Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to MLN
This content downloaded from 64.141.84.23 on Mon, 03 Sep 2018 02:25:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
M L N 1193
Alasdair Maclntyre,
Notre Dame, India
It is indeed refresh
grammatic statem
large degree the pr
(238). This must e
investigation of eth
the literary histori
the historian or crit
and ethos, he sho
between "character
both character and
But he must also co
and discourse: "This
roles . . . could not have occurred . . . if the forms of moral discourse, the
language of morality, had not also been transformed at the same time"
(33-34).
Further, unlike the "political languages" of Skinner, MacIntyre's
construct of "language of morality" is a non-trivial one; his use of the word
"language" is not vacuous, almost metaphorical as in Skinner's usage, but
stipulated by his account of classical, i.e. well-motivated, moral theory;'
MacIntyre makes the extremely strong case that the structure of classical
morality is in part discursive (163). A precondition for the judgemental
propositions of classical theory is the belief in the narrative unity of life;
thus the object of dramatic, epic, and historical formal initiatives is the
subject of moral theorizing. It is no accident, then, that the last of his
classical moral writers is Jane Austen; her discursive sensitivity is integral
to her moral sensitivity; discursive artifice enables moral discovery (169f.,
222f.).
But for a precise identification of the mutuality of operations and goals
of literary history and moral theory, it is not necessary to turn to
MacIntyre's account of Homeric ethics in his chapter, "The Virtues in
Heroic Societies," a chapter, to be sure, marked by the clarity and good
sense he displays throughout. Rather, the mutuality or reciprocity lies in
process, not product; we see, for example, the alliance inversely projected
in his subversion of the pretensions of social scientific discourse, as in the
chapter on "The Character of Generalisations in Social Science." Then, he
disputes false methodological alliances; where most contemporary
initiatives which attempt to combine the study of social and of
formal-discursive moments rely upon a simple, and reductive,
"functionalist" or "reflectivist" model, MacIntyre attacks function as a
construct of serious inquiry. The hegemony of "function" as explanation is
tied inextricably to manipulation as hegemonous social practice; the naive
sociologist of literature can only describe cultural practice as power
practice, he can only write a history of moral and political disorder.2
This content downloaded from 64.141.84.23 on Mon, 03 Sep 2018 02:25:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
1194 REVIEWS
This content downloaded from 64.141.84.23 on Mon, 03 Sep 2018 02:25:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
M L N 1195
NOTES
This content downloaded from 64.141.84.23 on Mon, 03 Sep 2018 02:25:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms