POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

White Light Corporation v City of Manila (2009)

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW:
CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Facts:
The City of Manila passed an ordinance prohibiting
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-
rated or “wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays.
Issue:
Whether it is a valid exercise of police power?

Held:
No. No matter how noble the goals of this ordinace, the
desirability of these ends do no sanctify any and all means of their
achievement. The prohibition does not only affected those with
illegitmate purpose but also those who has legit purpose.
Compiled by:
Nota Bene: concept of Intermediate Scrutiny Test vis-a-vis to
Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny; relate to Equal Protection
DARHLYN S. ALOJADO
MMDA v Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising (2009)

Facts:
MRTC contracted Trackworks for the installation of
AY 2013-2014 billboards, signages and other advertising media in the structures
of MRT3. MMDA pursuant to an MMDA regulation which prohibits
the installation, posting or display of any kind or form of
advertising on any part of the road, sidewalk, center space, island,
posts, trees, parks and open spaces request Trackworks to
dismantle it. Trackword refused the request of MMDA, MMDA
proceeded to dismantle the former's billboards and similar forms
of advertisements.
Issue:
Whether the MMDA has authority to prohibit the
installation of billboards, signages installed by Trackworks?
Held:
No. MMDA's power were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system,
and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 (MMDA's charter) granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power)
Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. v CA
Facts:
The City Mayor of Iligan cancelled the business permit of
Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. for violating the special conditions (re
practice of optometry) imposed on the business permits.
Issue:
Whether the imposition of special conditions is a valid
exercise of police power?
Held:
No. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses
and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits
must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law. The imposition of special conditions amounts
to those license to engage in the practice of a particular profession
and this should be issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
regulate the particular profession.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v DAR
Facts:
Several petitioners are the root of the case:
a) A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and
229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full
owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners
now content that President Aquino usurped the legislature's power.
b) A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria's Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131
is the creationg of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50B.
c) A petition by landowners which was placed by the DAR under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d) A petition invoking the right of retention under PD No. 27 to owners
of rice and corns lands not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:
Whether the aforementioned EO's PD, and RA were constitutional?
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was a valid
exercise of police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation 131 and
EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of police power and
power of eminent domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under
CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which paument of just compensation
is imperative. The taking is contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical
possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurence of the lawful subject and the method.
 Subject and purpose of Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however
what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.
Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page
for the common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC
space shall be allocated by the COMELEC, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on
public issues and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space shall
also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Philippine Press Institute (PPI), an organization of newspaper and
magazine publisher asks the Suprement Court to declare Resolution No.
2772 unconsitutional and void on the ground that violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. The COMELEC
claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional?
Held:
Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 compel print media
companies to donate “COMELEC space” amounts to taking of personal
property without payment of just compensation required in expropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the newspapers
were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property
for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
just compensation. Also the said resolution does not constitute a valid
exercise of police power of the state. In the case, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publisher.
BILL OF RIGTHS
DUE PROCESS
Lumiqued v Exevea
Facts:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR. He was
charged for dishonesty due to questionable gas expense under his
office and for unjustly removing the complainant (Zumudio) after
filing complaints against him. The issue was referred to the DOJ
and committee hearings were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992
without the assistance of counsel. On second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to enable him to employ the services of a
counsel which was granted. Neither Lumiqued or his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution. The investigating
committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec
Drilon adopted the recommendation and Pres. Ramos issued OA 52
dismissing Lumiqued from service.
Issue:
Whether Lumiqued's right to due process has been violated
because he was not assisted by a counsel during the administrative
proceeding?
Held:
No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right
afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It
is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and with more reason in an administrative
inquiry.
In the case, petitioner invoke the right of an accused in
criminal proceeding to have a competent and independent counsel
of his own choice. However, Lumiqued was no accused of any
crime in the proceeding below. The investigation conducted by the
committee created for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed
against him. The right to counself is not indispensible to due
process unless required by the Constitutional or the law.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one's side.
Secretary of Justice v Judge Lantion
Facts:
Mark Jumenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from
tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA.
Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant
to RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez to be
extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint
against him as well as the extradition request by the USA but the
DOJ Sec refused to provide him a copy thereof advising that it is
still premature to give him so and that it is no prelimnary
investigation hence he is ot entitled to received such copies.
Issue:
Whether the refusal of the DOJ Sec to provide him a copy of
the complaint and the extradition request violates the right of
Jimenez to due process of law?
Held:
Yes. The proceeding against Jimenez refer to an impending
threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is
this true, but even more so in the present case as it involves the
possible deprivation of liberty, which based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights (right to right, liberty and
property. Always in that order, :D) is placed second to life and
enjoys precedence over property. While forfeited property can be
returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievanle and beyond recompense.
Government of the USA v Purganan
Sequel to Secretary of Justice v Lantion
Summary of ruling:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to
determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with
the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person
sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended
merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back
to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed
therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition
case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the
accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all,
to a court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of
the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is
that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and
its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima
facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally examine the
affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
 exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the
arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her
to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may
apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there
is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in
the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk
involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and
to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights,
a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the
limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for
the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent
organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.
Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight
functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and “over-due process” every little step
of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings
become not only inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith
with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably
delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the
quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted
with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays
and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
Philippines Guardians Brotherhood Inc. v COMELEC
A Facts:
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution date October
13, 2009 deleting several party-list groups or organization from
the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties because
it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. It is provided, however, in the
said resolution that any national, regional, sectoral party or
organzation or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition.
Issue:
Whether PGBI's right to due process has been violated?
Held:
No. PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration.
The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and
in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing.
EQUAL PROTECTION
“All person or things similarly situated must be similarly treated
both as to rights conferred abd responsibilities imposed.”
Requisites of valid classification (SNAG):
1. Such classification rests upon substantial distinctions;
2. It is not confined to existing conditions only;
3. It applies equally to all members of the same class; and
4. It is germane to the purpose of the law.
TELEBAP v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of BP 881 on the
ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer losses
again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to
give it standing to question the validity of §92.
Issue:
Whether the differential treatment of broadcast media is
justified?
Held:
Yes. Differential treatment of broadcast media justified.
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio
and television stations to provide free air time. They contend that
newspapers and magazines are not similarly required as, in fact, in
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, we upheld their right to
the payment of just compensation for the print space they may
provide under §90.
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy
that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment under the
free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media.
There are important differences in the characteristics of the two
media, however, which justify their differential treatment for free
speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the
broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate
broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no
similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the
print media.
In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions
may validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason
for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public
funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry,
which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the
radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for
the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
People v Jalosjos
Facts:
Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress. Inspite of his
having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, his constituents liked him so much that they knowingly re-
elected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he
could not perform.
Issue:
Whether Jalosjos, as an re-elected member of the House of
the Representative, could be validly prevented to attend
congressional sessions, moreso, perform his duties.
Held:
Yes. There is a valid classification. The fact that Jalosjos is a
convicted rapist sets him apart from other members of Congress.
(Rapist din yung iba, di nga lang convicted. :D)
Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission
Facts:
President Aquino III found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration. On July 30, 2010,
he signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO No. 1 is violative of equal protection
clause of the constitution?
HELD:
Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Nota Bene: The Court upheld the authority of the president to
create commissions under Sec 17 of Article VI of the Constitution,
“take care clause” (also called residual powers) shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
COMELEC v Cruz
Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec 2 of RA 9164 entitled "An Act
Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991:
Sec. 2. Term of Office. – The term of office of all barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however,
That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged
proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC
decision.
Issue:
Whether the implementation of Sec 2 (2) of RA 9164 would
violate equal protection of the law?
Held:
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is
found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: "Nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Essentially,
the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who
are different from one another on the basis of substantial
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or
persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be
treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision
applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the
present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat
barangay officials differently from other local elective officials
because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction
between these elective officials with respect to length of term and
term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution
itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term
and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of
term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of
term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation.
Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial
distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows
a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist
under these conditions.
Jose Miguel Arroyo v DOJ
Facts:
Before the Court are three (3) consolidated petitions and
supplemental petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court filed by Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike
Arroyo) in G.R. No. 199082, Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) in
G.R. No. 199085 and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) in G.R. No.
199118 assailing the following:
1. Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 9266
"In the Matter of the Commission on Elections and
Department of Justice Joint Investigation on the Alleged
Election Offenses Committed during the 2004 and 2007
Elections Pursuant to Law" dated August 2, 2011;
2. Joint Order No. 001-2011 (Joint Order) "Creating and
Constituting a Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation
Committee [Joint Committee] and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and
Manipulation Cases" dated August 15, 2011;
3. Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections (Joint Committee Rules of
Procedure) dated August 23, 2011; and
4. Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team dated October 20,
2011. The consolidated petitions and supplemental
petitions likewise assail the validity of the proceedings
undertaken pursuant to the aforesaid issuances.
Issue:
Whether the creationg of a Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and
Manipulation Cases is constitutional in light of equal protection
clause of the 1987 Constitution?
Nota Bene: Compare with Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission
Held:
No. The equal protection clause is enshrined in Sec 1, Art
III of the Constitution which reads: Sec 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The concept of equal protection has been laid down in
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010: One of the basic
principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Sec 1, Art III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order No.
001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles
out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore,
it infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration since Executive Order No. 1 specifically referred to
the "previous administration"; while the Joint Committee was
created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of
election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA
and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as
there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official
duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation
by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Lim v Felix
Nota Bene:
The certification by the fiscal of the existenceof probable
cause does not bind the judge.
Preliminary inquiry (PI) is the process of determination of
probable cause for the filing of information (by the fiscal) while
Preliminary examination (PE) is conducted by a judge for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of warrant of
arrest. Take note! Probable cause in PI is different in PE.
Facts:
Petitioners were suspects of the slaying of a congressman
and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another.
They were initially charged with a crime of multiple murder with
frustrated murder. After conducting a preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued and a bail was fixed.
A fiscal was designated to review the case and issued a
resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners but ruled that a case of murder for each of the killing of
four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot
wound on the survivor. Thereafter, four separate informations to
that effect were field with the trial court with no bail
recommended.
Petitioners moved that another hearing be conducted to
determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them
and a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge. These
motions were denied by the court because the prosecution had
declared the existence of probable cause, information were
complete in form and in substance, and there was no defect on its
face.
Issue:
Whether the judge may issue a warrant of arrest by simply
relying on the fiscal's certification and recommendation that a
probable cause exists?
Held:
1. The judge committed grave abuse of discretion. In Placer v
Villanueva, it was held that the judge may rely upon fiscal's
certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the
certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the “search and
seizure” provision of the 1973 Consitution.
2. In the case of Solvien v Makasiar, decided under the 1987
Constitution, the Court noted that the addition of the word
 personally after the word determined and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrant to
other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does
not require the judge to personally examine the complaint
amd his witness in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. Following the established doctrine and procedures, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, the may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusionas to the existence of probable cause.
3. In the case, the respondent judge relies solely on the
certification of the prosecutor. Considering that all the
records of the investigation shows that he has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The
determination was made by the provincial prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.
Manalili v CA
Facts:
Policemen were patrolling the vicinity of the Caloocan
Cemetery due to reports of durgs addicts roaming the area. They
chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Manalili)
who seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was
observed to have reddish eyes ad to be walking in swaying manner.
When Manlili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached
him and asked what he as holding in his hands. Manalili tried to
resist but the policemen were persistent until he yeilded his wallet
which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana
residue. The trial court convicted Manalili for violation of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). On appeal, Manalili contended
that he was searched without warrant.
Issue:
Whether evidence seized is admissible in evidence?
Held:
Yes. Generally, search and seizure to be valid must be made
with a previously secured judicial warrant . However, this is not
absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:
1. Search incidental to lawful arrest;
2. Search of moving vehicle;
3. Search in plain view;
4. Costum search; and
5. Consented search (waiver by the person being searched)
In the above instances, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as essential requirement.
Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure) – the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead
reasonably discreet and prudent man to belive that an offense has
been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be search.
A stop and frisk operation is another exception to the
general rule. In this case, probable cause was established with
Manalili's suspicious behavior.
Nota Bene: Take note of landmark case of Terry v Ohio. Limited
only to the frisking of the outer protective clothing and after
question or inquiry. Ask first before frisk!
People v Sucro
Facts:
Police officers monitored activities of Edison Sucro, as the
latter was reported to be selling marijuana. Sucro was monitored
to have talked and exchanged things three times. After the next
buyer, the policemen intercepted one of the buyer and admitted
the buying of Marijuana from Scuro in front of the chapel.
Thereafter, police team intercepted and arrested Sucro and
recovered 19 sticks and 4 tea bags of marijuana,
Issue:
Whether the arrest without warrant is lawful? Yes.
Whether the evidence from such arrest is admissible? Yes.
Held:
Search and seizure supported by a valid warrant of arrest is
not an absolute rule. Sec 12 of Rule 126 of Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense without a search
warrant.
The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems
from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance
was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for its issuance.
However, the warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as
probable cause existed. The police officers have personal
knowledge of the aactual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were
the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in the performance of their duties.
People v Valdez
Facts:
At about 10:15 o'clock in the morning, the police was
informed of the presence of a marijuana plantation. At 5:00 o'clock
in the morning of the following day, a police team, accompanied by
the informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
grown. After a 3-hour uphill trek from the nearest barangay
road,they arrived at the place and found the accused in his nipa
hut. They looked around the unfenced “kaingin” and saw 7 five-
foot high marijuana plants planted approximately 25 meters from
his hut.
Issue:
Are the marijuana plants admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. The search and seizure without warrant violated §2, Art
III of the 1987 Constitution. Considering that the informant had
revealed the name of the accused as well as the place were the
marijuana was planted and the police had at least one day to
obtain a search warrant, they had no reason not to obtain one. The
plain view doctrine cannot apply. The seizure of evidence in plain
view applies where the police inadvertently came across the
object. In this case, the police team was dispatched precisely to
search for the prohibited flora.
People v Chua Ho San
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms
and other contraband, policemen began patrolling tge coastline.
While monitoring the coastal area, they have intercepted a radio
call from a baranggay captain requesting for police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat that the latter had spotted.
A vessel that looked different from the board ordinarily
used by fisherfolk of the area and eventually docked at the shore.
When the speed board landed, a male passenger (Chua Ho San)
alighted, carrying a multi-colored strawbag, and walked towards
the road.
Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction
but a police officer held Chua's right arm to prevent him from
fleeing. Then they introduced themselves as police officers. Chua
did not understand what they were saying. By resorting to the use
of sign language, a police officer motioned with his hands for the
Chua to open his bag. Chua acceded to the request and the said
bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing
shabu. Chua was then brought to police station where he was
provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional
rights.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest and the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers constitute a valid exemption from
the warrant requirement?
Held:
No. The Constitution bars the State from intrusion to a
person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the
rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases:
1. Search incidental to lawful arrest;
2. Search of moving vehicle;
3. Search in plain view;
4. Stop and frisk situations (Terry search)
5. Custom search; and
6. Consented search (waiver by the person being searched)
It is required that in above cases of inflagrante delicto, the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground f suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense charged (Take note probable cause! Different na sila,
PC for the issuance of warrant of arrest, PC for the issunce of
search warrant, PC for the filing of an information and PC for
conducting warrantless search :D)
In the case, there are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could have been spurred police officers
from conducting the obtrusive search. Chua was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel
that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats
of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of
perpetuating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was
no cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It cannot
also be considered a valid search under a waived or consented
search because the accused could have not understand the sign
language.
People v Tangliben
Facts:
Police officers were conducting a surveillance at a terminal.
At around 9:30 pm they noticed a person, Tangliben, carrying a
travelling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him,
inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The
accused was take into police for further reinvestigations.
Tangliben was found guilty of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issue:
Whether there was an unlawful search due to lack of search
warrant?
Held:
No. Sec 5 Rule 113 provides that a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant of arrest a person when in
his presence the person to be arrested when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, us committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
In the case, the accused was found to have been committing
possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully
even without a search warrant. Another reason is that his case
poses urgency on the part of the arresting public officers. It was
found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the
policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police
office officers had to act quickly and there was no enough time to
secure a search warrant.
People v Leila Johnson
Facts:
Leila Johnson was a departing passenger bound for the
United States. While entering the gate of NAIA, she was frisked
and the frsiker felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area.
Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had undergone an operation. Not satisfied by
the explanation, she was directed to the nearesr women's room for
inspection. They recovered 3 plastic packs of shabu.
Issue:
Whether the search is valid?
Nota Bene: Concept of “Reduced Expectation of Privacy”
Held:
Yes. What is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante
delicto pursuant to a valid search made on the person.
Person may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause be exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedure with increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come to an
increased security at the nation's airport.
People v Malmstedt
Facts:
A temporary checkpoint was set up at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs.
During the inspection, a police officer noticed a buldge on
accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge to be a gun, the officer
asked the accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
out whatever that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object
turned out to be a pouch bag containing wrap objects which
contains hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Issue:
Whether the search made was legal in a absence of a
search warrant?
Held:
Yes. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonble searches and seizures. However, it is not without
exception. There may be instances when a search without a
warrant is valid.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto.
Valmonte v De Villa
Facts:
Pursuant to a letter of instruction, NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts ofValenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioner Atty. Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Rights sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. The residents are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints. Petitioner contended that the checkpoints gave
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether military and police checkpoints violate the right of
the people against reasonable search and seizure?
Held:
No. Military and police checkpoints violate the right of the
people against unreasonable search and seizure.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable and not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is also to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
People v de Garcia
Facts:
Sometime in 1989 during the height to the coup attempts
against President Aquino, Rolando de Guzman was subjected to a
warrantless search and seizure. Various ammunition and
explosives were confiscated from him. Thus, were charged with
the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure is valid?
Held:
Yes. Search warrant can be dispensed with due to the
exigent circumstances attendant to the case. This case still stands
unchallened jurisprudence wise.
Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board
Facts:
In this case, the constitutionality of RA 9165 re: mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
certain offenses.
Issue:
Whether mandatory drug testing is not in violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure?
Held:
Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 imposing additional qualification for
candidates for senator in unconstitutional. The qualifications
enumerated by the Constitution is exclusive and cannot be
expanded by enacting a statute.
Sec 36(c) of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Sec 36(d)
covering employees of public and private office also constitutional.
The situation is entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosector's office with criminal offenses
punishable with 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomless and
suspicionless. In the case of person charge with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random
and suspicionless.
Pollo v Constantino-David
Right to privacy has two-fold requirement:
1. that a person has exhibited actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy; and
2. that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).
Facts:
An anonymouse letter complaint was received by the Civil
Service Commission alleging that the chief if the Mamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na Division of the CSC RO-IV has been lawyering
for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. CSC
Chairperson immediately formed a team with background in
information techonology and issued a memmorandum directing
them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-
ROIV] Mamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal Divisions. The team
proceeded and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers.
 Petitioner filed his comment denying that he is the person
referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he
protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was
on leave citing his letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he
informed the Director of CSC ROIV that the files in his computer
were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives friends and
associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating, and printing as these would violate his consitutional
right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that thought
government property, the temporary used and ownership of the
computer is issued under a memorandum receipt is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including
its use for personal purposes.
Issue:
Did the petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files? No.
Was the search authorized by the respondent CSC
Chairman, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioner's computer, reasonable in its inception and scope? Yes.
Held:
No. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy in his office or government
issued computer which contrain his personal files. Petitioner did
not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitor. Neither did he allege that he
used passwords or adopted means to prevent other employees
from accessing his computer files.On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the SCS, he normally would
have visitors in his office. Even assuming that petitioner had at
least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he
claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating
the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy
that puts its employees on notice that they have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, score, send or receive on the
office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use
of the computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies tha on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that computer resources were only used for legitimate business
purposes.
On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner's computer files was conducted in
connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct.
Under the facts, the Court held that the search conducted on
petitioner's computer was justified at its inception and in scope.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Secretary of National Defense v Manalo
Facts:
Manalo brothers were abducted by military men belonging
to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture,
the brothers escaped.
Ten days after their escaped, they filed a petition for
prohibition, injuction, and temporary restraining order to stop
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. While the pending in court, the rule
on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to
treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the CA granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Sec of National Defense and
Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with
all official and unofficial assignment of two military officials
involved and produced all medical reports and records of the
Manalo brothers whil under military custody. The Sec of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP seek to reverse and set
aside the decision of the CA.
Issue:
Whether the statements from victims themselves is
sufficient for amparo petitions?
Whether actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the
right to security of person may be invoke?
Held:
On the first issue, it depends on the credibility and
candidness of the victim themselves in their statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can
identify in the places where they were detained.
On the second issue, No. The right to security of person is
“freedom from fear”. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) enunciates in that “a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people. It is the right to security of person as the word security
itself means “freedom from fear”.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to
security of person may be invoked. While the right to security of
person appers in conjunction with the right to liberty, under Article
9, the committee has rules that the right to security of person can
exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, it is not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person may be invoke.
Reyes v Sec Raul Gonzalez
Facts:
Petitioner was among those who were arrested in the
Manila Peninsula Hotel seige on November 30, 2007 but was
released because the charge of rebellion against them was
dismissed for lack of probable cause.
Despite of the dismissal of the rebellion charged against the
petitioner, a hold-departure order (HDO) still subsists.
Petitioner filled a petition for a writ of amparo on the
ground the respondents violated petitioner's right to travel.
Petitioner argues that the Secretary of Justice has no power to
issue HDO and the subject HDO has no legal basis.
Issue:
Whether the right to travel is covered by the rule on the
Writ of Amaparo?
Held:
No. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the
Writ of Amparo are 1) right to life; 2) right to liberty; and 3) right
to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one
place to another. As held in Marcos v Sandiganbayan, “person's
right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction
for humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's discretion.”
In the case, the restriction on petitioner's right to travel as
a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY/ WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Gamboa v Chan
Facts:
Pres. Arroyo issued an administrative order creating
Zenarosa Commission wich was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAG) in the country in view of
eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future.
The PNP conducted surveillance operation against her and
her aides and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly, without
the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the report
enumeration of individuals maintain PAGs. Gamboa's association
with PAG was published and released in the different forms of
media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler.
 Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa
filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data
Issue:
Whether the resort to petition for writ of habeas corpus is
proper?
Held:
No. The forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Commission was not unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally
expected to forward or share intellignce information regarding the
PAG. The existence of the report was admitted but it is emphasized
its confidential nature. It was leaked to third parties and the
media. Gamboa failed to establish that PNP was responsible for his
unintended disclosure. There are other remedies available to her
to address the purported damage to her reputation.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
Navarro v CA
Facts:
Lingan and Jalbuena (radio reporters) went to a police
station to report for a blotter. During the course, a heated
argument arose between Navarro (a police officer) and the two
reporters. Navarro poked his firearm on the face of Jalbuena.
Lingan interfered which irked Navarro and then and thee hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This
caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.
Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said “kita mo yan ha, buhay
kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.” He then poked his gun
at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name of the
blotter. Lingan was taken to the hospital but then died because of
the injuries. Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on
tape the exchange between Navarro and the deceased.
Issue:
Whether the tape is admissible in evidence in view of RA
4200 (Anti-wiretapping Act)?
Held:
Yes, it is admissible. The law prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between Navarro and Lingan wasnot private, tape
recording is not prohibited.
Ramirez v CA
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner against
private respondent alleging that in a confrontation in the latter's
office, she was allegedly vexed, humiliated and insulted her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the events and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether RA 4200 applies in recordings by one of the
parties in the conversation?
Held:
Yes. RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all parties to any private
conversation, to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape record or any similar device. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.
 Zulueta v CA
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries and photographs. The
document and papers were seized in evidence in case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which she had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Are they admissible?
Held:
No. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the “privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
“lawful order from a court or when public safety or order so
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence inadmissible “for any purpose in
any proceeding.”
Waterous Drug Corporation v NLRC
Facts:
Catolico was hired as pharmacist by petitioner. Catolico
sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 when the
normal selling price is P320 per unit. She overcharged P64 per
unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a
“refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelop
addressed to her. A clerk of petitioner opened the envelop and saw
that there was a check payble to Catolico for P640.
Petitioner ordered the dismissal of Catolico for acts of
dishonesty. A labor case arose, NLRC ruled that the evidence of
the petitioner (check from YSP) is inadmissible in evidence
because the right to privacy of communication of Catolico was
violated.
Issue:
Whether the check is inadmissible as evidence?
Held:
No. In People v Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers tot he immunity of
on'es person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In the problem, it is not the government that interfered
with the privacy of communication of the respondent but the
petitioner who is the employer of the respondent, a private person.
(Read article 32 of the New Civil Code, if private person, that's the
remedy) Hence, it is admissible in evidence.
Nota Bene:
Compare with the Zulueta case. Both are committed by
privated individuals. This boils down to the concept of Expectation
of Privacy.
Marquez v Desierto
Facts:
Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained the a bank where
petition is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pernding investigation at the Office
of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo for violation of RA
3019. Petitioner wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply
with the orders without violating any law particularly RA 1405
(Secrecy of Bank Deposits).
Issue:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera
inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to
the law on secrecy of bank deposits?
Held:
No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there
must be:
1. a pending case before a proper court;
2. inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending
case;
3. account must be clearly identified; and
4. the bank personel and account holder must be notified to
be present during inspection.
In the case, there is only a pending investigation before the
Ombudsman and not a pending case.
Ople v Torres
Facts:
Administrative Order (AO) No. 38 entitled “Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System” was
issued and duly published. This was opposed by petitioner Ople on
constitutional grounds:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone
of privacy.
Issue:
Re: Right to Privacy. Whether the administrative order
violates the person's right to privacy?
Held:
Yes. The challenged AO provides for a creation of a
“common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies through the use of biotechnology. (Biometry is
the science of the application of statistical methods to biological
facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the
confirmation of an individual's identity through fingerprint, retinal
scan, hand geometry or facial features). The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes but the existence of
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a convert
invitation to misues, a temptation that may be too great for some
of our authorities to resist.
The AO does not even provide in clear and unequivocal
terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not
provide who shall control and access the data and under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information.
Note: If you have time. Read full text.
TELEBAP v COMELEC
Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec 90 and Sec 92 of BP 881 is
being challenged. Sec 90 requires the COMELEC to procure print
space and magazines with payment while Sec 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge.
Issue:
Re: Equal protection. - There is substantial distinction
between the radio and television and print and magazines. Hence,
there is a valid classification.
Re: Due process of law. - all broadcasting, whether radio or
television, is licensed by the Government, and the franchise issued
to a broadcast station is always subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by Congress when the common good requires. (Note:
franchise not protected by non-impairment clause)
Whether the procurement of air time without compenstion
is constitutional and does not restrain freedom of speech and the
press?
Held:
Yes, it is constitutional. It is an exercise of the plenary
police power of the State to promote general welfare.
Note: This case is rich in constitutional issues – equal protection of
the laws, due process, just compensation (power of eminent
domain), locus standi. Read in full text.
ABS-CBN v COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC issued a resolution prohibiting the conduct of
exit polss during elections for the reason that exit polls have the
tendency to cause confusion.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC resolution is in violation of the
freedom of the press?
Held:
Yes. The conduct of exit polls and reporting their results are
valid exercise of freedom of speech and the press. A limititation on
them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive
character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the
COMELEC cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit
polls cause chaos in voting centers.
SWS v COMELEC
Facts:
Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 provides that “surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and
surverys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days
before an election. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
the said provision.
Held:
It is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of
expression for laying prior restraint on the freedom without any
clear and present danger to justify it.
Nota Bene:
Take note of the O'Brien Test (US v O'Brien), governmental
regulation is valid if:
1. it is within the constitutional power of the government;
2. it furthers an important or substantial government interest;
3. the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and
4. the incidental restriction on the freedom is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former
President Joseph Estrada
Facts:
The Kapisanan ng Broadcaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder case and other criminal cases filed
against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in
order to “assure the public of full transparency in the proceedinfs
of unprecedented case in our history”.
Issue:
Whether the live media coverage of the trial should be
permitted by the court?
Held:
The right to impartial trial of accused prevails over freedom
of the press. Live TV coverage may be prohibited since the right of
the accused must prevail over the right of the public to information
and freedom of the press.
Note: in its resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Court
ordered audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary
purposes, not for live or real time boardcast. Only later they will
be made available to the public. :D
New Sound Broadcasting Network Inc v Dy
Facts:
Petitioner are radio stations operators of DZNC Cauayan
and Star FM DWIT Cauayan airing out of Cuauyan City and some
part of Cordillera Region. The only other station operating in
Cuauyan City is owned by the family of respondent Dy.
In 2002, petitioner applied for the renewal of Mayor's
permit. Thereafter, the municipal officials padlocked the radio
stations based on the ground that the petitioners failed to submit
the required zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the
mayor's permit.
In the case, it was shown that in 2001 Bombo Radyo was
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the
Dy political dysnasty. Respondent Cesar Dy is the brother of
Faustino Dy Jr, governor of Isabela until he was defeated in 2004
re-election bid by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station
manager of petitioner's own DZNC.
Issue:
Whether the closure of the petitioner's radio station is
constitutional?
Held:
No. There is undeniable political color. The bare acts of
closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act
of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dessimination.
Nota Bene:
Prior Restraint v. Subsequent Punishment; Content-Based
Regulations v Content-Nuetral Regulations
Hector Villanueva v PDI
Facts:
Villanueva was one of the mayoralty candidates of Bais,
Negros Oriental during the May 1992 elections. Two days before
the elections, repondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing
Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published a story that COMELEC
has disqualified Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of
Bais for having been convicted in three administrative cases for
grave abuse of authority and harassment while he was an officer-
in-charge of the mayor's office, and a day before the election, the
same story was published by respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer
(PDI). On the scheduled election date, petitioner failed in his
mayoralty bid. Believing that his defeat was cause by the
publication, petitioner sued the repondents PDI and Manila
Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages.
Issue:
Whether the said reports are covered under freedom from
subsequent punishments?
Held:
No. In Policarpio v Manila Times, the news items that
lacked truth and fairness were not privileged communications.
GSIS v Villaviza
Facts:
Villaviza, together with other employees of the GSIS, wore
red shirts as sign of protest. GSIS President and General Manager
Garcia filed charges against respondents for grave misconduct
and/or prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Issue:
What are public concern speeches?
Are these constitutionally protected?
Held:
Public concern speeches is defined as speech that relates to
a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.
Yes, these are protected speech. In Scott v Meters, it was
held that though government's right to impose reasonable
restrictions is recognized, it must not be “unconstitutionally
overboard”. The wearing of read shirts by the respondent did not
amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action rather it
constituted speech on a matter of public concern ad is protected
by the constitution.
Relate to: rights of workers to concerted peaceful activities (for
government employees, limited)
Soriano v Laguardia
Facts:
Petitioner as host of the program “Ang Dating Daan”
uttered obscene remarks against Michael Sandoval, Iglesia Ni
Cristo's minister and regular host of the TV program “Ang Tamang
Daan”. Two days after, several affidavit-complaints were lodged by
private respondents, all members of INC, against petitioner in
connection with the broadcast. MTRCB suspended him from
appearing in Ang Dating Daan program for three months.
Petitioner claims that his right to free speech has been
violated.
Issue:
Whether petitioner's contention is correct?
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case and
consid the adverse effect of petitioner's utterances on the viewer's
fundamental riight as well as petitioner's clear violation of his duty
as a public trustee, MTRCB properly suspended him.
It cannot be properly asserted that petitioner's suspensent
was an undue curtailment of his right against free speech either as
a prior restraint or as subsequent punishment.
It is MTRCB's mandate to regulate broadcast media, his
utterances were not suitable for general patronage.
Southern Hemisphere v Anti-Terrorism Council
Facts:
This case is a consolidated petitions challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007).
Petitioner claims that Sec 3 of RA 9372 is unconstitutional as it
provides- the following are elements of the crime of terrorism:
1. offender commits an act punishable by the RPC and the
enumerated special penal laws;
2. commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and
3. the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give into an unlawful demand*.
Issue:
Petitioner contend that the element of unlawful demand in
the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. Is
the contention correct?
Held:
No. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is the conduct and not
the speech.
Note on the ruling that is related to free speech:
• The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreath
doctrine is applicable only to cases involving free speech.
RA 9372 regulates the conduct and not the speech.
• Take note of void-for-vagueness and overbreath doctrine in
relation to the “chilling effect” to mass media.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
BP 880 – Public Assembly Act of 1985
Note: Read full text. Salient provisions – regulation not
prohibition. Exceptions to requirement of permit: private property,
freedom parks.
Bayan Karapatan v Ermita
Facts:
In the series of rallies conducted by petitioners during the
period September 26 – October 6, 2005 (they have engaged in
public assemblies without the required permits) where their
protests were forcibly and illegally dispersed that causes injuries
among some of their members as well as arrest. Police officers
have prevented them from proceeding further.
Petitioners assails BP 880 as well as the calibrated
preemptive response or the “CPR policy”. They seek to sop violent
dispersals of rallies underthe “no permit, no rally” policy and the
CPR policy recently announced.
Issue:
Whether or not the citizen's right to enagage in peaceful
assembly and to exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by
the Constitution, is directly affected by BP 880 which requires a
permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation streets
and parks?
Whether or not the CPR policy valid?
Held:
No. While this right is sacrosanct, it is not absolute. The
right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. This
right, however, may be regulated by the State for the promotion of
the general welfare through police power. This sovereign police
power is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by
authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city
councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was
adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it
as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection.
IBP v Hon. Atienza
Facts:
On June 15, 2006, IBP filed with the Office of the Mayor a
letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 to be participated in by IBP members and
officers, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing
IBP to stage a rally on the given date but indicated therein Plaza
Miranda as the venue, not Mendiola Bridge, which permit received
on June 19, 2006. Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the CA a
certiorari. The petition having not resolve in 24 hours, petitioner
filed a certiorari before the SC. While the petition is pending, the
rally pushed through at the Mendiola Bridge.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor of City of Manily committed
grave abuse of discretion in modifyig the venue in IBP's rally
permit?
HELD:
Yes. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people
to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of
public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act
with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated
as follows: x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or
to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP
who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant
the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes
the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
FREEDOM TO RELIGION
Estrada v Escritor
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las
Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her
husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to
investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for
such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is
exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of
religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable
and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the
OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Note: Attack is on free exercises clause. Benevolent Neutrality.
How about Compelling State Interest? It is promoting common law
relationships.
Soriano v Laguardia
Facts:
Petitioner as host of the program “Ang Dating Daan”
uttered obscene remarks against Michael Sandoval, Iglesia Ni
Cristo's minister and regular host of the TV program “Ang Tamang
Daan”. Two days after, several affidavit-complaints were lodged by
private respondents, all members of INC, against petitioner in
connection with the broadcast. MTRCB suspended him from
appearing in Ang Dating Daan program for three months.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised
“Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the
protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s
utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating
Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly
asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re
the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character
of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content,
of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
Pastor Austria v NLRC
Facts:
Private respondent is a religious corporation under
Philippine law and is represented by the other private
respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA until 1991, when his
services were terminated.
Austria worked with SDA for 28 years. He started as a
literature evangelist in 1963 then got promoted several times. He
became the assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan
Mission of the SDA in 1968 and Pastor in the West Visayan Mission
in 1972. Finally in February 1989, he was promoted as District
Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. Austria's services were
terminated on the grounds of misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against
the person of employer's duly authorized representative.
Issue:
Whether or not termination of the services of petitioner is
an ecclesiastical affair, and if, as such, involves the separation of
church and state?
Held:
No. The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or
purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance
of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine,
creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the power
of excluding from such association those deemed unworthy of
membership. Examples of this so called ecclesiastical affaits are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with
attached religious significance.
The case at the bar does not even remotely concern any of
the given examples. What is involved here is the relationship of the
church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is
purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of
terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is
different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.
Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v Executive
Secretary
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is
a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services
to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among
the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO
violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme
because said scheme is a function only religious organizations,
entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to
freedom of religion?
RULING:
The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal,
legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as
a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and
State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment
clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article
III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion was
accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret
for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its
own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only
the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness
and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours,
the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification
for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal,
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to
issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the
Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in
existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged
with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46,
these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to
screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the
perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim
Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by
petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official
religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption.
Velarde v Social Justice Society
Facts:
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of
several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
Issue:
May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike
Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office?
Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said
candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)
Held:
It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the
paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a
time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will
be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to
the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (Anu savee?
Nganga! I invoke my right. Napoles ang peg.)
Taruc v Bishop dela Cruz
Facts:
Respondent Bishop de la Cruz expelled/excommunicated
the petitioner from the Philippine Independent Church for
disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church; inciting
dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of
Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao
del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June
19, 1996; and for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church
causing anxiety and fear among the general membership reasons
Petitioners filed a complaint contending that their expulsion was
illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right
to due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case
involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution.
Held:
The case at bar is purely ecclasiastical matters which is
considered to be outside the providence of the court due to the
form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts
must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature.
Civil courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
religious organization except for the protection of civil or property
rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court,
and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims
to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Those who unite to an ecclasiastical body do so with
implied consent to submit to the Church government and they are
bound to submit to it. The power to exclude membership from the
church of those considered unworthy lies solely to the Church thus
it is outside the province of the civil court.
The expulsion of membership of the petitioners was legally
made. They have not violated the due process of law because they
were given apportunity to be heared when they were also warned
of the consequences of their actions.
RIGHT TO INFROMATION
Chavez v PCGG
Facts:
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744
FACTS:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the
extent of the people’s constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional
right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,
demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations
and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
Issue:
Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?
Held:
Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided
to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general -- such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.
Chavez v Public Estates Authority
Facts:
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts
that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is
limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA
maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Issue:
Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO
within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to
information?
Held:
Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the
people's right to information on matters of public concern: “…
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Further, the State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full
transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces
the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under the right to information. While
the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once
the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a
"definite proposition" on the part of the government.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability
Facts:
Petitioner Neri was to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee on their investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE
controversy. Neri admitted that the COMELEC Sec Abalos tried to
bribe him with P200M. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and she instructed not
to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
1. whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project
2. whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
3. whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence
laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
Held:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of
the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Note: Privilege communication (state interest, Sec 24 of Rule 130
of Revised Rules on Evidence) is an exception to right of
information.
Center for People Empowerment v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner CenPEG wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting
a copy of the source code of the PCOS programs, BOC CCS
programs, COMELEC server programs and the in house
COMELEC program called DCS utilities.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, which provides: Once an AES technology
is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly
make the source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof.
The COMELEC granted the request for the source code of
the PCOS and the CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS
was a "system used in processing the Lists of Voters which is not
part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated
by R.A. 9369." According to COMELEC, if the source code for the
DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might change
the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain
candidates or parties.
COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of
source code that it said it was approving for release.
Issue:
Whether the source code of the programs for the PCOS
machines is covered with the right to information?
Held:
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in
that "once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the
Commission shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political party or
groups which may conduct their own review thereof." The
COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing
the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG
asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, "under a controlled environment."
The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION
In Re: Edillon
Facts:
Respondent Marcial Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Court the removal of his name from the Roll
of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to
the IBP since the latter's constitution despite of due notice.
Edillon contends that the provision providing for the IBP
dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled to be a member of the IBP and to pay
corresponding dues.
Issue:
Whether the contention is correct?
Held:
No. Legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of
police power over an important profession.
Bar integration does not compel a lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as
he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Malabanan v Ramento
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
the respondent University. They soght and were granted by the
school a permit to hold a meeting from 8 am to 12 nn on August
27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the place indicated in such permit. At
the gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched towards
the Life Science Building and continued their rally. They rallied
outside the area covered by the permit and beyond the time
allowed.
On the same day, they were asked to explain why they
should not be held liable for the illegal assembly. On their failure
to explain, they were notified that they are preventively suspended
. They challenged the validity of their suspension on the ground of
right to peaceble assembly and free speech.
Issue:
Is there an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly
and its cognate right of free speech?
Held:
Yes. Students does not shed their constitutional right of free
speech and peaceable assembly when they are in the premises of
their respective university. The rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech are guaranteed to students of educational instituion.
Their exercise to discuss matter affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state has the right to
protect. This of course is without prejudice to the right of takinf
disciplinary action for the conduct which “materially distrupts
classworkds or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
right of others.”
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v Hon.
Bienvinido Laguesma
Facts:
Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees of Pepsi Cola.
It appears that the union filed a petition for certification elecction
on behalf of the route managers. The petitioner, however, was
denied by the med-arbiter on the ground that route managers are
managerial employees and therefore are ineligible for union
membership under the labor code.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the said provision in the labor code contravenes the
constitution.
Issue:
Is the contention valid?
Held:
No. The real intent of Art III, Sec 8 of the Constitution is the
absolute right to organize of government employees, workers,
supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally
guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right
to organized to labor purposes should be deemed granted to top
and middle level managers.
There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organizations – evident
conflict of interest.
 Acosta v CA
Facts:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in
Metro Manila. On various dates in September and October 1990,
they did not report to work and instead participated in mass
actions by public schools teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for
the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their
grievances.
Petitioners were administratively charged and was found
guilty of the charges and were dismissed from services.
Issue:
Whether petitioner's participation in the mass action was
an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assembly and
petition the government for redress of grievances?
Held:
No. These “mass actions” were to all intents and purposes a
“strike”. They constitute a concerted activity and unauthorized
stoppage of, or absence from work which was the teacher's sworn
duty to perform.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of
association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not
have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any
purpose. It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceable assembly that was punished, but
the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted to
temporary stoppage or distruption of public service in various
public schools in Metro Manila. There are efficient and non-
disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question,
whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of
grievances.
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation v Puerto
Azul Land, Inc.
Facts:
Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of
the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate Cavite. PALI's
business did very well until 1997 during the Asian financial crisis
and the decline of the real estate market. Consequently, PALI was
unable to keep up with its obligations, both current and those
about to fall due. PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments
and rehabilitation.
Issue:
Whether the rehabilitation plan are violation of the non-
impairment clause?
Held:
No. There is no violation of the impairment clause because
this case does not involve a law or an executive order declaring
the modification of the contract among debtor PALI and its
creditors and accomodation mortgagors.
Rehabilititaion contemplates a continuance of corporate life
and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation
to its former position of succesful operation and solvency. The
purpose of rehailitation proceedings is to enable the company to
gain a new lease on life and thereby allow creditors to be paid
their claims from their earnings. The rehabilitation of a financially
distressed corporation benefits its employees, creditors,
stockholders, and in a larger sense, the general public.
Alvarez v PICOP Resources, Inc.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its
Timber License Agreement (TLA) converted into IFMA but was
denied. PICOP filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus
against the DENR for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign
and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has
complied with all the legal requirements. The cause of the petition
of PICOP is that – the government is bound by contract, a 1969
document signed by the then President Marcos, to enter into and
IFMA (Integrated Forest Management Agreement) with PICOP.
Issue:
Whether the IFMA is recognized under the non-impairment
clause by which the government may be bound?
Held:
No. IFMA is a timber license. In Oposa v Factoran it was
held that timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
non-impairment clause . All licenses may be revoked or rescinded
by an executive or legislative action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Diaz v Secretary of Finance
Facts:
Petitioner Diaz filed a petition for declaratory relief
assailing the validity of the impending imposition of the value-
added tax (VAT) by the BIR on the collections of tollway operators.
Petitioner hold the view that Congress did not, when it
enacted the NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of
“sales of services” that are subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a “user
tax”, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would
amount to a tax on public service; and that since VAT was never
factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its imposition
would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner has the personality to invoke the
non-impairment clause?
Held:
Petitioner has no personality to invoke the non-impairment
of contract clause on behalf of private investors in the tollway
projects. She will neither be prejudiced by nor be affected by the
alleged dimunition in the return of investment that may result
from the VAT imposition. She has no interest at all in the profits
earned under the Tollways Operation Agreement. The interest and
the right to recover investments solely belongs to the private
investors. Her allegation that private investor's rate of recovery
will be adversely affected by imposing VAT on tollway operations is
purely speculative.
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
Re: Request of the National Committee on Legal Aid to
Exempt Clients from Paying Filing, Docket, and other Fees
Note: Supreme Court granted petition and commend the efforts of
the National Committee on Legal Aid.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
UN Convention Against Torture
Note: Read full text.
RA 9745 – Anti-Torture Act of 2009
Note: Read full text. Anti-Torture Act was a product of our
international commitment, being a signatory to the UN Convention
Against Torture the Philippine Congress enacted it.
 RA 7438 – Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation
Note: Sec 2(d) has been declared unconstitutional. Extrajudicial
confession must be in writing and signed by the accused with the
assistance of a counsel.
New Rules of Inquest Proceedings
Note: Inquest v Preliminary Investigation
People v Galit
Facts:
Francisco Galit was arrested for the killing of Natividad
Fernando on the occasion of a robbery. He was detained and
interrogated almost continuously for 5 days. He consistently
maintained his innocence. The was no other evidence to link him
to the crime. The interrogating officers began to maul and torture
him physically. Thereafter he admitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit. He then signed the confession they
prepared.
Issue:
Whether confession is admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and
he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silend and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by
the most expedient means – by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be coducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the
person arrest, by any person on his behalf or appointed by the
court. The right to counseld may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure harein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Subch a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirementd of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and laws. Instead
there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accusedd is from Samar and there is
no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of
his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sister and other relatives
did not know that he has been brought to te NBI for investigation
and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay
that his relative were allowed to see him. His statement does not
even contain any waiver of right to counself and yet during
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-
enactment, again the accused was not assisted by counsel of his
choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-
enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.
People v Ordoo
Facts:
Ordoo and Medina went to the police station to confess for
the crime of rape with homicide they have committed. The
investigators however could not at once get the services of a
lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the
investigation because there was no practicing lawyer in the area
because it was a remote town in La Union. Despite of the absence
of counsel, statements were taken from the accused after they
have been informed, in their own dialect, of their right to remain
silent and to be assisted by a competent and independent counsel
of their own choice. The said investigation was conducted with the
parish priest, the municipal mayor, the chief of police and other
police officers.
The accused however made an admission to an interview
taken by the DZNL radio announcer.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial confession is admissible in
evidence?
Whether the admission of the accused to the radio
announcer is admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. The extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
because it was taken without the presence of the accused's
counself. Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo
and Medina went to the police station to confess and the
investigating officer started asking questions and/or confession
from them. From that point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them.
Yes. Admissions or confessions made before radio/tv
reporter is admissible in evidence except it can be shown that the
police officer and radio/tv reporter collude with police officer in
order to obtain confession or admission.
People v Lugod
Facts:
On September 15, 1997, Naribe Ramos was found missing
in their house. The police officer made search to look for the child.
While on search, they found a shit hanging on a guava tree. On the
basis of a shirt and a pair of slippers, police officers arrested
Lugod. At first Lugod denied that he raped and killed the child but
threafter admitted it but refused to make a statement regarding
the crime. After vice-mayor attended the funeral of the child, he
visited the accused where the latter allegedly confessed the
commission of the offense.
Issue:
Whether Lugod's alleged confession to the mayor and vice
mayor can be used against him?
Held:
No. Confession must be categorical. The records do not
support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the mayor and
the vice mayor. The mayor did not testify in the trial while the vice
mayor's testimony with respect to the alleged confession made by
Lugod is not conclusive. Lugod merely responded to the
ambiguous questions that the vice-mayor propounded to him. He
did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and
killed the child.
People v Taboga
Facts:
Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide and
Arson. He admitted the killing of Tubon and set the tobacco stored
inside her house on fire, causing the whole house to be burned.
Police officers prepared a written extajudicial confession for
Taboga, but the latter refused to sign the confession upon the
advice of his lawyer. The following day, a radio reporting of DZNA
went to the police station to interview the accused. Taboga
admitted the killing of the deceased and setting her and her house
on fire over the radio taped.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the accused
to the radio reporter is admissible in evidence?
Held:
Yes. Such confession did not form part of custodial
investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man
in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even
discloses that accused admitted to the barangay capatin the he
clubbed and stabbed the viicted even before the police started
investigating him at the police station.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio
annoucer colluded with the police officer to elicit inculpatory
evidence against the accused. He was informed at the outset by
the radio announcer that he was a reported who will be
interviewing him to het his side of the incident.
People v Baloloy
Facts:
On August 3, 1995 at the waterfalls, a dead body of a girl
was found. The one who cause the discovery of the body was the
accused Baloloy who claimed to have found the body while he was
catching frogs in a nearby creek. At the wake, accused Baloloy
confessed to the barangay captain that he only wanterd to frighten
the girl but ended up raping and throwing her body in the ravine.
While in the custody of the authorities, he was asked incriminating
questions by Judge Dicon. Judge Dicon justified his actions saying
that accused was not yet in custodial investigation.
Issues:
Whether Baloloy's extrajudicial confessioin before the
barangay captain is admissible in evidence against him?
Whether Baloloy's extrajudicial confessioin before the Judge
Dicon is admissible in evidence against him?
Held:
Yes. As to his confession with the barangay captain, it has
been held that the constitutional provision of custodial
investigation but does not apply to spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner wehreby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime (res gestae). Neither can it apply to
admissiosn or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of
a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. In the case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to the
barangay captain that he raped and killed the victim. This
narration was spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in
an authority given in an ordinary manner. It was before he was
arrested or placed under the custody for investigation in
connecttion with the commission of the offense.
No. There is merit in the accused's claim that his
constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated
by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating
qusetions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is
settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to,
or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. He could not henceforth be asked about
his complicity in the offense without the assistace of counsel.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Agullo v Sandiganbayang
Facts:
Petitioner was charged of malversation as a result of an
audit conducted which resulted a cash shortage. During trial,
petitioner conceded the fact of audit and admitted the findings in
the Report of Cash Examination. In effect she admitted the fact of
shortage. Notwithstanding, she, at all stage of the trial,
persistently professed her innocence of the charge and
categorically denied having malversed or converted the public
funds in question for her own personal use or benefit. With
petitioner’s admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution
then rested its case. The Sandiganbayan convicted her of the
crime charged
Issue:
 Whether there is a violation of her right to be presumed
innocent?
Held:
Yes. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence, petitioner has
satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof the prima
facie evidence of conversion as to exonerate her from the charge.
The Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more
on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the
defense, not on the strength and merit of the prosecution’s
evidence.
People v Bato
Facts:
Sergio and Abraham Bato were indicted of the crime of
murder and was sentence a penalty of reclusion perpetua. They
appealed. their conviction and maintained that their identification
as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto’s murder is merely an
afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong evidence on the
part of the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether there is a violation of his right to be presumed
innocent?
Held:
The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution
fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants are guilty. The
totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of
the accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required
to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or even the
absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof
is accordingly vested on the prosecution. In acquitting the herein
appellant, this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in
the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
People v Ronaldo de Guzman
Facts:
In a case for violation of RA 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), Rolando de Guzman was found
guilty by the RTC and his conviction was affirmed by the CA.
On appeal, he argued that the prosecution failed to show
that the police officers complied with the mandatory procedures
under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to the fact that the
seized items were not marked immediately after his arrest; that
the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items
in his presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a
representative from the media and from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and
of appellant. Appellant also claims that the unbroken chain of
custody of the evidence was not established.
Issue:
Presumption of innocence v presumption of regularity?
Held:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to
observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the
presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general
rule, the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the
accused are accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. But
when the performance of their duties is tainted with failure to
comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the
presumption is effectively destroyed. Thus, even if the defense
evidence is weak, the prosecution’s whole case still falls. The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
People v Magsi
Facts:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970,
his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit
Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set
and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1,
1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty.
Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-
set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was
prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented
by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved
to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by
the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on
September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte
counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing
was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty.
Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in
Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio
counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario
entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he
committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and
the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty if murder and
made to suffer the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether his right to be heard was violated?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the desire to speed up
the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of
the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55
SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care
before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in
capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully
understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the
consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and
significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper
thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court
that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of
his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of
evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and
the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance.
People v Rivera
Facts:
Accused was charged of the crime of rape and was found
guilty of the charged. Aggrieved he appealed his conviction and
claims that claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the
trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie
Rivera concerning the latter’s sworn statements on the ground of
irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the trial court denied the motion
made by accused-appellant’s counsel de oficio to postpone the
cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because
of which the said counsel consequently waived the cross-
examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous
questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the
prosecutor; and (d) the trial court’s decision was promulgated just
one day after accused-appellant submitted his memorandum.
Issue:
 Whether his rights has been violated?
Held:
Procedural due process simply means that a person must be
heard before he is condemed. The Supreme Court held that they
find no merit in accused-appellant’s argument that he was denied
due process considering the speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated
one day after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by
the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on
which it is based. It discusses in full the court’s findings on the
credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its
evaluation of the evidence of both parties.
People v Alcanzado
Facts:
Accused was charged of the crime of murder. During trial,
the defense filed a motion for demurrer of evidence upon prior
leave of court. The motion was denied and promulgated judgement
without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his
evidence.
Issue:
Whether accused's right to tbe heard was violated?
Held:
Yes. The trial court violated Sec 15 of Rule 119. Appellant
had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which
was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer,
if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given appellant
the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the
fact that appellant’s counsel did not raise said irregularity as an
issue in the RTC or in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been
accorded due process.
Nota Bene: Criminal procedure
With leave of court (permission of court), if demurrer is
then denied, accused may proceed with presenting his evidence.
Without leave of court, if demurrer is denied, constitute a waiver
of the accused's right to present evidence.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
People v Bayya
Facts:
Accused was charged of the crime of rape committed
against his 12 year-old daughter. The trial court rendered the
judgment of conviction sentencing the accused to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death under RA 7659 (Heinous Crime Law).
The accused, on appeal, questioned the penalty imposed
considering that the Information is silent about the applicability of
the same. He alleged that he was denied of his right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him.
Issue:
Whether he has been denied of his right?
Held:
The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are:
(1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
The Information does not allege the minority of the victim
although the same was proven during trial as borne by the
records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense
not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried
or therein necessarily included.
The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as
absent is the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and
minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.
People v Malansing
Facts:
Accused was charged of two counts of murder. The trial
court rendered judgment imposing a penalty of death appreciating
the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and nocturnity.
None of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
Information.
Issue:
Whether the accused's right to be informed has been
violated?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating
circumstances were alleged in the informations nor in the
amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance
elevating either killing to murder. Thus, the offenses committed by
accused only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder.
Nota Bene: What has not been alleged, even if proven, may not be
appreciated.
People v Alvarado
Facts:
Accused was charged of the crime of rape committed
against his 14-year old daughter, Arlene. The Information alleged
that on the date of the rape, Arlene was 14-years old. The accused
confirmed that but Arlene's mother testified that she was just 13.
Issue:
Uhmm... Daw wala man xa relationship sa right to be hear..
=D
Held:
Minority as a qualifying circumstance, it must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.
Teves v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Occidental was
charged for violation of Sec 3(j) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). They were convicted of having a direct
financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of
1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which
they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.
Issue:
Whether his right to be informed has been violated?
Held: Variance doctrine.
No. The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be
convicted of second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering
that it was not charged in the information.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense
proved constitute or form part of those constituting the offense
charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the
offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the
offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included
in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to
this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar
Teves for the offense proved.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
RA 8493 – Speedy Trial Act
Note: Read the text. Take note of the salient features e.g. time
prescribed, fines and sanctions.
Estrada v Desierto
Facts:
After his depose to power, several investigations were
conducted by the Ombudsman. Estrada contends that respondent
Ombudsman should be enjoined from conducting investigation of
cases filed against him due to barrage of prejudicial publicity of his
guilt.
Issue:
Public trial v. Publicity trial?
Held:
The Court recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due
process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et
al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the
records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just
rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness
of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond
knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights
of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly
adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with
which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners
speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ
Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.
Re: Petition for Radio and and Television Coverage of the
Ampatuan Massacre
Facts:
Following the Maguindanao Massacre, Petitioner seek the
lifting of the absolute ban on live television coverage of court
proceedings.
Issue:
Grant or not? Public trial is different from publicity trial.
Held:
The Court partially grants the petitioner's prayer for a live
broadcast of the trial court proceeding, subject to guidelines.
“Totality of circumstances” test – the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a
fair trial, and that there must be an allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE
*Right to Cross-Examine the Witnesses
Carriaga v CA

Facts:
Jonathan Carriaga was charged of qualified theft for
stealing electrical wires (company property). The trial court
admitted in evidence the testimony of Ricardo Carriaga who did
not testify in open court during the criminal proceedngs.
Issue:
Whether the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face
to face has been violated?
Held:
Yes. The testimony of a witness who has not been submitted
himself to cross-examination is not admissible in evidence. The
affidavits of witnesses who were not present during trial – thus,
were not subjected to cross-examination – are inadmissible in
evidence because they are hearsay. This rules is an
implementating translation of the constitutional right of an
accused to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face.
People v Ong
Facts:
Accused was charged with violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). During trial, the prosecution did not present
the confidential informant who acted a poseur buyer. Instead they
presented the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales.
Issue:
Whether the non-presentation of the confidential informant
who acted as poseur buyer during the buy-bust and the admission
in evidence of the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales violated the
accused's right to meet his witnesses face to face?
Held:
Yes. In the case, the confidential informant acted as the
posuer buyer and had the sole knowledge of how the alleged
illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not
presented as a witness. SPO1 Gonzales had no personal knowledge
of the same and thus, his testimony is hearsay. It cannot be given
any probative value unless it can be shown that it falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule. To rule otherwise, would render the
constitutional right of an accused to confront his witnesses face to
face.
Nota Bene: It is case to case basis. Read it with People v Ricardo
and compare the two. Spoiler alert! In Ong the confidential
informant acted as posuer buyer and no one else could testify on
the alleged illegal sale but in Ricardo, the confidential informant
went to the police station, tipped police officers. A police officer
acted as poseur buyer, hence the presentation of the confidential
informant is not indespensable.
People v Ricardo Bohol
Facts:
A confidential informant came to the police station and
tipped a police officer that certain Ricardo is engaged in illegal
drug trade. A team was created to verify the tip and was found
positive. Thereafter, they launch a buy-bust entrapment. PO2
Estrada was assigned to act as posuer buyer.
The accused was found guilty of the crime charge.
Aggrieved, he appeal his case. He contends that his right to meet
his witnesses face to face has been violated because the
confidential informant was not presented in court.
Issue:
Whether the accused's right has been violated?
Held:
No. Ricardo cannot insist on the presentation of the
informant in court as informant's presence is no a requisite in the
prosecution of drug case. The police officers were able to testify
postively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually
tookplace and that the subject shabu could be likewise identified
by the prosecution when presented in court.
RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESSES
People v Chua
Facts:
Alicia Chua was found guilty of the charged of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale and 8 counts of estafa.
On appeal, Chua anchors her defense on the approval of her
application for a license to recruit on April 13, 1993, which
according to her, rendered her a genuine holder of authority. She
also claimed that she was denied of her right to compulsory
process.
Issue:
Whether she has been denied of her right to compulsory
processes?
Held:
No. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution expanded the right to
compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the
production of evidence in one's behalf. By analogy, US v Ramirez
which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of
witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the
movant must show: a) evidence is really material; b) that he is not
guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence; c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired;
and d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case, the trial court correctly denied Chua's motion
for the production of the records which were the basis of issuing
the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would
not in an way alter the undisputed fact that the appellant was not
issued a license until then.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
People v Malimit
Facts:
Accused was charged and convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide and was meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, appellant assigned several errors, among others
– in admitting as evidence the wallet and its contents although the
circumstances which lead to its production was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights as an accused.
Issue:
Whether his right to against self-incrimination has been
violated?
Held:
No. The right against self-incrimination applies only to
testimonial compulsion. It does not apply to the instant case
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating
statement by an object evidence.
People v Rondero
Facts:
Rondero was charged with special complex crime of rape
with homicide. While in the custody of the police officers, some of
his hair strands were taken from him without his consent amd was
submitted to NBI for DNA testing.
Accused alleged that his right against self-incrimination has
been violated.
Issue:
Whether his right has been violated?
Held:
No. Sec 12 and Sec 17 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
recognizes the fact that the psychological if no physical
atmosphere of custodial investigation in the absence of procedural
safeguards is inherently coercived in nature. However, compulsion
does not necessarily connote the use of violence, it may be a
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would
be sufficient. So is moral compulsion tending to force testimony
from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
What was actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from an accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Marcelo v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
After being arrested by the NBI for pilferage of mail matter
in the post office, the petitioner and his companions were asked to
affix their signatures on the evelops of the letters, which
constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime.
Appealing his conviction for qualified theft by the
Sandiganbayan, the petitioner invokes the Beltran v Samson ruling
in arguing that the signing of his name was not a mere mechanical
act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore
constitute self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether the act of signing constitutes self-incrimination?
Held:
No. The use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different
from the use of petitioner's signature in this case. In that case, the
purpose was to show that accused was the author of the crime
(falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing the
signature of petitioner on the evelops was merely to authenticate
the evelops as the one seized from him.
Query: But does the affixing of signature signify owning to the
possession of pifered materials. Hence, implied admission of guilt?
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a
complaint with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners in this case
on the alleged having engaged with former preseident Marcos in
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Filipino people.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its own
investigation through a hearing and invited Lopa and Bengzon to
testify to which they declined. Petitioner claims that the SBRC in
requiring his attendance and testimony acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
Issue:
Whether the right to remain silent extends to administrative
investigations?
Held:
Yes (with qualification), the right of an accused to remain
silent in criminal cases also extends to respondent in
administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature
of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. (Note: The
Court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the
petitioner therein cannot be compelled to testify.)
People v Gallarde
Facts:
Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Right after the incident, he was apprehended
by the police men who took photos of him without the assistance of
a counsel.
Issue:
Whether the accused's right against self-incrimination has
been violated?
Held:
No. The constitutional right of the accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion o
extort communication from the accused and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical
acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guidinghand of a
counsel is not required.
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against
himself through a testimonial act.
RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN
PUNHISHMENT
RA 9745 – Anti-Torture Act of 2009
Note: Read full text. Take note of salient features e.g. prohibit acts,
offenders, definitions. This law was passed, like others, because of
our international commitment.
People v Echegaray
Facts:
Echegarary was charged of raping his 10-year old daughter
and was meted a penalty of death.
Issues:
Whether the imposition of death penalty is unconstitutional
for violating prohibition agaisnt cruel, degarding and inhuman
punishment?
Held:
No. Death penalty is not per se cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited casse of Harden v Director, it was held
that “punishment are cruel when they involved torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word used in the constitution. It implies
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than mere
extinguishment of life.
People v Mercado
Facts:
Accused were charged of the crime of kidnapping with
murder and meted a penalty of death. Accused assails the
constitutionality of RA 8177 (Death by Lethal Injections) and RA
7659 (Imposition of Death Penalty in Heinous Crimes).
Issue:
Whether RA 8177 (Death by Lethal Injections) and RA 7659
(Imposition of Death Penalty in Heinous Crimes) are
unconstitutional?
Held:
No. It is settled that death penalty is no per se cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited casse of
Harden v Director, it was held that “punishment are cruel when
they involved torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word used in the
constitution. It implies something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than mere extinguishment of life. The lack of
particularity as to the details involve in the execution by lethal
injection does not render the said law cruel, degrading or
inhuman.

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Cuizon v CA
Facts:
Cuizon was charged of the crime of double homicide and
was meted a penalty of imprisonment and was ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P30,000 each.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification as to the
amount of civil indemnity. It was increased to P50,000 each.
Accused petitioned for review but the SC denied the said
petition and remanded the case to the trial court. The respondent
court promulgated the decision of the CA only with the respect to
the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
The Solicitor-General filed a motion for clarity of decision.
The CA Appeals simply modified the appealed decision of the court
a quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid
by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases. The penalty imposed by the
lower court was not touched on at all by this Court.
Acting on the motion to clarify decision the Court had
affirmed the decision of the trial court with regard to the penalty
of imprisonment imposed. This clarification is not an amendment,
modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision.
It is conceded that such cannot be done anymore.
Issue:
Whether the accused's right against double jeopardy has
been violated?
Held:
No. To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the
following must be proven:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the
same or is a frustration thereof
And legal jeopardy attaches only:
(a) upon a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) [when] a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for
the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes
of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused.
Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but
not the criminal.
The promulgation by Judge Ramos of the Respondent’s
court decision on April 4, 1995 did not terminate the criminal
cases against the petitioner. The first jeopardy did not attached at
that point.
The promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete and
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a
substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he
repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize
that grave abuse of discretion rendered the act of the trial court
void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the
first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot
prosper as a defense.
We must stress that Respondent Court’s questioned
Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It
merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on
petitioner.
Almario v CA
Facts:
 Petitioner was one of the accused for estafa thru
falsification of public document and for estafa. When the case was
called for hearing, private complainant was not present despite of
notice. The counsel for the accused moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground of violation of the right to speedy trial. The
case against the accused was dismissed pursuant to an order
dated September 8, 1995. The respondent court in its order dated
October 25, 1995 reconsidered and set aside the order dated
September 8, 1995. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but it
was denied.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the
presiding judge of RTC. However it was denied and sustained the
trial court. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the doctrine of
double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for
an alleged violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial?
Held:
The order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to
speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner
before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused
before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the
dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the
express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not
place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, double jeopardy may attach when there is:
1.)insufficiency of evidence; and 2.)denial of the right to speedy
trial
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the
trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties
and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were
clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-
accused, and/or counsel. Another was made without objection
from petitioner’s counsel. However, on September 8, 1995,
counsel for petitioner moved for dismissal of this case, because of
the absence of the private prosecutor due to a severe attack of
gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer
acceptable to the court.
There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no
postponements unjustifiably sought, the right of the accused to
speedy trial had not been violated. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Nota Bene: When confronted with a problem involving right to
speedy trial, it is case to case basis and factual. Study the facts
carefully and decide whether there has been an undue delay. =D
Manantan v CA
Facts:
When Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home with
his friends (Ambrocio, Tabangin, Nicolas), there was a jeepney
suddenly came from the opposite direction hit the driver side of
the car. Consequently, Nicolas, Manantan’s friend, died. Trial
followed.
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed
their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s
judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal
liability, the appellate court held him civilly liable and ordered him
to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas
Issue:
Whether or not Manantan was placed on double jeopardy?
Held:
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy
but the courts did not give merit to this contention. The following
elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first
jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be
for the same offense as the first.
 The records clearly show that no second criminal offense
was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower
court’s judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment
of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case
against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there
was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having
been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
People v Feliciano
Facts:
Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano were the accused for
the death of a particular Teresita Fuentes. Carlos Feliciano and
Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned and the two accused entered a
plea of not guilty. However, upon the motion of the prosecution,
Rodel de la Cruz,an accused, turned as a state witness and was
immediately stricken off from the Information.
The Regional Trial Court pronounced accused Carlos
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death.
Issue:
Whether the further prosecution of an accused who become
a state witness would place the state witness in double jeopardy?
Held:
Yes. It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused
to become a state witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The
impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the
consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution. A
discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further
prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part
of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness
in double jeopardy.
The rule, of course, is not absolute. In an instance where
the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and
refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his
discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for
the same offense.
Marciales v CA
Facts:
A criminal case for rape with homicide, in connection with
the death of one Maritess Ricafort Merciales, was filed against the
private respondents. The said cases were consolidated in Branch
8, presided over by the respondent judge.
During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the
public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused
Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness.
Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for
discharge, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence.
The trial court decided that all the accused in all these cases are
acquitteed and the cases filed against them are hereby dismissed.
Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the
said criminal cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a
petition to annul the foregoing Order of the trial court. However,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the reopening of the criminal case will violate the
accused's right against double jeopardy?
Held:
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not violate the right
of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that
double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements
concur: (1) the accused are charged under a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have
been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the
very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.
Potot v People
Facts:
Potot was charged with homicide. He pleaded guilty during
arraignment and thereupon, the trial court convicted him of the
crime charged. The petitioner filed a manifestation that he will not
appeal his conviction.
However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion for
reconsideration/retrial praying that the decision be set aside and
that the case be heard again because allegedly there were
irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused
miscarriage of justice.
The trial court granted private complainant's motion and
set aside its decision and ordered that the records of the case be
remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-
evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding charge.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to issue the order as the decision had
become final, and that the said order “would place the accused in
double jeopardy.” This was denied for the reason that the State is
not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers,
hence, jeopardy does not attach.”
Issue:
Whether the judgment has become final that the accused
right against double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the
same case?
Held:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation. Only the accused may ask for
a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And
this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before
he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the
following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the
accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision
imposing the capital penalty; (b)when he has partially or totally
served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to
appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or
(d) when he applies for probation. When one of these
circumstances is present, the trial court which rendered the
judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke
it. In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving
his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of
causing the judgment to become final and unalterable.
Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue
the order setting aside its Decision which had attained finality. A
judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes
immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the
judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct
clerical errors or mistakes. The assailed orders would violate the
constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy.
Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any
person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be
subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him
for the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
People v Astudillo
Facts:
This is a criminal case against Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo
and Hilario Astudillo for the crime of Murder. On March 16, 1998,
the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the
crime of Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, not having been alleged in the information,
cannot be appreciated against them. Appellants’ motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 13, 1998.
However, an Amended Decision was rendered where the
phrase “abuse of superior strength” was replaced with
“TREACHERY” in the body of the Decision and in the decretal
portion which states that the court found all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep Act No.
7659, qualified by treachery and for having conspired together and
helping one another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, however, offset
by the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the
amount of P65,288.50 actual damages, P50,000.00 for his death
and suffering plus P500,000.00 moral and exemplary damages and
to pay the costs of this suit.
Subsequently, they interposed the instant appeal, raising
that the trial court erred when it convicted the accused-appellants
of murder and committed a reversible error and acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it rendered the second decision. Hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court can appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in its amended decision?
Whether or not double jeopardy can be invoked when the
accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification to correct a manifest substantial
error?
Held:
The trial court cannot validly appreciate treachery in its
amended decision because it was not one of the issue raised in
their motion for reconsideration.
Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure,a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction
may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the
consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120, Section 7, a
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon
motion of the accused. These provisions changed the previous
rulings of the Court to the effect that such modification may be
made upon motion of the fiscal, provided the same is made before
a judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected. The
requisite consent of the accused to such motion for
reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter
from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or
penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.
Accordingly, once the judgment has been validly
promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a
manifest substantial error, even if unwittingly committed by the
trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous
comprehension, can be made only with the consent or upon the
instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be
corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or himself moves
for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.
The protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing
rules may be waived by the accused. Thus, when the accused
himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed
therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an
opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of
facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the
statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render.
The reason is to afford the court a chance to correct its own
mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken. In
effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with
consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the
review of the trial court without, however, conducting further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.
RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF
ATTAINDER
Bayot v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Bayot was accused with others in more than 100 counts of
estafa thru falsification of public documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The first 32 cases were filed on July 25, 1977
while Bayot ran for municipal mayor and was elected on Janaury
1980. The Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the
accused on all but one of the 32 cases filed against him.
While other charged of estafa is still pending before the the
trial court, BP 195 amending RA 3019 was enacted.
Issue:
Whether BP 195 which amends RA 3019 is an ex post facto
law?
Held:
No. The inclusion of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from public office peding
action in court is not an ex post facto law. The suspension from
employment and public office during trial shall not be considered
as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a
judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is
suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
People v Ferrer
Facts:
RA 1700 or Anti-Subersive Act of 1957 was enacted June
20, 1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein and for other purposes.
Issue:
Whether RA 1700 is constitutional?
Held:
A bill of attainder is solely legislative act and it punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determniation to a legislative determination of guilt. In order that
a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following must be
present: 1) the statute specifies persons or groups; 2) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder is
also an ex post facto law)
In the case, the statute simply declares the CPP as an
organization organized to overthrow the government. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having
the same prupose and their successors. The Act's focus is on the
conduct not on the person.
Republic v Katigbak
Facts:
RA 1379 was enacted by Congress providing for the
forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer. In a proceeding, the
court rule that the properties of the Katigbaks acquired during
1953-1955 shall be enforced a lien in favor of the government in
the sum of P100,000.
The Katigbaks assails the constitutionality of RA 1379
contending that it is an ex post facto law because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer and employees unlawfully
acquiring properties at a time that a law that had not been
enacted.
Issue:
Whether RA 1379 is an ex post facto law?
Held:
Yes. The forfeiture of the State of the property of a public
officer which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary, other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property
has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty and that
proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in
form are deemed criminal or penal. Hence, the law cannot be
given retroactive effect because of the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of an ex post facto law (applicable only to
criminal statute).
Penalty of forfeiture cannot be applied to acquisition prior
to its enactment without running afoul of the constitutional
provision condemning an ex post facto law because (1) it makes
criminal an act before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done and punishes the act; and (2) assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful. (Therefore, WAGI si Mr. and Mrs. KATIGBAK!)
Wright v CA
Facts:
The Australian Government and the Government of the
Philippines entered into an extradition treaty on March 7, 1988 in
order to suppress crimes. The said treaty was ratified by the
Senate in accordance with Sec 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty alleging that it amounts
to an ex post facto law.
Issue:
Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
Held:
Yes. In applying the constitutional principle, the prohibition
applies only to crminal legislation which affects the substantial
rights of the accused. A treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.
Lacson v Executive Secretary
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Groupd (ABRITG). After investigation, the
Ombudsman filed an information before the Sandiganbayan where
petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed a motion questionining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, contending that Sec 2 of RA 7975 limits the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of
the principal accused are government officers with Salary Grade
27 and higher, or PNP officials with rank of chief superintendent or
higher. While the motion is still pending for resolution, RA 8294
was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused”
in Sec 2 of Ra 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Sec 4 of RA
8249, including Sec 7 which provides that the said law shall apply
to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as
the approval hereof.
Issue:
Whether RA 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto
law?

Held:
No. There is nothing ex post facto in RA 8249. Ex post facto
law, generally provides retroactive effect of penal laws. RA 8249 s
not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is no
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their
punishment. RA 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurdiction,
its mode of appeal and other procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kings can be properly administer justice. Not being a penal law,
the retroactive application of RA8294 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.