Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s Association, Petitioner has NO legal standing

Inc v. Energy Regulatory Commission No transcendental Issue involved (all are absent)
CDP
 ERC promulgated the Magna Carta for Residential (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
Electricity Consumers (Magna Carta), which in the case;
establishes residential consumers' rights to have (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
access to electricity and electric service, constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
 Article 14 of the Magna Carta continues with a public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
provision on how the costs advanced by the government; and
residential end-user can be recovered. (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
 The same article specifies that if a developer specific interest in the questions being raised
initially pays the cost of the extension lines but Why?
passes it to the registered customer, the customer (1) Public funds are not involved
would still be entitled to recover the cost in the (2) allegations of constitutional and statutory
manner provided. (DIST SERVICES AND OPEN violations of the public respondent agency are
ACCESS RULE) unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges
 On January 18, 2006, the ERC modified this on the wisdom of the rules
provision when it issued the DSOAR. Section 2.6.1 (3) parties with a more direct and specific interest in
reiterates the old rule requiring consumers located the questions being raised — the residential end-
beyond 30 meters from existing lines to advance users — undoubtedly exist and are not included as
the costs of the requested lines and facilities. parties to the petition
Section 2.6.2 likewise provides that the costs
advanced by consumers may be refunded at the
rate of 25% of the annual gross distribution
revenue derived from all customers connected to
the line extension. However, Section 2.6.2 amends
Article 14 of the Magna Carta by limiting the
period for the refund to five years, whether or not
the amount advanced by the consumer is fully
paid.
The petitioner alleged that the entities it represented
applied for electrical power service, and MERALCO
required them to sign pro forma contracts that (1)
obligated them to advance the cost of the construction of
new lines and other facilities and (2) allowed annual
refunds at 25% of the gross distribution revenue derived
from the customer's electric service, until the amount
advanced is fully paid, pursuant to Section 2.6 of the
DSOAR.
The petitioner seeks to nullify Section 2.6 of the DSOAR, on
the following grounds: (1) it is unconstitutional since it is
oppressive and it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses; (2) it contravenes the provisions of
the EPIRA; and (3) it violates the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Lastly, requiring consumers to provide the huge capital for
the installation of the facilities, which will be owned by
distribution utilities such as MERALCO, results in unjust
enrichment.
ERC
 ERC avers that it issued Section 2.6 of the DSOAR
as an exercise of police power directed at
promoting the general welfare.
 The ERC likewise asserts that the equal protection
clause is observed since the distinction between
end-users residing within 30 meters of the existing
 lines and those beyond 30 meters is based on real
and substantial differences
 ERC points out that the DSOAR provisions do not
result in unjust enrichment since the DUs do not
stand to be materially benefited by the customers'
advances.
 It argues that petitioner lacks the standing to file
the present suit since the petitioner is not an end-
user who will sustain a direct injury as a result of
the issuance and implementation of the DSOAR
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc V. Bangko
Sentral Monetary Board
IBP V ZAMORA GR 141284
Facts:
● Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
● Estrada, in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief and through a verbal directive, deployed
the Marines, to join the PNP in visibility patrols
in response to alarming increase in violent
crimes in Metro Manila.
● The PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay formulated
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/2000 which
detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols would be conducted.
● Estrada confirmed his previous directive on
the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum dated 24 January 2000.
NO LOCUS STANDI
 while petitioners assert a public right to assail CB
Circular No. 905 as an illegal executive action, it is
nonetheless required of them to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief. It is significant
that in this petition, the petitioners do not allege
that they sustained any personal injury from the
issuance of CB Circular No. 905|||
 Petitioners also do not claim that public funds
were being misused in the enforcement of CB
Circular No. 905|||
 neither were borrowers who were actually
affected by the suspension of the usury law joined
in this petition
Petition raises no issues of transcendental
importance
 there is no allegation of misuse of public funds in
the implementation of CB Circular No. 905.
Neither were borrowers who were actually
affected by the suspension of the Usury Law joined
in this petition. Absent any showing of
transcendental importance, the petition must
fail.|||
1. WON the petition has merit.
○ NO
○ No locus standi
■ IBP’s alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution is too general an
interest. It has not shown any specific injury which
it has or may suffer by virtue of the deployment.
■ Despite the absence of locus standi, the Court
may (and in this case does) take cognizance of the
suit when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public.
○ The President did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in calling out the Marines.
■ Both parties agree that it is within the President’s
power to call out the armed forces, but the IBP
questions the basis for calling them out.
■ The court proposes an alternative approach: The
president may not be exercising his power to call
 ● IBP, asserting itself as the official organization
of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden
duty to uphold the rule of law, filed an instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and declare the
deployment of Philippine Marines as null and
void and unconstitutional.
● Supreme Court required Solicitor General to
file Comment on petition. Solicitor General
vigorously defended the deployment,
contending
○ petitioner has no legal standing
○ petition involves a political question
○ the team-up of Marines with PNP
does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution
PHILIPPINE CONSITUTION ASSOCIATION V.
ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
 The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was
passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on Dec 17 1993
 The GAB of 1994 imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in
the proposed budget previously submitted by the
president
 It also authorized members of congress to
propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels”
allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets
 Dec 30 1993: President signed this into law and
became RA 7663 / General Appropriations Act
(GAA of 1994)
 GR 113105 prayed for writ of prohibition and to
declare as unconstitutional and void:
o Article XLI on Countrywide Developmentt
Fund
o Special Provision of Art 1 entitled
Realignment Allocation for Operational
Expenses
o Art XLVII on Appropriation for Debt Service
i.e. the amount of 37b pesos allocated to
DepEd under this article
o Veto of president of the Special Provision
of Art XLVIII
out the military, but rather his power to keep the
peace. (Marcos v. Manglapus)
Locus Standi
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was
filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance,
the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and
113888 were filed without an enabling resolution
for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal
standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes
a preliminary issues before this Court can inquire
into the validity of the presidential veto and the
conditions for the implementation of some items
in the GAA of 1994
||| We rule that a member of the Senate,
and of the House of Representatives for that
matter, has the legal standing to question the
validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been
made without or in excess of the authority vested
on the President by the Constitution, the issue of
an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into
the domain of the Legislature arises.
To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
It is true that the Constitution provides a
mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27
[1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when

AKBAYAN V. AQUINO
 House Special Committee on
Globalization conducted an inquiry into
the negotiations of the
 JAPAN-PH Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA). In the course of its
inquiry, the Committee requested some
executive officials in particular Usec.
Tomas Aquino, Chairman of the PH
Coordinating Committee (the committee
tasked to study the feasibility of the
JPEPA) to furnish the Committee w/ a
copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA.
Requests were not met.
 Amid the speculations that the JPEPA
might be signed by the PH gov't within
Dec 2005, Petitioners (NGOs,
 Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers)
filed on Dec 9 before the SC a petition for
mandamus and prohibition (1) to obtain
the full text of the JPEPA with all the
pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto including (2) the PH and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiation
process.
 SC dismissed the petition for (1) the full
text of the JPEPA including its annexes
and attachments has been made
accessible to the public since Sept 11
2006 and for (2) the PH and Japaneses
offers are covered by executive privilege.
Petitioners failed to present a sufficient
showing of need to overcome the claim
of privilege in this case.
WoN petitioners have legal standing
the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to
be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the
duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where
the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin|||
|||
For a petition for mandamus such as
the one at bar to be given due course, it must
be instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation,
board or person which unlawfully excludes
said party from the enjoyment of a legal
right. Respondents deny that petitioners have
such standing to sue. "[I]n the interest of a
speedy and definitive resolution of the
substantive issues raised", however,
respondents consider it sufficient to cite a
portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office of
Executive Secretary which emphasizes the
need for a "personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy" on questions of standing.
In a petition anchored upon the right
of the people to information on matters of
public concern, which is a public right by its
very nature, petitioners need not show that
they have any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that they are
citizens and, therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right. As the
present petition is anchored on the right to
information and petitioners are all suing in
their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
including petitioners-members of the House
of Representatives who additionally are suing
in their capacity as such, the standing of
petitioners to file the present suit is grounded
in jurisprudence
|Standing?
Yes. Petition is anchored on the right to information
and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as
citizens.
Moot?
Not entirely moot because petitioners seek to obtain,
not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine
 and Japanese offers in the course of the
negotiations
OPOSA V. FACTORAN WON petitioners have legal standing
 this petition bears upon the right of Ruling:
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful - Cout ruled that petitioners have legal standing
ecology which the petitioners - The case at bar is of common interest to all
dramatically associate with the twin Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy
concepts of "inter-generational ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
responsibility" and "inter-generational refrain from impairing the environment. This
justice." Specifically, it touches on the policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title
issue of whether the said petitioners XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
have a cause of action to "prevent the - This right is also the mandate of the
misappropriation or impairment" of government through DENR. A denial or violation
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the of that right by the other who has the correlative
unabated hemorrhage of the country's duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
vital life support systems and continued gives rise to a cause of action.
rape of Mother Earth." - cause of action is defined as “an act or omission
 Facts: of one party in violation of the legal right or rights
- This is an instant special civil action for of the other; and its essential elements are legal
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set defendant, and act or omission of the defendant
aside the dismissal order on the ground that in violation of said legal right.”
the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
 Antecedent facts are as follows:
- The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case
No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective
parents
- The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests."
- Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment
be rendered:“. . . ordering defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to —(1) Cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the
country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
- Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government.
- respondent Judge issued an order granting
the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
 Thus the instant petition.

 - Petitioners contend that the complaint

clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section
3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE ● Whether or not Resident Marine Mammals
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAT V and Stewards have locus standi (right to bring
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
an action) to file this petition
FACTS: o YES. In the Rules of Procedure for
Timeline (Highlights) Environmental Cases, any Filipino
● 13 June 2002: DOE entered the Geophysical citizen is permitted to file an action
Survey and Exploration Contract – 102 with or a “citizen suit” for
JAPEX, which involves geological and environmental laws. Though this
geophysical study of the Tañon Strait. case took place before the RPEC
● 21 December 2004: DOE and JAPEX took effect, it was applied
converted the existing GSEC-102 contract retroactively (rules of procedure
into SC-46 (Service Contract no. 46), adding “may be retroactively applied to
exploration, development, and production actions pending and undetermined
of petroleum resources in the said area. at the time of their passage and will
● 9-18 May 2005: JAPEX conducted seismic not violate any right of a person
surveys in and around Tañon Strait. who may feel that he is adversely
 ● 31 January 2007: JAPEX’s application for affected, inasmuch as there is no
ECC was approved by the Protected Area vested rights in rules of procedure.”
Management Board of Tañon Strait.
● 6 March 2007: ECC was granted to DOE
and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in the area.
● 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008: JAPEX
drilled an exploratory well with a depth of
3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town in
western Cebu Province.

Claims
● Petitioners claim that after the seismic
survey was conducted, the average fish
harvest sharply decreased from 15-20 kilos a
day to merely 1-2 kilos a day. They attribute
this to the destruction of the “payao”, also
known as the “fish aggregating device” or
“artificial reef”.
● Petitioners also noted incidences of “fish
kill” as observed by local fishermen.

ALAN PAGUIA V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

TATAD V SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
FACTS
 This case is basically about how the
petitioners challenge the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
and For Other Purposes". R.A. No. 8180,
laws that were enacted after so many
people of the government/presidents tried
to alleviate the oil industry in the country.
 It is undeniable that that oil is not endemic
to this country, history shows that the
government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry.
o Prior to 1971, there was no
government agency regulating
On Procedural Issues: (the important part)
(LEGAL STANDING PART!!!!) (if there’s a part
you have to read, it’s this part)
1. Judicial power includes not only the duty
of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also the
duty to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.12 The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed
by the fundamental law. Where a statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the
right but the duty of the judiciary to
 the oil industry other than those
dealing with ordinary
commodities.
o In 1971, the country was driven to
its knees by a crippling oil crisis.
The government enacted the Oil
Industry Commission Act, which
created the Oil Industry
Commission (OIC) to regulate the
oil industry
o In 1984, President Marcos
through Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1956, created the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
to cushion the effects of frequent
changes in the price of oil caused
by exchange rate adjustments
o In 1987, President Aquino signed
EO 172 creating the Energy
Regulatory Board to regulate the
business of importing, exporting,
re-exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining,
marketing and distributing energy
resources "when warranted and
only when public necessity
requires."
o In 1992, Congress enacted RA
7638 which created
the Department of Energy to
control all programs and activities
of the government in relation to
energy exploration, development,
utilization, distribution and
conservation.
 In 1996, Congress deregulated the
downstream oil industry. It
enacted RA 8180, entitled the
"Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996." Under this law, any person
or entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use
the same for his own requirement,"
subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy.
 The law proposed two phases the
transition phase and the full deregulation
phase. During the transition
phase, controls of the non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry were to be
lifted. Upon full deregulation, controls on
the price of oil and the foreign exchange
declare such act as unconstitutional and
void. In seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy
2. The effort of respondents to question
the locus standi of petitioners must also
fall on barren ground. In language, too
lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has
brightlined its liberal stance on a
petitioner's locus standi where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the
people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, “
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of
sufficient personality, standing or interest
are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to
the public of the cases at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether
or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given
to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions.”
There is not a dot of disagreement
between the petitioners and the
respondents on the far-reaching
importance of the validity of RA No. 8180
deregulating our downstream oil industry.
Thus, there is no good sense in being
hypertechnical on the standing of
petitioners for they pose issues which are
significant to our people and which
deserve our forthright resolution.
 cover were to be lifted and the OPSF
(created by Marcos) was to be abolished.
 On February 8, 1997, the President
Ramos implemented the full deregulation
of the Downstream Oil Industry through
EO 372: “Declaring Full Deregulation of
the Downstream Oil Industry”
 RA 8180 and EO 372 were the laws that
the petitioners questioned.
 Petitioner Tatad’s Arguments:
o The imposition of different tariff rates
violates equal protection clause,
because it favors the big three oil
companies
o It does not actually deregulate the oil
industry but controls that industry,
abolishing the fostering objective of
competitive market
o Violated Sec 26(1) Art VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to
have one subject in its title
 Arguments of petitioners Lagman, Arroyo,
Garcia, Tanada, Flag Human Rights
Foundation, Inc., FDC and Sanlakas:
o Sec 15 of RA 8180 was an undue
delegation of power to President and
secretary of Energy because it does
not provide determinate standard to
guide the implementation of the
deregulation
o RA 8180 is arbitrary and
unreasonable because it was enacted
due to the alleged depletion of the
OPSF fund
o It allowed the formation of a de
facto cartel among the three existing
oil companies — Petron, Caltex and
Shell — in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against
monopolies and unfair
competition/trade.
 Respondent’s arguments:
o Issues of the petitions are not
justiciable as they pertain to the
wisdom of the law
o petitioners have no locus standi as
they did not sustain nor will they
sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION PH V Relevant Issue: WON petitioners have

COMELEC locus standi
HELD: YES
COMELEC on Oct. 29, 2002 adopted its
resolution 02-0170 a modernization program
for the 2004 elections.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued
an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid,
Out of the 57 bidders, the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total
Information Management Corporation (TIMC)
eligible. For technical evaluation, they were
referred to the BAC's Technical Working Group
(TWG) and the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST).
In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical
Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both
MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of
failed marks in the technical evaluation.
Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en
banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgated
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to
MPC.
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities
(including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M.
Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a
letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos
Sr. They protested the award of the Contract
to Respondent MPC "due to glaring
irregularities in the manner in which the
bidding process had been conducted." Citing
therein the noncompliance with eligibility as
well as technical and procedural requirements
(many of which have been discussed at length
in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.|||
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
FACTS:
 Matibag was appointed by COMELEC
en banc in 1999 as Acting Director IV
of the EID. The appointment was
Our nation's political and economic
future virtually hangs in the balance,
pending the outcome of the 2004
elections. Hence, there can be no serious
doubt that the subject matter of this case
is "a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest"; in other
words, it is of "paramount public
interest" and "transcendental
importance." This fact alone would
justify relaxing the rule on legal standing,
following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves "an issue of
overarching significance to our
society." Petitioners' legal standing should
therefore be recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that
taxpayers are allowed to sue when there
is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," or if public money is being
"deflected to any improper purpose"; or
when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." In the instant case,
individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers,
assert a material interest in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully
used. In the Petition, they claim that the
bidding was defective, the winning bidder
not a qualified entity, and the award of the
Contract contrary to law and regulation.
Accordingly, they seek to restrain
respondents from implementing the
Contract and, necessarily, from making
any unwarranted expenditure of public
funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that
petitioners possess locus standi.
 WoN the petition satisfies all the
requisites of judicial review
o YES. The issue in this case is
not, as the respondents argue,
the legality of petitioner’s
reassignment. Matibag has a
personal and material stake
 renewed in a temporary capacity in (locus standi) in the resolution
2000 and again in 2001. of the constitutionality of
 On March 22, 2001, PGMA appointed, Benipayo’s appointment
ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC because her reassignment is
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as without legal basis if Benipayo
COMELEC Commissioners, all with is not the lawful COMELEC
terms of 7 years which would expire on Chairman.
February 2, 2008. These appointments o Respondents also argue that
were not acted upon by the the constitutional issue was not
Commission on Appointments, so raised at the earliest
PGMA renewed them after Congress opportunity because the
adjourned. The expiry date of the petition was filed after the third
terms remained the same. Again, the time that the respondents were
renewed appointments were not acted issued ad interim
upon before Congress adjourned, so appointments. However,
PGMA renewed them with the same earliest opportunity pertains
expiry date of February 2, 2008. not to the filing date but the
 Benipayo, as COMELEC Chairman, fact that petitioner
designated Cinco as Officer-in-Charge questioned the
of EID and reassigned Matibag to the constitutionality in the
Law Department. pleadings.
 Matibag filed the instant petition o Unless the constitutionality of
assailing: Benipayo’s appointment is
o The appointments of Benipayo, resolved, the legality of
Borra, and Tuason as Matibag’s reassignment can’t
unconstitutional for violating be determined. Clearly, the lis
the provisions on the mota of this case is the very
independence of COMELEC constitutional issue raised
as well as on the prohibitions by Matibag.
on temporary appointments o In any case, the issue is of
and reappointments of its paramount importance
members because the legality of
o Her reassignment to the Law COMELEC’s decisions may be
Department and the put in doubt if the issue is left
designation of Cinco as Officer- unresolved.
in-Charge of the EID
On timeliness: Petitioner filed the petition
o The legality of the
on August 3, 2001 when the appointments
disbursements of
were issued March 22, 2001. However , it is
salaries/emoluments of not the date of filing of petition that
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The
earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional
issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP V
ROBREDO
REPUBLIC V. DELA MERCED AND SONS
LAUDE V. GINEZ-JABALDE
HACIENDA LUISITA INC. V PRESIDENTIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS
DE AGBAYANI V PNB
ARAULLO V AQUINO
BELGICA V OCHOA
HACIENDA LUISITA V PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PH V COMELEC
TATAD V SEC OF DOE
DISINI V SANDIGANBAYAN
such that, " if it is not raised in the pleadings,
it can't be considered at the trial, and if it is
not considered at the trial it can't be
considered on the appeal. There is no doubt
petitioner raised the constitutional issue on
time.
Petitioners fail to show the necessity of
examining the constitutionality of section 28 a
and b of RA7279 in the light of sections 1 and 6,
article 3 of the 1987 constitution.
In the case of magkalas v NHA, this court already
ruled the validity of evictions and demolitions
without any court order.
The petitioners failed to substantiate their
allegations that the public respondents gravely
abused their discretion in implementing section
28 a and b of RA 7279.instead they merely
imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public
respondents through general averments in their
pleading but without any basis to support their
claim.