İbn Taymiyya As Avicennan Al İkhmimi Al Munkız Min Al Dalal PDF

Ibn Taymiyya as Avicennan?
Fourteenth-Century
Cosmological Controversies in Damascus
Rodrigo Adem
Harvard University
I
n recent years, Jon Hoover has played a pioneering role in elucidating the role of
Avicennan conceptual models for the theology of Ibn Taymiyya.1 Yet despite the
relatively muted reception of this discovery in Western academia, the notion of Ibn
Taymiyya being influenced by Peripatetic philosophy is a topic long familiar to his mod-
(
ern critics in the Muslim world, from Muhammad
: Zāhid al-Kawtharı̄ (d. 1951)2 to Sa ı̄d
3
Ramadān
: al-Būt:ı̄ (d. 2013). Spirited debates on this topic are plentiful on the internet for
those who seek them, with a variety of positions taken, both critical and positive.4 They
center on Ibn Taymiyya’s bold but generally underappreciated contention that God is
eternally active as Creator, eternally undertaking a process of discrete creative acts with
no beginning or end. This view he had justified on the premise of the possibility of infi-
nite temporal regress (hawādith
: lā awwal lahā) which had been conceptually but-
tressed by Ibn Sı̄nā as a legitimate form of actual infinity5 and ran contrary to what was
1
The first intimations at an affinity with Peripatetic thought regarding divine creation began with
J. Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity in the Perfection of God: Ibn Taymiyya’s Hadith Commentary on God’s
Creation of This World,” Journal of Islamic Studies 15/3 (2004), 287–329. An explicit dependency on
Avicennan thought was subsequently made explicit in idem, “Ibn Taymiyya as an Avicennian Theolo-
gian: A Muslim Approach to God’s Self-Sufficiency,” Theological Review 27/1 (2006), 34–46, and, Ibn
Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007).
2
In his commentary on Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄’s al-Sayf al-Saqı̄l
: (discussed below) and Ibn Taymiyya’s
(
commentary on Ibn Hazm’s: Marātib al-Ijmā . For the precise references, see footnote 4.
3 (
Muhammad
: Sa ı̄d Ramadān
: al-Būtı̄,
: al-Salafiyya Marhala
: Zamaniyya Mubāraka lā Madhhab Islāmı̄,
4th ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2010), 163 ff.
4 (
These can be found with reference to Muslim scholars both Salafı̄ and Ash arı̄. It is beyond the scope
of this article, however, to address the details of the modern reception of the idea. For a cursory
(
presentation of 20th century discussions, including by al-Kawtharı̄, see Qidam al- ālam wa-tasalsul
(
al-hawādith,
: Kāmila al-Kawthārı̄ ( Ammān: Dār Usāma, 2001), 162–183.
5
See J. McGinnis, “Avicennan Infinity: A Select History of the Infinite through Avicenna,” Documenti e
Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 21 (2010), 199–222.
C 2018 Hartford Seminary.
V
DOI: 10.1111/muwo.12231
124
I BN TAYMIYYA AS AVICENNAN ?
(
by then part of the standard kalām proof for creation ex nihilo.6 Between Ash arı̄s and
Salafı̄s in the modern Muslim world, the question is posed as to whether or not Ibn Tay-
miyya (like al-Ghazālı̄ according to some accounts) had become so “entangled” in the
philosophy of his opponents such as Ibn Sı̄nā that he had become “tainted” by those
whom he had initially set out to refute.7
As this article will demonstrate, these seemingly obscure contemporary discussions
in fact find their precedent in fourteenth century debates which took place in the ensu-
ing decades following Ibn Taymiyya’s death, suggesting that the notion of Ibn Taymiyya
as an “Avicennan theologian” is not an entirely novel one, but was present even in the
earliest reception of his thought. Our sources for these debates, some of which will be
presented here for the first time, will be discussed with special attention to the rhetorical
strategies they employ, even if a more detailed conceptual analysis of the philosophical
topic in question remains an important desideratum.
As will be seen, the critique and defense of Ibn Taymiyya’s Avicennism appealed to
varying sources of authority dependent on the orientation of the author and his intended
audience. At times recourse was made to scriptural or traditional authority; in other cir-
cumstances, philosophical argumentation was foregrounded. These disparate and seem-
ingly contradictory approaches speak to enduring conceptual and social commitments
underlying the representation of philosophical theology in Muslim religious discourse
over the longue duree. Analyzed within their specific context, they afford us an invalu-
able source for appreciating the historically contingent manner by which Ibn Taymiyya’s
theological project has been self-conceived by its advocates or taxonomized by its oppo-
nents over time and in different arenas.
Part One: Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄ and the Seeds of

Controversy
Although the contentious nature of Ibn Taymiyya’s scholarly activity is well known,
accusations of philosophical proclivity are not included in the standard narratives provided
by the biographical dictionaries which inform the main contours of modern historiography
on his profile. The extant sources at our disposal which shed light on the first instance of
this point of controversy are theological texts which find as their initial locus the personage
(
of Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄ (d. 756/1355), chief Shāfi ı̄ judge of Damascus and a prominent
6
As established in the generation of al-Juwaynı̄; see H. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the
Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987), 145–146.
7
This view has even been ironically advocated by A. von K€ ugelgen, “The Poison of Philosophy: Ibn
Taymiyya’s Struggle For and Against Reason,” Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, eds. B. Krawietz and G. Tamer (Boston: De Gruyter, 2013),
253–328.
V 125
THE MUSLIM WORLD VOLUME 108 JANUARY 2018
figure in scholarly networks of the early Mamluk period.8 Two distinct circumstances occa-
sioned this occurrence: The first was a brief contention by al-Subkı̄ regarding the contents
of Ibn Taymiyya’s Path of the Prophetic Tradition (Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya), one
which in turn provoked noteworthy responses from Ibn Taymiyya’s admirers. The second
was a lengthier text penned by al-Subkı̄ in response to the al-Kāfiya al-shāfiya by Ibn Tay-
miyya’s student Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350). These texts, though known in the research,
have not yet been brought to bear on the topic at hand.
1.1. Al-Subkı¯, al-Surramurrı¯, and the Minhāj al-sunna

The Minhāj al-sunna,9 the composition of which can be dated to ca. 713–720/1313–
1320,10 was written as a response to Ibn al-Mut:ahhar al-Hillı̄’s
: (d. 726/1325) Minhāj al-
karāma, a refutation of Sunnism that was largely colored by the principles of the Twel-
ver “Us: ūlı̄” tradition of kalām-based theology.11 Ibn Taymiyya’s reply in turn contained a
(
critique of kalām’s broader influence on Muslim theology in both Sunnı̄ and Shı̄ ı̄ forms,
and over the course of his argumentation he problematized kalām’s doctrine of divine
immutability and its correlated premise of the impossibility of infinite temporal regress.
Al-Subkı̄ found the Minhāj al-sunna dissatisfying on a number of doctrinal points,
including that topic, and wrote a brief poetic critique of that work where he made
his displeasure clear.12 It included a fleeting but tantalizing criticism of Ibn Taymiyya’s
theological use of actual infinity:
He (i.e. Ibn Taymiyya) professes temporal occurrences in God with no begin-
ning to the first of them – may He be exalted beyond what is thought of Him.
If he were alive to see my words and understand them I would refute what he
said. . .
8
For a detailed portrait of his scholarly career, see S. Leder, “Damaskus: Entwicklung einer islamischen
Metropole (12.214. Jh.) und ihre Grundlagen,” Alltagsleben und Materielle Kultur in der Arabischen
Sprache und Literatur: Festschrift fur € Heinz Grotzfeld zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Th. Bauer and
U. Stehli-Werbeck (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005), 244 ff.
9 (
Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fı̄ naqd: kalām al-shı̄ a wa l-qadariyya, ed.
( (
M. R. Sālim, 9 vols. (Riyadh: Jāmi at al-Imām Muhammad
: Ibn Sa ūd al-Islāmiyya, 1986).
10
Jon Hoover has dated the composition of text to some point between 713–717/1313–1317; see
Perpetual Optimism, 11. However, three references made by Ibn Taymiyya to the disappearance of the
twelfth imam as having happened “over 460 years ago” (Minhāj al-sunna, vol. 6, 390, 402, 461) suggest
a longer period of composition, and a later terminus post quem for its completion; i.e. after 720/1320.
11
For an overview of the text, see H. Laoust, “La critique du Sunnisme dans la doctrine d’al-Hillı̄,” Revue

des Etudes Islamiques XXXIV (1966), 35–50. On the term us: ūlı̄, and its relationship to a distinct mode of
kalām-based Twelver polemic, see Kazuo Morimoto, “KETĀB AL-NAQZ,” _ Encyclopædia Iranica,
online edition, 2015, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ketab-al-naqz (accessed on 16
March 2015).
12
His critiques included hashw
: (a reference to tashbı̄h or likening God to creation), divorce rulings,
and ziyāra. The poem was included in the biography written by his son Tāj al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄, T: abaqāt
( (
al-shāfi iyya al-kubrā, eds. Abd al-Fattāh: al-Hilū
: and Mahmūd
: Muhammad
: al-Tanā
: hı̄,
: 10 vols. (Cairo:
(
Dār Ihyā
: al-Kutub al- Arabiyya, 1964), vol. 10, 176–177.
126 C 2018 Hartford Seminary.
V
Despite its brevity, al-Subkı̄’s critique of infinite regress as a point of issue with the
Minhāj al-sunna is a significant element of that text’s early reception; as will be shown
below, the same text gave occasion for one of his students to criticize Ibn Taymiyya on
the same topic in more detail. Furthermore, Muhammad : Rashād Sālim, editor of the
Minhāj al-sunna, has highlighted how al-Subkı̄’s poetic critique of the Minhāj al-sunna
went on to provoke even more detailed responses from Ibn Taymiyya’s supporters,
likewise in poetic form.13 These took on al-Subkı̄’s pithy comment on infinite regress
with considerable detail, and with an eye towards refuting what was left unsaid, yet
certainly implied by al-Subkı̄’s statement; namely, that Ibn Taymiyya had heretically
affirmed the eternity of the world.
The first, labeled The Islamic Passion in Assisting the Doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya
(al-H: amiyya al-islāmiyya fı̄ l-intis: ār li-madhhab Ibn Taymiyya) in extant manuscripts,14
was composed by Jamāl al-Dı̄n Yūsuf b. Muhammad : al-Surramurrı̄ (d. 776/1374), a
Baghdad Hanbalı̄
: scholar known for his prolific pen, and an emigre to Damascus from
15
Baghdad some time after Ibn Taymiyya’s death. Although he never met the Harrānian : )
(
scholar, one of his own teachers in Baghdad had been Safı̄ : al-Dı̄n Abd al-Mu min b.
(
Abd al-Haqq
: (d. 739/1338), a prominent Hanbalı̄
: scholar who fostered a positive
reception of Ibn Taymiyya in that city: Not only had Safı̄ : al-Dı̄n consulted Ibn Taymiyya
personally when composing a sharh: of his grandfather Majd al-Dı̄n Ibn Taymiyya’s
16
Muharrar;
: he had also been among the group of Baghdad scholars who wrote on Ibn
Taymiyya’s behalf concerning the topic of pilgrimage to graves during the latter’s last
imprisonment.17 Al-Surramurrı̄ was likely first exposed to Ibn Taymiyya’s thought via his
teachers in Baghdad,18 and it is probable that he developed a relationship with the lat-
ter’s students in Damascus as well, although no such contact is recorded. He also wrote
his own abridgement of the text under discussion, i.e., the Minhāj al-sunna,19 and was
13
Two poems to be precise, first printed together in the Būlāq edition of the Minhāj al-sunna; see Ibn
Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, i, 23–24 (introduction).
14
Manuscripts of the poem can be found in Wizārat al-Awqāf al-Kuwaytiyya, 2/163; Riyādh University,
microfilm 54, no. 21. See http://wadod.org/vb/showthread.php?t5229.
15 ( ( )
Ibn Hajar
: al- Asqalānı̄, al-Durar al-kāmina fı̄ a yān al-mi a al-thāmina, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Jı̄l,
1993), iv, 473–474.
16 ( ( (
Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl alā T: abaqāt al-H: anābila, ed. Abd al-Rahmān : b. Sulaymān al- Uthaymı̄n
(
(Riyadh: Maktabat al- Ubaykān, 2005), v, 83.
17 ( (
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, ed. Abd al-Rahmān : ( b.
( :
Muhammad
: Ibn Qāsim, 37 vols. (Medina: Mujamma al-Malik Fahd, 2004), xxvii, 199–200; Abū Abd
( (
Allāh Muhammad
: b. Ahmad
: ) Ibn Abd al-Hādı̄, al- Uqūd al-durriyya min manāqib Shaykh al-Islām Ibn
(
Taymiyya, ed. Tal: at b. Fu ād al-Hulwānı̄
: (Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Hadı̄thiyya,
: 2001), 273–274. See also the
laudatory eulogistic poem he wrote on the occasion of Ibn Taymiyya’s death; ibid, 388 ff.
18
Yet another teacher of al-Surramurrı̄’s, al-Daqūqı̄ (d. 733/1332) also wrote a number of poetic eulo-
gies for Ibn Taymiyya; see ibid., 310–320.
19 (
See Ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl alā T: abaqāt al-H: anābila, v, 80. Muhammad
: Rashād Sālim who made refer-
( (
ence to the work’s full title, al-Matālib
: al- awāl li-taqrı̄r minhāj al-istiqāma wa l-i tidāl via Ibn Nāsir
:
al-Dı̄n’s al-Radd al-wāfir had confused it for a summary of al-Istiqāma (see Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj
V 127
conversant enough with the Harrānian

: shaykh’s teachings that he evidently felt confident
enough to defend them against as eminent a scholarly personality as al-Subkı̄. An
invaluable document, al-Surramurrı̄’s versified rejoinder to al-Subkı̄’s critique of the
Minhāj al-sunna20 is to date the earliest extant source propounding Ibn Taymiyya’s
unique theological doctrines that stems from outside of his direct circle of students.
Al-Surramurrı̄ addressed al-Subkı̄’s various criticisms in extensive detail, dedicating
fifteen verses to address the latter’s brief mention of infinite regress:21 His argumentation
there is as follows: God’s ability to create is not an originated one, which would be an
imputation of incapacity. Part of God’s power is constituted in the fact that God’s actions
occur by choice (ikhtiyār). God must then be eternally described as capable of actions
such as speech and creation, occurring in accordance with His will. For God to actually
( (
act in this manner would mean that the “species of actions” (naw al-fi āl) be eternal,
(
even if a particular instance (al-mu ayyan min-hu) of one is not. Since God’s individual
(
creative actions are not eternal, the concomitance of the created (maf ūl) with the creator
(
(fā il) is avoided. God’s acts of speech and creation, like God’s love, hate, contentment
and anger, occur newly in the divine essence, yet speech and creation are distinct from
one another, and the act of creation is an act distinguishable from its product. In no way
do these doctrines infringe on God’s essential ontological priority over anything else.
Al-Surramurrı̄’s poem even inspired a later author to follow in his footsteps; a cur-
(
rently unidentifiable Muhammad
: b. Jamāl al-Dı̄n al-Yāfi ı̄ of Yemeni origin,22 who seems
to have taken the text as a model for his own poetic riposte to al-Subkı̄. In the pertinent
(
lines, al-Yāfi ı̄ affirms for God attributes of perfection (kamāl) both essential and of
(
action (dhātiyya/fi liyya).23 Attributes of action such as love, hate, and “arriving” are
established scripturally. God can thus be eternally (azalan) performing acts such as crea-
(
tion and speech if He so wills. Affirmation of infinite regress al-Yāfi ı̄ claims to find in
authoritative scriptural or traditional statements (bi’l-nas: s: ).
The arguments made in both texts against al-Subkı̄ center on Ibn Taymiyya’s
contention against the mutakallimūn that God can undertake new actions in accordance
with His will.24 This was a critical point to make, since it explained the possibility that
God’s essence conceptually act as substrate of an infinite regress of “new occurrences”
(hawādith)
: by unrestricted exercise of discrete instances of the divine will. This, Ibn
al-sunna, 86 [introduction]), but Ibn Rajab’s testimony confirms otherwise. Note also the similarity
(
between this title and al-Muntaqā min minhāj al-i tidāl, al-Dhahabı̄’s abridgement of the Minhāj
al-sunna.
20
Printed in Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj, i, 117–125 of introduction.
21
Minhāj, i, 120, line 20 – 121, line 13 (introduction). See translation in appendix A.
22
Minhāj, i, 110–117 (introduction). This poem, one of the two printed in the Būlāq edition of the
) (
Minhāj al-sunna, was also printed prior to that in al-Alūsı̄’s 1880 Jalā al- aynayn.
23
Minhāj, i, 113, line 6 to 114, line 4 (introduction). See translation in Appendix B.
24
See J. Hoover, “God Acts by His Will and Power: Ibn Taymiyya’s Theology of a Personal God in His
Treatise on the Voluntary Attributes,” in Ibn Taymiyya and his Times, eds. Y. Rapoport - Sh. Ahmed
(Karachi: University Press, 2010), 55–77.
V
(
Taymiyya had argued, was a possibility suggested by the so-called hadı̄th : of Imrān b.
25
Hu
: s: ayn, as well as the statement by Ahmad: ibn Hanbal
: that “God does not cease to
speak (lam yazal mutakalliman) if He wills.”26 These were traditional sources which
could give authentic credence to idea that God’s creative will be eternally active; this was
explained by Ibn Taymiyya ontologically as affirmation of eternity of the “species” of
action without any particular instance of action being eternal itself.
Whether al-Surramurrı̄’s response to al-Subkı̄ received any reply in turn we do not cur-
rently know. Yet it remains a noteworthy exemplar of the reception of Ibn Taymiyya’s
defense of infinite regress and eternal creation in a circle extending beyond Ibn Taymiyya’s
peers to his post-mortem admirers. Its level of detail is also useful for reconsidering the
extent of Ibn Taymiyya’s intellectual influence; the next thinker to cross al-Subkı̄ on the
topic, the prolific Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, has been viewed as the most natural successor
and representative of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, almost to the extent of monopoly.27
Infinite Regress between al-Subkı̄ and Ibn al-Qayyim

It is to Ibn al-Qayyim that we owe al-Subkı̄’s second, more detailed response on the
topic. It formed part of the latter’s rebuttal to Ibn al-Qayyim’s al-Kāfiya al-shāfiya, a
bleak tour de force of theological poetry and polemical homage to his master’s life
work.28 It is hard to ascertain what audience the Kāfiya was intended for besides those
already sympathetic to the final plight of the author’s shaykh,29 but in line with the meth-
odology of Ibn Taymiyya, this was no simple fideist creed: Ibn al-Qayyim had, as part
and parcel of his conceptual defense of theological “affirmationism” (ithbāt) in the
Kāfiya, also embraced his master’s defense of eternal creation.
Al-Subkı̄ penned his refutation of the Kāfiya, the al-Sayf al-s: aqı̄l, in 749/1348, over
twenty years after Ibn Taymiyya’s death.30 Ibn Taymiyya drew criticism there as the source
of Ibn al-Qayyim’s heterodoxy, as might be expected.31 But it is highly noteworthy that the
25
On which see Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity” 300 ff.
26
Referred to in “Perpetual Creativity,” 316. Note al-Subkı̄’s response to these arguments below in the
Sayf.
27
See the introduction to Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman (eds.), A Scholar in the Shadow - Essays in
the Legal and Theological Thought of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Oriente Moderno, n.s. XC/1 (Rome,
2010), 13–42.
28
See the instructive analysis by L. Holtzman, “Insult, Fury, and Frustration: The Martyrological
Narrative of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’s al-Kāfiyah al-Shāfiyah,” Mamlūk Studies Review XVII (2013),
155–98.
29
For further observations on the intended social function of the Kāfiya, see L. Holtzman, “Accused of
Anthropomorphism: “Ibn Taymiyya’s Mihan : as Reflected in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s al-Kāfiya
al-Shāfiya,” The Muslim World 106/3 (2016), 561–87.
30 (
The date is provided by the author; see Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄, al-Sayf al-Saqı̄l
: fı̄ l-radd alā Ibn Zafil,
ed. M. Z. al-Kawtharı̄ (Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li l-Turāth, n.d.), 148.
31
Curtailing Ibn Taymiyya’s influence was an intended outcome of the Sayf’s composition; see
Bori -Holtzman, A Scholar in the Shadow, 25–26.
V 129
very first doctrinal point for which Ibn Taymiyya incurs blame there is stated as: “The sub-
sisting of temporal occurrences (qiyām al-hawādith)
: in the essence of the Lord (may He
(
be praised and exalted), and that God has never ceased to be an agent (mā zāla fā ilan)
32
and that infinite regress (al-tasalsul . . . fı̄ mā madā)
: is not impossible.”
The priority given to this topic in particular also typifies a paradigmatic aspect of al-
Subkı̄’s approach to the debate with Ibn al-Qayyim: Al-Subkı̄ is less concerned with
whether Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine is philosophically defensible than whether it is in keep-
ing with tradition. For this reason, al-Subkı̄ immediately goes on to reject Ibn al-
Qayyim’s claim that the Kāfiya is in accordance with the beliefs of ahl al-hadı̄th, : saying
(
that the work is one of ilm al-kalām, the study of which al-Subkı̄ claims “the scholars”
prohibit.33 Yet this also reflects al-Subkı̄’s own misgivings about the inherent value of
kalām itself. Kalām, as al-Subkı̄ framed it in the Sayf, was only a necessary evil for the
sake of defending religion; the story of Ibn Taymiyya’s deviance is a parable for the
social dangers of studying such rational sciences, a theme likewise seen in his poetic
reply to the Minhāj al-sunna.34
These rules of engagement were made explicit in the introduction to the Sayf: al-Subkı̄
opens his work with a warning from the danger posed by seeking knowledge of God by
(
reason alone, in the manner of kalām and “Greek hikma.” : Subsequently, if the Mu tazilites
have failed to heed this warning and erred in favor of reason, then their typological oppo-
sites and counterparts, the fideist Hashwiyya,
: have erred in favor of scripture (naql).35 It is
to the latter group which Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, as Hanbalı̄s : accused of anthro-
(
pomorphism, are supposed to pertain. The Ash arites, with whom al-Subkı̄ identifies, how-
( (
ever, represent a happy synthesis of both. Thus, while Mu tazilites and Ash arites are
capable of properly carrying out rational inquiry, the same cannot be said of the
Hashwiyya,
: who fall short in that regard.36 The reader is to understand from al-Subkı̄’s
typology that Ibn al-Qayyim and his teacher Ibn Taymiyya have misrepresented reason
and scripture precisely by going too far with regard to both. As Hashwiyya : scripturalists,
they were never qualified to discuss matters of reason, yet they have adopted its methods
and gone astray. The net result is thus an unsanctioned and deviant form of theological
discourse which is denied admissibility precisely since it is belied by the improper interpre-
(
tation of revelation, which only Ash arite rationalist methods can perform properly. Better
than this, al-Subkı̄ advises his readers, is to avoid such quagmires by emulating the Prophet
Muhammad’s
: companions and refrain from all types of theological discussions, embodied
(
in al-Shāfi ı̄’s famous prohibition of practicing kalām.
32
Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄, Sayf, 23.
33
Sayf, 25.
34 (
“There is no guidance for the populace in ilm al-kalām, but rather innovation and misguidance in
acquiring it. Yet I am quite capable in it, and were it not for the weakness of the listener I would have
(
poetically rendered all I knew in polished form;” Tāj al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄, T: abaqāt al-shāfi iyya, 177.
35 3
See J. Hoover, “Hashwiyya,”
: EI .
36
Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄, Sayf, 21–22.
V
Ibn Taymiyya’s desire for asserting the harmony of infinite regress with traditional doc-
trine is thus reduced by al-Subkı̄ to an innovated distortion of traditional interpretive prac-
tices and authorities. When Ibn al-Qayyim refers to such authorities as Ahmad: ibn Hanbal
:
and al-Bukhārı̄ for the position of God’s speech as an eternal series of actions,37 al-Subkı̄
characterizes this as an interpretation “which Ibn Taymiyya innovated,” on account of
which he subsequently “adhered to” (iltazama) the position of temporal occurrences with
no beginning (hawādith
: lā awwal lahā).38 When responding to Ibn al-Qayyim’s challenge
in the Kāfiya for his opponents to produce a “report, explicit text, rational indication, or
incontrovertible proof” against infinite regress, al-Subkı̄ responds that the “ugliness” of
(
affirming infinite regress and impugning the character of Ash arite scholars is sufficient
proof against him – sufficing with the heretical connotations of going against generations
(
of scholarly predecessors alone. That being said, the “hadı̄th
: of Imrān b. Hu : s: ayn” which
39
states that “God was, and there was nothing with him,” is swiftly adduced to demonstrate
how far from the traditional sources Ibn al-Qayyim and his teacher have strayed.
Yet al-Subkı̄ does not suffice with traditionalist argumentation; he also utilizes the
argumentation of kalām: Within that framework he typifies Ibn al-Qayyim’s position as
tantamount to that of atheists or the Peripatetics (falāsifa), since infinite regress could
suggest either a nullification of the proof for God, or establishing an eternally existing
world within an Aristotelian model. As he states in critique of the relevant sections of
al-Kāfiya:40
[Ibn al-Qayyim] became passionate in mentioning al-Nas: ı̄r al-Tūsı̄
: (may God
curse him!), and is excused regarding that, except that there is no difference
between him and those who profess the eternity of the world (qidam
(
al- ālam) except that he doesn’t profess the eternity of these visible bodies or
souls since these bodies and souls are like daily temporal events (al-hawādith
:
al-yawmiyya) concerning which every rational person is in consensus on their
temporality.
But if a skeptic (zindı̄q) came and said that there had always been bodies and
souls, as a creation before a creation (khalqan min qabli khalqin) and that
there were other heavens before these heavens to infinity (lā ilā nihāya), or
souls other than these souls to infinity, then there would not be a difference
between him and [Ibn al-Qayyim] except that one is in other than God’s
essence, and that [Ibn al-Qayyim] professed their occurrence in His essence.
Infinite regress is possible according to him, so what can he say to refute the
heretic who claims that? And what difference is there between their two posi-
tions? If he accepts both, then what difference exists between the two and the
)
substance of the sky (jurm al-samā )?
37
Sayf, 58–59.
38
Sayf, 59.
39
Al-Subkı̄, Sayf, 69. As noted above, discussion of this narration was an important scriptural proof text
for Ibn Taymiyya’s own position.
40
Sayf, 66–67.
V 131
)
As for his statement that “effective causality (al-ta thı̄r) only comes with the
completion of its necessitating cause (tamām mūjibihi),” it necessitates two
)
objections: One of them is that an effective cause (al-mu aththir) is distinct
(
from a creator by choice (al-fā il bi l-ikhtiyār) and God the exalted is a creator
by choice.41 The second concerns his statement “after the completion of its
necessitating cause:” if he meant essential necessitation then this is the state-
ment of the Peripatetics (falāsifa), but God creates by choice, and one of the
necessities of action by choice is that [the action] be delayed to after the
choice, and such a delay requires origination (al-hudūth)
: so how can he free
himself of this misstatement?
Al-Subkı̄ thus makes explicit here what he only hinted at in his refutation of the
Minhāj al-sunna – that Ibn Taymiyya’s model of creation would imply an eternally exist-
ing universe, a position which kalām had sought to refute since its inception in the
eighth century against the position of Peripatetic philosophers and atheist materialists
(dahriyya). Al-Subkı̄ acknowledges that Ibn al-Qayyim does not believe any specific
entity other than God to be eternal; as we have seen in the poem of al-Surramurrı̄ (and
will see again below) this was an important point to be made clear. But al-Subkı̄ views
the common cosmological elements between Ibn Taymiyya and atheists as particularly
egregious since he imagines that the atheist will only submit to proof of God’s existence
on the basis of demonstrating ex nihilo creation. For Ibn Taymiyya to deny the necessary
correlation between the two is unthinkable.
This problem he accentuates with a contention about the philosophical language
which Ibn al-Qayyim uses about God; namely, that to describe God as a formal necessi-
tating cause eliminates God’s “choice” or ikhtiyār in creating the world. Eliminating divine
choice was a necessary corollary for those Muslim Peripatetics who asserted the eternity
of the world, and a dividing line vis-a-vis the ex nihilo creation of the mutakallimūn;
these opposing viewpoints had been famously pit against one another in al-Ghazālı̄’s ref-
utation of Ibn Sı̄nā, the Tahāfut al-falāsifa. Although, in fact, infinite regress of divine
actions was a concomitant of God acting voluntarily within Ibn Taymiyya’s writings,42
al-Subkı̄ either was unaware of this point or chose to ignore it. As we will see below, this
same contention would be taken up again by one of the latter’s students.
These exchanges between al-Subkı̄, al-Surramurrı̄, and Ibn al-Qayyim represent only
the first chapter of the post-mortem controversies over Ibn Taymiyya’s cosmology, and
constituted only one topic taken from a sundry list of controversies. As abbreviated as
these exchanges were, they were paradigmatic for subsequent debates on Ibn Tay-
miyya’s cosmology: they focused on his affinity with Peripatetic or atheistic cosmology,
questioned his intellectual knowhow based on a typology of Muslim scholarship, and
41
This critique, to my mind, perhaps reflects al-Subkı̄’s disinclination from the post-Rāzian attempt to
explain kalām-based precepts in the conceptual framework or terms of Peripatetic philosophy.
Otherwise he would not make such an association.
42
As explained by al-Surramurrı̄; see above.
V
emphasized his lack of conformity with traditional sources of authority. These elements
would inform the second, and more dramatic chapter of this story which took place only
a few years later, and represented an even graver challenge to Ibn Taymiyya’s legacy in
the fourteenth century Damascene milieu.
Part Two: Ibn Taymiyya’s “Avicennism” between

al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ and Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal.
Al-Subkı̄’s words did not conclude the controversy. In subsequent years, the rever-
berations of this scholarly debate were amplified even further in the Damascene schol-
arly sphere. Extended engagements with Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings and writings
continued to provoke the question of the relationship of his thought to Avicennan phi-
losophy, both conceptually and in terms of heresiographical classification, to a greater
extent than had been the case with al-Subkı̄’s earlier intimations. This chapter in the
reception of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought displays a vividly distinct profile from what is other-
wise of known of that history up to the nineteenth century.43 It was in the thick of these
heated scholarly exchanges that Ibn Taymiyya’s relationship with Avicennan philosophy
came to occupy center stage for both critiques and defenses of his legacy in a manner
which would not be seen subsequently for centuries afterwards.
The controversy was instigated this time by the opposition to Ibn Taymiyya in
)
the person of Bahā al-Dı̄n al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ (d. 764/1363), a student of Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄’s.44
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ was of Egyptian origin, and before moving to Damascus he had studied in
( )
Egypt with both Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄ and Alā al-Dı̄n al-Qūnawı̄ (d. 727/1327), another
(
prominent Shāfi ı̄ authority in his times and later Chief Qadi in Damascus. Well-regarded
for his prowess in kalām and us: ūl, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ later enjoyed the personal friendship of
al-Subkı̄’s son Tāj al-Dı̄n (d. 771/1370), the widely influential scholar and historian of the
(
Shāfi ı̄ school.
To briefly summarize the turn of events: Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ wrote a work of us: ūl al-dı̄n
which included a lengthy passage where he disparagingly accused Ibn Taymiyya of
espousing Avicennan doctrines. This accusation provoked the latter’s students to publicly
respond. In turn, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ wrote a rebuttal of their counterarguments. At some point
during the controversy, a detailed response to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s initial accusation was written
by one of Ibn Taymiyya’s last prominent students, Ibn Qādi : al-Jabal (d. 771/1370).
The sources from which this controversy is retrieved offer us a rare vantage point
from which to analyze the rhetorical strategies involved in this scholarly debate.
Both sides debated the problem of an “Avicennan” subtext for Ibn Taymiyya’s
thought in a manner which underscored the fraught conventions of propriety in
43
See for example Khaled El-Rouayheb, “From Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d.1566) to Khayr al-Din al-Alusi
(d.1899): Changing Views of Ibn Taymiyya amongst Sunni Islamic Scholars”, Ibn Taymiyya & His
Times, S. eds. Ahmed & Y. Rapoport (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 269–318.
44 (
See al-Subkı̄, T: abaqāt al-shāfi iyya, 10, 123–124.
V 133
Muslim scholarship with regard to the intersection of rationalist theological method

and public religious discourse. Ibn Taymiyya’s theological discussions posed diffi-
cult questions not only about the validity, but also the specific manner by which the
terminology and concepts of falsafa were publicly admissible or negotiable in the
late Sunnı̄ kalām tradition.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄
)
and the Munqidh min al-zalal
Bahā al-Dı̄n al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ was not necessarily looking for a public confrontation, and
in a different state of mind he might stayed away from any provocation. Yet in his The
Rescuer from Blunder (al-Munqidh min al-zalal),45 he took the opportunity to single
out Ibn Taymiyya for criticism before his scholarly peers when discussing proofs for the
existence of God and the origin of the world. A textual analysis reveals, however, that
Ibn Taymiyya was on al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s mind in more ways than one.
The Munqidh is a kalām text that clearly shows the imprint of the Rāzian synthesis
of that discipline with the terms and concepts of Peripatetic thought (falsafa).46 Al-Rāzı̄
is frequently referred to there as “the imam” in a manner which suggests that al-Ikhmı̄mı̄
made frequent recourse to his works during the composition of the text. Yet, when
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ turns to refuting the possibility of the perpetual existence of bodies (dawām
wujūd al-ajsām),47 he reproduces for this purpose –without explicit attribution48 – Ibn
Taymiyya’s paraphrasing of a section of al-Rāzı̄’s al-Mabāhith : al-mashriqiyya in the
Minhāj al-sunna which outlines arguments in the affirmative.49 In other words,
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ “cribs” notes on al-Rāzı̄ from Ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāj al-sunna to summarize
the very position he wishes to refute.50
45 ) ( (
Bahā al-Dı̄n al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, al-Munqidh min al-zalal fı̄ l- ilm wa l- amal, MS 1216 Feyzullah, Fatih
National Library, Istanbul. The text is currently unpublished. I would like to thank Dr. Mustafa Islam,
director of the Turath Center in Cairo for helping me procure a copy of the manuscript.
46
On the historical circumstances which led to such a synthesis, see A. Shihadeh, “From al-Ghazali to
al-Razi: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology,” Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy 15/1 (2005), 141–79; F. Griffel, “Between al-Ghazālı̄ and Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādı̄: The
Dialectical Turn in the Philosophy of Iraq and Iran during the Sixth/Twelfth Century,” In the Age of
Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century, ed. Peter Adamson (London: Warburg
Institute, 2011), 45–75.
47
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Munqidh, fol. 51b, line 9.
48
Munqidh , fol. 51b, line 10 – fol. 52a, line 3.
49 ( (
Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄, al-Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya fı̄ ilm al-ilāhiyāt wa l-t: abı̄ iyyāt, 2 volumes
) ( :
(Deccan: Majlis Dā irat al-Ma ārif al-Niz: āmiyya, 1343) i, 486–487 and Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj, 1,
246–248.
50
A position which al-Rāzı̄ had advocated in the Mabāhith,: a delicate fact which al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ will not
bring up for his present purposes. This may not be the only instance of indebtedness to Ibn Taymiyya’s
works: al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ seems influenced by Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of the concept of tarkı̄b for determin-
ing contingent, temporal being; compare al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Munqidh, fol. 51a, line 18 f. With Ibn Taymiyya,
) ( ( ( (
Dar ta ārud: al- aql wa l-naql, ed. M. R. Sālim, 11 vols. (Riyadh: Jāmi at al-Imām Muhammad
: Ibn Sa ūd
al-Islāmiyya, 1979–1983), v, 141f.
V
The cited text from the Minhāj al-sunna presents a section of a chapter of the
(
Mabāhith dedicated to reasons why effective agency (fi l ) need not be preceded
(
by non-being ( adam), and discusses the possibility of the world’s perpetual exis-
tence. However, the third argument given there is problematized by al-Rāzı̄, and
the reasoning behind this, as Ibn Taymiyya notes in the Minhāj al-sunna,51 is the
(
same that he would subsequently use in his al-Arba ı̄n fı̄ us: ūl al-dı̄n, as well as al-
) )
Āmidı̄ after him in the Daqā iq al-haqā
: iq to argue for the kalām position of the
temporal origination of the species of corpora.52 This closing observation by Ibn
Taymiyya in the Minhāj al-sunna is finally attributed to him by name – though
without reference to the original context53 – and occasions the following extensive
critique by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄:54
And this man – I mean Ibn Taymiyya – appeared at the beginning of the
eighth century55 and claimed that he gave victory to the sunna and assisted its
people, and vanquished innovation and subdued its advocates. By my life, he
was that way, but he was not free of prejudice (tahāmul: ) towards the rest of
the schools, even many of the compatriots of the Imam Ahmad : ibn Hanbal.
:
“Indeed, the soul frequently commands evil except for the one my Lord has
given mercy to [Q 12:53].” Most of his prejudice – may God have mercy on
(
him – was against the Ash arites like al-Ghazālı̄ and his followers and teachers,
and he intended by this to refute them and everything they innovated of
proofs (al-adilla), even if they were true in and of themselves, as will become
clear to you. And that was one of the reasons for repelling (tanfı̄r) the hearts
(
away from him, because they imagined that he was partisan (muta as: s: ib) or
ignorant.
One of these proofs upon which they based their doctrine (madhhab) regard-
(
ing the Creator being an agent by choice (fā ilan bi l-ikhtiyār) and not an
essentially necessitating cause (mūjiban bı̄ l-dhāt) was the impossibility of tem-
poral entities with no beginning (hawādith
: lā awwal lahā). So he [i.e., Ibn
Taymiyya] also has to abide by (lazima-hu) what those who profess the latter
abide by – such as Ibn Sı̄nā and his followers – like belief in the eternity of the
(
world (qidam al- ālam). But he refrained from that – and attempted to find an
(
authority for his refraining (qas: ada an yusnida man a-hu) – but his likeness
in that situation was like prey caught in a net; the more it moves the more
51
Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, i, 248.
52 (
The Mabāhith
: was more indebted to the Peripatetic framework, whereas the Arba ı̄n was more in
keeping with standard positions of kalām; see the chronological relationship of one text to another in
A. Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 8–9.
53
That is to say, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ replaces Ibn Taymiyya’s prefacing statement qultu regarding his
observations on the Mabāhith : with qāla Ibn Taymiyya without acknowledging him as source of what
preceded, or that what preceded was in fact a summary of the Mabāhith; : al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Munqidh, fol.
52a, lines 1–3.
54
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Munqidh, fol. 52a, line 3 to fol. 52b, line 6.
55
This parallels al-Subkı̄’s opening critique of Ibn Taymiyya, “Then a man came at the end of the sev-
enth century,” al-Subkı̄, Sayf, 23.
V 135
entangled it becomes. He mentioned things, which, if you will, I could say

were nothing but delusion, and if you will, I could also say that their result is
two things:
1) The first of them is that which is entailed (al-lāzim) by temporal entities with no begin-
(
ning; namely, the eternity of the world (qidam al- ālam). But he said: the eternity of
(
the species of temporal entities (qidam naw al-hawādith)
: does not necessitate the
)
eternity of any of its particulars (qidam shay min afrādi-hi).
(
2) The second issue is that he likened the species (al-naw ) to the sum composed of par-
)
ticulars (al-jumla al-murakkaba min ajzā ) as regards the fact that judgment about
(
them (al-hukm
: alay-hā) does not entail (lā yalzam) [the same] judgment about any of
its particulars. Like a human and a house and a tree, because none of their parts are a
house, human, or tree, or like that which is long or wide.56 This example, however, is
(
blundering (takhbı̄t: ), because a species (naw ) is a universal (kullı̄ ), and the sum is an
entirety (kull); and what is the entirety to the universal? It is known that the universal
has no existence except in its particulars, so whenever something is eternal, then the
eternity of one of its parts is necessitated.
He intended by all of this to distinguish himself from the doctrine (madhhab) of

Ibn Sı̄na and his followers which is the belief in the eternity of the Active Intellect
( ((
(al- aql al-fa āl). You, and anyone else who deserves to be talked to, know that
(
if he intended that this species (al-naw ) is eternal (qadı̄m) when abstracted
( (
from all temporal entities (fı̄ hāl
: tajarrudi-hi an jamı̄ al-hāwādith),
: then this is
the belief in the existence of a universal qua universal outside of the mind
(wujūd al-kullı̄ fı̄ l-khārij min haythu
: huwa kullı̄ ) – which is impossible! No rea-
soning person believes in this as he has explicitly said so himself in more than
one place.57 But if he intends that that species is eternal [as instantiated] in a
( (
particular which is not specified in its particularization (fard ghayr mu ayyan fı̄
ifrādi-hi), then there is no difference between his madhhab and the madhhab
(
of Ibn Sı̄nā except in specifying (ta yı̄n) or not specifying that eternal. For Ibn
Sı̄nā specified it as the Active Intellect and he [i.e, Ibn Taymiyya] did not
specify it.58
But if disbelief (al-kufr) is mandated for Ibn Sı̄nā regarding this matter, then it
is apparent (al-zāhir)
: that it would be necessitated for this man [i.e., Ibn
Taymiyya] as well, because no one anathemized (yukaffir) Ibn Sı̄nā for his
(
specification of an eternal (bi-ta yı̄ni-hi qadı̄man) other than God; they only
anathemized him for his belief in any eternal other than God. If this man does
56
This is a reference to Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, i, 425 ff.
57
The nature of Ibn Taymiyya’s objection to the objective grounding of universals such as Platonic
forms and Aristotelian essences has been thoroughly discussed in W. B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against
the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Ibn Taymiyya’s affirmation of the “eternity of the
species” is characterized by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ here as a contradiction of his own premises.
58
In his subsequent engagement with the topic (see following section) al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ will repeatedly
insinuate that Ibn Taymiyya and his followers believe in the eternity of a “particular” entity other than
God, in the attempt to establish a more palpable point of “heresy” shared with the Muslim Peripatetics.
V
not commit disbelief by mere belief in [any] eternal other than God,59 then Ibn
Sı̄nā has not disbelieved by his belief in a specified eternal other than God.
All this, plus the fact that temporal entities with no beginning is impossible
(
rationally (mustahı̄l: aqlan), because it should be said if none of these move-
)
ments and temporal occurrences occurred eternally (fı̄ l-azal ), then the
entirety of these movements and temporal occurrences must have a beginning
and a start – which is what we seek. But if some of these movements and tem-
poral entities obtain eternally, then this movement which obtains in eternity, if
it is not preceded by other than it, then this movement is the first of move-
ments – which is what we seek. But if it is preceded by other than it, then the
eternal (al-azalı̄ ) must be preceded by other than it, and this is impossible.
The point is to explain that the answer to this man [i.e. Ibn Taymiyya] is built
on this belief . . . [refutation of the Peripatetics (falāsifa) follows].
A few pages later al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ returns to Ibn Taymiyya stating:

)
Later philosophers (muta akhkhirū al-falāsifa)60 took the position that the
material (mādda) of this world is eternal, saying this is so because every tem-
poral thing has material (as will be explained concerning the topic of effective
causes), so if material were temporally originated then it would also have
another material with infinite regress. This was responded to by negating mate-
rial, and stating that God may create something from nothing as will be
explained later . . . but Ibn Taymiyya abided by infinite regression, so he must
also accept that the world does not have a beginning, just like the ignorant
materialists (ka-juhhāl al-dahriyya).61
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ began his critique by undermining Ibn Taymiyya’s orthodox credentials,

(
characterizing his views as stemming from animosity towards Ash arite theologians, and
also highlighting his critique of Hanbalı̄
: authorities - a sign of bad faith towards his
fellow Sunnı̄s. This was also an implicit defense of al-Rāzı̄ from the implications of Ibn
Taymiyya’s observations, as it deflected attention from al-Rāzı̄’s own Peripatetic predilec-
tions, which remain unaddressed.
Calling Ibn Taymiyya’s Sunnı̄ loyalty into question, serious as it was, was a mere
preamble for a more significant assertion: that Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine of divine creation
entailed a significant degree of equivalence with Ibn Sı̄nā on affirmation of the world’s
eternity, an offense deserving of anathematization as influentially stipulated in
59
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ summarizes Avicennan heresy as eternal predication “of any sort” in order to incorporate
Ibn Taymiyya’s belief in eternal predication of temporal of being, despite the fact that said category is
only instantiated in temporally bound extra-mental particulars which have no prior existence. The pos-
sibility of this will be refuted by Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal; see the Radd below.
60
Referring to this position as that of “later philosophers” – by which he probably means Plato and
Aristotle, if not the latter alone, also indicates (to me) an indebtedness to Ibn Taymiyya, since he had
frequently made such a distinction in his own works. It is possible, however, that they were referring to
the same source.
61
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Munqidh, fol. 54b, lines 18–21.
V 137
al-Ghazālı̄’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa.62 In this bold claim, which would go on to have wider
reverberations in the Damascene milieu, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ went even further than his teacher
al-Subkı̄ had done by asserting affinity between Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrine and that of
Avicenna and his followers.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, like al-Subkı̄, was aware that Ibn Taymiyya distinguished himself from
Avicenna by his rejection of co-eternals for God, and so focused on Ibn Taymiyya’s affir-
mation of “the eternity of the species of temporal occurrences” as a contradiction in
(
terms. He problematized Ibn Taymiyya’s equivocation of the “species” (naw ) of creation
with the mental abstraction of the sum of its particulars, itself an empiricist construction
of universals contrary to the prevailing Aristotelian essentialist model in usage.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ argued, in contrast, that affirmation of the eternity of the “species” actually
entailed affirming the external existence of a universal, which was untenable philosophi-
cally, as Ibn Taymiyya himself had argued. The only viable meaning for a “species”
(as an essentialist universal within the normative system of Aristotelian logic) – to be
truthfully predicated “eternally” is if a constituent part of that mental universal were also
eternal – a position al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ views as binding on Ibn Taymiyya. The upshot for
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ is that if “eternity” is predicated of anything else besides God, then that must
translate into an extra-mental co-eternal entity (specified or not) which can be character-
ized as equivalent to the Avicennan heresy. Finally, he characterizes this supposedly eter-
nal entity as either being the first of a sequence (which would be halfway respectable),
or being preceded by others, which would be a contradiction in terms with reference to
the eternal. Ibn Taymiyya, in sum, had strayed from Sunnı̄ orthodoxy to deny creation ex
nihilo and thus necessarily fallen in league with Avicenna and like-minded “materalists”
who affirmed co-eternals with God; a heretical and intellectually incoherent position, no
matter how it was justified.
Responses to the Munqidh in the Public Sphere and

al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s Counter-Response
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s critical statements in the Munqidh elicited a number of reactions from
Ibn Taymiyya’s students. The precise circumstances of the critique’s dissemination
among them are difficult to ascertain, considering its being wedged in the middle of an
otherwise obscure work of theology. Yet their responses were fortunately documented
by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ in an even more obscure treatise published for the first time by the
(
Jordanian scholar Sa ı̄d Fūda in 1997.63 There, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ imparted information which
62
Though this fact is fraught with some complications; see F. Griffel, ‘“. . . and the killing of someone
who upholds these convictions is obligatory!” Religious Law and the Assumed Disappearance of
Philosophy in Islam,” in Das Gesetz - the Law - la Loi, eds. Guy Guldentops & Andreas Speer (Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2014), 221 ff.
63 )
Fouda retrieved this text from a unique manuscript found in the library of the al-Aqsa Mosque. Bahā
( ) (
al-Dı̄n al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Risāla fı̄ l-Radd alā Ibn Taymiyya fı̄ Mas alat H: awādith lā Awwal la-hā, ed. Sa ı̄d
)
Fūda (2nd edition, Beirut: Dār al-Dhakhā ir, 2014).
V
no other source even slightly intimates at: that his critiques of Ibn Taymiyya concerning
the eternity of the world had reverberated among the shaykh’s students, and reached the
public sphere of Damascene religious life.
Although the al-Munqidh was aimed at a more specialized audience, the Radd was
designed to draw a line in the sand vis-a-vis Ibn Taymiyya’s thought in the terms of
traditionalist pietism common to a broader religious discourse.64 This is clear from the
theological grandstanding of his opening statement of purpose:65
Since the shaykh and Imam and great scholar Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n, known as Ibn
Taymiyya, came to believe in the eternity of the species of temporal entities
( ( (
(qidam naw al-hawādith)
: of both actions and effects (al-af āl wa l-mafā ı̄l )
which can never be separated from the eternity of a particular effect
( (
(lā yanfakku an qidam fardin min al-mafā ı̄l ), just as four is not separable
from “evenness” nor three from “oddness,” nor the sun from its rays66 – the sit-
uation dictated that I alert [the reader] to how this happened to him, and so I
brought attention to it and how it happened, and what the negative conse-
quence for him doing so was – and this was a mercy from God and an affirma-
)
tion of [the Prophet’s] saying, “There does not cease to be a sect (t: ā ifa) from
my umma manifestly upon truth.” The aspect of mercy in this is that the dear
na€ıve person not fall a victim to this and embrace the ignominious doctrines of
the materialists (madhhab al-dahriyya) such that it will be difficult to save
him.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ then tells us more concretely that his blessed intervention – by which he
means the authorship of Munqidh min al-zalal itself – had the effect of dividing “the
)
companions of that man” (as: hāb
: hādhā al-rajul) into three camps (t: awā if ),67 each
representing varying degrees of proximity to God’s guidance. The first two camps repre-
sented a victory for al-Ikhmı̄mı̄: One apologized for their shaykh by admitting that Ibn
Taymiyya was not infallible.68 The second group, similarly apologetic for an indefensible
position, claimed that their teacher had abandoned that view before he died.69 The third
camp, however, held their ground, and al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ subsequently divides them into three
more (somewhat arbitrary) groups:
64
This analysis presupposes a dichotomy between the rarefied scholarly discourse of kalām and the
form used in popular pedagogical methods. This is observable as a general phenomenon before the
modern period (characterized by increased literacy) with relatively few exceptions. For observations
on this phenomenon pertinent to Mamluk society, see C. Bori, “Theology, Politics, Society: the Missing
Link. Studying Religion in the Mamluk Period,” Ubi sumus? Quo vademus? Mamluk Studies - State of
the Art, ed. Stephan Conermann (Goettingen: V&R Unipress, 2013), 65–66, 79–87.
65
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Radd, 45–46.
66
This was a provocative reference to a common trope of emanationist doctrine, which Ibn Taymiyya
explicitly rejected, see e.g. Minhāj al-sunna, 195, 222.
67
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Radd, 46.
68
Radd, 46.
69
Radd, 46.
V 139
The first, he claims, did not understand the subject but merely showed animosity
( ( )
(al- adāwa) to him after seemingly good relations (ba da an kānū as: diqā ).70 The sec-
ond group showed animosity and set out to defend Ibn Taymiyya’s position.71 The third
group, which as we find out, actually refers to a particular individual, mounted “the pul-
pit of ignorance” (minbar al-jahl) and delivered a sermon (khat:aba khut: batan) which
( (
demonstrated an “absence of intellect” ( adam al- aql).”72 Although the language here
verges on the metaphorical, it would seem to be referring to an actual public speech act
since al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ tells us that it instantly elicited a hastily versified and angry poetic
response from an attendee.73 This turn of events prompted one of al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s associ-
ates to ask him to respond, which he claims he hesitated to do at first since he did not
know the sermonist personally. Finally, he decided to respond, and what we possess in
the Radd is his response to “this Taymiyyan man” (hādhā al-rajul al-taymı̄).74
The historical significance of this testimony should be made clear: al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s cri-
tiques in the Munqidh precipitated a rare event – the public rejection of creation ex
nihilo and the defense of an eternally existing universe in fourteenth century Damascus
by one of Ibn Taymiyya’s students. The Radd thus ought to be seen as a response to this
(
occurrence and an attempt to swiftly shore up Ash arite orthodoxy before a wider
audience.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ begins his response with a “summary” salutation of “peace!”75 – a
)
Qur ānic response to “the ignorant” (cf. Q 25:63). In his subsequent, “detailed” response,
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ cites what may have originally constituted a written summary of his
“Taymiyyan” interlocutor’s statements. Reading between the lines of the Radd’s contents,
it can be inferred that the outcry against al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ had been provoked by his insinua-
tion in the Munqidh that Ibn Taymiyya heretically believed in a co-eternal along with
God. To that effect al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ suggestively states: “My statement in al-Munqidh min al-
zalal, ‘If he meant such and such then he is such and such”76 does not mean that I
judged him as actually intending it such that the imbeciles (al-humq)
: of his companions
77
ought to become enraged (yaghtāz).” :
70
Radd, 46.
71
Radd, 47.
72
Radd, 47.
73
“Say to him (x4): Oh you supposed-scholar sermonist; if you don’t know, that’s a calamity, but if you
do know, then that is more calamitous!” al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Radd, 47. The verse’s mention of a “sermonist”
strengthens the inference that this refers to a public event.
74
Radd, 47.
75
Radd, 47.
76
A reference to the above-cited statement, “If he intends that that species is eternal [as instantiated] in
(
a particular which is not specified in its particularization (fard ghayr mu ayyan fı̄ ifrādi-hi), then there
(
is no difference between his madhhab and the madhhab of Ibn Sı̄nā except in specifying (ta yı̄n) or
not specifying that eternal.”
77
Radd, 49.
V
Yet, such insinuations are not far from his mind, as he opens his work with that sug-
gestion,78 and goes on to insinuate the possibility twice more,79 and claims that one of
(
the defenders of Ibn Taymiyya had personally confessed (i tarafa) to him the belief in
the “eternity of a being (dhāt) other than God” – an occurrence which al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ claims
he would have brought to the attention of the Hanbalı̄
: Qadi were it not for the public
benefit (al-mas: laha)
: he saw in not doing so. Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ then quips that he does not
know whether this confessor is the same one who gave the sermon, but if he is, then it is
the biggest indication of his being a “bastard” (walad zinā).80 The sermonist must under-
stand, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ tells his readers, that “nothing he said will serve him in warding off
that which inflamed his heart;” rather, he is like “those to whom a raincloud is sent in
which are layers of darkness, thunder, and lightning, so they put their fingers in their
ears from the lightning-bolts fearing death, and God fully-encompasses the disbelievers
[Q 2:9].”81
The theme of religious deviance is a mainstay of al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s response, but we also
learn that he was concerned with responding to accusations made against his own per-
son: al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ tells us that the sermonist accused him of professing the ultimate extinc-
)
tion of all bodies (fanā al-ajsām), which would include heaven, hell, and the bodies of
)
the prophets,82 as well as denying the vision (ru ya) of God in the afterlife.83 According
to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, these two accusations are no other than misrepresentations of the ortho-
dox interpretation of Q 28:8884 and the proper belief in beatific vision without modality
(kayfiyya)85 – further indications of his interlocutor’s ignorance.
Such allegations on the part of the sermonist, depicted by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ as the words of
a deviant grasping for straws, are not explainable through Ibn Taymiyya’s critiques of
(
Ash arism per se, though another interpretation is possible: The extinction of bodies had
been repeatedly emphasized by Ibn Taymiyya as a tenet of Jahm b. Safwān’s
: theology,
being the consequence of rejecting an infinite series of temporal events into the future.86
Rather than merely imputing to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ the belief in the necessary extinction of
bodies, it is plausible that his adversary had associated him with this Jahmite thesis
because of the paradigmatic role it played according to Ibn Taymiyya for the denial of
actual infinity in mainstream kalām.
78 (
Cf. his statements on the eternity of the effect (ma fūl ) cited above.
79
Radd, 49, 51.
80
Radd, 54–55.
81
Radd, 55.
82
Radd, 52. He also makes a comparison between him and the Karrāmiyya; Radd, 53.
83
Radd, 53.
84
Radd., 52. In fact, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ also retaliates here by alluding to Ibn Taymiyya’s belief in the extinc-
tion of Hell. For more on this topic, see J. Hoover, “Islamic Universalism: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s
Salafı̄ Deliberations on the Duration of Hell-Fire,” Muslim World 99/1 (2009), 181–201.
85
86 )
See, as a brief example, Ibn Taymiyya, Dar , iii, 157–158.
V 141
We may thus reasonably ask: Did the “Taymiyyan” sermonist accuse al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ of
(
being a Jahmite, being inspired by his teacher’s habit of subsuming Ash arism within
Jahmism, and then fallaciously ascribe to him all the doctrines with which Jahmism was
associated (including the categorical rejection of the vision of God)? Or, did he, in his
critique of al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s arguments for creation ex nihilo, invoke the Jahmiyya as the
originators of that doctrine and list their infelicitous doctrines, thus leading al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ to
work on the assumption that any mention of Jahmism was a “coded” reference to
(
Ash arite theology – and himself?87 Both are possible, and more probable than what
would be immediately suggested by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s presentation.
But al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ is not one to reveal such subtexts, as he not only downplays his
interlocutor’s knowledge of theology, but also suffices with an emphasis of his own con-
formity with traditionalist notions of theological normativity. This is evident, for instance,
in his public assertions of agreement with the “Taymiyyan’s” (unspecified) critiques of
88
the “unificationists” (al-ittihādiyya) and “immanentists” (al-hulūliyya) and show of
( : 89
:
agreement with al-Shāfi ı̄’s famous condemnation of kalām which the sermonist had
also invoked (both likewise at home in Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of “Jahmite” influence on
(
Islam). Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s solidarity with al-Shāfi ı̄’s statement here, as with his teacher al-
Subkı̄’s citation of it in the Sayf, should not be understood as a rejection of kalām:
(
Instead, it reflects a view popularized among Ash arite scholars since the 5th/11th century
(
that al-Shāfi ı̄’s prohibition of kalām only applied to innovated doctrine (summed up by
)
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ as contravention of the Qur ān, sunna, consensus, and what is necessarily
known by reason); and that the categorical rejection of kalām, in contrast, is only advo-
(
cated by an “innovator” (mubtadi ) who does not want to be refuted by its methods.90
This finally brings us back to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s addressal of the eternity of the world,
which takes the form of a response to three objections from his “Taymiyyan” opponent
quoted here:
(
1. [God’s] being an actor/creator by choice (fā ilan bi’l-ikhtiyār) does not necessitate the
(
eternity of the world (qidam al- ālam).91
87
Such sensitivities to “Taymiyyan” religious taxonomy had been evident in his teacher al-Subkı̄’s
(
response to Ibn al-Qayyim, as in the following statement, “He intends by “al-Jahmiyya” the Mu tazilites
(
and the Ash arites!” al-Subkı̄, Sayf, 69. Cf. Bori- Holtzman, A Scholar in the Shadow, 25.
88
89
Radd, 53.
90
Radd, 54. This characterization of the anti-kalām position was used by Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayrı̄
(
(d. 465/1073) several generations earlier in a pivotal text for Ash arı̄ apologia; see al-Subkı̄, T: abaqāt,
iii, 422.
91
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Radd, 47. A charitable reading of the “Taymiyyan” would be that for God to be an “actor”
implies the eternal potential for action which, if actualized by His will (in an infinite series of instances),
would not necessitate the eternity of a particular existent. Although within Ibn Taymiyya’s theology,
God’s eternal activity of creation is a related to His potential to create “by choice,” al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ prefers to
read it as an attack against ex nihilo creation which he characterizes as the only valid manner for God
to create by “choice” outside of the emanationist model.
V
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s response is to mock the statement as foolish, warding off a conclusion

which he claims no one believes to follow from its premises. This is so, he states, since
(
“the eternity of the caused” (qidam al-maf ūl)92 eliminates God’s “choice” (ikhtiyār) in
the first place,93 as what is eternally present obviates the necessity of a will to create it.
God must create ex nihilo – “by His will, at the moment (fı̄ l-waqt) when He wants to
create, and which His wisdom has determined.” The alternative to this, according to
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, i.e., that God be “an essentially effective cause [by nature]” (mūjib bi l-dhāt)
(
– is explained by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ as having been rejected by authorities such as al-Ash arı̄
and Ahmad
: ibn Hanbal.
: For God to be a creator “by choice,” the created must exist after
the Creator;94 if his opponent nevertheless chooses to use the word ikhtiyār in his theo-
logical discussions, then al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ insists that this is only “out of fear and dissimulation
(taqiyya).”95 He likewise “hopes” that Ibn Taymiyya himself did not “intend this
meaning.”96
2. [Series of unspecified differences between the madhhab of Ibn Taymiyya and the
madhhab of Ibn Sı̄nā]97.
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ states that these distinctions are insufficient; Ibn Sı̄nā’s disbelief was not
(
asserted by scholars due to the “entirety” (majmū ) of his erroneous doctrines, but due
to “each of them” individually. He then states magnanimously:98
And we hope that Ibn Taymiyya did not agree with him on any of them at all,
but that a semantic mistake occurred – contrary to what the words of this poor
Taymiyyan would suggest, who only harms his shaykh by his ignorance and
helps him not . . . as it seems that he conceded (sallama) that [Ibn Taymiyya]
had agreed with [Ibn Sı̄nā] on some things and disagreed on others.
Here al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ reiterates the overarching theme of the Munqidh, problematizing

Ibn Taymiyya’s theology due to correspondences that it displayed with positions held by
Ibn Sı̄nā. The sermonist’s comparative distinction between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Sı̄nā,
which seemingly acknowledged the shared intellectual premises between the two, was
92
Here al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ conflates “eternity of the species of creation” with the “eternity of an unspecified
entity” (see above), or indeed, the eternity of the world as predicated of an emanationist model.
93
Like al-Subkı̄ (see above) he fails to acknowledge that within Ibn Taymiyya’s writings God’s infinite
series of creative acts is suggested precisely due to God eternally being an actor by choice, philosophi-
cally speaking, a substrate of discrete temporally-relational actions; see, for example, Hoover,
“Perpetual Creativity”, 316, 326.
94
Again, if God creates by choice, then according to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ there must be creation ex nihilo.
95
The attribution of dissimulation to Muslims who affirmed the emanationist model was also part of
the Ghazālian approach; see Griffel, “. . . and the killing of,” 222. Ibn Taymiyya, in fact, adopted a simi-
lar outlook.
96
97
Radd, 49.
98
Radd, 49.
V 143
used against him as an admission or implication of guilt. The overarching premise of

(
these arguments is reiterated at the close of the Radd: Whoever defies al-Ash arı̄’s posi-
tion of creation ex nihilo must necessarily believe that God is “an essentially necessitating
cause” (mūjib bi l-dhāt) and nullify God’s choice (ikhtiyār), since they do not believe
that an eternal actor is ever described without an action. If they nevertheless use the
word “choice” (ikhtiyār), it must be viewed as “dissimulation” (taqiyya). The only alter-
(
native to al-Ash arı̄’s position, he states, is that of Ibn Sı̄nā.99 Differently from the Mun-
qidh, where he attempted to grapple with Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas more philosophically,
(
here al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ simplifies the matter as a choice between Ash arism and Avicennism –
with no third option available.100 Ibn Taymiyya, from this perspective, falls into the latter
camp, even if he denies it.
(
3. His being a Creator by choice necessitates the eternity of the species (qidam al-naw ),
and Ibn Taymiyya affirms this, as do the majority (jumhūr) of the umma, from among
the earlier and later generations (al-awwalı̄n wa l-ākhirı̄n).101
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ responds strategically by correcting his interlocutor’s explanation of Ibn

Taymiyya’s doctrines (and revealing his own familiarity with their sources) by
responding:
As for Ibn Taymiyya, he did not affirm the eternity of the species [of creation]
due to the Lord being an actor/creator by choice, but rather, because the per-
(
petuity of action (dawām al-fi l ) according to him was more perfect (akmal )
than its non-perpetuity.102
This view was not to be found in the Minhāj, where Ibn Taymiyya took a more neu-
) (
tral position,103 but in other works where causality (ta thı̄r) or action (fi l) were explicitly
described as a type of perfection (kamāl).104 Emphasizing this aspect of Ibn Taymiyya’s
thought allowed al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ to emphasize the former’s affinity with Ibn Sı̄nā while
deflecting attention from the role of divine “choice” in establishing the divine essence as
substrate of eternal creativity; this was critical, since (as with his teacher al-Subkı̄) the
denial of divine choice was pivotal for his critique of Ibn Taymiyya’s theology.
99
Radd, 57–58.
100
Such a dichotomy for models of creation (ex nihilo vs. emanationism) had been critiqued by Ibn
Taymiyya extensively; see for example Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity,” 311–312.
101
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄, Radd, 49. This is an explicit statement of what was implied by the first quote presented
here.
102
Radd, 50.
103
That is, arguing for its mere permissibility; see Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, i, 419–420; idem,
104 )
Dar , iv, 69 and al-Safadiyya,
: ed. M. R. Sālim, 2 volumes (2nd edition, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn
Taymiyya, 1406) ii, 53, here with distinction from Ibn Sı̄na’s position. Cf. Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity,”
324 ff.
V
Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ also fails to see merit in the response to his discussion in the Munqidh of
(
Ibn Taymiyya’s use of the term “species” (naw ). He reiterates that Ibn Taymiyya is given
two possible interpretations for his choice of locution: either believing that a universal is
instantiated outside of the mind (fı̄ l-khārij), which is false, or affirming a particular as
eternal, which is heretical.105 His disciple’s desire to negotiate the meaning of “species” on
his behalf is rejected once again as ignorance,106 as an alternative framing is “inadmissible
( 107
(ghayr masmū ) according to the people of rational inquiry (ahl al-nazar).”:
Finally, al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ responds to a claim by his “Taymiyyan” interlocutor that al-Subkı̄
had earlier responded to in the Sayf as well; namely, the assertion that the eternity of the
species of creation was a doctrine held by authoritative religious figures. He calls this “a
108
lie” because none of the salaf had ever “said it explicitly” (lam yus: arrih). : Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄
)
will later reiterate that the eternity of the species of action is not affirmed by the Qur ān,
sunna, Companion, or Successor – or anyone else – until Ibn Taymiyya.109 Such a view
“is not transmitted (manqūl) from them.”110 To drive the point home, he later quotes
(
Ahmad
: ibn Hanbal’s
: al-Radd alā l-Jahmiyya where the author says in debate with
his opponents: “Isn’t it the case that God existed with nothing else (a-laysa kāna Allāh
)
wa-lā shay )?111 Citing this text as proof of the traditionalist pedigree of ex nihilo
(
creation was entirely strategic; the book meant nothing to later Ash arı̄te theologians,
(
and the text contained material which contradicted Ash arite doctrine. But al-Ikhmı̄mı̄
undoubtedly knew that Ibn Taymiyya had relied on this work elsewhere. The fact that
he could also use this source in particular to both cast aspersions on Ibn Taymiyya’s
(
cosmology and uphold Ahmad : ibn Hanbal
: for Ash arite theological doctrine was an
added bonus.
Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal: The Last of the Taymiyyans?
Our investigation of these 8th/14th century debates within Ibn Taymiyya’s earliest
“Avicennan” reception concludes with Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal (d. 771/1370), a great-grandson
112
of the founder of al-Sāli
: hiyya,
: one of Ibn Taymiyya’s last direct students, and a Hanbalı̄
:
scholar who held prominent positions in both Cairo and Damascus, including that of
105
106
Radd, 50.
107
Radd, 51.
108
Radd, 51. This was a bold strategy, since the lack of explicit statements of the salaf had at times
been used to discredit kalām itself.
109
Radd, 55.
110
Radd, 56.
111 (
Radd, 56–57. This served an identical function to al-Subkı̄’s quotation of the hadı̄th
: of Imrān b.
Hu
: s: ayn (see above).
112
See T. Miura, “The Sāli
: hiyya
: Quarter in the Suburbs of Damascus: Its Formation, Structure, and

Transformation in the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Periods”, Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales 47 (1995), 129–181.
V 145
chief Hanbalı̄
: Qadi during the last four years of his life.113 In what has survived of his
response to al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s Munqidh, Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal provides us with an even rarer
glimpse into the nature of Ibn Taymiyya’s direct scholarly legacy beyond the towering
figure of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. The manuscript fragments of that text, presented here
for the first time, form the largest extant example of early “Taymiyyan” rationalist theol-
ogy outside of Ibn al-Qayyim’s corpus.
Unlike the vindictive ad hominem polemic which permeated Ibn al-Qayyim’s
Kāfiya, Ibn Qādı̄: al-Jabal’s treatise aimed at public conformity with the norms of social
respectability and staked out a theological position in accordance with the etiquettes and
protocols of scholastic disputation.114 Our source for Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal’s response, appro-
priately enough for the obscure subject it treats, is to be retrieved from a source which
was previously unknown to the research: an incomplete manuscript in approximately 22
folios from the Dār al-Kutub al-Mis: riyya.115 The manuscript is furthermore labeled
merely as Refutation of the one who refuted his shaykh Ibn Taymiyya and contains no
mention of al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ by name. Its author’s interlocutor is easily identifiable, however,
116
by Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal’s quotation of the Munqidh.
Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal only states in his introduction that he “came across a book whose
author I do not know,” a book on theology which he characterizes as “hapless”
(
(mukhabbit: ) in its organization and “imprecise in its quotations (lam yurā i fı̄-hi . . . al-
117
nuqūl al-muharrara).”
: According to the Qādı̄, it is during this author’s discussion of
( :
the temporal origin of the world (hudūth
: al- ālam) that Ibn Taymiyya was brought up in
a manner that was unbecoming of scholarly discourse.118 Thus, Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal pro-
ceeds to set his anonymous interlocutor aright after his scholarly faux pas.
This, then, is the given reason for the text’s composition. The tone of the treatise is
thus typified by an attempt to sustain a dispassionate tone which maintains the proper
protocol of scholarly discussion. His addressing al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ through the veil of anonym-
ity should be understand in this light as well. On a formalistic level, Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal
makes pains to correct al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ concerning inconsistencies in his statements and irreg-
ularities of expression with a touch of scholastic flair. By the time he reaches the more
113 (
Ibn Rajab, Dhayl tabaqāt
: al-H: anābila, ed. M. H.
: al-Fiqı̄ (Cairo: Matba
: at al-Sunna al-Mu hammadı̄ya,
:
(
1953), ii, 453 [this reference is not found in the newer edition]. Shihāb al-Dı̄n Ibn al- Imād, Shadharāt
( ) )
al-Dhahab fı̄ Akhbār man Dhahaba, ed. A. al-Q. al-Arna ūt: and M. al-Arna ūt, : 8 vols. (Damascus: Dār
Ibn Kathı̄r, 1992), viii, 376–377.
114
With regard to the etiquettes and procedures of scholarly disputation see the following pertinent
( (
example of Hanbalı̄
: scholarship; Najm al-Dı̄n al-Tūfı̄,
: Alam al-jadhal fı̄ ilm al-jadal, ed. Wolfhart
Heinrichs (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1987).
115 ( (
Ibn Qādı̄: al-Jabal, Risāla( li-Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal fı̄ l-radd alā man radda alā shaykhi-hi Ibn
)
Taymiyya, MS 323 Taymūr - Aqā id, Dār al-Kutub al-Mis: riyya. It is the hope of the author to publish
this text in the near future with a translation and commentary.
116
: al-Jabal, 16a ff.
Risāla li-Ibn Qādı̄
117
: al-Jabal, fol. 2a.
118
V
sensitive points of controversy, he seeks to have garnered the reader’s confidence to

question al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s use of “prejudice” (tahāmul)
: in describing Ibn Taymiyya’s cri-
(
tiques of Ash arism; such an expression, he says, ought not to be used to describe argu-
(
ments reached by sound rational or textual arguments (hujja : aqliyya/naqliyya). To say
(
that most of Ibn Taymiyya’s refutations were made against the Ash arites is also not cor-
rect, he says, “for whoever has expertise (khibra) about the state of the shaykh and has
read his works.” The notion that Ibn Taymiyya would intend to refute that which was
“true in and of itself” is furthermore not how one should speak of scholars, says the
Qadi.119
On this note, he goes on to say that in his lifetime Ibn Taymiyya used to praise the
(
expansiveness of al-Ash arı̄’s knowledge and would quote the latter’s works by memory
(
in public lessons (al-majālis al- āmma), in particular al-Ibāna. Likewise, he tells us, the
shaykh reserved high praise for al-Bāqillānı̄ (d. 402/1013) and al-Juwaynı̄ (d. 478/1085)
)
and would repeatedly mention their merits (fadā : il). As for al-Ghazālı̄, Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal
tells us that he studied the Fays: al al-tafriqa with Ibn Taymiyya, during which Ibn
Taymiyya told those present how impressed he was by al-Ghazālı̄’s eloquence and the
extent of his knowledge.120
Such anecdotes not only aim to show solidarity with Sunnı̄ scholarship (in refutation
of al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s innuendoes) but also reveal to us something of Ibn Taymiyya’s pedagogi-
cal circle. The Qādı̄
: even relates a personal anecdote in that regard with special rele-
vance to the topic at hand; namely, his composition of a poem (qas: ı̄da) of eighty-two
verses dedicated to the subject of the temporal origination of the world, which he pre-
(
sented to Ibn Taymiyya at the latter’s residence at the Qās: s: ā ı̄n madrasa in 722/1322.121
Such dedication by Ibn Qādı̄: al-Jabal to philosophical discussions under Ibn Taymiyya’s
tutelage also finds confirmation from external sources, such as Ibn Rajab’s testimony that
122
he studied Fakhr al-Dı̄n’s al-Muha: s: s: al with Ibn Taymiyya personally. A relationship of
this nature is currently unparalleled for any student other than Ibn al-Qayyim.123
His intimate knowledge of the shaykh’s views having been established, Ibn Qādı̄ :
al-Jabal moves on to resolve the chief controversy which al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ had provoked;
namely, whether Ibn Taymiyya’s position on creation was indistinguishable from
Ibn Sı̄nā’s or not. He tells us that the author of the treatise he is responding to (viz.
119
: al-Jabal, fol. 17.
120
: al-Jabal, fol. 17.
121
He tells us Ibn Taymiyya subsequently told him to set it down in prose due to the difficulty most
audiences would find in the subject matter; Risāla li-Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal, fol. 9a. This is the fourth poem
mentioned here in defense of Ibn Taymiyya’s theological doctrines, which poses further questions
about the role that this medium played in scholarly discourse. For one manifestation of the phenom-
enon, see L. Holtzman, “The Dhimmi’s Question on Predetermination and the Ulama’s Six Responses:
The Dynamics of Composing Polemical Didactic Poems in Mamluk Cairo and Damascus,” Mamlūk
Studies Review XVI (2012), 1–54.
122
Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, ii, 353.
123
Cf. Bori-Holtzman, A Scholar in the Shadow, 19.
V 147
al-Ikhmı̄mı̄) had referred to Ibn Taymiyya’s views as “delusion” and indistinguishable

from Ibn Sı̄nā’s doctrine except for its not “specifying” a co-eternal, thereby entailing dis-
belief.124 This incurs the protest that the author has gone beyond the bounds of manners
and fairness (adab/ins: āf ): Ibn Sı̄nā’s doctrine (madhhab), the Qādı̄
: explains, has been
oversimplified as referring to the eternality of the first intellect, but in reality, he, like
Aristotle, al-Farābı̄, Thābit b. Qurra, and al-Suhrawardı̄ had also made the heavenly
bodies eternal in substance and movement.125 In contrast, the Qādı̄ : emphasizes, Ibn
Taymiyya was in agreement with prophetic religion as to the fact that all things other
than God are created and came into existence after not having existed previously. That
he nevertheless believed in an actual infinity of creative acts and, thus, what he called
eternality of the species of temporal entities deserves further consideration.
By this time in the text, however, Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal has already taken us through a
panorama view of Islamic theology, reflecting not just wide familiarity with the practice
of kalām and falsafa but also the personal touch of Ibn Taymiyya’s methodology. Ibn
Qādı̄
: al-Jabal guides us through the fundamental differences between the Peripatetics
and the mutakallimūn on the nature of God as causal agent to temporal being, and pro-
vides a summary of the Tahāfut al-falāsifa’s core points of contention, concluding with
an affirmation of solidarity between Ibn Taymiyya and al-Ghazālı̄ – a necessary point to
make given al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s rhetorical use of that text’s anathemization of Ibn Sı̄nā against
his master.
This would be an easily attained showing of Sunnı̄ solidarity and orthodoxy. But
there is more at stake here. Thus, Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal does not cavalierly dismiss Ibn Sı̄nā’s
critique of al-Ghazālı̄’s theology, as might be otherwise expected, but instead gives it
proper consideration. As is well-known, the chief point of debate in the Tahāfut cen-
tered on the Peripatetics’ critique of kalām’s explanation of temporal being as arising
from an unchanging eternal will, and their question of why this eternal will did not entail
the eternal existence of the world – and if it did not, then what the additional, subse-
quent cause for its existence was. If an immediate cause of temporal being was assumed,
it too would need its cause as well and so on ad infinitum – a proposition considered
(
untenable on both sides of the debate – a situation which caused Ash arites to take the
intellectually derisible position that there was no intelligible cause at all. This conundrum
was established on the premise of divine immutability affirmed by both, based in the
case of the mutakallimūn on the impossibility of an actual infinite, a premise which Ibn
Taymiyya argued did not hold (in agreement with Ibn Sı̄nā).
)
In this exposition, Ibn Qādı̄: al-Jabal followed Ibn Taymiyya’s method in the Dar
(
al-ta ārud: and other texts of situating his theological contentions not only within the
classic debates of the Tahāfut, but also in their subsequent reverberations in the works
of prominent 7th/13th century intellectuals such as Ibn al-Athı̄r al-Abharı̄ (d. 663/1264)
124
See the above excerpt from al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s Munqidh.
125
Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal, Risāla li-Ibn Qādı̄
V
and Sirāj al-Dı̄n al-Urmawı̄ (d. 682/1283), these being cited as examples of respected
thinkers who explained temporal being in relation to an infinite chain of instances of
“preponderation” (tarjı̄hāt)
: or “will” (irādāt) subsisting either in the divine will or in the
126
world soul.
Having contextualized Ibn Taymiyya’s thesis of God’s infinite creative activity within
broader developments of Islamic thought as a whole, and post-Rāzian theological dis-
course in particular, Ibn Qādı̄: al-Jabal goes on to defend it with technical arguments:
Eternally possible entities (mumkināt) do not require primordial matter as the substrate
for their possibility (as the Peripatetics claim) since they possess no extra-existential
essence but only derive their possibility from their effective cause; neither does eternity
require an eternally existing body as a measure of time if eternity is conceived of not as
“infinite time,” but as an infinite series of times (azmān lā nihāyata la-hā).127 In sum,
the truth of azaliyyat al-imkān (the eternity of [being’s] possibility) does not necessitate
that a particular co-exist eternally with God, since “possibility” is not an essential prop-
erty of any entity (and thus in need of a substrate), but merely based on the eternal possi-
bility of a creative action from their effective cause (God).128
It remains to be explained, however, how such a position can have “traditional”
credentials. The Qādı̄: explains to us that Ibn Taymiyya’s position on infinite regress
(
(tasalsul) is taken (intizā ) from Ahmad
: ibn Hanbal,
: specifically the statement: “Indeed
God has not ceased to speak if He wills” (inna Allāh lam yazal mutakalliman idhā
)
shā ).129 This statement can be interpreted to justify the existence of an infinite chain
(
(tasalsul), both forwards and backwards, of caused things (maf ūlāt; literally “objects of
action).”130 This is the meaning of the eternity of the species of temporal objects (qidam
(
naw al-hawādith).
: Nothing other than God is eternal – the eternal chain of temporal
being is conceived of in the mind but has no external reality outside of the mind other
than the temporal being that is manifest in each of its particulars (afrād) – and nothing
which can be pointed to in the temporal world is eternal.131 The eternal instantiation of
this mental universal (kullı̄ ) does not entail the eternality of any of its instantiated partic-
)
ulars (juz ı̄).132
Conclusion
The material presented here demonstrates that a seminal but hitherto unappreci-
ated aspect of the postmortem reception, critique, and defense of Ibn Taymiyya’s
thought in the 8th/14th century was colored by associations with Avicennan thought.
126
127
: al-Jabal, fol. 13b.
128
: al-Jabal, fols. 15b – 16a.
129
130
: al-Jabal, fol. 8b.
131
: al-Jabal, fols. 19a–19b.
132
: al-Jabal, fols. 20a–20b.
V 149
Critiques took different manifestations: At times, the theme of “innovation” or con-

travention of traditional and scriptural authority took center-stage; this was the case
when al-Subkı̄ gave in to a rather lukewarm view of kalām, or during al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s
addressal of a broader audience in the Radd. When the methodology of kalām was
foregrounded, as in al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s Munqidh, and some parts of the Radd, Ibn Tay-
miyya’s position might be characterized as too close to that of the Peripatetics or
other religious skeptics (a type of “rationalist” heterodoxy), and yet other times it
could be construed as intellectually deficient (a failure to live up to kalām’s rational-
ist standards). Regardless of the analytical frame employed, affinity between the
intellectual premises or implications of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Sı̄nā’s thought could
be deployed as a marker of illegitimacy; “Taymiyyan” theology, for taxonomic pur-
poses, becomes “Avicennan,” in as much as it is coextensive with a set of ideas
(
which, since al-Ghazālı̄’s Tahāfut, presented a major challenge to Ash arite thought,
even from within.
On their part, Ibn Taymiyya’s defenders, aware of the conceptual meeting place
between the thought of Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn Taymiyya, emphasized the distinct theological
merits of the latter’s views. With al-Surramurrı̄ and al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s “Taymiyyan” interlocutor,
this took the form of highlighting Ibn Taymiyya’s reappraisal of kalām’s given consen-
suses, as well as his rehabilitation of scripturally attested voluntary attributes of action,
upon which infinite regress and the eternality of the genus of temporal being was theo-
logically predicated. Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal, in contrast, presented Ibn Taymiyya’s theology as
a contribution to the problem of divine creation as debated in al-Ghazālı̄’s Tahāfut and
subsequent theological discourse. Both the “Taymiyyan” sermonist and Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal
refrained from taxonomizing their teacher’s thought as Avicennan, and the latter’s
approach in this went hand-in-hand with the adoption of a higher register of compara-
tive investigation or tahqı̄q
: implemented by Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄, which as utilized by
Ibn Taymiyya provided the comparative intellectual vista necessary to make more inci-
sive contentions on the discursive underpinnings of Islamic thought. Ibn Qādı̄ : al-Jabal
stands out precisely among Ibn Taymiyya’s students because he wore this methodology
on his sleeve, as the common estate of the scholarly class.
Like the doctrine of hell’s eternal torment,133 the doctrine of ex nihilo creation had
long enjoyed the consensus of Islam’s kalām schools. From the time of its adoption in
the eighth century this model of creation had been expressly pit against the Aristotelian
model, and no third option was admitted; the parameters of debate had been fixed long
before Ibn Taymiyya, as al-Subkı̄ and al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ made perfectly clear. Certainly, Ibn
Taymiyya’s doctrine of the eternity of the species of temporal being implied that there
was no “time” when creation did not exist, and that the premise of an eternally existing
universe was true. The difference in its particular type of “eternality” from that of the
Aristotelian model (i.e. the eternality of the species as opposed to the particular) was
133
See footnote 85.
V
insufficient, however, to disassociate it from the connotations of heterodoxy conjured in

the phrase “eternity of the world,” which only the ex nihilo creation model could
(
assuage, as what became venerable Ash arite Sunnı̄ doctrine. This came to a head in the
most vivid manner during the public controversy provoked by al-Ikhmı̄mı̄.
It is noteworthy, given the strong emphasis here on traditionalist orthodoxy for the
negative evaluation of Ibn Taymiyya’s cosmology, that the necessary relationship
between infinite regress and Ibn Taymiyya’s defense of scriptural descriptions of divine
action was suppressed. This may have had to do with the sources by which such critics
gained access to his writings. But it is more likely that this was due to the sensitivity of
the topic, touching as it did on the contradiction between temporally related divine
action and kalām’s philosophical proofs for God; or, framed completely differently, it
)
resurrected an old fear that a failure to reinterpret such Qur ānic descriptions, in a man-
ner paradigmatically attributed to the Hashwiyya
: fideists, would impugn Islamic scrip-
ture’s conformity with reason, and thus invalidate the Islamic faith. To furthermore
reevaluate the basis of kalām’s reinterpretation of scriptural content via conceptual tools
associated with falsafa, as Ibn Taymiyya had done, offered even less consolation. These
two layers of consideration impeded communication between critics and admirers most
palpably, and have continued to do so in subsequent contexts. It is for this reason that
Ibn Qādı̄
: al-Jabal veered away from an approach bound to attribute-doctrines, since that
line of reasoning was intrinsically linked to his master’s critique of kalām’s infidelity to
revelation which had largely colored Ibn al-Qayyim’s combative outlook in the Kāfiya.
Presenting Ibn Taymiyya’s doctrines instead as a viable intellectual alternative to the Mus-
lim Peripatetics’ emanationist model was meant to afford him respectability in the eyes
of the Ghazālian religious mainstream. These efforts ultimately fell upon deaf ears, but
having finally been retrieved by modern scholarship, another evaluation of them is now
possible: They impart a vivid testimony of precisely those aspects of Ibn Taymiyya’s
thought which most fundamentally challenged the “unthinkable” in the context of medi-
eval Damascus – and which persist in being aptly described as such in the globalized
context of contemporary Islamic studies today.134
Appendix A
Verses by Yūsuf b. Muhammad
: al-Surramurrı̄ (d. 776/1374) on infinite regress in response to Taqı̄
al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄:135
As for temporal occurrences with no beginning to the first of them, that is one of the strangest
and amazing things recounted.
You did not hold your own in understanding it, so hold your tongue. That’s not your nest – be
gone, for the eagle is not like a locust.
134
For an important example of how Ibn Taymiyya himself attempted (and failed ) to negotiate aspects
of his reconciliation of reason and revelation in the discourse of public religion, see Ibn Taymiyya,
Lettre a Ab^
u l-Fid^a’, trans. Jean R. Michot (Louvain-la-Neuve: Universite Catholique de Louvain, 1994).
135
Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna, i, 120, ll. 20–121, line 13 (introduction).
V 151
If you had said, “He said x, and the response is y,” then the one who is wrong would have been
distinguished from the one who is right.
You mentioned things in a general manner and likewise made your response general – but if
you had been explicit I would have given an explicit clarification to what was most obscure.
(
If you had said: He was with no knowledge (wa-lā ilm laday-hi) and no speech or power at all
you would have disbelieved in Him.
Or if you had said He created it after it was impossible for Him, you would have argued by the
characteristic of deficiency.
How could He originate it after it was impossible for Him; can the corpse raise its shoulder?
Or if you said an action by choice (bi l-ikhtiyār) was impossible for Him, you would have
resembled a man deceived by his idols.
He did not cease – with His attributes – to be described by action and speech, far even in His
proximity.
) (
Praise be to Him, He did not cease to act as he willed (lam yazal mā shā yaf alu) in every time
(fı̄ kulli mā zamanin) with no one taking Him to account.
( (
Such is the species of speech as is the species of action (naw al-fi āl ); eternal – though not a
(
specific instance of it (lā al-mu ayyan min-hu) in succession.
And no one with intellect could have understood [that Ibn Taymiyya meant] the concomitance of
( ( (
a created entity with a creator (muqāranat al-maf ūl ma a fā lin) in the same rank.
He loves, hates, is pleased, angered. These are His descriptions – so please Him far from what
angers Him!
The [act of] creation (al-khalq) is not the same as the creation (al-makhlūq) such as you think,
but a verbal noun instantiated in the soul so know this!
And the statement: “Be!” is not a thing created – even the child knows this despite his
immaturity.
The Chosen One said, “God was before [everything]” and nothing other than Him Most Exalted is
) (
[with him] in his Veiledness. (kāna Allāh qablu, wa-lā shay un siwā-hu ta āla fı̄ tahajjubi-hi).
:
Appendix B (
Relevant verses by al-Yāfi ı̄ (death date unknown) in response to Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄:136
The Lord, may He be Exalted, does not cease (mā zāla) to be described with every description
of perfection (bi-kulli was: f kamāl ) when it is necessitated.
(
[Attributes] of essence (dhātiyya) and also action (fi liyya) which texts have conveyed with no
doubt or vagary.
As you can see they are two types subsisting in Him with certainty, the one who affirms Him
believes in them.
(
He is the Eternal with descriptions transcendent of origination (aws: āf munazzaha an al-hudūth)
:
as will follow so pay heed:
Living, Hearing, Seeing, Powerful, Self-Sufficient, Singular, Majestic, possessing grandeur, so be
satisfied with this.
Those are all essential [attributes] which have been transmitted, along with ones similar in
meaning, without vagueness.
136
Minhāj al-sunna, i, 113, ll. 6–114 line 4 (introduction).
V
Likewise the [attributes] of action, so look at their example and make an analogy; heed the
difference and you will be saved by it.
He loves, hates, is pleased, responds, sees, arrives, comes with no “how” or likeness.
Creator before the created (makhlūq); He brings it into being. The subduer before the subdued
(maqhūr) which [only] exists by Him.
The Merciful before that which is shown mercy to (marhūm) : which He gives mercy to; the
Provider before that which is provided for (marzūq) in its different varieties.
All of creation (al-makhlūq) proceeds from His command. And the command – mind you –
subsists in Him (yaqūm bi-hi) with no doubt!
The Lord of the Throne has spoken with all of the revealed books; speech the like of which
there is none.
( )
He does not cease to be active/creating or speaking in eternity (lam yazal fā ilan aw-qā ilan
azalan) if He so wills, and this is the truth, so be satisfied with it.
These are temporal occurrences with no beginning to the first of them [as described] by
)
authoritative statement (bi l-nas: s: ) so understand this oh sleepy one and wake up!
Since these are attributes of one so described through which they subsist, they are eternal as He
is, with no doubt.
The madhhab of the brethren is to narrate them as they have been transmitted without the
contamination of making likeness or similarities.

V 153

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Ibn Taymiyya as Avicennan?

Part One: Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄ and the Seeds of

1.1. Al-Subkı¯, al-Surramurrı¯, and the Minhāj al-sunna

conversant enough with the Harrānian

Infinite Regress between al-Subkı̄ and Ibn al-Qayyim

Part Two: Ibn Taymiyya’s “Avicennism” between

Muslim scholarship with regard to the intersection of rationalist theological method

entangled it becomes. He mentioned things, which, if you will, I could say

He intended by all of this to distinguish himself from the doctrine (madhhab) of

A few pages later al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ returns to Ibn Taymiyya stating:

Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ began his critique by undermining Ibn Taymiyya’s orthodox credentials,

Responses to the Munqidh in the Public Sphere and

Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄’s response is to mock the statement as foolish, warding off a conclusion

Here al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ reiterates the overarching theme of the Munqidh, problematizing

used against him as an admission or implication of guilt. The overarching premise of

Al-Ikhmı̄mı̄ responds strategically by correcting his interlocutor’s explanation of Ibn

sensitive points of controversy, he seeks to have garnered the reader’s confidence to

al-Ikhmı̄mı̄) had referred to Ibn Taymiyya’s views as “delusion” and indistinguishable

Critiques took different manifestations: At times, the theme of “innovation” or con-

insufficient, however, to disassociate it from the connotations of heterodoxy conjured in

C 2018 Hartford Seminary.

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