Cases 202-209

202. Gonzales vs. Macaraig

G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990

FACTS:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the
Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by
the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the
President for consideration and approval.

On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep.
Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.

Gonzales, together with 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of then President Corazon Aquino’s
veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55) and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision
of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power
does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto made by the president is constitutional.

HELD: Yes.
Article 6, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts: President generally can veto the entire bill as
exercise of her power, and president shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue of tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which does not object.

Generally, provisions made in an appropriations bill shall ultimately refer to a specific appropriation for it to
take effect; Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the entire bill. Similarly, the contents of this
section are concerned on Appropriation Disapproved and/or reduced by Congress that is not included in the face of
the bill.

Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot include in a General Appropriations Bill the matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be
treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step
further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section
55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate
provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some"
particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed
"provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved
or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect
of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section
16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for
the purpose of the President’s veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)

203. Bengzon vs. Drilon

208 SCRA 133 (1992)

FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during
the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges,
justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to
standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to
adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act
No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government
should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already
enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to
readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD
was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law
never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress
allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner:
Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired
justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices
in the judiciary in the General Appropriation Bill (GAB). She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed
vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to
question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of said item. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. The president
cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the
exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if
it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill,
including its undesirable parts.
 The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any
item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
Thus, It appears that in the same item, the President vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This
cannot be done. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely
vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.
The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. The president cannot act like an editor crossing out
specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally
all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to
run the machinery of government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The
President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. In addition, the
President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing
laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.

204. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) vs. Chadha

462 US 919 (1983)

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), which authorized either House of Congress to
invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General (Attorney General), the House of
Representatives (the House) suspended an immigration judge’s deportation ruling regarding Chadha.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where the House takes actions that have the purpose and effect of altering legal rights,
duties, or relations of persons outside of the legislative branch, bicameralism and presentment are required.

Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant
student visa, remained in the United States after his visa had expired and was ordered by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the
deportation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Act, which authorizes
the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension
to Congress as required by § 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution pursuant to §
244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings.

Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge
held that he had no authority to rule on its constitutionality, and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House
Resolution

Chadha's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no
power to declare § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional.

Chadha then filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INS joined
him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals held that § 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and
accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon the House
Resolution.
 Since the House action was pursuant to the Act, the resolution was not submitted to the Senate or presented
to the President.

ISSUE: Was the part of the Act authorizing a “one House veto” constitutional?

HELD: No. The Act violated explicit constitutional standards of lawmaking and congressional authority. The House
took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and regulations of persons, including the
Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside of the legislative branch. When the House takes
such actions it must comply.

The bicameral requirement was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto, and
indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the
prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and
fully considered by the Nation's elected officials.

Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, the authority to allow deportable
aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. Congress may delegate authority, but once it does
so it must abide by its decision until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.

The constitution is very clear that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair
representation of states that maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments of
efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative
support.

205. Bowsher vs. Synar

476 US 714 (1986)

FACTS:
In order to eliminate the federal budget deficit, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (Act), popularly known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act," which sets a maximum deficit
amount for federal spending for each of the fiscal years 1986 through 1991 (progressively reducing the deficit amount
to zero in 1991).

If in any fiscal year the budget deficit exceeds the prescribed maximum by more than a specified sum, the Act
requires basically across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted deficit level. These reductions are
accomplished under the "reporting provisions" spelled out in § 251 of the Act, which requires the Directors of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to submit their deficit estimates and
program-by-program budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General, who, after reviewing the Directors' joint
report, then reports his conclusions to the President.

The President in turn must issue a "sequestration" order mandating the spending reductions specified by the
Comptroller General, and the sequestration order becomes effective unless, within a specified time, Congress
legislates reductions to obviate the need for the sequestration order.

In consolidated actions in the Federal District Court, individual Congressmen and the National Treasury
Employees Union (Union) (who, along with one of the Union's members, are appellees here) challenged the Act's
constitutionality.

The court held, inter alia, that the Comptroller General's role in exercising executive functions under the Act's
deficit reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of powers because the
Comptroller General is removable only by a congressional joint resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not
retain the power of removal over an officer performing executive powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comptroller General's role in exercising executive functions under the Act's deficit
reduction process violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of powers.

HELD:
1. Yes. The powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate the Constitution's command that Congress
play no direct role in the execution of the laws. Under the constitutional principle of separation of powers, Congress
cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in
practical terms, reserve in Congress control of the execution of the laws. The structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does
not possess.

Thus, the Comptroller General has been improperly assigned executive powers. The Act's provisions give
him, not the President, the ultimate authority in determining what budget cuts are to be made. By placing the
responsibility for execution of the Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress, in
effect, has retained control over the Act's execution, and has unconstitutionally intruded into the executive function.

206. Miller vs. Mardo

2 SCRA 898

FACTS:
Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against
Bill Miller, owner and manager of Miller Motors, claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October
31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. Miller filed
with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition praying for judgment prohibiting Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio
Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said
Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. He questions the validity of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction
to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages,
overtime and separation pay, etc. Under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, the regional offices of the Department of
Labor have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over:

(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;

(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid wages,
underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers;
and
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic
help.

Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the
Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above.

Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, empowered the latter to abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may
not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service,
activities, and functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, in so far as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices
over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.

RULING:
Yes. The "functions" referred to in R.A. No. 1241 which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was
created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government which plainly
did not include the creation of courts.
It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial
prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidentals to or in connection with the performance
of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.

If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative
bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to
a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the
reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L-15138 is hereby
affirmed, without costs.

RATIO:
Restriction on grant of judicial power. The doctrine of separation of powers of government also operates to
restrict the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies. Since the legislature cannot exercise judicial
functions, it certainly is precluded from delegating the exercise of judicial functions to administrative agencies or
officers. While the legislature is powerless to confer purely or strictly judicial powers, functions, and duties to an
administrative agency, it, by no means, follows that it may not perform functions which are in their nature, judicial, and
possess and exercise quasi-judicial powers. It is recognized that some judicial powers may be conferred upon and
exercised by administrative agencies without violating constitutional powers inhibiting the "delegation" of judicial
power. However, the judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited to
what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes that are
committed to them for administration. Of course, arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred
upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule-making or adjudicatory functions.

207. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.

The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court
ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general
force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official
gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not
have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.
208. PVB Employees Union vs. Vega
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:

Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter,
the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V.
Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court.

After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made. However, due to
the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the
respondent judge from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. Sometime
in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen.

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to order the payment
and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their
prejudice.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. When
questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did not immediately take effect and that it only took effect 15 days after
publication in the Official Gazette or on March 10, 1992.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING: Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary
for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took effect on the date provided
for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect
after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless
otherwise provided”.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it
became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and
not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

(Additional information:
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a
corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash,
discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation
contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and solvency.

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation,
such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously
hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

209. Senate vs. Ermita

G.R. 169777. April 20, 2006

FACTS:

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22,
2005 to the officials of the AFP, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September
28, 2005. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently
attending to other urgent operational matters."

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding
the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation."

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede
to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource
persons were completed [the previous] week."

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation
of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section
6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress.

– In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall only be conducted in executive session.
 September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464,
and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
[regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to
[E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President."

On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent
a letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per
9

instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear
before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no
approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to
face court martial proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

HELD:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the
Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had
issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads
during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section 21 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
 “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information
of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view
thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed
as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or
that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds
of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President
under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that
is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O.
464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered
by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound
to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means
to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.