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G.R. No.

L-5621 March 25, 1953 he interrogated about fifteen laborers who were then there was no more work for the laborers to do in connection
present in the place. On the strength of the evidence with the different jobs given to them. It is now contended
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' adduced during the ocular inspection Judge Roldan issued that such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it
ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs. PREMIERE an order on November 8, 1951, allowing respondent to lay- deprived the workers affected of the opportunity to
PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent. off the workers mentioned in its petition with respect to disprove what apparently was represented to the court
Unit No. 2 and those assigned to the Ground Maintenance during the ocular inspection which at best may only be the
Department subject to the condition that, in the event that result of prearrangement devised by the company to justify
Cipriano Cid for petitioner. work is available in the future, they should be re-employed. its claim of lack of work and that what the court should
Salvador C. Bayani for respondent. With respect to the workers assigned to Unit No. 1, the have done was to make a full-dress investigation if not a
hearing was postponed. formal hearing giving both parties all the time and
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: opportunity to present their evidence before deciding such
A subsequent hearing was held in connection with the an important matter which affects the position and the only
This is a petition for review of two orders of the Court of workers assigned to Unit. 1 and on the strength of the means of livelihood of the workers affected by the petition.
Industrial Relations, one dated November 8, 1951, and the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again In other words, the petitioning labor union workers were
other November 24, 1951, which give authority to found the petition justifiable and authorized their lay-off in deprived of their employment without due process of law.
respondent to lay-off forty-four (44) of its employees in an order dated November 24, 1951, under the same
accordance with its urgent petition on condition that, in the condition as those contained in his previous order. The claim of petitioner that the laborers were not given an
event work is available in the future where their ability may opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the claim
be required, the same workers should be reemployed and Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of both orders of lack of work is disputed by counsel for respondent
that, if after the termination of the case, the court would dated November 8 and November 24, 1951, which motion company who claims that the labor union had its day in
find that at the time of their lay off work was available, the the court en banc denied in a resolution issued on March court because its counsel was present in the investigation or
respondent shall pay to them the back wages to which they 10, 1952. Hence this petition for review. ocular inspection and even presented some witnesses to
are entitled. These two holders were upheld by the court en protect its interest. The record before the court on this
banc in a resolution dated March 10, 1952, which is also matter is not clear and for such reason it has no way of
involved in the present petition for The only issue submitted to this court for reconsideration determining the truth of both claims. The stenographic
review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law is: May the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the lay notes taken during the ocular inspection have not been
library off of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without elevated for the reason undoubtedly that this is a petition
receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of for review and the only issue before the court is one of law.
such lay-off In the face of this confusing situations on an issue which is
On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of
Industrial Relations an urgent petition seeking authority to determinative of the controversy, the only guide that the
lay-off 44 men working in three of its departments, the first It appears that when the case was called for hearing to look court finds is the order of the court of origin which happily
batch to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of the in the merits of the urgent petition of respondent seeking to contains a reference to the evidence that it has considered
petition and the rest 45 days thereafter, in order that in the lay-off 44 men who were working in three of its and which has served as basis for its conclusion resulting in
intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending departments on the ground of lack of work and because its lay-off of the workers in whose behalf the present petition
picture. The ground for the lay-off is the financial losses business was suffering financial losses during the current was brought before this court. We refer to the order of
which respondent was allegedly suffering during the year the court, which was then represented by its presiding November 8, 1951, subject of the petition for review,
current year Judge, decided to make an ocular inspection of the studios wherein Judge Roldan makes express mention of the
and filming premises of respondent following a request evidence can only refer to testimony given by the workers
made to that effect by its counsel, and in the course of said interrogated by him and to whatever documents he found or
Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of inspection Judge Roldan proceeded to interrogate the examined in the course of such inspection. It is true, as
financial losses has no basis in fact it being only an act of workers he found in the place in the presence of the counsel counsel for respondent avers, that hearing were conducted
retaliation on the part of respondent for the strike staged by of both parties. The testimony of those interrogated was by the court a quo on October 8, and 15, 1951, and on
the workers days before in an attempt to harass and taken down and the counsel of both parties were allowed to November 5, 6, 15, and 21, 1951, but it is likewise true that
intimidate them and weaken and destroy the union to which cross-examine them. Judge Roldan also proceeded to those hearings do not necessarily refer to the petition under
they belong. examine some of the records of respondent company consideration but to other matters and incidents which were
among them the time cards of some workers which showed then before the court for determination such as the petition
On November 5, 1951, date when the urgent petition was that while the workers reported for work, when their of the labor union containing fourteen (14) demands and
set for hearing, at the request of counsel for respondent, presence was checked they were found to be no longer in the petition of the same union to declare respondent in
Hon. Arsenio C. Roldan, presiding judge of the Court of the premises. And on the strength of the findings made by contempt for having violated certain directives of the court.
Industrial Relations, held an ocular inspection of the studios judge Roldan in this ocular inspection he reached the At any rate, this matter does not appear clear and we are
and filming premises of respondent in the course of which conclusion that the petition for lay-off was justified because inclined to resolve the doubt in favor of labor considering
the spirit of our Constitution. The right to labor is a situation of the respondent company. In fact, this matter is Manila-Orani and vice versa 7 “
constitutional as well as statutory right. Every man has a now being looked into by the court a quo in connection Manila-Cabcaben and vice versa 4 “
natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but before Manila-Orion and vice versa 6 “
has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put finishing its inquiry it decided to grant the lay-off pending Manila-Limay and vice versa 6 “
into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The final determination of the main case. This action is in our Manila-Dinalupihan and vice versa 4 “
right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property opinion premature and has worked injustice to the The Pampanga Bus Company and La Mallorca opposed
within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his laborers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law these applications, both alleging that they are authorized to
means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or library operate and are actually operating a fleet of auto-trucks on
work without due process of law the lines applied for and rendering adequate and
WHEREFORE, the orders subject of the present petition satisfactory service; that the additional services applied for
Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the for review are hereby set aside, and it is ordered that the are superfluous, will not promote public interest in a proper
determination of any question or controversy, may adopt its cause be remanded to the court of origin for further and suitable manner, and will result in cut-throat and
own rules of procedure and may act according to justice proceedings giving to petitioner an opportunity to present ruinous competition. The Commission, after hearing the
and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that its evidence in support of its opposition to the urgent parties and their evidence and having before it the records
matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence petition for lay-off of respondent company. No of the authorized services on the lines applied for, as well
(section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103), this broad grant pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary as the findings of two of its agents who had been ordered
of power should not be interpreted to mean that it can chanrobles virtual law library by it to make an on-the-spot survey of the passenger traffic
ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due along those lines, rendered a joint decision in the four
process in the trials and investigation of cases brought cases, denying the applications on the grounds that
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Petitioner had not made a case for the grant of the
before it for determination. As aptly pointed out by this Labrador, JJ., concur.
court, there are certain cardinal primary rights which the certificates applied for, that the service of the Oppositors
Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur in the result. was adequate and sufficient for the actual needs of the
Court of Industrial Relations must respect in the trial of
every labor case. One of them is the right to a hearing public and that the grant of the applications would only
which includes the right of the party interested to present result in unnecessary or wasteful competition.
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof Reconsideration of this decision having been denied,
(Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor EN BANC Petitioner has sought a review of this Court.
Union, 71 Phil., 124, 129). An ocular inspection of the [G.R. Nos. L-7996-99. May 31, 1956.] It would appear from the record that the Pampanga Bus
establishment or premise involved is proper if the court ESTATE OF FLORENCIO P. BUAN, Petitioner, vs. Company is authorized and actually operating 27 round
finds it necessary, but such is authorized only to help the PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY AND LA MALLORCA, trips on the Limay-Manila line, 8 on the Limay-San
court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding Respondents. Fernando, Pampanga, line; 14 on the Mariveles-Limay line,
the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude 4 on the Balanga-Moron line, 3 on the Balanga-
the presentation of other evidence which the parties may DECISION Dinalupihan line, and 1 on the Guagua-Dinalupihan line,
deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an REYES, A., J.: while the La Mallorca has 15 round trips on the Lamao-
This is a petition to review a decision of the Public Service Manila line, 6 on the Balanga-Manila line, 16 on the
auxiliary remedy the law affords the parties or the court to
reach an enlightened determination of the case. Commission. Cabcaben Balanga line, and 20 on the Balanga-Dinalupihan
The estate of Florencio P. Buan, herein Petitioner, is an line. The main issue in this petition for review is whether or
authorized bus operator along various lines in central and not the trips actually being operated by the two companies,
Considering the merits of the controversy before us, we are northern Luzon, with authority to operate 8 auto-trucks together with those of Petitioner, are adequate to serve the
of the opinion that the required due process has not been along the Manila-Bagac line and 11 along the Moron public need.
followed. The court a quo merely acted on the strength of Dinalupihan line. Allegedly in response to various To prove the inadequacy of the present service, 14
the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the resolutions of municipal councils and on petition of civic witnesses took the stand for Petitioner and testified to the
respondent company. The petition for lay-off was and labor groups in the province of Bataan urging extension insufficiency of transportation facilities and the need for
predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that of its services to their respective municipalities, Petitioner additional service on the lines applied for. Documentary
the company was incurring financial losses. These applied in four cases in the Commission for certificates of proof, consisting of resolutions of municipal councils of
allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of public convenience to operate additional trips between Balanga, Dinalupihan, Limay, and Orani, and a petition of
the place of labor specially when such inspection was Manila and various municipalities and barrios in Bataan, the Association of Citizens of Orion, was also adduced to
conducted at the request of the interested party. As counsel with a total of 83 units distributed as show the need for the solicited additional service, and there
for petitioner says, such inspection could at best witness follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary was also mention of the inability of the Pampanga Bus
"the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be Manila-Balanga and vice versa 30 units Company to register its authorized number of units, as well
determinative of the larger and more fundamental issue of Manila-Mariveles and vice versa 10 “ as the alleged noncompliance on the part of the two
lack of work due to lack of funds". This fundamental issue Manila-Lamao and vice versa 8 “ Respondents companies with the terms of their certificates
cannot be determined without looking into the financial Manila-Moron and vice versa 8 “ by suppressing trips on hours when they do not expect a
sufficient number of passengers. On their part the two As pointed out in the decision, an examination of those southwest of Balanga and is connected to the highway by a
Respondent companies presented six witnesses, and reports “will show that on an average from 12 to 15 road which passes through Bagac and intersects it at Pilar.
documentary proof too, to show that they were rendering passengers were carried by each bus checked and in many Evidently, Respondents’ 15 trips from Lamao, 27 trips from
service in accordance with the requirements of their instances the number of passengers carried was between Limay, and the 6 trips from Balanga direct to Manila, as
certificates and that the needs of the traveling public were two and ten.” Needless to say, the sending of the two well as Petitioner’s own 8 trips from Bagac to Manila, all
being adequately served. checkers for purposes of observation appears to be justified, pass along this main highway so that in truth Lamao is
Unable at first to arrive at a decision from the conflicting for as this Court has already said, “where the evidence was served with 15 trips; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLimay and
evidence presented for both parties, the Commission conflicting as to whether existing service of the holder of a Orion 42 trips; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPilar, Balanga,
ordered a survey of the passenger traffic on the lines certificate of convenience for land transportation was Abucay, Samal, Orani, Hermosa, and Layac, 56 trips daily
applied for, and to that end assigned and stationed in two inadequate, so that another certificate should be granted to to and from Manila, not to mention the trips furnished by
strategic places in Bataan two of its agents. The agents Petitioner, the Public Service Commission acted with local operators within the province. With the Commission’s
made a check-up of the number of passengers coming to prudence in sending two of its inspectors to investigate and finding that the average payload per bus on the Bataan line
and from the whole province for a period of one week and report on the situation. (Gilles vs. Halili, 65 Phil., 738.) is less than 50 per cent and Respondents’ evidence, not
thereafter submitted their findings. Considering these It is, however, contended that the Commission erred in contradicted by Petitioner, that they are not getting a
findings together with the evidence submitted by the denying Petitioner’s four applications for direct service reasonably fair margin of profit on their lines, the granting
parties, the Commission found that — specially to those places where the two Respondents have of authority to operate the proposed additional services
“The reports of agents at both checkpoints confirm the no authority to operate a direct service to and from Manila, would undoubtedly crowd the routes presently served both
assertion of the Oppositors that the existing passenger and in sustaining Respondent’s opposition notwithstanding by the Respondents and the Petitioner and decrease the
traffic in all the lines do not warrant the authorization of the fact that they themselves have filed applications for already low average payload per bus, thereby provoking
additional service. In examination of the reports will show direct service on the lines proposed to be served by cut-throat competition, which ultimately results in
that on an average from 12 to 15 passengers were carried Petitioner in the present case, in which applications they deterioration of service due to heavy losses or diminution in
by each bus checked and in many instances the number of allege the necessity for additional service. It is argued in income.
passengers carried was between two and ten. A this connection that the two Oppositors are serving only The discriminatory attitude imputed to the Commission by
computation of the load of the buses on all the lines during three of the nine lines applied for by Petitioner, that is, reason of its having, to Petitioner’s prejudice, allegedly
the period of checking shows that the average payload per Limay-Manila, Lamao-Manila, and Balanga-Manila, and deviated from its consistent policy of approving
bus on the lines was even less than 50 per cent. On the dispatch early morning trips from Dinalupihan, Orion, applications for direct service since such kind of service is
Manila-Balanga line, the load was 33 per cent; Manila- Cabcaben, and Mariveles to Manila when neither of them more convenient to the traveling public than the broken
Limay 30 per cent; Manila-Lamao 33 per cent; -Orion 33 has authority to operate direct service from these places to trips, is more fancied than real, considering the finding that
per cent; Manila-Bagac 39 percent, and on the local lines Manila and that this unauthorized operation cannot be the present authorized trips are more than adequate to take
like San Fernando- Limay, Dinalupihan-Balanga; Guagua considered as evidence in support of the finding of care of the passenger traffic along the routes in question.
Limay and Dinalupihan-Moron, the average load was about adequate and sufficient facilities to warrant denial of Highly desirable as direct trips undoubtedly are, there
20 per cent of the carrying capacity of the truck. A similar applications for direct service to those places for which would be no sense in unnecessarily increasing their number
finding results from the checking undertaken at Layac, none is authorized. on lines already amply served by equally direct service
Dinalupihan, where the payload of the trucks as checked is We find no merit in Petitioner’s contention. While it is true supplemented by the local services.
practically the same as that of the trucks checked at that the two Oppositors have authority to operate direct The fact that Respondents have dispatched trips without
Balanga. The checking also indicates that Oppositors service only on three of the nine lines applied for by previous authority may call for some kind of disciplinary
operate their service in accordance with the schedules Petitioner, in reality these direct lines pass through the action. But we don’t think it would be a good ground for
prescribed in their certificates and that the service which other routes applied for like Orani and Orion, and the two authorizing additional trips where the Commission has
they render together with that of other operators provide the Oppositors have sufficient and convenient trips going to the found that there is already more than adequate service
public with buses at frequent intervals so that we find it other points like Mariveles, Moron, Cabcaben, and along the main highway and to and from communities with
difficult to believe the assertion of applicant’s witnesses Dinalupihan, whose hours of departure and arrival are easy access thereto.
that passengers cannot be accommodated due to insufficient coordinated with those on the direct trips to Manila. And It is true that subsequent to the filing of Petitioner’s
trips or that buses which arrive are so loaded that they are for a clearer apprehension of the situation in this case, it applications Respondents themselves have filed similar
not allowed to ride.” should be noted that there is only one main highway in the applications for direct service on the same lines and in
The above-quoted findings are obviously supported by province. From its Mariveles end, the route of this highway those applications they allege the need for additional
more than substantial evidence and therefore binding upon towards Manila traverses in consecutive order the barrios of service. But as to that we can believe Respondents’
this Court, which is not required to examine the proof de Cabcaben and Lamao, the towns of Limay, Orion, Pilar, explanation at the hearing that the filing of their own
novo and determine for itself whether or not the Balanga, Abucay, Samal, Orani, Hermosa, and the barrio of applications was merely a tactical move calculated to
preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision Layac, Dinalupihan. The only places not touched by this secure for themselves, as prewar operators with a heavy
below. Moreover, such doubt as might arise from the highway, to where lines are also proposed by Petitioner, are investment on the Bataan line, preference in the grant of
conflict of evidence appears to be dissipated by the reports Dinalupihan, which lies along the Zambales highway two authority for additional service, should the Commission
of the two checkers sent out to observe by the Commission. kilometers from the Layac junction, and Moron, which lies
decide after hearing that there is need for such additional violation of the conditions of its certificate of public
service. convenience and the regulations of the Commission, and
The law, in investing the Public Service Commission with for failure to comply with the directives to raise its service
the power of supervision and control over public ZALDIVAR, J.: voltage and maintain them within the limits prescribed in
transportation, has also clothed it with broad discretion in the Revised Order No. 1 of the Commission, and to acquire
the exercise of that power. With that discretion this Court is and install a kilowattmeter to indcate the load in kilowatts
not supposed to interfere except in case of clear abuse. These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together. at any particular time of the generating unit. 3
Such has not been shown to be the case here. What appears
is that the Commission, faced with the conflict of evidence Case G.R. No. L-20993 is a petition of the Rizal Light & For failure of the petitioner to appear at the hearing on
on the adequacy or inadequacy of the present service, has Ice Co., Inc. to review and set aside the orders of February 18, 1957, the Commission ordered the
sought to discover the truth through an on-the-ground respondent Public Service Commission, 1 dated August 20, cancellation and revocation of petitioner's certificate of
inspection and observation by its own agents and has, on 1962, and February 15, 1963, in PSC Case No. 39716, public convenience and necessity and the forfeiture of its
the basis of information thus obtained, arrived at the cancelling and revoking the certificate of public franchise. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said
conclusion that the additional service applied for is convenience and necessity and forfeiting the franchise of order on the ground that its manager, Juan D. Francisco,
uncalled for because there is already amplitude, if not said petitioner. In the same petition, the petitioner prayed was not aware of said hearing. Respondent municipality
superabundance, in the number of authorized trips. That for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte opposed the motion alleging that petitioner has not
conclusion is amply supported by the record and is far from suspending the effectivity of said orders and/or enjoining rendered efficient and satisfactory service and has not
being the product of partiality or unfair discrimination. And respondents Commission and/or Municipality of Morong, complied with the requirements of the Commission for the
it not clearly appearing that discretion has been abused or Rizal, from enforcing in any way the cancellation and improvement of its service. The motion was set for hearing
that the Commission has illegally used its powers, we have revocation of petitioner's franchise and certificate of public and Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, Chief, Industrial Division of the
to respect its judgment and not to try to replace it with our convenience during the pendency of this appeal. By Commission, was authorized to conduct the hearing for the
own. resolution of March 12, 1963, this Court denied the petition reception of the evidence of the parties. 4
Wherefore, the decision below is affirmed, with costs for injunction, for lack of merit.
against the petition.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Finding that the failure of the petitioner to appear at the
Case G. R. L-21221 is likewise a petition of the Rizal Light hearing set for February 18, 1957 — the sole basis of the
Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., & Ice Co., Inc. to review and set aside the decision of the
concur. revocation of petitioner's certificate — was really due to the
Commission dated March 13, 1963 in PSC Case No. 62- illness of its manager, Juan D. Francisco, the Commission
5143 granting a certificate of public convenience and set aside its order of revocation. Respondent municipality
necessity to respondent Morong Electric Co., Inc. 2 to moved for reconsideration of this order of reinstatement of
operate an electric light, heat and power service in the the certificate, but the motion was denied.
.R. No. L-20993 September 28, 1968 municipality of Morong, Rizal. In the petition Rizal Light
& Ice Co., Inc. also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte suspending the effectivity In a petition dated June 25, 1958, filed in the same case,
RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC., petitioner, respondent municipality formally asked the Commission to
vs. of said decision. Per resolution of this Court, dated May 6,
1963, said petition for injunction was denied. revoke petitioner's certificate of public convenience and to
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MORONG, RIZAL and forfeit its franchise on the ground, among other things, that
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents. it failed to comply with the conditions of said certificate
The facts, as they appear in the records of both cases, are as and franchise. Said petition was set for hearing jointly with
---------------------------- follows: the order to show cause. The hearings had been postponed
several times.
G.R. No. L-21221 September 28, 1968 Petitioner Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. is a domestic
corporation with business address at Morong, Rizal. On Meanwhile, inspections had been made of petitioner's
August 15, 1949, it was granted by the Commission a electric plant and installations by the engineers of the
RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC., petitioner, certificate of public convenience and necessity for the
vs. Commission, as follows: April 15, 1958 by Engineer
installation, operation and maintenance of an electric light, Antonio M. Alli; September 18, 1959, July 12-13, 1960,
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and heat and power service in the municipality of Morong,
MORONG ELECTRIC CO., INC., respondents. and June 21-24, 1961, by Engineer Meliton S. Martinez.
Rizal. The inspection on June 21-24, 1961 was made upon the
request of the petitioner who manifested during the hearing
Amado A. Amador, Jr. for petitioner. In an order dated December 19, 1956, the Commission on December 15, 1960 that improvements have been made
Atilano C. Bautista and Pompeyo F. Olivas for required the petitioner to appear before it on February 18, on its service since the inspection on July 12-13, 1960, and
respondents. 1957 to show cause why it should not be penalized for that, on the basis of the inspection report to be submitted, it
would agree to the submission of the case for decision service. Said application was entitled "Morong Electric Co., without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it delegated the
without further hearing. Inc., Applicant", and docketed as Case No. 62-5143. hearing of the case and the reception of evidence to Mr.
Pedro S. Talavera who is not allowed by law to hear the
When the case was called for hearing on July 5, 1961, Petitioner opposed in writing the application of Morong same; (2) that the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
petitioner failed to appear. Respondent municipality was Electric, alleging among other things, that it is a holder of a public convenience was unwarranted because no sufficient
then allowed to present its documentary evidence, and certificate of public convenience to operate an electric light, evidence was adduced against the petitioner and that
thereafter the case was submitted for decision. heat and power service in the same municipality of petitioner was not able to present evidence in its defense;
Morong, Rizal, and that the approval of said application (3) that the Commission failed to give protection to
would not promote public convenience, but would only petitioner's investment; and (4) that the Commission erred
On July 7, 1961, petitioner filed a motion to reopen the case in imposing the extreme penalty of revocation of the
upon the ground that it had not been furnished with a copy cause ruinous and wasteful competition. Although the
opposition is dated October 6, 1962, it was actually certificate.
of the report of the June 21-24, 1961 inspection for it to
reply as previously agreed. In an order dated August 25, received by the Commission on November 8, 1962, or
1961, petitioner was granted a period of ten (10) days twenty four days after the order of general default was In questioning the decision in Case No. 62-5143, petitioner
within which to submit its written reply to said inspection issued in open court when the application was first called contends: (1) that the Commission erred in denying
report, on condition that should it fail to do so within the for hearing on October 15, 1962. On November 12, 1962, petitioner's motion to dismiss and proceeding with the
said period the case would be considered submitted for however, the petitioner filed a motion to lift said order of hearing of the application of the Morong Electric; (2) that
decision. Petitioner failed to file the reply. In consonance default. But before said motion could be resolved, the Commission erred in granting Morong Electric a
with the order of August 25, 1961, therefore, the petitioner filed another motion, dated January 4, 1963, this certificate of public convenience and necessity since it is
Commission proceeded to decide the case. On July 29, time asking for the dismissal of the application upon the not financially capable to render the service; (3) that the
1962 petitioner's electric plant was burned. ground that applicant Morong Electric had no legal Commission erred when it made findings of facts that are
personality when it filed its application on September 10, not supported by the evidence adduced by the parties at the
1962, because its certificate of incorporation was issued by trial; and (4) that the Commission erred when it did not
In its decision, dated August 20, 1962, the Commission, on the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October give to petitioner protection to its investment — a
the basis of the inspection reports of its aforenamed 17, 1962. This motion to dismiss was denied by the reiteration of the third assignment of error in the other
engineers, found that the petitioner had failed to comply Commission in a formal order issued on January 17, 1963 case.1awphîl.nèt
with the directives contained in its letters dated May 21, on the premise that applicant Morong Electric was a de
1954 and September 4, 1954, and had violated the facto corporation. Consequently, the case was heard on the
conditions of its certificate of public convenience as well as We shall now discuss the appeals in these two cases
merits and both parties presented their respective evidence. separately.
the rules and regulations of the Commission. The On the basis of the evidence adduced, the Commission, in
Commission concluded that the petitioner "cannot render its decision dated March 13, 1963, found that there was an
the efficient, adequate and satisfactory electric service absence of electric service in the municipality of Morong G.R. No. L-20993
required by its certificate and that it is against public and that applicant Morong Electric, a Filipino-owned
interest to allow it to continue its operation." Accordingly, corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of 1. Under the first assignment of error, petitioner contends
it ordered the cancellation and revocation of petitioner's the Philippines, has the financial capacity to maintain said that while Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, who conducted the
certificate of public convenience and the forfeiture of its service. These circumstances, considered together with the hearings of the case below, is a division chief, he is not a
franchise. denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner lawyer. As such, under Section 32 of Commonwealth Act
in Case No. 39715 on February, 15, 1963, such that as far No. 146, as amended, the Commission should not have
On September 18, 1962, petitioner moved for as the Commission was concerned the certificate of the delegated to him the authority to conduct the hearings for
reconsideration of the decision, alleging that before its petitioner was already declared revoked and cancelled, the the reception of evidence of the parties.
electric plant was burned on July 29, 1962, its service was Commission approved the application of Morong Electric
greatly improved and that it had still existing investment and ordered the issuance in its favor of the corresponding We find that, really, Mr. Talavera is not a lawyer. 5 Under
which the Commission should protect. But eight days certificate of public convenience and necessity.1awphîl.nèt the second paragraph of Section 32 of Commonwealth Act
before said motion for reconsideration was filed, or on No. 146, as amended, 6 the Commission can only authorize
September 10, 1962, Morong Electric, having been granted On March 8, 1963, petitioner filed with this Court a petition a division chief to hear and investigate a case filed before it
a municipal franchise on May 6, 1962 by respondent to review the decision in Case No. 39715 (now G. R. No. if he is a lawyer. However, the petitioner is raising this
municipality to install, operate and maintain an electric L-20993). Then on April 26, 1963, petitioner also filed a question for the first time in this appeal. The record
heat, light and power service in said municipality — petition to review the decision in Case No. 62-5143 (now discloses that petitioner never made any objection to the
approved by the Provincial Board of Rizal on August 31, G. R. No. L-21221). authority of Mr. Talavera to hear the case and to receive the
1962 — filed with the Commission an application for a evidence of the parties. On the contrary, we find that
certificate of public convenience and necessity for said petitioner had appeared and submitted evidence at the
In questioning the decision of the Commission in Case No.
39715, petitioner contends: (1) that the Commission acted hearings conducted by Mr. Talavera, particularly the
hearings relative to the motion for reconsideration of the the latter's decision unless it clearly appears that there is no ... (W)e respectfully state that while the report is, as I see it
order of February 18, 1957 cancelling and revoking its evidence to support it. 10 Inasmuch as the only function of attached to the records, clear and very thorough, it was
certificate. We also find that, through counsel, petitioner this Court in reviewing the decision of the Commission is made sometime July of this year and I understand from the
had entered into agreements with Mr. Talavera, as hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence before the respondent that there is some improvement since this report
officer, and the counsel for respondent municipality, Commission upon which its decision can reasonably be was made ... we respectfully request that an up-to-date
regarding procedure in order to abbreviate the proceedings. based, as it is not required to examine the proof de novo, inspection be made ... . An inspector of this Commission
7 It is only after the decision in the case turned out to be the evidence that should be made the basis of this Court's can be sent to the plant and considering that the engineer of
adverse to it that petitioner questioned the proceedings held determination should be only those presented in this case this Commission, Engineer Meliton Martinez, is very
before Mr. Talavera. before the Commission. What then was the evidence acquainted to the points involved we pray that his report
presented before the Commission and made the basis of its will be used by us for the reason that he is a technical man
This Court in several cases has ruled that objection to the decision subject of the present appeal? As stated earlier, the and he knows well as he has done a good job and I think
delegation of authority to hear a case filed before the Commission based its decision on the inspection reports our proposition would expedite the matter. We sincerely
Commission and to receive the evidence in connection submitted by its engineers who conducted the inspection of believe that the inspection report will be the best evidence
therewith is a procedural, not a jurisdictional point, and is petitioner's electric service upon orders of the Commission. to decide this matter.
11 Said inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies
waived by failure to interpose timely the objection and the
case had been decided by the Commission. 8 Since incurred, and violations committed, by the petitioner xxx xxx xxx
petitioner has never raised any objection to the authority of resulting in the inadequacy of its service. We consider that
Mr. Talavera before the Commission, it should be deemed said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as bases of
the decision in question. It should be emphasized, in this ATTY. LUQUE:
to have waived such procedural defect, and consonant with
the precedents on the matter, petitioner's claim that the connection that said reports, are not mere documentary
Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in so proofs presented for the consideration of the Commission, ... This is a very important matter and to show the good
authorizing Mr. Talavera should be dismissed. 9 but are the results of the Commission's own observations faith of respondent in this case we will not even cross-
and investigations which it can rightfully take into examine the engineer when he makes a new report. We will
consideration, 12 particularly in this case where the agree to the findings and, your honor please, considering as
2. Anent the second assigned error, the gist of petitioner's petitioner had not presented any evidence in its defense, we have manifested before that Engineer Martinez is an
contention is that the evidence — consisting of inspection and speaking of petitioner's failure to present evidence, as experienced engineer of this Commission and the points
reports — upon which the Commission based its decision is well as its failure to cross-examine the authors of the reported by Engineer Martinez on the situation of the plant
insufficient and untrustworthy in that (1) the authors of said inspection reports, petitioner should not complain because now will prevent the necessity of having a hearing, of us
reports had not been put to test by way of cross- it had waived not only its right to cross-examine but also its bringing new evidence and complainant bringing new
examination; (2) the reports constitute only one side of the right to present evidence. Quoted hereunder are the evidence. ... .
picture as petitioner was not able to present evidence in its pertinent portions of the transcripts of the proceedings
defense; (3) judicial notice was not taken of the testimony where the petitioner, through counsel, manifested in clear
of Mr. Harry B. Bernardino, former mayor of respondent xxx xxx xxx
language said waiver and its decision to abide by the last
municipality, in PSC Case No. 625143 (the other case, G. inspection report of Engineer Martinez:
R. No. L-21221) to the effect that the petitioner had COMMISSION (to Atty. Luque):
improved its service before its electric power plant was
burned on July 29, 1962 — which testimony contradicts the Proceedings of December 15, 1960
Q Does the Commission understand from
inspection reports; and (4) the Commission acted both as the counsel for applicant that if the motion is
prosecutor and judge — passing judgment over the very COMMISSION: granted he will submit this order to show cause
same evidence presented by it as prosecutor — a situation for decision without any further hearing and the
"not conducive to the arrival at just and equitable It appears at the last hearing of this case on September 23, decision will be based on the report of the
decisions." 1960, that an engineer of this Commission has been ordered engineer of this Commission?
to make an inspection of all electric services in the province
Settled is the rule that in reviewing the decision of the of Rizal and on that date the engineer of this Commission is A We respectfully reply in this manner that
Public Service Commission this Court is not required to still undertaking that inspection and it appears that the said we be allowed or be given an opportunity just to
examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether engineer had actually made that inspection on July 12 and read the report and 99%, we will agree that the
or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the 13, 1960. The engineer has submitted his report on report will be the basis of that decision. We just
decision. The only function of this Court is to determine November 18, 1960 which is attached to the records of this want to find out the contents of the report,
whether or not there is evidence before the Commission case. however, we request that we be furnished with a
upon which its decision might reasonably be based. This copy of the report before the hearing so that we
Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the ATTY. LUQUE (Councel for Petitioner): will just make a manifestation that we will agree.
Commission on questions of fact and will not interfere in
COMMISSION (to Atty. Luque): To give applicant a chance to have a day in court the revoke a certificate of public convenience and necessity
Commission grants the request of applicant that it be given may be exercised by it even without a formal charge filed
Q In order to prevent the delay of the 10 days within which to submit a written reply on the report by any interested party, with the only limitation that the
disposition of this case the Commission will of the engineer of the Commission who inspected the holder of the certificate should be given his day in court.
allow counsel for the applicant to submit his electric service, in the municipality of Morong, Rizal, and
written reply to the report that the engineer of this after the submission of the said written reply within 10 days It may not be amiss to add that when prosecuting and
Commission. Will he submit this case without from today this case will be considered submitted for investigating duties are delegated by statute to an
further hearing upon the receipt of that written decision. administrative body, as in the case of the Public Service
reply? Commission, said body may take steps it believes
The above-quoted manifestation of counsel for the appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties,
A Yes, your honor. petitioner, specifically the statement referring to the particularly in the manner of informing itself whether there
inspection report of Engineer Martinez as the "best is probable violation of the law and/or its rules and
evidence to decide this matter," can serve as an argument regulations. It may initiate an investigation, file a
Proceedings of August 25, 1961 against petitioner's claim that the Commision should have complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as
taken into consideration the testimony of Mr. Bernardino. the respondent is given a day in court, there can be no
ATTY. LUQUE (Counsel for petitioner): But the primary reasons why the Commission could not denial of due process, and objections to said procedure
have taken judicial cognizance of said testimony are: first, cannot be sustained.
In order to avoid any delay in the consideration of this case it is not a proper subject of judicial notice, as it is not a
we are respectfully move (sic) that instead of our witnesses "known" fact — that is, well established and authoritatively 3. In its third assignment of error, petitioner invokes the
testifying under oath that we will submit a written reply settled, without qualification and contention; 13 second, it "protection-of-investment rule" enunciated by this Court in
under oath together with the memorandum within fifteen was given in a subsequent and distinct case after the Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Orlanes 16 in this wise:
(15) days and we will furnish a copy and upon our petitioner's motion for reconsideration was heard by the
submission of said written reply under oath and Commission en banc and submitted for decision, 14 and
third, it was not brought to the attention of the Commission The Government having taken over the control
memorandum we consider this case submitted. This and supervision of all public utilities, so long as
suggestion is to abbreviate the necessity of presenting in this case through an appropriate pleading. 15
an operator under a prior license complies with
witnesses here which may prolong the resolution of this the terms and conditions of his license and
case. Regarding the contention of petitioner that the Commission reasonable rules and regulations for its operation
had acted both as prosecutor and judge, it should be and meets the reasonable demands of the public,
ATTY. OLIVAS (Counsel for respondent municipality): considered that there are two matters that had to be decided it is the duty of the Commission to protect rather
in this case, namely, the order to show cause dated than to destroy his investment by the granting of
December 19, 1956, and the petition or complaint by the second license to another person for the same
I object on the ground that there is no resolution by this respondent municipality dated June 25, 1958. Both matters
Commission on the action to reopen the case and second thing over the same route of travel. The granting
were heard jointly, and the record shows that respondent of such a license does not serve its convenience
this case has been closed. municipality had been allowed to present its evidence to or promote the interests of the public.
substantiate its complaint. It can not be said, therefore, that
ATTY. LUQUE: in this case the Commission had acted as prosecutor and
judge. But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that The above-quoted rule, however, is not absolute, for
there was a commingling of the prosecuting and nobody has exclusive right to secure a franchise or a
With regard to the testimony on the ground for opposition certificate of public convenience. 17 Where, as in the present
investigating functions, this exercise of dual function is
we respectfully submit to this Commission our motion to case, it has been shown by ample evidence that the
authorized by Section 17(a) of Commonwealth Act No.
submit a written reply together with a memorandum. Also petitioner, despite ample time and opportunity given to it
146, as amended, under which the Commission has power
as stated to expedite the case and to avoid further hearing by the Commission, had failed to render adequate,
"to investigate, upon its own initiative or upon complaint in
we will just submit our written reply. According to our sufficient and satisfactory service and had violated the
writing, any matter concerning any public service as
records we are furnished with a copy of the report of July important conditions of its certificate as well as the
regards matters under its jurisdiction; to, require any public
17, 1961. We submit your honor. directives and the rules and regulations of the Commission,
service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as the
public interest may require and warrant; to enforce the rule cannot apply. To apply that rule unqualifiedly is to
xxx xxx xxx compliance with any standard, rule, regulation, order or encourage violation or disregard of the terms and
other requirement of this Act or of the Commission ... ." conditions of the certificate and the Commission's
Thus, in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. directives and regulations, and would close the door to
Estate of F. P. Buan, L-11438, July 31, 1958, this Court other applicants who could establish, operate and provide
held that the power of the Commission to cancel and adequate, efficient and satisfactory service for the benefit
and convenience of the inhabitants. It should be (T)he Public Service Commission, ... has the proposed and the authorization to do business will promote
emphasized that the paramount consideration should power to specify and define the terms and the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. 21
always be the public interest and public convenience. The conditions upon which the public utility shall be
duty of the Commission to protect investment of a public operated, and to make reasonable rules and As stated earlier, in the decision appealed from, the
utility operator refers only to operators of good standing — regulations for its operation and the Commission found that Morong Electric is a corporation
those who comply with the laws, rules and regulations — compensation which the utility shall receive for duly organized and existing under the laws of the
and not to operators who are unconcerned with the public its services to the public, and for any failure to Philippines, the stockholders of which are Filipino citizens,
interest and whose investments have failed or deteriorated comply with such rules and regulations or the that it is financially capable of operating an electric light,
because of their own fault. 18 violation of any of the terms and conditions for heat and power service, and that at the time the decision
which the license was granted, the Commission was rendered there was absence of electric service in
4. The last assignment of error assails the propriety of the has ample power to enforce the provisions of the Morong, Rizal. While the petitioner does not dispute the
penalty imposed by the Commission on the petitioner — license or even to revoke it, for any failure or need of an electric service in Morong, Rizal, 22 it claims, in
that is, the revocation of the certificate and the forfeiture of neglect to comply with any of its terms and effect, that Morong Electric should not have been granted
the franchise. Petitioner contends that the imposition of a provisions. (Batangas Trans. Co. v. Orlanes, 52 the certificate of public convenience and necessity because
fine would have been sufficient, as had been done by the Phil. 455, 460; emphasis supplied) (1) it did not have a corporate personality at the time it was
Commission in cases of a similar nature. granted a franchise and when it applied for said certificate;
Presumably, the petitioner has in mind Section 21 of (2) it is not financially capable of undertaking an electric
It should be observed that Section 16(n) of Commonwealth Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, which provides service, and (3) petitioner was rendering efficient service
Act No. 146, as amended, confers upon the Commission that a public utility operator violating or failing to comply before its electric plant was burned, and therefore, being a
ample power and discretion to order the cancellation and with the terms and conditions of any certificate, or any prior operator its investment should be protected and no
revocation of any certificate of public convenience issued orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission, shall be new party should be granted a franchise and certificate of
to an operator who has violated, or has willfully and subject to a fine and that the Commission is authorized and public convenience and necessity to operate an electric
contumaciously refused to comply with, any order, rule or empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and service in the same locality.
regulation of the Commission or any provision of law. hearing. It should be noted, however, that the last sentence
What matters is that there is evidence to support the action of said section states that the remedy provided therein 1. The bulk of petitioner's arguments assailing the
of the Commission. In the instant case, as shown by the "shall not be a bar to, or affect any other remedy provided personality of Morong Electric dwells on the proposition
evidence, the contumacious refusal of the petitioner since in this Act but shall be cumulative and additional to such that since a franchise is a contract, 23 at least two competent
1954 to comply with the directives, rules and regulations of remedy or remedies." In other words, the imposition of a parties are necessary to the execution thereof, and parties
the Commission, its violation of the conditions of its fine may only be one of the remedies which the are not competent except when they are in being. Hence, it
certificate and its incapability to comply with its Commission may resort to, in its discretion. But that is contended that until a corporation has come into being, in
commitment as shown by its inadequate service, were the remedy is not exclusive of, or has preference over, the other this jurisdiction, by the issuance of a certificate of
circumstances that warranted the action of the Commission remedies. And this Court will not substitute its discretion incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in not merely imposing a fine but in revoking altogether for that of the Commission, as long as there is evidence to (SEC) it cannot enter into any contract as a corporation.
petitioner's certificate. To allow petitioner to continue its support the exercise of that discretion by the Commission. The certificate of incorporation of the Morong Electric was
operation would be to sacrifice public interest and issued by the SEC on October 17, 1962, so only from that
convenience in favor of private interest. G. R. No. L-21221 date, not before, did it acquire juridical personality and
legal existence. Petitioner concludes that the franchise
A grant of a certificate of public convenience Coming now to the other case, let it be stated at the outset granted to Morong Electric on May 6, 1962 when it was not
confers no property rights but is a mere license or that before any certificate may be granted, authorizing the yet in esse is null and void and cannot be the subject of the
privilege, and such privilege is forfeited when the operation of a public service, three requisites must be Commission's consideration. On the other hand, Morong
grantee fails to comply with his commitments complied with, namely: (1) the applicant must be a citizen Electric argues, and to which argument the Commission
behind which lies the paramount interest of the of the Philippines or of the United States, or a corporation agrees, that it was a de facto corporation at the time the
public, for public necessity cannot be made to or co-partnership, association or joint-stock company franchise was granted and, as such, it was not incapacitated
wait, nor sacrificed for private convenience. constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, to enter into any contract or to apply for and accept a
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Estate of F. P. sixty per centum at least of the stock or paid-up capital of franchise. Not having been incapacitated, Morong Electric
Buan, et al., L-11438 and Santiago Sambrano, et which belongs entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of maintains that the franchise granted to it is valid and the
al. v. PSC, et al., L-11439 & L-11542-46, July the United States; 19 (2) the applicant must be financially approval or disapproval thereof can be properly determined
31, 1958) capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting by the Commission.
the responsibilities incident to its operation; 20 and (3) the
applicant must prove that the operation of the public service Petitioner's contention that Morong Electric did not yet
have a legal personality on May 6, 1962 when a municipal
franchise was granted to it is correct. The juridical mere license to the corporation until it accepts the business. It should be pointed out, however, that this Court
personality and legal existence of Morong Electric began grant and complies with its terms and conditions. did not say in that case that the rule is absolute or that under
only on October 17, 1962 when its certificate of (Thompson on Corporations, Vol. 4, 3rd Ed., Sec. no circumstances may the acts of promoters of a
incorporation was issued by the SEC. 24 Before that date, or 2929) 26 corporation be ratified or accepted by the corporation if and
pending the issuance of said certificate of incorporation, the when subsequently organized. Of course, there are
incorporators cannot be considered as de facto corporation. The incorporation of Morong Electric on October 17, 1962 exceptions. It will be noted that American courts generally
25 But the fact that Morong Electric had no corporate
and its acceptance of the franchise as shown by its action in hold that a contract made by the promoters of a corporation
existence on the day the franchise was granted in its name prosecuting the application filed with the Commission for on its behalf may be adopted, accepted or ratified by the
does not render the franchise invalid, because later Morong the approval of said franchise, not only perfected a contract corporation when organized. 28
Electric obtained its certificate of incorporation and then between the respondent municipality and Morong Electric
accepted the franchise in accordance with the terms and but also cured the deficiency pointed out by the petitioner 2. The validity of the franchise and the corporate
conditions thereof. This view is sustained by eminent in the application of Morong EIectric. Thus, the personality of Morong Electric to accept the same having
American authorities. Thus, McQuiuin says: Commission did not err in denying petitioner's motion to been shown, the next question to be resolved is whether
dismiss said application and in proceeding to hear the same. said company has the financial qualification to operate an
The fact that a company is not completely The efficacy of the franchise, however, arose only upon its electric light, heat and power service. Petitioner challenges
incorporated at the time the grant is made to it by approval by the Commission on March 13, 1963. The the financial capability of Morong Electric, by pointing out
a municipality to use the streets does not, in most reason is that — the inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Jose P. Ingal,
jurisdictions, affect the validity of the grant. But president of said company, regarding its assets and the
such grant cannot take effect until the corporation Under Act No. 667, as amended by Act No. 1022, amount of its initial investment for the electric plant. In this
is organized. And in Illinois it has been decided a municipal council has the power to grant connection it should be stated that on the basis of the
that the ordinance granting the franchise may be electric franchises, subject to the approval of the evidence presented on the matter, the Commission has
presented before the corporation grantee is fully provincial board and the President. However, found the Morong Electric to be "financially qualified to
organized, where the organization is completed under Section 16(b) of Commonwealth Act No. install, maintain and operate the proposed electric light,
before the passage and acceptance. (McQuillin, 146, as amended, the Public Service Commission heat and power service." This is essentially a factual
Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 12, Chap. is empowered "to approve, subject to determination which, in a number of cases, this Court has
34, Sec. 34.21) constitutional limitations any franchise or said it will not disturb unless patently unsupported by
privilege granted under the provisions of Act No. evidence. An examination of the record of this case readily
Fletcher says: 667, as amended by Act No. 1022, by any shows that the testimony of Mr. Ingal and the documents he
political subdivision of the Philippines when, in presented to establish the financial capability of Morong
the judgment of the Commission, such franchise Electric provide reasonable grounds for the above finding
While a franchise cannot take effect until the of the Commission.
grantee corporation is organized, the franchise or privilege will properly conserve the public
may, nevertheless, be applied for before the interests and the Commission shall in so
company is fully organized. approving impose such conditions as to It is now a very well-settled rule in this
construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or jurisdiction that the findings and conclusions of
operation as the public interests and convenience fact made by the Public Service Commission,
A grant of a street franchise is valid although the may reasonably require, and to issue certificates after weighing the evidence adduced by the
corporation is not created until afterwards. of public convenience and necessity when such is parties in a public service case, will not be
(Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corp. Permanent Edition, required or provided by any law or franchise." disturbed by the Supreme Court unless those
Rev. Vol. 6-A, Sec. 2881) Thus, the efficacy of a municipal electric findings and conclusions appear not to be
franchise arises, therefore, only after the approval reasonably supported by evidence. (La Mallorca
And Thompson gives the reason for the rule: of the Public Service Commission. (Almendras and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. Mercado, L-19120,
vs. Ramos, 90 Phil. 231) . November 29, 1965)
(I)n the matter of the secondary franchise the
authorities are numerous in support of the The conclusion herein reached regarding the validity of the For purposes of appeal, what is decisive is that
proposition that an ordinance granting a privilege franchise granted to Morong Electric is not incompatible said testimonial evidence provides reasonable
to a corporation is not void because the with the holding of this Court in Cagayan Fishing support for the Public Service Commission's
beneficiary of the ordinance is not fully organized Development Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro Sandiko 27 upon which findings of financial capacity on the part of
at the time of the introduction of the ordinance. It the petitioner leans heavily in support of its position. In said applicants, rendering such findings beyond our
is enough that organization is complete prior to case this Court held that a corporation should have a full power to disturb. (Del Pilar Transit vs. Silva, L-
the passage and acceptance of the ordinance. The and complete organization and existence as an entity before 21547, July 15, 1966)
reason is that a privilege of this character is a it can enter into any kind of a contract or transact any
It may be worthwhile to mention in this connection that per revocation order, the Commission gave credence to the This is an appeal by respondents Secretary of Public Works
inspection report dated January 20, 1964 29 of Mr. Meliton latter. Naturally, whatever conclusion or finding of fact that and Communications and Benjamin Yonzon from the
Martinez of the Commission, who inspected the electric the Commission arrived at regarding the quality of decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga dated
service of Morong on January 15-16, 1964, Morong petitioner's service are not borne out by the evidence November 9, 1959 in Civil Case No. 1508 of said Court,
Electric "is serving electric service to the entire area presented in this case but by evidence in the previous case. which was initiated by a petition of herein appellee, Manuel
31 In this connection, we repeat, the conclusion, arrived at
covered by its approved plan and has constructed its line in Borja, for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
accordance with the plans and specifications approved by by the Commission after weighing the conflicting evidence preliminary injunction.
the Commission." By reason thereof, it was recommended in the two related cases, is a conclusion of fact which this
that the requests of Morong Electric (1) for the withdrawal Court will not disturb. Borja is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of some
of its deposit in the amount of P1,000.00 with the Treasurer 104 hectares in barrio Consuelo, municipality of Macabebe,
of the Philippines, and (2) for the approval of Resolution And it has been held time and again that where province of Pampanga. This land, utilized as a fishpond,
No. 160 of the Municipal Council of Morong, Rizal, the Commission has reached a conclusion of fact was acquired by him from Ayala and Company in 1937. On
exempting the operator from making the additional after weighing the conflicting evidence, that August 15, 1958 an administrative complaint was filed with
P9,000.00 deposit mentioned in its petition, dated conclusion must be respected, and the Supreme the office of respondent Secretary by Benigno Musni and
September 16, 1963, be granted. This report removes any Court will not interfere unless it clearly appears others, including then Senator de la Rosa, against a number
doubt as to the financial capability of Morong Electric to that there is no evidence to support the decision of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement
operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power of the Commission. (La Mallorca and Pampanga of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams,
service. Bus Co., Inc. vs. Mercado, L-19120, November dikes or any other works in the public navigable rivers in
29, 1965 citing Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. vs. Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3. With the financial qualification of Morong Electric Dela Cruz, 96 Phil. 278) 2056. In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to have
beyond doubt, the remaining question to be resolved is closed the stream called Matlaue supposedly public, which
whether, or not, the findings of fact of the Commission For that matter, petitioner's pretension that it has a prior runs through his land.
regarding petitioner's service are supported by evidence. It right to the operation of an electric service in Morong,
is the contention of the petitioner that the Commission Rizal, is not tenable; and its plea for protection of its Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
made some findings of fact prejudicial to its position but investment, as in the previous case, cannot be entertained. stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
which do not find support from the evidence presented in Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
this case. Specifically, petitioner refers to the statements or other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
findings that its service had "turned from bad to worse," WHEREFORE, the two decisions of the Public Service
Commission, appealed from, should be, as they are hereby stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
that it miserably failed to comply with the oft-repeated
promises to bring about the needed improvement, that its affirmed, with costs in the two cases against petitioner
equipment is unserviceable, and that it has no longer any Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. It is so ordered. Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public
plant site and, therefore, has discredited itself. Petitioner Works and Communications, was designated by the
further states that such statements are not only devoid of Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Secretary to investigate the charges in the complaint. A
evidentiary support but contrary to the testimony of its Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. copy of the decision, purportedly signed by the
witness, Mr. Harry Bernardino, who testified that petitioner Undersecretary, M. B. Bautista, and dated April 3, 1959,
was rendering efficient and satisfactory service before its was served upon counsel for Borja on June 12, 1959,
electric plant was burned on July 29, 1962. ordering the latter as follows: to "remove the dams and/or
dike found across the channel bordering the properties
G.R. No. L-16487 July 31, 1964 owned by respondent and Maxima Vda. de Blas, and
On the face of the decision appealed from, it is obvious that restore the bed to its original condition within thirty (30)
the Commission in describing the kind of service petitioner days from the date of receipt of this decision; otherwise, the
was rendering before its certificate was ordered revoked MANUEL BORJA, petitioner-appellee,
vs. removal thereof shall be effected by this office or its duly
and cancelled, took judicial notice of the records of the authorized representative at the expense of the respondent
previous case (PSC Case No. 39715) where the quality of HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, ET AL., respondents,
within ten (10) days after the expiration of the thirty-day
petitioner's service had been squarely put in issue. It will be HON. FLORENCIO MORENO as Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Communications, and (30) period, without prejudice to whatever judicial action
noted that the findings of the Commission were made that may be instituted against them pursuant to Section 3 of
notwithstanding the fact that the aforementioned testimony BENJAMIN YONZON, respondents-appellants.
Republic Act No. 2056.
of Mr. Bernardino had been emphasized and pointed out in
petitioner's Memorandum to the Commission. 30 The Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner-appellee.
implication is simple: that as between the testimony of Mr. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants. The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary was
Bernardino and the inspection reports of the engineers of assailed by petitioner Borja in the latter's petition before the
the Commission, which served as the basis of the court a quo on several grounds; that it was based on
erroneous findings of fact; that it was contrary to law; that The provisions of Republic Act No. 2056 referred to by To the writer of this opinion the view thus taken by the
the investigation constituted a usurpation of judicial power appellants in their first assignment of error are Sections 1 court a quo and now urged upon us by petitioner-appellee
and hence beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Secretary; and 2. Section 1 provides that the construction or building has cogent reasons behind it. There is a certain danger in
that the delegation to Benjamin Yonzon of the authority to of dams, dikes or any other works which encroaches into leaving the adjudication of a claim of private ownership of
investigate was illegal and therefore null and void; and that any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of an
the investigation was conducted with grave abuse of other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the executive official. This danger is demonstrated by the very
discretion and in violation of due process. Respondents construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works argument of appellants under their third and fourth
raised a number of defenses in their answer to the petition, in areas declared as communal fishing grounds shall be assignments of error. They point to the evidence submitted
and after trial the court rendered the judgment now subject ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited at the administrative investigation and, invoking the
of the present appeal, granting the writs prayed for by construction, but authorizes the Secretary of Public Works "substantial evidence" rule, assail the lower court's
petitioner; declaring null and void and of no legal effect all and Communications to allow the construction of any such conclusion that the Matlaue stream is privately owned. The
proceedings had by respondents in the administrative works when public interest or safety so requires, or when it said rule, indeed, which has been applied in a number of
investigation, including the decision entered on April 3, is absolutely necessary for the protection of private cases in this jurisdiction, is that if there is substantial
1959; restraining and prohibiting respondent Secretary property. Section 2 provides for due notice and hearing to evidence to support the findings of an administrative
from enforcing said decision, and declaring the injunction establish the facts mentioned in Section 1, after which the official in matters within his competence, that is, "such
previously issued to be permanent. Secretary, upon an affirmative finding as to their existence, relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
is authorized to order the removal of the works declared as adequate to support a conclusions" (Ang Tibay v. CIR 69
The issues raised by appellants in this appeal are nuisances or prohibited constructions, giving the party Phil. 635, 642), the courts are bound to look no further, not
formulated in the errors assigned in their brief, as follows: concerned a period of not more than 30 days to do so, even to consider contrary evidence of a preponderant
failing which such removal should be carried out by the nature. If the decision of the administrative official carries
Secretary within 10 days after the expiration of the period with it, as the premise upon which it rests, a finding that
I originally allowed. The same section adds that the certain property claimed by a private party to be his in fact
investigation to be conducted by the Secretary must be part of the public domain, it does not seem fair to take that
The lower court erred in holding in effect that Republic Act terminated and decided, by him within a period not finding as conclusive upon the courts just because it is
No. 2056 is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue exceeding 90 days from the time a complaint in writing is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be
delegation of judicial power to an administrative official. filed with him by any interested party apprising him of the evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and
existence of the illegal works or constructions. Failure on evaluated, would lead them to a different conclusion.
II his part, without justifiable reason, to terminate or decide a
case or to effect the removal of the works or constructions The other members of this Court, however, hold that the
within the time limit is considered an offense, for which the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and
The lower court erred in holding that here was no duty on corresponding penalty is prescribed.
the part of petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Communications to inquire into and decide the question of
the public or private character of a river or stream is
With respect to the first error assigned by appellants, it is incidental to the power conferred upon him by the statute to
III not true that the trial court ruled the foregoing provisions conduct the necessary investigation and to order the
unconstitutional. On the contrary, it declined to pass upon removal of any works which constitute obstructions therein.
The lower Court erred in not finding the decision of the the constitutional question on the ground that those This authority recognized, the next question posed by
Secretary of Public Works and Communications supported provisions do not apply to the facts of the instant case. As appellants is with respect to the correctness of the trial
by evidence. far as may be gathered from the court's opinion, the court's finding that the Matlaue stream is privately owned
particular fact which removes this case from the purview of by petitioner-appellee. Under the "substantial evidence"
Republic Act No. 2056 and which it considered duly rule (laying aside for the moment the question of whether
established by the evidence is that the Matlaue stream or not such evidence may properly be considered at all, in
which runs through the land of petitioner-appellee is not a view of the manner in which the administrative
The lower Court erred in holding that the Matlaue river is a public navigable river but his private property. The investigation was conducted) we find appellants' third and
private stream. implication is that the authority of the Secretary of Public fourth assignments of error to be well-taken: there is
Works and Communications to proceed under the substantial evidence to support the conclusion of
V provisions of said statute covers only cases where there is respondent Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public
no dispute as to the public navigable character of the river navigable river. This evidence consists of the testimony of
or waterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, but that two witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman, and
The lower Court erred in finding that respondent Benjamin
when this is precisely a basic fact in contention the matter of the result of the ocular inspection conducted by the
Yonzon gravely used his discretion and acted capriciously.
should be left to the courts for determination. investigator, appellant Yonzon, as embodied in the report
subsequently submitted by him and depicted in a sketch
prepared by the assistant engineer of the Pampanga River Yonzon's ruling that Attorney Mendoza's request for of said right; (3) conducting an ocular inspection motu
Control Project. reservation to cross-examine amounted to a waiver of the proprio and interrogating witness during the same; (4) not
right to do so. Yonzon refused to reconsider. When allowing Attorney Madarang to cross-examine the
Nevertheless, we do not feel justified in affirming, for Attorney Madarang reiterated his request, Yonzon relented complainants' witnesses during the hearing of October 30,
purposes of adjudication, the aforesaid conclusion of and agreed to allow him to cross-examine the witnesses 1958; (5) calling to the witness stand a person who was not
respondent Secretary, and reversing that of the trial court, who had previously testified, but without waiting for the a witness for either the complainants or the respondents,
for the investigation wherein the evidence was received transcription of the stenographic notes of the hearing and asking him questions to which he refused to entertain
was conducted with manifest disregard of the requirements previously had. Attorney Madarang agreed to cross- any objection from counsel; (6) arbitrarily refusing appellee
of due process. And it is solely on this ground that the examine even if only on the notes taken by Attorney opportunity to present Eliseo Panopio on the ground that
members of this Court are agreed that this decision should Mendoza. But when he was about to do so Yonzon again his testimony was merely corroborative, although as it later
be predicated. changed his mind and refused to let him cross-examine. On turned out in court Panopio's testimony was important to
that same day, Attorney Madarang sought to take the stand appellee's defense; and (7) terminating the hearing without
as witness for appellee in order to identify certain giving appellee full opportunity to present his other
The administrative complaint was filed with respondent documents which he had secured for the latter, but Yonzon witnesses — all these are indicative of the capricious and
Secretary on August 15, 1958. On October 22, 1958 prevented him from doing so. In addition, during that same arbitrary manner in which the administrative investigation
Yonzon issued a subpoena to Borja ordering him to appear hearing Yonzon called to the witness stand a certain was conducted.
at the hearing of the case on October 24, 1958. That was engineer Manangan of the Pampanga River Control Project,
the first time Borja had notice of the complaint. Acting on allegedly as witness for the Government, which was not a
his request that the hearing be postponed for at least two By way of justification Yonzon repeatedly invoked the
party to the case. And then Yonzon denied to Attorney ninety-day period prescribed by R.A. 2056 within which an
weeks, Yonzon deferred it, but only up to October 27, Madarang the right to object to any question propounded to
1958. When that day arrived Attorney Vicente V. Mendoza, administrative case for abatement of nuisance thereunder
Manangan, even if the same were prejudicial to appellee's must be terminated. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that
a member of the law firm Carlos, Laurea & Associates, in interest.
representation of appellee, attended the investigation at while the complaint for abatement was filed on August 15,
Macabebe, Pampanga, but for the sole purpose of 1958, it was only on October 22, 1958 — more than two
delivering to Yonzon appellee's motion to quash and On November 17, 1958 appellant Yonzon, at the request of months later — that appellant officials informed appellee
dismiss on the grounds that complainants Musni, et al., did appellee, issued a subpoena to Eliseo Panopio to attend the thereof and, strangely enough, by means of a subpoena.
not have the capacity to file the complaint and that hearing the next day. When Yonzon delivered the subpoena The latter did not have sufficient time to prepare his
Republic Act 2056 would be unconstitutional if it should be he found out that Panopio was in the province. In spite of defense when appellant Yonzon started rushing the
given retroactive effect. Without acting on the motion Attorney Madarang's insistence that Panopio's testimony proceedings, evidently to make up for lost time.
Yonzon proceeded with the examination of the two would not be limited to identifying the latter's report
witnesses for the complaints. Attorney Mendoza repeatedly (Exhibit S) Yonzon refused to grant continuance, reasoning As it was, even with all that undue haste, the last day of the
manifested that he was not prepared for the hearing and out that Panopio's testimony only corroborate that of hearing was still beyond the deadline sought to be met. The
was not in a position to cross-examine complainants' Valderrama, who had identified certain documents which decision was dated April 3, 1959, eight months after the
witnesses because the law firm of which he was a member were in the custody of his office. The Panopio report, it complaint was filed; and copy was, served on appellee's
had not had time to confer with appellee on account of the may be mentioned, was prepared by him in 1931 when, as a counsel only on June 12, 1959.
limited time given by Yonzon. Attorney Mendoza, surveyor of the Bureau of Public Works, he investigated the
however, sought to reserve his right to cross-examine, but different streams and rivers situated in Macabebe,
Pampanga, and found that Matlaue in particular had been The manner the investigation was conducted was a virtual
Yonzon ruled that his failure to cross-examine was in effect denial of due process. This is one of the exceptions to the
a waiver of the right. artificially dug, and subsequently increased in width, length
and depth by the owner at the time, from whom Borja rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies — in
acquired the land in 1937. this case by appeal to the President, if otherwise it was
On October 28, 1958 appellant Yonzon, upon a mere oral necessary at all — before resort to the courts may be had.
notice, conducted an ocular inspection of the questioned
stream without giving appellee Borja sufficient time to On November 18, 1958, Yonzon terminated the hearing
without giving counsel for Borja opportunity to present The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it sets
prepare therefor. Furthermore, Yonzon did not limit himself aside the administrative investigation conducted by
to inspecting the premises but proceeded to conduct a other witnesses and in spite of vigorous objection on his
part. respondents-appellants and the decision therein against
hearing by questioning the witnesses who had testified the petitioner-appellee, but not in so far as said judgment
day before. declares the Matlaue stream or river the private property of
Appellant Yonzon clearly abused his discretion in riding said petitioner-appellee, the question of ownership thereof
On the next hearing date, October 30, 1958, Attorney roughshod over appellee's right to a fair hearing. His acts of being left for determination in such other proceeding,
Clemente Madarang, Jr., of the law firm representing (1) proceeding with the hearing without first acting on administrative or judicial, as respondents-appellants may
appellee, was present. He asked for reconsideration of appellee's motion to dismiss; (2) ruling that appellee's deem proper to initiate. No pronouncement as to costs.
attempt to reserve his right to cross-examine was a waiver
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, The facts of the case are as follows: hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October
Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur. 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, as well as on the second hearing on October 17, 1990.
G.R. No. 96266 July 18, 1991 1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB
their respective applications on oil price increases To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to cross-
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner, (docketed as ERB Case Nos. 90-106, 90-382 and 90-384, examine the witnesses, the ERB set the continuation of the
vs. respectively). hearing to October 24, 1990. This was postponed to
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner Maceda.
(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an order granting a
CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their
respondents. filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. respective motions for leave to file or admit
Maceda v. ERB, et al., G.R. No. 95203), seeking to nullify amended/supplemental applications to further increase the
G.R. No. 96349 July 18, 1991 the provisional increase. We dismissed the petition on prices of petroleum products.
December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's authority to grant
provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended
EUGENIO O. ORIGINAL, IRENEO N. AARON, JR., Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:
RENE LEDESMA, ROLANDO VALLE, ORLANDO petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same time requiring
MONTANO, STEVE ABITANG, NERI JINON, applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public
WILFREDO DELEONIO, RENATO BORRO, What must be stressed is that while under Hearing in two newspapers of general circulation (p. 4,
RODRIGO DE VERA, ALVIN BAYUANG, JESUS Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is Rollo and Annexes "F" and "G," pp. 60 and 62, Rollo).
MELENDEZ, NUMERIANO CAJILIG JR., RUFINO indispensable, it does not preclude the Board
DE LA CRUZ AND JOVELINO G. TIPON, petitioners, from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief
vs. it did here, subject to its final disposition of commenced on November 21, 1990 with ERB ruling that
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of
(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the Affidavits (p. 6, Rollo). ERB subsequently outlined the
CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION, application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence, as
respondents. temporary restraining order or a writ of follows:
preliminary attachment issued by the courts,
which are given ex-parte and which are subject to
G.R. No. 96284 July 18,1991 the resolution of the main case. CHAIRMAN FERNANDO:

CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., petitioner, Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not Well, at the last hearing, applicant Caltex
vs. negate each other, or otherwise, operate presented its evidence-in-chief and there is an
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, CALTEX exclusively of the other, in that the Board may understanding or it is the Board's wish that for
(Philippines), INC., PILIPINAS SHELL, INC. AND resort to one but not to both at the same time. purposes of good order in the presentation of the
PETROPHIL CORPORATION, respondents. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board evidence considering that these are being heard
and the grounds for which it may decree a price together, we will defer the cross-examination of
RESOLUTION adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice applicant Caltex's witness and ask the other
and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, applicants to present their evidence-in-chief so
under Section 8, an authority to increase that the oppositors win have a better Idea of what
provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject an of these will lead to because as I mentioned
to the final outcome of the proceeding. The earlier, it has been traditional and it is the
Board, of course, is not prevented from intention of the Board to act on these applications
MEDIALDEA, J.: conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional on an industry-wide basis, whether to accept,
authority-which is of course, the better procedure reject, modify or whatever, the Board win do it
In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of — however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it on an industry wide basis, so, the best way to
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated failed to conduct one. (pp. 129-130, Rollo) have (sic) the oppositors and the Board a clear
December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings (Emphasis supplied) picture of what the applicants are asking for is to
conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on
did not allow him substantial cross-examination, in effect, record first and then the examination will come
In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing later, the cross-examination will come later. . . .
allegedly, a denial of due process. provisional increase, the ERB set the applications for
(pp. 5-6, tsn., November 23, 1990, ERB Cases We have, in G.R. Nos. 95203-05, previously taken judicial Board is left with no other recourse but to grant
Nos. 90-106, 90382 and 90-384). (p. 162, Rollo) notice of matters and events related to the oil industry, as applicants oil companies further relief by
follows: increasing the prices of petroleum products sold
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof by them. (p. 161, Rollo)
deprived him of his right to finish his cross-examination of . . . (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has
Petron's witnesses and denied him his right to cross- incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the Petitioner Maceda together with petitioner Original (G.R.
examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He exchange rate has fallen to P28.00 to $1.00; (3) No. 96349) also claim that the provisional increase
points out that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial the country's balance of payments is expected to involved amounts over and above that sought by the
of due process. reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at P2.855 petitioning oil companies.
Billion as of the first nine months of the year.
We disagree. The Solicitor General has pointed out: The Solicitor General has pointed out that aside from the
. . . (p. 150, Rollo) increase in crude oil prices, all the applications of the
. . . The order of testimony both with respect to respondent oil companies filed with the ERB covered
the examination of the particular witness and to The Solicitor General likewise commented: claims from the OPSF.
the general course of the trial is within the
discretion of the court and the exercise of this Among the pieces of evidence considered by We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990
discretion in permitting to be introduced out of ERB in the grant of the contested provisional granting a provisional price increase on petroleum products
the order prescribed by the rules is not improper relief were: (1) certified copies of bins of lading premised on the oil companies' OPSF claims, crude cost
(88 C.J.S. 206-207). issued by crude oil suppliers to the private peso differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to NPC
respondents; (2) reports of the Bankers (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies are "entitled to as
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in Association of the Philippines on the peso-dollar much relief as the fact alleged constituting the course of
administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and (3) OPSF action may warrant," (Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises,
matters of rate or price fixing is considered as status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs. The Inc., G.R. No. L-28297, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 261
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, ERB was likewise guided in the determination of citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Aguilar v. Rubiato,
function As such administrative agency, it is not international crude oil prices by traditional 40 Phil. 470) as follows:
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence authoritative sources of information on crude oil
governing court proceedings (Sec. 29, Public and petroleum products, such as Platt's Oilgram Per Liter
Service Act; Dickenson v. United States, 346, and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. (p. 158,
U.S. 389, 98 L. ed. 132, 74 S. St. 152). (Emphasis Rollo) Weighted
Thus, We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional Petron Shell Caltex Average
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice increase in oil price, as We note that the Order of December
and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the 5, 1990 explicitly stated:
ERB provides that — Crude Cost P3.11 P3.6047 P2.9248 P3.1523
in the light, therefore, of the rise in crude oil
These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and importation costs, which as earlier mentioned, Peso Cost
procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in reached an average of $30.3318 per barrel at
all matters of inquiry, study, hearing, $25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the Diffn'l 2.1747 1.5203 1.5669 1.8123
investigation and/or any other proceedings within huge OPSF deficit which, as reported by the
the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the Office of Energy Affairs, has amounted to P5.7 Forex Risk
broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any Billion (based on filed claims only and net of the
particular matter, except itself from these rules P5 Billion OPSF) as of September 30, 1990, and
and apply such suitable procedure as shall is estimated to further increase to over P10 Fee -0.1089 -0,0719 -0.0790 -0.0896
promote the objectives of the Order. Billion by end December 1990; the decision of
the government to discontinue subsidizing oil Subsidy on
(pp. 163-164, Rollo) prices in view of inflationary pressures; the
apparent inadequacy of the proposed additional
Sales to NPC 0.1955 0.0685 0.0590 0.1203
P5.1 Billion government appropriation for the
Petitioner Maceda also claims that there is no substantial OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso
evidence on record to support the provisional relief. in relation to the US dollar to P28/US $, this Total Price
Increase Diesel Oil 1.4100 SO ORDERED.

Applied for P59.3713 P5.1216 P4.4717 P4.9954 Fuel Oil/Feedstock 0.2405 Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Less: September 21 Price LPG 1.2200 Davide, J., concurs in the result.

Relief Asphalt 2.5000 Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Actual Price Increase P1.42 Thinner 2.5000

Actual Tax Reduction: In G.R. No. 96349, petitioner Original additionally claims QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO
that if the price increase will be used to augment the OPSF BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA,
Ad Valorem Tax this will constitute illegal taxation. In the Maceda case, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON
(G.R. Nos. 95203-05, supra) this Court has already ruled MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA
that "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
(per Sept. 1, 1990 by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of
taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956,
price build-up) P1.3333 as amended by Executive Order No. 137. DECISION
Specific Tax (per The petitions of E.O. Original et al. (G.R. No. 96349) and This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
C.S. Povedas, Jr. (G.R. No. 96284), insofar as they question Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Oct. 5, 1990 price the ERB's authority under Sec. 8 of E.O. 172, have become Court of Appeals[1] dated 21 December 2001 which
moot and academic. affirmed with modification the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission promulgated 30 March
build-up) .6264 .7069 2.1269 2001.[2]
We lament Our helplessness over this second provisional
increase in oil price. We have stated that this "is a question On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of
Net Price Increase best judged by the political leadership" (G.R. Nos. 95203- respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers,
05, G.R. Nos. 95119-21, supra). We wish to reiterate Our Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc.,
Applied for 2.8685 previous pronouncements therein that while the and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against
government is able to justify a provisional increase, these respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal
findings "are not final, and it is up to petitioners to dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the
Nonetheless, it is relevant to point out that on December
demonstrate that the present economic picture does not perpetuation of the Cabo System. They thus prayed for
10, 1990, the ERB, in response to the President's appeal,
warrant a permanent increase." reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration of
brought back the increases in Premium and Regular
gasoline to the levels mandated by the December 5, 1990 their regular employment status.
Order (P6.9600 and P6.3900, respectively), as follows: In this regard, We also note the Solicitor General's
comments that "the ERB is not averse to the idea of a For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend
presidential review of its decision," except that there is no the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their
Product In Pesos Per Liter respective affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52)
law at present authorizing the same. Perhaps, as pointed out
by Justice Padilla, our lawmakers may see the wisdom of complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor
OPSF allowing presidential review of the decisions of the ERB Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings to
since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still "an elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants
administrative body under the Office of the President (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment
Premium Gasoline 6.9600
whose decisions should be appealed to the President under with respondent firm.
the established principle of exhaustion of administrative In substance, the complainants averred that in the
Regular Gasoline 6.3900
remedies," especially on a matter as transcendental as oil performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle
price increases which affect the lives of almost an Filipinos. segregators, and others, they were employees of respondent
Avturbo 4.9950
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further maintained that when
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. respondent company replaced them and prevented them
Kerosene 1.4100
from entering the company premises, they were deemed to appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of respondent argues that the instant petition should be
have been illegally dismissed. sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners[7] to sign the
complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando petition as well as the verification and certification of non-
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed Nieto were declared regular employees since they were the forum shopping, in clear violation of the principle laid
a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and only ones subjected to cross-examination.[5] Thus - down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.[8]
cause of action, there being no employer-employee
relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, The crux of the controversy revolves around the
Inc., and that respondents Lipercon Services, Peoples x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits
Specialist Services and Interim Services being bona fide ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of the despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents
independent contractors, were the real employers of the parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on and undergo the test of cross-examination.
complainants.[3] As regards the corporate officers, position papers and their accompanying documentary
respondent insisted that they could not be faulted and be evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative to establish The petition is impressed with merit. The issue
held liable for damages as they only acted in their official the parties claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it confronting the Court is not without precedent in
capacities while performing their respective duties. was necessary to give them ample opportunity to rebut each jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC[9]
others statements through cross-examination. In fact, squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of
rendered a decision ordering respondent company to subjected to rigid cross-examination by petitioners counsel. affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that the
reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the However, the testimonies of private respondents Romero, argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants
rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to cross- were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive
to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of examination, as should have been the case, and no because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed explanation was offered by them or by the labor arbiter as proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC
upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already to why this was dispensed with. Since they were where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00.[4] represented by counsel, the latter should have taken steps papers only.
so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was In Rase v. NLRC,[10] this Court likewise sidelined a
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter done by their counsel to that effect.[6] similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for
ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by
respondent companys witnesses who, as district sales counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would
supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse
Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary
complainants personally, the testimonies of the nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
complainants were more credible as they sufficiently favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of
supplied every detail of their employment, specifically In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of evidence.
identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of Appeals should not have given weight to respondents claim Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v.
assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and of failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike NLRC[11] succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor
dismissal. regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the parties position papers and affidavits in support of their not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the
Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the
relationship between the complainants and respondent thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to
company when it affirmed in toto the latters decision. Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason
subsequently denied for lack of merit respondents motion were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a to deviate therefrom.
for consideration. decision in their favor. To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are
not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the
of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the that since the other alleged affiants were not presented in Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may
NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed court to affirm their statements, much less to be cross- be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a
between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals suppletory character and effect. The submission by
respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, rightly held, be stricken off the records for being self- respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,[12] that an affidavit not
namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. With respect testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no
Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and to Nestor Romero, respondent points out that he should not real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present
Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative have been impleaded in the instant petition since he already case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and quantum of evidence different from that of an
undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally,
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to in a matter involving strict observance of the rules. The concur.
determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, attestation contained in the certification on non-forum
trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who
be decided based on verified position papers, with executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION , G.R. No.
supporting documents and their affidavits. for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter 174935
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by Petitioner,
properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to harking on the policy of liberal construction (underscoring P
follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC[13] supplied). r
which outlines the parameters for valid compromise e
agreements, waivers and quitclaims - In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper s
Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day e
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within n
policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and which to file their petition for review in view of the absence t
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the of a counsel to represent them.[16] The records also reveal :
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty. Arnold Cacho,
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible of appearance as counsel for herein petitioners. Clearly, at PUNO, C.J.,
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its the time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable petitioners were not yet represented by counsel. Surely, QUISUMBING,
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be faulted for the
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of procedural lapse since they could not be expected to be YNARES-SANTIAGO,
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim conversant with the nuances of the law, much less
is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be knowledgeable with the esoteric technicalities of procedure. CARPIO,*
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing
of the present petition may be overlooked and should not be AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CORONA,
that on their face the Compromise Agreement[14] and -versus-
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[15] are devoid of any Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 CARPIO MORALES,
palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are fair
and just. Neither can we glean from the records any attempt which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 29 May 1998 ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers AZCUNA,
by the parties to renege on their contractual agreements, or
to disavow or disown their due execution. Consequently, Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo Espina,
Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo TINGA,
the same must be recognized as valid and binding
transactions and, accordingly, the instant case should be Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson
Manalastas to their former positions as regular employees, CHICO-NAZARIO,
dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns
petitioner Nestor Romero. and to pay them their full back wages, with the exception of
Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be VELASCO,
We cannot likewise accommodate respondents
contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the computed upon proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED,
with the MODIFICATION that herein petition is DENIED NACHURA,
petition as well as the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of insofar as it concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a
valid and binding Compromise Agreement and Release, REYES,
the Rules of Court will cause the dismissal of the present
appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict Waiver and Quitclaim with respondent company.
observance of the Rules, it however provides an escape SO ORDERED.
hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh consequences BRION, JJ.
of non-observance. Thus - TRISTAN C. COLANGGO,
Respondent. Office No. XIII (CSC-CARAGA) in Butuan City. The subsequently filed an omnibus motion for the production of

Promulgated: CSC-CARAGA immediately investigated the matter. original documents relative to the charges against him and

the presentation of persons who supervised the October 25,

April 30, 2008 In the course of its investigation, the CSC-
x---------------------------------------- 1992 PBET. His motion was granted and the concerned
----------x CARAGA discovered significant irregularities in
proctor and examiners were subpoenaed.
DECISION respondents documents. The photographs of Tristan C.

CORONA, J.: Colanggo attached respectively to the PBET application After evaluating the evidence, the CSC found:

form and to the October 25, 1992 picture seat plan did not
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set On the basis of the
resemble photographs attached [to] the PBET
aside the February 22, 2006 decision2 of the Court of application form and the picture seat
respondent. Furthermore, the signature found in the PBET plan, it is evident that the person who
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79047 and its resolution filed the application form for the PBET
application form was markedly different from that affixed is not the same person who actually
denying reconsideration.3 took the said examination on October
on respondents personal data sheet (PDS). It appeared that 25, 1992. This disparity of physical
On October 25, 1992, respondent Tristan C. features of the former and latter are
someone other than respondent filed his PBET application evident. The person who filed the
Colanggo took the Professional Board Examination for PBET has fuller cheekbones and
and still another person took the exam on his behalf. Thus, slanted eyes, thinner lips and has a
Teachers (PBET) and obtained a passing rate of 75.98%. different hairstyle from that of the John
the CSC-CARAGA filed a formal charge for dishonesty Doe who took the said examination. On
On October 1, 1993, he was appointed Teacher I and was the other hand, the latter has thinner
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service cheekbones, elongated chin, full lips
assigned to Don Ruben E. Ecleo, Sr. Memorial National with a moustache and round eyes. Also,
against respondent on January 13, 1999.4 the signatures appearing of the PBET
High School in San Jose, Surigao del Norte. applicant and that of the PBET
On September 27, 2000, respondent filed an examinee are also in different strokes,
curves and slants.
Subsequently, a complaint questioning the answer denying the charges against him and moved for a
Comparing the signatures on
eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed in the formal hearing and investigation. The CSC granted the the [PBET application form] and
[picture seat plan] vis--vis those affixed
Civil Service Commission (CSC) CARAGA Regional motion and scheduled a hearing on October 31, 2000. on the PDS of respondent more
evidently reveals that the three are
Respondent failed to appear on the said date but different persons. The photographs and
signatures appearing on the [PBET
application form] and [picture seat
plan] are far and different from the Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for The CSC moved for reconsideration13 but was
facial features and signatures from both
John Does. Respondent looks older, has certiorari in the CA alleging that the CSC committed grave denied.14 Hence, this petition.
full cheekbones, flatter nose and thin
lips. In other words, the picture and abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 021412.8 He
signatures affixed on the PBET The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in
application form, picture seat plan pointed out that the pieces of evidence against him were
and PDS undoubtedly belong to three finding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in
different persons which clearly serve inadmissible as they were unauthenticated photocopies of
a ground to establish a just cause for rendering Resolution No. 021412.15 The Uniform Rules on
CSC-CARAGA to issue a formal the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS.
charge on January 13, 1999 against Administrative Cases in the Civil Service16 (Uniform
respondent.5 (emphasis supplied)
On February 22, 2006, the CA granted the Rules) does not require strict adherence to technical rules of

The CSC concluded that respondent did not apply for and petition.9 It ruled that the photocopies of the PBET evidence. Thus, it validly considered the photocopies of the

take the PBET exam. Thus, in Resolution No. 021412, the application form, picture seat plan and PDS should have PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS in

CSC found respondent guilty of dishonesty and conduct been authenticated.10 Only documents or public records resolving the formal charge against respondent in spite of

prejudicial to the best interest of service and ordered his duly acknowledged or certified as such in accordance with the fact that they were not duly authenticated.

dismissal. 6 law could be presented in evidence without further proof.11

The petition is meritorious.
Consequently, the CA annulled and set aside Resolution
Respondent moved for reconsideration but his
No. 021412 and ordered the dismissal of charges against Administrative rules of procedure are construed
motion was denied.7
respondent.12 liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in

obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of

their respective claims and defenses.17 Section 39 of the The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in Moreover, it exhaustively discussed the differences in

Uniform Rules provides: investigating complaints against civil servants, is not bound appearances of respondent and the persons whose

by technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in photographs were attached to the PBET application form
Section 39. The direct
evidence for the complainant and the judicial proceedings. and the picture seat plan. It likewise compared the various
respondent consist of the sworn
statement and documents submitted in signatures on the said documents.
support of the complaint or answer as The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of
the case may be, without prejudice to
the presentation of additional evidence PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though Resolution No. 021412 reveals that the CSC
deemed necessary but was unavailable
at the time of the filing of the complaint not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was carefully evaluated the allegations against respondent and
and the answer upon which the cross-
examination, by the respondent and the sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the thoroughly examined and weighed the evidence submitted
complainant respectively, shall be
based. Following the cross- respondent. Worth noting was that respondent never for its consideration. The penalty (of dismissal) imposed on
examination, there may be re-direct or
re-cross examination. objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely respondent was therefore fully in accord with law20 and
Either party may avail
himself of the services of counsel and disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were jurisprudence.21 We find no grave abuse of discretion on
may require the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documentary not authenticated. the part of the CSC.
evidence in his favor through the
compulsory process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum. As a general rule, a finding of guilt in ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby

The investigation shall be administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 decision and August
conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining the truth without (or that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might 17, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-S.P. No.
necessarily adhering to technical
rules applicable in judicial accept as adequate to justify a conclusion),18 will be 79047 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
proceedings. It shall be conducted by
the disciplining authority concerned or sustained by this Court.19
his authorized representatives. Resolution No. 021412 dated October 22, 2002
(emphasis supplied)
The CSC graciously granted respondents motions and the May 19, 2003 resolution of the Civil Service

to ensure that he was accorded procedural due process. Commission finding respondent Tristan C. Colanggo
GUILTY of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of service and dismissing him from the service with

forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and

disqualifying him from reemployment in the government

service are REINSTATED.