A scrutiny of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the events leading to the arrest of the
RULE 128
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence
(in this case, prohibited drugs) seized without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any
proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end
never justifies the means.
The Case
This principle is stressed in this appeal from the Judgment, [1] promulgated on July 15, 1994
by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32, [2] in Criminal Case No. 3668, convicting
Appellant Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.
An Information,[3] dated May 22, 1992, was filed by Third Asst. Surigao City Prosecutor Virgilio
M. Egay charging appellant of said crime allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in gross disregard of the prohibition of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control dried
marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams, more or less, which he transported to Surigao City from
Cebu City aboard a passenger ship, well knowing that such acts are expressly prohibited by law.
Before arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra, offered to plead guilty
to a lesser offense, i.e., illegal possession of prohibited drugs. [4] The trial court requested the
prosecution to study the offer,[5] but the records do not show any agreement on such proposal.
Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [6] After the prosecution
presented its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, [7] a Demurrer to Evidence dated
September 1, 1993,[8] questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly was illegally
seized from appellant. The court a quo denied the motion, ruling:[9]
For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1, 1993 of the accused, Roel
Encinada, praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of the inadmissibility
of the evidence for the prosecution consisting of the marijuana (seized) from him by the
police. The accused raised the following issues, to wit: (1) Whether the arrest and search of the
accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a
lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject marijuana is admissible in evidence against the
accused.
xxxxxxxxx
accused started when SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia, chief of the PNP vice control section, received a tip
from his informer that the accused, Roel Encinada would be arriving on board the M/V Sweet
Pearl at about seven oclock in the morning of May 21, 1992. On cross-examination SPO4 Bolonia
testified that the information was given to him by his asset at about four oclock in the afternoon of
May 20, 1992. After receiving the tip he relayed the information to SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., PNP
chief of intelligence. SPO4 Bolonia further declared that he would have applied for a search
warrant but there was simply no time for it.
xxxxxxxxx
In the later case of People vs. Tangliben (184 SCRA 220) the Supreme Court modified its ruling
in the Aminuddin case when it held that the arrest and search is lawful when the police had to act
quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. It is noted that the tip was given
to SPO4 Bolonia by his informant at about the closing time of the offices of the various courts. He
still had to inform SPO4 Iligan in order to coordinate with him. The boat carrying the accused was
scheduled to dock in Surigao City at seven oclock the following morning when the courts had not
yet opened.
It is therefore quite obvious that the police did not have enough time to apply for a search warrant
in the interim. The police cannot be faulted for acting on the tip and for stopping and searching
the accused even without a warrant.
In the case at bar, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in actual possession of the
marijuana. The search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of Rule
113, Section 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which allows a warrantless search as an
incident to a lawful arrest (People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401).
xxxxxxxxxxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence in question is denied for lack of
merit.
After trial in due course, the assailed Judgment was rendered, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Roel Encinada, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The marijuana (Exhibit B) involved in this case is hereby forfeited to the government to be
destroyed or disposed of pursuant to present rules and regulations. The two plastic chairs
(Exhibits D and D-1) are also forfeited to the government.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
 The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, recounts the events leading to appellants arrest,
as follows:[10]
At around 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip
from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City in the
morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him marijuana. Bolonia was
then Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police (pp. 27-29; TSN, November 27,
1992, 34-40; p. 10, TSN, May 14, 1993).
Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter previously was engaged in illegal gambling
known as buloy-buloy. After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of his team - SPO3
Marcial Tiro, SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3 Charlito Duero - as well as his colleague SPO4 Cipriano
Iligan, Jr., the chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, of the information he
received. Because the information came late, there was no more time to secure a search warrant
(pp. 38; TSN, November 27, 1992, May 14, 1993, p. 13; pp. 4, 19; TSN, March 3, 1993).
In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers deployed
themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept Encinada. At about 8:15 a.m.
of the same day, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. The police officers saw Encinada walk
briskly down the gangplank, carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand (p. 11 TSN,
May 14, 1993; pp. 4, 5, 15-16 TSN, March 3, 1993; pp. 29-30 TSN, November 27, 1992, pp. 29-
30).
From their various positions, the police officers followed Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle
at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As the tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia
chased it and ordered the driver to stop after identifying himself as a police officer. When the
vehicle stopped, Bolinia identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from the
tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs, to which the latter complied (pp.
5, 6, 17 TSN, March 3, 1993, pp. 30-32, 35 TSN, November 27, 1992).
Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs, one green and the other blue, stacked together
and tied with a piece of string. Between the stack of chairs, there was a bulky package. Bolonia
examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the
cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the what appeared to be marijuana, a prohibited
drug (pp. 6-9 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. B, D and sub-markings; pp. 32-34. 35-39 TSN,
November 27, 1992).
Encinada was brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of one Nonoy Lerio
who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada, opened the package. It was
discovered that indeed, the contents consisted of dried leaves known as marijuana. In the course
of the investigation, Encinada surrendered to Bolonia his passenger ticket issued by M/V Sweet
Pearl (pp. 9-11 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. E; pp. 34-35, 39-40 TSN, November 27, 1992).
On July 13, 1992, Bolonia brought the package of dried leaves for examination at the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City. The forensic chemist, Inspector Vicente
Armada, tested the leaves and confirmed that they were positive for marijuana. However, the
marijuana only weighed 610 grams, which Armada opined to be probably due to shrinkage and
moisture loss (pp. 12-17, 19-21, 24-40, 41; TSN, November 27,1992, Exh. A, B. C and sub-
markings.)
Version of the Defense
Appellant sets up denial as his defense. In his brief, he denied ownership and possession of
said plastic baby chairs, as follows:[11]
1) In the morning of May 21, 1992, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, the
accused was seen to have disembarked from MV Sweet Pearl after an overnight trip from Cebu
City;
2) The accused proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a motorela bound for his
residence at Little Tondo, (within the City Proper), Surigao City. The Motorela was fully loaded
with passengers, with the accused as the fourth passenger;
3) When the motorela was already able to travel a distance of about ten (10) meters more or less,
the same was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the passengers to disembarked
(sic).Thereafter, all the (baggage) of the passengers and the driver were ordered to stand in a line
for which a body search was made individually (sic);
4) After the search was made, the accused was singled out in the line and ordered to board the
service vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP Police Station.
Before however the accused boarded the jeep, he was openly protesting to the action taken by
the police authorities and demanded from the apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant
and/or warrant of arrest for the search made and for his apprehension;
5) In the police headquarters, the accused was made to undergo custodial investigation for which
a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject marijuana leaves. The
accused denied that the said plastic bag belonged to him.
The denial was witnessed by Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. a member of the Surigao City Press,
who was invited by the Police Investigators to witness the presentation of the alleged marijuana
leaves, during the said investigation;
6) After the custodial investigation, the accused was placed immediately behind bars and the
Information for Violation of RA 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 was filed before
the Court;
xxxxxxxxx
Aside from appellant, the defense also presented five (5) other witnesses whose testimony
allegedly established the following:[12]
8.a) Ruben Concha the driver of the motorela who testified that he was surprised when the
motorela he was driving was forcibly stopped (while already in motion ) by the police authorities
while directing his four (4) passengers, (3 males and 1 female) to disembarked (sic) together with
their (baggage).
That after the search was made, the accused was singled out, and despite the protests made,
was ordered to board the Police service vehicle, while the 2 other male passengers just left the
scene while the female passenger continued to board the motorela who directed him to proceed
to the residence of Baby Encinada to verify whether the person picked up by the police authorities
was related to the latter;
8.b) Josephine Nodalo testified that she is a beautician, and that she was one of the four (4)
passengers of the motorela driven by Ruben Concha, which motorela was forcibly stopped by
men who are chasing it after travelling a distance of 5 to 10 meters away from its loading area
near the PPA Gate.
All the four (4) passengers were ordered to disembarked (sic) from the motorela whereupon they
were all subjected to body search including their (baggage).
That it was the male passenger who was sitting at the rear portion of the motorela who was
picked up by the Police Authorities and despite the protests made was ordered to board the
Police service vehicle.
Upon learning from the persons who were gathered at the scene, that the one who was picked up
was the son of Mr. Encinada, the latter boarded back the motorela and directed the driver to
proceed to the residence of the Encinadas at Little Tondo to verify whether it was really their son
who was picked up by the police authorities. She made this, as Mrs. Encinada, (the mother of the
accused) is his (regular) customer;
8.c) Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. testified that, being a member of the Press, he was requested by
the police authorities to witness the custodial investigation conducted upon the person of the
accused, who, during the entire proceedings of the investigation vehemently denied having any
knowledge about the marijuana leaves placed inside the plastic bag;
8.d) Isabelita Encinada testified that she was informed by her manicurist (Josephine Nodalo)
about the arrest x x x (of) her son, somewhere at the PPA Port Area and upon being informed,
she and her husband immediately went to the Surigao PNP Headquarters to verify the (news) x x
x;
x x x x x x x x x.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rejected appellants claim that he was merely an innocent passenger and that
his package contained mango and otap samples, not marijuana. Emphasizing that the Surigao City
Police had no ill motive against appellant, the trial court gave credence to SPO4 Bolonias story that
he actually received from his police asset the information regarding appellants arrival in Surigao
City. The trial court further emphasized that appellant was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante
delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana
obtained was admissible in evidence.
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant submits the following assignment of errors: [13]
I. The lower court erred in finding that the accused was caught in flagranti (sic) delicto in
possession of the subject marijuana leaves and is the one responsible in transporting the same;
II. The lower court gravely erred in finding that search and the arrest of the accused without a
warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as incident to a lawful arrest --
III. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the subject marijuana leaves is admissible in
evidence
In short, the main issues are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence showing possession of
marijuana by appellant and (2) the validity of the search conducted on the person and belongings
of the appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs
Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of the
plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the
number of passengers riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and
irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also
conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim, aside from being
flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of stenographic notes.
In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs, stressing
that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. However, his denial is easily
rebutted by Bolonias testimony:[14]
Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, what did
you observe in his person, if any?
A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs.
Q: What kind of chairs?
A: A (sic) plastic chairs.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you and
your companions do?
A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the
wharf.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed
him?
 A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him
stopped (sic).
xxxxxxxxx
Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize
tricycle?
A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs
was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an
imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs
with his left arm).
Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter
that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of credibility, the opinion of the trial court
deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of
the witnesses on the stand;[15] hence, it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies.
Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal
drug cases;[16] it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.
Second Issue: Illegal Search and Seizure
Based on the foregoing discussion, appellants conviction could have been affirmed by this
Court. However, the very evidence implicating him -- the prohibited drugs found in his possession
-- cannot be used against him in this case or, for that matter, in any proceeding.
Generally, a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is subject to challenge. [17] Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, is apropos:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a
fruit of the poisonous tree. This principle is covered by this exclusionary rule:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The plain import of the foregoing provision is that a search and seizure is normally unlawful
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. This protection is based
on the principle that, between a citizen and the police, the magistrate stands as a mediator, nay,
an authority clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. [18]
The right against warrantless searches, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions,
as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.[19] In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
upon probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition,
probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[20]
In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence report that
appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the M/V Sweet
Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause, Bolonia explained that
he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City were already closed for the
day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next morning to the port
area. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela, Bolonia stopped the motor
vehicle and conducted the search. He rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs
which were held by appellant and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped
in a small plastic envelope.
Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his belongings was
proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this contention, opining that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless
search conducted after his lawful arrest was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in
evidence.
Rule 113, Section 5, discusses the instances when a warrantless arrest may be effected, as
follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x x x x x x x.
In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City
policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental
to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
arrest. Bolonias testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest: [21]
 Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed
him?
A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him
stopped (sic).
xxxxxxxxx
Q: You said you stopped the motor tricycle in which Roel Encinada (sic) riding, what
did you do?
A: At first I identified myself to the driver and to some of the passengers.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: And after that, what happened next?
A: I requested Roel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of that
information given to us in his possession.
Q: Possession of what?
A: Possession of marijuana, Sir.
Q: And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, People vs. Tangliben[22] is factually inapplicable to the case
at bar. The prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious
enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances.
We disagree with the trial courts justification for the search:
The arrest of the accused without warrant was lawful because there was a probable cause or
ground for his apprehension. The police had received reliable, albeit confidential information from
their informant that Roel Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board the
M/V Sweet Pearl. Unfortunately there was no more time for the police to apply for and secure a
search warrant as the information was received late in the afternoon of May 20, 1992 and the
accused was expected to arrive at seven oclock the following morning. The different courts were
closed by then. Nevertheless the police felt constrained to act on the valuable piece of
information.
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house,
there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected
to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows applications for
search warrants even after court hours:
3. Rafflling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant
may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after
office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is
required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; (Emphasis supplied)
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of
1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts
with Multiple Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and
order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly,
these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes
against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of
firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial
Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of
and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge,
the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where the
application is filed.
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be
taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to
be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct
the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of
information.He shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of
search warrants provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.
In People vs. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found
in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally
seized. The Court firmly struck down the policemens cavalier disregard for the Bill of Rights,
explaining:
The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce. Bolonias
receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly
committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But
he failed or neglected to do so. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a
constitutional right of the appellant.
It is significant that the Solicitor General does not share the trial judges opinion. Taking a
totally different approach to justify the search, the Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily
handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively
waived his right against the warrantless search. This, he gleaned from Bolonias testimony:[23]
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the
eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law
enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and
the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED. Unless convicted for any other crime or
detained for some lawful reason, Appellant Roel Encinada is ORDERED RELEASED immediately.

A: Yes, Sir. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two plastic
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two
chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search.[24] The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.[25] Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty.
Appellants alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent appreciated in the
recent case of People vs. Lacerna.[26] In said case, the search was conducted at a validly
established checkpoint and was made in the regular performance of the policemens duty. Although
it became intrusive when the policemen opened his baggage, it was validated by the consent of
appellant, who testified in open court that he allowed such search because he had nothing to
hide. In the present case, there was no checkpoint established. The policemen stopped
the motorela and forthwith subjected the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. In
contrast to the accused in Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search
by asking for a warrant.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is
simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That the search disclosed a prohibited
substance in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and
suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an
arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.
We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement
agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes
and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. Law
enforcers are required to follow the law and to respect the peoples rights.Otherwise, their efforts
become counterproductive. We remind them of this recent exhortation by this Court: [27]

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 98252. February 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN
CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @ TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO
CID, accused, and RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y
BAYOT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling
from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations of our peoples rights to life,
liberty and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human liberty
and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations from ignorant, overzealous
and/or incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness
that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the commission
of an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) competent but
also (b) independent and (c) preferably of his own choice as well.
In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants were
their own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence
and with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. Such counsel cannot in
any wise be considered independent because he cannot be expected to work against the interest
of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later, he in fact was admitted into its
work force. For this violation of their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve
acquittal. After the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence
remains in the Courts records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be presumed
innocent of any crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in
Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case No. TG-1392-89, viz.:
WHEREFORE, and premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused:
(1) RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN
and-
(2) EFREN CANAPE Y BAYOT
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 14 last sentence of R.A. No.
6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law and as charged against them in the
Information and pursuant to the said law, this Court hereby imposes upon the said accused, the
supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment.
Further, they are ordered to pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims,
namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of:
(a) P50,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the costs of
this proceeding.
There being no evidence to warrant a finding of conviction beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is
hereby rendered ACQUITTING Accused SANTIAGO CID of the crime charged. Being a detention
prisoner, the City Warden of Tagaytay City is hereby ordered to immediately release said person
from his prison cell, unless he is therein detained for any other cause. is
SO ORDERED.
The Antecedents
On November 7, 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco,
Jr., was filed against accused-appellants Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused
Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of
Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law)[2] allegedly commited as follows:
"That on or about September 4, 1987, at Barangay Bulihan, Municipality of Silang, Province of
Cavite, the above-named accused, together with Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos who
(sic) still at-large, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously, after stabbing to death the driver Gernonimo (sic) Malibago and
conductor Andrew Patriarca, take, steal and carry away and carnap, one Isuzu passenger type
jeepney, with plate No. DFB-550, owned by Doris and Victor Wolf, to their damage and prejudice
in the total amount of P124,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]
Arraigned on February 7, 1989, appellants Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.[4] On May 30, 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered
a plea of not guilty.[5] Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. At the trial, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: Myrna Temporas, NBI Agent Arlis S. Vela, Vicente Dilanco Pons, Andrew
Patriarca, Sr., Juliana Malibago, Atty. Magno Toribio, and Atty. Carlos Saunar, documentary and
other evidence tending to prove the following:
Sometime in March 1988, Santiago Cid went to the house of prosecution witness Vicente
Dilanco Pons, a farmer engaged in the buy and sell business, in Camarines Sur. Cid, Pons' cousin,
asked Pons if he wanted to buy a jeepney. Pons replied that he had no money but that he could
help him find a buyer for the jeepney for the price of P50,000.00. With Amador Alayan, one of the
drivers of his son who was around, Pons offered to look for a buyer of the jeepney provided that
Cid would entrust the vehicle to them. Cid agreed to the proposal. At that time, Pons did not know
who owned the jeepney, but he eventually offered it for sale to Myrna Temporas who agreed to the
purchase price of P65,000.00. However, Temporas paid Pons only the amount of P48,500.00.[6]
Myrna Temporas had a slightly different story. According to her, Pons said that the jeepney
was owned by his niece, Doris Wolf. Pons, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf,
borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the jeepney as a
collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check payable
to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore
a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who
subsequently deposited it in his account.
On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from Doris
Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons failed to pay the indebtedness. So,
Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount
borrowed but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. [7]
Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas
lodged a complaint against him for estafa before the NBI. [8] Acting on the complaint, the NBI
contacted the relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the
jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor
(deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. [9]
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI team led
by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of
Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a group of four (4) persons named Rene Januario,
Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered
that the jeepney was disposed of through Cid. [10]
Appellants Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI
then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The jeepney was
recovered in an auto shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that
the jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila.
From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on March 27, 1988,
the team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation
where presumably they were killed. Because appellants volunteered that their companions were
their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team
decided to take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled with
appellants to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 28, 1988.
At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of appellants one at
a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just around somewhere," to assist appellants
during the investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the statement of appellant Januario while
Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape. The first portion of the statement, Exhibit C, taken
from appellant Januario reads:
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NA IBINIGAY NI RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN SA HARAP
NI NBI AGENT ARLIS E. VELA NGAYONG IKA-28 NG MARSO 1988 SA NBI, NCR,
MANILA.
xxx xxx
xxx
1. TANONG Mr. RENE JANUARIO ipina-aalam namin sa iyo na ikaw ay aming
inuusig sa salang pagnakaw ng isang jeepney at pagkapatay sa driver at
conductor nito. Gusto naming malaman mo na ikaw ay hindi maaring pilitin na
magbigay ng salaysay at kong (sic) sakaling magbibigay ka ng salaysay, ano
mang sasabihin mo rito ay pueding (sic) gamitin laban sa iyo sa ano mang
caso. Nauunawaan mo ba ito?
SAGOT Naiintiendihan (sic) ko.
2. T Kailangan mo ba ang tulong ng abogado sa pagtatanong na ito?
S Magsalaysay (sic) lang ako pag-may abogado ako.
3. T May abogado ka ba sa ngayon?
S Mayroon po si Atty. CARLOS SAUNAR ay nandito para tulongan (sic) ako.
4. T Nanunumpa ka na magsasabi ng katotohanan, buong katotohanan at wala
ng iba kungdi katotohanan lamang sa pagtatanong na ito?
S Opo.
5. T Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at iba-ibang bagay tungkol sa iyong
pagkatao?
S RENE JANUARIO Y ROLDAN, 26 taong gulang, binata, isang (sic) buy
and sell hanapbuhay at naninirahan sa Puro Batya, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
xxx xxx
xxx."[11]
According to appellant Januario, two weeks before September 1987, he was already in the
house of appellant Canape in Bgy. Palapala, Dasmarias, Cavite to procure chicken and "kalawit"
for his business. He also went there because his new friends named Toto Sarita and Digo Samera
(sic), as well as appellant Canape, wanted him to look for a buyer of a jeep. Appellant Januario
asked for a photograph of the jeep to assist him in making a canvass of buyers in Bicol but he was
told that he would have it later at night because they were then having drinks in the house of Toto.
After that drinking spree, the group agreed to fetch appellants Januario and Canape at 4:00
o'clock the following morning. It was Digo Samera who fetched appellants before they went to the
house of Toto Sarita. Together, they went to GMA town in Cavite. It was around 5:00 o'clock in
the morning when they hailed a jeep from the "looban." Thereafter, the following allegedly
transpired:
"18. T Ano na ang nangyari noong kayo ay sumakay sa jeep?
S Ako ang naunang sumakay pagtigil noong jeep. Bago maka-alis ang jeep
nagsalita si TOTO SARITA na nasa baba pa kasama sina EFREN CANAPE at
DIGO na `HINTAY ka muna may naiwanan pa ako.' Sumakay si Digo sa tapat
ng conductor na nasa loob ng jeep samantalang si TOTO ay pumuesto sa
bandang kanan sa unahan ng jeep at si EFREN ay sa bandang kaliwa rin ng jeep
tapat ng driver at sabay si EFREN at TOTO na sumakay sa unahan ng jeep at
mabilis na tinulak ni EFREN ang driver patungo kay TOTO na siyang tumutok,
(sic) sa driver ng isang sandata balisong 29. Habang nangyayari iyon ay
tinutukan naman ni DIGO na nasa loob ng jeep ang conductor na pinasubsub ang
ulo habang tinutukan ng 29. Ang sabi sa akin ni DIGO ay REN igapos mo ito' at
inabutan niya ako ng isang panyong panali. Sa aking kabiglaanan ako ay
napasunod at tinali ko iyong conductor.
19. T Ano na ang sumunod na nangyari matapos matalian mo ang conductor?
S Napansin ko na lang na maneho na ni TOTO Sarita ang jeep na kanyang
pinasibad habang ang driver ay nakatali na rin at ako naman ay sinabihan ni
DIGO na hawakan iyong conductor sa balikat habang tinutukan ng patalim ni
DIGO. Ang conductor ay nagsasalita na siya ay nasasaktan dahil nakatusok na
ang patalim sa kanyang leeg o batok.
 20. T Ano ang nangyari matapos na matutukan ang conductor at driver at habang
nagmamaneho si TOTO?
S Mula sa lugar na iyon pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay biglang iniliko sa isang
maliit na lupang kalsada na napapaligiran ng tubo at talahib at doon ay hininto
ang sasakyan.
21. T Ano na ang sumonod (sic) na nangyari sa lugar na iyon matapos na
maihinto ang jeep?
S Unang bumaba po ay si TOTO na hawak ang driver pababa at itinulak ang
driver sa may tobohan (sic). Si EFREN ay sumonod (sic)hanggang sa may gilid
ng karsada habang si TOTO ay tuloy sa tobohan (sic) na dala ang driver. Si
DIGO naman ay tinulak ang conductor hawak-hawak sa buhok at ang sabi naman
sa akin ay hawakan ko ang balikat. Kinuha sa akin ang conductor ni DIGO at
dinala sa may tubuhan (sic) at akin na lang narinig na ang pag-ungol ng conductor
dahil malapit lang iyon sa sasakyan.
22. T Nakikita mo ba sila DIGO at ang conductor habang siya ay umuungol?
S Hindi ko na po nakita kasi nasa tubohan na.
23. T Sila TOTO at ang driver nasaan sila habang naririnig mong umuungol ang
conductor?
S Pumasok po sa tubohan hindi ko na sila makita.
24. T Ano na ang nangyari matapos na dalhin ni TOTO ang driver at ni DIGO
naman ang conductor sa tobohan (sic)?
S Mga ilang minuto lang po ay bumalik na sila sa sasakyan at kami sumakay
na at si TOTO ang nagmaneho ng sasakyan at tuloy-tuloy na kami sa Bikol, sa
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
25. T Noong kayo ay umalis sa tubohan na iyon, nasaan na noon ang driver at
ang conductor?
S Wala na po.
26. T May napansin ka ba kina DIGO at TOTO noong sila ay sumakay sa jeep
galing sa tubuhan (sic)?
S Humihingal sila po na parang pagod at napansin ko na may dugo ang
kamay ni DIGO at ang damit at pantalon naman ni TOTO ay may tilamsik (sic) ng
dugo.
xxx xxx
xxx."[12]
Appellant Januario described the driver as more than fifty years old, of medium build, and
with gray hair and a fine nose. Upon reaching Libmanan, they went directly to Santiago Cid with
whom appellant Januario had earlier conferred regarding the sale of the jeep. Appellant Januario
did not know to whom the jeep was sold but he knew that Cid approached Vicente Pons. The latter
gave appellant Januario P1,000 cash and rice and eggs worth around P600. A second jeep was
brought by Toto and Digo to Roger Abajero. Cid brought both appellants to the house of
Roger. Later, the jeep was impounded at the NBI Naga City office.
Appellant Januario signed and thumbmarked his statement which was sworn before NBI
Executive Director Salvador R. Ranin. It was also signed by Atty. Carlos Saunar "as counsel."
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, Exhibit I, was taken by Atty. Magno V. Toribio, a
supervising NBI Agent. Quoted in full, the statement reads:
"SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI IBINIGAY NI EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT KAY AGENTS
MAGNO V. TORIBIO AND TOMAS C. ENRILE, MGA AHENTE NG NBI DITO SA NCR,
NBI, MANILA, NGAYONG IKA 27 NG MARSO 1988.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
1. TANONG Ginoong EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ikaw ay aming iniimbistigahan
ngayon tungkol sa pagkanakaw ng isang Izuzu (sic) type jitney sa Silang, Cavite
at sa pagkamatay ng conductor nito noong buwan ng Septembyre (sic)
1988. Bago ka namin tanungin aming ipinaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan
sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas. Una, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng
salaysay sa imbistigasyon na ito, at manahimik. Ano mang sabihin mo dito ay
puweding gamitin laban sa iyo sa asunto kriminal o civil. Ikalawa, ikaw ay may
karapatan na kumuha ng iyong abogado upang tulungan ka sa imbistigasyon na
ito. At kung gusto mo pero wala kang pambayad sa sirbesyon (sic) nito, ikaw ay
bibigyan ng NBI ng libre. Matapos mong malaman ang iyong mga karapatan,
ikaw ba ay nakahandang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay?
ANSWER Opo, sir.
2. T Kung ganoon sabihin mo ang iyong buong pangalan, tirahan at iba pang
mga bagay-bagay na pweding pagkakakilalanan sa iyong pagkatao?
S Ako si EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, 31 anyos ang idad (sic), kasal kay
AIDA ROLDAN, isang mag-sasaka (sic), nakatapos ng ika-limang baitang sa
elemantarya, at sa kasalukuyan ay naninirahan sa Bgy. Sibuho, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur.
3. T Ikaw ba ay may nalalaman sa pagkanakaw ng isang Malaguea type
jeepney sa Bulihan, Silang, Cavite noong buwan ng Septyembre 1988?
S Opo, sir.
4. T Kung ganoon sabihin mo sa mga imbistigador na ito kung paano ang buong
pangyayari?
S Kasi nuong (sic) minsan ako ay mapasyal sa Bgy. Crossing, sakop ng
Dasmarias, Cavite noong mga buwan ng Agosto 1987, kami ay nagkita ng aking
kaibigan na si TOTO' SARETA at ang kanyang kasama na si DIGO (complete
name unknown) at ako ay kanyang sinabihan na humanap ng buyer ng isang
jeep. Kaya, ng (sic) ako ay umuwi na ng Libmanan, Camarines Sur ako ay
humananp (sic) ng taong interesado na bumili ng nasabing jeep, katulung si
RENE JANUARIO na taga bayan ng Libmanan. Ang aming nakitang interesado
sa jeep ay si SANTIAGO CID. Kaya ang aming ginawa ni RENE ay bumalik sa
Bgy. Crossing, Dasmarias, Cavite para ipaalam kina TOTO SARETA na kami ay
nakakuha na ng buyer. Ng gabing yaon na kami ay dumating kami ay niyaya nina
TOTO na mag inuman at habang kami ay nag-iinuman sinabi ni TOTO na may
makukuha na kami na jeep. Mga bandang alas kuwatro ng madaling araw, kami
ay niyaya na nina TOTO na kunin na ang jeep. Kami ay lumakad na papuntang
 Bulihan, Silang, Cavite. Pagdating namin doon, kami ay naghintay ng mga ilang S Hindi ko na ho masyadong matandaan ang mga iksaktong oras na
minuto. Ng (sic) dumaan ang isang jeep na wala pnag (sic) pasahero, ito ay kanyang pagbayad at kung magkano, basta ang pag-kaalam ko ay mga tatlong
pinara ni DIGO at kami ay sumakay. Mga ilang minuto naman ang lumipas, beses lang siyang nag-hulog at iyon ay kanyang ibinibigay kay SANTIAGO. Si
habang ang diyep (sic) ay tumatakbo papuntang Alabang ay naglabas ng patalim SANTIAGO naman ang siyang nag-bibigay (sic) sa amin.
sina TOTO at DIGO at tinutukan ang driver at ang kundoktor. Tapos kami ni
RENE ay sinabihan (sic) din nila na maglabas ng patalim at tutukan din ang driver 14. T Ito bang si SANTIAGO CID at si VICENTE PONS ay alam kung saan at
at ang kundoktor (sic). Pagdating namin sa Bgy. Maguyam, sakop din ng Silang, paano ninyo nakuha ang jeep?
sapilitana (sic) ibinaba nina TOTO, DIGO at RENE ang driver at ang kundoktor
S Opo, sir.
(sic) at dinala sa loob ng tubuhan. Ako ay naiwan sa loob ng jeep. Hindi naman
natagalan ay lumabas na ang tatlo galing sa loob ng tubuhan, hindi na kasama 15. T Nasaan na ngayon sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO?
ang driver at and kundoktor (sic). Tapos, narining ko kay TOTO na `ayos na
daw'. Ang sunod naming ginawa ay pinatakbo na namin ang jeep papuntang S Sa Dasmarias, Cavite ho.
Libmanan. Pagdating namin sa Libmanan kami ay dumerretso (sic) kay
SANTIAGO CID at ibinigay na namin sa kanya ang jeep. Ang sabi naman ni 16. T Hindi na ba sila napupuntang Libmanan?
SANTIAGO ay dadalhin niya ang jeep kay VICENTE PONS na taga Libmanan S Bihira na ho sir. Pumupunta lang ho sila kung kukuha ng pera.
din.
17. T Sa pagkaalam mo, mayroon pa ba silang ibang jeep na dinala sa
5. T Alam mo ba ang nangyari sa driver at konduktor (sic) ng jeep na inagaw Libmanan?
niyo?
S Mayroon pa ho akong nalaman kay SANTIAGO CID na may isa pang jeep
S Ang pag-kaalam ko ho sa sabi ni TOTO na ayos na' ang ibig sabihin ay na dinala daw sina TOTO at DIGO sa kanya at kanya namang ibenenta kay Mr.
patay na sila. ROGELIO ABAJERO, na taga Libmanan din.
6. T Sino naman ang VICENTE PONS na ito? 18. T Ano pa ang ibang alam mo tungkul (sic) dito sa pangalawang jeep na
S Ang sabi sa amin ni SANTIAGO si VICENTE PONS ay ang kanyang ibenenta (sic) nila kay Mr. ABAJERO?
nakuhang buyer ng jeep. S Wala na ho sir.
7. Q Sa pagkaalam mo ba ay talagang binili ni VICENTE PONS and jeep? 19. T Iyung tungkol sa unang jeep na ibenenta kay Mr. VICENTE PONS, alam
A Opo, sir. mo ba kung nasaan na iyon ngayon?

8. T Magkano naman ang pagkabili ni VICENTE PONS? S Hindi ko rin po alam kung saan dinala ni Mr. PONS.

A Hindi ko po alam kung magkano ang iksaktong halaga, pero ang presyo 20. T Ito bang sina TOTO SARETA at DIGO ay matagal mo nang kakilala?
sa amin ni SANTIAGO ay P25,000.00. S Matagal na ho sir, dahil sa ako ay ipinanganak din sa Dasmarias, Cavite
9. T Nang dalhin ba ninyo ang jeep kay SANTIAGO ay agad ninyong dinala at at doon din lumaki. Sila ho ay aking mga kababayan at matalik kung mga
pinagbili rin kay VICENTE PONS? kaibigan.

S Opo, ng araw din na iyon. 21. T Nung ikaw ba ay sabihan nina TOTO na humanap ng buyer ng jeep alam
mo ba na ang jeep na iyon ay nanakawin lamang?
10. T Magkano ba ang paunang bayad, kung mayroon man, na ibinigay ni
VICENTE PONS sa inyo? S Opo, sir.

A Ang alam ko ho ay P4,000.00 ang ibinigay ni VICENTE PONS kay 22. T Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong sa iyo, ikaw ba ay
SANTIAGO dahil siya ang kausap nito. mayroon pa ibig sabihin?

11. T Magkano naman ang halagang naparte mo? S Wala na po, sir. KATAPUSAN NG SALAYSAY.
(Si
S Ako ho ay binigyan ni SANTIAGO ng P1,000.00? gned and thumbmarked)
E
12. T Ito bang pag-pabili ninyo ng jeep kay VICENTE PONS ay may kasulatan? FREN B. CANAPE
N
S Wala po.
agsasalaysay
13. T Kailan pa ang mga sumunod na bayad na ibinigay sa inyo ni VICENTE
PONS?
 SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Illegible signature) (Illegible signature)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 27th day of March 1988 at
NBI, National Capital Region, Manila. I likewise certify that I have carefully examined
the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed his statement and
understood the same.
( scheduled for that day. Noting the presence of Atty. Carlos Saunar, a prosecution witness whose
Signed)
Atty.
ARLIS E. VELA
(By
Authority of Rep. Act 157)"[13]
After the investigation, appellants went with the NBI agents in searching for their
companions.[14]
Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the
jeepney and its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in
Silang and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after September 4, 1987, the body of 23-year-old Andrew
Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his
body.[15] The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the
jeepney,[16] was recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the plantation[17] in
Maguyam.[18] Malibagos widow identified his body from its clothing.[19]
On September 12, 1989, the prosecution formally offered its evidence, [20] which the court duly
admitted.[21] For its part, the defense, through counsel, manifested its intention to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, because the defense had not yet presented accused Cid, the court on
November 21, 1989, ordered the cancellation of his bailbond and gave his surety thirty days within
which to show cause why judgment against the bond should not be rendered. The defense
counsel, Atty. Jose Claro, was likewise required to explain why he should not be held in contempt
of court for his failure to file a demurrer to evidence. [22]
For failure of the defense counsel to appear at the scheduled hearing dates and to file the
promised demurrer to evidence, the court on December 22, 1989, issued an order stating that the
"accused may no longer at this time be allowed to present their Demurrer to Evidence." It
scheduled dates for the presentation of defense evidence and appointed Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as
counsel de oficio for the defendants.[23]
Nevertheless, on December 26, 1989, counsel for the defense Claro mailed a "demurrer to
evidence or motion to dismiss on (sic) insufficiency of evidence." [24] On January 10, 1990, the trial
court denied the motion finding that the demurrer did not "contain any reason compelling enough
to recall the previous order," disallowing the filing of said pleading. [25]
On February 8, 1990, upon the manifestation of Atty. Claro that appellants would no longer
present evidence, the trial court issued an order considering the case terminated as far as
appellants were concerned. However, it granted a "reservation" to present evidence as regards
Cid. The trial court further directed Atty. Claro to present Cid before the court on March 9, 1990. It
ordered the filing of memoranda "as the case of accused Januario and Canope (sic) is now
considered closed." It set the "partial promulgation of judgment" on March 9, 1990 "insofar as the
two (2) accused are concerned."[26]
[27]
On March 1, 1990, appellants' counsel filed their memorandum.
On March 9, 1990, the trial court did not make a "partial promulgation of judgment." Instead,
it ordered the "continuation of proceedings for purposes of rebuttal evidence." [28]
On the same day, the defense presented Santiago Cid as a witness. He testified that a
certain Raul Repe, Toto Sarita and Digo Sarreal approached him about the sale of the jeepney. He
referred them to Vicente Pons who he thought would buy the vehicle. He knew appellants were
also from Libmanan but did not see them during the transaction for the sale of the jeepney. [29]
On March 27, 1990, the Court denied defense counsel Claro's motion to cancel the hearing
attendance during scheduled trial dates had been delayed, and citing the "imperatives of justice,"
the trial court issued an order directing that the testimony of said witness should be heard that
day.[30] In the absence of the counsel of record for the defense, the trial court reiterated the
appointment of Atty. Oscar Zaldivar as counsel de oficio.
Atty. Saunar testified that he joined the NBI sometime in May or June 1988. On March 1988,
while still in private practice, he was at the NBI head office handling a client case when Atty. Vela,
an NBI agent, approached him. The latter and Atty. Toribio introduced him to appellants and
Cid. Vela and Toribio told him that the three had verbally confessed to participation in a crime and
that they needed his assistance as they were about to execute their sworn statements. [31] Saunar
agreed to assist the three suspects and allegedly explained to them the consequences of their
confession. He also supposedly told them individually and in Tagalog, their constitutional rights,
like their rights to be silent and to counsel and that whatever they would say could be used against
them.[32]
Saunar identified his signature in the sworn statement of appellant Januario. However, he
could no longer recall which of the three accused was appellant Canape although he admitted that
the latter's face was "familiar."[33] He was certain, however, that he participated in the taking of
appellant Canape's sworn statement on March 28, 1988. He admitted that his signature does not
appear on appellant Canape's sworn statement but he could "only surmise" that he did not sign the
same sworn statement because either it was not presented to him immediately after the statement
was taken or that it could have been misplaced. [34]
After receiving Saunar's testimony, the trial court asked the prosecution whether it was
presented as rebuttal testimony. Answering in the positive, the prosecutor reminded the court that
when Saunar could not be presented as a witness, he had made a reservation to call him as
"additional evidence for the prosecution and/or rebuttal" testimony. Clarifying, the court said that
as against Cid, the testimony was a principal one but a rebuttal as far as the appellants were
concerned.[35]
On May 11, 1990, the defense manifested that it was closing its case. The prosecution having
waived its right to present "any rebuttal evidence," the trial court issued an order requiring the filing
of the parties' respective memoranda.[36] On June 27, 1990, the trial court rendered the herein
questioned Decision.[37]
The Issues
In their separate briefs filed by their respective counsel (Atty. Jose C. Claro for Januario and
Atty. Florendo C. Medina for Canape), appellants ascribe basically two errors against the trial court:
(1) The trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission of the testimony of Atty.
Carlos Saunar, was irregular and prejudicial to the appellants; and
(2) The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having been
extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel.
Insisting that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Januario
contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his sworn statement before the NBI and
the testimony of Atty. Saunar as rebuttal or additional witness after the prosecution had rested its
case, he (appellant Januario) had filed his memorandum, and the decision had been scheduled for
promulgation.[38]
For his part, appellant Canape also claims that his guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He questions the trial court's having given "weight and sufficiency" to his extra-
judicial confession.[39]
Appellant Januario contends that the trial court erred in allowing the presentation of Saunar
as a witness after the prosecution had closed its case and offered its documentary
evidence. Saunar could not in any guise be considered as a rebuttal witness simply because there
was no defense evidence to rebut.
The Courts Ruling
The First Issue: Order of Trial
The pertinent provisions of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court state:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial.- The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge, and in the proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from
the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
the furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the cases shall be deemed submitted unless the court
directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The trial procedure as outlined in this rule is ordinarily followed to insure the orderly conduct
of litigations to attain the magisterial objective of the Rules of Court to protect the parties'
substantive rights.[40] However, strict observance of the Rules depend upon the circumstances
obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial judge. Thus, as early as 1917, this Court
explained:
"x x x. The orderly course of proceedings requires, however, that the prosecution
shall go forward and should present all of its proof in the first instance; but it is competent
for the judge, according to the nature of the case, to allow a party who has closed his case
to introduce further evidence in rebuttal. This rule, however, depends upon the particular
circumstances of each particular case, and falls within the sound discretion of the judge, to
be exercised or not as he may think proper."[41]
Hence, the court may allow the prosecutor, even after he has rested his case or even after
the defense has moved for dismissal, to present involuntarily omitted evidence.[42] The primary
consideration is whether the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case. Thus
"The claim that the lower court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to introduce new
evidence is devoid of any merit, for while the prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet
terminated and the cause was still under the control and jurisdiction of the court and the latter, in
the exercise of its discretion, may receive additional evidence. Sec. 3(c), Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court clearly provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant either of the
parties the right and opportunity to adduce new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue
in question."[43]
Saunars testimony was admitted in evidence before the trial court rendered its
Decision. Undoubtedly then, the court a quo retained its jurisdiction even though the prosecution
had rested its case. As to appellants, Saunar was an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal
witness, because the defense waived presentation of evidence after the prosecution had rested its
case.[44] Saunar was, therefore, a rebuttal witness with respect to accused Cid. [45]
The Second Issue: Appellants Right to Counsel
Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is, however, not
a guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article III,
Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Elucidating on this particular constitutional requirement, this
Court has taught:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic
laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant
to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions
guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a
competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in
the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel `contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.'
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter Although, he does not need a lawyer, we provided him a lawyer by the name of Atty.
could not afford one) `should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or Carlos Saunar, who was present during the investigation, and who advised him
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the of the consequences of the statements that he will give, and he did not refuse.
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are FISCAL VELAZCO:
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
Q Now, how did you know that Atty. Saunar gave him advice, gave accused Canape
authorities can be symbiotic."[46]
advice?
We find that Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation
A Because we were present.
counsel. Thus, NBI Agent Arlis Vela testified:
Q Now, when did Atty. Saunar give that advice to accused Canape, was it before,
"Q Now, considering that they were then under your custody, and under investigation,
during, or after the taking of this statement?
were they represented by counsel during the time that you took their statements?
A Before, during, and after the taking of the statement.
A Yes, sir. They were.
Q Now, may we know from you why Atty. Saunar was present there?
Q Do you recall who was that counsel who represented them?
A He was present there because he was then applying for the position of NBI
A Atty. Carlos Saunar, sir.
agent.
Q Was he the counsel of their own choice, or was the counsel furnished by
your office? FISCAL VELAZCO:
A Because they were not represented by counsel of their own choice, we got Q Was he the only lawyer who was present there?
the service of Atty. Carlos Saunar who helped them.[47]
A I remember, Atty. Claro, sometimes is there, representing another client. [49]
xxx xxx xxx.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q And Atty. Saunar is connected with the NBI?
Q Now, Atty. Saunar is employed with the NBI office, am I right?
A At that time, he was at the NBI Office. He was just somewhere around.
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was the NBI who requested Saunar to assist Mr. Rene Januario in the
investigation? Q When was he employed at the NBI office? Tell us the exact date?

A We requested him, because he was just around, sir."[48] (Emphasis supplied.)

COURT:
As regards Saunar's assistance as counsel for appellant Canape, investigating NBI Agent
Magno Toribio testified as follows: If you can.
"Q Now, with regards to your advice that he has a right to counsel, and to seek
assistance of a counsel of his own choice if he does not have one, and to remain WITNESS:
silent, and if he does not have a lawyer, you will furnish one for him, now what
was his answer? Maybe in September.
WITNESS:
ATTY. CLARO:
According to him, he does not need a lawyer, but despite that refusal to have a lawyer
...
19?
COURT:
A 1988.
That is not refusal. That is manifestation that he does not need a lawyer. He did not
refuse. He said, he does not need a lawyer. Q But he was always frequent in the NBI office because he was to be employed, is
that what you mean?
WITNESS: (con't.)
A He was applying.
 Q And from where is he?
A I think he is from Bicol.
xxx xxx
xxx.
Q Now, how many times have you requested Atty. Saunar to assist a person under
your investigation in the NBI office, other than this?
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q You always ask him to assist if there is no lawyer available, or the person to be
investigated has no lawyer?
A If he is around."[50] (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us for the moment grant arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond
question. Under the circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have been
the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant for a
position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In
fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As regards appellant Januario,
Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise appellant of his constitutional right as
reflected in the written sworn statement itself.
However, the same cannot be said about appellant Canape. Clearly, he was not properly
informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights,
asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. [51] In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of
his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative
answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to
explain and to contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed.[52] Appellant Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper,
fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the aforequoted testimony of NBI
Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents
should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
Moreover, there is enough reason to doubt whether appellant Canape was in fact and in truth
assisted by counsel. Atty. Saunar affirmed on the witness stand that he assisted appellants on
March 28, 1988.[53] However, the sworn statement itself reveals that it was taken on March 27,
1988. No satisfactory explanation was made by the prosecution on this discrepancy. All that Agent
Vela stated was that they conducted an oral investigation in Naga City on March 27, 1988 and that
investigation at the NBI Manila head office was made in the afternoon of March 28, 1988. [54]
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of appellants' constitutional rights is shown
not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution. They have likewise
forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that
an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel otherwise
it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. [55]
An admission, which, under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is an "act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact" is different from a confession which, in turn,
is defined in Section 33 of the same Rule as the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein." Both may be given in
evidence against the person admitting or confessing. In People vs. Lorenzo,[56] the Court
explained that in a confession there is an acknowledgment of guilt while in an admission the
statements of fact by the accused do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which the accused is charged.
Appellants verbally intimated facts relevant to the commission of the crime to the NBI agents
in Naga City. This is shown by the testimony of NBI Agent Vela that, based on the facts gathered
from interviews of people in that city, they "invited" and questioned appellants, thus:
"Q Now, tell us, what was your purpose in inviting these two (2) people?
A That was in connection with the vehicle I mentioned earlier, in connection with the
carnapping incident mentioned earlier.
Q You invited them in connection with the carnapping because you want to know
from them actually what they know about the carnapping, am I correct?
A Precisely, that is right."[57]
Apparently attempting to avoid the questions on whether appellants admitted complicity in
the crime, Agent Toribio testified:
"ATTY. CLARO:
When you were conducting an investigation, and you saw me at the NBI building, Naga
City, you were referring to the investigation of Mr. Canape, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that investigation you were conducting was reduced to writing, and that is now
Exhibit `G', am I right?
A That is not.
Q But you investigated Mr. Canape in Naga City at the NBI building, am I right, tell
the Court?
A At that time, we were taking the statement of the woman, the complainant, in the
estafa case, and the other witnesses.
COURT:
You mean, at the time you investigated that estafa complaint, that was the time when
you also investigated Canape, is that what you mean?
FISCAL VELAZCO:
No, your Honor.
COURT:
But there is a question of counsel. You better clarify that.
WITNESS:
He was asking me if I had already taken the statement of Canape.
COURT: It is true that we were sometimes talking with those people, but not investigating them
yet."[58] (Emphasis supplied.)
That is it, sir, Naga City. That is the question.
Note should also be taken of the fact that according to Atty. Saunar, when he acceded to be
WITNESS: the custodial investigation counsel of appellants, the latter had already confessed. Thus:
Not yet. We were only asking him. "COURT:
ATTY. CLARO: There is one thing that he would like to add, `that I talked to the accused one by one,'
you want to add something?
By him, whom are you referring to:
A And I confirmed with them whether they are confessing to their crime, and they
A The complainants and the witnesses, sir.
said yes. In fact, from what I observed, they have already confessed to the NBI
Q All right. You were with Atty. Vela when you conducted an investigation to (sic) Mr. agents.
Canape, am I right? In Naga City?
COURT:
WITNESS:
All of them confessed?
Yes, sir.
A Yes, your Honor, because they also told me what happened.
Q And Mr. Vela at that time, was also conducting an investigation to (sic) a certain
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Rene Januario in Naga City, is that right?
Now, when they informed you that they intend to confess, now, did you explain to them,
A. No. We took the statement in Manila.
to the accused or to the persons under investigation the consequences of
COURT: confessing?

You took the statement in Manila. How about in Naga, that is the question of counsel?
A Naga, no statement yet.
ATTY. CLARO:
Mr. Toribio, because you were with Mr. Vela, Mr. Vela did not conduct any investigation
to (sic) Mr. Januario, one of the accused in this case, in Naga City? Tell the Court?
A Not yet at that time, because it was useless. The crime was committed in Silang,
Cavite. They will have to be brought to Manila for the appropriate Judge or Fiscal.
A Yes, that is basic. I informed them of their rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and whatever they will confess there will be used against them during the trial of
this case.
Q How about that ultimate consequence of admission?
A Yes. I told them that if they confess, they will have to go to prison.
Q And what were their answers?
A Actually, they have already confessed to their crime before I talked to them.

COURT: xxx xxx xxx.

So, you are claiming that you did not conduct any investigation of Canape? ATTY. ZALDIVAR:

A We conducted an investigation. When we took the statement of the other Your Honor, the witness has just answered during the preliminary question of the Fiscal
witnesses, complainant and witnesses . that at the time his assistance was sought by the NBI, the accused had in fact
already confessed.
COURT:
COURT:
Does that satisfy you?
I am now asking him, have you said that?
ATTY. CLARO:
A They have already confessed.
No.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
COURT;
We can review the transcript of stenographic notes.
Please clarify the question.
COURT:
WITNESS: (con't.)
 What do you mean by that?
A They were still confessing at that time, your Honor.
ATTY. ZALDIVAR:
I just want to manifest into the record that they have already confessed; that the witness
has just repeated the word.
COURT:
But there is an explanation by him. Put that on record, all of them.
FISCAL VELAZCO:
Now, did you verify whether that confession was only verbal or in writing?
A That was only verbal that is why there is a need for the sworn statement to
be taken. That was the time that I was telling them that they can be put to
jail."[59](Emphasis supplied.)
It is therefore clear that prior to the execution of the sworn statements at the NBI head office,
appellants had already made verbal admissions of complicity in the crime. Verbal admissions,
however, should also be made with the assistance of counsel. Thus:
"The verbal admissions allegedly made by both appellants of their participation in the crime,
at the time of their arrest and even before their formal investigation, are inadmissible, both
as violative of their constitutional rights and as hearsay evidence. These oral admissions,
assuming they were in fact made, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions within
the meaning of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution." [60]
That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga City is
shown by the fact that the NBI agents brought them to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other
culprits who could be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in
Naga City resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the latter had become as
constitutionally infirm as the former. In People vs. Alicando,[61] this Court explained the
ramifications of an irregularly counselled confession or admission:
"We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary rules known as the `fruit of the poisonous tree,' a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States.
According to this rule, once the primary source (the `tree') is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the `fruit') derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the `fruit of the poisonous tree' is the indirect result of the same illegal
act. The `fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained."
Appellants might have indeed committed the crime in concert with Eliseo Sarita and Eduardo
Sarinos. However, what could have been their valuable admissions and confessions as far as the
prosecution was concerned were sullied and rendered inadmissible by the irregular manner by
which the law enforcement agents extracted such admissions and confessions from
appellants. Without such statements, the remaining prosecution evidence -- consisting mostly of
hearsay testimony and investigation reports -- is sorely inadequate to prove appellants participation
in the crime.
Notably, these law enforcers did not only defy the mandate of Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
but, after making "inquiries" from appellants about the crime, they likewise illegally detained
appellants as shown by the admission of one of the NBI agents that appellants were deprived of
their liberty while in their custody.[62] Appellants were even made to travel for ten (10) hours [63] from
Naga City to Manila just so their formal confessions could be executed in the latter city. According
to NBI Agent Vela, they "actually arrested" the appellants when the court issued the warrant for
their arrest.[64] The records show however that the NBI turned appellants over to the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo in Cavite only on March 30, 1989. On the same day, the same
court turned them back to the NBI for "detention during pendency of the case." [65]
Epilogue
The Court understands the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies in apprehending
violators of the law especially those involving syndicates. It sympathizes with the public clamor for
the bringing of criminals before the altar of justice. However, quick solution of crimes and the
consequent apprehension of malefactors are not the end-all and be-all of law
enforcement. Enforcers of the law must follow the procedure mandated by the Constitution and
the law. Otherwise, their efforts would be meaningless. And their expenses in trying to solve
crimes would constitute needless expenditures of taxpayers money.
This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights
as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government. The admonition given by this Court to government officers, particularly those involved
in law enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People vs. Cuizon,[66] where NBI
agents mishandled a drug bust operation and in so doing violated the constitutional guarantees
against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated
in the case at bench, to wit:
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to
expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their
rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search
and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless
of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking
in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our
system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within
the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means.[67]
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 in
Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Rene Januario and Efren
Canape are ACQUITTED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Director, National Bureau of Investigation in order that Eliseo Sarita and
Eduardo Sarinos, who are still at large, may be apprehended and this time properly investigated
and prosecuted.
The accused-appellants are hereby ORDERED RELEASED immediately unless they are
being detained for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101817. March 26, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO GOMEZ and FELIPE
IMMACULATA, accused, FELIPE IMMACULATA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Quite unfortunately, in the war on drugs, almost invariably, it is the little fellow who easily gets
the axe but the barons come out unscathed.
Accused Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were
implicated in the crime of transporting twenty (20) kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth
$40,000,000.00,[1] contained in two golfbags. Arraigned, tried and ultimately convicted, Gomez and
Immaculata were each meted the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand ordered to pay a P20,000.00
fine by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113,[2] in Criminal Case No. 90-4717.
Also charged, along with the duo, with having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade
arrest. Gomez, an American citizen of Filipino ancestry, surrendered to the officer-in-charge of the
then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City, while Immaculata was apprehended by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI").
Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. [3] The prosecution
moved to discharge Gomez so that he could be a state witness. [4] The motion was strongly opposed
by Immaculata.[5] Eventually, the trial court refused to discharge Gomez holding that, among other
things, "it (was) evident throughout his affidavit that his only purpose in executing the same was to
exculpate himself and (to) lay the blame on his co-accused."[6]
The events that transpired leading to the filing of the charges were recounted in good detail
during the trial of the case.
On 27 February 1990, David, an employer[7] of Immaculata sent the latter to Bangkok,
Thailand, to canvass ready-to-wear clothes.[8] David and Gomez followed Immaculata about a week
later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and
Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the Union Towers Hotel. [9]After two days, they transferred to
the apartment of one Lito Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in Bangkok.[10]
On 14 March 1990, Immaculata, Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded
Manila-bound flight numbered PR-731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats No. 52A and
No. 54D. Gomez was on the same flight.[11] He checked-in two golfbags, and he was issued interline
claim tags No. PR 77-28-71[12] and No. 77-28-72.[13]
In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags with the interline baggage room for his
connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight numbered 058
scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit
rack baggage along with other pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight.[14]
Well before flight time on 15 March 1990, Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), was requested by Customs Collector Edgardo de Leon to
help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought from his security officer, a certain
Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having received the go-signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon
the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's
lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in
at the interline baggage room.[15]
At the interline baggage room, Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo, a PAL employee
assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage handling section, and presented the
two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and plane ticket. Convinced that Dumag
had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggages, Benipayo released, upon the approval of a
customs examiner named Nick,[16] the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge the
release, Dumag affixed his signature[17] to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list."[18]
PAL loader Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in
counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag No. 594513 and Tag No.
594514) and wrote the name "Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag
the boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for Gomez. [19] Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a
restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the travel papers of Gomez. [20]
Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from the aircraft. At
around four o'clock in the afternoon, PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to the
check-in counter for a security check-up. The x-ray machine showed unidentified dark
masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the information to Capt. Ephraim Sindico of the
801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force Security Command ("PAFSECOM")
then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get
the golfbags pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that something was indeed
wrong, Capt. Sindico reported the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the
golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray machine. The unidentified dark masses having
been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued bottom zipper of the
golfbags. The golfbags yielded thirty-one single packs,[21] each with an approximate size of 1" x 6"
x 4," containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a total weight of 20.1159
kilograms.[22] The examination by the PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA manager,
a representative of the UAL and other customs personnel. [23]
Initial PAFSECOM investigation established that the two golfbags were interline baggages
which arrived on 14 March 1990 on board PAL flight PR-731 from Bangkok. The identity of the
owner was traced, through UAL claim tags No. 594513 and No. 594514, to Gomez. Before turning
over the golfbags and the thirty-one packs of white powder, together with the UAL claim tags, to
the authorities,[24] the packs were first individually weighed at the office of the District Collector of
NAIA in the presence and with the participation of three personnel of the Bureau of Customs and
three agents of the NBI.
Leonora Vallado, chief of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, who later conducted a
laboratory examination on the white powder, issued a report, dated 23 March 1990, to the effect
that the substance was positive "for the presence of HEROIN HCL in the amount of 70.6% and
86.1% respectively."[25]
Immaculata and Gomez denied having anything to do with the confiscated drug.
A former shuttle bus driver for six years, Immaculata said he was hired by David to be a "stay-
in driver" with a monthly salary of P2,000.00. He would at times be asked to likewise do some
special errands for David.[26]
 Gomez, on his part, stated that he had met David for the first time in 1986 on board a plane
flight from the Philippines to Los Angeles, U.S.A. Gomez was a bartender at the Horseshoe Hotel
in Las Vegas, while David was a jewelry trader in Texas and Los Angeles. The two got to be on
friendly terms after their second chance meeting at a wedding anniversary celebration in Los
Angeles. On Mondays thereafter, Gomez would meet David in Las Vegas to play golf with Benny
Cunanan.[27] Once, Gomez was asked if he would be willing to "bring in" some dollars to the
Philippines. Gomez showed no interest to accept the deal until some time in 1990 when he finally
agreed. Gomez was to receive a free round-trip ticket (US-Manila-US) plus $2,500.00. Upon his
return to the U.S., Gomez would then get another $2,500.00. During the first week of February,
1990, Cunanan told Gomez that he had bought himself a golf set which Gomez could use in the
Philippines. A few weeks later, one Andy Bombao requested Gomez to also take with him another
golf set for Cunanan.
Gomez left the U.S. for the Philippines on 26 February 1990. He checked-in the two golfbags
and a luggage. He handcarried a small traveler's bag and the US$30,000.00 cash he was
commissioned to bring with him. At the NAIA, Gomez was met by David and Immaculata. The three
proceeded to a house in Bicutan where David took the golfbags and the dollars. [28] From Bicutan,
Gomez, David and Immaculata went to Nasugbu, Batangas, where they stayed for about two or
three days. From Nasugbu, they went to Vito Cruz and then back to Bicutan. Here, Gomez was
handed two (2) plane tickets, a PAL round-trip ticket to Bangkok (Manila-Bangkok-Manila) and a
UAL ticket for San Francisco, U.S.A.[29]
On 27 February 1990, David sent Immaculata to Bangkok to canvass prices of ready-to-wear
clothes. Immaculata stayed at the Asia Hotel for four days. On the fourth day of his stay,
Immaculata called David to inform him that he was running out of cash. David instructed
Immaculata to wait for him in Bangkok and to meanwhile stay with Lito Tuazon in the latter's
apartment.
David and Gomez left for Thailand on 04 March 1990 bringing with them a golf set
each. Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport and brought them to the Union Towers
Hotel where they stayed for two days. On the third day, David and Gomez played golf while
Immaculata cleaned and prepared Lito Tuazon's apartment for David where the latter transferred
and spent the rest of his stay in Bangkok.[30]
[31]
David returned to Manila on 09 March 1990. On 10 March 1990, Lito Tuazon had the tickets
of Gomez and Immaculata also confirmed for the return trip to Manila. David, who was by then in
Manila, called up Gomez to tell him that Aya Yupangco was arriving in Thailand and that the latter
should not be allowed to see the golfbags.[32] Gomez became suspicious but David assured Gomez
that the golfbags merely contained precious jewels and stones.
On 12 March 1990, Yupangco, who claimed to be a NARCOM agent, arrived in Thailand. He
had dinner with Gomez.[33] The following day, Gomez was told by Immaculata to pick up the
golfbags from Lito Tuazon's apartment. On 14 March 1990, Gomez picked up the golfbags. He
noticed that the golfbags were heavier than usual. Tuazon explained casually to Gomez that there
were pieces of jewelry and precious stones inside the golfbags. At the Bangkok Airport, Tuazon
checked-in the golfbags for Gomez.[34]Immaculata and Yupangco took the same flight. Gomez was
met at the NAIA lobby by David.
On 15 March 1990, Charlie Rivera and David took the ticket and passport of Gomez in order
to confirm the latter's flight to the U.S. The following day, 16 March 1990, Rivera informed Gomez
that he could not take his flight to San Francisco. Gomez confronted David about the matter. The
latter promised to clear up things and invited David to Nasugbu where they stayed until 21 March
1990.[35] Thereafter, Gomez stayed with a certain Jhun Guevarra at Bicutan. It was there that
Gomez called up his stepfather and told him about the situation he was in. Gomez's stepfather
convinced him to give himself up to the American authorities. On 23 March 1990, Gomez, his
stepfather and his half-brother named Frankie, went to the then officer-in-charge of Clark Airbase
in Angeles City. The latter turned over custody of Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")
of the United States in Manila. The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI.[36]
Meanwhile, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for Hongkong reportedly to get
some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car.[37] In Hongkong, after buying the car spare parts,
David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for
David, Immaculata was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong
Immigration office, requesting for his travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation
because of an expired visa, then turned over to the police authorities and finally to the court which
decreed his imprisonment.
In the Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the
"heroin" case. He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to
execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported
to Manila.[38] According to the NBI, when Immaculata was apprehended by the Hongkong
immigration authorities, he and David were preparing to leave for Mexico. [39]
The trial court found Gomez and Immaculata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. While Gomez and Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to this Court from their
conviction,[40] only Immaculata, however, filed his brief.[41] Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a
"manifestation of withdrawal of appeal"[42] to which the Solicitor General interposed no
objection.[43] The Court would only thus consider the appeal of Immaculata.
In his appeal, Immaculata[44] insists that the trial court has erred in including him in the drug
conspiracy and in admitting in evidence his sworn statement taken, without the assistance of
counsel, by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong.
Unquestionably, heroin, a prohibited drug, was being transported when discovered by the
authorities at the NAIA. That the contraband failed to reach its final destination would not preclude
the commission of the crime of transporting illegal drugs; the fact of actual conveyance would
suffice to support a finding of guilt.[45]
The trial court found appellant Immaculata to have been part of the conspiracy in the illegal
traffic of drugs, and it deduced appellant's conspiratorial participation in the crime from the following
facts: (1) appellant was not only an employee but a business partner or associate of David; (2)
appellant, Yupangco and Gomez were all on board the same PAL flight No. PR-731 from Bangkok
to Manila in which flight the golfbags containing the heroin were checked-in, and (3) all three stayed
in one apartment while in Bangkok.
Conspiracy is deemed to arise -
"x x x `when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.' Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime
itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy
need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence
therefore must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design." [46]
Conspiracy, to be the basis for a conviction, should be proved in the same manner as the criminal
act itself. It is also essential that a conscious design to commit an offensemust be
established. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of the
cohorts.[47]
 Appellant, it might be true, was an incorporator, along with David, of AD-333, Inc.; however,
nothing could be gathered from the records to show that the corporation was engaged in or used
at one time or another for any unlawful purpose, let alone in the illegal traffic of drugs. It would, in
fact, appear that appellant was made to be a signatory of the incorporation papers of AD-333, Inc.,
only because David needed to comply with the minimum number of incorporators required by law
for its registration.[48]

The trip to Bangkok of appellant and his co-accused might perhaps elicit suspicion on the
real nature of his association with David, but an assumed intimacy between two persons of itself
does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal conspiracy. Conspiracy certainly
transcends companionship.[49]

While the sworn statement taken from appellant by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in
Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the
court a quo, a word could be said about the manner in which it was procured. It would seem that
appellant was merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain
silent. He then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the
affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. Appellant
answered:

"S. Sa ngayon po ay hindi na at totoo lang naman ang aking sasabihin. Kung mayroon po kayong
tanong na hindi ko masasagot ay sasabihin ko na lang po sa inyo." [50]
After that response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance
with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a
person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. [51] It is immaterial that the sworn
statement was executed in a foreign land.Appellant, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these
constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.
Under our laws, the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal
offense lies with the prosecution. The burden must be discharged by it on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense or the lack of it. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Here, it is not unlikely for one to suspect that appellant has had an inkling on the existence of
the conspiracy but the essential connecting link showing a definite community of design between
him and the others just has not been adequately shown. When the circumstances obtaining in a
case are capable of two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and
the court must acquit.[52]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant Felipe Immaculata of the
crime charged is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the basis of reasonable doubt. His
immediate release from the New Bilibid Prisons is ordered unless he is detained for any other lawful
cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY MAHINAY
AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to
the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the
youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the
fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity,
committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock
on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act"
of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an
ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to lust.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record: [1] *
"Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1993.
His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old
residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela ,
Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters
away from the unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
"The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass
by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard, catching maya birds
together with other children. While they were playing, appellant was always around washing his
clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31;
September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).
"On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around
10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
"Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the compound,
saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip's unfinished
house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from
Rivera's store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp.9-11).
"On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house
between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V.
Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house,
Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he
saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995,
pp. 3-7; 14-17).
"Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that appellant
Y appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was
walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he
left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
"Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty
white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
"Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June 26,
1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando
Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and
had thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).
"That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the
septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira
Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
"With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the
septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results
of the autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, supra pubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm, angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5
cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm.,
left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area,
right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left,
posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm.
forearms, left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm.
thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd, 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x
2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd , 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral
mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial
hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995;
p. 4; Record, p. 126)
"Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip
that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it was unlikely for
appellant to just disappear from the apartment since whenever he would go out, he would
normally return on the same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995,
pp. 6-11-27).
"SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was working
in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said place. The owner
of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know
his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant
could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-
9).
"The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under
construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt
and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma.
Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that
of Appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as
appellant's belongings. These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995,
pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
"A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear from
the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
"After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with
the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the
victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 13-21)."
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information
which reads:[2]
"That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation
employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with
said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on
the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
"Contrary to law."[3]
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting appellant
of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00
to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is likewise
condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and
to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
"Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court
for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
Upon automatic review by the court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended,[5] appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony
summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the
brother of Maria Isip, appellants employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he
was summoned by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 oclock noon.
Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends
to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5).
At 2 oclock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to rejoin
Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one case of red horse
beer. Around 6 oclock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at Gregorio Riveras house. They
went to Zaldys house and bought a bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 oclock p.m.
After consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby
store. It was already 9 oclock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy
met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995,
pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Riveras store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isips apartment. But
because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second floor of Isips unfinished house.
Around 10 oclock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body
inside the room where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a
knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him. He,
However, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the
dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon,
Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they would kill him. At 4 oclock
the following morning, he left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police
officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the
police officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed
the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by
Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).[6]
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the
review thereof since there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the
termination of a human life.[7] For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be
restored. In order therefore, that appellants guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons
why, as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence[8] and pursuant to settled jurisprudence,[9] conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[10] Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.[11]
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the shadow
of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big
house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan was
found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the
evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the
compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice
noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accuseds hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the
accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically, testified that on June 25, 1995
between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house, he met accused Larry
Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-laws residence which is about 50 to 75 meters
away to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan
standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same
evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where victims body was
found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since
November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked
permission from her to leave. That after finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry
Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the
same day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he
was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the route
Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Diam St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his
passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of
the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a clear indication that the
victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or there
was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any evidence as
to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People
vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed
of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorneys
Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of
accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have
been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any
maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He
did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July
8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession
abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to
the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony.
That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is
expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation
and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of
death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate.
Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the latters head hit
the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama
iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There were no
medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police
officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of
violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the
investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v.
Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v.
Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to enter the
apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he proceeded to the second
floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying
the cadaver of the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two
ordered him to have sex with the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist
them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp8-9 October
16, 1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment
and not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night of June
25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss
how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished
house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the
second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet
and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be disposed/dumped later in the septic tank
located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the
septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver knowledge
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous. (People
vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the
body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police
officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is
unnatural. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime
as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A
persons silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not
innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt. He
left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not return until he was
arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.[12]
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: [13]
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined
and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A.
7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
 5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog
Syndrome (AIDS) disease. na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.

6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation.[14]
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,[15] although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-
classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted
even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent.[16] (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and
the victim may even be a man.)[17] If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent
becomes immaterial[18] not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, [19]but the
absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will
therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is be proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over
at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must
be proven but also the other element that the perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are
present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem
examination on the childs body:
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigators table. Subject
evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa,
basta araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.
22. T: Alam mo na ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?

Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine? S: Hindi ko po alam.

A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim. 23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at
pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
S: Oho.
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock position
and that the edges were congested. 24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?

Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration? S: Naka-isa po.

A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ. 25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng NAKARAOS, maaari bang
ipaliwanag mo ito?
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
A: Adult male organ, sir.
26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
A: I am very sure of that.[20]
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that
he had sexual congress with the unconscious child. S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.

15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon? 28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?

S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?
 S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
S: Natatakot po ako.
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o
patay na?
S: Buhay pa po.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.[21]
In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse.[22] The mere touching by the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia of
the pudendum of the womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own account, he pushed the
victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance
that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which he,
however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention
is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained
to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the
assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were
told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime
of, I think, rape with homicide.
Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person
present?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the
investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q- And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already
there?
A The accused was already there.
Q Was he alone?
A he was alone, sir.
Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers,
what did they tell you, if any?
A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
crime charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorneys Office.
Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as
assisting lawyer to the accused?
A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
Q What are those right?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice
and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right
to refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him.
Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall
whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be
able to recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you
mentioned?
A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry
Mahinay, Nagsasalaysay, whose signature is that?
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A proper.
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you
asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform? Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?

A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q But you were present?
A I was then present when he signed.
Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there
are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.
Q The signature of whom?
A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compaero be encircled
and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in
Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A- Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay
subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined
the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial
Confession, do you recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir.[23] (emphasis supplied).
Appellants defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and
forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey,[24]
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.

Q What was the reply? Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the
rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
A He said Opo. trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses department on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to
Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment? the appellate courts.[25] In this case, the trial courts findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, [26] the same being supported
A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or
Q In your presence? disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the
outcome of this case[27] or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
A In my presence, sir. below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists.[28] Neither was any
Q And when he said or when he replied Opo so the question started? wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
A Yes, sir. Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 when by reason or on occasion
signed this waiver? of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. This special complex crime is
treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape -- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) attendant
A Yes, sir, I was also present. circumstances enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot
Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver? be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper
A I had also explained to him, sir. penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven
Q In Filipino? but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15,
the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Articles 63 of the RPC in mentioning
A In Tagalog, sir. aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if
any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying
circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in
which case the only penalty is death subject to the usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime
of rape with homicide, the court has no option but to apply the same regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime[29] in accordance
with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended.[30] This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty
of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing
laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic
review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the
imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. (emphasis
supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried
to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime. [31] Again, the record
rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of
age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of
the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).[32] In
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code[33] in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof.[34] Civil Indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages.[35] The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of
the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is recognized that the victims injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages.[36] Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of
moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. [37]
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by
one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code [38] after proof that
the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages. [39] Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victims heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence
against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of
the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting,
or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation[40] in accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: [41] It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by
said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer,
one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person
in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested
or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or
messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must
be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at
any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning
that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same
had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at
any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray[42] that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
 WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
RULE 129
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 90342 May 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO MACASLING, JR. y COLOCADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Hilario Macasling, Jr. appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which sentenced him
to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine and costs of litigation.
Appellant Macasling was charged with violation of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6425, as amended,
in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Hilario Macasling, Jr. y Colocado for violation of
Section 21(b) in relation to Section IV, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 (Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Transportation & Distribution), committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of August 1988, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport fifty (50)
grams of shabu, knowing fully well that said shabu [is] a prohibited drug, in
violation of the above-mentioned provision of law.1
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment and the case proceeded to trial. After trial, on
18 August 1989, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Hilario
Macasling, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting and/or
attempting to deliver 50 grams of shabu in violation of Section 21(b), Article IV
in relation to Section 15, Article III, in relation to No. 2(e), Section 2, Article I of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The 50 grams of shabu contained in the wrapped package marked Happy
Days (Exh. H and series) being the subject of the crime, is hereby declared
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State and referred to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for immediate destruction.
The accused Hilario Macasling, Jr. being a detention prisoner is entitled to be
credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
So Ordered.2
The evidence of record discloses that on 19 August 1988, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Lt. Manuel Obrera, Chief of the Narcotics and Intelligence Division, Integrated National Police
("INP"), Baguio City, received a telephone call from the Chief of the Narcotics Command
("Narcom"), First Regional Unit, INP. The latter sought the assistance of Lt. Obrera in the
apprehension of appellant, who according to the Narcom Chief, would be delivering shabu at
Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio City, on that same afternoon. Lt. Obrera
quickly formed a team which include Pat. Ramoncito Bueno, Pat. Martel Nillo and himself and
hastily left for the hotel. There they were met by the Narcom Chief who informed them that
appellant Macasling had previously agreed with a Chinese businessman in Las Pinas, Metro
Manila, that appellant would deliver about 250 grams of shabu at Room 77 of the Hyatt Terraces
Hotel.
Accordingly, Lt. Obrera and his companions waited inside Room No. 77 of the hotel, for appellant
to show up. Appellant, however, did not arrive that afternoon. Instead, he arrived at the Hyatt
Terraces Hotel at about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of the following day, together with one
Editha Gagarin and a third person who was an undercover Narcom agent. Lt. Obrera opened the
door of Room No. 77 to let appellant and his party in, upon noticing that the Narcom agent was
combing his hair, which was pre-arranged signal meaning that appellant had the shabu in his
possession. When appellant and his party were inside Room No. 77, Lt. Obrera and his
companions identified themselves to appellant and asked him about the shabu. Appellant handed
over a small package with a wrapper marked "Happy Days" which, upon being opened by
arresting officers, was found to contain about 50 grams of crystalline granules. 3 Appellant and
Editha Gagarin were brought to Camp Bado, Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, where the fact of
their arrest was officially recorded. They were later transferred to the Baguio City Jail as detention
prisoners. The crystalline granules were forwarded to the INP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for examination. The Forensic Chemist in charge of the examination subjected the
granules to four (4) different tests, namely, the color test, the melting point test, the thin layer
chromatography test, and the spectro-infra red test. All the test showed the presence of
metamphetamine hydrochloride, the scientific name of the substance popularly called shabu.4
The investigation by the City Prosecutor of Baguio City initially included Editha Gagarin. However,
upon the basis of a letter written by appellant Macasling admitting sole responsibility for the acts
charged in the information, Editha was excluded from the information. In that letter, appellant
stated that Editha was completely innocent, and that she had merely come along with appellant at
his invitation, to Baguio City.
Appellant Macasling made the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that since the arresting officers were
not armed with a search warrant of arrest, the arrest and consequent
confiscation of the package with a wrapper marked 'Happy Days' contain[ing]
50 grams of shabu (Exh. H and series) are illegal and unlawful, hence are
inadmissible in evidence.
2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground that
'shabu' is not of those mentioned in R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground that he
was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him.5
We shall consider the above alleged errors though not in the order submitted by appellant.
We consider first appellant's argument that he cannot be convicted of the offense charged in the
information considering that shabu — the term in the information — is not a dangerous drug,
since it is not one of those enumerated as such in R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, distinguishes between "prohibited drugs" and "regulated drugs."
Article I, Section 2 (e) defines the term "dangerous drugs" as referring either to "prohibited drugs"
or to "regulated drugs" in the following manner:
(e) "Dangerous drugs" — refers to either:
(1) "Prohibited drug" which includes opium and its active components and
derivatives, such as heroin and morphine; coca leaf and its derivativeness;
principally cocaine; alpha and beta eucaine, hallucinogenic drugs, such as
mescaline, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and other substances producing
similar effects; Indian hemp and its derivatives; all preparations made from
any of the foregoing; and other drugs and chemical preparations, whether
natural or synthetic, with the physiological effects of a narcotic or a
hallucinogenic drug; or (As amended by B.P. Blg. 179, March 12, 1982.)
(2) "Regulated drug" which includes self-inducing sedatives, such as
secobarbital, phenobarbital, pentobarbital, barbital, amobarbital and any other
drug which contains a salt or derivative of a salt of barbituric acid; and salt,
isomer or salt of an isomer, of amphetamine, such as benzedrine or
dexedrine, or any drug which produces a physiological action similar to
amphetamine; and hypnotic drugs, such as methaqualone, nitrazepam or any
other compound producing similar physiological effects (as amended by P.D.
No. 1683, March 14, 1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The statute penalizes the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of both
"prohibited drugs" and "regulated drugs:"
Article II
Prohibited Drugs
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense is
a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section
be the proximate cause of the victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed. (As amended by P.D. No. 1675, February 17,
1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
Article III
Regulated Drugs
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug. If the victim of the offense is
a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this section
be the proximate cause of the death of the victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed. (As amended by P.D. No. 1683,
March 14, 1980.)
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court after noting the above-quoted provisions of the statute, went on to say that:
 From the above provisions of law, it is clear that shabu which is the street
name of metamphetamine hydrochloride, is not among those enumerated as
prohibited drugs under No. 1 (e), Section 2, Article I on Definition of Terms of
Republic Act 6425, as amended.
Obviously, metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is a derivative of
amphetamine or a compound thereof, meaning to say, amphetamine in
combination with other drugs or elements which, if one looks closer, is actually
enumerated among the regulated drugs under No. 2(e), Section 2, Article I on
Definition of Terms of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
Note that the law says when it defines regulated drugs as those "which
includes self inducing sedatives such as . . . of amphetamine such as
benzedrine or dexedrine, or any other drug which produces a physiological
action similar to amphetamine, and hypnotic drugs, such as methaqualone or
any other compound producing similar physiological effect." Since shabu is
actually metamphetamine hydrochloride, it would then be obvious that its
component parts would be the compound of amphetamine with other
elements to form metamphetamine hydrochloride. In other words, among the
elements contained in metamphetamine hydrochloride is amphetamine, a
regulated drug.
xxx xxx xxx6
(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the above ruling of the trial court. This Court has in fact taken judicial notice
that shabu is a "street name" for metamphetamine hydrochloride (or "methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride").7 Considering the chemical composition of shabu, the Court has declared
that shabu is a derivative of a regulated drug,8 the possession, sale, transportation, etc. of which
is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6425 as amended. It remains only to point out that, in the
case at bar, the laboratory examination conducted on the crystalline granules recovered from
appellant in fact yielded the compound metamphetamine hydrochloride. The use in the criminal
information of the casual or vulgar term shabu rather than the scientific term metamphetamine
hydrochloride, does not affect the legal responsibility of appellant under the relevant provisions of
R.A. No. 6425 as amended.
It is true, as pointed out by the trial court, that the preambular portion of the criminal information in
this case referred to violation of "Section 21 (b) in relation to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179." Section 21 (b) of the statute reads as follows:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. — The same penalty prescribed by this Act
for the commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or
conspiracy to commit the same in the following case:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sale, Administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous
drugs;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, Article II of the statute deals with "sale, administration, distribution and transportation
of prohibited drugs." Upon the other hand, Section 15 of the statute is concerned with the "sale,
administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation and distribution of regulated drugs." It will be
recalled that the term "dangerous drugs" as used in the statute covers both "prohibited drugs"
and "regulated drugs." Thus, again as pointed out by the trial court, the opening clause of the
information should, more precisely, have referred to Section 15 which deals with "regulated
drugs" rather than to Section 4 which refers to "prohibited drugs." This imprecision in the
specification of the appropriate section of R.A. No. 6425 as amended has, however, no
consequences in the case at bar. For it is the character of the acts charged in the criminal
information and proven at the trial that is important, rather than the correctness of the designation
of the section and article of the statute violated. It should also not escape notice that the penalty
provided in Section 4: "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00," is exactly the same penalty imposed in Section 15 of the statute.
In much the same way, appellant's contention that he had been deprived of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, is bereft of merit. The acts with
which he was charged are quite plainly set out in the operative portion of the criminal information:
that appellant "did — willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distributed, dispatch in
transit or transport 50 grams of shabu, knowing fully well that said shabu [is] a prohibited drug . .
.". We agree with the trial court that the use of the term "prohibited drug" was merely a conclusion
of law, something which is for the Court to determine; in the circumstances of this case, the
inaccurate use of the term "prohibited drug" was also merely a falsa descriptio. The trial court
said:
The Court stressed this point as in the body of the Information what is alleged
as the offense committed is that the accused unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport 50 grams of shabu knowing
fully well that said shabu is a prohibited durg in violation of the law.
It can readily be seen that the subject matter of the offense, as recited in the
body of the Information, is the transport or sale or delivery of the 50 grams of
shabu. This is the allegation of fact in respect to the acts consituting the
offense. This is the offense that would need to be proved. However, the
allegationthat shabu is a prohibited drug is a conclusion of law.
Apparently, the prosecutor, who filed the Inforamtion considered shabu a
prohibited drug. Thus, the prosecutor designated the offense as a violation of
Section 21 (b) in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended. The Court pointed this out as should shabu, which really is
the street name of metamphetamine hydrochloride be, in fact, a regulated
drug, the the designation of the offense should have been Violation of Section
21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. But note, despite the mistaken designation of he offense for as
recited in the body of the Information, what is charged is still the sale,
transport or delivery of 50 grams of shabu. That is the one important. Only the
designation of the offense was a mistake from regulated drug to prohibited
drug which is a conclusion of law.
 This would not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accuasation against him. As in fact, the accused
is still informed of the offense charged, that is, the unlawful, transport, sale or
delivery of 50 grams of shabu.
xxx xxx xxx9
(Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
Appellant's next contention is that because he was not lawfully arrested, the package with a
"Happy Days" wrapper containing 50 grams of shabu, taken from him was inadmissible in
evidence. Appellant's claim that he was unlawfully arrested is anchored on the fact that the
arresting officers had neither warrant of arrest nor a search warrant.
The basic difficulty with appellant's contention is that it totally disregards the antecedents of the
arrest of the appellant inside Room No. 77 of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. It will be recalled that the
arresting officers had been informed by the Chief of the Narcom Regional Office that a
transaction had been agreed upon by appellant in Las Pinas, Metro Manila, involving delivery
of shabu, which delivery was, however, to take place in Room No. 77 at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel
in Baguio City. Only appellant with Editha Gagarin and the undercover Narcom agent showed up
at Room No. 77 at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel and the Narcom undercover agent had signalled that
appellant had with him the shabu. The reception prepared by the arresting officers for appellant
inside Room No. 77 was in fact an entrapment operation. The sale of the shabu (understood as
the meeting of the minds of seller and buyer) did not, of course, take place in the presence of the
arresting officers. The delivery or attempted delivery of the subject matter did, however, take
place in their presence. The trial court explained:
The situation at hand is no different from a buy bust operation and is in fact
part of a buy bust operation. It must be stressed that the sale was transacted
and closed in Las Pinas, Metro Manila by a Chinese businessman but the
delivery was directed to be made in Room 77, Hyatt Terraces, Baguio. And
instead of the Chinese businessman being inside Room 77 to receive the
delivery, the Narcom elements took his place to entrap the party that will
deliver.
Normally, the buy bust operation may take the form of both the negotiation for
the sale and delivery being made in the same place between the seller and
the poseur buyer. And when the sale is agreed upon, on the same occasion
the drug is delivered upon the payment being given. And it is at this juncture
that the police or the Narcom elements close in to arrest the offender in the act
of selling and delivering. This is the classic case of a "buy-bust" operation, to
bust drug pushing.
But surely, there are variations of a "buy-bust" operation, where the sale is
agreed upon in one place like on the street and then the delivery is to be
made in another place as when the buyer and the seller proceed to the house
where the drug is stored for the delivery. And upon the delivery of the drug by
the seller to the buyer, the police elements will arrest the seller in the act of
delivering.
And in the case at bar, the situation is but an extension of the second variation
above illustrated where the sale is agreed upon in one place but the delivery is
to be made in another place. As here the sale was agreed upon in Las Pinas
but the delivery is to be made in a far away place, in Hyatt Terraces, Baguio
City. Surely, the above is still part and parcel of a buy bust operation although
as we said it is more a "buy the delivery" operation.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the Narcom got to know beforehand the delivery to be made thru
their intelligence sources must be given credence by the Court. Like any other
organization fighting the crime on drugs, the Narcom must have intelligence
sources or it cannot perform its functions well and fulfill its mission.
Thus, to wait for the delivery, the Narcom elements deployed themselves
inside Room 77 in place of the Chinese businessman to entrap the party who
will appear to deliver the shabu which they would be in his possession thru a
pre-arranged signal of their undercover agent. Whosoever comes and appear
at Room 77 would be it. All other persons are unexpected (sic) to come to
Room 77 and have no business appearing there except to deliver the shabu
unless explained. And ultimately their waiting paid off as accused Hilario
Macasling, Jr. appeared in Room 77 to deliver the shabu and from whom it
was taken by the Narcom. The lack of warrant of arrest is not fatal as this
would be covered by the situation provided for warrantless arrests under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court where an offender is arrested while
actually committing and offense or attempting to commit the offense in the
presence of a peace officer.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court must stressed that the situation in the case at bar is very different
from a situation where the law enforcing agents or elements will simply accost
people at random on the road, street, boat, plane or bus without any pre-
arranged transaction and without warrant of arrest or search warrant and by
chance find drugs in the possession of a passerby. This latter situation is
clearly not permissible and would be in violation of the constitutional rights of a
person against unreasonable searches and seizures. This would be a fishing
expedition. You search first, and if you find anything unlawful you arrest.
But here it is not at random. There was a previous unlawful transaction. There
is a designated place for delivery, Room 77 and a specified time frame, that
very day of August 19, 1988 or thereabouts, and limited to a particular person,
in the sense that whoever would appear thereat would be it. Those who don't
knock at Room 77 and don't go inside Room 77 will not certainly be
arrested. But those who will there at that time and in that place will surely be
arrested because of the advance information, thru the intelligence sources, on
the delivery and the prior transaction made. This makes a lot of difference.
xxx xxx xxx
 But in the case at bar, accused Hilario Macasling, Jr., at the time of his arrest,
was actually in the act of committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime
in the presence of the peace officers as he appeared there in Room 77 to
deliver 50 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, which was previously bought but
directed to be delivered thereat.
The accused had no reason to be at Room 77, knocking therein, and going
inside, if he was not the party to deliver the shabu, and indeed he was. And
the Narcom elements have the right to pounce on him immediately lest he
gets away, or is tipped off, or can sense something is amiss or wrong. Unless,
of course, accused can explain then and there that he knocked on the door
and went inside Room 77 by mistake like being an innocent hotel boy, room
boy or hotel employee who is going inside the room to fix the room. Or that
accused is a hotel guest who committed a mistake as to his correct room. but
this is not the situation at hand as no such explanation was immediately made
by the accused. On the contrary, accused went inside the room when let in
indicating beyond reasonable doubt that he was the party to deliver, and
indeed he was, as the shabu was taken from his person after the pre-arranged
signal was given by the undercover agent. These circumstances speak for
themselves. Res Ipsa Loquitor. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto.
package he was carrying for Mrs. Diqueros was seized. Unknown to him , he insisted, the gift
package contained "shabu."12
The trial court was not persuaded by appellant's elaborate disclaimer of knowledge about
the shabu, finding such disclaimer as contrived and improbable and not worthy of
credence.13 The rule, of course, is that testimony to be believed must not only originate from a
credible witness, but must also itself be credible. 14 We see no reason, and we have been pointed
to none, why the Court should overturn the appraisal of the trial court of the credibility (or rather
lack of credibility) of the long story offered by the appellant. We find no basis for departing from
the basic rule that the appraisal by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses who appeared
before it is entitled to great respect from appellate courts who do not deal with live witnesses but
only with the cold pages of a written record.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 5936-R
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

xxx xxx xxx10

(Emphasis supplied)

We consider that under the total circumstances of this case, the warrantless arrest of appellant
inside Room No. 77 was merely the culmination of an entrapment operation and that the taking
of shabu from appellant was either done immediately before, or was an incident of, a lawful
arrest.11

As his principal factual defense, appellant denied knowledge of the fact that the package bearing
the "Happy Days" wrapper contained a quantity of a dangerous drug, claiming that he has merely
been instructed by his employer, Mr. Ben Diqueros, to bring the package to Baguio City as a gift
for Mrs. Diqueros. Appellant sought to explain his trip to Baguio by insisting that he has been
asked by Mr. Diqueros to drive the latter's Toyota Celica car to the Diqueros Residence in Tranco
Ville, Baguio City, as Mrs. Diqueros was planning to sell the car. Macasling had in turn invited
Editha Gagarin, together with the latter's children and mother, to join him in Baguio City. They
reached Baguio City later in the evening of 19 August 1988 and stayed temporarily at the Castilla
Monte. Appellant contended that he had left the Castilla Monte to see Mrs. Diqueros at their
residence in Tranco Ville but was informed by one Mario and a domestic helper that Mrs.
Diqueros was at the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. Appellant then had Mario accompany him to the hotel
where they found Mrs. Diqueros playing in the casino. Appellant, however, decided not to bother
Mrs. Diqueros and so returned to the Castilla Monte.

While at the Castilla Monte, appellant continued, he received a telephone call from Mario
informing him that Mrs. Diqueros had finished playing at the casino. Although it was then
midnight, appellant together with Editha Gagarin proceeded to the Hyatt Terraces Hotel. There
they were met at the hotel lobby by Mario who informed them that Mrs. Diqueros was at Room.
No. 77. Appellant claimed that he was, in Room No. 77, searched at gunpoint and that the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 91261 February 19, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REY FRANCIS YAP TONGSON @ REY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 1178 finding the accused, Rey Francis Yap Tongson, alias Rey, guilty of the
crime of rape committed against 13-year-old Glenda Laplana.
As found by the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:
. . . In the evening of May 21,1987, while the offended party was on her way home from
the house of Emerenciana Aberasturi at Malitbog, Southern Leyte, she was held by the
accused and forcibly dragged towards the sea. She shouted for help but to no avail.
Upon reaching the seashore, the accused held her hair and immersed her in the sea.
The place of immersion was knee-deep. Her whole body wet, she was dragged ashore
by him. He then pushed her and she fell down. While she was lying down, he gagged
her with his T-shirt and then boxed her thrice on her abdomen.
Thereafter, the accused removed her panty, inserted his fingers into her vagina, and
after pulling them out, had sexual intercourse with her. She tenaciously resisted the
lustful designs of the accused by moving her body, pushing him and even boxing him
while he was sexually abusing her. Her efforts at resistance, however, proved futile as
he was much stronger than she. (p. 19, Rollo.)
What happened afterwards are as follows:
. . . After he had performed the act, he warned her not to divulge it or else he would kill
her. The accused then brought her towards the house of Tiu Tiam Su where he was
then working.
When they reached near the house of Tiu Tiam Su alias Onjo, the accused told her to
wait because he would get a pump boat. She did not, however, wait for him. As soon as
he was at a distance from the house of Tiu Tiam Su, she ran towards the house of her
aunt, Estela.
Upon arriving at Estela's house she called for the people upstairs. Estela responded to
her call. They met at the stairway. Estela asked her why she was wet and crying. She
told Estela she (victim) was raped by the laborer of Tiu Tiam Su. She then went up the
house after telling Estela about the incident.
Later that evening she was brought to the office of the Chief of Police, Guerillito Lura.
There were policemen and civilians (among them being the accused) in that office.
When the Chief of Police asked her who among those men raped her, she pointed to
the accused. After identifying the accused she went to the hospital for examination.
Corroborating certain parts of the victim's testimony, Estela Aberasturi declared that at
about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of May 21, 1987, Arleta Espera (a maid of
Emerenciana Aberasturi, Estela's mother-in-law) went to her house in the poblacion of
Malitbog. Arleta asked her where Glenda Laplana was. She told Arleta that Glenda was
at Emerenciana's house. Arleta said Glenda went ahead of her as she (Glenda) felt
sleepy.
When she (Estela) went downstairs, she felt surprised to see Glenda crying and her
whole body wet. She had no more slippers. She asked her why she was crying. Glenda
answered she was raped by the laborer of Tiu Tiam Su. She further noticed that
Glenda's hair was sandy and she had bruises on her arms and feet. After questioning
Glenda, she told her parents-in-law and also her brother-in-law about the incident. And,
they called for a policeman.
Guerillito Lura, the Station Commander of the Malitbog Police, testified that in the
evening of May 21, 1987 the guard of the Police Station sent for him, informing him
there was a rape incident. He immediately went to the police station. He found many
people there. He asked the guard what transpired. The guard told him that Pat. Claro
Faelnar and Pfc. Macario Lagatierra were in pursuit of the perpetrator, a laborer of Tiu
Tiam Su.
He followed the policemen to Tiu Tiam Su's residence. When he arrived there he asked
Lando (a son of Tiu Tiam Su) where Pat. Faelnar and Pfc. Lagatierra were. He was told
that they were looking for Rey. The policemen were then in the bodega of Tiu Tiam Su
searching for Rey. They could not find Rey at that instant. Pat. Lagatierra followed Rey
as he evaded the police and managed to jump out of the bodega.
He summoned other policemen and some people around to help apprehend the culprit.
Among them were Fernando Aberasturi, his brother (Rico), and a younger brother,
Fernando apprehended Rey at the wharf about 50 meters away from the bodega of Tiu
Tiam Su. Rey was brought to him immediately.
When the victim (whom he had summoned) arrived, he asked her to pinpoint the person
who raped her. She immediately pointed to the accused, Rey Tongson, from among
some twenty persons present. The accused just bowed his head when the victim
 identified him. Before the victim (Glenda Laplana) arrived at his office, he asked the
accused if it was true that he raped her. He admitted without hesitation.
Dr. Leonardo S. Gimeno told the court he examined the victim, Glenda Laplana, at
about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of May 21, 1987. He issued a medico-legal certificate
containing his findings (Exh. A). He found all those multiple contusions and abrasions
indicated in Item No. 1 of Exh. "A". These injuries could have been caused by fistic
blows or by some pressure on the victim after she fell down.
With reference to Item No. 2, he told the victim to undress because he wanted to
examine her vagina. Upon taking off her panty, he saw blood on the front portion of her
panty. There was blood also on the vaginal orifice. The blood came from the first-degree
laceration. One cause of this laceration is the forced entry into the vagina of a man's
penis.
As he examined the victim further, he found traces of sand and grass in the vaginal
canal. The injuries sustained by the victim indicate signs of struggle by her during the
incident. His examination, however, proved negative for spermatozoas. (pp. 16-
18, Rollo.)
The records do not reveal when the victim filed a complaint, but the information based on the
complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 30, 1987.
After the trial, the lower court found Tongson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.1âwphi1 It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). Petitioner-
appellant was given credit for his preventive imprisonment.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred: (1) in giving much weight
and credit to the evidence of the prosecution without considering that of the defense, and (2) in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Contrary to appellant Tongson's claim that the offended party voluntarily submitted to his sexual
advances, the trial court found that the victim Laplana resisted vigorously so that he had to drag
her towards the seashore. She testified that she shouted for help many times but nobody was on
the road at the time, so no one came to help her. She described how she struggled against the
appellant, causing him to box her three (3) times in the abdomen, and her futile efforts to attract
the attention of the persons attending a public dance some 120 to 130 meters from the seashore
where she was sexually assaulted.
The alleged "public setting" of the rape is not an indication of consent. For, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, rape may be committed at a place where people congregate such as parks
(People vs. Vidal, 127 SCRA 171), by the roadside (People vs. Aragona, 138 SCRA 569), or on a
passageway at noontime (People vs. Lopez, 141 SCRA 385). In the case of People vs.
Barcelona, G.R. No. 82589, October 31, 1990, we took judicial notice of the fact that a man
overcome by perversity and beastly passion chooses neither time, place, occasion, nor victim.
That no spermatozoa was present in the specimen that was taken from the vagina of the victim
did not disprove the rape. Presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial since it is
penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation that constitutes rape (People vs. Paringit, G.R.
No. 83947, September 13, 1990; People vs. Barro, Jr., G.R. No. 86385, August 2, 1990).
Appellant's contention that he did not have sexual intercourse with the complainant but merely
inserted his light middle finger into her vagina was correctly found by the trial court to be
incredible:
The claim of the accused that he merely inserted his middle right finger into the victim's
vagina does not appear credible. He admitted though that he did it without her
permission. His demonstration of how it was done defies our imagination. Here is the
reactment (sic) of the fantastic scene;
Sitting side by side with her, he placed his right thigh over the victim's left thigh, holding
her right hand with his left, and at the same time inserting his middle right finger into her
vagina, while the victim was holding his right lap with her left hand. The situation
described by him appears awkward and improbable.
Moreover, it does not jibe with his pre-demonstration testimony that he was embracing
the victim with his left hand, face to face with her, when he inserted his right middle
finger into her vagina. Furthermore, by demonstrating that the victim held his right lap
with her left hand while he was inserting his finger, he wanted to imply that she
voluntarily consented to such insertion. And yet according to him, she got mad. Is this
not absurd? (p. 45, Rollo.)
That the complainant was raped was established by the medical findings, to wit: "blood in the
vaginal orifice, first degree laceration of one inch or more at 6:00 o'clock position of the vaginal
orifice" (p. 61, Rollo). Dr. Leonardo Gimeno, the physician who examined the victim after the
incident, declared that the injury to her vaginal orifice was "caused by the forced entry into the
vagina of a man's penis" (p. 62, Rollo). The doctor's other findings support complainant's
testimony that she was raped on the seashore. Sand and grass were found in her vagina. The
multiple abrasions and contusions on the victim's lips, right face, lower back including both
buttocks, left elbow, left thigh, both knees, legs and feet, are mute testimonies giving credence to
her claim that the appellant dragged her on the shore and forcibly had sexual intercourse with
her.
When a woman testifies that she was raped, she says all that is necessary to show its
commission, for no young and decent Filipino — in this case only thirteen (13) years old — would
publicly admit having been ravished unless it is the truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her
honor (People vs. Manago, G.R. No. 90669, November 21, 1990; People vs. Barcelona, G.R. No.
82589, October 31, 1990). The testimony of a rape victim is credible where no motive to testify
against the accused is shown except the desire to vindicate her honor (People vs. Lutanez, G.R.
No. 78854, December 21, 1990; People vs. Fabro, G.R. No. 79673, November 15, 1990).
In any case, whether or not carnal knowledge is voluntary and free is a question of credibility
(People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 72726, October 15, 1990). Since the witnesses to rape are often
only the victim and the offender, the trial judge's evaluation of the witnesses' credibility deserves
utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness, considering the trial judge's advantage of
observing the witnesses' demeanor in court (People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 90390, October 31,
1990. We find no reason to reverse the trial court's conviction of Tongson for rape.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1178 is
affirmed in all respects except the award of damages to the victim Glenda Laplana which is
increased from P30,000 to P40,000 in accordance with the latest policy of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82589 October 31, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GIDEON BARCELONA y DEQUITO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose P. Villanueva counsel de oficio for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 6026 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Gideon Barcelona y Dequito
was charged with the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1985 at Barangay IV, Poblacion,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and felonously have carnal knowlege, with one Sylina Rodriguez against her
wil and consent to her damage and predice. 1
When arraigned, the acused, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the commission of the
crime. 2 After trial, however, he was found guilty, as charged, and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to pay the offended party the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay the cost. 3
From this judgment, the accused appealed to this Court.
The incrimatory facts of the case, according to the People's counsel, are as follows:
Around 6:30 p.m. of November 7, 1985, Sylina Rodriguez, a sixteen-year old
high scholl student of the Roxas National Comprehensive High School in
Roxas, Palawan, was walking on her way home (July 2, 1986 tsn, p. 7.). Upon
reaching a point in the diversion road near the Medicare Hospital of the new
townsite, she looked back and say a male person jogging (Ibid., p.8). She
continued walking (Ibid.). The jogger overtook her and, upon doing so,
suddenly turned back and took hold of her hands and started pulling her
towards the bushes (Ibid.). She resisted and hit him with fist blows on his
chest (Ibid.). As he was pulling her, he threatened to kill her by making a
motion to pull something from his back (Ibid.. p. 9). He was finally able to pull
her to the bushes (Ibid.).
In the bushes, he forcibly undressed her, removing both her skirt and panty
(Ibid., p. 10). He also undressed and forced her to lay down on her back
(Ibid.). He then lay on top of her and began to kiss her cheeks and lips (Ibid.,
pp. 9-10). At this point, she was in tears (Ibid., p, 11). Then he inserted his
organ into her private part (Ibid., p. 1 0). She immediately felt a stab of pain
(Ibid., p. 11). When he was finished he allowed her to dress up but warned her
not to report the incident to the police authorities (Ibid, p. 12). The victim then
went home (Ibid., p. 13).
The following day, November 8, 1985, accompanied by her uncle and auntie,
she reported the matter to the police authorities (Ibid., p. 14). Thereafter, she
was brought to the Medicare Community Hospital where she was examined
(Ibid.).
Upon information from Hernando Cayaon that he saw accused-appellant,
Gideon Barcelona jogging near the diversion road in the late afternoon of
November 7, 1985, the police authorities invited the latter on November 9,
1985 for questioning (November 18, 1986, tsn, p. 3). Upon confrontation, the
victim positively Identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her
(July 2, 1986, tsn, p. 14). Thereafter, accused-appellant was placed under
arrest. 4
The accused Gideon Barcelona, however, denied that he committed the crime imputed to him
and interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court summarized the evidence for the defense as
follows:
The accused in his defense testified that he is presently 19 years old having
been born on November 7, 1968. He was employed since October 1985 in the
finishing outfit of Paning Paner and has their base at Cabugan Island, Roxas,
Palawan. Normally, they go to the Poblacion of Roxas every Saturday to haul
water and supplies. Sometime in the afternoon of November 9, 1985, he was
fetched by P/Sgt. Eriberto Castillo of Roxas Police Station and taken to the
Municipal Building. In the said place he saw Melchor Cayaon as well as his
brothers and sisters. He alleged since complainant saw him, she did not
positively Identified (sic) him but entertained doubts as the person who raped
her.
Supporting in part his testimony was the statement of Roger a detainee at the
municipal jail of Roxas, Palawan at the time who alleged that he saw suspect
Melchor Cayaon in the early morning of 8 November, 1985. He stated that at
about 8:00 A.M. of the same day when victim saw Melchor Cayaon, the former
identified the latter as the one who raped her. He further heard the
complainant describe that the person who raped her had curly hair. Suspect
Melchor Cayaon had curly hair while accused Gideon Barcelona had no curly
hair.
In addition to this, witness Jose Lagrada testified that he was the companion
of the accused at the fishing outfit of Paning Paner. In brief, said witness
testified that he knew accused Gideon Barcelona. Both of them were
employed in said fishing outfit about the latter part of October, 1985 and
 continued uninterruptedly until his arrest on November 9, 1985. He stated that
their schedule of fishing is from 7:00 o'clock a.m. up to 1:00 o'clock p.m. He
claimed that from the last week of October 1985 up to his arrest on November
9, 1985, accused Barcelona never went to the Poblacion of Roxas, Palawan
and continuously stayed at Cabugan Island. Despite prior knowledge that the
latter was arrested for rape, he never informed the Police Force of Roxas,
Palawan or any person for that matter about the stay of Barcelona in their
place of work nor did he visited (sic) accused in jail despite his close friendship
with him. (Test. of Jose Lagrada, tsn: pp. 1-11, December 12, 1986) 5
In this appeal, the accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred: (1) in giving weight to the
testimony of the complainant which is allegedly materially inconsistent, contradictory and
incredible; and (2) in convicting the accused-appellant when there is no evidence on record that
his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We find no merit in the appeal. There is no doubt that the complainant had been raped on 7
November 1985, in the manner testified to by her and affirmed by the trial court. When a woman
testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed, for no young and decent Filipino woman would publicly admit that she has been
criminally ravished unless that is the truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her honor. 6
Besides, complainant's testimony is confirmed by the surrounding physical facts. Medical
examination of her genitalia in the morning following the attack showed that (1) there was a slight
mucosal inflammation of the labia majora; (2) hymenal laceration at 2:00 o'clock, 5:00 o'clock,
and 9:00 o'clock; and (3) whitish mucosal vaginal discharge, scanty in amount noted. 7 Dr.
Feliciano Velasco, medical officer of the Roxas Palawan Medicare Community Hospital, who
examined the complainant, opined that this was the first time she had sexual intercourse because
the lacerations on the hymen were fresh. 8
Moreover, the outrage was immediately reported to the police authorities after its commission,
removing any doubt that the complainant may have concocted her charge against the appellant.
The appellant contends, however, that the crime of Rape was not committed because no force or
intimidation was employed, i.e., no external injuries or bruises or scratches were found on the
complainant's body, despite her testimony that she was dragged to the bushes, and that the
complainant did not offer tenacious and spirited resistance to the assault on her.
The absence of physical injuries on the complainant's body does not, of itself, negate the
complainant's testimony that she was raped; nor does it make the complainant a willing partner in
the sex act. The victim need not kick, bite, hit, slap or scratch with her fingernails the offender to
successfully claim that she had been raped. It is enough that coition was undertaken against her
will. It is sufficient that the carnal knowledge was done after the woman yielded because of an
authentic apprehension of a real fear of immediate death or great bodily harm. In this case, there
is evidence that the offended girl yielded to the carnal desires of the appellant for fear that he
might kill her since, according to complainant, the appellant had threatened her with death and
made menacing gestures as if to draw a weapon. It is this same fear that must have prevented
her from making an outcry or reporting the outrage to her uncle. 9
As the Court had said in a case, 10 "the force or violence required in rape cases is relative. When
applied it need not be too overpowering or irresistible. What is essential is that the force used is
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the offender had in mind, or to bring about the
desired result. In using force, it is not even necessary that the offender is armed with a weapon,
as the use of a weapon serves only to increase the penalty. Intimidation can be addressed to the
mind as well. In sum, the absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the
commission of the crime of rape.
As to the identity of the perpetrator of the dastardly act, the complainant declared, and the trial
court agreed with her, that the appellant committed the crime. The complainant positively
identified the accused as the person who raped her 11 and, as the trial court said, she had no
doubt nor second thought about her identification of the accused-appellant. Besides, it would
appear that the complainant had no ill motive to falsely against the appellant. In fact, the appellant
was a complete stranger to her and she did not know his name then; But, when they came face to
face, the second time, she readily pointed to the appellant as the person who ravished
her. 12 This court consistently held that the testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is
credible where she has no motive to testify falsely against the accused. 13
The appellant argues that the testimony of the complainant should not be given weight and
credence because it is allegedly inconsistent, contradictory and incredible in that: (1) on direct
examination, she declared that in trying to repel the advances of the appellant, she bit him on the
left forearm, whereas, on cross examination, she denied having stated that she bit the appellant;
(2) on direct examination, the complaint that she did not report the incident to her uncle because
she was afraid but, on cross examination, she stated that she reported the incident to her uncle
who, in turn, reported it to the police; and (3) on direct examination, the complainant testified that
the sexual act took about twenty (20) minutes and that she felt pain, but that she felt no
ejaculation, while on cross examination, she stated that there was ejaculation inside her vagina.
These alleged contradictory statements are not fatal as they refer to relatively minor details, and
they are to be expected from uncoached witnesses. They do not affect, nor can they prevail over
the positive identification of the appellant as the rapist. As repeatedly held by the Court, the
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses which refer to minor
details do not impair the probative value of their testimony. 14
The insinuation of the appellant that he could not have raped the complainant on 7 November
1985 because it was his birthday is, definitely, without basis for a man overcome by perversity
and beastly passion chooses neither time, place, occasion, nor victim.
There being no error committed in the judgment appealed from, the same should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.