22. Dolar vs.

Sundiam 38 SCRA 616 , April 30, 1971

On June 25, 1948, one Generoso Tupas, Jr. filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo for the allowance of his father's will and the appointment of an administrator for the
deceased's estate.

After the probate of the will and the appointment of the deceased's widow (later replaced by
Luis Tupas) as judicial administrator of the testate estate, Generoso Tupas, Jr., on December 5,
1953, sold to the herein respondent Lumampao, for the price of P40,000, two (2) parcels of
land bequeathed to him by his father. On August 9, 1955, Lumampao, by virtue of this
purchase, asked the surrogate court to be allowed to intervene in the proceedings. The court
granted his motion.

On February 18, 1957, however, a complaint for the recovery of the said two parcels of land
was filed by Lumampao against Generoso Tupas, Jr. and Luis Tupas with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. The validity of the sale to him of these properties, which was brought in issue
in the, said case, was upheld by the court a quo on May 15, 1959.

Prior to the final adjudication on the aforementioned complaint of Lumampao, however, Luis
Tupas filed with the probate court, on February 9, 1960, a motion for authority to sell four (4)
parcels of land of the testate estate for the payment of taxes due to the Government in the
amount of P1,701.68, attorney's fees and other obligations. The said motion included the two
parcels of land previously sold to Lumampao. The motion was approved by the probate court on
February 13, 1960 with Judge Wenceslao Fernan, presiding, subject to the condition that
"before executing the sale, the price must first be referred [to] and approved by his Court."

On June 4, 1963, Luis Tupas sold to his herein co-petitioner Cirilo Dolar the four (4) parcels of
land specified in the motion, inclusive of the parcels of land previously sold to Lumampao by
Generoso Tupas, Jr. It will be noted that at this time, the validity of the sale to Lumampao was
still pending adjudication in the Court of Appeals.

On January 24, 1964, the probate court, through Judge Imperial Reyes, who temporarily took
over the functions of the court a quo in the absence of its presiding judge who was then in
Manila, affixed his signature at the foot of the deed of sale executed by Luis Tupas to his co-
petitioner Cirilo Dolar, indicating his conformity therewith.

On October 22, 1966, pending decision on his motion to set aside, Lumampao filed with the
probate court a petition for the appointment of a receiver over the two parcels of land conveyed
and adjudicated to him.

On December 1, 1966, the probate court, with Judge Carlos Sundiam presiding, granted
Lumampao's petition, and, on February 8, 1967, appointed the herein respondent Gregorio Lira
receiver over the said parcels of land.
On June 7, 1967, Tupas and Dolar filed with this Court the instant petition to set aside the
receivership order of the court a quo. On June 16, 1967, we issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against the herein respondents Judge Sundiam, Lumampao and Lira.

ISSUE:

WHETER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER OVER THE THE TWO PARCELS OF LAND CONVEYED AND
ADJUDICATED TO HIM.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court held, where, as in this case, a piece of property which originally is a
part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by an heir of the deceased having a valid claim
thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake, subsequently inventoried or considered part
of the deceased's estate subject to settlement, and, thereafter, with the authority and approval
of the probate court, is sold once more to another person, a receiver of the property so sold
may, during the pendency of a motion to set aside the second sale, be appointed by the court
when in its sound judgment the grant of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to
secure and protest the rights of its real owner against any danger of loss or material injury to
him arising from the use and enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot acquire any
right of dominion thereon because the approving surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to
authorize the further sale of such property to another person.

Under the particular facts of the instant dispute, we find no compelling reason for disturbing the
respondent court's order granting the petition of Lumampao for the appointment of a receiver
over the parcels of land in question.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of the court a quo dated December 1, 1966 is hereby affirmed. The
said court is, however, enjoined to act in consonance with the tenor and intendment of this
decision. No costs.
23. Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals 300 SCRA 345 , December 21, 1998

Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, and Lourdes Sampayo were co-owners of the
539-square meter lot with improvements, covered by TCT No. T15374. On
March 1986,Sampayo died intestate. On April 1987, the private respondents, all claiming to
be collateral relatives of the deceased Sampayo, filed an action for partition and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. Sps. Conti refused
partition because of failure by the respondents to produce documents that will
prove that they were the rightful heirs of the deceased. On August 30, 1987,
Conti died and was substituted by his children as party defendant.

At the trial, private respondents presented evidence to prove that they were the
collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-
owner of the subject lot. On the other hand, petitioner Rosario alleged that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo
and that her family had been staying in the property in question since 1937. She
also testified that her late husband paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the
necessary repairs and improvements thereon because there had been an agreement that
Lourdes would leave her share of property to them.

Since no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by the petitioners, the
trial court declared that private respondents were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and
ordered both parties to submit a project partition of the residential house and lot for
confirmation by the court.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
erred in finding the private respondents were the heirs of Sampayo and that they were entitled
to the partition of the lot and improvements in question.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PRIVATE REPONDENTS
ENTITLED TO THE PARTITION OF THE LOT AND IMPROVEMENTS IN QUESTION.

RULING:
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the
heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison
v. Salud 31 —

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs
are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not
entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any
proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro
Quison; and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action.
There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil
Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes
at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the
purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in
proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the; plaintiffs to
maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 32 of the Civil
Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the
right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right
originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action
been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small
value. 33 But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-
half share which they inherited; from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of
ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rules 69 of the
Rules of Court —

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously
maintained by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second,
if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion
should go to which co-owner. 34 Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private
respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they are co-
owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to
be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the
trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.

However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly
preponderate to the right of private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any
reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for
review on certiorari will not lie.
24. Litam, etc., et al. vs. Rivera 100 Phil. 364 , November 27, 1956

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of RIzal. On April 24, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam filed
a petition stating that the petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam and the deceased was survived
by 8 children by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, that after the death of
Rafael Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had contracted in the
Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, that the decedent left as his property among
others 1/2 share in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera and that
the decedent left neither will nor debt. Petitioner prayed that after appropriate proceedings,
letters of administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera.

Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition substantially denying the alleged marriage of the
decedent to Sia Khin as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition,
asserting that the properties described are her paraphernal properties and praying that her
nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased.

The Court granted Marcosa Rivera’s petition and Arminio assumed as administrator of the
estate. He submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam and said inventory did
not include the properties mentioned in the petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in April 1952. Gregorio,
on November 1952, filed a motion for the removal of Arminio Rivera as administrator of the
aforementioned estate. Meanwhile, Remedios Espiritu was appointed as guardian of Marcosa
who was declared incompetent. Gregorio Dy Tam filed Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court
against Espirity and Arminio Rivera. He reproduced substatially the allegations made in his
petition in April 1952 stating that the properties in dispute are conjugal and are more than
those specified in the inventory.

The trial court dismissed CivilCase No. 2071. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT APPELLANTS ESTABLISH STATUS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

2. WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP IN CIVIL CASE IS PROPER.

RULING:
 1. NO. APPELLANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISHED STATUS OF LEGITIMACY AND BARS THEIR
CLAIM TO THE SHARE IN THE ESTATE.

Appellants claims that they are the children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in
China in 1911 with S.K.; that during the subsistence of the marriage, the decedent had
contracted in 1922 another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; that as heirs, they are entitled to the
decedent’s one-half share in the properties acquired during the second marriage. Held: The
various official and public documents executed by the decedent himself convincingly shows that
he had not contracted marriage with any person other than M.R., and that he had no
child.Thus, in the marriage certificate it was clearly stated that he was single when he married
M.R. in 1922; in the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950, he
declared under oath that no child; and in several other documents executed by him and
presented in evidence he had consistently referred to M.R. alone his wife; he had never
mentioned S.K. as his wife, or their alleged children. On the other hand, appellants did not
present in evidence the marriage certificate of the decedent and their mother, which is the best
evidence of the alleged marriage; or gave any explanation for the non-presentation thereof or
of its loss neither have they presented any competent secondary evidence of the supposed
marriage. The finding, therefore, of the lower court that the appellants are not heirs of the
decedent is correct.

2. NO. DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP IN CIVIL CASE IS NOT PROPER.

Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the
decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such
declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the
court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.