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Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
States, whose support for China erodes America’s technological edge and
ability to compete in international markets. These groups are managed
by a professional cadre of Chinese government and government-
associated science and technology transfer specialists who facilitate
intellectual property “exchanges” through a maze of venues. They tar-
get specific advanced technologies drawn from China’s industrial plan-
ning priorities (e.g., Made in China 20252) such as semiconductors,
robotics, next-generation information technologies (e.g., big data, smart
grid, internet of things), aviation, artificial intelligence, and electric
vehicles. As a result of their efforts, a commission convened by the
National Bureau of Asian Research concluded that IP theft, primarily
from China, costs the American economy hundreds of billions of dollars
each year, with significant impact on employment and innovation.3 For-
mer commander of United States Cyber Command and director of the
National Security Agency General Keith Alexander was even more grave
when he asserted the ongoing theft of IP by China represents “the great-
est transfer of wealth in h
uman history.” 4
Targets
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
naïveté. The methods and tradecraft are custom tailored to each target.
For universities, China takes advantage of the commitment to intellec-
tual freedom on campus, which strongly resists government scrutiny of
the activities of foreign students in hard-science programs and interna-
tional academic cooperation. For corporations, the lure of the Chinese
market gives Beijing tremendous leverage in exacting tech transfer from
American firms, combined with financial incentives for employees to
purloin intellectual property for personal gain. Finally, US government
labs have a historical commitment to international scientific cooperation,
and an uneven record of monitoring that cooperation for unsanctioned
transfers of information.
These efforts complement China’s legitimate efforts to invest in its
own indigenous innovative capacity. China has for several decades made
science and technology development a priority and appears to have the
political w ill to see it through. This is demonstrated by the research and
development funding programs it has put into place, the investment in
core scientific infrastructure that is in some cases unparalleled any-
where else in the world, and a national scientifically oriented industrial
policy. Yet the continuing intense engagement in IP theft is, in many
ways, an indication of the gaps in China’s indigenous innovation efforts.
Once acquired, foreign technology is converted in China into products
and weapons at 180 “Pioneering Parks for Overseas Chinese Scholars,”
160 “Innovation Serv ice Centers,” 276 “National Technology Model
Transfer Organizations,” and an unknown number of “technology busi-
ness incubators.” These facilities are strategically located to ensure wide
distribution of the foreign technologies.
Nontraditional Collectors
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
are targeted for access to research they have pursued by their own pas-
sion and intellect. Indeed, some nontraditional collectors may even be
unwitting in their support.
Collectors do not appear to be chosen by Beijing for their race or
nationality; rather they are targeted for their access to the desired
intellectual property and their willingness to violate their employee
agreements or national laws. Indeed, more recent scholarship has shat-
tered the shibboleth that the Chinese government only recruits ethnic
Chinese. While Chinese intelligence does have a historically strong
track record of attempting to recruit ethnic Chinese, primarily because
of cultural and language affinity, more recent cases of espionage and
technology transfer suggest that the Chinese government has broad-
ened its tradecraft to recruit nonethnic Chinese assets and collectors
as well, perhaps as a way of complicating US counterintelligence
efforts.
China’s most systematic channel for identifying foreign-based non-
traditional collectors is its Recruitment Program of Global Experts (海
外高层次人才引进计划), commonly known as the Thousand Talents Plan
(千人计划) or the Thousand Talents Program (TTP).5 The TTP is a
massive and sustained talent recruitment campaign designed to recruit
leading experts from overseas to assist in the country’s modernization
drive.
Initiated in 2008, the TTP aims to recruit leading overseas scien-
tists and experts who work in areas that are deemed high priority for
achieving China’s modernization goals.6 The program originally aimed
to recruit one thousand “overseas talents” (海外人才) over a period of five
to ten years. Official Chinese TTP websites list more than three hun-
dred US government researchers and more than six hundred US corpo-
rate personnel who have accepted TTP money.7 In many cases, t hese
individuals do not disclose receiving the TTP money to their employer,
which for US government employees is illegal and for corporate person-
nel likely represents a conflict of interest that violates their employee
agreement.
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Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Open-Source Research
China’s efforts to exploit foreign innovation is further seen in its open-
source acquisition infrastructure, which surpasses that of any other coun-
try. China employs a cadre of thousands to locate, study, and disseminate
foreign journals, patents, proceedings, dissertations, and technical stan-
dards without regard to ownership or copyright restrictions. The docu-
ments are indexed, archived, and supplied to Chinese commercial and
military “customers.”
Exchanges
The Chinese government organizes and pays for exchanges in which par-
ticipants travel from the United States, divulge technical knowledge
through scripted venues, are briefed on China’s technology interests,
return to their US base to collect more information, and repeat the pro
cess. China has a program for what it euphemistically calls “short-term
visits” by co-opted foreigners, which, stripped of its rhetoric, is indistin-
guishable from state-r un espionage.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Joint Research
The preferred method of establishing a research beachhead in the United
States is through the formation of a joint research center with a promi-
nent US university. One example is the China-US Joint Research Cen-
ter for Ecosystem and Environmental Change at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville.10 Launched in 2006, researchers from the Univer-
sity of Tennessee and the Department of Energy–funded Oak Ridge
National Laboratory partnered with the Chinese Academy of Sciences
to address “the combined effects of climate change and human activities
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Cyberespionage
Perhaps the most damaging channel for stealing US intellectual prop-
erty is cyberespionage. As noted above, NSA director Keith Alexander
has called cyberespionage by Chinese state actors the “greatest transfer
of wealth in human history.” Cyberespionage is both a means for pilfer-
ing US science and technology and a method of intelligence collection
for potential attacks against American military, government, and com-
mercial technical systems. As a result, t hese cyber intrusions represent a
fundamental threat to American economic competitiveness and national
security.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
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Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.