Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v.
01, Canon 3 of
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo, Respondent
A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
Facts:
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar, and violation of duties and oath as a
lawyer. From 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, the
respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat –
willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with
intent to defraud against the complainants by using
false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that
he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the
Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the
acquaintance of the complainants.
It started when the respondent convinced the
complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP
495,000.00 as advanced money to expedite the titling
of the subject land. He further committed
misrepresentation by presenting himself as the
lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer
of the land. He also led complaints to believe that he
has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation he well knew
were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce
the complainants to give and deliver the said amount.
Upon receipt of the money, he did not comply with
his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but
instead use the money for personal use. The
complainants demanded the return of the money to
no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent
committed the acts complained of. He, himself,
admitted in his answer that his legal services were
hired by the complainants through Magat regarding
the purported titling of land supposedly purchase. He
used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the
titling of the subject properties. He never denied that
he did not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of PhP 495,000.00.
The Supreme Court find the respondent in violation
of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2 and Rule 3.
the CPR. The respondent was suspended from
practice of law for one year and return the amount of
PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco
with 10 days upon receipt of decision. The respondent
is required to submit to the Supreme Court proof of
compliance.
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR. vs. ATTY. JOSELITO
M. SILVOSA A.C. No. 7360, 24 July 2012
Facts:
Thee Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direc
t bribery for bribing his then colleague prosecutor.
Attyy Silvosa claimed that “it is not the lawyer in res
pondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a pu
blic officer, the charge against respondent for which
he was convicted falling under the category of crime
s against public officers.
Issue: won Atty. Silvosa should be disbarred consider
ing that the crime for which he was convicted was in
his capacity as public officer.
Ruling:
Yes.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa
’s conviction of the crime.
His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity
as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable a
nd betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his c
haracter. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty.
Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privil
ege.
Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa was DISBARRED.
Elpidio Tiong vs Atty. George Florendo
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Pardon Does Not Bar
Sanction Against an Erring Lawyer – Moral Depravity
– Grossly Immoral Conduct
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer
of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US
citizen is often times away. For two years, he
suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were
having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen
to a telephone conversation where he heard Atty.
Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty.
Florendo confronted the two and both eventually
admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo
and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit,
which was later notarized, stating that they admit of
their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the
forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave
Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio
filed a disbarment case against Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because
he was already pardoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.
HELD: No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of
a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is
meant to protect the public and the courts of
undesirable members of the legal profession. As such,
pardon by the offended party of the act complained
of does not operate to offset the ground for
disbarment or suspension. Florendo’s act of having an
affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own
marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by
his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena
amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct
warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It
cannot be also said, as he claims, that their
relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion
considering that their affair went on for more than
two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.
ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009,
the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the letter-
complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, conformably to Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution, but castigated, so to
speak, the feisty and aggressive, if not foul-mouth,
respondent lady senator for using what I would call
intemperate and hate-filled language in a privilege
speech she had delivered before the Philippine
Senate which was directed against the Philippine
Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
The JBC had previously rejected her nomination as
Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court.
In the aforecited case, although the Court held that
the privilege speech of the combative lady senator
was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court, it however
expressed its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her
speech and its effect on the administration of
justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted
as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme
Court of idiots.”
The offensive and disrespectful words of the lady
senator were as follows:
“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.”
ISSUE: WON Santiago is liable.
HELD:
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the
respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode
the people’s faith in the judiciary. The Court stated
that in this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others."
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice.”
Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to
the continuity of government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people.” Thus has it been said
of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.”
The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself
for neglecting its duty to discipline the respondent
senator for her offensive language. The Rules of the
Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary
Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using,
under any circumstance, “offensive or improper
language against another Senator or against any
public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had
not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for
appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates
under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Noe lacsamana vs bustamante
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was
the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the
counsel for the defendant Imelda
B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which
resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed
as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as
counsel. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating
counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from
25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-
Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and
notices specified Dela Rosa
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-
Lacsamanaalleged that upon verification with this
Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that DelaRosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate
and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmentealleged that Dela Rosas employment
with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to
continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the
help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer1presented as proof by Noe-
Lacsamana was forged.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of
directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the
practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The
Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.6
Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
was published which reads:“Annulment of Marriage
Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the
Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs.
Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband,
Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-
6mos provided thecase will not involve separation of
property and custody of children. It appears that
similar advertisements were also published.An
administrative complaint was filed which was
referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty.
Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of
Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement,
he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued
that he should not be charged. He said that it was
time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t
served in any wayby the prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 &
Rule3.01.
HELD:
Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a
profession in which the primary duty is public service
and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary
consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers
should subordinate their primary interest.Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage
specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of business
is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for
that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in
a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar.
Flora Narido vs Atty. Jaime Linsangan
58 SCRA 85 – Legal Ethics – Mutual Bickering Between
Opposing Counsels
This case arose from a labor dispute where Atty.
Rufino Risma represented Flora Narido, an indigent
client against her employer Vergel De Dios, the client
of Atty. Jaime Linsangan. During the proceedings in
the trial court, Atty. Risma vehemently opposed the
submission of a certain affidavit executed by De Dios
because, in the belief of Risma, said affidavit is
perjured. He threatened Atty. Linsangan that if said
affidavit is submitted in court, they shall file a
disbarment case against him. The affidavit was filed
and so Risma and Narido filed an administrative case
against Linsangan.
Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate
administrative case against Risma where he accused
Risma of instigating his client to file an administrative
case against him; that said administrative case is
groundless; that it was only filed to spite him and is
just a mere scheme to threaten him and to ensure
that Risma and Narido has an edge over the labor
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not both administrative cases
should prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court adopted the findings
of the Solicitor General where it was recommended
that both administrative cases are not well merited.
In the administrative case against Linsangan, it was
found out that there is no sufficient evidence to prove
that De Dios’ affidavit is perjured. Or if even so, there
is no showing that Linsangan was in bad faith for it
was not proven that he has the intention of
misleading the court.
In the administrative case against Risma, it was not
proven that he instigated Narido. It was Risma’s zeal
in protecting his client’s interest that made him to
convince Narido to file an administrative case against
Linsangan. There was no bad faith on the part of
Risma. He even advanced the expenses because
Narido is indigent.
HOWEVER, it was found that Risma made an
arrangement with Narido that he shall collect 15%
from whatever amount they shall collect from De
Dios as a result of the labor case. Risma was
admonished for this; that under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, he’s only allowed to collect a
maximum of 10%. He’s advised to keep abreast of
said law.