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Article 40

Abunado vs. People

In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan to work there. She returned in 1992 but
Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceño was able to locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado
was already cohabiting with somebody else. Further, Arceño also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida
Biñas.

In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May 1995, Arceño filed a bigamy case against Abunado.
Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different courts.

In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted by the trial court for bigamy.

Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment case he filed against Arceño
was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should
have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.

HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated.

Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of
bigamy were present – the nullity of the prior marriage is immaterial.

Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at

Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984,
Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court.
Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
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marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in
information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue:

Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can

be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed
to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the
present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy

143 SCRA 449

FACTS:

• July 1978 – Respondent Karl Heinz and petitioner Lilia Wiegel got married

• Subsequently, Karl filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia

o Ground: Lilia’s previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion, celebrated on June 1972

• Lilia admitted the existence of the prior subsisting marriage but claimed that said marriage was null 

and void as she and Eduardo were forced to enter the said marital union

• During the pre-trial, the parties agreed upon the issue of whether or not Lilia’s first marriage was 

void or merely voidable, assuming that there was force exerted upon the Lilia and Eduardo 


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o In contesting the validity of the pre-trial order(casedidnotmentionthePTO),Liliaclaims,

among others that Eduardo was already married to someone else at the time of their marriage in 1972 and asked to be
given the opportunity to present evidence to such claims; RTC denied the request; hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether the presentation of evidence should be allowed to prove that Lilia’s marriage with Eduardo was vitiated by force.

RULING: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO: NO.

• There is no need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because assuming this to be so, said
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.

• Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she was still validly married to Eduardo,
her first husband; consequently, her marriage to Karl is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code)

• There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of Eduardo at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl; accordingly, the marriage of Lilia and Karl would be regarded VOID under the law. 


*Domingo v. CA

Facts:

Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of

nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at
Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage
with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for
bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner
of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.

Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity
is unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on
the ground of bigamy.

Ruling:

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the

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former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.
Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.

The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the
issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the
couple's properties.

Valdes v. RTC
260 SCRA 221
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby
declaring their marriage null and void. It

also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:

(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51
and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

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Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of

marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted
in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise
clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration
of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.

People v. Aragon
100 PHIL 1033

FACTS:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent
Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon
contracted another a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria Gorrea died, and seeing that the
coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however,
suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to
Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to Maglasang.

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The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing
of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial
declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not
renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one
and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant- appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Mercado v. Tan (Syllabus: Mercado)

337 SCRA 122

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado married a second time. He married a
certain Consuelo Tan.

In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.

In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code (psychological incapacity).

In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.

In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought the dismissal of the bigamy case
filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of,
hence, his “second” marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting and was
not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a
person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

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Republic v. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20

Presumptive Death

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed
that respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a in a bar in England. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique.

After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San
Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

His efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of
Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his
lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even
after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica’s disappearance to the Philippine
government authorities.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to
assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a “well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead,” 2 and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding
was a “cunning attempt” to circumvent the law on marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD: In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decidion declaring that Parker’a presumptive death is reversed,
both decisions were nullified and set aside with costs against the respondent.

BASIS:

Article 1 of the Family Code

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Note: While the Court understands the need of respondent’s young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements
of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death must be denied.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution

Article 149 of the Family Code

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.

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Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect.

Lukban v. Republic
G.R. No. L-8492, February 29, 1956

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of
since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that
husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have
her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. HELD:

The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.

Armas v. Calisterio
G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. He was survived by his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the
second husband of Marietta who was previously married to William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a
trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico got married without Marietta
securing a court declaration of

Bounds’ presumptive death.


Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that the
marriage between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly bigamous is by itself null and void. She prayed that her son be
appointed as administrator of the estate of the decedent and inheritance be adjudicated to her.

ISSUE:

WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death

RULING:

No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was solemnized in 1958 where the law in force at the time was the Civil
Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family Code limits its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code provides that
declaration of presumptive death is


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not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry, then
Marietta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right to claim a portion of Teodorico’s estate.

Anaya v. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

Facts: On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's
counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months
prior to the marriage, he had pre- marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to
recover moral damages.

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did
not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied
stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a
means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

Issue: Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of
marriage?

Held: No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a
woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered
into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

Buccat v. Buccat
72 PHIL 19
Facts:

• March 1938 – Godofredo and Luida meet

• 19 September 1938 – The two become engaged

• 26 November 1938 – The two get married, Catholic cathedral of Baguio City 

o Godofredo claims that he agreed to the marriage promise based on Luida’s assurance that she was a virgin

• 23 February 1939 – 89 days after marriage, Luida gives birth to a son


o Godofredo promptly left Luida and never returned to a married life with her

• 20 March 1939 – Godofredo initiated a case in Baguio CFI, praying that the marriage be annulled on grounds that there
had been fraud [that Luida had claimed that she was a virgin] 

o Although duly summoned by the trial court, Luida failed to appear; Godofredo was allowed to present his proof – but

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the court decided in favor of Luida anyway. 

Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts: 


• Art 45 [Family Code]

A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-
one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared
or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

• Art 46 [Family Code]

Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

NOTE: Obviously the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time, but in case it is asked how the case would turn out today,
these two provisions are to serve as the basis.

Issues:

1. Should the marriage between Godofredo and Luida be annulled on the ground that there had been fraud (concealment of
pregnancy) at the time of marriage?

Ruling:

Ratio Decidendi:

1. NO.

• Clear and authentic proof of fraud was not established.

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(1) Assertion of Godofredo that he had not even suspected Luida’s pregnancy, highly unlikely:

• Luida was in an advanced state of pregnancy at the time they were married (late into 2nd 

trimester/early into 3rd)

• Godofredo’s contention (not rare to find persons with developed abdomens) – foolish, 

especially considering that Godofredo was a first year law student

• “Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would need clear and
authentic proof. In this case no such proof exists.”

Aquino v. Delizo
109 PHIL 21

FACTS: A complaint was filed against the defendant for the alleged concealment from her husband, the plaintiff that she was
pregnant by another man at the date of their marriage on December 27, 1954. Four months after their marriage, the defendant
gave birth to a child sometime in April, 1955. The defendant answered that the child was conceived between her and the
plaintiff. The complaint filed was based on the ground of fraud for the annulment their marriage.

At the trial, only the marriage certificate of both parties was presented. Without the birth certificate of the child born after the
marriage, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff filed a “petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence” to
present the birth certificate but it was denied.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the claim of the plaintiff to not have
noticed the pregnancy when he married her was found to be unbelievable. The plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration
for a new trial. The court then denied the motion for it “does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes”. Thus a petition for certiorari to review was filed.

ISSUE: Whether the annulment of the marriage between parties can persist on the ground of fraud. HELD: Yes. Concealment of
pregnancy at the time of marriage constitutes fraud as ground for annulment. The evidences presented: Affidavit of Cesar Aquino
who admitted as the father of the defendant’s first born and the plaintiff ’s brother, Affidavit of the defendant who admitted the
concealment of her pregnancy from the plaintiff and the birth certificate of the child were found to be sufficient to constitute
fraud alleged by the plaintiff. A new trial was ordered, the decision was set aside and the case remanded to trial court for hearing
of evidence.

Menciano v. San Jose

89 PHIL 63
Facts:

Matilde Menciano, in her and her children,s behalf, filed a motion for declaration of

heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944
before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S.J.; that they lived together before the said marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on
March 9, 1940, the child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child; that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was
born on April 25, 1945 and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful
wedlock.

On the other hand, on an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo Pelaez (designated

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universal heir in the will of the deceased dated

December 19, 1940), denied the substantial allegations of Menciano,s motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged that the
deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943

which became worse a year later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation of the legal provisions
and requisites because of the latter,s age, sickness, and bombardment; that Menciano took advantage of the deceased,s condition,
forced the latter to marry her by means of deceit and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile and impotent.
Moreover, the defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of 286,000 in cash, for jewels and certain properties which, as
presumed, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.

Issue:

(1)Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?

(2)Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and
Matilde Menciano?

(3)Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties
aforementioned?

Decision:

(1)Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications for a marriage license, dated September 28, 1944, the
first one, signed by the deceased to marry Menciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate
for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil Registrar and the deceased and Menciano;
the marriage contract signed by the

deceased and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer, and the witnesses L. B. Castaños and
Samson Pañgan. The 4 documents are official and public; there validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and
convincing oral testimony. In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so as to declare the said
marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures of the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they
could not have been written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectually incapacitated, as the
defendants, witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the tests pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show the
capacity to contract marriage of the deceased. Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no reason why
is should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage, which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not
err in declaring valid the marriage of the deceased and Menciano.

(2)Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and Menciano. The requisite for potency being met, the necessary
conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased with Menciano in
lawful wedlock.

No. The court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be
legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his parents.

(3)No. After a careful and exhaustive review of evidence, the trial court correctly reached the conclusion that such allegation has
not been substantiated. The testimonies of mother and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money
are contradictory. Moreover, Clotilde Galarrita de Labitad,s testimony is unbelievable. With regard to the jewels, no satisfactory
evidence was presented to prove that Menciano misappropriated them.
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Jimenez v. Canizares
G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that Remedios is impotent because her
genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to
answer the complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert
to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard
solely on Joel’s complaint. The marriage was later annulled.



ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.



HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of Joel who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios
is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear
in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could
not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

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