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Author’s Info: Frederick Travis, Maharishi Vedic Science Department, Maharishi Univer-
sity of Management, 1000 North 4th Street, Fairfield, IA 52557; (641) 472-7000 x3319;
email ftravis@mum.edu.
®Transcendental Meditation, TM, and Maharishi Vedic Science are registered or common
law trademarks licensed to Maharishi Vedic Education Development Corporation and
used under sublicense or with permission.
facts about the nature of experience (Nagel, 1974; Velmans, 1997). The
hard problem can be phrased: Why are some perceptions, cognitions, and
discriminations accompanied by conscious awareness, i.e. why they can
be reported (Chalmers, 1996)?
The “easy” problems are in principle addressable within current
cognitive and neuroscience research paradigms. They include investiga-
tion of (a) the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environ-
mental stimuli, (b) the integration of information by a cognitive system,
(c) the reportability of mental states, (d) the ability of a system to access
its own internal states, (e) the deliberate control of behavior, (f) the
mechanics of divided, sustained, and selective attention, and (g) the
difference between wakefulness and sleep.
The “hard” problems are difficult because they persist even after all
processes and functions have been explained. For instance, in the field of
neurobiology, Crick and Koch (1990) theorized that coherent EEG in a
band centered around 40 Hz serves to bind sensations into perceptions.
Yet, why do these cortical oscillations give rise to conscious experience?
Chalmers (1995) comments:
… the question of why binding and storage should themselves be
accompanied by experience is never addressed. If we do not know
why binding and storage should give rise to experience, telling a
story about the oscillations cannot help us.
In the field of psychology, Baars (1997) proposed a “global
workspace” model of consciousness. In this model, consciousness serves
the central function of broadcasting simultaneously to many specialized
non-conscious processors. However, this is a theory of cognitive acces-
sibility, which explains how information is widely accessible within a
system, as well as a theory of informational integration and reportability.
The theory shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional
correlate of conscious experience, but it does not offer an explanation for
the hard problem of consciousness.
To solve the hard problem, we need to explore the nature of inner
self-awareness independent of the processes and content that we are
aware of and which define our waking stream of consciousness. As
science uses instruments to explore deep into material objects, so we
need technologies of consciousness to explore deep within individual
awareness.
The objective research tradition of the West has yielded a highly
developed understanding of matter. It has penetrated to the nonmaterial
quantum mechanical basis of matter and its interactions (Hawking, Page,
& Pope, 1980). Yet our Western scientific tradition is still in its infancy
Travis et al. THE “HARD” PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 125
DESCRIPTION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION TECHNIQUE
During practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique, atten-
tion systematically experiences quieter, more subtler levels of the think-
ing process, and arrives at the source of thought, in which “…the
experiencer is left by himself without an object of experience, and
without the process of experiencing” (Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 1963).
This state is called Transcendental Consciousness. The content of Tran-
scendental Consciousness is pure self-awareness—the self experiences
the self through the self. It is a state of pure self-awareness. The three
distinct elements of ordinary waking experience (knower, known, and
the process of knowing) have become one. Maharishi (1963) explains:
When we have transcended the field of the experience of the
subtlest object, the experiencer is left by himself without an
experience, without an object of experience, and without the process
of experiencing. When the subject is left without an object of
experience, having transcended the subtlest state of the object, the
experiencer steps out of the process of experiencing and arrives at
Travis et al. THE “HARD” PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 127
the state of Being. The mind is then found in the state of Being
which is out of the relative. (p. 46)
Like a scientist’s microscope, TM practice systematically leads to
the experience of pure self-awareness—the knower by itself without the
customary contents (known) and processes of experience. Examining
the knower independent of its constant involvement in planning, percep-
tion, and behavior, gives insights into the dynamics of conscious experi-
ence. The subjective and objective correlates of the experience of pure
self-awareness are reported next.
These data further suggest that the knower has a status independent
from the processes and context of knowing. The knower, as experienced
during TM practice, is a state of consciousness described as silent,
unbounded, and outside of time and space. When this state of conscious-
ness converges with perceptual and cognitive processes through the
mechanism of attention, then a conscious experience results.
Two Neural Circuits Necessary for Experience
This hypothesized convergence of inner and outer values is sup-
ported by the convergence of two different neural circuits to yield
reportable experiences, according to neuroscience (Elbert & Rockstroh,
1987). Neuroscience has identified both phasic and tonic projections to
all cortical regions. This suggests that activity in both these projections
are necessary for conscious experience. Phasic projections comprise
sensory afferents from the transduction of light, chemical and pressure
energy from external objects into reverberating action potentials in
thalamocortical circuits (Llinas & Pare, 1991). The resulting spatial-
temporal patterns of thalamocortical activation appear to encode specific
information about objects and their movement through time and space
(Freeman & Skarda, 1985). However, phasic inputs only lead to a
consciousness experience if tonic activation (arousal or alertness) is
sufficiently high.
Cortical tone is governed by afferents from the so called nonspecific
nuclei of the thalamus, i.e. the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus
(Baars, 1995; Bogen, 1997), the matrix cells of the thalamus, and by the
cholinergic peribrachialis nuclei in the midbrain and pons tegmentum
areas (Smythies, 1997). These subcortical structures are elements in a
larger cortical-striato-thalamic threshold regulation circuit (Elbert &
Rockstroh, 1987). Alexander and colleagues (1986) have detailed six
cortico-striato-thalamic feedback loops that control cortical activation
levels. Within each loop, the basal ganglia sample ongoing cortical
activity and feed this information back into the (nonspecific) thalamo-
cortical circuits, responsible for cortical tone, vigilance and alertness.
These threshold regulation circuits keep cortical activation at an optimal
level for information processing. For instance, this circuit modulates
attention by increasing arousal thresholds, interrupting ongoing infor-
mation processing and setting the stage for attending to a specific
channel of information. These regulatory circuits exhibit features of
deterministic chaos—generating the diversity of EEG through the inter-
action of a few self-interacting systems (Elbert & Rockstroh, 1987).
Travis and Wallace (1999) proposed that these threshold regulation
circuits may also function during practice of the Transcendental Medita-
Travis et al. THE “HARD” PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 133
tion technique. They suggest that frontal areas act like a “neural switch”
to affect a rapid shift of physiological and cortical processing to a more
restfully alert state at the onset of TM practice; and that threshold
regulation mechanisms maintain this restful state for the duration of the
TM session.
Threshold-regulation feedback circuits may more generally under-
lie self-awareness, distinct from the contents and processes of experi-
ence. These feedback circuits, also termed reentrant circuits (Edelman,
1974), may merge new information with ongoing cortical activity. This
convergence of past and current cortical states may link individual
moments of experience into an ongoing stream of consciousness. This
self-referral functioning could be the real link between consciousness
and brain functioning.
Future research could investigate the link between self-referral
inner experiences and cortical feedback loops to help illuminate the
possible connections between consciousness and matter. Combining the
strengths of the research methodologies of the East and West could
provide the platform to address the hard question of consciousness.
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