Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980
8, RULE 110
FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar,
individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23,
1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges:
Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo
of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to
quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential
elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent
judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be
present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of
residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet
subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The
People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of
the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the
possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts
but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble
is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law
itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and
scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to
penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No.
1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who
commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The
preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not
a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of
the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.
86 SCRA 542
G.R. No. L-42050-66
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978)
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of
law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused
with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned
above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which
will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations,
on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized
under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection
with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous
weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a
case of statutory construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND
AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and
the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence.
G.R. No. 187919
PEREZ, J.:
THE FACTS
In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do
business under the name Smartnet Philippines[1] and/or Smartnet
Philippines, Inc. (SPI),[2] applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit
facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the
Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and officers, presented its
Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its
congressional telecom franchise. RMSI was represented by the following
officers and directors occupying the following positions:
Gilbert Guy - Exec. V-Pres./Director
Philip Leung - Managing Director
Katherine Guy - Treasurer
Rafael Galvez - Executive Officer
Eugenio Galvez, Jr. - Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller
Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted it a P250 million
Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet Philippines, RMSI's
Division. On 1 February 2000, the credit line was increased to P452 million
pesos after a third-party real estate mortgage by Goodland Company, Inc.,[3]
an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in favor of Smartnet Philippines, [4]
was offered to the bank. Simultaneous to the increase of the Omibus Credit
Line, RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line
and peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc.,
which Gilbert Guy, et al. represented as a division of RMSI,[5] as evidenced
by the letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the
financial audit made by SGV & Co., an independent accounting
firm. Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of Incorporation of
RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the
Secretary's Certificate of SPI authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip
Leung to transact with AUB.[6] Prior to this major transaction, however, and,
unknown to AUB, while RMSI was doing business under the name of
Smartnet Philippines, and that there was a division under the name Smartnet
Philippines, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a
paid-up capital of only P62,500.00.
Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines - the division of RMSI
- AUB granted to it, among others, Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in
the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre
Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover
the liability of this Irrevocable Letter of Credit, Gilbert Guy executed
Promissory Note No. 010445 in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This
promissory note was renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI (Promissory
Note No. 011686), and last, in the name of Smartnet Philippines under
Promissory Note No. 136131, bolstering AUB's belief that RMSI's directors
and officers consistently treated this letter of credit, among others, as
obligations of RMSI.
When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent letters demanding
payments. RMSI denied liability contending that the transaction was incurred
solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies,
but which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI. RMSI further
claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division, SPI, is a
subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity.
Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1689 against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert
G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H.
Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
AUB alleged that the directors of RMSI deceived it into believing that SPI
was a division of RMSI, only to insist on its separate juridical personality later
on to escape from its liabilities with AUB. AUB contended that had it not
been for the fraudulent scheme employed by Gilbert Guy, et al., AUB would
not have parted with its money, which, including the controversy subject of
this petition, amounted to hundreds of millions of pesos.
In a Resolution dated 3 April 2006,[7] the Prosecutor found probable cause to
indict Gilbert G. Guy, et al. for estafa but dismissed the charge of violation of
PD No. 1689 against the same for insufficiency of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondents be charged for ESTAFA
under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and the attached
information be filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City, with a
recommended bail of P40,000.00 for each respondent.
It is further recommended that the charge of violation of P.D. 1689 against
the said respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[8]

Accordingly, an Information dated 3 April 2006[9] was filed against Gilbert
Guy, et al. with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Both parties, i.e., the AUB and Gilbert Guy, et al., filed their respective
Petitions for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the 3
April 2006 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
In a Resolution dated 15 August 2006,[10] the DOJ reversed the City
Prosecutor's Resolution and ordered the dismissal of the estafa charges
against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency of evidence.
The AUB's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, constraining it to assail
the DOJ Resolution before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA partially granted AUB's petition in a Decision dated 27 June 2008,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, finding probable cause
against private respondents for the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315, par 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The assailed Resolution dated August 15,
2006 of the Department of Justice is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, subject
to our ruling that the private respondents are not liable under P.D. 1689. The
April 3, 2006 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Paudac is hereby
REINSTATED.[11]
Aggrieved, Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung and Eugenio H. Galvez Jr. (in G.R. No.
188030) and separately, Rafael Galvez and Katherine Guy (in G.R. No.
187919) filed the present petitions before this Court assailing the CA
Decision which reinstated the City Prosecutor's Resolution indicting them of
the crime of estafa. The AUB also filed its own petition before us, docketed
as G.R. No. 187979, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision for dismissing
the charge in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
Gilbert Guy, et al. argue that this case is but a case for collection of sum of
money, and, hence, civil in nature and that no fraud or deceit was present at
the onset of the transaction which gave rise to this controversy, an element
indispensable for estafa to prosper.[12]
AUB, on the other, insists that this controversy is within the scope of PD No.
1689, otherwise known as syndicated estafa. It contends that Guy, et al.,
induced AUB to grant SPI's letter of credit to AUB's damage and prejudice by
misleading AUB into believing that SPI is one and the same entity as
Smartnet Philippines which AUB granted an Omnibus Credit Transaction.
After receiving and profiting from the proceeds of the aforesaid letter of
credit, Gilbert Guy, et al. denied and avoided liability therefrom by declaring
that the obligation should have been booked under SPI as RMSI never
contracted, nor authorized the same. It is on this premise that AUB accuses
Gilbert Guy, et al. to have committed the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to PD No. 1689.
At issue, therefore, is whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute
Gilbert Guy, et al. for the crime of syndicated estafa on the basis of
fraudulent acts or fraudulent means employed to deceive AUB into releasing
the proceeds of Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in favor of SPI.
Our Ruling
This controversy could have been just a simple case for collection of sum of
money had it not been for the sophisticated fraudulent scheme which Gilbert
Guy, et al. employed in inducing AUB to part with its money.
Records show that on 17 February 1995, Radio Marine Network, Inc. (Radio
Marine) amended its corporate name to what it stands today Radio Marine
Network (Smartnet), Inc. This was a month after organizing its subsidiary
corporation the Smartnet Philippines, Inc. with a capital of only
P62,500.00.[13] A year earlier, Gilbert Guy, et al., established Smartnet
Philippines as a division of Radio Marine under which RMSI operated its
business.
It was, however, only on 26 March 1998, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission approved the amended corporate name, and only in October
1999 did RMSI register Smartnet Philippines as its business name with the
Department of Trade and Industry.[14]
It is in this milieu that RMSI transacted business with AUB under the name
Smartnet Philippines and/or SPI.
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned herein below x x x :
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. x x x.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following:
a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means;
b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;
c. That the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means;
d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.[15]
First, Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez and Eugene
Galvez, Jr., interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, represented to AUB in
their transactions that Smartnet Philippines and SPI were one and the same
entity. While Eugene Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI, he actively dealt
with AUB in his capacity as RMSI's Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller by
falsely representing that SPI and RMSI were the same entity. Gilbert Guy,
Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez, and Eugene Galvez, Jr. used
the business names Smartnet Philippines, RMSI, and SPI interchangeably
and without any distinction. They successfully did this by using the confusing
similarity of RMSI's business name, i.e., Smartnet Philippines its division,
and, Smartnet Philippines, Inc. the subsidiary corporation. Further, they were
able to hide the identity of SPI, by having almost the same directors as that
of RMSI. In order to let it appear that SPI is the same as that of Smartnet
Philippines, they submitted in their application documents of RMSI, including
its Amended Articles of Incorporation,[16] third-party real estate mortgage of
Goodland Company[17] in favor of Smartnet Philippines, and audited annual
financial statement of SGV & Co.[18] Gilbert Guy, et al. also used RMSI
letterhead in their official communications with the bank and the contents of
these official communications[19] conclusively pointed to RMSI as the one
which transacted with the bank.
These circumstances are all indicia of deceit. Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury.[20]
Second, the intent to deceive AUB was manifest from the start. Gilbert Guy
et al. laid down first all the necessary materials they need for this deception
before defrauding the bank by first establishing Smartnet Philippines as a
division of Radio Marine under which Radio Marine Network Inc. operated its
business.[21] Then it organized a subsidiary corporation, the SPI, with a
capital of only P62,000.00.[22] Later, it changed the corporate name of Radio
Marine Network Inc. into RMSI.[23]
Undoubtedly, deceit here was conceived in relation to Gilbert Guy, et al.'s
transaction with AUB. There was a plan, documented in corporation's
papers, that led to the defraudation of the bank. The circumstances of the
directors' and officers' acts in inserting in Radio Marine the name of
Smartnet; the creation of its division Smartnet Philippines; and its registration
as business name as Smartnet Philippines with the Department of Trade and
Industry, together with the incorporation of its subsidiary, the SPI, are indicia
of a pre-conceived scheme to create this elaborate fraud, victimizing a
banking institution, which perhaps, is the first of a kind in Philippine business.
We emphasize that fraud in its general sense, is deemed to comprise
anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an
undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.[24] It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated.[25]
As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Mendezona,[26] we held that an accused may be
convicted for estafa if the deceit of false pretense is committed prior to or
simultaneous with fraud and is the efficient cause or primary consideration
which induced the offended party to part with his money or property.
Third, AUB would not have granted the Irrevocable Letter of Credit No.
990361, among others, had it known that SPI which had only P62,500.00
paid-up capital and no assets, is a separate entity and not the division or
business name of RMSI. Gilbert Guy, et al. however, contends that the
transaction subject in this controversy is a letter of credit and not a loan,
hence, SPI's capital does not matter.[27] This was also the contention of the
DOJ in reversing the Resolution of the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasig. The
DOJ contended that:
It is also noted that the subject transaction, one of the several series of
transactions between complainant AUB and SPI, is not a loan transaction. It
is a letter of credit transaction intended to facilitate the importation of goods
by SPI. The allegation as to the lack of capitalization of SPI is therefore
immaterial and irrelevant since it is a letter of credit transaction. The seller
gets paid only if it delivers the documents of title over the goods to the bank
which issued the letter of credit, while the buyer/importer acquires title to the
goods once it reimburses the issuing bank. The transaction secures the
obligation of the buyer/importer to the issuing bank. [28]
It is true that ordinarily, in a letter of credit transaction, the bank merely
substitutes its own promise to pay for the promise to pay of one of its
customers, who in turn promises to pay the bank the amount of funds
mentioned in the letters of credit plus credit or commitments fees mutually
agreed upon. Once the issuing bank shall have paid the beneficiary after the
latter's compliance with the terms of the letter of credit, the issuing bank is
entitled to reimbursement for the amount it paid under the letter of credit.[29]
In the present case, however, no reimbursement was made outright,
precisely because the letter of credit was secured by a promissory note
executed by SPI. The bank would have not agreed to this transaction had it
not been deceived by Gilbert Guy, et al. into believing the RMSI and SPI
were one and the same entity. Guy and his cohorts' acts in (1) securing the
letter of credit guaranteed by a promissory note in behalf of SPI; and, (2)
their act of representing SPI as RMSI's Division, were indicia of fraudulent
acts because they fully well know, even before transacting with the bank,
that: (a) SPI was a separate entity from Smartnet Philippines, the RMSI's
Division, which has the Omnibus Credit Line; and (b) despite this knowledge,
they misrepresented to the bank that SPI is RMSI's division. Had it not for
this false representation, AUB would have not granted SPI's letter of credit to
be secured with a promissory note because SPI as a corporation has no
credit line with AUB and SPI by its own, has no credit standing.
Fourth, it is not in dispute that the bank suffered damage, which, including
this controversy, amounted to hundreds of millions of pesos.
It is worth emphasizing that under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the function of a preliminary investigation is to
determine "whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded
belief that a crime x x x has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."[30]
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, the accused committed the crime.[31] Preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence.[32] It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.[33] The validity and merits of a party's
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,
are better ventilated during the trial proper.[34]
We, therefore, sustain the findings of the CA and the City Prosecutor's
Resolution finding that probable cause exists against Gilbert Guy, et al. for
the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and
that Gilbert Guy, et al. are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
AUB's voluminous documents submitted to this Court overcome this difficulty
and established that there is sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Lest it be misunderstood, we reiterate that this Court's finding of probable
cause is grounded on fraud committed through deceit which surrounded
Gilbert Guy, et al. transaction with AUB, thus, violating Article 315 (2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code; it is neither their act of borrowing money and not
paying them, nor their denial thereof, but their very act of deceiving AUB in
order for the latter to part with its money. As early as the Penal Code of
Spain, which was enforced in the Philippines as early as 1887 until it was
replaced by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, the act of fraud through false
pretenses or similar deceit was already being punished. Article 335 of the
Penal Code of Spain punished a person who defrauded another "by falsely
pretending to possess any power, influence, qualification, property, credit,
agency or business, or by means of similar deceit."[35]
Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al. should be charged for
syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which states that:
SEC 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/ associations from the general public.
We hold that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar, for the following
reasons:
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the elements of syndicated estafa are: (a)
estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed
by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. [36]
First, as defined under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, a syndicate "consists of
five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Five (5) accused, namely,
Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and
Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. were, (a) all involved in the formation of the entities
used to defraud AUB; and (b) they were the officers and directors, both of
RMSI and SPI, whose conformities paved the way for AUB to grant the letter
of credit subject of this case, in AUB's honest belief that SPI, as Gilbert Guy,
et al. represented, was a mere division of RMSI. As already discussed,
although Eugenio Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI, he, together with
Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung, actively participated in the scheme through
their signed correspondences with the bank and their attendance in the
meetings with executives of AUB.[37] Rafael Galvez and Katherine Guy, on
the other hand, were the directors of RMSI and SPI who caused and
authorized Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB.[38]
Second, while these corporations were established presumably in
accordance with law, it cannot be denied that Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H.
Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. used
these corporations to carry out the illegal and unlawful act of misrepresenting
SPI as a mere division of RMSI, and, despite knowing SPI's separate
juridical personality, applied for a letter of credit secured by SPI's promissory
note, knowing fully that SPI has no credit line with AUB. The circumstances
of the creation of these entities and their dealings with the bank reveal this
criminal intent to defraud and to deceive AUB.
Third, the fact that the defraudation of AUB resulted to misappropriation of
the money which it solicited from the general public in the form of deposits
was substantially established.[39] Section 3.1 of the General Banking Law
defines banks as "entities engaged in the lending of funds obtained in the
form of deposits." The Old General Banking Act (R.A. No. 337) gave a fuller
picture of the basic banking function of obtaining funds from the public by
way of deposits and the lending of these funds as follows:
Sec 2. Only entities duly authorized by the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank may engage in the lending of funds obtained from the public through
the receipt of deposits of any kind, and all entities regularly conducting such
operations shall be considered as banking institutions, xxxx.
Gilbert Guy et al. want this Court to believe that AUB, being a commercial
bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. We hold, however, that a
bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. P.D. No.
1689 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather,
that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This
is bolstered by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that
the same also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public." This is precisely the very same scheme
that PD No. 1689 contemplates that this species of estafa "be checked or at
least be minimized by imposing capital punishment involving funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public" because "this erodes
the confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative system,
contravenes public interest and constitutes economic sabotage that
threatens the stability of the nation."[40]
Hence, for the stated reasons, we applied the law in People v. Balasa,[41] a
non-stock/non-profit corporation the Panata Foundation of the Philippines,
Inc. We held that PD No. 1689 also applies to other
corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general
public.
In People v. Romero,[42] we also applied the law to a stock corporation
engaged in marketing, the Surigao San Andres Industrial Development
Corporation. Likewise, in People v. Menil,[43] we applied the law to another
marketing firm known as ABM Appliance and Upholstery.

In these cited cases, the accused used the legitimacy of their entities to
perpetrate their unlawful and illegal acts. We see no reason not to apply this
law to a banking institution, a corporation imbued with public interest, when a
clear reading of the PD 1689 reveals that it is within its coverage.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 June 2008 in

CA-G.R. SP No. 97160 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy and
Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. be charged for SYNDICATED ESTAFA under Article
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1689.

SO ORDERED.
US vs. Hart (GR 8848)
Intrinsic Aid - PUNCTUATION EMPLOYED
FACTS:
 Hart, Miller, and Natividad were found guilty in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy. All appealed.
 Evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he
pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about 2-3
weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.
 Hart had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon
and in another house.
 Each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 – divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons.
Each clause enumerates a certain calls of person who, within the meaning of
this statute, are to be considered as vagrants.
“Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the
physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some
lawful calling; every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the country without visible
means of support; … … …”
ISSUE:
 Whether or not “without visible means of support" apply to “every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops”
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
 When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the
duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute which will
give it effect.
 The construction finally adopted should be based upon something
more substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act.
 If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be
used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of
the words of the statute as thus punctuated.
 But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive,
and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary, to give the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and
inserting others where necessary.
HELD:
 A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it sound,
is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a construction of
the law.
o What is loitering? It is idling or wasting one’s time.
o The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling
houses is seldom anything but that.
o If “visible means of support” does not apply to “every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling
houses”, practically all who frequent such places commit a
crime of vagrancy.
 Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of
dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of the society.
o That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is
necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering
around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not
even negatived by the punctuation employed.
 For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted.
U.S. vs Hart, et al.,
G.R. No. 8848
November 21, 1913
TRENT, J.:
DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE
This case is about vagrancy
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling and Vagrancy
where they all appealed.
Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night one in Angeles
and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He also operated a hotel Angeles in which
he did a business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs which he sold to
the Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several
hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in Tacondo. With the power
of an attorney, he furnished the same property and paid for the 1st public
school in Tacondo.
Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that he was fined for
gambling and was seen in houses of prostitution. Miller was discharged from
the Army last year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a rating as
"excellent" on being discharged. He had a partnership with one Buckered and
invested P1000. The business netted him P300 per month.
Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to saloons, he
sometimes acted as a banker. His occupancy is that of a tailor which was
sufficient enough to support his family.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court
of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of Act No. 519, found
guilty, and were
each sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further
sentenced to a fine
of P200, and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have committed the act of
Vagrancy.
RULING:
Defendants are AQUITTED
Act No. 519 states that:
"(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence,
who had the physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply
himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling
housed, or tramping or straying through the country without
visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a
pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own
confession or by his having been convicted of either said
offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support
when found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in
any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or dissolute
person of associate of known thieves or ladrones who
wanders about the country at unusual hours of the night; (5)
every idle person who lodges in any barn, shed, outhouse,
vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging
purposed, without the permission of the owner or a person
entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute
person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; every
common prostitute and common drunkard, is a vagrant."
 It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible means of
support, which are evident in the occupations of the accused, would not be a
bar to the conviction under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said act.
The AG contends that "visible means of support" only applies to those "staying
through the country".

The courts decided that the mere missing of the punctuation cannot
hold bar the argument of the AG, since the intention of the legislators was to
prevent "loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or wasting one's time.
The time spent in saloons drum shops, and gambling houses is anything but
that.

The three defendants were earning a living by legitimate means in a degree of

comfort higher than the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the
legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

For these reasons, the defendants are ACQUITTED, with the costs de
oficio.
Case Digest: Paras vs Comelec

PARAS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169

Facts:

Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994.

Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve
the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the
petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a
TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition
and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date
January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section
74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was
set on the first Monday of May 1996.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent
Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s
opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place
within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall
may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.

Issue:
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its
of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The
spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus,
Held: interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will
unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is
intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that
defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather
that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the
“regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled.
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution) GR 123169, this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It
would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49) En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for be filled by the electorate.
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered office concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made
The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which permanent.
was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.

In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no
recall can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the
Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996. He
cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument,
the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular local
election.

Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a

regular local election in a recall proceeding

Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than the
letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads
to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the
law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually found not in “the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth”. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. The
Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as
98 Phil. 32
LABRADOR, J.:
This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul
the sale of a homestead which had been inherited by them from said
decedent. Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land containing an area of
10.0709 hectares, more or less, in San Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija
in the year 1917. His application was approved on June 22, 1917. He filed
the corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on
June 15, 1943 the said final proof was approved by the Director of Lands,
who thereupon ordered the issuance of a patent in his favor. (Exhibit A.) At
the time of the issuance of the above order, Sergio Nicolas had already died,
so the order directs. the issuance of the patent to Ms heirs, represented by
his widow. In or about the. year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the
homestead to the defendants. The above transfers were approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the
defendants secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor.
Original Certificate of Title No P-558 has been issued also in their favor
covering the said parcel of land.
The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the
conveyances executed by plaintiffs to. defendants and to recover the land,
together with the frits of the land recelved by the defendants, as damages.
The defendants alleged the execution of the sales in their favor. After the
issues had been joined the parties presented an agreed statement of facts,
the most pertinent parts of which have already been get forth above. The trial
court held that the transfer or conveyance of the homestead made by the
heirs ox the original homesteader was a mere transfer of. the rights of the
original homesteader to the iand authorized under the provisions of Section
20 of the Public, Land Act (C. A. 141) ; therefore, as it was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the conveyance was, valid. It held,
that section 118 of the Public Land Act is not applicable; that both Section 20
and. Section 118 being apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled such
that the prohibition, contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if
the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be
absolutely useless. Against this judgment the appeal was prosecuted in this
Court.
The provisions which affect, the conveyance sought to be annulled are as
follows:
"Sec. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before patent
is. issued the" applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of
Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but, cannot
continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona
fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land,
and that conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the
applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any
person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such
transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to the land so
acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and
obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the
purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not again apply
for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall
result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A.
141)
"Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provision shall
not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of the
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period but
the improvements or crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations."
"No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years
and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall
not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds." (Id.)
The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader
has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his
heirs. The legislative policy is so strong and consistent that the original
period of five years from the issuance of the patent, within which period
conveyance or sale thereof, by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited
(section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured (Sec. 118, par. 2, C.
A. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted
authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when properly sold by the
homesteader within five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No.
141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried out in
Section 20, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homestead rights
from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the
Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot continue with kis homestead
through no. fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous
permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be
obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer made without such
previous approval is null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the
entry and the refusal of the patent. As the conveyances made under the
provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be
determined is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section
20 of the Act.
The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows:
"That the heirs of, Sergio Nicolas executed in or. about 1947 a transfer of
homestead rights over the land in question in favor of the defendants, which
transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on
March 9, 1948; that with the approval of said transfer of Homestead rights,
the defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the
title being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P 558 of the land
records of Nueva Ecija."
The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands
had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or homesteader
"has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with
the homestead through no fault of his own." Furthermore, according to'the
stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made with the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the
requirements of section 20 has been complied with.
But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of
official acts the Director of Lands must have recommended the approval of
the transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances still
suffer from at least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they had to
be made because the homesteader could not continue with his homestead
through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions
on this necessary requirement, because the order for the issuance of the
patent states just the opposite. The order for the, issuance of the patent
states expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all the
requirements of the law with respect to cultivation, possession and otherwlse
thus:
"(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements
contataed in the final proof papers was conducted by a representative of the
Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the
residence and cultivation requirements of the law; and"
***
"* * *, the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied with
the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land
applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.)
The order for the issuance of a, patent as well as the statements of fact
therein contained, as above-quoted conclusively disprove the existence of
the requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead
through no fault of his own.
In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order for
the issuance of a patent after the approval of the final proof, the right of the
homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the
ministerial duty of the corresponding officials of the Government to issue said
patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is
the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Ferrales, 51
Phil 499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or
conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the prohibition
should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to the date on
which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued, which in this case is
June 13, 1943.
Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made
by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants herein in the year 1947 do
not comply with. the first requirement of section 20 of the Public Land Act
that the Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the
homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue with his homestead
through no failt of his own, and with the second that a conveyance must be
made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce; that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a
homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as
having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition
contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and
policy of the law may be avoided by the homesteader by postponing the
getting of his patent.
In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel
defendants, are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title of
issued m the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register, of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land land was valid.
returned, to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts HELD:
received as price for the sale.
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
No damages or costs. So ordered.
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act
that the

Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that

he could

not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al. conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the
Case No. 290 Secretary of

G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of
Nicolas was
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61
null and void.
FACTS:

Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved

in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who
issued a

patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by
his heirs,

represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the
homestead

to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and

Commerce,

and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs
of the

deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to

recover

the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.

ISSUE:
99 Phil. 253
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering
respondents to reinstate petitioner as foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal,
Office of the City Engineer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day from the date of his
removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the
most pertinent of which are as follows: Petitioner was a foreman, Group
Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day On
June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place
was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before
June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was
transferred from the City Health Department to the Office of the City
Engineer. In April, 1954, petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition
was not headed by the respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that
petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the
unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended),
and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution. The court
further held that the notation at the bottom of petitioner's appointment to the
effect that his appointment is "temporary pending report from the
Government Service Insurance System as to the appointee's physical and
medical examination" did not make his appointment merely temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint,
the names of the persons holding the Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer,
City Auditor and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they being designated only
by their official positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings
and of the judgment. As said persons were sued in their official capacity, it is
sufficient that they be designated by their official positions.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words "Civil Service" in
section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters
for the same words, "civil service," in section 670, Revised Administrative
Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are
protected in the above-mentioned sections of the Constitution. We see no
validity in this argument. Capital "C" and "S" in the words "Civil Service" were
used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the
similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference
between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter.
There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the
benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are
expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and
priviliges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are
so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not
subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified
service. This can not be a valid reason for denying previleges to the former
that are granted the latter.
As the removal of petitioner was made without investigation and without
cause, said removal is null and void and petitioner is entitled to be reinstated
to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil.,
740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778)
There is, however, an, additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the
memorandum submitted by the attorneys for the respondents in lieu of oral
argument. This is the fact that as petitioner was removed on June 16, 1953
and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15
days, petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being
considered as having abandoned his office.
We can not or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally
dismissed, he may conform to such illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or
by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law be considered as
having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to he reinstated. These
defenses are valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is
our decision in the case of Mesias vs. Jover, et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided
November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with approval Nicolas vs. United
States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained:
"A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the
obligation to take steps for his own protection, and may not for an
unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the order of removal * * * and then
sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case of unreasonable
delay he may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to
recover its emoluments." (Mesias vs. Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any
period which may be deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office.
In the abovecited case decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States, 11 months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to
abandonment of office and of the right to recover its emoluments. H6wever,
we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action
must be instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the
island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of
the Code of Civil Proceedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an
expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to
an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take
steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience
that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to
positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that
public business may be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right
to positions in the service must be discouraged. The following considerations
as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to
employees in the civil service:
"Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction
of the officer for one year could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a
renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to
resign his position anytime he pleases. "And there is good justification for the
limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office should be
subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples' interest requires that
such right should be determined as speedily as practicable." (Tumulak vs.
Egay, 46 Off.Gaz., 18], 3693, 3695.)
circumstance (belated objection) would bar the consideration if it were a
defense merely. However, we consider it to be essential to the petitioner's
right of action that the same is filed within a year from the illegal removal.
The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject
to waiver. It is essential: to petitioner's cause of action and may be
considered even at this stage of the action.
"We would go farther by holding: that the period fixed in the rule is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause, of action, with the result
that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the
matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss." (Abeto vs. Hodas, 46
Off. Gaz., [3], 930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a cause of action is not waived by failure to raise
same as a defense (section 10, Rule 9),
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as petitioner was dismissed
on June 16, 1953 and did not file his petition for mandamus for his
reinstatement until July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year, he is deemed:
to have abandoned his right to his former position and is not entitled to
reinstatement therein by mandamus. Without costs. So ordered.

Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any

person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as
against another actually holding it, so 1&at title Government may not be
faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person
actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the
policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within
which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to
a position in the civil service should also be required to file his petition for
reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby
considered as having abandoned his office.

One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact
that the objection as to the delay in filing the action is raised, for the first time
in this Court, not having been raised in the court below. The above
 EN BANC and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those
appointed to the classified service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying
[G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956.]
privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without
MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY AUDITOR and the CITY
cause, said removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated
ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.
to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740,
47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778).
FACTS: There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the
memorandum submitted by the attorneys for the Respondents in lieu of oral
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer,
argument. This is the fact that asPetitioner was removed on June 16, 1953
Cebu City, at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him
and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15
from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by
days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being
Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division,
considered as having abandoned his office.
including personnel, was transferred from the City Health Department to the
Office of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated
but his petition was not heeded by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held
that Petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the
unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended),
and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words “Civil Service” in
section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters for
the same words, “civil service,” in section 670, Revised Administrative Code,
indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in
the above-mentioned sections of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the use of capital in the words "Civil Service" in the
Constitution and the use of small letters for the "civil service" in the Revised
Administrative code indicates that the protection only pertains to the classified
service.
DECISION:
We see no validity in this argument. Capital “C” and “S” in the words “Civil
Service” were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are
used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no
difference between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the
latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from
the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are
expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; chan Hence,
Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in
the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989 vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO,
JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE TAAY, respondents.
POLICE POWER

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA,
AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CRUZ, J.:
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE
& NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs. FACTS:
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989 serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS

JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
Occidental, petitioners, process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
vs. property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide
for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989 belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal
protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power
or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not
subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain
or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation
to the owner of the property expropriated.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal
questions. They will be subject to one common discussion and
resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr.
who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229,
and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of
the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400
planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the
implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It
was granted by the court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was
granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of
his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the
then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer
were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay
lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation
of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without
hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not
been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which
rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No.
131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the
measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits required
by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that
a bill should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of
eminent domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation
RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been
sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when
the Congress was formally convened and took over legislative
power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its
principal purpose and therefore is not required to conform to the
requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of
the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is
payment of just compensation unlike in the exercise of police power
wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there
is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the
subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method
employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of
payment, other modes of payment shall be permitted as
compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, they
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of
value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of
the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon
the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available to the
landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment
is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets,
tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is
as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result
in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes
even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our
view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall
decree today.)
11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under
P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
November 6, 2010
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175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal
Protection – Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
(PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27,
EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands
for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be
paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that
just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law,
classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying
small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged

in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies
like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation
can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government –
even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body
is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so
provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept

in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of
pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is
in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds,
and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
Peope v. Manantan
Full
Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1962/jul1962/gr_l
-14129_1962.php
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised
Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the
purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any
province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or
to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice
of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right
to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed
the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised
Election Code?
Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly
included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the
kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and
justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the
legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.",
which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue
of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers
appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice
of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and
not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature
omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt
the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer
as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by
the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In
the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace
from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also,
the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In
the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its
purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition
under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously
applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons
for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace"
People v. Manantan Case digest
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
Facts:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary
investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable
cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss
the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not
one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of
the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case
cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code
Held:
Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. The maxim ‘casus omisus’ can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of
‘casus omisus’ does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms
is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term 'judge' includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace
from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of
peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic
and broader term ‘judge’, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of
the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges
of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme
Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded
the case for trial on the merits.
People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]
15 Aug
Ponente: REGALA, J.
FACTS:
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The
defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the
peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second
motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case
cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case was remanded for trial on the merits.
RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty
that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there
has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On
law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of
the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected.
To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
applied the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule
has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the
peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no
reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
Comm. Of Customs vs CTA, 43 SCRA 192
G.R. Nos. L-31776-78
October 21, 1993
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
MANILA STAR FERRY, INC., UNITED NAVIGATION & TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, CEABA SHIPPING AGENCY, INC., and THE COURT' OF
TAX APPEALS, respondents.
1st Division
Ponente: Quiason, J:
FACTS:
Private respondents Manila Star Ferry, Inc. and the United Navigation &
Transport Corporation are domestic corporations engaged in the lighterage
business and are the owners and operators, respectively, of the tugboat
Orestes and the barge-lighter UN-L-106. Private respondent Ceaba Shipping
Agency, Inc. (Ceaba) is the local shipping agent of the Chiat Lee Navigation
Trading Co. of Hongkong, the registered owner and operator of the S/S Argo,
an ocean-going vessel.
Vessel S/S Argo was apprehended while unloading goods of foreign origin
onto the barge UN-L-106 and the tugboat Orestes, without the necessary
papers showing that the goods were entered lawfully though a port of entry
and that taxes and duties on said goods had been paid.
Thereafter, seizure and forfeiture proceedings were separately instituted
before the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila against the S/S Argo
and its cargo, the Orestes, the UN-L-106 and the two bancas, charging them
with violations of Section 2530 (a), (b) and (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Criminal charges were likewise filed against the officers and crew of said
vessels and watercraft.
Section 2530 (a) and (c) of said law reads as follows:
Sec. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture under Tariff and
Customs Laws. — Any vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles and
other objects shall, under the following conditions, be subject
to forfeiture:
(a) Any vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall, be used
unlawfully in the importation or exportation of articles into or
from any Philippine port or place except a port of entry; and
any vessel which, being of less than thirty tons capacity shall
be used in the importation of articles into any Philippine port
or place except into a port of the Sulu sea where importation
in such vessel may be authorized by the Commissioner, with
the approval of the department head.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any vessel or aircraft into which shall be transferred cargo
unladen contrary to law prior to the arrival of the importing
vessel or aircraft at her port of destination.
In the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Collector of Customs rendered
a consolidated decision dated December 27, 1966, declaring the forfeiture of
said vessels and watercraft in favor of the Philippine government by virtue of
Section 2530 (a) and (b) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
All respondents therein, except the owner of the two wooden bancas,
separately appealed the consolidated decision of the Collector of Customs for
the Port of Manila to the Commissioner of Customs. In his Decision dated
February 1, 1967, the Acting Commissioner of Customs found the Collector's
decision to be in order and affirmed the same accordingly.
The same respondents separately elevated the matter to the Court of Tax
Appeals (C.T.A. Cases Nos. 1836, 1837 and 1839), which in a consolidated
decision dated September 30, 1989, substantially modified the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs, stating thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Manila Star Ferry, Inc.
and the United Navigation & Transport Corporation are each
ordered to pay a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and
Ceaba Shipping Agency, Inc., a fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), within thirty days from the date this decision
becomes final .
It is this decision of the Court of Tax Appeals that is being questioned by the
Commissioner of Customs before this Court.
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals held that while the S/S Argo was
caught unloading smuggled goods in Manila Bay, the said vessel and the
goods cannot be forfeited in favor of the government because the Port of
Manila is a port of entry (R.A. 1937, Sec. 701).
The Commissioner of Customs argues that the phrase "except a port of entry"
should mean "except a port of destination," and inasmuch as there is no
showing that the Port of Manila was the port of destination of the S/S Argo, its
forfeiture was in order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the S/S Argo can be subject to forfeiture and seizure
HELD:
No. Section 2530(a) in unmistakable terms provides that a vessel engaged in
smuggling "in a port of entry" cannot be forfeited. This is the clear and plain
meaning of the law. It is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of the law, for indeed, we are bound by the words of the statute.
Neither can we put words in the mouths of the lawmaker. A verba legis non
est recedendum.
It must be noted that the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 from which the
Tariff and Customs Code is based, contained in Section 1363(a) thereof
almost exactly the same provision in Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code, including the phrase "except a port of entry." If the lawmakers intended
the term "port of entry" to mean "port of destination," they could have
expressed facilely such intention when they adopted the Tariff and Customs
Code in 1957. Instead on amending the law, Congress reenacted verbatim the
provision of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
Congress, in the very same Article 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code, used
the term "port of destination" in subsections (c) and (d) thereof. This is a clear
indication that Congress is aware of the distinction between the two wordings.
The barge-lighter UN-L-106 and the tugboat Orestes, on the other hand, are
subject to forfeiture under paragraph (c) of Section 2530 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The barge-lighter and tugboat fall under the term "vessel"
which includes every sort of boat, craft or other artificial contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water (R.A. No. 1937,
Section 3514). Said section 2530 (c) prescribes the forfeiture of' any vessel or
aircraft into which shall be transferred cargo unladen contrary to law before
the arrival of the vessel or aircraft at her port of destination Manila was not the
port of destination, much less a port of call of the S/S Argo, the importing
vessel. The S/S Argo left Hongkong and was bound for Jesselton, North
Borneo, Djakarta and Surabaja, Indonesia; and yet it stopped at the Port of
Manila to unload the smuggled goods onto the UN-L-106 and the Orestes.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. CTA, GR Nos. L-48886-88, 1993-07-21
Facts:
This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated July 28, 1978 of the
Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832 which was
promulgated prior to the issuance on February 27, 1991, of Circular No. 1-91
to the effect that appeals from a final order or... decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals shall be to the Court of Appeals.
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were
constructed and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at
the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia", MS
"Pavel Rybin", MS "Caledonia", and MS "Leonidas" are vessels engaged in
foreign trade and represented in the Philippines by private respondent
Litonjua Shipping Company with Granexport Corporation as its... sub-agent.
On various dates, the berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express Corporation
at Kiwalan, Iligan City were used by the above vessels and were assessed
berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid by private
respondent under protest, to wit:
Issues:
Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade, which berths at a privately owned
wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge under Section
2901 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, which, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed and
respondent Commissioner of Customs is ordered to refund to petitioner the
amount of P40,551.00. No costs. (p. 51, Rollo)
The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of
Kiwalan, which was constructed, operated, and continues to be maintained
by private respondent Iligan Express Corporation, are not subject to berthing
charges, and petitioner should refund the... berthing fees paid by private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals AFFIRMED.
Principles:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed
in the familiar maxim expressio unjus est exclusio alterius. Where a statute,...
by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations
in a statute had the intention been not to... restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd
Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The port of Kiwalan not
being included in the list of national ports appended to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in Executive Order No. 72, it follows
inevitably as a matter of law and legal principle that this Court may not
properly consider said port as a national port. To do otherwise would be to
legislate on our part and to arrogate unto ourselves... powers not conferred
on us by the Constitution.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs CTA – 224 SCRA 665 – July 21, 1993
FACTS: LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY with GRANEXPORT as sub-agent
(Hereinafter referred to as “private respondent” for brevity) has used the
berthing facilities of ILIGAN BAY EXPRESS CORPORATION, a private
corporation which exclusively operates and maintains said facilities, at
Kiwalan, Iligan City for the following vessels which are engaged in foreign
trade: 1) MS “Chozan Maru”; 2) MS “Samuel S”; 3) MS “Ero”; 4) MS “Messinia”;
4) MS “Pavel Rybin”; 5) MS “Caledonia” and MS “Leonidas”. For the use of
said berthing facilities on various occasions, the COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
assessed berthing charges for each vessel, amounting to a total of PhP 40,
551, which were paid by private respondent under protest.
Private respondent then filed cases before the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
through the COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the refund of berthing fees under
protest, but it did not prosper. This matter was then elevated at the
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, but of no avail.
On July 28, 1978, the COURT OF TAX APPEALS reversed the decision of
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, rendering that the private respondent is
entitled to a refund, amounting to PhP 40, 551.
The COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS contends that the government has the
authority to impose and collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a
private pier or at a national port. It is also of the belief that KIWALAN is a
national port, for it is within the jurisdiction of the collection district and territorial
limits of the national port of Iligan.
On the other hand, private respondent countered that the right of the
government to impose berthing fees is limited only to national ports; further,
KIWALAN is not a national port, considering that it is operated by a private
corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not a vessel engaged in foreign trade which berths at a
privately owned wharf or pier is liable for the payment of berthing charges
under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34?
HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject vessels, not having berth
at a national port, but at the port of KIWALAN which was constructed by a
private corporation, are not subject to berthing fees. Private respondent are
further entitled to receive the refund for the berthing fees it previously paid.
KIWALAN was not accorded the status of a national port as per
Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 or in Executive Order No. 72. It was
neither included in the list of national ports specified on said orders, nor there
was a showing that it was converted as a national port. It is a settled rule in
Statutory Construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction be
extended to others. It further lies on the premise that the legislature would not
have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Moreover, Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
PD No. 34, expressly provided that only the national ports are subject to
berthing fees, to wit:
“Definition – Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal
wharf at any national port in the Philippines; for mooring or making fast to a
vessel so berthed; or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin,
river, or canal under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines;
Provided, however that in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%) per
cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the
succeeding sections.

Said amendment, in comparison with the provision it superseded, included

the word “national” before the word “port”, thus, indicating that a change from
the former one has been made, rendering the court to give and apply the
legislative meaning and intent of the amendment.
TOPACIO NUENO v. ANGELES
Jose Topacio Nueno, et al., petitioners
Gerardo Angeles, et al., respondents
FACTS
Jose Topacio Nueno, Manuel De La Fuente, Eustaquio Balagtas and
Carmen Planas were elected as members of the Municipal Board in the
general election on Dec 1940, and qualified on Jan. 1941. Nueno and Planas
subsequently resigned from their office to run for the House of
Representatives on Nov. 1941, but they were not elected. The President of
the Commonwealth then appointed Nueno to fill the vacancy he created
because of his resignation, and Delia Dino to fill the vacancy created by
Carmen Planas, since they were both from the same political party, “The
Young Philippines.”
On 1942, the Japanese Army invaded the country. The regular
election as provided in the Election Code could not be held because the
Japanese still occupied the country. The special election likewise could not
be held after the restoration of the Commonwealth due to physical
impossibility. Therefore the President of the Commonwealth appointed the
six respondents to the Municipal Board.
The four petitioners instituted an action quo warranto against six
respondents, averring that their term of office of three years has not yet
expired since they have not served for such period due to the Japanese
occupation. They also assert their right to hold-over, or their right to continue
in office until a successor has been elected. Also, that their appointments
are in contravention of Sec. 16, Act 357 since the party of Dino has not been
represented, and that such appointments were not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments.
Respondents contend that petitioners have no right to hold public
office since their term expired on Dec 1943, and that term of office must be
distinguished from tenure. Also that the appointments are valid under the
emergency powers granted upon the President.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a right to hold-over of office
(2) Whether or not the appointments of the President are valid
RULING & RATIO
(1) NO. The term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right and fixes the interval after the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The term of
office is not affected by hold-over, and the tenure may be shorter than
the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office
may be extended by reason of war.
Sec. 27 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code
provided for the right to hold-over of a municipal and provincial
officer: “the incumbent shall hold-over until a successor shall be duly
qualified.” Such phrase was suppressed by a subsequent
amendment (Act No. 2774), but was provided by a different section
in the act, so it was still in effect. However, the foregoing provisions
were all repealed by Sec. 184 of the Commonwealth Act No. 357. It
provided: “The officers elected shall assume office on the first day of
January next following.”
(2) YES. Sec. 16 of the Commonwealth Act provides for the appointments
to be done by the President in case of vacancy in an elective or
municipal office. The vacancies enumerated thereof may be
immediately filled in the manner provide, therefore there will be no
interregnum during which the office may be temporarily without an
incumbent.
The act provides for appointment during temporary vacancy
of office under subsection (a). Subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e)
provides for appointment to fill in a vacancy. Subsection (a) cannot
be applied in this case since no vacancy, temporary or otherwise,
exists in this case. Temporary absence is not the same as vacancy
since in vacancy, there is no incumbent in public office.
The petitioners were also not appointed under subsection (f),
which provides for the appointed officer to serve for the “unexpired
term of office.”
Their terms, therefore, expired already on Dec. 1943, and
the subsequent appointments of the respondents are valid under
Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act 357.
 Furthermore, such interpretation, if adopted, would aggravate the problem of
smuggling and pave the way to national economic ruin. For it would
DISPOSITIVE encourage unlawful importation, since by the mere expedient of redeeming
Action quo arrant is dismissed. their seized importation the smugglers would be freed from personal criminal
liability for the offense. Such a course we cannot in the least sanction.

People v Desiderio 15 scra 402

facts:The information was originally filed on February 17, 1958, in the
Municipal Court, and subsequently on May 3, 1958, in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City. It charged that Ignacio Desiderio, on or about
November 28, 1958, in Zamboanga City, "did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess, receive, conceal, buy, sell (after illegal
importation) eleven (11) cases and twenty (20) cartons of Chesterfield
cigarettes and eleven (11) cartons of Camel cigarettes of foreign brand and
manufactured in a foreign country, knowing that the same have been
imported contrary to law."
A plea of not guilty was entered by the accused. On June 27, 1961, however,
said accused presented a motion to quash on the ground that his criminal
liability had been extinguished by a compromise agreement with the
Collector of Customs, on February 10, 1958, in accordance with Section
2307 of the same Republic Act 1937. After considering the arguments, pro
and con, on said motion, the Court granted the same in its order of October
11, 1062, dismissing the case.
All the more does the position of the accused become untenable when it is
considered that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 1937 on July 1, 1957,
the applicable law contained a provision allowing the Commissioner of
Customs to compromise the criminal liability of the offender in cases of
unlawful importation. We refer to Section 1369 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Its elimination in Republic Act 1937 clearly shows the intent of
Congress henceforth not to allow compromises of the offender's criminal
liability in said cases. Significantly, also, Section 2307 of Republic Act 1937
falls under part 2 of Title VI of said Act, which is entitled "Administrative
Proceedings." Settlement of the administrative proceedings does not, in the
absence of express provision to that effect, amount to settlement of the
criminal liability.

issue: wonsettlement of the case under Section 2307 extinguishes criminal

liability under Section 3601, both of Republic Act 1937, otherwise called the
Tariff and Customs Code.

held: It is urged by the accused that settlement under Section 2307, prior to
the filing of the criminal action, discharges all liabilities which may or might
attach by virtue of the offense. Such interpretation would stretch the law too
far. Section 2307 expressly states what are deemed discharged thereunder,
namely, "all liability which may or might attach to the property by virtue of the
offense which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might
have been incurred under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect to
such property." It limits the effects of the aforesaid settlement to the liability
that attaches to the property, or to the bond that replaces the property. It
does not speak of the liability that falls on the person or offender. Clearly,
therefore, the interpretation of the accused is not supported by the law.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 306 SCRA 287 APRIL 21, 1999
FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers. During the strike they
did not report for work. The investigation was concluded before the 90 days
suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged.
Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service. While,
respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas and Elizabeth Somebang were
ordered suspended for six (6) months effective. Private respondents moved
for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all charges
against them and they be paid salaries during suspension. Private
respondents were exonarated of all charges against thrm for acts connected
with the teachers strike. Although they were absent from work, it was not
because of the strike.
ISSUE: WON The private respondents is entitled for a compensation during
their suspension
HELD: The Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the
time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports until their actual reinstatement for a period not exceeding five (5)
years. In this case, The private respondents were entitled to back salaries
although found guilty of violation of office rules and regulations in the reason
that they were absent from work without filling a leave and in addition to that
is, the absence was not because of the strike.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public
school teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the
teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were
administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil
Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5)
gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and;
7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation
ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the
service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA,
the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their
reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during
the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated
them).
ISSUE
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their
appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.
HELD
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of
back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his
suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated
and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should
be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of
the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as
under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In
the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of
suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive
suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated
and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.
Title : HON. R. GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS
Citation : G.R. No. 131012
April 21, 1999
Ponente : MENDOZA, J
Facts :
 Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS
Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to
security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper
because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine
of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues : even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential
immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his
security of tenure.
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers
which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture
and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19
SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible
is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force
his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria
vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Held :
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST
petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The cannot be countenanced.
questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is
grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent
court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite".
The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private
respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in
vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject
reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides,
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of
private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no
definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
15 Aug
Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.
FACTS:
[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November
26, 1991. It is “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
and for Other Purposes.” Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district
and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for
the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379,
approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to
Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b)
and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to
the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained
that election of Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct
in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
RATIO:
Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A.
7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that
respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its
reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute
is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-
district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro
Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the
May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by
district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
Manuel T. De Guia, in his capacity as councilor of the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Petitioner Vs. Hon. Commission on Elections,
Respondent
G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992
Facts: On November 18, 1991, Congress passed RA 7166 "An Act providing
for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other purposes." On November
20, 1991, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent
resolutions in question.
On February 20, 1992, Petitioner De Guia, an incumbent member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque filed with COMELEC a
motion for clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities
of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district
municipalities would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992 or in the 1995
regular elections.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 stating that its purpose in
recommending to Congress the apportionment of Sangguniang Panglungsod
and Bayan seats to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for.
Petitioner De Guia received the copy of the Resolution to mean that the
election of elective members of Sangguniang Bayan, by district of the 13
Municipalities in Metro Manila shall apply in the May 11, 1992 election. Not
satisfied, De Guia filed the instant petition for reversal of the position of the
respondent. Petitioner insisted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque
should fall under category (d) in which they will still be elected at large until
the 1995 elections.
Issue: Whether or Not the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque
and other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, would be
elected by district in the May 11, 1992 regular elections?
Held: Yes. As stated in Paragraph (c) Section 3, Cities with 2 or more
legislative districts ( Manila, Cebu, Davao ) shall continue to be elected by
district, as well as the 13 Municipalities of Metro Manila which have already
been apportioned into 2 districts.
Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang
Bayan for Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which will remain to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 election. Paragraph (d) should be
interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of
the petitioner would make the act of the statute in singling out the single
district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to
what the legislature intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or
reason which induced it to enact the statute.
Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A
Construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish its purpose for which it is enacted.
De Guia v Comelec
GR no. 104712, May 6, 1992
Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and enforcement
of Comelec’s Resolution No. 2313, adopting the rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the provinces with only 1 legislative district and
the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the
preparation of the project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars. Resolution No. 2379, approving the
Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313,
and Resolution Und. 92-010, holding that paragraphs in Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
apply to the May 11, 1992 elections.
A petitioner is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January
1988 local elections. He prays, for reversal of the position of respondent
insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and all other municipalities
in the Metro Manila Area.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi to raise the question.
Ratio Decidendi:
The petitioner has no locus standi since the petitioner lacked personal or
substantial interest and did not allege any legal right that has been violated by
the respondent. In his petition, he did not state that he is running for re-election,
much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paranaque. As
such, the Court ruled that petitioner does not appear to have a locus standi, a
personal or substantial interest.
However, the Court resolved that they would brush aside the question of
procedural technicalities due to the importance of the issue. The issue being
brought upon the Court is important since it concerns the general public,
specifically the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the
apportionment. Despite the lack of legal standing of the petitioner, the Court
decided to tackle the issues presented because issues presented concerns
matters of public interest.

Finding no abuse of discretion much less grave, on the part of respondent, and
for lack of merit, the instant petition is dismissed was dismissed by the
Supreme Court. No cost.
LORENZO T. TANGGA-
AN vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE TANKS
HIP DELAWARE LLC, and CARLOS C. SALINAS
G.R. No. 180636, 13 March 2013
FACTS:
Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-
an with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf of its for
eign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed f
or a period of six months as chief engineer of the vessel the S.S. “Kure”. He
was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent
to 15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the am
ount of US$700.00 a month. On February 2002, Tangga-
an was deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. Tangga-
an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries f
or the unexpired portion of his contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral dam
ages, attorney’s fees and interest.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitio
ner’s claim for back salaries, LA said he is entitled not to four months which i
s equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months,
inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3 months
= US$24,600) pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3
months back salaries.
RULING:
No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, that an illegally dismissed overseas employee i
s not entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearl
y reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed ove
rseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of hi
s employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpi
red term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contr
act concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident fro
m the wording “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the wordin
g “salaries x x x for three months.” To follow the thinking that private respond
ent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser a
mount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statut
e while giving effect to some.
Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired porti
on of his six-
month employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all hi
s corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are
expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his
monthly salary and benefit package. Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salari
es of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 mont
hs). “Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwa
ges shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equi
valent.” As we have time and again held, “it is the obligation of the employer t
o pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the sal
aries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to
which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and
had not stopped working.”
G.R. No. 180636 March 13, 2013
LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN, Petitioner,
vs.
PIDLIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE TANKSHIP
DELAWARE LLC, and CARLOS C. SALINAS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Tangga-an alleged that on January 31, 2002, he entered into an overseas
employment contract with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and
in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC. Under
the employment contract, he was to be employed for a period of six months
as chief engineer of the vessel the S.S. "Kure". He was to be paid a
basic salary of US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a
months or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount of
US$700.00 a month.
On February 11, 2002, Tangga-an was deployed. While performing his
assigned task, he noticed that while they were loading liquid cargo at Cedros,
Mexico, the vessel suddenly listed too much at the bow. At that particular
time both the master and the chief mate went on shore leave together, which
under maritime standard was prohibited. To avoid any conflict, he chose to
ignore the unbecoming conduct of the senior officers of the vessel.
On or about March 13, 2002, the vessel berthed at a port in Japan to
discharge its cargo. Thereafter, it sailed to the U.S.A. While the vessel was
still at sea, the master required Tangga-an and the rest of the Filipino
Engineer Officers to report to his office where they were informed that they
would be repatriated on account of the delay in the cargo discharging in
Japan, which was principally a duty belonging to the deck officers. He
imputed the delay to the non-readiness of the turbo generator and the
inoperation of the boom. Moreover, upon checking the boom, they found the
same operational.
Upon verification, they found out that when the vessel berthed in Japan, the
cargo hold was not immediately opened and the deck officers concerned did
not prepare the stock. Moreover, while cargo discharging was ongoing, both
the master and the chief mate again went on shore leave together and
returned to the vessel only after midnight. To save face, they harped on the
Engine Department for their mistake. Tangga-an and the other Engineering
Officers were ordered to disembark from the vessel on April 2, 2002 and
thereafter repatriated. Hence, the complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not Tangga-an was illegally dismissed
2) Whether or not petitioner should be awarded his salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of his sex-month employment contract, or equivalent to
four months
RULING:
1) Yes. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed
and opined that an investigation should have been conducted to ferret out
the truth instead of dismissing petitioner outright. The NLRC affirmed the
finding of illegal dismissal. It held that no notice of hearing was served upon
petitioner, and no hearing whatsoever was conducted. The respondents
should not have dispensed with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
However, there remains no issue regarding illegal dismissal. The CA likewise
adhered to the finding of illegal dismissal.
In spite of the consistent finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed,
respondents did not take issue, which thus renders all pronouncements on
the matter final. It is already settled that petitioner’s employment was illegally
terminated. As a result, his wages as well as allowances were withheld
without valid and legal basis.
2) In resolving petitioner’s monetary claims, the CA utterly misinterpreted the
Court’s ruling in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Skippers Maritime Services, Ltd.
The Court did not agree and hence modified the judgment in said case. It
held that, following the wording of Section 10 and its ruling in Marsaman
Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, when the
illegally dismissed employee’s employment contract has a term of less than
one year, he/she shall be entitled to recovery of salaries representing the
unexpired portion of his/her employment contract.
It is not disputed that private respondent’s employment contract in the instant
case was for six (6) months. Hence, we see no reason to disregard the ruling
in Marsaman that private respondent should be paid his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.
Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of his six-months employment contract, or equivalent to four months.
This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage
bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment
contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package. These benefits
were guaranteed to be paid on a monthly basis, and were not made
contingent.
As we have time and again held, "it is the obligation of the employer to pay
an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries
or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to
which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and
had not stopped working."
Tangga-an vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers
G.R. No. 180636
13 March 2013
FACTS
Tangga-an alleged that on January 31, 2002, he entered into an
overseas employment contract with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
(PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware,
LLC. Under the employment contract, he was to be employed for a period of
six months as chief engineer of the vessel the S.S. "Kure". He was to be paid
a basic salary of US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a
months or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage bonus in the amount of
US$700.00 a month.
On February 11, 2002, Tangga-an was deployed. While performing
his assigned task, he noticed that while they were loading liquid cargo at
Cedros, Mexico, the vessel suddenly listed too much at the bow. At that
particular time both the master and the chief mate went on shore leave
together, which under maritime standard was prohibited. To avoid any
conflict, he chose to ignore the unbecoming conduct of the senior officers of
the vessel.
On or about March 13, 2002, the vessel berthed at a port in Japan to
discharge its cargo. Thereafter, it sailed to the U.S.A. While the vessel was
still at sea, the master required Tangga-an and the rest of the Filipino
Engineer Officers to report to his office where they were informed that they
would be repatriated on account of the delay in the cargo discharging in
Japan, which was principally a duty belonging to the deck officers. He
imputed the delay to the non-readiness of the turbo generator and the
inoperation of the boom. Moreover, upon checking the boom, they found the
same operational.
Upon verification, they found out that when the vessel berthed in
Japan, the cargo hold was not immediately opened and the deck officers
concerned did not prepare the stock. Moreover, while cargo discharging was
ongoing, both the master and the chief mate again went on shore leave
together and returned to the vessel only after midnight. To save face, they
harped on the Engine Department for their mistake. Tangga-an and the other
Engineering Officers were ordered to disembark from the vessel on April 2,
2002 and thereafter repatriated.
ISSUES
(1) Was Tangga-an illegally dismissed?
(2) Should the petitioner be awarded his salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract which is
equivalent to four months?
RULING
(1) YES. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed
and opined that an investigation should have been conducted to ferret out
the truth instead of dismissing petitioner outright. The NLRC affirmed the
finding of illegal dismissal. It held that no notice of hearing was served upon
petitioner, and no hearing whatsoever was conducted. The respondents
should not have dispensed with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
However, there remains no issue regarding illegal dismissal. The CA likewise
adhered to the finding of illegal dismissal.
In spite of the consistent finding that petitioner was illegally
dismissed, respondents did not take issue, which thus renders all
pronouncements on the matter final. It is already settled that petitioner’s
employment was illegally terminated. As a result, his wages as well as
allowances were withheld without valid and legal basis.
(2) In resolving petitioner’s monetary claims, the CA utterly misinterpreted the
Court’s ruling in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Skippers Maritime Services, Ltd. The
Court did not agree and hence modified the judgment in said case. It held
that, following the wording of Section 10 and its ruling in Marsaman Manning
Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, when the illegally
dismissed employee’s employment contract has a term of less than one year,
he/she shall be entitled to recovery of salaries representing the unexpired
portion of his/her employment contract.
It is not disputed that private respondent’s employment contract in the instant
case was for six (6) months. Hence, we see no reason to disregard the ruling
in Marsaman that private respondent should be paid his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.

Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the

unexpired portion of his six-months employment contract, or equivalent to
four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay
and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his
employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package.
These benefits were guaranteed to be paid on a monthly basis, and were not
made contingent.

As we have time and again held, "it is the obligation of the employer
to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the
salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases,
to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed
and had not stopped working."
JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted.
No. 109835. November 22, 1993] The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but there is no
15 Aug such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
Ponente: CRUZ, J. inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.
FACTS:

Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor

Relations Commission citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the
Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the
case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only
to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and
a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in
escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance
with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, “to primarily answer for
valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims.” The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond
and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by
Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to

perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

RATIO:

Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that
the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of

rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Under the petitioner’s interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be
Office of the Solicitor General v. CA and Municipal Government of Saguiran,
Lanao del Sur
Facts:
The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for
mandamus4 filed with RTC of Lanao del Sur by the former members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong, Amrosi
Macote Samporna, Alanie L. Dalama, Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S.
Rataban. Therein petitioners sought to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to
pay them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid
terminal leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999. The
Municipality of Saguiran sought the trial court’s dismissal of the petition
through its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition on the ground that the act being
sought by therein petitioners was not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained
that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary
process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. The
Municipality of Saguiran partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. The
OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required
memorandum, explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in
connection with the case. It asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such
documents within which to file the required memorandum. On April 23, 2010,
the OSG’s motion was denied by the CA on the ground that the relief sought
was not among the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. The OSG was
instead given a non-extendible period of 90 days from notice within which to
file the memorandum. OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion12 requesting to
be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority
to represent the Municipality of Saguiran but it was denied.
Issue:
The Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in compelling the OSG to represent the municipal
government of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur in its lawsuit.
Held:
Meritorious. OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code must be
construed taking into account the other statutes that pertain to the same
subject of representation in courts. As the Court explained in Philippine
Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation:
Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to
the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or
particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.
The rule is expressed in the maxim, “interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi,” or every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are
authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the mandate
of a local government unit’s legal officer.
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions
of a local government unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the
lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court
proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is
exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail
over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a
general law on the subject matter.
Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions which
obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran.
The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension
of time to file the required memorandum could not have estopped it from later
raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality of
Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the
OSG could have validated an act that was beyond the scope of its authority.
[G.R. No. 106588. March 24, 1997.] RAUL H. SESBREÑO , Petitioner, v. interpretation could not have been intended by the law. It is a familiar rule in
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and THE CITY statutory construction that" (t)he legal provision being therefore susceptible
ASSESSOR OF CEBU CITY, Respondents. Raul S. Sesbreño in his own of two interpretations, we adopt the one in consonance with the presumed
behalf. The Solicitor General for Respondents. intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and
beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective
FACTS: On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan and harmonious with other provisions of law." Section 24 merely lays down
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 the general rule that assessments under PD 464 are to be given prospective
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City 3 and described in the deed of application. It cannot be construed in such a manner as to eliminate the
sale as follows: "A parcel of land (Lot 308 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), imposition of back taxes. If Section 24, instead of Section 25, were made to
with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu (formerly apply as suggested by petitioner, he would in effect be excused from the
Municipality of Cebu), containing an area of Forty Nine (49) square meters, payment of back taxes on the undeclared excess area of his property. The
more or less . . . A parcel of land (Lot 309 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), Court, clearly, cannot allow a taxpayer to evade his obligation to the
with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an government by letting him pay taxes on a property based on its gross
area of Forty Eight (48) square meters, more or less . . ." The conveyance undervaluation at P60,000.00, when the same had then a current market
included "a residential house of strong materials constructed on the lots value of P449,860.00.
above-mentioned" located in Cebu City. Thereafter, petitioner declared the
real property constructed on the said lots for purposes of tax assessment as
a residential house of strong materials with a floor area of sixty (60) square
meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was assessed by
Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-20454
at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00.
During a tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field
inspectors of the Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real property
declared has excess portion not declared by the petitioner that's why when
they re-assessed the property value, it increased to P499,860.00, of which
the petitioner protested for being "excessive and unconscionable". The
petitioner claims that Respondent CBAA err in considering the issue of back
taxes, the same being closely related to an error properly raised. The
Respondent CBAA applied Section 25 of PD 464 which had authorized the
imposition of back taxes. The petitioner claims that Section 25 of PD 464
"refers solely to real estate declared for the first time and does not apply to
the area which, upon revision, has been shown to be in excess of that which
was formerly declared." The CBAA held that the area in excess of that
declared by the taxpayer was deemed declared for the first time upon its
discovery.

ISSUE: Is Respondent CBAA gravely erred in misinterpreting or misapplying

Section 24 and 25 of P.D. 464.

HELD: No, the CBAA is correct in interpreting and applying Section 24 and
25 of P.D. 464. If Section 24 is the only applicable provision in cases where a
taxpayer has eluded the payment of the correct amount of taxes for more
than nine (9) years, as in this case, Section 25 of PD 464 which requires the
payment of back taxes will be rendered superfluous and nugatory. Such
LALICAN v. HON. VERGARA, et al.

G.R. No. 155634, April 27, 2000

FACTS

Lalican was charged with violating Section 68 of PD 705 for possessing

without lawful authority of permit, 1,800 board feet of assorted species and
dimensions of LUMBER on 2 passenger jeeps with a value of P14,000.
Lalican claimed that the law is “vague and standardless” as it does not
specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws
and regulations. Hence, the information should be quashed as it violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE

whether a charge of illegal possession of “lumber” is excluded from the crime

of illegal possession of “timber” as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705 to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense
or a “nonexistent crime.”

RULING

No, to exclude possession of “lumber” from the acts penalized in Sec. 68

would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed
as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted
as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an
inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. The phrase “forest
products” is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
manufactured timber.
(refer to PDF) The provi sions of the former law which nationalize the retail business.

KING vs HERNAEZ Itchong Case

MACARIO KING, ET AL., peti tioners-appellees, vs . PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ISSUE

ETC., ETAL., respondentsappellants.
I s th e employmen t o f a l iens i n n o n- contro l p os ition in a re tail e s tabl
FACTS i shment o r

Macario King, a naturalized Filipino ci tizen Import Meat and Produce" Tra d e prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
Philippine Cold Stores,
RULING
Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce
Yes , i t is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law(X
And Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and )unconsti-right of employer to
mandamus(Court of First
Choose Th e nation ali zatio n o f an e co nomic measu re when fou nded o n
Ins tance of Manila) gro unds o f

Wri t of preliminary P u b l ic p o l icy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s u n j u s t , a r b i t r a r y o r

oppressiveor
Appeal __
C o n t r a r y t o t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n because i ts aim is merely to further
(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180 the material progress
No p e rs on wh o i s n o t a ci ti zen o f th e Ph i l ippines , a nd n o as so And welfare of the citizens of a country. I nd eed, in natio nali z ing
ciatio n, employmen t in re tai l
P a rtn e rship , o r corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by ci Tra d e th e ri ght o f ch oice o f an employer i s n ot impai red b u t i ts sp
tizens of the here i s me rely
Phi l ippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: . ." L imi ted to th e ci ti zens to th e e xclus ion o f th ose o f other nationalities.
emphasis supplied)(x) Fal l s wi thin the
Merely to ban them from i ts ownership and not from i ts management control S co p e o f p ol ice p ower, th ru which a nd b y wh ich th e S tate insures i ts
or operation. existence and
(Anti -Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republ ic Security and the supreme welfare of its citizens
Act
WH E R E F O R E , t h e d e c i s i o n a p p e a l e d f r o m i s r e v e r s e d
No.134) . T h i s p r e l im i n a r y
Wh i ch seek s "to p u ni sh acts o f evas ion o f th e l aws o f natio nali zatio I n j u n c ti o n i ssued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 i s hereby
n o f ce rta in lifted. The petition for
Ri gh ts , f r a n c h i se s o r p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i o n w Mandamus is dismissed, with costs against appellees.
ith

T h e R e t a i l T r a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy Law would punish acts

intended to circumvent

MACARIO KING v. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, GR No. L-14859, 1962-03-31
Facts:
Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the owner of the
business establishment known as "Import Meat and Produce" a grocery
wholesale and retail business, previously owned by the Philippine Cold
Stores, Inc... he sought permission from the President of the Philippines to
retain the services of the three Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A
of Commonwealth Act 108
Secretary of Commerce... and Industry. This official recommended to the
President the disapproval of King's request on the ground that aliens may not
be appointed to operate or administer a retail business under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 1180 which requires that its capital be wholly owned by...
citizens of the Philippines,... President approved the recommendation of the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry since... the positions of purchaser and
salesmen occupied by the three Chinese employees are not technical
positions... employment of the three Chinese as salesmen and purchaser in
the store of Macario King is a violation of Section 1 of the Retail Trade Act...
which provides that only citizens of the Philippines can engage in retail trade,
as well as of Section 2-A of the Anti-Dummy Law which prohibits Chinese
citizens to intervene in the management, operation, administration or control
of such business, whether as an officer,... employee or laborer with or
without remuneration.
Chinese employees are not technical men who are exempted from the
operation of the law, and even if they are, they need the authorization of the
President which they failed to obtain in... their case.
lower court entered judgment holding "that petitioner Macario King may
employ any person, although not a citizen of the Philippines or of the United
States of America, including the three petitioners herein as purchaser and
salesmen, in any position in his... retail business not involving participation,
or intervention in the management, operation, administration or control of
said business; that petitioners Lim Pin, Chang Pak and Ng See Keng are
entitled to continue as purchaser and salesmen, respectively, in Macario
King's Import
Meat and Produce
With regard to the Retail Trade Law, this Court had already occasion to rule
on its constitutionality. We held that the same is valid and that its purpose is
to completely nationalize the retail trade in the Philippines
The nationalization... of retail trade is, therefore, complete in the sense that it
must be wholly owned by a Filipino citizen or Filipino controlled entity in order
that it may be licensed to operate.
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice,... creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions;
that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of
the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish
the National Rice and Corn
Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies
We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens
retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and
powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in
the communities and big centers of population. They... own no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or
emergency.
translate the general preoccupation of the Filipinos against the threat and
danger to our national economy caused by alien dominance and control of
the retail... business by weeding out such threat and danger and thus prevent
aliens from having a strangle hold upon our economic life.
the issue was posed whether the prohibition to aliens from engaging in such
trade is intended merely to ban them from its ownership and not from its
management, control or operation. However, from the context of the... law as
well as from the decision of this Court in the Ichong case, it may be safely
inferred that the nationalization of the retail trade is merely confined to its
ownership and not its management, control, or operation.
Read in connection with the Retail Trade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would
punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions... of the former law which
nationalize the retail business.
three Chinese petitioners testified that they had nothing to do with the
management and control of the business, nor do they participate in its
profits... outside of their monthly salaries. They had been employed long
before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1180. They only wait for customers
and sell according to the prices appearing on the tags previously fixed by
their manager Macario King. They desire to continue in the employ... of
Macario King in his business and their job is their only means of earning
support for themselves and their families. Lim Pin who is employed as buyer
declared that his duties include no more than buying the groceries appearing
in a list prepared and given to him from time to... time by Macario King and at
no more than the prices indicated in said list.
pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law postulates that... aliens cannot
be employed by Filipino retailers except for technical positions with previous
authority of the President, and it is contended that Macario King had in his
employ his Chinese co-petitioners for a period of more than 2 years in
violation of Section 2-A of Republic
Act No. 134. Hence, respondents contend, due to their breach of the law
petitioners have forfeited their right to file the present action for declaratory
relief.
Issues:
Is the employment of aliens in non-control positions in a retail establishment
or trade prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
Ruling:
do not intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of
the retail establishment of Macario King they are not covered by the Anti-
Dummy Law.
there... is nothing in the Retail Trade Law which prohibits a Filipino-owned
retail enterprise from employing an alien and the dummy law merely limits
the prohibition to any position that relates to management, operation,
administration or control, petitioners contend that they may be... allowed to
continue in their positions without doing violence to both the Retail Trade
Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
Filipino citizen has a right under the Constitution and the laws of this
Republic to engage in any lawful business, to select, pick and employ
anyone who in his opinion may be amenable, congenial, friendly,
understanding and profitable to his... business provided that they are not
criminals, say communists, or affected by some contagious disease or
morally unfit.
circumstances surrounding the enforcement of the Retail Trade Law being
the very foundation of the Anti-Dummy Law the same circumstances that
justify the rejection of counsel's proposition in the Ichong case should also
apply with regard to... the application of the Meyer case in the consideration
of the unconstitutionality of the Anti-Dummy Law.
alien petitioners were already in the employ of the establishment known as
"Import Meat and Produce" previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores,
Inc. when Macario King acquired the ownership of said establishment and
because of the doubt he... entertained as regards the scope of the prohibition
of the law King wrote the President of the Philippines to request permission
to continue said petitioners in his employment, and immediately after the
request was denied, he instituted the present petition for declaratory... relief.
It cannot, therefore, be said that King has already breached the law when he
filed the present action.
Principles:
The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retail trade by denying
its ownership to any alien, while the other limits its management, operation,
administration and control to Filipino citizens. The prevailing idea is to secure
both the ownership and management of... the retail business in Filipino
hands.
If a Filipino citizen has the right to employ any person in his business, has a
naturalized citizen the same rights? We hold and sustain that under the
Constitution and... laws of this country, there is no difference between a
natural-born citizen and a naturalized citizen, with the possible exception, as
provided by the Constitution, that while the former can be President, Vice-
President or member of Congress, the latter cannot. But outside of... these
exceptions, they have the same rights and privileges.
This premise has no foundation in law for it confuses the right of employment
with the right of association embodied in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
Section 1, paragraph 6, of said Bill of Rights, provides that "the right to form
associations or societies... for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be
abridged", and this has as its main purpose "to encourage the formation of
voluntary associations so that thru the cooperative activities of individuals the
welfare of the nation may be advanced.
It is respondents' theory that a complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper
if filed after a contract or statute has been breached. The law does not even
require that there shall... be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there
is a breach of the law, or an actionable violation, to bar a complaint for
declaratory judgment
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, et al. vs. HONORABLE
BIENVENIDO V. REYES G.R. No. 127708. March 25, 1999
FACTS:
After the Escudero franchise under Act No. 3648 was transferred to MERAL
CO, PD. 551 was enacted and provides that the franchise tax shall be 2% of
the gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature i
mposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
Pursuant to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known a
s the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo imposing a tax on business enj
oying a franchise, at a rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts, which
shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the prece
ding calendar year within the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of non-
impairment clause when the City of San Pablo imposed a local franchise tax
pursuant to the LGC upon MERALCO considering that under PD 551 the tax
paid is in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by a
ny national or local authority on savings or income
RULING:
No. The phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory langua
ge of the Local Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of
such exemptions, privileges, and that upon the effectivity of the Local Govern
ment Code all exemptions except only as provided therein can no longer be i
nvoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.
There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-
impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked to uphold Meralco’s exempti
on from the local tax. Legislative franchise under Act No. 3648 provided that t
he franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to amendm
ent, or repeal by the Congress of the United States. Also, under the 1935, th
e 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted exc
ept under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or re
peal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or w
ithout the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a r
easonable exercise of the police power; they are also subject to alteration by
the power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted away.
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs Reyes
305 SCRA 353 [GR No. 127708 March 25, 1999]
Facts: Act 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Service Company a legislative
franchise to maintain and operate an electric light and power system in the city
of San Pablo and nearby municipalities. Section 10 of said act provides:
In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall
pay unto the municipal treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying
electric current to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to two percentum
of the gross earning from electric current sold or supplied under this franchise
in each said municipality. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall
be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind nature or description levied,
established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial or
insular, now or in the future, or its pole wires, insulator, switches, transformers,
and structures, installations, conductors and accessories placed in and over
and under all public property, including public streets and highways, provincial
roads, bridges and public squares, and on its franchises, rights, privileges,
receipts, revenues and profits from which taxes the grantee is hereby
expressly exempted.
Escudero’s franchise was transferred to the plaintiff MERALCO under RA
2340.
On October 5, 1992, the sangguniang panlungsod of San Pablo City enacted
ordinance no. 56 otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San
Pablo. Pursuant to sec 2.09 article D of the said ordinance, the petitioner city
treasurer sent to private respondent a letter demanding payment of the
aforesaid franchise tax.
Issue: Whether or not the city of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax
to MERALCO.
Held: Yes. A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law
by mere implication unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest and it must
be convincingly demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and to the premptory language of the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. of such exemption privileges.

It is our view that petitions correctly rely on the provisions of sections 137 and
193 of the LGC to support their position that MERALCO’s tax exemption has
been withdrawn. The explicit language of section 137 which authorizes the
province to impose franchise tax not withstanding any exemption granted by
law or other special law is all encompassing and clear. The franchise is
imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under special law.

Sec 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By

stating that unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed all persons whether natural or
juridical, including GOCCs except: 1.) local water districts; 2.) Cooperatives
duly registered under RA 6938; 3.) Non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
education institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the
obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the 3 enumerated entities. It is a
basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act or consequences excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterus. In the absence of any provision of
the code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any existing
tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by the MERALCO under the existing law
was clearly intended to be withdrawn.

Reading together section 193 and 137 of the LGC conclude that under the
LGC, the local government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not
excluding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar
year based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction.
The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privilege only enjoy and an existing law
or charter is clearly manifested by the language used in sections 137 and 193
categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions
enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to
enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or
privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general withdrawal of such
exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been
used.

It is true that the phrase “in lieu of all taxes” found in special franchises has
been held in several cases to exempt the franchise holder from payment of tax
on its corporate franchise imposed of the internal revenue code, as the charter
is in the nature of a private contract and the exemption is part of the
inducement for the acceptance of the franchise, and that the imposition of
another franchise tax by the local authority would constitute an impairment of
contract between the government and the corporation. But these “magic
words” contained in the phrase “shall be in lieu of all taxes” have to give way
Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal

Case No. 280

G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989)

Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for
failure to

deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends
that the

case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board and

not the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD
1344)

HELD:

The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument

relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should
prevail.

LATIN MAXIM:

1, 20c, 50
 Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals, and Developmentt Bank of the Philippines
185 SCRA 751
May 1990
FACTS:
For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada
(spouses Fiestan) to pay their mortgage indebtedness to respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the latter was able to acquire at
a public auction sale on August 6, 1979 the parcel of land (Lot No. 2-B
covered by TCT No. T-13218) that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur
after extrajudicial foreclosure of said property. The Provincial Sheriff issued a
certificate of sale that same day which was registered on September 28 in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Earlier, or on September
26, spouses Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was
likewise registered on September 28, 1979. When spouses Fiestan failed to
redeem their parcel of land within the 1 year period which expired on
September 28, 1980, the Register of Deeds cancelled their title over the
subject property and issued TCT No. T-19077 to DBP upon the latter’s duly
executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership.
On April 13, 1982, the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria, so the Register of
Deeds of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBP’s title over said property and issued TCT
No. T-19229 to Peria’s name, who later secured a tax declaration for said lot
and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He thereafter mortgaged said lot
to the PNB-Vigan Branch as security for his loan of P115,000.00. Since the
spouses Fiestan were still in possession of the property, the Provincial
Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises, but instead of leaving, they filed
a complaint in the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur for annulment of sale, mortgage
and cancellation of transfer certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City,
PNB-Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds of
Ilocos Sur.
The lower court dismissed said complaint, declaring valid the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the DBP and its
subsequent sale to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage
constituted in favor of PNB-Vigan. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed
said decision. The spouses Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on the ground that the Provincial
Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without first effecting a levy on said
property before selling the same at the public auction sale.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to acquire by purchase the subject property?
COURT RULING:
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court reiterated that the formalities of a
levy, which the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to comply with,
are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can
be sold at public auction. The spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails
over the case are par. (2) of Article 1491 and par. (7) of Article 1409 of the
Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction either in person or through the mediation of another,
the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them
unless the consent of the principal has been given. However, the Supreme
Court ruled that the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that
contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but
is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own
protection, as provided under Section 5 of Act No 3135, as amended, which
is a special law that must prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law.
Even in the absence of statutory provision, there is authority to hold that a
mortgagee, and in this case the DBP, may purchase at a sale under his
mortgage to protect his own interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to
a third person at a price below the mortgage debt.
DIONISIO FIESTAN v. CA, GR No. 81552, 1990-05-28
Facts:
Records show that Lot No. 2-B was acquired by the DBP as the highest
bidder at a public auction sale on August 6, 1979 after it was extrajudicially
foreclosed by the DBP in accordance with Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, for failure of petitioners to pay their
mortgage indebtedness.
Issues:
The nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale in the instant case is further
sought by petitioners on the ground that the DBP cannot acquire by purchase
the mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of par. (2) of
Article 1491 and... par. (7) of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits
agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction either
in person or through the mediation or another, the property whose
administration or sale may have been entrusted to them unless... the consent
of the principal has been given.

Ruling:

Under Act No. 3135, as amended, a mortgagee-creditor is allowed to

participate in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions as any
other bidder, as in the case at bar, thus:

"Section 5. At any sale, the creditor, trustee, or other person authorized to

act for the creditor, may participate in the bidding and purchase under the
same conditions as any other bidder, unless the contrary has been...
expressly provided in the mortgage or trust deed under which the sale
made."

Needless to state, the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that

contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by theagent but
is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own...
protection.

Principles:

The prohibition mandated by par. (2) of Article 1491 in relation to Article 1409
of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case where the sale of the
property in under dispute was made under a special power inserted in or
attached to the real... estate mortgage pursuant to Act. No. 3135 as
amended.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling.

FACTS: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all ISSUE:
games of chance.
W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to enact ordinances
to prevent and suppress gambling and other games of chance. Cagayan de Oro are valid.

STACON: These two should be harmonized rather than annulling one and HELD:
upholding the other. Court said that the solution to this problem is for the The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amusements and
government units to suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling except those
that are allowed under the previous law Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree. Under
the

LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling

and

other prohibited games of chance.” Since the world “gambling” should be

read as

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of
chance,
Case No. 158
must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflict between
G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) P.D. 1869

Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130 and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but
to give
FACTS:
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino gambling is authorized
PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in by P.D.
order
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic nullified by
organizations,
a mere ordinance.
religious elements, women’s and youth groups, and even the local officials
angrily LATIN MAXIM:

denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two 5a, 9c, 11e, 28, 37, 38, 50

ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue

that by

virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod

may

prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, peti requi rement that the ordinances should not contravene a s tatute is
tioners, obvious.Casino gambling i s

vs . authorized by P.D. 1869. Thi s decree has the status of a statute that cannot
be amended or
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION, nul lified by a mere ordinance. Hence, i t was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of
FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro Ci ty to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a buildings for the
casino in Cagayan de
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
Oro Ci ty. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble casinos. For all their
arose when in 1992, flush
prai seworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
with i ts tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand i public policy announced
ts operations to
therein and are therefore ultra vi res and void.
Cagayan de Oro Ci ty.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro Ci ty was swift
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
and hostile. On December 7, 1992, i t enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was
this all. On January 4, MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE
ORO, petitioners,
1993, i t adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the vs.
ordinances before the Court PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
of Appeals, where i t was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
chal lenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
the ordinances invalid
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city
and i ssued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an
affront to the welfare of the city.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.
HELD: No
To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and
suppress, among equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Christmas season.
others , "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 AN
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
law.The rationale of the CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT
FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR
PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Nor was this all.
On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13,
1993. The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because
they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling
is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself.
ISSUE: WON The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant
with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
HELD:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity
of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only
by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the
propriety of gambling.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of
the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a
word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that
since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of
chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which,
like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation
of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
21 - De Castro v JBC
FACTS:
This case has several petitioners ranging from Senators, Lawyers, Chairmen,
and concerning organizations all questioning the same thing: the principal
legal question of whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. The question is
undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the nation
because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most
important appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and
Art. VIII, Sec. 9.
Considering, Art. VII, under Executive Department,
Art. VII, Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a president or acting president shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. In relation to Art. VII, under Judicial Department,
Art. VII, Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
courts shall be appointed by the president from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the judicial and bar council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the president shall
issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010,
just 7 days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art.
VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in
the Judiciary.
RULING/HELD:
NO. We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the
matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been
resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. The decision of March 17, 2010
has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We
cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any
unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
LAPID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov.
Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials with alleged dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
allegedly having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and
collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control
slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry
material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection
thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner for
misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension
without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the
assailed decision of the Ombudsman.
Proceeding from the premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not
yet been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and
mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely
implementing the assailed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing
upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.
HELD:
NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of
public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that
the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one
month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence,
immediately executory. The clear import of these statements taken together is
impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the
one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision.
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution
pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for
such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion.[28]
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code
of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the
three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a
principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply
to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other.[29] In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner
could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before
the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before the
Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however,
that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone
which should govern his case.
Libanan vs. HRET (283 SCRA 520 - 1997)
Nature: Special Civil Action in the SC. CertiorariFacts:
• May 28, 1997: HRET affirmed proclamation of Jose Tan Ramirez as duly
elected rep of Eastern Samar over Marcelino Libanan
• Libanan filed an election protest before HRET claiming, among other things,
that the May 8, 1995 elections were marred by massive electoral irregularities
perpetrated by Ramirez and his followers.
• Libanan prayed for HRET to issue an order to annul election and
proclamation of Ramirez and thereafter so proclaim him as duly elected
Representative of Samar.
• HRET said ballots had the required COMELEC watermarks and were thus
valid.
• Petitioners said the absence of the signature of the chairman of BEI deemed
ballots void.
Issue: WON HRET committed GAD in ruling that the absence of the signature
of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious
Held: NO! Failure of the BEI to sign the ballot shall constitute an election
offense. However, ballot shall not be considered invalid. There is really nothing
in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall
thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman
accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.Where the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should
be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity
in the words, there should be no room for construction.It merely renders BEI
Chairman accountable for such failure. (Section 24 of RA 7166) Authenticating
marks may be any of the following:
a) COMELEC watermark
b) Signature or initials or thumbprint of Chairman of BEI
c) Presence of red and blue fibers
QUIJANO vs. DBP G.R. No. L-26419 October 16,1970
FACTS:
A petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was
filed by petitioners-appellants (Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenia T. Quijano)
to compel respondent-appellee (Development Bank of the Philippines) to
accept said petitioners-appellants’ back pay certificate payment for their loan
from the said appellee Bank.
It further compelled the respondent-appellee to restrain the ex-officio sheriff
of the province of Misamis Occidental from proceeding with the scheduled
foreclosure sale of the real properties mortgaged by appellant spouses to
appellee Bank.
That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the
herein respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500
That the petitioners’ urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board
Resolution No. 2533 on April 30,1953
That the mortgage contract was executedby the petitioners in favor of the
respondent-bank on March 23, 1954.
That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other
releases were made subsequent thereafter
That on July 27, 1965, petitioner (as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181)
wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of
P14,000 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank
That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of
the non-acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred
before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of
the approval of Republic Act No. 897
RULING:
The Court ruled that the obligation was subsisting at the time of the approval
of Republic Act No. 897 since it was availed only when they executed the
mortgage contract in March 23, 1954 and received the installments
thereafter.
RATIONALE:
The Court cited the pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the
aforementioned Back Pay Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 897 on
June 20, 1953.
It is clearly stated here that the provisions expressly require the obligations –
for which certificates of indebtedness may be accepted as payments of –
must be subsisting at the time of the approval of R.A. 897. Should back pay
certificates be offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of an
obligation which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said
amendatory Act on June 20, 1953, the corporation may not legally be
compelled to accept such certificates.
In the appellants’ case, the approved loan was availed only about nine (9)
months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the corresponding
releases were received only after the execution of the mortgage contract
dated March 23, 1954. Therefore, only after the corresponding amounts were
released to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach
thereby affirming that the said loan was not subsisting at the time of the
approval of Republic Act 897 on June 20, 1953.
Despite the appeal by the appellants that a more liberal construction of the
law would enable “many crippled or disabled veterans, or their wives and
orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or
contributed to the cause of war” which was the purpose of the said law, the
Court ruled that there is no room for interpretation or construction in the clear
and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. The
Court’s first and fundamental duty is the application of law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
Therefore, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, the said law
still limited the applicability of the back pay certificates to “obligations
subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act” and therefore obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18,1948 cannot be considered.
ENRILE V SALAZAR
186 SCRA 217
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of
arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed
coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set
for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was
then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus
questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against
him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the
landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion
cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the
proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion –
which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him. He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty
minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile
claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have
been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s
office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a
warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause
has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling
should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the
case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there
was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the
Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be
complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said
law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution).
That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the
Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because
courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law
(which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it
stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder.
Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with
rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an
hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was
raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a
voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is
sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason
to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single
circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed
FLORESCA V PHILEX MINING CORP
136 SCRA 141
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in
that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex,
in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et
al have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed
for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they
may have not availed of such a remedy. But, if in case they’ll win in the lower
court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the
WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by
the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the
law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter
of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life
SALENILLA V COURT OF APPEALS 169 SCRA 829
FACTS:
On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to
Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay
their loan,
the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by
Private
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the
property
under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the
property
disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property.
Respondent
also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based
on
Monge et al. vs. Angeles.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said
Act.
2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed.
Held:
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction
made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners’
contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.
With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale
and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be
different.
For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the
expiration of
the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed
Rolando Canet v. Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004
I. The Facts:
Petitioner Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while
Respondent Julieta Decena was the Mayor. Canet was allowed to operate and
maintain a Cockpit in Bula as per Resolution No. 049. In 1999, the
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 001, regulating the operation of
cockpits and other related game-fowl activities in Bula and providing penalties
for any violation to its provisions which was denied by Decena because it does
not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting and other related game-fowl
activities and a separability clause. The Sangguniang Bayan resolved to shelf
the Ordinance indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Canet filed an application for mayor's permit but was was denied
by Decena on the ground that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the
authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the
Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as
there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the
same. Citing Resolution No. 049, allowing him to operate a cockpit, and local
municipal tax ordinances, which generally provides for the issuance of a
mayor's permit for the operation of businesses, Canet sued Decena and
sought to be given permit.
II. The Issue:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled
to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner without a municipal
ordinance that would empower her to do so.
III. The Ruling:
No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor's permit would not only be a
violation of the explicit provisions of Sec. 447 of the Local Government Code
of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on respondents
administrative prerogatives. Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing
the operation of a cockpit, Resolution No. 049, authorizing Canet to establish,
operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be
implemented. Also, the municipal tax ordinances relied upon by Canet contain
general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do not contain
specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be pain in the operation
of cockpits and other game fowl activities. Even on the assumption that there
is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court
presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by a judicial fiat.
GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)
People vs. Jabinal
FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of
the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the
requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment
as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with
authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs.
Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the
latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that
“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”
— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to
his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished
for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
 in 1 installment, the penalty for delinquency should be computed starting the
QUIMPO V. MENDOZA day after the due date when the tax payer should have paid.
00 SCRA 00
GUERRERO, AUGUST 31, 1981 Disposition. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner
to pay to the City Treasurer of Cagayan de Oro City the amount of P116.00
NATURE representing full payment of the last installment of P100.00 on the realty tax
petition to review on certiorari for the year 1969 and the tax penalty of P16.00 for eight months of his
delinquency from January, 1970 to August, 1970; and ordering said City
FACTS Treasurer to accept the aforesaid payment, issue the official receipt therefor
-Quimpo, an owner of a building in CDO, was assessed P20k for 1969, P400 and a tax clearance certificate covering the aforementioned real estate tax
annual realty tax payable in 4 equal installments. Quimpo was able to pay and penalty. No costs. Judgment modified. SO ORDERED.
the first 3 monthly installments but was not able to pay the last installment.
-On August the following year, he wanted to pay P124.00 (P100 tax due +
P24 penalty) to Mendoza, the City Treasurer of CDO, but Mendoza required
him to pay P196 (P100 + P96 penalty based on City Charter of CDO).
Quimpo consigned P124 with Clerk of Court then instituted mandamus with
damages against Mendoza in CFI
-CFI: dismissed based on Padilla v. City of Pasay and City Treasurer
1. Pay P96 penalty = 2% of original tax which is P400
2. no authority to entertain suit for failure of Quimpo to comply with provisions
of Charter of CDO on payment of tax

ISSUE (relevant lang, ung iba remedies and damages na eh)

WON the basis for computing the tax penalty should be the tax payable for
the said year or only the installment unpaid

HELD
Only base deficiency on unpaid installment
Ratio. We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the
interpretation of tax statutes that such statutes are construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic,
fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act
faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is allowed by law
to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due and payable on four
specified dates and having paid the first three (3) installments faithfully and
religiously, it is manifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to
penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth and last installment.
Reasoning. Padilla v. City of Pasay not applicable to the case as the said
case was decide before RA 5447 took effect in January 1, 1969. Petitioner
was being assessed real property tax for 1969 so RA 5447 applies to the
petitioner already. RA 5447 amends city charters by providing that real
property tax is due and payable in 4 equal installments. Thus, each
installment is due and payable on or before a specified statutory limit. Default