TC32 R

3RD FACULTY OF LAW(INTRA) MOOT COURT COMPETITON, 2018-19 TC - 32
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME SPECIAL COURT OF ASNARD
44
AND IN THE MATTER OF:
HPC Ltd., & Amy Santiago………………………………..Applicant.
V.
Steve Rovers………………………………………………Respondent.
Civil case under Sections 17 of Asnard Contract Act and Section 21 of

Constitution of Asnard.
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
Most Respectfully Submitted To the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Asnard.

Team code- 32.
3RD FACULTY OF LAW(INTRA) MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018-19 TC-32
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................................3.
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................4-6.
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................7.
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................................8.
5. ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………………………………………….9.
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................10-11.
7. PLEADINGS.........................................................................................................................12-30
I. Whether fraud was committed by Mr. Steve Rovers under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872?..............................................................................................................................12-16.
II. Whether the contract dated 14th august 2017 voidable at the option of Mr. Tony
Snark?...........................................................................................................................16-21.
III. Whether Mr. Steve Rovers is liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her
husband and her consequent loss of livelihood?.................................................21-25.
IV. Whether Mr. Steve Rovers being the supplier and service provider of LPT machines, is
liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of contract?...........................26-30.
8. PRAYER........................................................................................................................31.
2|Page
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
§ - Section
& - And
Addl. - Additional
AIR - All India Reporter
All - Allahabad High Court
Alias - Also Known as
Anr - Another
Art. - Article
Co. - Company
Del - Delhi High Court
ed. - Edition
Govt. - Government
HC - High Court
Hon’ble - Honourable
Ld. - Learned
NCT - National Capital Territory
OLR - Orissa Law Review
Ors - Others
PC - Privy Council
PM - Prime Minister
RI - Rigorous Imprisonment
SC - Supreme Court
SCC - Supreme Court Cases
SI - Simple Imprisonment
u/s - Under Section
v. - Versus
3|Page
INDEXOF AUTHORITIES
I. CASE LAWS CITED
S. NO. CASE CITATION CITED ON

PAGE NO.
1. Bhagwandas metals ltd. V. M/S 14th June 2011
Raghavendra agencies
2. M/S Arosan enterprises ltd. V. AIR 1999 SC3804
union of India &Anr
3. State of Andhra Pradesh v M/S AIR1990 AP 294
Associated Engineering enterprises
4. State of Kerala & Anr v. 2007(3) CTC 329
M.A.Mathai
5. C.V. George &company v. M/S 1983 MLIR 525
Marshall sons (manufacturing ltd.)
6. Muhammad Habidullah v. Bird and AIR 1992PC 178
company
7. P. Radhakrishna murthy v. NBCC (2013) 3SCC747
Ltd.
8. J.G. engineers (P) ltd. V. Union of (2011)5SCC758
India
9. Kourfas v. C.Czarnikow ltd. (1969)1A(350)
10. Gray v. Barn (1971)2A11ER949(CA)
11. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854)9EX 341

12. Victoria laundry (Windsor)ltd. V. (1949)2KB528
Newman industries ltd.
13. State of Kerala V. K. Bhaskaran AIR 1985 Ker49(para12)
14. The University of Madras V. Shanta AIR1954 Mad 67
Bai
15. Reichest V. Gen Ins. Co. of Am 442P 2D 337
16. Amen v. mercede cnty title co. 58 Cal 2d 528 (1962)
17. Dachner v. Union lead mining & 65Nev 313 (1948)

smelter co.
18. Keifi v. metro life ins. Co. 797 f.supp. 2d 1072
19. Laguerre v. Nev. Sys. Of higher 2011 WL 3444 202 (D,Nev)

educ.
20. May v. Anderson 119P.3d1254,1257,121Nev.668,672(2205)
21. Bradley v. Nev.-Cal.-Or. Ry. 178 P.906,908(1919)
22.
23.
24.
4|Page
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
5|Page
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
II.BOOKS REFERRED
• BASU DAS DURGA:INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Lexis
Nexis India.
• J.N. PANDEY , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Central Law Agency, Allahabad.
• M.P. SINGH, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow.
• M.P. JAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed., 2010), Lexis NexisButterworths
 ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT, Oxford university press.
 THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, R.K. Bangia.
III. DICTIONARIES REFERRED
1. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 2002) US: West Group

2. P. RamanathaAiyar’s Concise Law Dictionary (4th ed. 2012) New Delhi: Lexis Nexis
ButterworthsWadhwa
3. Wharton’s Law Lexison(15th ed. 2011) New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co.
Pvt. Ltd.
IV. STATUTES REFERRED
1. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872
2. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
6|Page
VI. WEBSITES REFERRED
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.the-laws.com
3. www.jstor.com
4. www.scconline.com
5. www.jcconline.com
7|Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction. In addition, Article 32 of
the Constitution gives an extensive original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in regard to
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari to enforce them. The Supreme Court has been conferred with power to direct
transfer of any civil or criminal case from one State High Court to another State High Court
or from a Court subordinate to another State High Court. The Supreme Court, if satisfied that
cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before it and
one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and that such questions are
substantial questions of general importance, may withdraw a case or cases pending before the
High Court or High Courts and dispose of all such cases itself. Under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, International Commercial Arbitration can also be initiated in the
Supreme Court.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked by a certificate granted by the
High Court concerned under Article 132(1), 133(1) of the Constitution in respect of any
judgement, decree or final order of a High Court in both civil and criminal cases, involving
substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Appeals also lie to the
Supreme Court in civil matters if the High Court concerned certifies : (a) that the case
involves a substantial question of law of general importance, and (b) that, in the opinion of
the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has also a very wide appellate jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals
in India in as much as it may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause
or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India.
Under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules the Supreme Court may review its judgment or
order but no application for review is to be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the
grounds mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal
proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.
8|Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS
HPC Ltd. (2012), a leading company owned by Mr. Tony Snark enjoys absolute monopoly
W.R.T. ‘Lobanza’ capsule in DSA (Asnard) and this capsule is prescribed by doctors for
reducing addiction for narcotic substances and if it is in taking while consuming narcotic
substances it may cause death. Tony Snark and Steve Rovers were childhood friend (resident
of Dorne). Steve designed his own machine named LPT (labzo pharma tech), it increases
production of medicines (also lobanza) by 5 times and at a cheaper rate and its market value is
$10M. HPC Ltd. Purchased LPT on 4thjune 2017 and LPT proved to be boon for HPC, it
increases production at higher rate than they thought and due to this HPC Ltd. On 14 th Aug
2017 enters into agreement for 3 more LPTs and Steve agreed for delivery in 5 days, once the
machines assembled and repaired but LPTs delivered in 9 days and HPC used 1LPT for
manufacture other medicine. Mr. Pablo Escocar, was janitor in govt. school in state of
Riverrum prone to drugs and smoking saw advertisement of a medicos about lobanza capsule
and because his wife Mrs. Amy Santiago constantly pushing him to quit all that , he bought
Lobanza but he didn’t refrain from smoking. A week prior to sale of 3 LPTs on 14 thaug 2017,
Mr. Steve received a report from auditor about certain patent defects but he failed to disclose
to HPC Ltd. And consequently HPC Ltd. Encountered frequent problem with few LPTs on 22nd
oct. 2017, all machine malfunctioned and Mr. Tony appoints Mr. Steve and his tech team for
repair due to this few instances of illness were reported but no serious medical catastrophe had
occurred. After 8 days of consumption, Mr. Pablo died and his wife went into mental trauma
because he was sole bread owner, no one helps her and due to lack of awareness she wasn’t
aware of cause of her husband’s death. Mr. tony ,aggrieved by huge loss found about Mr.
Pablo’s death and requested his wife for joining the suit against Mr. Steve which he initiated
for fraud and breach of contract before dorne district court for compensation of $100M and she
agreed to join, claiming a part for her livelihood
Case was transferred from district court to HC due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and HC
dismissed the suit on the ground of sufficient merit after that HPC Ltd. Appealed before SC of
Asnard.
9|Page
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
Whether fraud was committed by Mr. Steve Rovers under section 17 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872?
It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court that the accused on account of delay in the
delivery made full payment in a go. HPC Ltd. has already purchased one machine on 4 th june
2017, and LPT consequently proved to be a boon for HPC Ltd. and significantly increased the
production of lobanza at a higher rate than before. Owing to the efficiency and productivity of
the machine, Mr. Snark planned to buy few more machines.
II.
Whether the contract dated 14th august 2017 voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark?
It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court that the accused never committed fraud so
the contract could not be said to be voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark. As discussed
in the opening paragraph of the Judgment as per Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
in a contract, where time is essence, if the promisor fails to do the thing promised at or before
the specified time, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed becomes voidable
at the option of the promisee. The principle laid down in 3rd Part of Section 55 of the
Contract Act, 1872, clearly applies to the facts and circumstances of this case and hence in
the light of the above context this Court is of firm view that the plaintiff has not been suffered
damages on account of the belated delivery of the LPTs machines. It is also established that
the production of the plaintiff's company was not at all affected by the delay in delivery of
LPTs. Since, the plaintiff, who has been complaining of breach of the contract has not
suffered legal injury in the sense of sustaining loss or damage, there is nothing to compensate
him for; there is nothing to recompense, satisfy or make amends. Therefore, he will not be
entitled to compensation.
10 | P a g e
III
Whether Mr. Steve Rovers is liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her
husband and her consequent loss of livelihood?
It is humbly submitted that Mr. Rovers is not liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the
death her husband as it was a damage which could not be foreseen and so no due care could
be taken for this damage
IV
Whether Mr. Steve Rovers being the supplier and service provider of LPT machines, is
liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of contract?
It is humbly submitted that Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for
breach of contract as a contract is a written or spoken promise, or series of promises, between two
parties. Each party to a contract promises to perform a certain duty or pay a certain amount. The
agreement is meant to be legally enforceable, so that each party will have legal recourse if the
agreement isn’t kept. A breach of contract occurs when the agreement is not kept, because one party
to the contract does not fulfill their obligation according to its terms. In our case there was no breach
of contract as the contract that they entered was for sale and purchase of machines only.
11 | P a g e
PLEADINGS
Whether fraud was committed by Mr. Steve Rovers under section 17 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872?
It is most respectfully submitted that the accused cannot be held liable for fraud under sec 17
of the Indian contract act,1872. It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court that the
accused on account of delay in the delivery made full payment in a go. HPC Ltd. has already
purchased one machine on 4th June 2017, and LPT consequently proved to be a boon for HPC
Ltd. and significantly increased the production of lobanza at a higher rate than before. Owing
to the efficiency and productivity of the machine, Mr. Snark planned to buy few more
machines.
1.1.Essentials of the offence of fraud:Fraud defined —‘Fraud’ means and includes

any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his
connivance, or by his agent1, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his
agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:— —‘Fraud’ means and
includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his
connivance, or by his agent1, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his
agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract.
 the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to
be true,
 the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
 a promise made without any intention of performing it;
 any other act fitted to deceive;
 any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.
Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to
enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that,
regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or
unless his silence, is, in itself, equivalent to speech. Illustration
 A sells, by auction, to B, a horse which A knows to be unsound. A says nothing to B
about the horse’s unsoundness. This is not fraud in A. (a) A sells, by auction, to B, a
13 | P a g e
horse which A knows to be unsound. A says nothing to B about the horse’s

unsoundness. This is not fraud in A."
Thus mere silence is not fraud on the part of Mr. Steve Rovers as he was not even
sure about the defect because their had been no problem so far and the machine was
quite efficient and productive so far, as everyone says including Mr. Snark.
1.2.Relevant case :
In the case of Bhagwandas Metals Ltd vs M/S.Raghavendra Agencies1 , it was held that the
factual matrix of the case of the parties to the suit may be summarized in short as follows:
The suit is filed by the plaintiff for recovery of money to the tune of Rs.61,48,000/- with
interest at 24% per annum from the defendants towards damages for the breach of contractual
obligations on the part of the defendants
The whole case has been revolving around the proviso to Section 55 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872. For the better adjudication of this case, it may be appropriate to extract Section 55
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter it may be referred to as the Act). Section 55 of
the Act reads as follows:
Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential:-
When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time,

or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or
before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed,
becomes voi1dable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was
that time should be of the essence of the contract.
The scope and application of Section 55 of the Act is that if a party to a contract fails
to do a certain thing, which he promises to do at or before a specified time the
contract becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties
was that time should be of the essence of the contract.
The contract does not become voidable by the failure of a party to a contract to do such
thing, if it was not the intention of the parties to a contract that time should be of the essence
1
14th june, 2011.
14 | P a g e
of the contract. In such case the promisee is entitled to get compensation from the promisor
for any loss incurred by himself by such failure.
If a promisor fails to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts
performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim
compensation for any loss incurred by the non-performance of the promise, unless at the time
of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
As discussed in the opening paragraph of the Judgment as per Section 55 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872, in a contract, where time is essence, if the promisor fails to do the thing
promised at or before the specified time, the contract or so much of it as has not been
performed becomes voidable at the option of the promisee. As contemplated in 3rd Part of
Section 55, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform
his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time
other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by
the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance,
he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
The principle laid down in 3rd Part of Section 55 of the Contract Act, 1872, clearly applies
to the facts and circumstances of this case and hence in the light of the above context this
Court is of firm view that the plaintiff has not been suffered damages on account of the
belated delivery of the BOCBs. It is also established that the production of the plaintiff's
company was not at all affected by the delay in delivery of BOCBs. Since, the plaintiff, who
has been complaining of breach of the contract has not suffered legal injury in the sense of
sustaining loss or damage, there is nothing to compensate him for; there is nothing to
recompense, satisfy or make amends. Therefore, he will not be entitled to compensation.
1.3.Fiduciary relationship: In such a relation good conscience requires

the fiduciary to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest of the one who
trusts. A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of
another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of
trust and confidence.
As in our case Mr. Steve Rovers and Mr. Tony Snark were childhood friends and residents of
the district of Dome. HPC Ltd. was largely owned by Mr. Tony Snark and LPT machine was
designed by Mr. Steve Rovers and because of their friendship Mr. Rovers sold LPT machines
15 | P a g e
to him at the cost of $10 M which was the cost of the machine during its testing phase. Owing
to its uniqueness and success of this machine across the country , and the cost of production
incurred in producing such a comprehensive technology, the market value of LPT post its
testing phase shot up to $10 M.
Now coming back to the agreement on 14th august 2017, the price for the 3 machines still
remain the same to $ 30 M.
Thus relying on the above arguments there was no fraud committed by Mr. Steve Rovers .
II
Whether the contract dated 14th August 2017 voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark?
It is submitted that the accused (Mr. Steve Rovers) has not committed any fraud or
misrepresentation which would render the contract voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark.
Section 55 of Indian Contract Act: It says so that Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time,
in contract in which time is essential.—When a party to a contract promises to do a certain
thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do
any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been
performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was
that time should be of the essence of the contract. —When a party to a contract promises to do
a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and
fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has
not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the
parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract." Effect of such failure when time
is not essential.—If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of
the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before
the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss
occasioned to him by such failure. —If it was not the intention of the parties that time should
be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do
such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from
the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure." Effect of acceptance of
16 | P a g e
performance at time other than that agreed upon.—If, in case of a contract voidable on account
of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts
performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim
compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time
agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention
to do so.—If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his
promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other
than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-
performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives
notice to the promisor of his intention to do so."
In the case of M/S. Arosan Enterprises Ltd vs Union Of India & Anr2, it was held that if it
was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the
contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified
time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned
to him by such failure. If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure
to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise
at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss
occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of
such acceptance, he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so."
Incidentally the law is well settled on this score on which no further dilation is required in
this judgment to the effect that when the contract itself provides for extension of time, the
same cannot be termed to be the essence of the contract and default however, in such a case
does not make the contract voidable either. It becomes voidable provided the matter in issue
can be brought within the ambit of the first paragraph of Section 55 and it is only in that
event that the Government would be entitled to claim damages and not otherwise. In Pollock
& Mulla's Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts, three several cases have been very lucidly
discussed, where time can be termed to be the essence of contract:
1. Where the parties have expressly stipulated in their contract that the time fixed for
performance must be exactly complied with.
2
16th September 1999.
17 | P a g e
2. Where the circumstances of the contract or the nature of the subject matter indicate that
the fixed date must be exactly complied with and
3. Where time was not originally of the essence of the contract, but one party has been guilty
of undue delay, the other party may give notice requiring contract to be performed within
reasonable time and what is reasonable time is dependant on the nature of the transaction and
on proper reading of the contract in its entirety.
In the contextual facts, the Division Bench relied on the Telex messages of the seller, as
noticed above, as a representation against cancellation but the fact remains that there was in
fact a definite indication of expression of stand of the Government as regards the withdrawal
of the letter of cancellation. The issue arises as to the true effect of the withdrawal of the
cancellation. Incidentally on the factual score it appears that after withdrawal of the first letter
of cancellation the Government again for the second time cancelled the Agreement by a letter
dated 25th January, 1990 to the following effect:
1. "Your attention is invited to the contract mentioned above for supply of 58000 MTs of
imported sugar, Clause 3 whereof stipulates that the seller shall arrange shipment of the entire
quantity so as to reach Indian ports, basis coast as per Clause 4(1) ibid not later than 31st
October, 1989
2. As you have failed to fulfil the contractual obligation within stipulated time and the time
being the essence of the contract, the contract is hereby cancelled at your risk and cost
3. The performance Bank Guarantee tendered with reference to the above contract is also
forfeited for the reasons mentioned above."
There is therefore, a cancellation of an agreement which once stood canceled and withdrawn:
can it be termed to be an otherwise valid termination after recalling of the letter of
cancellation in the month of November, 1989.
The High Court has dealt with the entire correspondence in extenso between the parties
during this interegnum and as such we refrain ourselves from dealing with the same in detail,
suffice it to record that as a matter of fact from the date of recalling of the cancellation letter,
there were consistent reminders about the dispatch instruction, about the arrival of vessels
18 | P a g e
and as to the port of landing which were for the Respondents herein, to fix, in terms of the
Agreement but there was a total silence from the Respondent's end.
Admittedly and there cannot possibly be any doubt as regards the cancellation of Agreement
on the expiry of the time if the time is treated to be the essence of the contract, but in the
contextual facts when as a matter of fact, there was a letter of cancellation in terms of the
contract and assuming by reason of failure to supply as per the Agreement between the
parties - but that cancellation stands withdrawn. There is, therefore, a waiver of the breach if
there be any, as regards non- performance of the contract and it is on this score that the High
Court has gone wrong on the issue of duty to speak and it is on this score that the
presumption of the High Court to the effect that the cancellation was on the representation of
the seller, is totally unwarranted. Fixation of a future date of performance in the absence of
any evidence by the Appellate Court, is not only unjustified but wholly untenable in law.
Court cannot possibly fix a date on its own for performance of the contract. It is thus
necessary to detail out herein below the observations of the Appellate Court on this count.
The Appellate Court in paragraph 29 of the judgment observed as below:
"29. The delivery was to be effected by 31st October, 1989. On the representation of the
seller as contained in their messages dated 8th and 9th November 1989 the cancellation was
withdrawn. That is the only conclusion possible. Any other conclusion will be wholly
erroneous. We therefore, cannot accept the submission that the withdrawal of cancellation
was not on the representation of the seller. On this view the respondents were bound in law to
accept delivery if effected by 14th/15th November, 1989. It is implicit that the buyers had
consented to take delivery by 14th/15th November, 1989. The contention of learned counsel
for the seller that the mention of 31st October, 1989 by the respondents in letter dated 25th
January, 1990- also shows that the respondents did not treat 14th/15th November, 1989 as the
extended delivery date cannot be accepted. Since delivery was not made at all, the mention of
31st October, 1989 in the letter of cancellation (25th January, 1990) by itself would not show
that the buyer did not treat 14th/15th November, 1989 as delivery date. It thus cannot be said
that the cancellation was on non-existent grounds. The contract also stipulates that the buyer
may extend the delivery period at a discount as may be mutually agreed to between buyer and
seller. In this state of affairs the further contention that the supply could not be made by
14th/15th November, 1989 on account of non amendment of the delivery period in the
contract and non amendment of letter of credit cannot be accepted. This plea is clearly an
19 | P a g e
afterthought. Our attention has not been drawn to any legal proposition which casts an
obligation, under these circumstances, on the buyer to fix a fresh date of delivery. The effect
of accepting the contention of the seller would be that prior to 8th November, 1989, on the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the breach was on the part of the seller but the
buyer having withdrawn the cancellation and not having specified the fresh date of delivery,
31st October, 1989 having already passed, the breach would be on the part of the buyer. The
contention on the face of it is fallicious. It has to be rejected."
It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court that the accused never committed fraud so
the contract could not be said to be voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark. As discussed
in the opening paragraph of the Judgment as per Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
in a contract, where time is essence, if the promisor fails to do the thing promised at or before
the specified time, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed becomes voidable
at the option of the promisee. As contemplated in 3rd Part of Section 55, if in case of a
contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the time
agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed,
the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of
the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the
promisor of his intention to do so.
In the case of Bhagwandas Metals Ltd vs M/S.Raghavendra Agencies3 ,it was held that effect
of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon.- If, in case of a contract
voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the
promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the
promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the
promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the
promisor of his intention to do so. Obviously, the plaintiff had not issued any notice to the
defendants of his intention of claiming compensation.
In this connection, the learned counsel for the defendants has submitted that the failure on the
part of the plaintiff in not giving notice of his intention of claiming compensation prior to
16.08.1995 or at the time of delivery of BOCBs on 16.08.1995, would not entitle him to
3
14th june 2011.
20 | P a g e
claim any compensation as he was disqualified from claiming compensation from the
defendants. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the following decisions:
1. State of Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Associated Engineering Enterprises4, 2.State of Kerala and
another vs. M.A. Mathai5, 3. C.V. George and Company vs. M/s. Marshall Sons
(Manufacturing) Ltd.6, 4. M/s. Arosan Enterprises Ltd., vs. Union of India and another7, 5.
Muhammad Habidullah vs. Bird and Company8, In State of Andhra Pradesh v. M/s.
Associated Engineering Enterprises9, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Paragraph 20 has held as follows: "20. The first aspect to be noticed in this behalf is that the
contractor did not choose to terminate the contract on account of the Government's delay in
handing over the sites. He requested for, and agreed to extension of the period of contract,
and completed the work. It is not the respondent's case that while agreeing to extension of the
period of the period of contract he put the Government on notice of his intention to claim
compensation on that account. Section 55 of the Contract Act reads thus:- (extracted supra)"
In Paragraph No.21 it is held as follows: "21. According to this Section, it was open to the
respondent to avoid the contract on account of the Government's breach of promise to deliver
the sites at a particular time; but, he did not choose to do so, and accepted the delivery of sites
at a time other than what was agreed upon between them earlier. If so, he is precluded from
claiming compensation for any loss occasioned by such delay, unless, of course, at the time
of such delayed acceptance of the sites, he had given notice to the Government of his
intention to claim compensation on that account. It must be remembered that this provision of
law was specifically referred to, and relied upon in the counter filed by the Government to the
respondent's claim before the arbitrator. But, it is not brought to our notice that the contractor
had given such a notice (contemplated by the last sentence in Section 55). We must make it
clear that we are not entering into the merits of the decision of the arbitrator. What we are
saying is that such a claim for compensation is barred by law, except in a particular specified
situation and inasmuch as such a particular specified situation is not present in this case, the
claim for compensation is barred. It is well settled that an arbitrator, while making his award,
has to act in accordance with law of the land, except in a case where a specific question of
4
AIR 1990 AP 294
5
2007 (3) CTC 329
6
1983 MLJR 525
7
AIR 1999 SC 3804
8
AIR 1992 PC 178
9
AIR 1990 AP
21 | P a g e
law is referred for his decision." In State of Kerala and another vs. M.A.Mathai10, while
writing the Judgment on behalf of a Division Bench His Lordship Hon'ble JUSTICE
Dr.ARIJIT PASAYAT has held in Paragraph No.8 as follows: "8.If, instead of avoiding the
contract accepts the belated performance of reciprocal obligation on the part of the employer,
the innocent party i.e. the contractor, cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by
the non-performance of the reciprocal promise by the employer at the time agreed, "unless, at
the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so". Thus, it
appears that under the Indian law, in spite of there being a contract between the parties
whereunder the contractor has undertaken not to make any claim for delay in performance of
the contract occasioned by an act of the employer, still a claim would be entertainable in one
of the following situations: (i) if the contractor repudiates the contract exercising his right to
do so under Section 55 of the Contract Act, (ii) the employer gives an extension of time either
by entering into supplemental agreement or by making it clear that escalation of rates or
compensation for delay would be permissible, (iii) if the contractor makes it clear that
escalation of rates or compensation for delay shall have to be made by the employer and the
employer accepts performance by the contractor in spite of delay and such notice by the
contractor putting the employer on terms."
III
Whether Mr. Steve Rovers is liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her
husband and her consequent loss of livelihood?
It is humbly submitted that Mr. Rovers is not liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the
death her husband as it was a damage which could not be forseen and so no due care could be
taken for this damage
Section 73 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872
73. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.—When a contract has
been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who
has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which
naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew,
10
2007 (3) CTC 329
22 | P a g e
when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. —When a contract
has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party
who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby,
which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties
knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it." Such
compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by
reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those
created by contract.—When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been
incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is
entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had
contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract. —When an obligation resembling
those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured
by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in
default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract."
Explanation.—In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means
which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract
must be taken into account.
As stated in the provisions relating to damages under the Indian Contract Act 1872, one of
the vital requirements for an award of damages is that the loss or damage “arose in the usual
course of things from such breach; or parties knew that such a loss or damage could
subsequently arise at the end of the time of entering into the contract.”11 Thus, the defendant
would not be liable for damages that are remote to the breach of contract.
“Breach of contract” constitutes the pre-condition for a claim of damages, be it liquidated,

unliquidated or otherwise. Thus, irrespective of the extent to which the defendant profits from
the contractual arrangement, there can be no claim for damages unless there is a breach of the
contract. Further, the party committing the breach is liable to compensate by way of damages.
To establish a breach, it has to be adjudicated upon and be proved, and not merely decided by
the parties.12
11
Indian Contract Act 1872, s 73
12
. P Radhakrishna Murthy v. NBCC Ltd. (2013) 3 SCC 747; J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd., v. Union of India (2011)
5 SCC 758
23 | P a g e
The House of Lords in England in Kourfos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd.13 has enunciated the
following principles: “In case of breach of contract, the aggrieved party is only entitled to
recover such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably
foreseeable as liable to result from the breach........ What was at that time reasonably so
foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the parties or at all events, by the
party who later commits the breach........ For this purpose, knowledge ‘possessed’ is of two
kinds: one imputed, the other actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the
‘ordinary course of things and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of
contract in that ordinary course.’ But to this knowledge which a contract breaker is assumed
to possess whether he actually possesses it or not, there may have to be added in a particular
case -knowledge which he actually possesses, of special circumstances outside the ‘ordinary
course of things’ of such a kind that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable
to cause more loss.”
For a claim of damages and affixing liability, there has to be causal connection between the
breach committed and the loss or injury suffered. This causal connection is said to have been
established if the act of the defendant amounting to breach of the contract is the only “real
and effective” cause in relation to the injury or damage for which damages are claimed; in the
presence of multiple causes, the “dominant and effective” cause is to be taken into
consideration.14
Establishment of causation would not conclusively, make the defendant liable where the
injury caused is too “remote” to the breach of contract or not foreseeable or where the
contractual terms provide for exclusion of the liability of the defendant under the given
circumstances. Additionally there may be cases, where the flow of causation is broken by
external causes like those by third parties or acts of nature or by acts of the plaintiff himself
or otherwise. In cases where there is contributory default or negligence of the plaintiff, he
would be disentitled from claiming damages. This would depend on the consideration of the
facts and circumstances. This can be related with the principles of equity that “He who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.”
13
(1969) 1 A.C. 350
14
Yorhhire Dale Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Minister of War Transport, The Coxwold [1942] 2 All ER 6 at 9-10 per
Viscount Simon LC (HL); Gray v. Barr [1971] 2 All ER 949 (CA)
24 | P a g e
In the landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale15, the principle governing remoteness of

damages was elaborated. The rules enunciated in this case were that a party injured by a
breach of contract can recover only those damages that either should “reasonably be
considered... as arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things” from the
breach, or might “reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”16
In circumstances where it is evident that the defendant has not assumed such risk as
contemplated under the special circumstances under the terms of the contract or that any
reasonable man would not have assumed such risk, then mere knowledge of the special
circumstances would not make the defendant liable for the corresponding loss or injury.17
Reiterating the finding in Hadley v. Baxendale18, the following principles of remoteness and
foreseeability were enunciated in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v. Newman Industries
Ltd19: “In cases of breach of contract, the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part
of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable
to result from the breach. What was at that time reasonably so foreseeable, depends on the
knowledge then possessed by the parties or, at all events, by the party who later commits the
breach. For this purpose, knowledge ‘possessed’ is of two kinds: one imputed, the other
actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the ‘ordinary course of things’ and
consequently, what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in that ordinary course.
This is the subject matter of the ‘first rule’ in Hadley v. Baxendale20. But to this knowledge,
which a contract-breaker is assumed to possess whether he actually possesses it or not, there
may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which he actually possesses, of special
circumstances outside the ‘ordinary course of things,’ of such a kind that a breach in those
15
. (1854) 9 EX 341
16
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 EX 341
17
H. G. Beale (ed.). Chitty on Contracts (28th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 1999) 1296
18
(1854) 9 EX 341
19
[1949] 2 KB 528
20
(1854) 9 EX 341.
25 | P a g e
special circumstances would be liable to cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of
the ‘second rule’ so as to make additional loss also recoverable.”21
This can be summed by referring to the observation made by the Kerala High Court that:
“The defendant is liable only for natural and proximate consequences of a breach or those
consequences which were in the parties’ contemplation at the time of contract… the party
guilty of breach of contract is liable only for reasonably foreseeable losses - those that a
normally prudent person, standing in his place possessing his information when contracting,
would have had reason to foresee as probable consequences of future breach.”22
As per the facts, A research was conducted by Prof. Aldus Humbledore at the University of
Hemsworth on the ‘Lobanza’ Capsule. His Research Paper titled ‘Effects of Lobanza on
humans’ stated that:
“Adults who are prone to drugs, smoking, and tobacco are generally prescribed Lobanza
Capsule by doctors, who reiterate that the capsule has no side effects. The capsule, however,
is not advisable only for those who are prone to various forms of allergy. Consumption of the
same by any such person may cause severe neurological damage.”
Mrs. Amy Santiago, wife of Mr. Pablo Essar, had been constantly pushing him to get rid of
his drug addiction and smoking habit as soon as possible. Mr. Pablo bought and started
consuming Lobanza Capsule each day after subscribing to the advertisement on that hanging
banner. However, he couldn’t refrain from smoking.
On certain occasions, HPC Ltd. encountered frequent problems with few LPT Machines, and
unfortunately on 22nd October 2017 all machines malfunctioned. Mr. Tony appointed Mr.
Steve and his tech-team for the repair. Few instances of illness were reported amongst a few
people but no serious medical catastrophe had occurred.
Unfortunately, Mr. Pablo’s health started deteriorating rapidly, but he still couldn’t refrain
from smoking. As a consequence, he died after eight days of consumption of the capsule. Due
to a sheer lack of awareness in such small districts, Ms. Amy wasn’t aware of the causes that
21
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1949] 2 KB 528
22
State of Kerala v. K. Bhaskaran AIR 1985 Ker 49 (para 12)
26 | P a g e
lead to her husband’s untimely death, and was oblivious to the legal ramifications of what
had recently transpired.
Thus, it is evident from the facts that death of Pablo Escocar is a remote and indirect loss or
damage which was not foreseeable and neither the same was intended. And moresoever the
actual cause of death of Mr. Pablo Escocar is unknown. Therefore respondent is not liable to
compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her husband and her consequent loss of
livelihood.
3.2 NO CONTRACT FORMED
Sec. 10 of The Indian Contract Act,1872-What agreements are contracts
All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to
contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly
declared to be void.
Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in [India], and not hereby expressly
repealed, by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of
witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents.
Mr. Escocar saw the advertisement of Lobanza capsule on a banner across both sides of the
road. The banner contained a blurry 3-D image of the Lobanza capsule and stated the
following:
“Lobanza Capsule- Lifeline for drug addicts, smokers, and tobacco consumers. Please
contact Riverrun Medicos for the capsule situated on the border of State of Westeros and
other states.”
Mrs. Amy Santiago, wife of Mr. Pablo Essar, had been constantly pushing him to get rid of
his drug addiction and smoking habit as soon as possible. Mr. Pablo bought and started
consuming Lobanza Capsule each day after subscribing to the advertisement on that hanging
banner. However, he couldn’t refrain from smoking.
Unfortunately, Mr. Pablo’s health started deteriorating rapidly, but he still couldn’t refrain
from smoking. As a consequence, he died after eight days of consumption of the capsule.
Thus, as evident from the fact there was no contract between Amy Santiago or Pablo Escocar
and Steve Rovers, and therefore there is no question of breach of contract and liability of Mr.
Steve Rovers for the consequential loss of livelihood of Ms. Amy Santiago.
27 | P a g e
3.3 NO CLAIM FOR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD AGAINST PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
“The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles together constitute the conscience of the
Constitution.”23 It is primarily against the might of the State that the individuals need
protection, Article 12 is the key to Part III and unless an authority can be said to be a ‘State’
within the meaning of Article 12 none of the provisions of Part III which relate to the
‘State’willapply to such authority.24The objective behind defining state was to provide an
impetus to the effective enforcement of fundamental rights.25
The doctrine of state action is not defined in the Indian Constitution rather it is implied in
Article 12 of which defines State for the purpose of Part III. It enumerates a list of authorities
against which fundamental rights can be enforced by invoking the writ jurisdiction if
Supreme Court and High Court. As per the Article, State includes the Government and
Parliament of India and government and legislatures of each state in India. It also includes
local and other authorities within the territory of India and local and other authorities under
the control of Government of India.26
23
GLANVILLE AUSTIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 50 (1985).
24
The University of Madras v. ShantaBai A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 67 (In this case the question was whether
the direction issued by the University to its affiliated college to prevent it from admitting girl students
was valid or not. The direction was given because the college lacked facilities to be accommodating
girls. It was alleged by the respondent college that the direction violated Article 15 (1) and 29 of the
Constitution).
25
VII CONSTITUTION ASSEMBLY DEBATES 607-610 (1948) (While initiating a debate on this
Article in the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar described the scope of
this Article and the reasons why this Article was placed in the Chapter on fundamental rights.
According to him the object of fundamental rights is twofold firstly, to enable every citizen to claimthose rights
secondly, and to make it binding upon every authority. He insisted on the retention of
Article 12 so that the fundamental rights could be claimed against anybody or authority exercising
power over the people).

26
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 12 (“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State'
includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and, the legislature of each of
28 | P a g e
Therefore, Steve Rover is not liable for the loss of livelihood of Ms. Santiago as he does not
owe the duty to provide for her livelihood and thus she cannot claim for means of livelihood
from Steve Rovers.
IV
Whether Mr. Steve Rovers being the supplier and service provider of LPT machines, is
liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of contract?
It is humbly submitted that Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for
breach of contract as a contract is a written or spoken promise, or series of promises, between two
parties. Each party to a contract promises to perform a certain duty or pay a certain amount. The
agreement is meant to be legally enforceable, so that each party will have legal recourse if the
agreement isn’t kept. A breach of contract occurs when the agreement is not kept, because one party
to the contract does not fulfill their obligation according to its terms.
A breach can occur if a party fails to perform within the time frame specified in the contract,
does not perform in accordance with the terms of the agreement, or fails to perform
whatsoever.
If one party fails to perform while the other party fulfills her duties under the contract, the
performing party is entitled to legal remedies for breach of contract.
The following are different types of contract breaches:
 Minor Breach: a minor breach occurs when one party “substantially performs,” or
meets the essential obligations of the contract, but does not meet a condition that is
minor and does not affect the contract terms. This is also known as a partial breach.
 Material Breach: A material breach is a substantial breach in contract terms usually
excusing the non-breaching party from performing and giving her the right to sue for
damages.
the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India.”).
29 | P a g e
o For example, in a home purchase contract, a seller refusing to give the buyer
the keys to the home after the buyer has completed all contract terms is a
material breach.
 Fundamental Breach: This occurs when one party violates the contract terms so
egregiously that the other party may terminate the contract (as well as seek damages).
 Anticipatory Breach: Contracts generally have set dates on which “performance,” or
fulfillment of the contract’s obligations, are required.
o If one of the parties commits a breach prior to that time, then they have
committed an anticipatory repudiation, or anticipatory breach. If this occurs,
the non-breaching party may immediately consider the contract breached, and
take legal action.
The elements for a claim of breach of contract are:
1. Valid contract (offer, acceptance, consideration) exists between plaintiff and defendant;
2. Defendant breached the contract or failed to render performance when it became due;
3. Defendant’s breach or failure of performance was unexcused;
4. All conditions precedent to defendant’s duty to perform were fulfilled by plaintiff or were
excused;
5. Plaintiff was damaged by the breach;
6. Causation and damages were a forseeable consequence of a particular breach (causation is an
essential element of liability).
In the case of Reichert v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am.,27 Amen v. Mercede Cnty. Title Co., 28Dachner v.
Union Lead Mining and Smelter Co.,29 is says that a contract is an agreement or creation of a duty
between two or more parties, with mutual assent and sufficient legal consideration, which the law can
provide a remedy in case of breach.
In order to establish a claim of breach of contract, the plaintiff must show four elements: (1)
formation of an enforceable contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance (or excuse of the
performance); (3) defendant’s material breach; and (4) resulting damages. In the case
of Keife v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 30; Laguerre v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ.,31 says
27
442 P.2d 337
28
58 Cal. 2d 528(1962)
29
65 Nev. 313(1948)
30
797 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1076 (D. Nev. 2011)
31
2011 WL 3444202 ( D.Nev.)
30 | P a g e
that Without a valid and enforceable contract under law, one cannot establish a claim for
breach of a contract. “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the
law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 132 (1981). There are many essential elements
to a valid and enforceable contract, such as, “an offer and acceptance, meeting of the minds,
and consideration;” adherence to the statute of frauds; express and implied terms of a
contract; and legal capacities of parties. May v. Anderson, 33 see David G. Epstein, Bruce A.
Markell & Lawrence Ponoroff, (2d ed., Lexis 2006). For the focus of this material, the
element of the “meeting of the minds” is most noteworthy because it directs courts to the
contract’s material terms.
In May v. Anderson, the court held that the parties’ settlement agreement was a valid
contract, even with a party’s refusal to sign the agreement, because essential terms of a
release, which was material to the agreement, was agreed upon in advance. May v.
Anderson,. The court decided that agreeing to the terms of release, which was material to
the agreement, was enough to prove that there was a valid contract with the “meeting of the
minds,” with or without the party’s signature of agreement.
Of course, one may only enforce a contract if one is himself in compliance with the
contract. A plaintiff can claim breach of contract only after fulfilling his or her duties and
obligations unless there is an excuse to the performance. “If there is anything well settled, it
is that the party who commits the first breach of the contract cannot maintain an action
against the other for a subsequent failure to perform.” Bradley v. Nev.-Cal.-Or. Ry.34, “Full
performance of a duty under a contract discharges the duty.” Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 235 (1981). In order for the plaintiff to raise a claim, he or she must fulfill
“nothing less than full performance.”
No further claims can be made by the appellant once the contract is completed. The contract
that they entered upon was for the sale and purchase of lpt machines and the contract was
completed as the machines were delivered and payment by the appellant was made.
32
1981
33
119 P.3d 1254, 1257, 121 Nev. 668, 672 (2005)
34
178 P. 906, 908 (1919).
31 | P a g e
So there is no liability to compensate Mr Rovers on the part of Mr. tony snark, as the contract
was fulfilled and there was no breach of contract.
All of this is most respectfully submitted
32 | P a g e
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts of the case, the arguments advanced, the authorities cited
and the evidences on record, it is most respectfully prayed before this hon’ble Supreme Court
of Sessions that by the power vested in it by virtue. It may be graciously pleased to:
I. ACQUIT the accused against all charges under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
II. ACQUIT the accused against all charges under the Constitution of India.
AND/OR
Pass any other order as it deems fit in the light of justice, equity and good conscience.
Place: Asnard. S/d ______________
Date: 16th November, 2018 (Counsels for the respondent)

TC32 R

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

TC32 R

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

3RD FACULTY OF LAW(INTRA) MOOT COURT COMPETITON, 2018-19 TC - 32

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME SPECIAL COURT OF ASNARD

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

HPC Ltd., & Amy Santiago………………………………..Applicant.

Civil case under Sections 17 of Asnard Contract Act and Section 21 of

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Most Respectfully Submitted To the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Asnard.

husband and her consequent loss of livelihood?.................................................21-25.

I. CASE LAWS CITED

S. NO. CASE CITATION CITED ON

11. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854)9EX 341

17. Dachner v. Union lead mining & 65Nev 313 (1948)

19. Laguerre v. Nev. Sys. Of higher 2011 WL 3444 202 (D,Nev)

21. Bradley v. Nev.-Cal.-Or. Ry. 178 P.906,908(1919)

• BASU DAS DURGA:INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Lexis

• J.N. PANDEY , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Central Law Agency, Allahabad.

• M.P. SINGH, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow.

• M.P. JAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed., 2010), Lexis NexisButterworths

 ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT, Oxford university press.

 THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, R.K. Bangia.

III. DICTIONARIES REFERRED

1. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 2002) US: West Group

IV. STATUTES REFERRED

1. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

VI. WEBSITES REFERRED

the machine, Mr. Snark planned to buy few more machines.

1.1.Essentials of the offence of fraud:Fraud defined —‘Fraud’ means and includes

horse which A knows to be unsound. A says nothing to B about the horse’s

Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential:-

When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time,

1.3.Fiduciary relationship: In such a relation good conscience requires

Section 73 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872

“Breach of contract” constitutes the pre-condition for a claim of damages, be it liquidated,

In the landmark case of Hadley v. Baxendale15, the principle governing remoteness of

3.2 NO CONTRACT FORMED

Sec. 10 of The Indian Contract Act,1872-What agreements are contracts

3.3 NO CLAIM FOR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD AGAINST PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

power over the people).

liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of contract?

The following are different types of contract breaches:

The elements for a claim of breach of contract are:

was fulfilled and there was no breach of contract.

All of this is most respectfully submitted

Place: Asnard. S/d ______________

Date: 16th November, 2018 (Counsels for the respondent)

Potrebbero piacerti anche