PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES (Rule 110)

A. Institution of criminal actions

1. When offended party does not initiate
- Salazar v. People, 391 SCRA 162, September 10, 2002 (ALCANTARA)
2. Effect of prescription
a. Filing with the Office of Ombudsman
- Llenes v. Dicdican, 260 SCRA 207, July 31, 1992 (ALDANA)

FACTS:

On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then officer-in-charge

of the Physical Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of
Region VII in Cebu City of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (hereinafter
Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave oral defamation allegedly committed on
23 September 1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same
Regional Office.

In his resolution of 15 March 1994, Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of

the said office, recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the necessary information against the petitioner.
This resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas.

On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in Cebu City an information[4] for grave oral defamation against the
petitioner. This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7
thereof.

On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash[5] the information on the
ground that the "criminal action or liability" has been extinguished. She contended that
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of grave oral defamation
prescribes in months and that since the information was filed only on 28 March 1994, or
186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its alleged commission, the crime had then
already prescribed. In support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia[6] vs. Reyes,
Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the filing of
an information at the fiscal's office will not stop the running of the prescriptive period for
crimes.

In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court which provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases and which fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the complaint directly with the said court
or with the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. The
filing of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's (now
prosecutor's) office under said Section 1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of
R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

ISSUE: Whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a
government official for grave oral defamation interrupts the period of prescription of
such offense.

HELD:

Yes. Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of
the period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13
October 1993, or barely twenty days from the commission of the crime charged, the
filing then of the information on 28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month
prescriptive period.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the Government, the
investigation of such cases.

The Court ruled that the filing of the complaint by the private respondent with
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a
complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under said Section 1 pursuant to its
powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.

b. Offenses under the Summary Procedure

- Zaldiva v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 27, July 3, 1992 (ALMIRA)

Facts:
Petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a Mayor’s
permit which is in violation of Ordinance No. 02 series of 1982 of Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
on May, 30, 1990, while the information was filed with the MTC on October 2, 1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed because the information was filed beyond the two month statutory period
from the date of the alleged commission of the offense.
Issue:
Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground of prescription
Held:
Yes. The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced
from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter on July,
1990. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with
the Municipal Trial Court, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime
had already prescribed.
c. Where the court has no jurisdiction
- Arambulo v. Lacqui, 342 SCRA 740, October 12, 2000 (APARECIO)

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel against petitioners

before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that the latter
circulated a letter containing malicious imputations against them.

An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City. After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer
to Evidence. The Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order, ruled that it had no jurisdiction
over the case as the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded to the RTC for further
proceedings.

The case was forwarded to branch 215 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription
of the offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case, but stating that the offense had not
yet prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the Information for
Libel with the RTC.

The Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent court, petitioner filed a
Motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The motion was denied. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed Order dated
December 4, 1997.

Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, upheld the
contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and
consequently, dismissed the said petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or

grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in the instant case has not yet
prescribed.

Whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for
purposes of preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for
the crime.

HELD:
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek
grievance against respondent as they filed their complaint before the city prosecutor
forty-two days after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of the City
Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of
libel brought about by the passage of R.A. 7691which took effect on April 15,
1994. Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to
include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. However,
libel, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four
years is not covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial. The mistake of the Office of the City
Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the Metropolitan Trial Court in taking
cognizance of the case was thus understandable. The error was immediately rectified
by the said court upon realizing its mistake when it ruled it was the Regional Trial Court
which had the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake should not operate to
prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more importantly,
the right of the offended party to obtain grievance.
B. The complaint or information
1. Determination of who to charge
a. Discretion of the prosecutor
- Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773, February 20, 1996
(ARALAR)

Facts:

The OSP filed two (2) Informations with the respondent Court against petitioner.
The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for
violation of Section 3(e) of the same law. In the first, he was accused of intervening in
his official capacity as Provincial Governor in the contracts for the installation and
construction of waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and Resources
Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a member of the board of directors,
thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said transactions. In the second, he was
charged with the disbursement of public funds for the purchase of a motor launch
which was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of
Palawan because the same broke down only after its maiden voyage. Petitioner filed
before respondent court an amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) the Board
of Directors of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation; and (b) the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel in
question.

Issue: Whether or not the Informations are void in view of the non-inclusion of his co-
principal.

Ruling:

Negative. The rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as
reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all
criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name
of the People of the Philippines "against all persons who appear to be responsible for
the offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for an offense.
This does not mean, however, that they have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in
determining whether the evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person
has committed an offense. What the rule demands is that all persons who appear
responsible shall be charged in the information, which conversely implies that those
against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required to be included.

b. Court order to include other persons

- Alonzo v. Concepcion, 448 SCRA 329, January 27, 2005 (ASIS)

FACTS:

There was a shooting incident that caused the death of private plaintiff’s
nephew. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a
certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation was conducted. 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and
Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Atienza, the
prosecutor found no sufficient evidence to charge them. Thereafter, an information
was prepared. Bulacan RTC presiding Judge Concepcion issued an Order directing the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to amend the information so as to include all
aforementioned accused in this case, all as principals. Petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration and inhibition on the ground that the court had no authority to review
and reverse the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable
cause against respondent for the purpose of amending the information.
ISSUE:

Whether Judge Concepcion erred when he issue the Order.

RULING:

Yes. The rules on criminal procedure set the proper procedure for the
investigation of the complaints and designate the prosecutor to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The function of preliminary investigation is to determine
whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation that the prosecution
determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a
case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons. There is a remedy where a prosecutor err in not charging a person in an
Information, the recourse is to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, by ordering
prosecutor to include other persons in the Information.

C. Complaint defined
1. Complaint filed in court
- Ebarle v. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 808, December 29, 1987 (AUSTRIA)

Facts:

Ebarle was then the provincial governor of Zamboanga. Anti-graft League of the
Philippines filed a complaint against Ebarle for violations of the Anti-Graft Law and other
offenses under the Revised Penal Code. Ebarle’s defense among others that the Anti-
Graft League has no locus standi to commence the series of prosecutions.

Issue:

Whether or not the Anti-Graft League has standing to commence the series of
prosecutions.

Held:

Yes. The SC ruled that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by

the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the
offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be
filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The "complaint"
referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that
case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself.
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information,
both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended
party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed
with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

2. Value of allegation of complaint

- People v. Mendez, 334 SCRA 106, July 5, 2000 (BADANG)

Facts:

Rosendo Mendez was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Romblon, of
raping his 16-year-old stepdaughter, Virginita Mendez. The supreme penalty of death
was imposed upon him. That on or about of 11th day of December, 1996 at around
10pm in Bgy. Agbunda, Romblon, Rosendo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of his daughter, against her will in their house.
Rosendo denied the charge against him and countered that Virginita was not his true
daughter, and pointed out the information or complaint for rape should expressly
allege the commission of the rape in the manner prescribed in law.

Issue:
Whether the accused be convicted of rape “by means of force”, as stated in
the complaint, where the information charging him of the offense failed to alleged
such act?

Ruling:
As a general rule, no. However, in this case, the complaint filed by the victim (for
purposes of preliminary investigation) expressly alleged that the rape was committed
by “means of force”. In case of People vs Oso established the principle that in case of
variance between the complaints filed by the offended party and the information in
crimes against chastity, the complaint controls. The failure of the information to state
that Rosendo raped Virginita “through force or intimidation” is not a fatal omission in this
cases because the complaint alleged that the ultimate fact that Rosendo raped
Virginita by means of force. The victim is minor, when the offended parties are young
and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if
the matter about which they testified is not true.

D. Information defined
1. Information not under oath
- Estudillo v. Baluma, 426 SCRA 83 (CAABAY)

FACTS:
In a verified complaint, Jovelyn Estudillo assisted by her mother, Visitacion L.
Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance of the
Law.
 Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose from the dismissal
of a criminal case by respondent judge of the RTC of Bohol Branch 1 a family court.

The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, Judge Himalaloan found that there was sufficient
ground to hold the herein accused for trial for the offense. The record of the case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review by Third
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor he failed an Information.

Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order on the ground that the same is
not subscribed and sworn to by the prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is correct in dismissing the subject Information on the
ground that it was not under oath.

HELD:

No. Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing

charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the
court.

Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a complaint and
an information need to be under oath. But the oath is not required when it is a public
prosecutor who files the information because he does so under the oath he took when
he qualified for his position.

E. Who must prosecute criminal actions

1. Presence of public prosecutor
a. Reason for authority
- People v. CA, 301 SCRA 475, January 21, 1991 (DALONOS)

Facts:

Rosalinda Dy was allegedly shot and killed by Jonathan Cerbo in the office and
in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. A case was filed against Jonathan.

After preliminary investigation, MCTC found a well-founded belief that Jonathan

has committed the killing and forwarded the entire record of the case to the provincial
prosecutor. Allyn Dy, Rosalinda’s daughter, later executed an affidavit-complaint
charging Billy as a conspirator of the crime.

The provincial prosecutor, after investigating the case, recommended the filing
of an amended information including Billy Cerbo as one of the accused. A warrant for
Billy’s arrest was later issued.
 Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. The RTC judge issued an
order dismissing the case as against him. This order was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals saying that the judge did not commit an error because there was no sufficient
evidence for the charge. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Is the RTC judge correct in dismissing the information filed by the prosecutor?

Held:

No. The determination of the probable cause by the prosecutor for the filing of
an information is an executive function. The correctness of the exercise of such function
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass on.

Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed
against the accused is valid on its face, and no manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice can be imputed to the prosecutor.

b. Absence during arraignment

- Villanueva v. Almazan, 328 SCRA 230, March 6, 2000 (DELIN)

Facts:

The herein complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La
Union, presided by the herein respondent, two complaints for Grave Oral Defamation
against Teresita Nabayan. Respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investigation
after which he issued order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander. The
complainant presented a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, contending
that such action does not accord with the Rules of Court, however, it was denied. The
accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the absence of the public prosecutor, who
did not received any calendar of cases for that day. Because of what happened, the
complainant filed an administrative case against herein respondent for gross ignorance
of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct before the Office of the
Court Administrator.

Issue: Whether the Judge erred in proceeding with the arraignment without the
participation of the public prosecutor.

Held:

Yes, the Judge erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused without
the participation of public prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the
officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due
process requires that the public prosecutor must afford the opportunity to intervene in
all stages of the proceedings. It cannot be denied that the assigned public prosecutor
was not notified by the respondent judge of the scheduled trial of the said case.
Wherefore, Judge Benjamin Almazan is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.

c. Absence during trial

- Enriquez v. Vallarta, 378 SCRA 12, February 7, 2000 (DEL PUERTO)

Facts:
This is a complaint against Judge Placido B. Vallarta, for falsification of
certificates of service, gross ignorance of the law, and grave abuse of authority and
discretion, in connection with his handling of Criminal Case No. 215-98, entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Santos. The complainant, Atty. Enriquez, was counsel for the
accused in Criminal Case for malicious mischief, before the court of respondent judge.
The criminal case involved the alleged malicious cutting by the accused of the
branches of a tamarind tree worth P20,000.00. Complainant claims that respondent
judge allowed the prosecution of the case to be conducted by a private prosecutor
without the participation of a public prosecutor.
Respondent judge argues that the appearance and intervention of a private
prosecutor in the criminal case is authorized by Rule 110, 5 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure (now Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure), as held in People v. Beriales.
The OCA found that that the intervention of a private prosecutor was authorized
under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge can be faulted in allowing the intervention
of a private prosecutor without the participation of a public prosecutor?
Held:
The Supreme Court agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that
respondent judge cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private
prosecutor in the trial of Criminal Case.Rule 110, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (2000) provides:All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall
cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case
to the Regional Trial Court. . . .
Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that official duty was
regularly performed. This presumption is reinforced in this case by the fact that
complainant, as counsel for the accused, failed to object to the absence of the public
prosecutor, giving rise to the presumption that the intervention of a private prosecutor
was due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor. By failing to make a timely
objection, complainant must be deemed to have waived his objection to the
proceedings before respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Vallarta is found guilty of ignorance of the law and delay in
the disposition of cases and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with
admonition to be more conscientious and prompt in the performance of his duties and
with warning that repetition of similar infractions will be sanctioned more severely.
d. Rule on appeal
- Salazar v. Rmoaquin, 429 SCRA 4, May 21, 2004 (FELIZARTE)

Facts:

Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan filed an Information charging Salazar with murder.

Petitioner then filed in the RTC of Aklan an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
to Lift Warrant of Arrest issued against him, on the ground that he filed a petition for
review in the Office of the Secretary of Justice for the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor funding probable cause for murder against him. Presiding Judge Romaquin
issued an Order granting the motion to suspend proceedings, but denied the motion to
lift Warrant of Arrest. Petitioner forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but was
denied on the ground that the petitioner failed to serve a copy of his petition on the
Solicitor General, the counsel of the respondent People of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether the service of a copy of petition on the respondent People of the
Philippines may be effected through the Provincial Prosecutor who appeared as its
counsel in the trial court.

Held:

No. The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and respresent the
respondent People of the Philippines is confined only in proceedings before the RTC. In
appeals before the CA and SC either: (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c)
on automatic appeal; or (d) in special civil actions where the People of Philippines is a
party. The general rule is that the Office of the Solicitor General is the sole
representative of the People of the Philippines. This is provided for in Section 35 (1)
Chapter 12, Title 3 of Book 4 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Petitioner's failure to have
a copy of his petition served on the respondent, through the OSG, is a sufficient ground
for dismissal as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the ROC. Hence,
the petition is denied due course for lack of merit.

2. Where prosecutor finds no probable cause

- Sta. Rosa Mining v. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367, August 31, 1987
(GASTANES)

Facts:
 The Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron)
forming part of the installation on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte against private respondents with the Office of Provincial Fiscal.

The Case was assigned to the third assistant fiscal for preliminforary investigation
and issued a resolution recommending that an information attempted theft be filed
against private respondents which was approved by Provincial Fiscal Ilustre. He filed it
and charged the respondents with the crime of attempted theft.

The respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for review of the resolutions.
The letter was opposed by petitioners alleging that the information for attempted theft
had already been filed against private respondents for which reason the request for
review because it was moot and academic.

After the review of the Secretary of Justice, they directed the prosecuting office
to dimiss the criminal case. A motion to dismiss was filed but the court denied the
motion. Private Respondents sought for reconsideration but was denied by the court.
The Fiscal filled the second motion to dismiss but denied by trial court again.
Respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized
any private prosecutor.

Issue:

Whether or not the Fiscal has a right not to prosecute the case and dismiss it.

Held:

No. There is no question that the institution of criminal action is addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal, he has a discretion to file or not and when
he decidedes, he may not be compelled to change it.

Fiscal are not clothed with power, without the consent of court, to dismiss
criminal actions. The power to dismiss criminal action is vested solely in court.

Even if he is not convince that a prima facie evidence exist, he is obliged by law
to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot move the court because of
his opinion, he must continue for the presentation of evidence.

3. Private offenses
a. Filing by a retardate
- People v. de la Cruz, 384 SCRA 375,July 11, 2002 (HEMOR)

FACTS:

Defendant dela Cruz was accused of raping Jonalyn Yumang on 3 and 4 July
1996. The victim was 20-year old then and a mentally deficient female person with
mental age of an 8 ½ - year old as determined during her psychiatric examination.
Upon a complaint dated 5 July 1996 signed by Jonalyn with the assistance of her aunt
Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The prosecution presented Jonalyn
as their witness. The RTC convicted dela Cruz of crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
1275-M-96 (July 3 rape), but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 (July 4 rape)
for insufficiency of evidence.

The defense argued that Jonalyn had no capacity to sign the same considering
her mental deficiency or abnormality. The assistance extended to Jonalyn by her aunt
Carmelita Borja did not cure the defect. The defense also insisted on assailing the
competency of Jonalyn as a witness. It claimed that Jonalyn's testimony, considering
her mental state, was coached and rehearsed. Worse, she was not only asked leading
questions but was fed legal and factual conclusions which she was made to admit as
her own when they were in fact those of the prosecution. In the Appellee's Brief, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters Jonalyn's mental retardation does not
render her incompetent for initiating the prosecution of the crime committed against
her and for testifying in court. Moreover, the OSG asseverates that Jonalyn's testimony
on the fact of rape is corroborated by medical and physical evidence.

ISSUE:

WON Jonalyn can sign the compliant even if she is mentally deficient and of
mental age of an 8 ½ - year old.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court agrees with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of
Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, Jonalyn, then 20
years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise
file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully
considered filed by a minor. A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is
required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and
her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with
the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved
woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated
controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family.

The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that
Jonalyn had the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her
competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an
8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a
witness. Jonalyn, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to
make her perceptions.

The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed were Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353 otherwise known as
"The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5 of
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Prosecution of the crimes of
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. --The
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
 Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states: The offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended party dies or
becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known
parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her
behalf. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the
prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other
than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the
complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. The right to file
the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of
all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided,
except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount of P50,000 and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.

b. Filing by a daughter
- People v. Nicolas, 387 SCRA 638, August 22, 2002 (JARDINICO)

Facts:

The daughter of the victim testified that her mother was physically paralyzes and
has a very week state of mind when her uncle raped her mother. She confessed that
she saw ter uncle at the top of her mother and saw that her shorts were pulled down. It
was also testified by some of their relatives. Hence, they reported it to the Brgy. Office
and filed a case of rape against her uncle. However, her uncle filed to dismiss the case
since the complainant, was absent during the prosecution.

Issue:

Whether the daughter can file a case in behalf of her mother?

Held:

Yes, there is nothing in the rule that requires the complaint to still be identified
during trial. Rape has been reclassified form RA 8553 being a private crime into a crime
against person, rape may now be prosecuted de officio. The two- fold purpose is to (1)
Afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross
examination (2) Allow the judge to observe the deportment of witness. Knowledge of
the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the tume of commission of the
crime rape makes it punishable by death.

c. Filing by father
- People v. Tamayo, 226 SCRA 527, September 17, 1993 (LADAG)
d. Signing of information
- People v. Goles, 192 SCRA 663, December 21, 1990 (
4. Defamation imputing a private offense
- Gonzales v. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 629, November 18, 1991 (LUCENA)
5. Other offenses
- Agujetas v. CA, 261 SCRA 17, August 23, 1996 (MANA-AY)
F. Sufficiency of complaint or information
1. When element may be inferred
a. Intent to gain
- Avecilla v. People, 209 SCRA 466, June 2, 1992 (MENDOZA)

FACTS:
This case involves a crime of theft allegedly committed by Antonio Avecilla and
an unidentified woman alias Juana Doe. There was a registered lettercontaining a
check worth $400 which was sent by Maria Paz to her sister Lourdes from USA.Lourdes
was working at that time at Litton Mills, and the letter was addressed a t Litton Mills.
When the letter arrived here in Mandaluyong, Philippines. Maria Paz sent another letter
to her another sister Carmencita to verify if Lourdes had already received the registered
letter but when Carmencita asked Lourdes about the letter, she said that she haven’t
received any, so Lourdes went to Mandaluyong Post Office to ask about the letter.
The clerk there said that the registered letter was already claimed by the
messenger of Litton Mills based on the registry and there was a woman who was
introduced by Antonio Avecilla to her as the one Lourdes and that woman also signed
the control book in her presence but the true Ms. Lourdes now repudiated that. Lourdes
complained the incident to the management of Litton Mills to investigate. Avecilla was
working there as their messenger for about 2 years already. That’s why Avecilla was
charged of the crime of simple theft.

ISSUE:
Whether Avecilla may be convicted of the crime qualified theft even if the
offense designated in the information was simple theft only because what was taken
was a mail matter, and even if the information did not alleged intent to gain, as one of
the elements of the crime of theft.

HELD:
Both yes. The averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime
to be prosecuted and determine the court before which the case must be tried. What
controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in
the information. The SC also said that the allegation that the subject of the taking is a
registered letter categorizes the theft as a qualified rather than a simple one. Under
Administrative Code of the Phil., mail matter includes letters.
All the essential elements of the crime of theft are present, to wit: (1) that there
be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. Although intent to gain is not explicitly
alleged in the information, it may be presumed from the allegation that the said mail
matter was unlawfully taken.
Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the
theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be
presumed from all stealthy taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless
special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As earlier
noted, the intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.
b. Conspiracy
- People v. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360, July 10, 1998 (MOLLENO)
2. Statement of details of the crime
- People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24, August 5, 1985 (PAGADUAN)

FACTS:
Arsenio Arbois and co-accused were charged, and subsequently found guilty of
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (qualified by treachery and attended
by the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling and band) of Castor Borden,
who was attacked, assaulted, stabbed and hacked to death by Arbois and co-
accused.
Counsel for the accused questions the sufficiency of the information as the court
allowed the introduction of evidence detailing the gory details of the killing. Counsel
contends that these details should have been alleged in the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the details of the crime, as to matters of evidence, need to be
averred in the information

HELD:
NO. The rules is that matters of evidence need not be averred in the information.
What needs to be averred, are the facts essential to the description of the offense
(material facts establish the essential elements of the offense charged).
- People v. Perez 417 SCRA 499, December 10, 2003 (PAREDES)
FACTS:
Isidro, who was then coming home from work, was invited by Joel Perez
and Agapito Saballero to have a drink. After 2 ½ bottles of gin, Joel started
singing which irritated Agapito, so the latter told Joel to lower the volume of his
voice because they might disturb the neighborhood. This resulted to a heated
quarrel between the two and then later at night, Joel stabbed Agapito in the
chest. Upon hearing Agapito’s cry for help, Isidro and his wife peeped out of the
window, only seeing Joel pull out the knife from the chest of Agapito. Later on
Agapito died. Isidro provided a sworn statement and stood witness in the trial,
however, his statements in the court appeared to be inconsistent with what he
provided in his sworn statement (with regard to the weapon used and if he truly
saw the entirety of the incident). Nevertheless, the trial court convicted Perez of
being guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder. Perez alleged
that the court erred in ruling such taking into account the inconsistencies of
Isidro’s testimony.

ISSUE:
Whether the inconsistencies in the statement of Isidro fatal to the prosecution of
the case

HELD:
No. The inconsistencies in the testimony of Isidro refer only to minor details
and does not affect or weaken the credence of the prosecution. The
inconsistencies herein referred need not be alleged in the complaint or
information. What must be alleged in the information or complaint are those
enumerated in Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
viz.: “A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.”
3. Sufficiency of allegation in libel
- Vasquez v. CA, 314 SCRA 460, September 15, 1999 (PLAGATA)
 G. Name of the accused
1. Erroneous designation of name
- People v. Cagadas, 193 SCRA 216, January 23, 1991 (RELOVA)

Facts:
Roberto Cultura was one of the members of the Integrated Civil Home Defense
Force (ICHDF) who were charged and eventually convicted of murder beyond
reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum, Davao. However, in an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendant-appellants argued that the lower court
erred in convicting Roberto Cultura because he was not the one charged in the
information but a certain “ Jose” Cultura, actually his father's name.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting Roberto Cultura despite the
erroneous designation of his name in the information
Held:
No, the appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in convicting Roberto
Cultura for he was not one of those indicted in the information has no merit. The
erroneous designation of his name in the information will not vitiate it, as it was clearly
proven that the accused was part of the group that arrested, hogtied and killed the
victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise the question of his identity during the arraignment,
wherein precisely he was informed of the nature of the crime against him and he was
identified as one of the accused. His acquiescence to be tried under the name “Jose”,
at that stage of the case, is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise the question of
his identity as one of the accused for the first time on appeal.
H. Designation of the offense
1. Designation not controlling
- Avecilla v. People, Ibid. (MENDOZA)
2. When section needs to be specified
- People v. Guitierrez, 403 SCRA 123. May 9, 2003 (REYNOSO)

Facts:
Appealant Bernabe Gutierrez appeals the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
rape committed against complainant Gina Alcantara y Velasquez, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appealant contends that the Informations
were all invalid for not substantially conforming to the prescribed form, particularly as to
the designation of the offense by the Statute. He argues that the three Informations
cited in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which, however, had already been
repealed at the time of filing of the Informations by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997. Furthermore, he asserts that the decision failed to comply with the
constitutional mandate that a judgment of conviction must state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.

Issue: Whether the contention of appealant is meritorious?

Held:
No. A complain or information is sufficient if it states
a. The name of the accused;
b. The designation of the offense given by the statute;
c. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
d. The place where the offense was committed;
e. The approximate date of the commission of the offense;
f. The place where the offense was committed.
Only the designation of the offense given by the statute is necessary--- it is only
when there is no specific name given to the offense that reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it may be made, and this usually applies to offenses
under special laws. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information.
I. Cause of accusation
1. Retroactivity of the rule
- People v. Sayaboc, 419 SCRA 659, January 15, 2004 (SISON)

Facts:

This is the case where the RTC of Boyombong, Nueva Vizcaya found appellant
Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder upon the
person of Joseph Galam and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The
information that was filed contained, among others, that on or about December 2,
1994, the accused employed the qualifying circumstance, that is, treachery in
murdering J. Galam. The information did not alleged craft and price or reward as
aggravating circumstances. Then B. Sayaboc made a confession that he killed J.
Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000.00. The RTC rendered
a decision finding B. Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder with treachery as qualifying
circumstance, and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances.

Issue: Whether Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which requires the allegation of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the
information to be considered in the case, can be applied retroactively.
Held:

Yes. The Court states that the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or
reward, even if proved, can neither be considered because they were not specifically
alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition of
penalty. This requirement is beneficial to the accused and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect even if the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was in effect at the time
of institution of action.

2. Allegation of recidivism
- People v. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528, April 14, 2004 (VILLARUZ)
3. Allegation in preamble
- People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 540, September 15, 2000
(ALCANTARA)
- People v. Mendoza, 407 SCRA 563, July 31, 2003 (ALDANA)

FACTS:

On April 9 1996, private complainant filed two complaints for rape as follows:

“The undersigned private complainant, MONALIZA MENDOZA, Filipino, thirteen

(13) years old, single and a resident of Barangay Olympia, Bais City, Philippines, hereby
accuses ROLANDO MENDOZA Y DELA CRUZ of the crime of rape, committed as follows:

That on or about April 2, 1996 at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the undersigned,
by means of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will.”

The second complaint was likewise worded but the date is May 16, 1996.

The trial court imposed the punishment of rape to the accused. However, the
accused argued that at all events, assuming arguendo that he is guilty, the trial court
erred in imposing death on him since the prosecution failed to allege the minority of
Monaliza in the accusatory portion of each of the complaints.

ISSUE: Will the error of not including the minority of the victim in the accusatory portion
of the complaints reduce criminal charge from qualified rape to simple rape?

HELD:

The gravamen of the offense of rape as defined under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will or without her consent. Thus, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) such act was accomplished
through the use of force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is twelve (12) years of age, or is demented.

Monalizas age at the time of the filing of the complaints appears in the caption
or preamble thereof as a description of her as the private complainant. Her age at the
time the incidents occurred was, however, not specified in the accusatory portion of
each of the complaints. Such omission is prejudicial to the right of appellant to be
informed of the nature of the accusations against him. Thus, in several cases, this Court
held that it is not sufficient to simply allege the qualifying circumstances in the caption
or the preamble but, more importantly, these must be alleged in the body or the
accusatory portion of the information.

It has been held that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or the preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated . . . but from the actual recital of the
facts as alleged in the body of the information.

This insufficiency prevents a judgment of conviction for qualified rape and thus,
the death penalty cannot be imposed.

- People v. Villanueva, 413 SCRA 431, October 15, 2003 (ALMIRA)

4. Failure to specify nature of circumstance
- People v. Tigle, 420 SCRA 424, January 21, 2004 (APARECIO)

Facts:
The trial court found appellant Resty Tigle guilty of murder qualified by treachery
and attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking
advantage of superior strength, and disregard of the age and sex of the
victim. Appellant pleaded not guilty on his arraignment. However, during the pre-trial,
appellant manifested that he would like to withdraw his plea of not guilty and replace it
with a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The prosecution rejected this
manifestation. Appellant admitted that he killed the victim Luisa Lapera but invoked the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of murder
despite the fact that no qualifying and aggravating circumstances had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
We cannot appreciate treachery against appellant. There is no treachery where
the sudden attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim. There was no sufficient evidence that appellant
deliberately adopted the means of execution employed by him. What is apparent is
that appellant perpetrated the killing impulsively. For treachery to be appreciated, it
must exist at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack continues, even
if present at the subsequent stage, treachery is not a qualifying or generic aggravating
circumstance. The prosecution must adduce conclusive proof as to the manner in
which the altercation started and resulted in the death of the victim. If the prosecution
fails to discharge its burden, the crime committed is homicide and not murder.

Evident premeditation

Saturninos testimony establishes something that is merely speculative. To be

considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
premeditation but must be evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Threats to kill do not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing

that appellant performed acts indicating that he clung to his determination. Apart from
Saturninos testimony, the records of the case do not show any evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation as alleged in the Information.
There is no showing when and how appellant planned and prepared to kill Luisa.
Appellants threats, unsupported by evidence disclosing a criminal state of mind, are
merely casual remarks naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not proof of
evident premeditation.[30]

Abuse of Superior Strength and Disregard of Age and Sex

The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and disregard of age and sex attended the commission of the crime and
sentenced appellant accordingly. In its zeal to convict appellant of the crime of
murder, the trial court overlooked that the Information does not allege these
circumstances. Aggravating circumstances, even if proven during trial, cannot affect
appellants liability when the Information fails to allege such circumstances. This is
pursuant not only to Section 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
but also more importantly to an accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

5. Effect on civil liability of failure to allege

- People v. Agudez, 428 SCRA 692, May 20, 2004 (ARALAR)

Facts:
 The RTC convicted Agudez and his sons of two counts of murder, and sentenced
them to die. The two Informations against them alleged the attendant circumstances of
evident premeditation, treachery and superior strength. The circumstances of band
and uninhabited place were not alleged but were proven in trial. The court
appreciated the said circumstances to the prejudice of the appellant.

Issue: Whether or not circumstances not specifically alleged in the information can
aggravate a crime

Ruling:

No. We agree with appellants that the aggravating circumstances of band and
uninhabited place although established by the prosecution evidence should not have
been appreciated by the trial court because they were not alleged in the two
Informations as required by the Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that the crime was committed in 1998, before the
effectivity of the said Revised Rules on December 1, 2000. However, the Rules may be
applied retroactively because they are more favorable to the appellants.

While these circumstances could not aggravate the crime because they were not
specifically alleged in the Informations in violation of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
presence of these aggravating circumstances entitles the heirs of Dominador and
Mamerto to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with
Article 2230 of the Civil Code and with prevailing jurisprudence.

J. Place of commission of the offense

1. Erroneous designation of place
- People v. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537, May 25, 1994 (ASIS)

FACTS:

In a sworn statement taken on February 16, 1991, Chandra Lucas y Austria, then
17 years old, charged her natural father, accused Jose Lucas, of attempted rape
committed against her on February 12, 1991. She revealed therein that she was first
raped by him when she was only 9 years old or as disclosed by her, it happened in
November 6, 1982 and from there the act was repeated severally. Private plaintiff filed
two separate sworn criminal complaints for rape and for attempted rape. Trial Court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape and
sentenced him of reclusion perpetua plus all the accessory penalties and damages. As
to the first charged, there was a variance between the evidence presented and the
allegations of the complaint. The complaint charges the accused with the crime of
rape committed on November 26, 1982. However, the plaintiff and her witness testified
that the incident took place November 26, 1983.
ISSUE:

Whether the variance is fatal to the prosecution.

RULING:

No. Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of
the crime charged , conviction may be held on proof of the commission of the crime,
even it appear that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged,
or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial facts set out in the
complaint, providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the
statute of limitations, and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.

K. Date of the commission of the offense

1. Indefinite date of commission
a. Scope of “on or about”
- People v. Lizada, 396 SCRA 657, January 24, 2003 (AUSTRIA)

Facts:

Lizada was charged with 4 counts of raping his stepdaughter. In the complaint,
the first rape occurred when Analia was about 11 years old. The RTC found Lizada guilty
and sentenced him reclusion perpetua. Upon automatic review of the SC, Lizada assails
the information against him for violating rule 110, Sec. 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure because the phrase “on or about August 1998” stated in the information is
too indefinite.

Issue:

Whether or not the information was defective.

Held:

No. The precise date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of
the crime. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape
based on an information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rape
from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, a time difference of almost four years which is
longer than that involved in the case at bar. In any case, as earlier stated, accused-
appellants failure to raise a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver
of his right to object. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed
does not make the information defective.

b. “On or about August 1996”

- People v. Espinosa, 432 SCRA 86, June 14, 2004 (BADANG)
Facts:

That on or about the month of august 1996, in Baliwag, Bulacan, accused

Charlie Espinosa, armed with fan knife and with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of Marilou Arcangel, 14 years old, against her will. The RTC of Bulacan,
convicted Espinosa of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.

Issue:
Whether the complaint not stating the particularity the date of offense
committed is defective and in violation of Section 11 of Rule 110 of the revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure?

Ruling:
The court does not agree. In People vs Lizada, that the precise date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the
exact date when the rape was committed does not render the information defective.
The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the
accused. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time s near to
the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient and
compliance with Rule 1100. If the appellant was of the belief that the criminal was
defective he should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court before
his arraignment.
Section 11, rule 110 states that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense as committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense.
2. Remedy where date is not specific
- People v. Desuyo, 381 SCRA 235, April 17, 2002 (CAABAY)

FACTS:
Maricel Peru Desuyo instituted a complaint against her father, accused Antonio
Desuyo, for having repeatedly raped her.
In the course of the preliminary examination conducted by the municipal trial
court judge, accused Antonio Desuyo asked forgiveness from his daughter and
promised to leave her alone should she withdraw the charge she filed against
him. Maricel vehemently refused as her father grovelled for forgiveness. As a
consequence, an Information was filed against the accused Antonio
Desuyo alias "Tony" for raping his fifteen (15)-year old daughter Maricel.
The accused denied having raped Maricel. The trial court did not give credence
to the bare denials of the accused. Solely on account of Maricel's testimony, the
court a quo found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
"multiple incestuous rape" and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
Accused avers that the Information for "multiple rape" filed against him is
deficient since by merely stating that the sexual assaults were repeated it failed to state
the exact dates when the alleged rapes were committed.
ISSUE: Whether the Information is defective for failing to allege the time of the
commission of the offense
HELD:
It is indeed too late in the day for the accused to raise this issue because objections
to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. At any rate, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of rape is not an
essential element thereof and need not be stated in the information.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the remedy against an indictment that
fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a
motion for bill of particulars. The records show that the accused never asked for a bill of
particulars in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
L. Name of the offended party
1. Offended part in theft
- People v. CFI, 209 SCRA 704, June 10, 1992 (DALONOS)

Facts:

Private respondents were charged for qualified theft before the CFI Quezon.
They allegedly entered a public forest zone under a lease to Aluk Logging Corporation
and then cut and took away two Lauan trees.

It was later found out that Aluk was not a registered partnership or corporation.
Thus, it does not have a capacity to be a lessee or a licensee. It was the basis for the
accused’s contention for the motion to quash the information. They said that the
information failed to include the name of the offended party.

The respondent court quashed the information for such ground. The judge
reasoned that the fiscal’s categorical admission that the state was the offended party,
and not Aluk Logging Corporatio, was a fatal information and should have been
included in the information.

Issue:

Does an information for qualified theft properly charges even if it fails to allege
the offended party therein?

Held:

Yes, it does. All criminal actions must be commenced either by an information or

a complaint in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved. Thus, while the private offended
party may initiate proceedings, the prosecution is required to be in the name of the
People of the Philippines whose peace, in legal theory, has been breached. Also, the
rules does not particularly state that the People of the Philippines shall be named in the
body of the information.

More particularly, in the case of Sayson v. People, in construing Sec 11 of Rule

110 (now Sec 12), it was clearly held that in offenses against property, the designation
of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensible as long as the criminal
act in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

2. Offended party in bigamy

- Garcia v. CA, 266 SCRA 678, January 27, 1997 (GARCIA)

Facts:

The herein petitioner filed an affidavit of complaint charging his wife with bigamy
on the ground that she was previously married to Reynaldo Quiroca without the said
marriage having been dissolved before she contracted her second marriage with the
herein petitioner. The petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as
1974 but the complaint was only filed in 1991. The private respondent filed a motion to
quash on the ground of prescription, according to her, pursuant to Article 91 of the
RPC, the period of prescription of the offense started to run upon the discovery of the
petitioner and since bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, it shall prescribed in 15 years
pursuant to Article 92 of RPC. The RTC dismissed the case and the petitioner went to CA
and stated that, bigamy is a public crime; hence, the offended party is not the first or
the second innocent spouse but the State whose law was transgressed. But the CA
affirms the decision of the RTC, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the State is the offended party in the crime of Bigamy.

Held:

It is true that bigamy is a public offense, however, it is entirely incorrect to state that
the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public offense, and,
therefore, only the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively commence the
running of the period of prescription. Article 91 of the RPC does not defined the term
“offended party”, it is the stated in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Criminal Procedure as
“the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed.” It is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or
private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable. Therefore, the offended party
in this case is the petitioner and the period of prescription starts to run upon his
discovery of the commission of the offense.

M. Duplicity of the offense

1. Special complex crime
- People v. Sanchez, 227 SCRA 627, November 8, 1993 (DEL PUERTO)
 2. Conviction of component crimes
- People v. Nardo, 270 SCRA 672, April 4, 1997 (FELIZARTE)

Facts:

Both the accused went to the eatery of spouses Suitos one morning offering to
sell marijuana leaves. Spouses told them that it is prohited so they left. In the evening of
the same day, they went back to the eatery and then and there fired indiscriminately
at the place. An information was filed charging both the accused of the crime of
Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder. RTC found both accused to have
conspired in the commission of the crime charged. CA affirmed RTC's ruling but
modified the crime as four (4) separate crimes of murder and two (2) separate crimes
of attempted murder.

Issue: Whether the accused may be convicted of a crime not charged in the
information.

Held:

No. As a rule, an accused, as established by evidence, may be convicted only of

the crime charged in the information, or an offense which necessarily includes in that
which was charged or included therein. However, the wording of the information
charging the appellants imputed to the accused the commission of the several
felonies. Appellants also did not move to quash the information on the ground of
multiplicity of charge, such defect is deemed waived. Article 48 of the RPC defines
complex crime as that which exists when a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary means for committing the other. It was
held that where the killing was not shown to have been committed by a single
discharge of firearms, the crime cannot be complex. The conclusion from the evidence
presented in this case is that the killing of 4 victims and wounding of 2 others resulted
from separate discharge of firearm. When various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitutes separate and distinct crimes. Thus, appellants should be liable for
separate crimes of 4 murders and 2 attempted murders.

N. Amendment or substitution
1. Amendment and substitution distinguished
- Galvez v. CA, 237 SCRA 346, October 24, 1994 (GASTANES)

Facts:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of

San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly
shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma
Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent

prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original
informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993
and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same
day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
for illegal possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying
the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original
informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994.
On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent
Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier
stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February
18, 1994, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void
on the ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court
petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw
was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative
need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused
is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new
informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional
offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been
no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed
procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the
consequent filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained
and tenuous an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original
informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still
stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence
of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than
with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital
offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of
discretion under either an amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not
divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held
that—“The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a
notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The
court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the
aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the
dismissal and not certiorari.”

2. Amendment inform or substance

- Poblete v. Sandoval, 426 SCRA 346, March 25, 2004 (HEMOR)

FACTS:

The officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng Pulborista, Inc., a non-stock,

non-profit, non-government organization, filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against municipal officials of Kawit (herein petitioners) for causing the
registration of foreshore land located in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the
Municipality of Kawit and subsequently sold the same to a corporation, FJI Property
Developers, Inc., notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the land is
inalienable and cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease.
Ombudsman directed the filing of an information against the mayor and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Kawit for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act).

Subsequently, an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed in

which the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the information by inserting the
number of the lot under controversy, Lot 4431, and the amount of P123,123,123.00
representing the price paid by FJI Property Developers Inc. for it. This was admitted by
Sandiganbayan since it was presented before arraignment. In the meantime or on July
12, 2001, the accused-herein petitioner Bienvenido C. Pobre was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.

Thereafter, the prosecution filed on September 14, 2001 a Motion to Admit

Amended Information (second Amended Information). The Sandiganbayan granted
the Motion to Admit the second Amended Information. The accused argued that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, and the information contained averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.

ISSUE: WON the rights of the accused Pobre, et. al. have been prejudiced, thus should
be re-arraigned based on the Second Amended Information.

HELD:

NO. An objective appraisal of the second Amended Information shows that the
amendments are merely formal for they do not touch upon the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged nor on the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. Instead, the amendments merely involve deletions, transpositions and re-
phrasings, thereby raising the same issue and the same operative facts already found in
the first Amended Information.

Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of Rules of Court states that: Amendment or substitution. A

complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused

The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a compliant or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information,
as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information. The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second
Amended Information which are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not
change the basic theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material change or
modification in the defenses of the accused.

Contrary to petitioners position, it having been established that the questioned

amendments are merely formal, there is no longer any need for accused Bienvenido
Pobre to be re-arraigned on the second Amended Information. The second Amended
Information, while adding the word public officers, does not introduce a new and
material fact as the accused in the first Amended Information were referred to as either
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor or Members of the Sangguniang Bayan. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

(Just for your notes)

The second Amended Information is hereinbelow quoted verbatim:

That on or about 28 January 1995 to 28 November 1997 or sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused public
officials, Federico Poblete, then Municipal Mayor, Rodrigo Caimol, then Vice Mayor
and Bienvenido Pobre, Juanito Galang, Ricardo Flores, Pedro Paterno, Salvador Olaes,
Rosario Cherry Nolasco, Leo Padilla and Hernan Jamir, then Sangguniang Bayan
Members, all of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, while in the performance of their
official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and
confederating with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, cause undue injury to the
Government and local fishermen of the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite in the following
manner: the said accused public officials maliciously sold a foreshore land described as
Lot 4431 through the passage of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 3-97, Series of 1997
authorizing the sale said land situated in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite in favor of FJI
Property Developers, Inc. in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS
(P123,123,123.00) Philippine Currency, despite their full knowledge, and in complete
disregard, of the legal prohibition under Sections 159 in relation to Section 61,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, prohibiting the disposition through sale of foreshore land
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to FJI Property Developers, Inc. to the
damage and injury to the Government in the aforementioned amount. (Underscoring
in the original)

3. Example of formal amendments

a. Allegation of insanity of victim
- People v. Degamo, 402 SCRA 133, April 30, 2003 (JARDINICO)
b. Change in description of injury
- People v. Jaralba, 226 SCRA 602, September 20, 1993 (LADAG)
c. Change of date of commission
- Pangilinan v. CA, 375 SCRA 69, January 30, 2002 (LUCENA)
d. Insertion of the word “printed”
- Banal v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, November 15, 2005 (MANA-
AY)
e. Allegation of conspiracy
- Buhat v. CA, 265 SCRA 701, December 17, 1996 (MENDOZA)

FACTS:
This case involves the crime of Homicide as contained in the information filed by
the City Prosecutor but later on was tried by the prosecution to amend the information
from Homicide to Murder. On the information, it was stated there that: Danilo Buhat,
together with two unidentified persons John Doe and Richard Do, armed with knife,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with abuse of superior strength
and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attacked,
stabbed and injure one Ramon George Yu, while the two other accused held the arms
of the latter, thus using superior strength, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
After the arraignment, the prosecution has already presented 2 witnesses when
the Secretary of Justice then Secretary Franklin Drilon ordered the City Prosecutor to
amend the information by upgrading the offense from Homicide to Murder and include
the identification of the other two accused upon the pending MR of the heirs of the
Victim with the Secretary. Thus, the City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend
the information. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that he has discretion
to do that and since the accused was already arraigned and the amendment was a
substantial amendment, not just formal, thus proscribed by the rules of court.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals and the CA ordered the
trial court to accept the amendment. The SG and accused however appealed to the
SC since there was an error on the part of the CA in the identification of the other
accused as posited by SG. On the other hand, the accused said that the amendment
was substantial which is proscribed by the rules, else he will be prejudiced.

ISSUE:
Whether the amendment is substantial or formal, and may be allowed or not.

HELD:
The amendment was only formal and not substantial. The amendment may be
allowed. In this case, such amendment to insert in the information real names of the
accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the
accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the offense
charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not
change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.
In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way
affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as
alleged in the body of the information.
The information specifically alleges that the said accused conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attacked the victim. Since the killing is characterized as having been committed by
taking advantage of superior strength, a circumstance which qualifies a killing to
murder, the information sufficiently charged the commission of murder.

f. Other formal amendments

- Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 737, April 12, 2005 (MOLENO)
4. Substantial amendments
 a. Homicide to murder
- Buhat v. CA, 265 SCRA 701, December 17, 1996 (MENDOZA)
b. Robbery to robbery in an uninhabited place
- People v. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (PAGADUAN)
c. Allegation of relationship
- People v. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476, December 18, 2000 (PAREDES)
O. Place where the action is to be instituted
1. Place of institution
a. Territorial jurisdiction
- Macasaet v. People, 452 SCRA 365, February 11, 2005 (PLAGATA)
b. Specific powers
i. Violation of BP 22
- People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, January 1988
ii. Violation of anti-fencing law
- People v. Guzman. 227 SCRA 64, October 1993
iii. Estafa through misappropriation
- Barrameda v. CA, September 2, 1999
iv. Estafa through issuance of check
- People v. Grospe, Ibid.
c. Offenses aboard public vehicles
- People v. Panlilo, 255 SCRA 503, March 29, 1996 (RELOVA)

Facts:
Danilo Panlilio was charged and eventually convicted with Kidnapping and
violation of the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Valenzuela. However, in his petition for appeal, Panlilio contended that the RTC of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction over the case involving the violation of the Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery because the robbery was penetrated in Navotas. In the
course of the trial it was indeed stated by the complaining witness who was a minor
that it was when she and the accused alighted from the jeepney in Navotas that the
accused forcibly asked her to remove her earrings. It was stated that Panlilio was
pointing a knife to the complaining witness’ neck all throughout the time that they were
walking from the school of the complaining witness which was located in Valenzuela,
until they boarded and disembarked from a jeepney. The complaining witness further
narrated that before being able to ride a jeepney, she and Panlilio walked from her
school for a very long time that she felt exhausted.
Issue:
 Whether or not the RTC of Valenzuela has jurisdiction over the highway robbery
case
Held:
No, the RTC of Valenzuela did not have the jurisdiction over the highway robbery
case. It was ruled by the Court that the prosecution failed to establish the precise place
where the highway robbery supposedly was committed other than in Navotas.
According to Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, when an offense is committed on a railroad
train, in an aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip,
the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any including municipality
or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passes during such trip, including
the departure and arrival (emphasis added). It should be noted that the complaining
witness’ testimony that she and Panlilio have walked a great distance from the school
located in Valenzuela was damaging to establishment of the fact that they have
boarded the jeepney and departed in Valenzuela. Hence, the Court dismissed the
highway robbery case due to the lack of jurisdiction of the Valenzuela RTC.
d. Aboard a vessel on a voyage
- Calme v. CA, 261 SCRA 285, August 30, 1996 (REYNOSO)

Facts:
Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the information for murder filed against
him. Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by
allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V Cebu City. Petitioner assert that, although
the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid down
in paragraph a Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable
provision in determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Section 15
paragraph c thereof since the exact location where the alleged crime occurred was
known. Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to
the Marine Protest filed by the vessel Captain, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan
Point, Siquijor Island, when he received the report that a passenger jumped overboard.

Issue: Whether the Oroquita Court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against
petitioner.
Held:
Yes, Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The exact
location where the alleged offense was committed is immaterial since it is undisputed
that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable
provision is par. C of Section 15, Rule 110 which provides that of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first point of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to
the general accepted principles of international law.
e. Place of institution of libel
- Agustin v. Pamintuan, 467 SCRA 601, August 22, 2005 (SISON)

FACTS:
Petitioner Victor Agustin was charged with 4 separate Information of libel by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio. On September 10, 2001, he then filed a Motion
to Quash the Information on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Information did not contain any
allegations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general
circulation on Baguio City. Private complainant opposed the motion alleging that he
was a bona fide resident and acting general manager of Baguio Country Club.

The petitioner contented that in the absence of any allegations on the

Information that the private respondent was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio as mandated by
Article 360 of the RPC, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He
asserted that the amendment of the Information would be improper considering that
the defects of the Information were not of form but of substance.

The OSG maintained that the failure of the Information to allege that private
respondent is a resident of Baguio City is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserted that the
averment in the Information that the crimes charged were committed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other
allegations thereon are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the subject cases.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the
four Information.

RULING:
The SC granted the petition holding that the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction.
 The SC held that venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any of its
essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Article 360
of the RPC provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

In the case at bar, the Information did not allege that the offended party was
actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. IT cannot even
be inferred from the allegation that the offended party was the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the
community that the private complainant was actually residing in Baguio City.
- Uy v. Mercado, 154 SCRA 567, September 30, 1987 (VILLARUZ)
P. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action
1. Intervention prohibited
- Dichaves v. Apalit, 333 SCRA 54, june 8, 2000 (MALABAYABAS)

FACTS:
Dichaves complainant filed criminal cases against Navarro for violation B.P. Blg.
22 on the ground that checks issued by Navarro against the United Coconut Planters
Bank, had all been dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It appears that, Navarro filed
with the RTC Quezon City a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against Uyboco
and GCDC. In his complaint, Uyboco and GCDC were able to obtain loans from
complainant, to guarantee which Navarro issued the checks which became the
subject of the criminal cases filed against him. In return, Uyboco and GCDC allegedly
issued postdated checks to Navarro. Based on the filing of this case, Navarro moved for
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases, alleging that the issue in the
civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which would determine the result
of the criminal cases. In his order, respondent granted Navarro’s motion. Complainant
moved for a consideration of the order. Pending resolution of the motion, Navarro
amended his complaint in Civil Case by impleading complainant as a defendant.
Respondent denied complainant’s motion. However, the appellate court set aside
respondent’s order. Upon resumption of the trial of the criminal cases, Navarro next
sought the disqualification of Dichaves’ counsel as private prosecutor on the ground
that complainant had no right to intervene in the criminal cases. Respondent again
granted the motion, holding that the civil action arising from crime was being tried in
the civil case. Complainant moved for reconsideration, arguing that he is merely an
unwilling co-plaintiff in the civil case and that the obligation owed him by Uyboco to
Navarro was different from that owed by the latter to complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dichaves’ counsel has the right to intervene as private prosecutor
in the criminal cases.

HELD:
Yes. There are three instances when the offended party in a criminal case
cannot take part in the criminal prosecution, to wit: (1) if the civil action has been
waived; (2) if the right to institute a separate civil action has been reserved; and (3) if
the civil action was filed prior to the criminal action. None of these actions was done by
complainant so as to bar him or his counsel from taking part in the criminal prosecution.
Complainant did not bring the civil case. It was Navarro who did, and he simply
dragged complainant into the case by impleading him as a defendant or an unwilling
co-plaintiff. As in his order suspending the trial of the criminal cases on the ground of
prejudicial question, respondent’s order barring complainant and the latter’s counsel
from participating in the criminal prosecution was laconic and did not state the basis, if
any, thereof.
As provided in Rule 111, Section 5, a civil case constitutes a prejudicial question
only if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue is determinative of whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, even if Navarro prevailed in
the civil case filed by him against Uyboco and GCDC, this result would not be
determinative of his guilt in the criminal prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for it is
now settled that the mere issuance of worthless checks is punishable under B.P. Blg. 22,
and it is immaterial whether the checks have been issued merely to guarantee another
person's obligation. Indeed, at the time respondent ordered the suspension of the
proceeding in the criminal case, complainant was not a party to the civil case. It is
difficult to imagine how such case could affect Navarro's criminal liability for issuing to
complainant the checks which had been dishonored. Respondent ordered the
suspension of proceedings in the criminal cases without even explaining how the
resolution of the issues in the civil case would determine the issues in the criminal cases.
2. Offense with no offended party
- Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, 446 SCRA 706, December 13, 2004
(LACESTE)

FACTS:

Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing

the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate
transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable
payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained into
between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the
petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-
RSBS, together with twenty-seven (27) other persons[7] for conspiracy in misappropriating
AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao
filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved
by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133.
Pending resolution of an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Information, Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction and an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion to Suspend Proceedings, because of the pendency of his motion for
reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman, the law firm of Albano & Associates
filed a Notice of Appearance as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for
the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The notice
of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired
Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members
thereof.
The petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as
private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were purely
public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil
liability had arisen. He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
an offended party may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in
those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged. He
maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the
prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AGFOI, are private injured parties entitled to intervene as private
prosecutor in the subject cases.

HELD:

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in
Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint
or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in
damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on
the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted and the offended party has not waived the
civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior
to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses
is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will
act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. On the other hand, the sole purpose
of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene
in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of
tolerance.
The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local
governments or government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS,
which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds,
reparation, or indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public funds or property
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article 213 of the Revised
Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as
amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil
liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, any party,
including the government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue
injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the government is to
be represented by the public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the
accused.
 Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,
or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained
of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to
recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and
the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must
not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party
must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
some third and unrelated party.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents under
paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the
felony of falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to
third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The
controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does
not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the
payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the
correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the
petitioner and his co-accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount
of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered
the offended party entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the
Government Corporate Counsel.
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. Where offended party did not initiate
- Agujetas vs CA, 261 SCRA 17, August 23, 1996 (MALABAYABAS)
4. Where offended party desisted
- People v. Amaca, 277 SCRA 215, August 12, 1997 (LACESTE)