G.R. No.
L-59514 February 25, 1988 Petitioner's change of theory at midstream takes
PACIANO REMALANTE, petitioner,
vs.
CORNELIA TIBE and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Disputed in this case is the ownership of six (6)
parcels of land. The trial court awarded three (3) parcels
to petitioner and the other three (3) to private
respondent, but the Court of Appeals held otherwise and
awarded all six (6) to private respondent.
In a complaint filed before the trial court, private
respondent Cornelia Tibe, as plaintiff, sought the
annulment of certain contracts and other documents
which became the bases for the transfer of six (6) parcels
of land from private respondent to petitioner
PacianoRemalante, the defendant below. Private
respondent claimed that petitioner, through fraud,
deceit, abuse of confidence and misrepresentation,
induced her to sign three (3) affidavits of transfer
(Exhibits I-3, K and M), purported to be bail bonds, that
transferred three (3) parcels of land under Tax
Declaration Nos. 20280, 20273 and 20274 to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter presented the affidavits to the
Provincial Assessor and caused the three (3) parcels of
land to be declared under Tax Declaration Nos. 20323,
20324 and 20325.
Private respondent also claimed that petitioner
forged her signature in a deed of absolute sale (Exhibit
22) whereby her other three parcels of land described
under Tax Declaration Nos. 13959, 17388 and 16999
were transferred to petitioner's name.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND IN NOT ADOPTING THE SAME IN TOTO.
RULING
Thus, while previously petitioner asked the
Court of Appeals to modify the decision or the trial court
which awarded him only three (3) parcels of land and
awarded the other three (3) parcels of land to private
respondent, by awarding him all six (6) parcels of land,
now, with the second assignment of error, he wants this
Court to reinstate the decision of the trial court from
which he appealed.
His prayer causes even more confusion. In his
petition (entitled 'Appeal By Certiorari'), petitioner
prayed "that defendant-appellant be declared as the real
and absolute owner of the properties declared and
described in Tax Declaration Nos. 20323,20324 and
20325 and that plaintiff appellant been joined to deliver
the ownership and possession of the same also to
defendant-appellant plus costs of suit." [Rollo, p. 9].
However, in his brief he prayed "that a new decision be
promulgated reversing the previous decision of the Court
of Appeals by adoptingintoto the decision of the trial
court." [Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, p. 13].
him nowhere.
The Court likewise finds no basis to disturb the
findings of the Court of appeals, which adopted the
findings of the trial court on the ownership of the three
parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos.
13959,17388 and 16999:
However, Exhibit 22, the deed of sale
respecting the properties declared and
described in Tax Declaration Nos. 13959,
17388 and l6999 is vitiated with substantial
error and fraud. It seems that the consent of the
plaintiff respecting their disposition was
secured through substantial error or fraud, the
plaintiff believing the same to be merely an
undertaking for the provisional liberty of the
defendant in a concubinage case. This was
substantial error and fraud because if plaintiff
knew that what she was signing was a deed of
sale in favor of the defendant of the lands in
question, she would not have consented to their
alienation ...
The misrepresentation of the defendant, upon
an illiterate woman, not knowing how to read,
write and understand the English language is
fraudulent. Had plaintiff known that the
document she was about to affix her signature
was a sale rather than a mere bail bond, she
would not have done so.
xxxxxxxxx
Since it has been established by uncontradicted
evidence that the plaintiff is practically
unschooled and illiterate, not knowing how to
read, write and understand the English
language in which Exhibit 22 was drafted, it
would have been incumbent upon the
defendant to show that the terms thereof have
been fully explained to the plaintiff. The
evidence is entirely lacking at This point, and
the lack of it is fatal to the cause of the
defendant for his failure to discharge and
burden of proof.
Consequently, as the decision of the Court of
Appeals is based on its finding of preponderance of
evidence in the record and is in accord with law and
jurisprudence, this Court finds no cogent reason to
overrule the decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is denied and
the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED
 [G.R. No. 118509. September 5. 1996]
LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and NATIONAL
BOOK STORE,
FACTS:
Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling,
Inc., for reconsideration of the Courts resolution
of March 29, 1996, which set aside the
Courts December 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in
toto the Court of Appeals decision dated August 12,
1994.
It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the case
should be referred to the Court En Banc as the
doctrines laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and De
Gracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. deNieba, 43
SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc.,
et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or
reversed. A more circumspect analysis of
thesecasesvis-a-vis the case at bench would
inevitably lead petitioner to the conclusion that
there was neither reversal nor modification of the
doctrines laid down in
the Abrenica, Talosigand Villonco cases. In fact, the
inapplicability of the principle enunciated
in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already
been extensively discussed in the Courts resolution,
hence the same will not be addressed anew. As
regards the case of Villonco, petitioner mistakenly
assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu
with the former. The Court finds no further need to
elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the
significant fact that the offer of the buyer
in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the
seller, Bormaheco, Inc.; and Villonco involves a
perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the
instant case as there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should have be
decided by the court en banc.
RULING:
Corollarily, as the petitioners exhibits failed
to establish the perfection of the contract of sale,
oral testimony cannot take their place without
violating the parol evidence rule.[9] It was therefore
irregular for the trial court to have admitted in
evidence testimony to prove the existence of a
contract of sale of a real property between the
parties despite the persistent objection made by
private respondents counsels as early as the first
scheduled hearing. While said counsels cross-
examined the witnesses, this, to our view, did not
constitute a waiver of the parol evidence rule.
The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,[10] and Abrenica v.
Gonda and de Gracia[11]cases cited by the Court in its
initial decision, which ruled to the effect that an
objection against the admission of any evidence
must be made at the proper time, i.e., x xx at the
time question is asked,[12] and that if not so made it
will be understood to have been waived, do not
apply as these two cases involved facts[13] different
from the case at bench. More importantly, here,
the direct testimonies of the witnesses were
presented in affidavit-form where prompt objection
to inadmissible evidence is hardly possible,
whereas the direct testimonies in these cited cases
were delivered orally in open court. The best that
counsels could have done, and which they did,
under the circumstances was to preface the cross-
examination with objection.
x xx xxx xxx
As a logical consequence of the above findings,
it follows that the court a quo erred in allowing the
appellee to introduce parol evidence to prove the
existence of a perfected contract of sale over and
above the objection of the counsel for the defendant-
appellant. The records show that the court a quo
allowed the direct testimony of the witnesses to be in
affidavit form subject to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel. If the purpose thereof was to
prevent the opposing counsel from objecting timely
to the direct testimony, the scheme failed for as early
as the first hearing of the case on February 28, 1989
during the presentation of the testimony in affidavit
form of Pedro Revilla, Jr., plaintiff-appellees first
witness, the presentation of such testimony was
already objected to as inadmissible.[14]
The other points raised by petitioner need no
further discussion as they have already been
considered in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered, and no compelling reason is shown to
urge this Court to change its stand.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners motion for
reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the
Court En Banc are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY,
without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions
that the Court may take not only against counsel on
record for the petitioner for his irresponsible
remarks, but also against other persons responsible
for the reckless publicity anent this case calculated
to maliciously erode the peoples faith and
confidence in the integrity of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased,
MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-
appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
FACTS;
On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
8432, was opposed by the appellees AmparoAranza
Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla TreyesExpedita Bonilla
Frias and Ephraim Bonilla:
The appellees likewise moved for the
consolidation of the case with another case Sp. Proc.
No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in
an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the
consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved
again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:
will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The
will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by
other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may
be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost
or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased can be determined by the probate
court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court
dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion
for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the
Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition
to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is
hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:
whether a holographic will which was lost
or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.

RULING:
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code,
probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the
will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is
required and, if no witness is available, experts may
be resorted to. If contested, at least three
Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the
holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no
other copy is available, the will can not be probated
because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap,
104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic