147 SCRA 509 | CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA
AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO vs. HON.
ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS,
Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal,
Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN.
FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA
Facts:
Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of
the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1
before Special Military Commission 1, and also one of
the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 30 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) MC-25-113 of Military Commission 25, both
cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose
Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large. At around
9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of
the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from the Hon.
Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month of
"round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a
"suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for
being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m., Aguilar-
Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection
of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City.
The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest
had previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00
noon on the same day, elements of the CSG searched
the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City.
Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge of the
premises, was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching
party seized 428 documents and written materials, and
additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden
boxes, making 431 items in all. On August 10, Aguilar-
Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by
the CSG against the former for "Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion.
On August 13, the City Fiscal filed an Information for
Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-
Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding. On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that
Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16.
On September 10, the CSG submitted an Amended
Return in the Search Warrant case praying, inter alia,
that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431
documents and articles, "in connection with cases that
are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court."
On December 13, Judge Paño admitted the Amended
Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be
subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case
against respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque,
et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress, praying that such of
the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them.
It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search
Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the
Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the
validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the
other case, apparently unaware of the Order issued by
Judge Paño on December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque,
and Tolentino filed the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the
(1) Search Warrant issued by RTC Judge Paño; (2) his
Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the
Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC
Judge Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to
Suppress. Issue: Whether the description of the
personalities to be seized in the search warrant is too
general to render the warrant void. Held: The disputed
Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to
be seized as "Documents, papers and other records of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books
and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to
Page 2 of 18
the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources." It is at once evident that the Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing
description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain
to make them subversive or to enable them to be used
for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might
be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as,
in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. Search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search
Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized
under an invalid search warrant should be returned,
they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque.
Some searches may be made without a warrant.
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is declaratory in
the sense that it is confined to the search, without a
search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It
is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place or premises where the arrest was made can
also be search without a search warrant. In this latter
case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances,
and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions
as to what constitutes the extent of the place or
premises which may be searched". Considering that
Aguilar-Roque has been charged with Rebellion, which
is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her
arrest has not been served for a considerable period of
time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity
of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was
made within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of
the opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-
B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order. Such being the case, the
personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case,
leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance
and to ask Special Military Commission 1 to return to
her any all irrelevant documents and articles.
5. GR 202122 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ
FACTS:
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja)
is appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one
Attempted Rape.
The victim, AAA, was thirteen (13) years of age when
the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse
took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in
December 2003, February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was only eight
years old. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her
mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe
Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother,
together with three (3) of their children.
The first incident took place on December 2003. AAA’s
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives
in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, while
AAA was asleep, Pareja placed himself on top of.
Then, Pareja, who was already naked, begun to
undress AAA. He then started to suck her breasts. Not
satisfied, he likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s
anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,
AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their
house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told
anyone about the incident for fear that Pareja might kill
her. He threatened to kill AAA in the event that she
would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA narrated that the incident happened more than
once. On February 2004, she had again been
molested by Pareja. With her mother not around and
her half-siblings asleep, he again laid on top of her and
started to suck her breasts. He caressed her and held
her vagina and inserted his finger in it.
With regard to the March 2004 incident, it was AAA’s
mother who saw Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of
her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep.
Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to
the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA
then narrated to the barangay officials that she had
been sexually abused by Pareja many times.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother,
proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital for a medical and genital
examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued
Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-
Page 3 of 18
0091. Her medico-legal report stated the following
conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7
o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or
Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed
that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a
complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police
Station.
As his defense, Pareja offered both denial and ill
motive of AAA against him. He denied raping AAA but
admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his
live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
He also averred that it would have been impossible
that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the
same, he described the layout of their house and
argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual
abuses could have happened. Further, the vicinity
where their house is located was thickly populated with
houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also
had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was
hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about
with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors
noticing the same.
Verily, Pareja was adamant and claimed innocence as
to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He
contended that AAA filed these charges against him
only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at
him for being the reason her parents’ separation.
The RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of
attempted rape for want of evidence but convicted him
of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the
December 2003 and February 2004 incidents,
respectively.
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape
and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless
denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to
testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004,
the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted
Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence.
The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of
AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she
had no personal knowledge of what happened on
March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that
time.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court seriously erred in
convicting Pareja of the crimes charged
notwithstanding that his guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in
convicting Pareja based solely on the prosecution
witness’ testimony.
RULING:
As to the Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone
basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.
We find the argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented
before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that
have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In
People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s
evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the
demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage
point, the trial court is in the best position to determine
the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would
justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by
the lower court’s findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if
the CA concurred with the RTC.
Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s
testimony are generally expected.
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to a person’s achievement or
accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving;
rather, it is something which causes deep
psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her
conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget.
Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account
of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the
stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial
account has never been used as a standard in testing
the credibility of a witness. The inconsistencies
Page 4 of 18
mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she
was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding
the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAA’s ordeal. The date and time of the
commission of the crime of rape becomes important
only when it creates serious doubt as to the
commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the
evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words,
the "date of the commission of the rape becomes
relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of
the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime." Moreover, the
date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone
testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court
has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a
single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and
reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be
sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule
requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him
from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not.
This Court has observed that many of the rape cases
appealed to us were not always committed in
seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, and
rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v.
Sangil, Sr., we expounded on such occurrence in this
wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the
interesting fact that among poor couples with big
families living in small quarters, copulation does not
seem to be a problem despite the presence of other
persons around them. Considering the cramped space
and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have
gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of
sexual congresses which elude the attention of family
members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it
would be almost impossible to copulate with them
around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor
incredible for the family members to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault
is being committed. One may also suppose that
growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups
and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and
suspirations in the night. There is no merit in
appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a
room where other people are present. There is no rule
that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have
repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time
and place," and rape can be committed in even the
unlikeliest of places.
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct
belie her claim that she was raped.
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will
tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual
abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact
that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person
being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that
failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate
rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the
victim has consented to the sexual act, especially
when that person was intimidated into submission by
the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by
a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or
common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja
would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever
spoke of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after
being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough to
discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape,
cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society’s expectations. It is
unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction
to an irrational experience, especially from a young
victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an
unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the
workings of a human mind placed under emotional
stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a
standard reaction or behavior among victims of the
crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating
that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating
trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be
given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and
when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted."
Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s
hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as
evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that
occurred in December, was not by penetration of the
vagina.
This Court has time and again held that an accused
can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado, we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the
commission of rape, as even a medical examination of
Page 5 of 18
the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical
certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she
was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary,
the medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim
of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion,
and not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and
prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja
cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December
2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of
the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition
of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a
woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and
the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free rape. "The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification
of rape as a crime against persons and the
introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated
from the traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or
‘rape through sexual intercourse.’"4 Republic Act No.
8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the
Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article
266-A.
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. –
Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is "by any
person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in
December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus.
While she may not have been certain about the details
of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that
Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus,
clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual
assault. In other words, her testimony on this account
was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive,
and probable.
However, since the charge in the Information for the
December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by
sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second,
and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of
rape by sexual assault when what he was charged
with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section
5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 to
wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in
the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
Page 6 of 18
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the
evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC
found AAA’s declaration on the rape in the December
2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction,
albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above.
However, it did not find that the same level of proof,
i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by
the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a
second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case
No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the
RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not
she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually
resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay, stated that aside from sucking
her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her
vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and
convincing account of such insertion during her
testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the
prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were
sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja
also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later
on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her
vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the
material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident.
Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of
AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed
above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her
account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly
convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión correccional
in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in
degree,i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month
and 1 day to 6 months. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper
penalty that could be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness, which, in this
case, absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, is the medium period of prisión
correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies
the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages;
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find
accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of
two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate
prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as
maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim,
AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment.
6. GR 118013-14 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod
City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP.
ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ,
PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES
DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY,
JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ,
EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR
PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO
FACTS:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with
murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City against fourteen persons, five of whom are
members of the Philippine National Police. The two
cases was consolidated.
While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a
motion for the transmittal of the case to the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense
charged were committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the case is no longer cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by
subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction
in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the
case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or
the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of
jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of
R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the
end of the litigation.
Page 7 of 18
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as
the informations were filed not before it but before the
Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the
foregoing assumption that the informations in the
subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers
with offenses committed in relation to their office so
that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the
Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the
informations had already been filed with the said
tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the
Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the
cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the
effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has
not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred
to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were
previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the
jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the
latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been
commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would
anyway be transferred again to the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to
Section 2 thereof.
7. GR L-46934 | ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR vs. HON.
NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court,
San Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide
withmultiple serious physical injuries and damage to
proeperty throughreckless imprudence before the
Municipal Court of San Fernando,Pampanga. Cuyos
entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment andthe
judge set the case for trial, but before it could
commence, petitionerfiled a Motion to Remand the
Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyosclaimed that
there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal
Courtand contended that the damages suffered by the
Volkswagen he hitamounted to P18,000.00. He argued
that under Art. 365, par. 3 of theRevised Penal Code,
the crime would carry a fine in an amount rangingfrom
the amount of the damage to three times the value of
the damagealleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00=P54,000.00).Under §87 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine
notexceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion
to Postpone the Trial.The municipal judge denied the
motion to transfer and set the case for
trial. Cuyos‟ verbal motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San
Fernando,Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case
against Cuyos
HELD:
The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor
General that theMunicipal Court has no jurisdiction to
try the present case. The case at barinvolves a complex
crime of homicide, multiple serious physical
injuriesand damage to property resulting from reckless
imprudence. Art. 365,par.2 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty imposableupon petitioner, if
found guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence,would be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. At thetime the
complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had
jurisdiction toimpose a penalty of imprisonment not
exceeding six(6) years or a fine not exceeding
P6,000.00 or both.Thus, because the penalty for
damage to property throughimprudence or negligence
as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the
va
lue of damagesto three times such value, the case must
be forwarded to the Court of FirstInstance. Art. 365
simply means that if there is only damage to
property,the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if
there is also physical injuries,there should be an
additional penalty for the latter.The applicable rule on
allocation of jurisdiction on cases involvingcases of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical
injuries issummarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated
that in such cases, Art. 48of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable, but there may be cases when theimposable
penalty is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court, whilethe fine is under the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance. Since theinformation cannot be
split into two, the jurisdiction of the court isdetermined
by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resultingfrom the reckless imprudence. The maximum
fine imposable for the crimein this case is P54,000.00
and the maximum imprisonment for homicide issix (6)
years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.The order of the
Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and voidand the
Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
Page 8 of 18
8. GR 75079 | SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA vs. THE
HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge,
Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION
Facts:
Solemnidad Buaya is an insurance agent of private
complainant of Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation. Private respondent Buaya, was
authorized to transact and underwrite insurance
business and collect the corresponding premiums for
and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the
terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is
required to make a periodic report and accounting of
her transactions and remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent located in the
City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on
petitioner's account which showed a shortage. She was
charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no
jurisdiction over the offense since the collection was
done in Cebu City and the offense complained of is
purely civil in nature. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss.
Issues:
1) Whether or not RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the
case. 2) Whether of not the offense complained is
purely civil in nature, hence warrants the dismissal of
the criminal case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the averments in
the complaint or information characterize the crime to
be prosecuted and the court before which it must be
tried. Thus, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the complaint must be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the
court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of
courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and not by
the findings the court may make after the trial. Further,
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: In all criminal — prosecutions the action sh
all be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any of the essential elements thereof
took place. The subject information charges petitioner
with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June
15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . .
." Clearly then, from the very allegation of the
information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction. Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing
or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the
place where any of the essential elements of the crime
took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is
damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private
respondent has its principal place of business and
office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit
the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
As to the second issue, the contention that the subject
matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that
evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.
9. GR 214925 | JOHN LABSKY P. MAXIMO AND
ROBERT M. PANGANIBAN vs. FRANCISCO Z.
VILLAPANDO, JR.
10. GR 102342 | LUZ M. ZALDIVIA vs. HON. ANDRES B.
REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for
commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the
Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.
Timeline:
1. On May 11, 1990 - The offense was allegedly
committed.
2. On May 30, 1990 - The referral-complaint of
the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal.
3. On October 2, 1990 (5 months after filing of
complaint in fiscal’s office) -The corresponding
Information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that the crime had prescribed.
Lower Court Decision: MTC denies motion to quash.
Appellate Court Decision: RTC sustains denial.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner:
FIRST argues that the charge against her is governed by
the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, whose scope includes:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Page 9 of 18
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
B. Criminal Cases
Xxx
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed
by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six
months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
NEXT, petitioner argues that Act No. 3326, the law
establishing prescriptive periods for violations
penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances
which also provides when such periods begin to run
and when the same will be interrupted, accordingly
treats the Information against her as having been filed
way beyond the two-month statutory period from the
date of the alleged commission of the offense, the
charge against her should have been dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the
prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. (NOTE: The position of the fiscal
seems to be in accordance with the doctrine of
Brillante v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19,
2004 - - -That the filing of a complaint with the fiscals
office suspends the running of the prescriptive period
of a criminal offense). Agreeing with the respondent
judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing
as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses NOT subject to
the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said
courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However,
in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the LAST PARAGRAPH. The
respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes
under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase
"in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure applies to violations of municipal
ordinances. (Specifically, whether or not the CA erred
in denying petitioner’s motion to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription, for having
applied Section 1, Rule 110, instead of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, as petitioner argues)
HELD:
No, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure DOES NOT APPLY to violations of municipal
ordinances; it does not apply to offenses which falls
under Summary Procedure.
The LAST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as argued by respondent,
was an adoption of the doctrine in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals - - - “that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed can not try the case on
its merits.” However, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the
phrase, "for offenses NOT subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly
signifies that the section does NOT apply to offenses
which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase
"in all cases" appearing in the LAST PARAGRAPH
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section,
that is, those offenses NOT governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent. As it is
clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
Rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Page 10 of 18
Where paragraph (b) of the Section 1 Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure does speak of "offenses
falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious
reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in
such courts. These offenses are not covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Rule on Summary Procedure provides that the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court; Running of prescriptive period tolls on the date
of filing in court
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
"the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination
or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that
this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-
quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does.
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as
a special law (SPECIAL RULE) prevails over Section 1,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure must yield to Act
No. 3326
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section
1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there
be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again
yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases
is a substantive right.
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it relevant to
observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under
the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case
is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the
crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance
with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted
by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not
a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
11. GR L-1477 | THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.JULIO GUILLEN
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of
Simeon Varela (Barrela)and to multiple frustrated
murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, JoseFabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the
injured parties,as the information filed against him
provided.Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged against him, but waslater found after duly
admitting his intention to kill the President, thelower
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
wassentenced with the highest capital punishment, for
the murder of SimeonVarela (Barrela) and to the
multiple frustrated murder of President Roxasand
company.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty
of the said crime.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the
accused guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated
murderer because the act of Guillen wasnot fully
realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage,
preventinghim from fulfilling his act of assassinating
the President. Therefore, Guillenis not guilty of the
crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of
multiple attempted murder.
Page 11 of 18
12. GR 130605 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX
UGANAP alias Commander Matador, FAUSTINO
UGANAP, SALVADOR UGANAP, NONOY PANDAY,
TIRSO ARANG and four (4) JOHN DOES
FACTS:
The victim and some of the accused were close
relatives. AccusedTirso Arang is the half-brother of the
victim, while accused-appellant Felix
Uganap is also the victim‟s cousin. Accused Faustino
Uganap is the
brother-in-
law of the victim, being brother of the latter‟s wife,
Leilani
Asang.The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of
the victim,that ataround 8:30 in the evening, he was
walking home when he stopped nearthe house of
Salvador Uganap. He peeped through a hole in the wall
of the house and saw the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap
had a .38 revolver,while Nonoy Panday had a pistolized
carbine. The room was illuminatedby a lamp. Samuel
Arang moved away from the house and hid behind
acoconut tree. The accused went to the house of Pedro
Arang, which was30 meters away from where the
witness was. Samuel stated that he sawFelix
immediately shoot Pedro when the latter opened the
door. Samuelfled because they were afraid.Nolly
Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was a
member of vigilante religious group called Ituman. That
he was also recruited whenhe was 14
years old. Felix Uganap was the group‟s designated
commanderas “Commander Matador”. Luchavez left
the group.
Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang
was proposed byFaustino Uganap at a coffee shop.
Faustino paid Felix P 3,000.00 for thepurpose. The
group intended to effect the killing on December 24,
butaborted because Pedro left the town to visit his
wife. Hence, the plan wasset to January 6. Luchavez
was unable to go with the group because hehad a
fever.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy and;Whether or not
the price or reward as an aggravatingcircumstance will
be appreciated.
HELD:
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested. The
accusedappellant was convicted while the other
accused were acquitted, by RTC.The review of criminal
cases necessitates a re-examination of theentire
evidence on record. The Court is likewise not
prohibited frominstituting a finding of conspiracy, in
reversal of the findings of the lowercourt, when its
existence is manifest from the evidence at hand. In
theinstant case, however, nothing less than direct
proof of a previousagreement to kill the victim, plus an
eyewitness account of how theconspirators effected
their plan, was submitted into evidence
butdisregarded by the trial court.The information
alleges that the crime was attended treacheryand
evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of
treachery, but theevident premeditation is present.
Court also observes that another aggravating
circumstance was proven by evidence. L
uchavez‟s testimonythat the taking of Pedro Arang‟s
life carried the price of P3, 000.00 was
categorical, credible and unrebutted.However,
because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure
asrevised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating
circumstances must bespecifically named in the
information, the Court will allow for thisamendment to
retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence,
theaggravating circumstance of price or reward shall
not be appreciated.Reclusion Perpetua is applicable
and award of damages are the same.
13. GR 132169 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANICO NUEVO @ “SANY"
Facts
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 o‟clock in the
evening of
December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and
invited her husbandfor the drinking spree at Anselmo
Sr., his father. She was left at home withher 10 month
old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00
pm,appellant returned and entered their room. She
was awakened whenappellant held her neck, pinned
down her arms and took off her clothing.She struggled
to extricate herself but to no avail.Appellant lay on top
of her and proceeded forcibly to havesexual
intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present,
witnessed whatwas being done to her. Appellant
threatened her and her niece. Robertatestified that she
did not see him because it was very dark that night,
sheidentified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wife‟s story. He
saw Sanicoleft his father‟s place at around 11:00 pm
and returned only at around
1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no
fresh injury foundon the victim, that only old
lacerations were present.Sanico Nuevo, declared that
he knew Roberta since they wereschoolmates in grade
school and she was a former neighbor. He denied,he
invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial
court finds theaccused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
with aggravating circumstances.The accused was
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death.
ISSUES:
Page 12 of 18
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by
theoffended party based only on her recognition of the
sound of his voice;
Whether or not the prosecution‟s evidence suffices for
the
conviction of rape and the imposition of the death
penaltyon him.
HELD:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity
withanother, identification becomes quite an easy talk
even from aconsiderable distance. In a number of
cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice of a person
is an acceptable means of identification where
thewitness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for anumber of years.In People
vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of the
circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of
R.A. No.7659,mandating the death penalty are in the
nature of qualifyingcircumstances and the absence of
proper averment thereof in thecomplaint will bar the
imposition of that extreme penalty.While the decision
of the trial court held that dwelling and theuse of a
deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court
find thatthese were not averted in the information.
Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, effective
December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint
orinformation must state not only the qualifying but
also the aggravatingcircumstances with specifity. This
requirement has retroactive effect.The result is that
the crime committed by appellant is only simplerape,
which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
amended byR.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of
commission thereof, ispunished only with Reclusion
Perpetua.
14. GR 145391 | AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya
and theother owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo
and driven by petitionerAvelino Casupanan, figured in
an accident. Two cases were filed, with theMunicipal
Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal caseagainst Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage toproperty. On the
other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
caseagainst Laroya for quasi-delict.When civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at itspreliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed amotion to dismiss the case on the ground of
forum-shopping consideringthe pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
anddismiss the civil case.Casupanan and Capitulo, filed
a motion for reconsideration.They insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can
proceedindependently of the criminal case. The MCTC
denied the motion forreconsideration. Casupanan and
Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65
before the RTC and still it was denied for lack of
merit.They f iled a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC
denied the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case
for recklessimprudence can validly file, simultaneously
andindependently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict againstthe private complainant in the criminal
case;Whether or not there is forum-shopping.
HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on
theground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative CircularNo. 04-94. MCTC did not state in
its order of dismissal that the dismissalwas with
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC‟s dismissal, being silent on
the matter,
is a dismissal without prejudice.Section 1 of Rule 41
provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the Capas
RTC‟s order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground
that the properremedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing
of multiple suits involving the same parties for thesame
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively.
It is presentwhen in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rightsof action and relief
sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant
casebecause the law and the rules expressly allow the
filing of separate civilaction which can proceed
independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is “deemed
instituted” with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from thecrime or ex-delito. All other civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code are
no longer deemed instituted and may be filed
separatelyand independently even without
reservation.
In no case, however, may the “offended party recover
damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly,Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, notthe
accused.
15. GR L-64261 | JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS,
JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC. vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
Page 13 of 18
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.
Facts
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamuswith preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of 2search
warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge ErnaniCruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal,under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
QuezonCity, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,business addresses of the
“
Metropolitan Mail
”
and
“
We Forum
”
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printingmachines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articlesused in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers,as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
writtenliterature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner JoseBurgos, Jr. Publisher-editor of
the
“
We Forum
”
newspaper, were seized.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search warrant?
Ruling:
The two search warrants were issued wihout probable
cause. Tosatisfy the requirement of probable cause a
specific offense must bealleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the caseat bar,
nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated
only is theclaim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885,
asamended. There is no mention of any specific
provision of the decree. Inthe words of Chief Justice
Concepcion,
“
It would be legal heresy, of thehighest order, to convict
anybody
”
of violating the decree withoutreference to any
determinate provision thereof.
16. 160 SCRA 838 | RODOLFO DELA CRUZ vs. Hon.
FELIX L. MOYA
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of
theArmed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the
Intelligence andOperations Section and together with
other PC men they received anorder mission to
proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao
forthe purpose of verifying and apprehending person
who are allegedlyengaged in the illegal cockfighting. In
compliance with the said mission,they caught in
flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but
theyresisted the arrest. They left the place but brought
with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting
cocks. The operators of the illegalcockfighting,
including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the
soldieron their way to the Headquarters. Fighting
ensued and in the scuffle, DelaCruz shot Cabilto.As a
result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of
homicidein the Court of First Instance of Davao.
However, while the case is pendingtrial, PD. Nos. 1822
and 1822-A were promulgated by the President
onJanuary 16, 1981, vesting in court
–
martial jurisdiction over crimescommitted by the
members of the Armed Forces or of the
PhilippineConstabulary in the performance of their
duty.
Issue:
Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the
subjectmatter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August
2, 1979.On such date, General Order No. 59, dated
June 24, 1977 published in theOfficial Gazette, states
that military tribunals created under GeneralOrder No.
8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
committedby military personnel of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines while in theperformance of their
duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A
werepromulgated after the filling of the complaint
however, General Order 59was enacted before the
commission of the crime.The court held that PD. 1822
and PD 1822-A are inapplicable tothe case however,
General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore,
thepetition was GRANTED.
17. 477 SCRA 409 | STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR
PINOTE vs. JUDGE ROBERTO LAYCO
Facts:
The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the
defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor
Page 14 of 18
or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a
clear transgression of the Rules.
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case
to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two
witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor
Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State
Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon
City.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal
case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco,
maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his
absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the
prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine
the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint
lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Serious Misconduct.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on
Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to present
evidence in the absence of a prosecutor
HELD:
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public
prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there
are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the
court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall
continue to prosecute the case until the termination of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,
unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of
the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness. It is on this account that the presence of a
public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of
which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter
how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the
Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the
State.
Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform
the court of his inability to attend the hearings or to file
a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently
file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing
the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates
may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of
his utter disregard of the Rules.
18. 461 SCRA 599 | ARTEMIO TORRES JR vs. SPS DRS.
EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T. TORRES-
AGUINALDO
19. GR 149472 | JORGE SALAZAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
20. GR 144037 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL
TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET
21. GR 147703 | PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the
event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently,
the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-
large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal
case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently
of the accused.
Page 15 of 18
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that
the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that
appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-
delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability
in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor --
still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect
the remaining civil interest therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be
viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While
they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case,
the former cannot act independently on their own
behalf, but can only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner
now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma
of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in
a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter
has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.
22. GR 145420 | A. RAFAEL DINGLASAN JR vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL
23. GR 182926 | ANA LOU NAVAJA vs. HON. MANUEL
DE CASTRO
24. GR 220953 | Gloria Macapagal Arroyo vs People
and Sandiganbayan
25. GR 226679 | SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA
vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165.
He wants to enter into a plea bargaining agreement but
Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because
Section 23 specifically prohibits plea bargaining in
drugs cases. Estipona argues that Section 23 is
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Page 16 of 18
Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-
bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for
two reasons. First, it violates the equal protection
clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.)
are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not,
considering that rape and murder are more heinous
than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court under the
constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature
and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme
Court.
26. GR 192799 | ROLEX RODRIGUEZ y OLAYRES vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED DOMECQ
SPIRITS AND WINES, represented by ALLIED DOMECQ
PHILS., INC.
FACTS:
RTC convicted Rolex Rodriguez of Unfair Competition.
After promulgation of sentence, he filed for a motion
for reconsideration before the RTC on last day of the
reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen days after
receipt of the RTC denying his motion for
reconsideration, he filed his Notice of Appeal. Thus, the
denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being
filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure (29 days after promulgation).
Rodriguez asserted that the fresh period rule should be
applied after the motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the fresh period rule should apply.
RULING:
The SC held that the fresh period rule should also apply
to criminal cases.
As was the decision in Yu v. Tatad, the fresh period rule
should also apply to Rule 122, Sec. 6 of the Rules of
Court. The SC said that the privilege should also accord
those in criminal cases and not just in civil case
27. GR 163972-77 | JOSELITO RANIERO DAAN vs. THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Daan, together with Kuizon, were charged with
three counts of malversation of public fund before the
Sandiganbayan. In addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee. In the falsification cases, the
accused offered to withdraw their plea of ―not guilty‖
and substitute the same with a plea of ―guilty‖,
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession
or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed
instead to substitute their plea of ―not guilty‖ to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee with a plea of ―guilty‖, but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute
their plea of ―not guilty‖ thereto with a plea of
―guilty‖, but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts. The
prosecution found as acceptable the plea bargaining
proposals of the accused. The Sandiganbayan,
however, denied petitioner‘s Motion to Plea Bargain,
despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution,
on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution
failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound
to the benefit of the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea bargaining offer of the
petitioner should be granted.
HELD:
Yes, the plea bargaining offer should be granted.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the
basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be
made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea
of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules
however use word may in the second sentence of
Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the
trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a
matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused. Apparently, the
Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events
and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present
case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's
equity jurisdiction - Equity as the complement of legal
jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to
the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so
Page 17 of 18
to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts and of its power of control and supervision over
the proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford
equal justice to petitioner.
28. GR 179611 | EFREN S. ALMUETE vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
29. GR 179267 | JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE
RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE,
all surnamed GARCIA
30. GR 129670 | MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L.
LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC,
Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested without a
warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the
police. It appears that the parents of complainant
Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their
daughter, then 16years old, had been contacted by
Lavides for an assignation that night at his room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioner‘s activities. He was
charged with violation of RA 7610. Lavides filed a
Motion, contending that the warrantless arrest made
was illegal and that he should be allowed to post bail
as a matter of right. Later, nine more Informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides. No bail was
recommended but he still filed separate applications
for bail in the nine cases. The trial court issued an order
resolving the Motion of Lavides, ruling that he is
allowed to post bail, under the conditions that: a) The
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance
during the trial of these cases; b) In the event that he
shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his
arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall
proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure
Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d)
Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment to enable this Court to immediately
acquire jurisdiction over the accused. He thereafter
filed a motion to quash the Informations against him
and to suspend his arraignment. The court however
denied said motion so he was arraigned during which
he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. The
court then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to
the conditions in the Order. He filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial court‘s denial of
his motion to quash and the conditions set forth in its
order. The CA declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid
but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d)
on the ground that the issue had become moot and
academic since Lavides has already been arraigned. He
then filed this present petition in the SC, contending
that the CA erred in not declaring condition (d) as a void
condition and that his arraignment should be also
considered void because it was held pursuant to a
invalid condition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition is void and the
arraignment is invalid.
Held
The condition is void. Bailshould be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is
quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then
be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence
of petitioner atthe arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the
proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the
grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place himin a position where he hasto choose
between (1)filing a motion to quash and thus delay
hisrelease on bail because until his motion to quash can
be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2)foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the
accused‘s constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaintorinformation
sufficienttocharge himwitha crime and hisrightto bail
31. GR 213847 | JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before
the Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF.
When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and
detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a
motion to fix bail where he argued that:
He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
Page 18 of 18
Although charged with plunder his penalty would only
be reclusion temporal considering that there are two
mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender and
that he is already at the age of 90;
That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition
must be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the
grounds that:
He is charged with a capital offense;
That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of
his bail because the prosecution have not yet
presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health
and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to
ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same
time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is
the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty.
The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the
crime charged should be allowed independently of the
merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is
injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be
granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and
attended, which will then enable him to attend trial
therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.
32. GR 231989 | PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA