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(PARTIAL) COMPILATION OF CRIMINAL LAW CASES PENNED BY JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE

4-Manresa, S.Y. 2018-2019

Abad

People of the Philippines vs Nestor Ano y Del Remedios


G.R. No. 230070 | March 14, 2018

RA 9165 – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; Section 5 – Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. It is
likewise essential for a conviction that the drugs subject of the sale be presented in court and its identity established with moral
certainty through an unbroken chain of custody over the same. In cases like this, the prosecution must be able to account for each
link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.

Section 21 – Chain of Custody

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs in order to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved. Under the said section, prior to
its amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination purposes. In the case of People v. Mendoza, the
Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public
official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

Exceptions to the Chain of Custody Rule

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21of RA 9165
may not always be possible. In fact, IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030-
provide that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not
automatically render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court
explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.

Richard A. Cambe vs Office of the Ombudsman


G.R. Nos. 212427-28/ G.R. Nos. 212694-95/ G.R. Nos. 212794-95 / G.R. Nos. 213477-78 / G.R. Nos. 213532-33 / G.R. Nos. 213536-
37 / G.R. Nos. 218744-59 / G.R. Nos. 212014-15 | December 6, 2016

Criminal Procedure; Plunder and RA 3019; Probable Cause


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Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief." Thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.
In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the accused are required, not absolute certainty." In this case, the petitioners were charged with
the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as
amended, has the following elements:

(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in
Section 1 (d) thereof; and
(c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)of RA 3019 are:

(a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
(c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence of these elements is required. Jurisprudence
teaches us that in dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is "merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
person charged should be held responsible for it." It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence." Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level." Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings." In this
light, this Court has ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper. To
stress, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only
after a full-blown trial on the merits.

Priority Development Assistance Fund; Forgery

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the
findings of the x x x prosecutor on the issue of forgery should be ventilated in a full-blown trial. This is highlighted by the reality that
the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must
conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the
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disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to
be genuine. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio
Azores and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the PDAF documents in their
handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "without the original document containing the
alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that "[a] comparison based
on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results." Furthermore, it may
not be amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be tested. They still have to
authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution should also be given a chance
to properly contest Azores and Pagui's findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own handwriting experts
during trial to rebut such findings.

Priority Development Assistance Fund; Conspiracy

The testimonies of the whistle-blowers which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman - are, in fact, the most integral
evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla
was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Enrile, and Sen. Estrada
were explicitly implicated to have dealt with Napoles in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that the whistleblowers had
personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation
and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial
transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs'
accounts.

Criminal Law; Plunder; Conspiracy

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistle-blowers’ testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials,
and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause
against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF
amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue
prejudice to the government.

That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the
offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in
the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired
with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the systematic pillaging of Sen.
Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to the
involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that one of the person charged of the crime only prepared the
money and did not deliver the same as he claims, the act of preparation is still connected to the common objective of the
conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause for the crime charged.

Acosta
People of the Philippines Vs. Marcelino Crispo y Descalso alias "Gogo" and Enrico Herrera y Montes G.R. No. 230065. March 14,
2018

Criminal Liability extinguished by death; Article 89 of RPC


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Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore. Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action against him is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals;
It must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to
obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the crime.
Chain of Custody; Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165 as Amended by RA 10640
The Court clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.
In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. For the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. The
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.
Chain of Custody; Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165
The absence of the required witnesses (elected public official, representatives from the DOJ and the media) does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced. The prosecution must
show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable - without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent
actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. Police officers
are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.

Antonio Gamboa y Delos Santos Vs. People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 220333, November 14, 2016

Criminal Procedure; Appeals;


At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The
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appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs


In this case, Gamboa was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order
to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a)the
accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b)such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

Chain of Custody; Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165


Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of
the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.
As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. The aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 applies only where the
prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that' the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved.
When police officers do not turn over dangerous drugs to the laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they
must identify its custodian, and the latter must be called to testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place to
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved, which did not take place in this case.
Case law states that, the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot
be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
For indeed, however, noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a
governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.

Fely Y. Yalong Vs. People of the Philippines and Lucila C. Ylagan


G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013
Criminal Procedure; Venue
It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts
material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein
any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a
criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

Alparaque

Arroyo vs People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan


G.R. No. 220598

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court
because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that

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the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and
the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so — x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the
conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown. We also stress that the community of
design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an actual
agreement among all the coconspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly
agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are
shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.

To be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in
pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a coconspirator, and
each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been
explained in People v. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 (2003): An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’être for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a
majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this
is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment
of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say
with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada,
the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayangravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start
with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering
that the information did not aver at allthat she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and
arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified “OK” as an overt act of plunder

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was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release
by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62 (2003), an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime only
when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not
have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies. An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one
conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his
coconspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed
the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 538 (2002), exists when there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain
to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1939), of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and
possess narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to
operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what
transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to
addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, “the
conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at
the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers.” Each conspirator knew that “the success of that part with which he was
immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole.” This means, therefore, that “every member of the conspiracy
was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana.”

Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each coconspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for
the act of one is the act of all. A coconspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to
know the exact part performed by the coconspirator in the execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each
accused is individual and independent.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for
plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her coconspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel
conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly
proven by the Prosecution.

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The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers
to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The
Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84 (2011), that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case
involves neither a probe of GMA’s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.

To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; 2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government-
owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation
or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delictishould lead to the
dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases,
and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.

PERLAS-BERNABE ,J.,Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

—A petition for certiorari is generally prohibited to assail an order denying a demurrer to evidence. Section 23, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Section 23. Demurrer to evidence.— x x x. x x x x The order denying the motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
However, case law has recognized certain exceptions to this rule. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 544 SCRA 324 (2008),
this Court had the occasion to explain: On whether certiorari is the proper remedy in the consolidated petitions, the general rule
prevailing is that it does not lie to review an order denying a demurrer to evidence, which is equivalent to a motion to dismiss, filed
after the prosecution has presented its evidence and rested its case. Such order, being merely interlocutory, is not
appealable;neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The rule admits of exceptions, however. Action on a demurrer
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or on a motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In Tadeo v. People [(360 Phil. 914, 919 [1998]), this Court
declared that certiorari may be availed of when the denial of a demurrer to evidence is tainted with “grave abuse of discretion or
excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.” And so it did declare in Choa v. Choa [(441 Phil. 175, 182-183
[2002]), where the denial is patently erroneous.

On a separate procedural matter, it is my view that the Information against petitioners, including their co-accused, sufficiently
apprised them of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. In order for the accused to be sufficiently apprised of the
charge of Plunder, it is essential that the ultimate facts constitutive of the crime’s elements be stated in the Information with
reasonable particularity. Plunder, as defined in RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659, has the following elements: first, that the offender
is a public officer;second, that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal actsdescribed in Section 1(d); and third, that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least
P50,000,000.00.

At this juncture, let me express that it is of no moment that the main plunderer was not identified on the face of the
Information. Contrary to the ponencia’s stand, the identification of a main plunderer is not a constitutive element of the crime of
Plunder. In fact, the charge in this case is hinged on an allegation of conspiracy, which connotes that all had participated in the
criminal design. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be considered as valid and sufficient, an Information must state
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed. All that should appear in the Information are the ultimate facts reflecting the elements of the crime
charged, and not the evidentiary facts from which the conclusion of who was the main plunderer or who actually amassed, acquired,
or accumulated the subject ill-gotten wealth may be drawn. Verily, the degree of particularity required for an Information to be
sufficient is only based on the gauge of reasonable certainty — that is, whether the accused is informed in intelligible terms of the
offense charged, as in this case.

In concept, a demurrer to evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by
the accused. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”

For a conspiracy charge to prosper, it is important to show that the accused had prior knowledge of the criminal design;
otherwise, it would hardly be the case that his alleged participation would be in furtherance of such design. In theory, conspiracy
exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the
agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. “Prior agreement or assent
is usually inferred from the acts of the accused showing concerted action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, and
concurrence of sentiments or community of interests.”

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In this case, I am hard-pressed to find that Arroyo’s periodic approvals of Uriarte’s multiple letter-requests for additional CIF
funds — which was the sole justification behind the Sandiganbayan ruling under present scrutiny — amount to sufficient evidence
which would prove her complicity in the Plunder of CIF funds. While she may have approved the use of CIF funds which would be the
determinative act for which Uriarte was able to amass, acquire, or accumulate the questioned funds, the prosecution failed to
satisfactorily establish any overt act on Arroyo’s part that would clearly show that she knew that the funds she had approved for
release was intended to further the alleged criminal design. In other words, while Arroyo’s approval was an indispensable act in
ultimately realizing the objective of the scheme or pattern of criminal acts alleged in the Plunder Information, there is no sufficient
evidence — whether direct or circumstantial — to prove that she had knowledge of such objective, and hence, could have given her
assent thereto. Without knowledge, there can be no agreement, which is precisely the essence of conspiracy.

The President’s approval of a request for intelligence funds which lacks any detailed explanation on the intended purpose or
specifics thereof would be tantamount to an overt act that would support the finding that he/she facilitated the conspiratorial
design. In this case, records reveal that Uriarte indeed personally delivered to Arroyo the letter-requests for CIF funds in the
aggregate amount of P295 Million, and that the latter provided her “OK” notations in each of those letter-requests.

To stress, LOI 1282 merely required that requests for additional CIF funds shall “indicate in full detail the specific purposes for
which said funds shall be spent,” and “explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular
aims to be accomplished.” It did not provide for any other parameter as to how the purposes and the underlying circumstances
should be particularized, thereby giving the President ample discretion to scrutinize and deem by himself/herself whether or not a
letter-request indeed complied with the requirements of LOI 1282. In this case, it must be pointed out that as General Manager of
the PCSO, Uriarte enjoyed the full trust and confidence not only of the PCSO Board of Directors who appointed her as such, but also
of the President (Arroyo, in this instance), who is the appointing authority of the said board. Hence, when Arroyo placed her “OK”
notations on Uriarte’s letter-requests, it is as if she deemed such letter-requests compliant with the requirements of LOI 1282. Thus,
while the Sandiganbayancorrectly examined Arroyo’s alleged participation under the lens of her duties under LOI 1282, it, however,
erroneously concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove that she knew of any Plunder conspiracy and henceforth,
proceeded to approve the release of CIF funds in furtherance thereof.

In sum, considering that Arroyo’s “OK” notations in Uriarte’s letter-requests are the only pieces of evidence which
the Sandiganbayan used to link her to the Plunder charge, and that the same does not sufficiently prove that she assented to or
committed any irregularity so as to facilitate the criminal design, it is my considered opinion that the Sandiganbayan patently erred
— and in so doing, gravely abused its discretion — in denying Arroyo’s demurrer to evidence. As I see it, the evidence of the
prosecution has failed to prove Arroyo’s commission of the crime, and her precise degree of participation under the evidentiary
threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While the records do reveal circumstances that may point to certain
irregularities that Arroyo may or may not have knowingly committed, in the context of this criminal case for the high crime of
Plunder, there lingers reasonable doubt as to her actual knowledge of the criminal design and that her approval of the release of CIF
funds was in furtherance thereof. Case law instructs that “[i]ndeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment.
Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The
Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral
certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a
matter of right.” Also, everyone is entitled to the presumption of good faith. While it is indeed tempting to cast the former President

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in a negative light because of the numerous anomalies involving her, the allure of publicity should not influence the outcome of a
decision. Magistrates must be impartial to all that seek judicial succor. Every case should be decided based on the record and on its
merits. The refuge of all presumptions, both of innocence and good faith, should not distinguish between similarly situated suitors.

In contrast, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the Sandiganbayan in denying the demurrer of Aguas as his
complicity to the said scheme appears to be supported by sufficient evidence on record. As PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager,
Aguas was tasked to audit CIF liquidation reports. In this light, he is bound to comply with the provisions of COA Circular Nos. 92-385
and 2003-002 on the audit of CIF, which includes, inter alia, the proper scrutiny of liquidation reports with the corresponding
supporting documents, as well as the submission of the same to the COA chairman before subsequent cash advances may be
made. As exhaustively discussed by the Sandiganbayan, Aguas committed various irregularities in such audit, resulting in the release
of additional CIF funds to Uriarte.

The gravamen of plunder is the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer. Section 1(d) of the
Plunder Law states the multifarious modes under which the amassment, accumulation, or acquisition of public funds would be
tantamount to the Plunder of ill-gotten wealth. There is simply no reasonable relation that the requirement of personal benefit
commonly inheres in the sense of the words accompanying the predicate act of “raids on public treasury.” For one, “misuse” is such
a broad term that would encompass the gamut of illegal means and methods for which public funds may be amassed, accumulated,
or acquired, without necessarily meaning that the public officer so amassing, accumulating, or acquiring the same had derived any
personal benefit therefrom. Equally perceivable is the connotation given to the word “malversation,” which under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, can be classified into a type known as “technical malversation.” In technical malversation, the public officer
applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the
fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. In such instance of malversation, there is no necessity to prove that any personal benefit
was derived. Thus, based on these observations, I respectfully submit that the doctrine of associated words, or noscitur a sociis was
misapplied.

The Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out that: “to require proof that monies went to a plunderer’s bank account or was used to
acquire real or personal properties for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had
already illegally amassed, acquired, or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just decided to keep it in his vault
and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing,
the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person to actually benefit, would that not
still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should
still be evidence-based must fail.” The ponencia’s appreciation of the Plunder Law tends to deleteriously impact the prosecution of
other pending Plunder cases. Unfortunately, the majority has imposed a rule which now requires the State to submit direct proof of
personal benefit for an accused plunderer, as well as those who have conspired with him to be convicted. I strongly criticize this
approach as it is practically the case that those who have raided the coffers of our government, especially in light of the fairly recent
PDAF controversy and now current litigations, would, in great likelihood, had already hidden the money they stole through ingenious
schemes and means. Regrettably, the majority’s interpretation tends to enervate the potency of the Plunder Law’s force.

People of the Philippines vs Jovencito Miranda Y Tigas


G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018

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At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. "The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

In this case, Miranda was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. Case law states that in every prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused charged
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements also by proof beyond reasonable
doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In both instances, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain
of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in
order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination. In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
[seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugsl that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken
chain of custody."

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and
the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution
must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

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The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media in order to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Despite the non-observance of this requirement, the prosecution did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor. No
practicable reasons were given by the police officers, such as a threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which the
other witnesses might need to consider. Thus, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs are clearly put into question.

Amparo

People of the Philippines vs Romeo Antido y Lantayan

G.R. No. 208651 March 14, 2018

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the
criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment[.]

In People v. Culas, the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
(a) Law;
(b) Contracts;
(c) Quasi-contracts;
(d) Xxx;
(e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section l, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 6

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso

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facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in
connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, 7 may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate
civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Marlon Curammeng y Pablo vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 219510 | November 14, 2016

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of
the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal, noncompliance with the foregoing rule may render the same
dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that “the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who
seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably
lost.”

Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in
light of the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the
petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction

SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191219 | July 31, 2013

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only questions of law and not questions
of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily
established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. Hence, absent any of the
recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule, the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed as
conclusive

Aspilla

People of the Philippines vs Timothy Desmond

Principle: Remedial Law - Criminal Procedure

Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable
cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

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The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect,
the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on
the evidence without a full-blown trial.

The judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself
ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant
of arrest.

This prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.”

While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must
be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the
evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he
doubts the existence of probable cause.

A judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure
to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful.
After all, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all the
evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being
merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

In this case, the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was
not observed. Certain essential facts – namely, (a) whether Desmond committed false representations that induced Dio to invest in
Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project for purposes
different from what was agreed upon –remain controverted. It cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) and 315(1)(b) of the RPC had already been established.

People of the Philippines v Placido Goco

Principle: Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure

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An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Principle: Criminal Law - Dangerous Drugs Act

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the
following: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
it. What remains material for conviction is proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. On the other hand, in order to convict an accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Principle: Dangerous Drugs – Chain of Custody Rule

Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the
moment of seizure, to receipt of the same by the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and finally to the presentation of the drugs or
chemicals in court for destruction. The chain of custody requirement is strictly applied when the evidence sought to be presented is
not distinctive and not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness. The same standard applies to evidence susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and
substitution or exchange.

In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must
follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy of the same. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) mirror the content of Section 21 of RA 9165 but
adds that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165- under justifiable
grounds- will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify the persons who handled the seized items from
seizure up until their presentation in court as evidence. To do so, the prosecution must present testimonies about every link in the
chain, in such a way that every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and from whom they were received, where
they were and what happened to them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he or she received them, and their
condition upon delivery. The witnesses must describe the precautions taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of
the illegal drugs and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain
of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.

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Verily, marking the drugs or other related items immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody
as it is the starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a twin purpose, first is to give the succeeding handlers
of the specimen a reference, and second to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the moment of seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting", or
contamination of evidence. The police officers' failure to mark the seized items may lead to the acquittal of the accused based on
reasonable doubt.

In this case, Goco was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.

The Court finds that the prosecution failed to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved, and
that the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR was justified. The prosecution failed to show who
handled the seized items after P02 Emano took hold of them, how their custody was transferred to another, who marked the seized
sachets of drugs, and when and how they were marked.

Goco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines v Crispian Merced Lumaya

Principle: Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure - Appeal

An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. (Sec 11 Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)

In this case, it was only Crispian who successfully perfected his appeal, a favorable judgment shall benefit the co-accused who did
not appeal, Derek should likewise be acquitted herein.

Principle: Criminal Law – Dangerous Drugs Act

In every prosecution for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the following elements must be proven with moral certainty: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish
the necessary elements thereof, to wit: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

And finally, to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the prosecution
must show: (a) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (b) such possession is
not authorized by law.

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In all these instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drugs and/or drug paraphernalia be established beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that the prohibited drug and/or drug paraphernalia form an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime/s.

Principle: Dangerous Drugs Act – Chain of Custody Rule

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized
drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.

In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.

Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials
or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The
importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use
the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other
material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence.

In the case at bar, while it appears that the apprehending officers did conduct a physical inventory and photography of the drugs
allegedly seized from the accused, it is, nonetheless, baffling that the number of sachets shown in the photographs
taken (i.e., eighteen [18]) do not correspond with the number of sachets for which the accused, as per the subject Informations and
inventory report, were herein charged (i.e., eleven [11]). This discrepancy - if left unaccounted for - clearly renders suspect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. During trial, the police officer failed to give any tenable explanation.

Also, it is undisputed that the police officers did not immediately mark the sachets of shabu at the place of confiscation during the
buy-bust operation or at the nearest police station. Instead, they proceeded to the house of Crispian to implement the subject
search warrant and only thereafter, conducted the marking. Thus, they marked the items "only after the search of the house of the
parents of Crispian."

Buniel
People of the Philippines vs Wilson Ramos Y Cabanatan

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G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018

RA 9165 DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

In every prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the following elements be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.21

Moreover, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, as the dangerous drug itself forms
an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. It has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain from the moment the drugs are seized up
to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.22

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in order
to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 23 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 24 the apprehending
team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.25 In the case of People v. Mendoza,26 the Court stressed that
"[without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the
seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs], that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would
have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."27

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
may not always be possible.28 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.29 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of
RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. 30 In People v. Almorfe,31the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved.32 Also, in People v. De Guzman,33 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.34

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
Ramos.

First, although it is true that the seized plastic sachets were marked in the presence of Ramos himself and an elected public
official, i.e., Kgd. Ruiz, the same was not done in the presence of any representative from the DOJ and the media.

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.39 However,
a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced.40In People v. Umipang,41 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest
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efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives
were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."42 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.43 These considerations arise
from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently,
make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure
prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but
must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.44

Second, the combined weight of the seized specimens, which initially weighed 0.2934 gram during the first qualitative
examination,45 decreased to 0.2406 during the re-examination46 by the second forensic chemist. These were the same items that IO1
Dealagdon identified in court as those that he had previously marked. Although the discrepancy of 0.0528 in the amounts may be
considered negligible, the prosecution, nonetheless, did not even venture to explain how the discrepancy came about. As already
adverted to, the saving clause "applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained
the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the burden
of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was confiscated from the accused
during his arrest."47

Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the PDEA operatives, which were unfortunately left unjustified by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Ramos, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised.48 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.49 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Ramos's acquittal is perforce in order.

Prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived
deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is
determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the
fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate
court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the
appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

Accordingly, accused-appellant Wilson Ramos y Cabanatan is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People vs Layag
G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016

TOPIC: ACCUSED DIED PENDING PROMULGATION OF RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT

In a Resolution1 dated August 3, 2015 (August 3, 2015 Resolution), the Court adopted in toto the Decision2 dated January 29, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05383 finding accused-appellant Ariel Layag (Layag) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of one (1) count of Qualified Rape by Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and one (1) count of
Acts of Lasciviousness.

Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment 4 dated October 14, 2015 declaring that the aforesaid Resolution had already
become final and executory. However, the Court received a Letter5dated July 18, 2016 from the Bureau of Corrections informing us
of the death of accused appellant on July 30, 2015, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death 6 attached thereto.

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In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court is constrained to reopen the case despite the finality of the August 3, 2015
Resolution. In Bigler v. People,7 the Court explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter
alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting the same, viz.:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down. NVS.: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j)
that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 8 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Resolution dated August 3, 2015 - a matter which the
Court was belatedly informed of - clearly shows that there indeed exists a specfal or compelling circumstance warranting the re-
examination of the case despite its finality.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases
against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the
accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Egagamao,9 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
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4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription. 10

Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with
his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. 11chanrobleslaw

Christian Caballo vs People of the Philipines


G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013

TOPIC: RA 7610 “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”

Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing offense are the following:

(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and

(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group...

It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section
3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child

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Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced
or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other
forms of sexual abuse.

In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s
free will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of
influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the
wishes of one who wields it."30

In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the
purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:

First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law. 31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.

Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on
this point:

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse
with another person.

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having
sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she
is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.

The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In
other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x x32

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Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor
placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.

Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured
AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he
would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations
and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected manner in which
Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of
duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA
eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In
any case, the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in
sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject offense exists.

In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.

Confessor

People of the Philippines Vs. Cristhian Kevin Guib y Butay


G.R. No. 233100. February 14, 2018
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized drugs in
order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 29 Under the said section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and ( b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. In People v. Almorfe,38 the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentia~ value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved:9 Also, in People v. De Guzman, 40 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

In this case, while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs were indeed conducted, a reading of the
Certificate of Inventory42 shows that only an elected official, i.e., Brgy. Capt. Bagay, was present and that there were no
representatives from the DOJ and the media. To make matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible explanation as to

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why there was a complete absence of an elected official and a representative from the DOJ and the media in order for the saving
clause to apply.

People of the Philippines Vs. Mario Galia Bagamano G.R. No. 222658. August 17, 2016

Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors.—It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Same; Information; To consider matters not specifically alleged in the Information, even if proven in trial, would be tantamount
to the deprivation of the accused’s right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.—It must be stressed that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him to ensure that his due process
rights are observed. Thus, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity
as to the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof. Hence, to consider
matters not specifically alleged in the Information, even if proven in trial, would be tantamount to the deprivation of the accused’s
right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.

People of the Philippines Vs. Camaloding Laba y Samanoding G.R. No. 199938. January 28, 2013

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Words and Phrases; “Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean
“to carry or convey from one place to another”; While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel
some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular
instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.―“Transport” as used
under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from one place to another.” The essential element of the
charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the
airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or 196.63 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber
shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his
possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or
moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another.

Chain of Custody Rule; With respect to the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, the Supreme Court finds no reason to
disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals that the same had been faithfully observed by the arresting officers: from the time
that the illegal substance was seized from appellant and properly marked by the arresting officers, to its laboratory examination
until its presentation in open court for identification purposes.―With respect to the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, the
Court likewise finds no reason to disturb the findings of the CA that the same had been faithfully observed by the arresting officers:
from the time that the illegal substance was seized from appellant and properly marked by the arresting officers, to its laboratory
examination until its presentation in open court for identification purposes. Considering that the integrity of the seized substance
has been duly preserved, failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21, Par. (a) of RA 9165 requiring the apprehending officers to physically
inventory and photograph the confiscated items shall not render the evidence inadmissible.

Candolita

People of the Philippines Vs. Allan Bugtong y Amoroso


G.R. No. 220451. February 26, 2018

RA 9165, Requisites for a charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to prosper


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For a charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to prosper, the prosecution must prove: (1) the identity of the buyer, and seller, of the
subject drug; (2) the object and the consideration of the sale; and, (3) the delivery of the sold item, and its payment. Further, it is
crucial that the integrity of the seized drug be preserved; in this regard, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of custody
over the subject illegal drug. This means that every link in the chain of its custody, from the time of its confiscation until its
presentation in court, must be established.

RA 9165, Chain of Custody

As a general rule, there are four links in the chain of custody of the recovered item: (1) the confiscation and marking, if practicable,
of the specimen seized from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) its turnover by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the investigating officer's turnover thereof to the forensic chemist for examination; and, (4) its submission
by the forensic chemist to the court. As starting point of the chain of custody, the immediate marking of the specimen is necessary
because it serves as reference for and by the subsequent handlers of the item. Marking is also used to distinguish the subject item
from any similar or related evidence from their seizure until their disposal after the proceedings. More particularly, marking refers to
the placement by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of one's initials or signature or any identifying signs on the
specimen. It must be done in the presence of the apprehended violator of law, and immediately upon his or her apprehension.

Edmund Bulauitan y Mauayan Vs. People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 218891. September 19, 2016

Criminal Procedure, Appeals

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors.—At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.

Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable”
within the meaning of the said constitutional provision.—Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the
same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct of a search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules, states
that: SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses.—No search of a house, room or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

People of the Philippines Vs. Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati


G.R. No. 201363. March 18, 2013

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Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Elements that must concur for warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
operate

Paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.—For the warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time
of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the appellant had committed it.

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause

“Probable cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.—In fine,
appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with
his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. “Probable cause” has been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.

Dimaligalig

Crisologo vs People
December 3, 2012

Settled is the rule that debts incurred by directors, officers, and employees acting as corporate agents are not their direct liability
but of the corporation they represent, except if they contractually agree/stipulate or assume to be personally liable for the
corporations debts.

People vs Crisanto Gray


Feb 07, 2018

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established:

(1) that a person was killed;

(2) that the accused killed him or her;

(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and

(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

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It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction
even in a charge of murder.

When the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies,
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if
not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in
the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.

For evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying or an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove: (a)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; ( b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and ( c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will

The Court stresses the importance of the requirement in evident premeditation with respect to the sufficiency of time
between the resolution to carry out the criminal intent and the criminal act, affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think
and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what accused-appellant had planned to do, where the interval should be
long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme.

People vs Gerrjan Acut


August 17, 2016

Three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected.

These are:

(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;

(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and

(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with
the element of immediacy

The clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which
these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers
have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the
pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay.
On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 ( ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.

Domingo

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People vs Delos Reyes


G.R. No. 130714 October 16, 2012

Whether or not the case of an accused who jumped bail and was sentenced by the RTC to suffer death penalty, subsequently
elevated before the Court En Banc for automatic review, should be sent to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review

Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact, tried and convicted in
absentia. There is dearth of evidence showing that he has since surrendered to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray
for affirmative relief before the courts. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom.

Thus, even if the Court were to remand these cases to the CA for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to
dismiss appellant’s appeal, as he is considered a fugitive from justice. On this score, Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court is
relevant, which provides:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

It bears to stress that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.

People vs Allan Egagamao


G.R. No. 218809 August 3, 2016

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:


1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

xxxx
In People v. Bayotas, the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as
follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:


1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability, based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
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separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases, where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

People Ronaldo Paz y Dionisio


G.R. No. 229512 January 31, 2018

RA 9165 DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT

It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as
a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as its IRR, Paz's
acquittal is perforce in order.

In this case, Paz was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In every prosecution for an unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is
essential that the following elements are proven beyond reasonable doubt:

(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Meanwhile, to convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the
following elements also by proof beyond reasonable doubt:

(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug;

(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and

(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In both circumstances, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain
of custody from the moment that the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

In this regard, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the seized
drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said provision, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the
same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.

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In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs) that
were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized
into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and
custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.

Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that:

(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and

(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a
fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

Estillore

Reyes vs Ombusman
787 SCRA 354 , March 15, 2016

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information. - There is no merit in Napoles's assertion that the complaints are insufficient in
form and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the commission of
the crimes charged.

"According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is, therefore,
whether the facts alleged therein, if hypotheticallv admitted, constitute the elements of the offense."

In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated that:
a. Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the ones responsible for the PDAF scam;
b. Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019;
c. they used a certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of which were stated therein;
d. because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount of
P345,000,000.00; and
e. the PDAF scam happened sometime between the years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City,
and Pasay City.

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The aforesaid allegations were essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations - one (1) for Plunder and fifteen (15) for
violation of RA 3019 - filed before the Sandiganbayan. Evidently, these factual assertions already square with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-cited. Upon such averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet
Napoles has been completely informed of the accusations against her to enable her to prepare for an intelligent defense. The NBI
and the FIO Complaints are, therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation. – Certainly, De Asis's defenses, which are anchored on the want of
criminal intent, as well as the absence of all the elements of the crime of Plunder on his part, are better ventilated during trial and
not during preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.

Hence, for De Asis's apparent participation in the PDAF scam, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
probable cause against him for one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation. – It should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore,
“the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause. – In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion,
attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling — that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should
be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), “probable cause, for
the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean ‘actual or positive cause’ nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.”—In determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
[accused] are required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and violations of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause. – owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the "technical
rules of evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the determination of probable cause
does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies
presented." Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman163 (Estrada), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally
adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause. - Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause
and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in People v. Castillo,242
delineated the functions and purposes of a determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and
the trial court, on the other: There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to
have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
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authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in
a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause. - The Court in Mendoza v. People (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or
the Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, namely to:
a. dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
b. issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and
c. order the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

The Court went on to elaborate that "the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory" and
reiterated that "the court's first option is for it to 'immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.'"

Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled
to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line
with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court." Nevertheless, the Court, in
Mendoza cautions the trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature:

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of
probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on
hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds
probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; State Witness. - The Court rejects Reyes's theory that the whistleblowers and Tuason are the
"most guilty" in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the Ombudsman violated Section 17, Rule 119
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting immunity to them.

To begin with, "the authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the
Ombudsman, as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily
originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts.
The latter do not, as a rule, have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution's evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently,
courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a
witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure].

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. - In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that:
a. she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief of staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions
whenever they would enter into transactions involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF;
b. Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest partiality and evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-
controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-funded projects - even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or
negotiated procurement, in direct violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; 197 and
c. the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy. - As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must be first
highlighted that they are placed in the same situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with crime/s principally
performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or multiple violations of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as
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private individuals on account of their alleged conspiracy with public officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal
axiom that "[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." Thus, the reasonable likelihood that conspiracy exists
between them denotes the probable existence of the elements of the crimes above-discussed equally as to them.

"Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interests.”

Criminal Law; Conspiracy. - In the same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for De Asis's involvement as a co-
conspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. A perusal thereof readily reveals that De Asis is
the President of KPMFI and a member/incorporator of CARED - two (2) among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used in the
perpetuation of the scam particularly involved in the illegal disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF. Moreover, in the Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their respective Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay they tagged
De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker; that he, among others, received the checks issued by the
IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, De Asis was also one of
those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's house.

With these, the Court finds that there are equally well-grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation
as President of KPMFI and member/incorporator of CARED, as well as his acts of receiving checks in the name of said NGOs,
depositing them in the NGOs' bank accounts, delivering money to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the delivery of "kickbacks" and
"commissions" of the legislators, conspired with the other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.

Criminal Law; Forgery. - Anent Reyes’s claim that her signatures in the documentary evidence presented were false, falsified, and
fictitious, it must be emphasized that “as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the
instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been
forged.”

Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to present clear and convincing evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in
light of the following considerations pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos.
212593-94:
a. in a letter dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator Enrile himself admitted that his signatures, as well as those
of Reyes, found on the documents covered by the COA’s Special Audit Report are authentic; and
b. Rogelio Azores, the supposed document examiner who now works as a freelance consultant, aside from only analyzing
photocopies of the aforesaid documents and not the originals thereof, did not categorically state that Reyes’s signatures on
the endorsement letters were forged.

As there is no clear showing of forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot subscribe to Reyes’s contrary
submission. Notably, however, she retains the right to raise and substantiate the same defense during trial proper.

Criminal Law; Plunder. –Plunder has the following elements:


a. that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
b. that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
described in Section 1(d) thereof; and
c. that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
a. that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual
acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
b. that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
c. that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
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Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements need not be definitively established
for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause — the determinative matter in a
preliminary investigation — implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.

Criminal Law; Plunder. - Anent Janet Napoles's complicity in the abovementioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in all
reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. As exhibited in the modus operandi
discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead employee"
the JLN Corporation, would prepare a listing of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by
the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Senator
Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile
would then indorse Janet Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, which were "ghost projects" that allowed Janet
Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.

Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge
of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that:
a. she, in conspiracy with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described
modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile's PDAF, who supposedly abused his authority as a public officer in order to do so;
b. through this modus operandi, it appears that Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of "kickbacks"
in the years 2004-2010; and
c. the total value of "kickbacks'' given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least P172,834,500.00.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Plunder; Conspiracy. - At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Napoles of her
mistaken notion that as a private individual, she cannot be held answerable for the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers. While the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public
officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing
the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In this case,
given that the evidence gathered perceptibly shows Napoles's engagement in the illegal hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF, the
Ombudsman rightfully charged her, with Enrile and Reyes, as a co-conspirator for the aforestated crimes.

People vs Mamangon
G.R. No. 229102, JANUARY 29, 2018

Criminal Law; RA 9165. - In every Prosecution of unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the following elements
are proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 25 Meanwhile, in order to convict an accused who is
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements also by proof beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; ( b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and ( c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In both cases, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous
drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over
the dangerous drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs on account of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to
account for each link of the chain from the moment that the drugs are seized up to their presentation
in court as evidence of the crime.

Criminal Law; RA 9165; Procedure. - Immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and he seized drugs must be turned over to the

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PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. In the case of People v. Mendoza, 30 the
Court stressed that "[w)ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
[seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly head ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
may not always be possible. The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that:
a. there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
b. the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Verily, procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.43 As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as
well as its IRR, Mamangon's acquittal is perforce in order.

Ho

Rivac vs Pp
G.R. No. 224673, Jan. 22, 2018

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari the resolution of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Rivac for the crime of Estafa under
Art. 315 (1(b)

Facts: Accused Rivac was charged in the RTC of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating and converting for her own personal use and
benefit the pieces of jewelry turned over to her by complainant Fariñas on consignment.

The RTC subsequently found Rivac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. After the promulgation of the judgment
and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac moved to reopen the proceedings on the ground that she intended to present the additonal
testimony of Fariñas which as it turned out was a recantation of her previous testimony.

In its Order, the RTC affirmed its assailed Judgment. The CA likewise upheld Rivac’s conviction.

Hence this petition.

Issue: w/n the CA correctly upheld Rivac’s conviction for the crime of Estafa.

Held: The SC denied Rivac’s petition since all the elements for the crime of Estafa were present. It held that the essence of this kind
of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be
made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, the legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

With regard to Fariñas subsequent testimony, the SC held that Fariñas' testimony partakes of a recantation, which is aimed to
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renounce her earlier statement and withdraw the same formally and publicly. Verily, recantations are viewed with suspicion and
reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of
desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the
rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable as there is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.

Pp vs Tibayan and Puerto


G.R. Nos. 209655-60, Jan. 14, 2015

FACTS:
Information: The accused was charged with the crime of Syndicated Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

PROSECUTION:
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001.

Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the
course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration
statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation
Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer's Affidavit before the SEC.

Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI's corporate registration for being fraudulently procured.

The complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will
recover their investments.

After giving their money to TGICI,


private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the
amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings.

Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting
private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At
the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private complainants
acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would
be paid.

However, the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and,
thus, they were constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.

DEFENSE:
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to defraud private complainants.
Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he
was no longer a director of TGICI.

For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICI's Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an
incorporator nor a director of TGICI.

RTC: RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a),
Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in the

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informations that accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of defrauding the
public, or it failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants committed Syndicated
Estafa.

CA: The CA modified accused-appellants' conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized
under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.

HELD:
SC: The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the two accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Estafa.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.:


-that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions;
-that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
-that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and
-that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a
syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are:


a. Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed;
b. the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and
c. defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited
by corporations/associations from the general public.

The accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the
defraudation of the TGICI investors.

A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds
contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to
generate high returns with little or no risk.

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case,
considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants,
made false pretenses and representations to the investing public — in this case, the private complainants — regarding a supposed
lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations
were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard
earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants'
investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
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Melgar vs People
G.R. No. 223477 | 2018-02-14

RA 9262 “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children." Notably, "psychological violence is
an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the
means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of
the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party." Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the
accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was
presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the variance doctrine which
allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged - the
courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and
even without the additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

PENALTY; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be
punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided
therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People, the Court succinctly
discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.: Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate
sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of
People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is defined
in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects
under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the
indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC. Applying the foregoing to this
case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment, and
report compliance to the court.

People vs Romeo Lintag y Laureola


G.R. No. 219855 | 2016-09-06

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.

Sections, Article II of RA 9165 reads in part: Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. -The penalty of life imprisonment to
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death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. x x x xx xx To secure a conviction under the aforesaid provision,
the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Material for such conviction is proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. "As the dangerous drug itself
forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus
delicti."

Chain of Custody Rule.

In view of the importance of ensuring that the dangerous drug seized from an accused is the same as that presented in
court as evidence against him, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides for a "chain of custody rule," or a standard protocol which
the police officers must adhere to in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized contraband. In People of the
Philippines v. Sumili, the Court explained that, while strict adherence to the said rule is desired, any deviation from the same is
acceptable so long as there is ample justification for the same and that the evidentiary value of the seized contraband is preserved,
viz.: To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the "chain of custody rule" outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers
should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the
apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the
same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or of the accused's or the person's
representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then
sign the copies of the inventory; and(b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its
confiscation for examination purposes. While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that non-
compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so
long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.

It is settled that in Criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti
of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the seized item.

An examination of the records, however, reveals that as indicated in the PNP Crime Laboratory's receiving stamp on the
request for laboratory examination, it was SPO3 Valdez -and not SPO2 Gonzales -who delivered such request and presumably, the
seized plastic sachets as well, to Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano. This immediately puts into question how SPO3 Valdez came
into possession of the seized items, which was neither explained by the prosecution through the presentation of testimonial or
documentary evidence, nor sufficiently addressed by the courts a quo. Thus, absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there
arises a substantial gap in the chain of custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this compromises the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. It is settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the
presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that
they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter
of right, as in this case.

Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 198694 | 2013-02-13

Searches and Seizures.

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Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person's right against unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that: Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government authorities in
contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section
3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that: 2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to
Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited
proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches,
searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures and searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.

Warrantless Arrest.

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the parameters of Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to
arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In
this light, the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.

Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose
of suspending his liberty,20th is should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person's liberty be subjected to ubiquitous
abuse. As law enforcers, it is largely expected of them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The
determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It
demarcates the line between legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this
respect, it must be performed wisely and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man.
Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed with utmost
conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of public accountability.

Ibay

People of the Philippines vs Alexander Alvaro y De Leon and Rosaliie Geronimo y Madera

Section 5, RA 9165

In this case, accused-appellants were charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, which has
the following elements: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment.

Section 11, RA 9165

In addition, Geronimo was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements of which are: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

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Section 21, RA 9165

Notably, however, in order to secure a conviction for the foregoing crimes, it remains essential that the identity of the confiscated
drugs be established beyond reasonable doubt. To obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

The chain of custody rule provides the outline the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; also, the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

Non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. However, for this saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. The justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

The Court concurs with accused-appellants that indeed, numerous lapses, and even inconsistencies, taint the prosecution's account
of how the arresting officers handled the subject confiscated drugs, to wit:

First. With respect to the place of marking, Siborboro testified that he immediately marked and inventoried the seized items at the
place of arrest. This was, however, contradicted by P03 Castillo who testified that they did not prepare the inventory at the place of
the arrest since Laperal Compound was teeming with people; instead, they conducted the inventory along EDSA, at the trunk of the
service vehicle.

Second. The prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of the accused as required by law. The
presence of the required witnesses, i.e., the representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected official, was also not
established. While records show that Brgy. Chairman Bobier had signed the inventory receipt, based on Siborboro's own statement,
the former was not present when the same was prepared and that it was only brought to his office for signature. For his part, PO3
Castillo testified that the apprehending team immediately returned to their office right after the inventory and preservation
marking, without passing by any other place. He also contradicted his previous statement that the inventory was made along EDSA,
when he later stated that Brgy. Chairman Bobier signed the inventory receipt at the place of arrest.

Third. The prosecution failed to show that the seized items were photographed. While Siborboro could not recall if photographs of
the seized items were taken, PO3 Castillo testified that the items were photographed by a designated photographer. Unfortunately,
the records do not support P03 Castillo's claim as the prosecution did not offer the photographs of the seized items as evidence.

Fourth. The sachet subject of the sale was purportedly marked by Siborboro as "JSJR" and the other sachet confiscated from
Geronimo was marked as "JSJR-l." However, the crime laboratory's report shows that S/Insp. Mangalip, the forensic chemist,
examined two (2) sachets, one marked "JSJRND" and the other "JSJR-1." Instead of presenting PO1 Santos - as the receiving
investigator - and S/Insp. Mangalip, the prosecution stipulated upon and dispensed with their testimonies.51 The stipulation was, in
fact, limited to the fact "[t]hat the white crystalline substance contained in a transparent plastic sachet with markings 'JSJR and JSJR-
I' were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office together with the Request for Laboratory Examination." Consequently, no

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witness could explain the provenance of the sachet "JSJRND" and the whereabouts of the sachet "JSJR" after the same were left to
the custody of PO1 Santos. Neither did the prosecution justify if the said discrepancy was a mere typographical error.

Fifth. The records reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered by PO1 Santos but by a certain Serrano.
Siborboro and PO3 Castillo both failed to explain how Serrano came to possess the seized items, while PO2 Orante's testimony54
shows that he had no personal knowledge of the arrest and what transpired thereafter. With PO1 Santos's testimony stipulated
upon and dispensed with, no witness was able to explain how Serrano came to have custody over the seized items.

In view of the unaccounted gap in the chain of custody and the multiple unrecognized and unjustified departures of the police
officers from the established procedure set under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court therefore concludes that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drugs had been compromised. Case law states that
in cases involving dangerous drugs, the drugs presented as the corpus delicti of the offense must be established with moral certainty
to be the same illicit substance taken from the accused. Absent such conclusive identification, there can be no finding of guilt on the
part of the accused. The persistence of reasonable doubt on the identity of the drugs seized from the accused results in the latter's
acquittal, as in this case.

Vinson D. Young a.k.a. Benzon Ong and Benny Young a.k.a. Benny Ong vs People of the Philippines

Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must
be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.

The evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for
violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208.

Section 4 (a)&(e) and Section 6 (a)&(c) of RA 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)

Sections 4 (a) and (e) of RA 9208 read:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

xxxx

(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography[.]

Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 read:

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

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(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xxx

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three

(3) or more persons, individually or as a group[.]

As it appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.

Certiorari to the CA

Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a certiorari petition, the Court finds the
OSG's argument well-taken. In this regard, jurisprudence has carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari
petition, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.

In this case, the assailed RTC Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. Significantly, the present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is characterized by sexual violence and slavery.
Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this case.

People of the Philippines vs Jover Matias y Dela Fuente

Penalties

Following the pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People for sexual abuse, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which has the
range of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, therefore, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be
properly imposed under the law, which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal, while the minimum term
shall be within the range next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, or a period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Similarly, the award of moral damages is increased
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, pursuant to the Malto case.

Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610

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Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; xxx

In the case of People v. Pangilinan, which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v. Dahilig and People v. Abay, the
Court explained:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized
with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of
Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code
(such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for rape under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6,
2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). It bears pointing
out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.

On this score, it is worth noting that in its April 19, 2007 Decision, the RTC concluded that AAA was the victim of sexual abuse
labeled 'rape', considering the established fact that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus, appellant's conviction
was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. In the light of all
the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon appellant.

Jardinel

Girlie M. Quisay vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 216920. January 13, 2016.

FACTS:

Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a RESOLUTION, finding probable cause against GIRLIE for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610. An information was consequently filed before the RTC.

Girlie moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same
before the RTC. Girlie contended that while the RESOLUTION was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor with approval of the Senior
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Assistant City Prosecutor, the INFORMATION was without any approval from any higher authority. In this regard, petitioner claimed
that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the Information
must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. 7

RULING: The Pabatid Sakdal or INFORMATION, must be quashed as it suffers from an incurable infirmity — that the officer who filed
the same before the RTC had no authority to do so, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Information; Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein be fore a
complaint or information may be filed before the courts.—Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein
before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.: SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review.—If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information.
He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint. Within five
(5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or
to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such
action. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. x x x x (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority
or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section
3(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules.

Same; Same; Same; People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 (2004),firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or
even by express consent.—In this relation, People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 (2004), firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by
an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10071, gave the City Prosecutor the power to “[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be
investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions,
and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused,” he may indeed delegate
his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service.—The CA correctly held that based
on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to “[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be
investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused,” he may
indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also
correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No.
32, which gave division chiefs or review prosecutors “authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other action,
and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval,” without necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor’s authority
to act directly in appropriate cases. By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang, Deputy
City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the
OCP-Makati.

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People vs Rico Niebres Y Reginaldo


GR NO. 230975 December 4, 2017

FACTS:

NIEBRES raped AAA (his sister-in-law, 16 y.o) while he and his wife together with their children visited his in laws. He was indicted by
the RTC of SIMPLE RAPE, but CA said it was QUALIFIED RAPE since the victim:

1. has a state of mental retardation established by testimony of PSYCHIATRIST;


2. such mental state was not disproved by accused during trial

Criminal Law; Qualified Rape. The CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental
disability at the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent evidence to substantiate the same. –
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed –
xxx
d. when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is DEMENTED,
xxx
Art. 266 -B. Penalties.
xxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time
of the commission of the crime.

xxx

For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, it is necessary that the
elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.

In this instance, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape, as it was shown that: (a) AAA was
suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q. equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child; (b) Niebres successfully had carnal
knowledge of AAA sometime in October 2010; and (c) Niebres was able to accomplish the said act because AAA, being a mental
retardate, was deprived of reason at the time of the incident.
However, the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental disability at the time of
the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent evidence to substantiate the same.

Notably, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape is a special
qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death.[27] Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be sufficiently alleged
in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. [28] It must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. [29]
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was specifically alleged in the
Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental
retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of
her disability at the time of its commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [30] On that score, the prosecution cannot
simply profit from Niebres's omission, as it must rely on its own evidence to prove his knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond
reasonable doubt.

Jaron

Paz Cheng y Chu vs People of the Philippines

Criminal Law 2 - Estafa Through Misappropriation


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In a purely debtor-and-creditor relationship, the debtor who merely refuses to pay or denies the indebtedness cannot be held liable
for estafa by misappropriation. The reason is readily apparent. To convict a person of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, the State must prove that she has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal
property received. Considering that the petitioner already became the owner of the pieces of jewelry, she could dispose of the
same, and her disposal of them would not amount to the misappropriation thereof. In short, the petitioner did not thereby violate
any trust or other obligation to account for the items of jewelry that she already owned.

The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows:


(1) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same;
(2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property;
(3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.

In the case of Pamintuan v. People, 621 SCRA 538 (2010), the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the
aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit: The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The
words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion
to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of
conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.

People of the Philippines vs Ernesto L. Delos Santos

Criminal Law Procedure


"A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause - that is, one made for the purpose of filing an [I]nformation in court - is
essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny."

However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz.:

Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been
arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

In De Los Santos-Dia v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a case [under the authority of the aforesaid provision]
must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record [show] that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence."

"[F]or the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect
is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on
the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense."
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Criminal Law 2 – Qualified Theft


The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
are as follows:

(a) the taking of personal property;


(b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) it be done without the owner's consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and
(g) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.

It has been held that in cases where one, in good faith, "takes another's property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt
from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on
behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel,
either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker
honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for
another."

The Court reiterates that "[w]hile probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the
evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom
and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials
arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges."

Laguialam

Hilario Lamsen vs People of the Philippines

Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

Article 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. – x x x:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;

xxxx

The elements of the said crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public document.

Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise establish the fact of falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, as
the same is never presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged
signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged. "Under Rule 132,
Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud.
As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who
had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best."
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In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of falsification or forgery. While Batiles
testified during cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person, and that there is a
certainty that the subject deed was falsified, the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and inconclusive, as it is
inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, which Batiles himself issued after examining the
allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles found that no definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the
prosecution were mere photocopies of the original, viz.:

1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned and the standard signatures of ANICETA TANDAS reveal
dissimilarities in stroke structures, slant, lateral spacing, a strong indication that they were not by one and the same person.
However, no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute
details are not clearly manifested.

2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned and the standard signatures of NESTOR TANDAS reveal
dissimilarities in stroke structure, slant, lateral spacing, a strong indication that they were not by one and the same person.
However, no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute
details are not clearly manifested.

Batiles further clarified that there are other handwriting elements which could not be determined in the photocopy, such as minor
details which could not be visibly detected by the naked eye, i.e., handwriting movement, line quality, and emphasis.

Notably, the genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could not be competently established without a copy of the original.
Photocopies are considered secondary evidence which can be rendered inadmissible absent any proof that the original was lost,
destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered.50 Here, not only did the
prosecution fail to present the original copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise did not provide ample proof that the same was
lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of Lamsen. Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine
the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering
Batiles' declaration inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.

Adina B. Manansala vs People of the Philippines

Article 12 (6) of the RPC

While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to appreciate the "mitigating
circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling
without correcting the latter court's mistake.

To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13
of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to
be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the
fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.

In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the
subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at
UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be
appreciated in her favor.

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Indeterminate Sentence Law

Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's criminal liability in this case - and also taking
into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as maximum.

Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (4), of the Revised Penal Code

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

xxxx

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxxx

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

xxxx

The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (c) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to
cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender
makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.

In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crime,
considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents
she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance
nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report
by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was
terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that findings of fact made by a trial
court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that
can otherwise affect the results of the case or any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower
court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.

Lavares

Dolores Diaz vs. People of the Philippines and Leticias S. Arcilla


G.R. No. 208113. December 2, 2015

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PENALTIES

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or “greater weight of the credible evidence,” is required. Thus, an accused
acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

Criminal Procedure/Evidence

Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing
himself of its contents and consequences.

Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular.
This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created,
thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

Respondent’s possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not
been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing
evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent’s favor.

Digna Ramos vs. People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 226454 November 20, 2017

PENALTIES

Since the crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation which is punishable by arresto menor or a fine of P200.00*, the
Court deems it proper to impose on Ramos the latter penalty instead, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

*Note: While Section 94 of Republic Act No. 10951 already increased the prescribed fine to P20,000.00, such adjustment
could not be made to apply in this case as the crime was committed prior to the law's enactment (in 2017). It is settled that
penal laws are given retroactive effect only if their application shall be favorable to the accused, which is not the case here.

Article 358. Slander. - Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos.

The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical
person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may
either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical
meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the
offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended
party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the
heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.

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Criminal Procedure

An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

Licayan

People of the Philippines vs Oscaar Parba y Solon


G.R. No. 214506 October 19, 2015

Murder; Elements
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 243 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.

Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery


One of the circumstance which qualifies the killing to murder is the existence of treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution thereof, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
People v. Gunda, 715 SCRA 505 (2014), it was explained that when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden and
unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant was about to do, there is treachery.

Alibi
It is well-settled that alibi as a defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
A distance of one and a half (1 ½) to two (2) kilometers was held not too far to travers by walking. Likewise, a distance of about two
(2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the
accused was present at the locus criminis. Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the “physical impossibility”
contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi. Moreover, considering its doubtful nature, clear and convincing evidence must be
submitted to support the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and underserving of weight in law.
Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, especially in
cases where the testimonies of the witnesses are categorical, consistent and untainted by ill will.

Damages when death results from the commission of a crime


When death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity
ex delicto for the death of the victim; without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory
damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.

Rogelio B. Antone vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 225146 November 20, 2017

Criminal procedure; When Court of Appeals imposes Reclusion Perpetua; How to appeal to SC

Antone made a procedural lapse in elevating the case before the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Section 3 (e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure especially provides that "except as provided in the
last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. In this regard, Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules states:

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Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. – xxx (c) In cases where the Court of Appeals
imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such
penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

In this case, the CA affirmed the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to Antone for each count of Statutory Rape
committed against AAA. As such, he should have filed a notice of appeal before the CA instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court.

Criminal Procedure; Doctrine of Immutability of Judgement; Purpose

Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter court's Decision dated July 31, 2015 and the CA
Resolution denying Antone’s Motion for Reconsideration dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into finality. A decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a
mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied.

Lumanag

People of the Philippines vs Nino Calibod y Heneboso


G.R. No. 230230 November 20, 2017

Calibod was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In
order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with the said crime, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Further, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug
itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to remove any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drug, the prosecution must show an unbroken chain of custody over the same, accounting for each link thereof from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

As held in the Dela Riva v. People, the chain of custody is divided into four (4) links:

 first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
 second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
 third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
 fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling the
seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.

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In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."

Notably, the Court declared that while the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the police officers, strict
adherence with the prescribed procedure may not always be possible under varied field conditions. In fact, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the
requisite inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable
grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Simply put, the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.

Moreover, in People v. De Guzman it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact,
because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod, thereby putting into serious question the integrity and evidentiary value of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod.

An examination of the records reveals that the police officers committed a procedural lapse in the first link of the
chain.1âwphi1 While the prosecution was able to show that P02 Oruga was able to mark the seized shabu with his initials "GAO," it
did not establish whether or not the requisite inventory and photography were properly conducted by the police officers. During the
direct examination of P02 Oruga, he claimed that he marked the seized shabu immediately after the conduct of buy-bust operation
and subsequently brought the item, together with Calibod, to the crime laboratory.

Based on the his testimony, P02 Oruga immediately proceeded to the crime laboratory after marking the seized shabu. He did not
state if the marking was done within the view of Calibod, an elected public official, and a representative from the DOJ or media. He
likewise did not mention whether the said witnesses were present during the buy-bust operation or immediately thereafter.

Moreover, it was not shown if P02 Oruga actually conducted a physical inventory and photography of the seized shabu - either at the
place of the arrest or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team - and in the presence of Calibod, an elected
public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media. Despite the non-observance of these requirements, the prosecution
did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor. Perforce, the Court is constrained to rule that the police officers' unjustified
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 constitutes a fatal flaw which affects the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

Furthermore, it appears that there were also procedural lapses on the second and third links of the chain. Since P02 Oruga
immediately went to the crime laboratory without conducting the requisite inventory and photography after the buy-bust operation,
there was no showing that the confiscated shabu was initially turned over to an investigating officer for further investigation.
Additionally, the prosecution was silent as to how the specimen shabu was subsequently received at the crime laboratory,
considering that P02 Oruga did not state if he submitted the same directly to FCO Huelgas. No details were given as to the identity of
the person who received the specimen shabu on behalf of the crime laboratory, as well as how it was handled, preserved, and
managed before FCO Huelgas conducted an examination thereon. According to P02 Oruga, he simply left the plastic sachet
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of shabu and the buy-bust money at the crime laboratory and brought Calibod to the police station, where he was charged of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs

By and large, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militates against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal
drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Calibod's acquittal is perforce in order.

People of the Philippines vs Antonio Balcueva y Bandocoy


G.R. No. 214466 July 1, 2015

RULING:

Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC reads:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

xxxx

The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the victim i$ a female over 12 years but under 18
years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority.17

A perusal of the. records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. Thus, the RTC and the CA committed no
reversible error in convicting Balcueva of the crime of Qualified Rape.

As correctly ruled, AAA's clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed raped by Balcueva, her own
father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva's flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony
and identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as
rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why
AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.

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PENALTY: Anent the penalty to be imposed on Balcueva, the R TC and the CA properly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole,21 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9346.

In view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed upon
Balcueva because of the provisions of RA 9346, the Court hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, the Court imposes
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully
paid.

Lozada

Rizaldo L. Orsos vs People of the Philippines

Jurisdiction

At the outset, it bears to emphasize the recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of a witness on
the stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding
and conclusive upon this Court.

CRIMINAL LAW 2 – Acts of lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which reads:

Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either
sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

There must be a confluence of the following elements before conviction can be had for such crime: (1) that the offender commits
any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. 45

On the other hand, RA 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or those
"persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." 46 Section 5 (b) thereof
provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] (Emphases supplied)

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The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7 610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 47

"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7610, as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 48 (Emphases supplied)

In Quimvel v. People,51 however, the Court clarified that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and influence," and
that "x x x lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will.x x x [T]he term 'influence' means the 'improper use
of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective.' Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the
'improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.’"52

JURISDICTION - In accordance with Section 1757 of RA No. 8369,58 which provides that in areas where there are no family courts, the
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the said family courts59 shall be adjudicated by the regular courts, the RTC correctly exercised
jurisdiction over this case.

PENALTY - Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the prescribed penalty for lascivious conduct is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken
from the medium period60 thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period.61 Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a period of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Likewise, and conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, 62 he is directed to pay AAA the amounts of
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱l5,000.00 as fine, all of which
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment.

Alvin Comeciante y Gonzales vs People of the Philippines

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable”
within the meaning of said constitutional provision.-

—Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure
becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two
(2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.-

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—For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b) requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of
the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5(a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section
5(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

Miranda
People of the Philippines vs Brahim Lidasan, et. al.
G.R. No. 227425. September 4, 2017

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in
the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; ii) it is committed by simulating public authority;; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notably,
the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.

Accomplices; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law

As to the proper penalties to be imposed on accused-appellants, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code originally prescribes the
death penalty for the commission of said crime made for the purpose of extorting ransom. Hence, the RTC meted such penalty on
the principals, and the penalty one (1) degree lower – i.e. reclusion perpetua – on the accomplices pursuant to Article 52 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the passage of Republic Act 9346 effectively lowered the imposable penalty to the principals to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Resultantly, the imposable penalty to the accomplices must likewise be lowered to
reclusion temporal, thereby entitling them the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

GUILLERMO WACOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 213792. June 22, 2015

Criminal Procedure; Appeals

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on the
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.

Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray

The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting or attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons
quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray;

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(e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries or who used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between
several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and
the author thereof cannot be ascertained.

Homicide

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, shall kill another, without the attendance
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by
reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any
justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.

Mens Rea; Intent to Kill in Homicide; Mitigating Circumstances

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision on homicide should apply only where the crime committed is different from that
intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem). It is well-settled that if the victim
dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to
kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequence thereof.

The penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code. In determining the intention of this
circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the intention of the
accused must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts.

Mortejo
Joselito Peralta y Zareno vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 221991, August 30, 2017

Special Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, Section 1 of PD 1866

The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or
carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess or carry the same.

Paraffin test results; Probative Value

The failure to present the results of the paraffin test is inconsequential since it is not indicative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused on the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test was extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; however, the test alone cannot determine whether the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or
even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other
than gunpowder.

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Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests, Search and Seizure

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant
before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may
be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same,
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Peralta, the courts a quo en-ed in sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

As may be gleaned from Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended, the prescribed penalties for the crime committed is "prision
mayor in its minimum period," or imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day up to eight (8) years, and a fine of
P30,000.00. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). If the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the
ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court deems it proper to adjust the indeterminate period of imprisonment
imposed on Peralta to four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Finally, the imposition of fine in the amount of P30,000.00 stands.

People of the Philippines vs Bernabe P. Palanas alias “Abe”


GR No. 214453, June 17, 2015

Criminal Law; Murder, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

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xxxx

Treachery; Two (2) conditions to be met

Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." There are two (2) conditions
therefore that must be met for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting
the victim no chance to resist or escape. The attack must be sudden and unexpected rendering the victim unable and unprepared to
put up a defense.

Penalties;

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA 9346 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Noble
People of the Philippine vs Ruperto Rubillar Jr. y Gaberon
G.R. No. 224631 August 23, 2017

To be convicted of Rape under Article 226-A (1) (a) of the RPC, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and ( b) such act was accomplished through force, threat, or
intimidation.

In the present case, Rubillar' s invocation of the "sweetheart theory" is essentially an admission of him having carnal knowledge with
AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual. Thus, it is crucial to determine whether or not AAA indeed consented to the
sexual act, considering that the gravamen of Rape is sexual congress with a woman without her consent.

The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. As afore-
stated, it is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of
proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." In People v. Patentes, the Court discussed the evidence required in order
to support such defense, to wit:

We are mindful that appellant's bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos,
mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.

The "sweetheart theory" operates to impair the victim's testimony or create doubt on her version of the facts when the defense
presents sufficient evidence of a relationship between the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it. Notably, a woman
who was sexually abused by a lover has no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the accused in a rape trial because
admitting such relationship would not negate her allegation of rape, as the Court has consistently ruled that "a 'love affair' does not
justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will." Nonetheless, if she denies the relationship but it was found
existing, she runs the risk of tainting her testimony when her version of the facts is inconsistent with the presence of an intimate
relationship between them. The Court proceeds to resolve this case with this mindset.

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In this case, Rubillar's allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his other witnesses. First, Odiongan
testified that prior to the alleged incident, AAA introduced Rubillar to him as his new boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate
embrace. Second, Laguardia recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend through a text message, then, borrowed his
motorcycle, which Rubillar and AAA used for about an hour. Third and most relevant is the testimony of Kalan, AAA' s long time
friend, who testified that AAA explicitly told her that Rubillar was his boyfriend once before the alleged incident and a second time
after AAA ran away from home.

It appears from these testimonies that Rubillar and AAA mutually acknowledged their clandestine relationship and revealed it to
some people close to them. The Court stresses that the finding of a then subsisting relationship between the complainant and the
accused raises suspicions on the truthfulness of AAA' s testimony, wherein she vehemently denied having a relationship with the
accused.

In addition, AAA's act of leaving home to elope with her alleged malefactor is uncharacteristic of one who has been raped and
seeks retribution for it. While it is true that not all victims react the same way after suffering forced coitus, it appears highly unlikely
for a victim of rape to cry out that she was sexually abused and, thereafter, to elope with her offender. At this point, it is worthy to
note that AAA failed to give any reason why her two close friends would testify against her claim of rape in court.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[a] conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution." If the prosecution fails
to do so, "the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For
the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense,"as in this case.

As elucidated in Patentes:

The testimony of the offended party should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted.
Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged
victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While
judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally
bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.

The appeal was granted and Rubillar was acquitted.

People of the Philippines vs Rick Arguta alias “Joel” and Wilson Cahipe alias “Siwit”
G.R. No. 213216 April 20, 2015

The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies the crime of Rape.1âwphi1 If
one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating circumstance. When the two
circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic aggravating circumstance for
either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence,
the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

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3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.

The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty. In People v. Lamberte, the Court clarified the legal
effect of the presence of both circumstances, as follows:

The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" - qualifies the crime. If one is present,
the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating circumstance. That was our ruling in People vs. Garcia,
[192 Phil. 311, 342] (1981) reading:

In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely.

1. use of a deadly weapon and

2. that two persons committed the rapes.

The first was alleged in the information while the second was proved during trial. In both cases, the Court
appreciated the first as a qualifying circumstance and the second as a generic aggravating circumstance,
in accordance with settled jurisprudence according to the trial court.

We do not agree. Under the law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two
circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic
aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which
is reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.

Novelero

People vs John Paul Ceralde y Ramos


G.R. No. 228894 August 7, 2017

Criminal Procedure: ( On RA 9165)


- In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove:

(a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements to warrant his conviction:

(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug;

(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and

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(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

- Case law states that in both instances,

a. it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody
over the same.
b. it must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up
to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, among others,

a. immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

b. In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.

- Thus, the claim that the instant buy-bust operation is a "confidential matter" which requires them "not to tell other person
about it," not even an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media, cannot be given credence, as
the law mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain of custody and to avoid the possibility of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence.

- Moreover, P03 Delos Santos did not satisfactorily explain why compliance with said rule "will not prove productive," not to
mention the exigent circumstances which would actually show that they were "running out of time to inform" the said
required witnesses. In fact, there is dearth of evidence to show that the police officers even attempted to contact and
secure the other witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that buy-bust operations are usually planned out ahead of time.

- Neither did the police officers provide any other explanation for their non-compliance, such as a threat to their safety and
security or the time and distance which the other witnesses would have had to consider. Thus, since the prosecution failed
to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ceralde were already compromised. Perforce,
Ceralde's acquittal is in order.

- "As a final note, it is fitting to mention that '[t]he Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon
our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals.

- The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-
handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are
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not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x
x x. ' "

People of the Philippines vs Eugene Samuya


G.R. No. 213214 April 20, 2015

(On Self Defense)


- In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt
that:
(a) a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him or her;
(c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and
(d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.

- The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense, either to justify the commission of a
crime or to mitigate the imposable penalty. It is settled that without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete.
- For unlawful aggression to justify or mitigate a crime, the same must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely threatening and intimidating attitude, towards the one claiming self-defense.

Here, Eugene claims that he saw Gabriel rushing towards his direction, armed with a knife. Fearing that Gabriel was going to attack
him, he pulled his own gun and shot the victim.
- However, as duly observed by the RTC and the CA, Eugene's account of events remained uncorroborated as no witness was
ever presented to support his story. In fact, his co-accused, Rudy, even denied seeing Gabriel rush towards them, brandish a
knife, and threaten to attack Eugene. Thus, apart from Eugene's self-serving testimony, nothing on record supports his
claim that Gabriel was about to attack him. On this score, Eugene's plea of self-defense - whether as a justifying or as a
mitigating circumstance - should fail.

(On Treachery)
- There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
- In People v. Tan, the Court held that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked.
- In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance
may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or
her defense.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Eugene's attack on Gabriel was so swift and sudden, and without any warning.
Eyewitnesses testified that immediately upon his arrival and without any exchange of words, Eugene pulled out his gun and shot
Gabriel. As the RTC and CA aptly pointed out, although the attack was frontal, it was so sudden and unexpected which made it
impossible for Gabriel to defend himself The gunshot wound on Gabriel's chest caused massive bleeding which led to his death not
long after. Thus, in view of the long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
deserve great weight and respect, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.

Requina

Christopher Fianza a.k.a. vs “Topel” vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 218592. August 2, 2017

Criminal Law; Penalties


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At the outset, the Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which Fianza was charged to Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC considering that the victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents. In
instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age, the offender
should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in
accordance with Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims [sic] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder.

Acts of Lasciviousness; Section 5 (b) RA 7610; Elements


The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) by using force or intimidation; (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age;
and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex.[30] On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements: (a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is below eighteen (18) years
old.
In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as well as
the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on
two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November 30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and
masturbate him.
Second element of sexual abuse; when is a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult. Case law further clarifies that lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some
form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto,
Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a
variety of forms.

Presumption; A child is presumed to be incapable of giving a rational consent to any lascivious act
In Malto v. People,[35] the Court explained:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she
is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.

The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business
deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In
other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Criminal Procedure; Sufficiency of Complaint or Information; Allegation on the date of the Commission of the Offense

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In this relation, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules), which lays down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a
complaint or information, provides:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
As to the sufficiency of the allegation on the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules adds:

SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be
proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
Indeed, the precise date and time of the incidents are not among the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610.
It is likewise well-settled that it is sufficient that the acts or omissions constituting the offense be stated in the information in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, albeit in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Dissenting Opinion- J. Caguioa
Penalty
With due respect, I maintain my position as elucidated in my Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel v. People, that a person may only be
convicted of a violation of Article 336 in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 upon allegation and proof of the unique
circumstances of the child-that is, that the child is "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse". Conversely, the
higher penalty of reclusion temporal, in the range that the ponencia holds to be applicable in this case, is not automatically
applicable and may only be justified if it is alleged and proved that the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
for money, profit, or any other consideration.

Charging of Criminal Offense; Elements for Conviction


It is my position that insofar as the first Information is concerned, Petitioner cannot be convicted for violation of Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 and consequently suffer a penalty of reclusion temporal as provided for in
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, precisely because, as illustrated in my Dissenting Opinion in Quimvel,2 a first sexual affront, on
its own, cannot be automatically considered a violation of Section 5(b), absent a showing that the child is already a child
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" at the time the sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct was
committed, or that the circumstances prior to or during the act complained of already constitutes the first instance of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct so as to convert the child into a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
Petitioner, for the second instance, was correctly charged and convicted for a violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of
Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, because, this time, the child, at the time the act complained of was
committed, already qualifies as one subjected to "other sexual abuse" thereby furnishing the essential element for a conviction
under Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610.
Considering that the specific class of lascivious conduct in Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 requires allegation that the acts were performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, I respectfully submit that insofar as the first incident of July
2010 is concerned, the facts of the case warrant Petitioner's conviction only for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.
Inasmuch as the child was already subjected to "other sexual abuse" at the time the second sexual affront occurred on November
30, 2010, I raise no objection to Petitioner's conviction for violation of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, insofar as the second incident is concerned.

People of the Philippines vs Tagaylo


G.R. No. 212635. March 25, 2015

Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs

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In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must be able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.

Chain of Custody Rule


It must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized items have been preserved. In other words, the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165


Note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 916533 as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements
of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for such non- compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any deviation
from the prescribed procedure must be justified, but, at all times, should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items.

Marking of the Corpus Delicti


The Court cannot over-emphasize the significance of marking in illegal drugs cases. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until
they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence.43 Hence, in People v. Sabdula,44 the Court acquitted the accused on the ground of failure to mark the plastic sachets
confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that he did not mark the plastic sachets which contained the seized drugs, but instead placed the
marking on the "transparent plastic cellophane" wherein he placed the seized sachets. To the Court’s mind, the act of marking only
the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching, planting,
and contamination of the evidence – the very acts which the requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the cellophane passed
hands, it can now no longer be determined with certainty that its contents have remained intact, especially considering the dearth
of testimony from SPO1 Mugot that the cellophane was tightly sealed or, at the very least, secured.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Object Evidence


It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus
delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.46 The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt,47 as in this
case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal
should come as a matter of course.

G. Resurreccion

People of the Philippines vs. Dominador Ladra


G.R. No. 221443. July 17, 2017

Article 266-A Rape; where it can be committed

"Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a
house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not
impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault
is being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places."

Article 336 Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610

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Acts of Lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which reads:

Article 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex,
under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Conviction for such crime requires the concurrence of the following elements:

(a) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;


(b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances:
(i) through force, threat, or intimidation,
(ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
(iii) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, and
(iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; and
(c) that the offended party is another person of either sex.

Meanwhile, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; xxx

Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the requisites of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in addition to the requisites for
sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows:

(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Act of Lasciviousness; element of “lewdness”

The courts a quo convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Unjust Vexation instead of Acts of Lasciviousness on the finding that
there was no element of lasciviousness or lewdness in accused-appellant's act. xxx

The Court disagrees.

"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, as
follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
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xxx

After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age -
could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several years
prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates
that the mere touching - more so, "squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's
genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. xxx

"'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner."

People of the Philippines vs. Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ "Dani" or "Danilo"


G.R. No. 206381. March 25, 2015

Appeal

In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are
facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA’s factual findings. There is no
indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.

Article 12; Self-defense

Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that
the killing of Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.

Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense. Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense.

Article 14; Treachery

Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, it was
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the
attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.

Article 248 Murder

In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b)
the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC;
and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.
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Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in
the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance:

Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – xxx

xxxx

“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term “unlicensed firearm” has already been expanded as follows:

Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall include:

1. firearms with expired license; or


2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)

Damages

Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following
awards:

(a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime;
(b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty;
(c) moral damages; and
(d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

Q. Resurreccion

People vs Norieto Monroyo


G.R. 223708, June 28, 2017

FACTS:
Four informations were filed charging Monroyo of the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA and Qualified Rape against her
sister, BBB.
On the charges of Acts of Lasciviousness:
FIRST INCIDENT: While AAA was cleaning the house, Monroyo approached her, touched her private organ, and warned her against
telling her parents about what happened
SECOND INCIDENT: AAA went out to buy the cigarette sticks, handed them to Monroyo, and went to the living room to resume
cleaning the house. Monroyo followed her to the living room and once more, touched her private organ.
THIRD INCIDENT: AAA went to Monroyo's house looking for her cousin, Norton, but the latter was not at home. When she was about
to leave, Monroyo touched her private organ.
On the charge of Rape:
BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old girl, slept on a bed with her siblings, AAA and EEE. BBB woke up when she felt someone touching her
breast. She saw Monroyo, the husband of her mother's half-sister, sitting on the floor beside their bed. He then forced her to lie
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down on the floor and started kissing her all over her body. He forcibly removed her shorts and panty and thereafter stood up to
remove his shorts and brief. He then placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her private organ, and made a push and
pull motion.

ISSUE: WON Monroyo is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness Qualified Rape

RULING:
YES. The elements of the crime acts of lasciviousness are the following:
1. that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. that it is done
a. by using force or intimidation, or
b. when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or
c. when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and
3. that the offended party is another person of either sex.
AAA clearly and convincingly narrated in detail each lascivious act committed by Monroyo against her. On various occasions,
Monroyo succeeded in touching the latter's private organ. The Court finds that Monroyo's overt acts were done against AAA's will
and much more, committed without any other justifiable reason, hence, demonstrating its lewd character. AAA also sufficiently
established that she was a minor during that time. In this relation, it should be pointed out that Monroyo was AAA's uncle and thus,
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her, which according to case law, constitutes intimidation.

The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are:


(a) the victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age;
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
(c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.

Both the RTC and the CA found credible BBB's categorical testimony that Monroyo had carnal knowledge of her without her consent;
that she was sixteen (16) years old at that time; and that Monroyo is her uncle, being the husband of her mother's half-sister. In
addition, the results of Dr. Valdez's medical examination corroborated BBB's account. The lower courts also noted BBB's testimony
that Monroyo previously molested her five (5) times prior to the rape incident but she opted not to inform her parents due to
Monroyo's threats against her.

Benabaye vs People of the Philippines


G.R. 403266, February 25, 2015

FACTS:
Benabaye was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank. As such, she was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments of Siam
Bank's clients and issue provisional receipts therefor, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the
amounts of money that she has received, and remit such payments to Tupag, her supervisor.

Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions and thereby found out that fraud and certain irregularities
attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of some loan payments received from its clients based on the
provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional
receipts. 853 provisional receipts were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and, more significantly, the corresponding
payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on file.

ISSUE: WON Benabaye is guilty of ESTAFA

RULING:
NO. The elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC are:
(a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same;

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(b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property;
(c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended
party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material
possession of the employee. The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of
the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-
perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.43 Hence, conversion of personal property in the
case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.

In the case at bar, Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the end of
every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day.
Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.

Sabrido
Goromeo vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017

Relevant Topic in Criminal Law: Chain of Custody

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove
the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.

In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling
the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation
for examination.

It is important to note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provides that non-compliance
with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long
as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.1âwphi1

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After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana
confiscated from the accused were preserved, and any deviation from the chain of custody procedure was adequately justified.

By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous chain of custody which preserved the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated from the accused, notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from
the media and the DOJ at the time of the arrest and the taking of inventory. Notably, the absence of media representatives at the
time Ominga prepared the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she testified that when
contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the area and would not be able to arrive on time.

As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has
been the practice in their office for him to go to the PDEA office to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the
crime. While this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is not the
fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In People v. Rebotazo, the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, non-compliance with Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated inadmissible.

As a final point, it should be mentioned that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and involve the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions are made from such findings. This rule finds even more stringent application where the findings are sustained by the CA,
as in this case. After all, as the trier of facts, the RTC has the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and manner of
testifying and, as such, is a better judge of their credibility.

People of the Philippines vs Benjamin Casas y Vintulan


G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015

Relevant topics in Criminal Law: Self Defense as a justifying circumstance & Treachery as a qualifying circumstance

The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability.

Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from the denial of his demurrer, banks on the justifying circumstance of self-defense
in order to overturn his conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide.

The statutory basis therefor is Article 11 (1) of the RPC.

After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced that the above-
mentioned requirements were not present in this case. It is significant to point out that upon invoking the justifying circumstance
of self-defense, Casas assumed the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is
because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission.

Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for
the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a
deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.

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It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed
considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled that the moment the first
aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases,
the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is
committed.

Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when
the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.

Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven, Casas’s claim of self-defense falters and his criminal
liability stands.

This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder considering the prosecution’s
failure to prove the existence of treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is treachery.1âwphi1 Under Article 14 of the RPC, "[t]here is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make." In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the
slightest provocation on the latter’s part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack.
Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was
killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.

In People v. Discalsota, the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in instances when the victim had the opportunity to
flee or defend himself.

It is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as
Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

Siatan

PEOPLE vs. ALLAN JAO Y CALONIA AND ROGELIO CATIGTIG Y COBIO


G.R. No. 225634; June 07, 2017

For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven that the accused passed on
possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law;
and that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without
consideration. On the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such possession is not authorized by law;
and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal

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liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

PEOPLE vs. MARCELINO VITERBO y REALUBIT and RONALD VITERBO y REALUBIT


G.R. No. 203434; July 23, 2014

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur:

(a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and

(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.

As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link
in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in
court as proof of the corpus delicti.

While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the
items void and invalid, this is true only when

(a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and

(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated items.

Uayan

People of the Philippines vs Mauricio Hallarte y Mendoza


G.R. No. 205382 April 2, 2014

FACTS: In the afternoon of June 4, 2000, AAA was playing with Charissa Hallarte (Charissa), her cousin and the daughter of her
uncle, herein appellant. At the time, appellant happened to also be at the house. When Charissa went to the ground floor to urinate,
appellant approached AAA and began to remove his shorts. Thereafter, he laid AAA, raised her skirt and pulled down her underwear.
Then, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, causing AAA to feel pain and to shout for help from Charissa. When appellant
realized that his daughter Charissa might be returning anytime, he let AAA go. AAA did not recount her ordeal to anyone until she
complained to her mother, CCC, of the pain in her vagina. AAA then confessed that her uncle, appellant herein, inserted his penis
into her vagina. On the other hand, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 17, 2000, while appellant’s other niece, BBB, was with
him in his house, he inserted his penis into her mouth and threatened her not to tell anyone what he had done. BBB did not report
the incident immediately because she feared appellant. Two separate informations were filed against the Appellant for the two
incidents.

In defense, appellant denied the charges against him and claimed that on June 4, 2000, on the date when the rape incident involving
AAA allegedly transpired, he was in Novaliches, Quezon City working as a carpenter, where he reported for duty at 8 o’clock in the
morning and finished his tasks at 5 o’clock in the afternoon. He asserted that from his house in Barangay Pasong Tamo to
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Novaliches, it would take him around one and a half hours of travel time. Similarly, on June 17, 2000, the date of the incident against
BBB, he was at the office of Vanguard Agency (Vanguard) in Kalayaan, Quezon City where he also used to work, which would take an
hour’s travel from his house. Appellant denied knowledge of why he was being criminally charged by the parents of the private
complainants. Appellants defense of alibi were duly corroborated by his co-employees.

Appellant was convicted in the RTC in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93225 for Simple Rape, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226 for Rape by Sexual Assault,
the RTC sentenced appellant to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 2 months and 21 days of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum, and ordered him to pay
BBB the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: W/N the prosecution was able to prove the minority of BBB.

RULING: While the information44 alleged that BBB was "8 years of age, a minor," and the parties stipulated 45 on her minority during
the pre-trial conference, the same are insufficient evidence of her age which must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the
crime itself.46 As the Court succinctly explained in People v. Soria:

"[T]here must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the
absence of denial by the accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or school
records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the minority of "AAA" other
than her testimony, appellant’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The prosecution also failed to establish that the
documents referred to above were lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent.

Apart from BBB’s testimony and the aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft of sufficient evidence to prove BBB’s age. Thus, the
penalty prescribed in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 49 for Rape by Sexual Assault must be imposed in this
case, i.e., prision mayor, which ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Applying the ISLAW, the penalty next lower in degree is
prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Hence, a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant for the crime of Rape by Sexual
Assault.

People of the Philippines vs Pala Toukyo y Padep


G.R. No. 225593

FACTS: The prosecution alleged that on November 22, 2010, Agent Ryan Peralta (Agent Peralta) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received information from a civilian informant regarding the illegal drug
selling activities of Toukyo. After confirming via text message that Toukyo was indeed selling a brick of marijuana for ₱2,000.00, the
PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust team comprised of

Agents Peralta, John Kay-an (Agent Kay-an), and Santino Awichen (Agent Awichen) to entrap Toukyo. In the afternoon of even date
near a restaurant located at Burnham Park, Agent Peralta and the informant met with Toukyo. After Toukyo showed Agent Peralta
the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta executed the pre-arranged signal, leading to Toukyo's arrest. Agents Kay-an and Awichen
immediately marked the seized marijuana at the place of arrest, and thereafter, Agent Peralta took the marijuana as well as the
backpack where it is placed. Upon reaching the PDEA-CAR field office, Agent Peralta turned over the backpack containing the
seized marijuana to Agent Dick Dayao (Agent Dayao), who in tum, executed the proper documentation and delivered the seized
item to the Crime Laboratory. A qualitative examination reveals that the backpack indeed contains one (1) kilogram/1,000 grams
of marijuana. For his part, Toukyo invoked the defenses of denial and frame-up.

The RTC convicted Toukyo. Toukyo subsequently appealed the conviction. During the pendency of the appeal, Toukyo died in jail.

ISSUE: W/N death of the Accused during pendency of the appeal extinguishes criminal liability.

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RULING: In People v. Bayotas,21 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) xxx e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.22

Thus, upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused.23 Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no private complainant
to begin with.

Villaviray
People of the Philippines vs Cadano
G.R. No. 207819 March 12, 2014

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to
the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the
absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the
victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of
the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.25

A judicious review of the records would reveal that the aforementioned elements of statutory rape are present. First , the
presentation of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on July 25, 1998 has proven that she was below 12 years of
age when the three (3) rape incidents happened on December 26 and 27, 1996, and in June 2000, respectively. Second , the
prosecution proved that Cadano indeed had carnal knowledge of AAA on three (3) separate occasions through the latter’s positive,
categorical, and spontaneous testimony, as corroborated by the medico-legal report.

The Court likewise agrees that Cadano should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory rape. On this
matter, it is apt to discuss that RA 8353 introduced various qualifying circumstances that would increase the penalty for the crime of
rape from reclusion perpetua to death, e.g., when the offended party is a minor under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,

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ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim28 – a circumstance that was not present under the old rape provision, i.e., Article 335 of the RPC. Thus, the
aforementioned circumstance could not qualify the first two (2) rape incidents which occurred prior to the enactment of RA 8353,
but it could be properly appreciated in the third one. Nevertheless, in light of the abolition of the death penalty pursuant to RA
9346,29 the imposable penalty for the third rape incident is lowered to reclusion perpetua, with the offender being rendered
ineligible for parole.30

People of the Philippines vs Rigor


G.R. 225608

Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of
any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion
temporal.

"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention
to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of
parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the
victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance." 24

On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were committed prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 835325 in 1997) read:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
xxxx

"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said carnal knowledge
was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty."26

On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-
accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said
case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under
certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance.

Yamas

People of the Philippines vs Puyat Macapundag y Labao


G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017

FACTS:

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The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing Macapundag of violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165, x x x.

The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the morning of March 14, 2009, an informant tipped the Caloocan City Police
that a certain individual known as alias "Popoy" was selling shabu in Baltazar Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City. Acting on the tip,
Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation in coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (P03) George Ardedon (P03 Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer,
and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO 1) Amel Victoriano (SPOl Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (P02) Jeffred Pacis (P02 Pacis), as back-up
officers. After the team's final briefing, they proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag, who was then identified by
the informant as "Popoy." Consequently, P03 Ardedon approached Macapundag and retorted "Brod, pakuha," followed by "Brod,
paiskor naman." Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to which P03 Ardedon responded "Tatlong piso fang," and simultaneously
handed the three (3) marked ₱l00.00 bills. Macapundag then took four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
gave one to P03 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3) back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, P03 Ardedon gave the pre-
arranged signal by holding his nape and then held Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed to the scene. P03 Ardedon marked
the plastic sachet he purchased from Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano marked the other three (3) recovered from his pocket.

Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station, where the seized items were turned over to P02 Randulfo Hipolito (P02
Hipolito), the investigator on duty. Later, P02 Hipolito brought the items to the crime laboratory for physical examination.
Eventually, Forensic Chemical Officer-PCI Stella Ebuen (PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen, which tested positive for ephedrine, a
dangerous drug.

The RTC found Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively, finding that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. The CA
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto finding that the integrity of the seized drugs was aptly preserved and the chain of custody was not
broken, notwithstanding the fact that the procedural requirements in Section 21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully observed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

HELD:

Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In
order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a)
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. On the
other hand, the prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did not make any inventory and failed to take pictures of the
confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest. There was also no justification given as to why they failed to comply with
these requirements of law.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling
the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
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accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation
for examination.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that P03 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over by Macapundag to him)
and SPOl Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest) marked the seized items
immediately at the place of arrest. However, the prosecution's witnesses failed to state whether or not the police officers
inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his representative. Likewise, they were silent as
to the presence of the other required witnesses, i.e., a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public
official, and a member of the press. In fact, the prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs
thereof as evidence. In this relation, it is observed that the Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt and the Affidavit of Attestation,
which form part of the evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items were actually inventoried or
photographed in accordance with the parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR; thus, their submission cannot
constitute compliance with the law.

Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter
of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.

Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro vs People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014

FACTS:

Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget Division and holding the positions of
Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I, respectively.

On March 20, 1995, at about past noon, Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the
CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday party. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain
Dario and asked him to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision in the case entitled “Mateo Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc.” (Fernando), docketed as CA–G.R. No. 36808–R.

On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter turned down.
Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Arnel Macapagal (Atty. Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA
Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him (Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 267 in a safe place.

On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 covering the period from January 28 to February 12, 1969 was missing and,
hence, immediately reported the same to Atty. Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the loss, Atibula encountered Atienza
near the canteen, shouting “[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami!”

On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to Atibula a bag containing a
gift–wrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the
said package to Atibula.

Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and decision as well as of a decision in another case
found in pages 906 to 922 of Volume 266 of the CA Original Decisions were conducted by the NBI. As a result, it issued its
Questioned Documents Report No. 937–1295, finding that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been altered; and (b) the signatures of the CA
Justices in the subject resolution and decision (questioned signatures) and their standard/sample signatures “were not written by
one and the same person,” leading to the conclusion that the questioned signatures were forgeries.
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Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air–conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter’s
Division was conducted, whereby it was discovered that the improvised angle bar supporting the air conditioning unit at the right
most end from the main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall holding the same was broken (“may bak–bak na”).
NBI Agents then conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, and, in the course thereof, interviewed several personnel of the CA
Maintenance Division. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of forcible entry; (b) the perpetrators
gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division “by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air
conditioning unit” located on the right most [sic] end from the main door; (c) there was conspiracy to commit the crime of
Falsification of Public Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their “concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous
acts and deeds;” and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario “to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely the missing
volume to the [CA Reporter’s Division].”

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on account
of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

COURT’S RULING:

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred
based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on
record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and
that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.

Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented
in this case to establish the elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the same code, or of petitioners’ supposed conspiracy therefor.

The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro

To begin with, it is essential to note that Castro’s purported possession and eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon
the statement of one Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e., the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 9, 1995. Nelson was not, however,
presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not subjected to any in–court examination. It is settled that while affidavits may
be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer
oaths), they are still classified as hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon
and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross–examine them.

Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castro’s guilt.

The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza

In similar regard, the prosecution’s evidence on the circumstances in this case do not sufficiently establish Atienza’s guilt for the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document.

While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the
CA Original Decisions from the Reporter’s Division, the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different
document, that is Volume 266. The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the strength of
the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the
part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well–established that mere
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proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence
from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor.

In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired in this case. While direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests, records are, however, bereft of any
showing as to how the particular acts of petitioners figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and inserting
the falsified documents therein. Hence, the prosecution’s theory of conspiracy does not deserve any merit.

All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As such, their conviction,
tested under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s
culpability. Such moral certainty is, however, lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented.

A Final Word

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of innocence prevails
and the accused should be acquitted. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. xxx Accordingly, there being no circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any subsequent
finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents in this case.

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