ALPHA

RHO
LAMBDA
LAW
SOCIETY
BAR OPERATIONS 2018
CASES DECIDED/PENNED BY JUSTICE
MARIANO DEL CASTILLO

POLITICAL LAW
 ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582; April 8, 2010
Party-List System, Equal protection, freedom of expression & association

DOCTRINE: The crucial element in party-list registration is whether a particular

organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941 that the
party-list is indeed marginalized and under-represented.
DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). They applied for
accreditation before the COMELEC but was denied on the ground that the organization had
no substantial membership base. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation
COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds. Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying
that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC should grant petitioner’s application for registration
2. Whether or not Ang Ladlad is covered under the equal protection clause
3. Whether or not COMELEC violated the freedom of expression and association clause

HELD:
1. Yes, the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani does not stand for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.
We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and
the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent
ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani.
2. Yes, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
 similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors.
3. Yes, under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.

DEMAALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 173523; February 19, 2014
Due Process

DOCTRINE: Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings,
yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day
in court.

FACTS:
Demaala was the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused for violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed a Motion to Suspend Demaala stating that suspension was mandatory. Demaala
opposed. Sandiganbayan (9 Feb 2006): granted the preventive suspension.
On 3 March 2006, Demaala filed an MR. Demaala scheduled the hearing of her MR on 26
April 2006. Ombudsman (prosecution) sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27,
2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a
later date and was later granted by Sandiganbayan. The continuation for presentation of
the prosecution’s evidence was scheduled on August 2 and 3, 2006
Sandiganbayan (23 May 2006): denied Demaala’s MR. Demaala claims that she was denied
due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her MR
even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006 hearings.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan its
Resolution denying the MR without conducting a hearing thereon.

HELD: No, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her MR is
fatal to her cause. Her excuse was that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26,
2006 since “she had no business to be there” is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21,
2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to
reset trial as related to her pending MR.
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed
to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.
Petitioner was accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings.
As stated in Batul v. Bayron: Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
 ANTOLIN v. DOMONDON
G.R. No. 165036; July 5, 2010
Right to Information

DOCTRINE: The people’s right to information is not absolute and as such is limited to
“matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.”

FACTS:
Hazel Antolin (petitioner) took the 1997 CPA Board exams but failed (4/7 of the subjects).
Antolin was convinced she deserved to pass, thus, she wrote to Abelardo Domondon
(respondent), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer
sheets be recorrected. Antolin was shown her answer sheets which consisted merely of
shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Antolin wrote
again but Domondon denied the request. Petitoner Antolin filed a Petition for Mandamus
with Damages. Respondent Domondon opposed arguing that petitioner was not entitled to
relief sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic.

HELD: No, the petition has not become moot and academic when Antolin passed the 1998
CPA Board exam. Art. III, Sec 7 of the Constitution recognizes the right of people to matters
of public information on matters of public concern, together with the guarantee to right to
information is Art. II, Sec. 28 which promotes full disclosure and transparency in
government. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
The people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further
“subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.”
In the case at bar, the Court has held that national board examinations such as the CPA
Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in
particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of
these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession.

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176229; October 19, 2011
Rights of the Accused

DOCTRINE: Allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and

material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is extracted from
the accused and becomes the basis of their conviction.

FACTS:
13 HK nationals arrived as tourists at NAIA. At the arrival area, the group leader of the HK
tourists presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner, Cinco. When Cinco
examined each of the baggage, she saw similar chocolate boxes from the first baggage and
the second baggage. As Cinco became suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes
and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, white crystalline substance (aka shabu)
contained in a white transparent plastic was revealed.
The 13 HK tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. Out of the 13 tourists, the
NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five
coaccused.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights under custodial investigation when
evidence taken during custodial investigation was not excluded.
2. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation.
HELD:
1. No, petitioner was not deprived of his rights. While petitioner was subjected to all the
rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of
his constitutional right under Sec. 12, Article III of the Constitution such constitutional
provision prohibits, as evidence, only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against him. In the case at bar, petitioner did not make any confession or admission
during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from petitioner as evidence of his guilt and no statement was taken
from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him.
As the Court held in People v. Buluran, “any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence
taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
2. No, petitioner was not denied of his right. The right to confrontation, under Sec. 14(2),
Art. III of the Constitution is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross examine
the witnesses of the prosecution. The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who
should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross
examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to
secure the opportunity for cross examination, so that if the opportunity for cross
examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been
accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross
examination.”

AGUILAR v. O’PALLICK
G.R. No. 182280; July 29,2013
Due Process

DOCTRINE: A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding

in which he was not made a party to.

FACTS:
PPGI entered into a Contract-To-Sell with Poblete and Villanueva over Unit 3301 in Makati
Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati City. Thereafter, PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor
of O’Pallick after he paid the purchase price in full. Although O’Pallick took possession of
the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor was never registered nor annotated.

Meanwhile, a case between PPGI and petitioner Aguilar (HLURB case), Aguilar was able to
obtain a final and executory decision in her favor, which resulted to the levy of several
properties including Unit 3301.
Notice of Sale was posted and published. O’Pallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.
Still, public auction was conducted where Aguilar was declared as the highest bidder. Thus,
O’Pallick filed a Complaint for quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the
unit, to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in the HLURB case is binding upon O’Pallick.

HELD:
NO. It is not binding upon O’Pallick.
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law. O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, thus, he could not be
bound by the decision. Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the
opportunity to present his case therein. Since O’Pallick was not impleaded, he had the right
to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very
same condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim.
 SR METALS v. REYES
G.R. No. 179669; June 4, 2014
Equal Protection

DOCTRINE: Issue on violation of EPC is moot since all small scale miners are equally
treated as the production limit applies to all of them.

FACTS:
SR Metals Inc. was awarded a 2yr SmallScale Mining Permit (SSMP) and were allowed to
extract Nickel and Cobalt (NiCo) in Agusan del Norte. The mining corporations’ ECCs
contain a restriction that the amount of NiCo ore they are allowed to extract annually
should not exceed 50,000 MTs of ore pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899. Gov. Amante of
Agusan del Norte questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and shipped by the
mining corporations. The mining corporations denied having exceeded the extraction limit
of 50,000 MTs and explained that an extracted mass contains only a limited
amount/percentage of NiCo because it is lumped with gangue (the unwanted rocks and
minerals.)
Gov. Amante sought the opinion of DOJ. By comparing PD 1899 to RA No. 7076, a
subsequent law that likewise defines smallscale mining, the DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD
1899 is deemed to have been impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions
of the latter law mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for smallscale
mining.DOJ categorically concluded that the term ‘ore’ should be confined only to NiCo, that
is, excluding soil and other materials that are of no economic value to the mining
corporations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 1, PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No, while under RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to 'mining activities which rely
heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives
or heavy mining equipment. Significantly, this definition does not provide for annual
extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.
DOJ Opinion concluded that since nothing from RA 7076 speaks of an annual production
limit, Sec. 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly repealed by RA 7076, the later law.
However, while these two laws tackle the definition of what small-scale mining is, both
have different objects upon which the laws shall be applied to. PD 1899 applies to
individuals, partnerships and corporations while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives.
With the 50,000MT limit likewise imposed on smallscale miners under RA 7076, the issue
raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats
all smallscale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is
therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the
said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is the government agency tasked with the
duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources; it is also the agency vested with
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of mining laws.

DOH v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.

G.R. No. 182358; February 20, 2013
State Immunity

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either
expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit.
There is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability.
“Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith.”
FACTS:
In line with a Memorandum providing for a list of categories of sanctions to be imposed on
accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings
regarding their products (e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed
by them during their accreditation, the Department of Health (DOH invited accredited drug
companies, including Phil Pharma, to a meeting.
The meeting appraised the drug companies that some of their products are Violative
Products unfit for human consumption. The companies were then directed to submit,
within 10 days, their respective explanation on the adverse findings on the Report. Phil
Pharma, instead of submitting an explanation, sent a letter informing DOH Under-Secretary
(USec) that their lawyers are preparing the corresponding reply. USec replied telling them
that their letter is “untenable” and informed them that its accreditation has been
suspended for two years. Phil Pharma questioned the suspension by filing a Complaint
mainly seeking to nullify various DOH Memorandums, with a prayer for damages against
DOH USecs, alleging, among others, that there was an undue suspension of its accreditation,
which warrants damages. DOH moved to dismiss claiming that the case was one against the
State.
RTC: Dismissed. The principle of state immunity from suit is applicable. The case is one
instituted against the State
CA: Reversed: by filing a motion to dismiss, DOH is deemed to have hypothetically admitted
the allegations in the complaint, which state that they were being sued in their individual
capacities, negating their claim that the case is an unauthorized suit against the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case be dismissed for being a suit against the State?

HELD: Yes, as a general rule, a state may not be sued. This immunity may be waived by way
of an express or implied consent to be sued. There is express consent when a law, either
special or general, so provides; there is implied consent when the state “enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state
enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability.
The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. However, when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory
provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity because it is an unincorporated agency, which
performs sovereign/governmental functions. It has neither sued nor consented to be sued.
If a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the state,” the defense
of non-suability may be properly invoked. The doctrine of state immunity extends its
protective mantle to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge
and performance of their duties. “Public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”

MAMBA ET AL v. LARA ET AL
G.R. No. 165109; December 14, 2009
Locus Standi

DOCTRINE: A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.

Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Cagayan approved several resolutions authorizing
respondent governor to enter into numerous contracts for the construction and
improvement of priority projects. Petitioners filed a petition for the annulment of contracts
and agreements entered into by the provincial government through respondent governor.
Issue(s):
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi.

Held:
YES. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived
from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a
law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected
by the alleged act. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As
long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.

REPUBLIC v. BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110; October 7, 2013
Naturalization

DOCTRINE: Under existing Philippine law, foreign women who are married to Philippines
citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens.

FACTS:
Azucena Batuigas was born in Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese
parents. Her primary secondary and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools.
She then practiced her teaching profession in various schools situated in the Philippines.
In 1968, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas, a natural born Filipino citizen.
Azucena then filed a Petition for Naturalization. In her petition she stated that she intends
in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce, absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time
of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is
engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that
Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because
aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.

ISSUE: Has Azucena Batuigas complied with the citizenship requirement to become a
Filipino citizen?

HELD: Yes, under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act
No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is
found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they
have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
 DU v JAYOMA
G.R. No. 175042; April 23, 2012
Powers of Local Government Units

DOCTRINE: Sangguiniang Bayan is empowered to authorize and license the establishment,

operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial
breeding of gamecocks; A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is
a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interest so requires.

Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini, Bohol, enacted an ordinance requiring the conduct of a
public bidding for the operation of a cockpit. Petitioner was authorized to continue his
cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements which the
latter did on December 31, 1992. Upon discovering in 1997 that petitioner continued his
operation in violation of the ordinance, the municipality resolved to suspended the same
and petitioner was ordered to desist from holding any cockfighting activity.

Issue(s):
Whether or not was deprived of due process.

Held:
NO. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. It is well enshrined in our
jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not
property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require."

ANTONIO KING VS. FRANCISCO ROBLES

G.R. No. 197096-97; December 2, 2013
Ombudsman

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to investigate on its

own or on complaint by "any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."

FACTS:
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay
Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were
ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full backwages from the
time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision became final and
executory. Labor Arbiter Robles issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm
of the NLRC "to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo
located at J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and
collect the sum of x x x P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio's] backwages and 13th month
pay. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the
same from the movable or immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from
execution.” In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy
Sheriffs served a Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the
representative of therein respondents. Personal properties found inside the compound
were levied upon. Meanwhile, Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC,
one of the companies represented by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before
Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC filed
a Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property and to Inhibit
Sheriffs. PMAFC contended that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to
PMAFC worth P12M and that the Deputy Sheriffs intended to sell the said properties for a
measly sum of P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed that the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution
be set aside for being void ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be disqualified. In an Order
Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an amount double the
judgment award.
After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties' respective position, the
Ombudsman dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable cause.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's evidence failed to establish the four elements of
the crime of robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since
Rogelio is the owner of the subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder
and a Certificate of Sale issued to him. Thus, Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the
personal property of another.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to
hold respondents for trial?

HELD: No, the Ombudsman has prerogative to prosecute or dismiss a complaint.

By constitutional fiat and under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Because of the endowment of broad
investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the
sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it may
also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it
except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

G.R. No. 231658; July 4, 2017
Judicial Power

DOCTRINE: The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated powers
he will avail of in a given situation.

FACTS:
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao on
May 23, 2017 for a period not exceeding 60 days.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 includes the following: Proclamation No. 55 was
issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao; Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that, “Incase of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that, “the
crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives;”
Part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts
committed by the Maute terrorist group, such as the attack on the military outpost in Lanao
del Sur in 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi
City in 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
That on May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi
City, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and
private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started
flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of
Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the
laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the
crime of rebellion; and This recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and
other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in
Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. - All 3 petitions may be taken cognizance
by the Court, by virtue of par 3, Sec. 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. The jurisdiction of this Court under par 3
of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as
in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved
by the Court. - It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass
upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a
clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution
or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase “in an
appropriate proceeding” would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be
emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this
Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII. Three (3) Petitions were
filed questioning the legality of the said declaration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by
paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required by the Court.

HELD: YES.
Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis.
Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by the Constitution or by law. “In an appropriate
proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article
VIII.
Par 3, Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
“In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the
history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear
some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be
accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.”
Montenegro v. Castaneda: The authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion
requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the
President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was
initially reversed, but later reinstated in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which ruled: According to
the SC, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of
the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by
the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18
of Article VII. This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its
members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even
without the concurrence of Congress.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the
extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the
provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under
Article VII or the Executive Department.
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a
six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers
inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are
specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of
the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
martial law.
The 1987 Constitution now provides that suspension of the privilege of the writ can be
exercised only in 2 cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a
period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such
suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked
by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial
review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which renders the executive action a
political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
Purpose/ significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse
by the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers. Purpose of Section 18, Article
VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President.

HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 184496; December 2, 2013
Judicial Department

DOCTRINE: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

FACTS:
Abdul was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and re-elected for a
second term. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging him and Domado, with
falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). That they made it appear that Engr. Murad as Municipal Engineer
prepared and signed the Local Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as
the Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional
Statement and General Objective, respectively, when in truth and in fact, as the accused
well knew that said Zubair F. Murad was never employed as Municipal Engineer of the said
Municipality, to the damage and prejudice of public interest which led to their suspension
pendente lite.
Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO alleging that the suspension
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
suspension order, however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the
expiration of Abdul’s second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-
election during the May 2004 election. During the May 2007 election, Abdul emerged as the
winner in the mayoralty race and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. Abdul
called attention to Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement in its Resolution that his defeat in the
election has effectively rendered his suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless,
Sandiganbayan ordered anew the suspension of Abdul from his present position for a
period of 90 days. Abdul moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, a
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor
of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur?

HELD: No, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. In the
present case, the acquittal of Abdul operates as a supervening event that mooted the
present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of
suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking
he did not commit the offense charged. Notwithstanding the mootness of the present
Petition, he nevertheless implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether
the offense of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in
the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019. As earlier quoted, to
warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be charged
with an offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3)
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. Admittedly, Abdul in this
case was not charged under RA 3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven, Book II of
the RPC as the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is
covered by Title Four, 26 Book II thereof. Since vouchers are official documents signifying a
cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably involves fraud upon
public funds.
In fine, we reiterate that the issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner’s suspension
had mooted considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan. As such, there is no justiciable
controversy for this Court to adjudicate.

DELA CRUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 161929; December 8, 2009
Liabilities of Public Officers: Preventive Suspension

DOCTRINE: Preventive suspension of the accused is mandatory upon finding that the
Information is valid. Court possesses no discretion to determine whether one is necessary.

FACTS:
The City of Tarlac approved budget allowing for construction and/or renovation project
involving several multi-purpose halls in various barangays therein.
But, as it turns out, instead for renovating/constructing multipurpose halls, the funds were
used to renovate barangay chapels.
For doing so Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz – Assistant Accountant, and other City of Tarlac high-
ranking officials, including the mayor, were charged with the violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. Information was eventually filed against all
of them. The Information stated that they conspired with one another, committing the
crime in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official position, acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue
injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a
specific group of constituents by approving and releasing the amount knowing fully well,
that what we’re being constructed are in truth chapels.
After being arraigned, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused pendente
lite. In various suits, the accused filed for motions to quash, which were all denied by the
Sandiganbayan. De la Cruz et al were ordered 90-day preventive suspension pursuant to
the mandatory imposition upon a finding that the information is valid. Hence, this appeal
filed by De la Cruz et al.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension is valid pending appeal.

HELD: Yes, preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA 3019 is

mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid.
The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is
necessary to forestall the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate
witnesses, or frustrate his prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance.
The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution
or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both. All that is needed is proof that a valid
information exists.

BALASBAS v MONAYAO
G.R. No. 190524; February 17, 2014
Liabilities of Public Officers

DOCTRINE: Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is an administrative

offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.

Facts:
Respondent appeared in lieu of her deceased father in a land dispute between him and
petitioner’s brother. Despite judgment rendered awarding one-half of the property to
petitioner’s brother and respondent’s subsequent notarized waiver of her rights to her half,
the latter illegally sold the portion, over which she had waived her rights, to her children
via a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by her father who had died in 1987.

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Alfonso Lista against
respondent for misrepresentation, fraud and dishonesty, but the local government refused
to take action on the ground that the acts complained of were not in relation to the
respondent’s duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer.

Issue(s):
Whether or not only acts related to the duties and responsibilities of a government officer
can be the subject of an administrative case.

Held:
NO. Respondent’s supposed dishonest acts and misrepresentations committed in relation
to a land dispute arising from her private dealings cast doubt on her fitness to discharge
her responsibilities as a public official. If it is true that respondent caused the execution of a
forged or falsified deed of sale in 1992 in order to transfer the disputed portion of the
property to her children, then she committed a dishonest act even as she is enjoined to
adhere at all times to law, morality, and decency in her private and professional life. The
acts complained of constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, an
administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.

NAZARENO ET AL v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

G.R. No. 181559; October 2, 2009
Midnight Appointments

DOCTRINE: Appointments (midnight appointment) are banned prior to the elections to

ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to
prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. The exception
is when it will be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening
process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy
immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.

FACTS:
Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in May 2001 elections
but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. A few weeks before the end of his term,
outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city
hall employees, including the herein 52 petitioners.
When he assumed office, Mayor Perdices publicly announced that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City
Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to refrain from making any cash
disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new
positions. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against the City of Dumaguete. They sought to
enjoin respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their
appointments. The CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City revoked and invalidated the
appointments of the petitioners. Pertinent portions of the findings are the following:

1. There was only one meeting of the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) held to consider the
number of appointments and no PSB statements certifying that there was actual screening
and evaluation done on all candidates for each position.
2. The 89 appointments were all issued after the elections and when the new city mayor
was about to assume office.
3. The rationale against the prohibition on the issuance of "midnight appointments" by the
President is applicable to appointments extended by outgoing local chief executives
immediately before and/or after the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mass appointments are valid

HELD: No, this case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to
issue "midnight" appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It
does not only cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also
affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy
in defending their appointments instead of attending to their functions.
Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. However, it
must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that
the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that
the appointments are not in bulk.
Here, there was only one en banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the appointments,
without any evidence that there were any deliberations on the qualifications of the
petitioners, or any indication that there was an urgent need for the immediate issuance of
such appointments. The absence of evidence showing careful consideration of the merits of
each appointment, and the timing and the number of appointments, militate against
petitioners’ cause. On the contrary, the prevailing circumstances in this case indicate that
the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing administration.

SAÑO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182221; February 3, 2010
Remedies Jurisdiction in Election Law

DOCTRINE: The mere invocation of the grounds of a pre-proclamation controversy,

without more, will not justify the exclusion of election returns which appear regular and
authentic on their face.

FACTS:
Petitioner Saño of LAKAS-CMD and private respondent Manuel Que of the Liberal Party
both ran for Municipal Mayor of Leyte during the May 2007 elections.
During the canvassing of votes, Saño sought to have the contested ERs excluded on the
grounds of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously
manufactured returns. He alleged that after the casting and counting of votes, a man was
seen carrying a ballot box that was not locked, inserted certain documents, took the
aluminum seal, sealed the box, and turned it over to the Reception Group. 5 election
returns (ERs) were allegedly affected by this anomalous activity.
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Que as Municipal Mayor.
Saño filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and/or Proceedings of the MBOC
before COMELEC. He prayed for the exclusion of the contested ERs and that he be
proclaimed the winning candidate. However, COMELEC upheld the proclamation of Que.
Hence, Saño filed this petition for certiorari. He insisted that all 5 of the contested ERs were
prepared by one person and surreptitiously presented before the MBOC. Thus, the issues
raised before the MBOC of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and
obviously manufactured returns were pre-proclamation controversies as defined in Sec
241 of the Omnibus Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Sec 243(b) of the
said Code. As such, the contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass and
MBOC’s proclamation of Que violated Sec 39 of CA 7859 and Sec 20 of RA 7166.
Que argues that the allegations raised by Saño on the contested ERs are not proper in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Moreover, he failed to substantiate his claims and failed to
follow the mandatory procedure under Sec 20 of RA 7166.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations raised are proper in a pre-proclamation controversy.

HELD: No, the Court ruled that not only did petitioners fail to follow the proper procedure,
the unsubstantiated issues were not proper for a proclamation controversy.
1. Concept
- A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in the Omnibus Election Code, is any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the
board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sec. 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appearance of the
election returns.

2. Compliance with the procedure on contested ERs

- A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character and limited in scope. It is to be
promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. Hence, the BOC will not look
into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear
otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Consistent with its summary character,
compliance with the procedure on contested ERs before the BOC under Sec. 20 of RA 7166
is mandatory. Such provides that any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by
making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass.
- In the case herein, Saño failed to timely object as there was a lapse of over 12 hours after
the ERs have been presented for canvass before objections were made. Moreover, it is
irregular that only one written petition for exclusion was filed for the 5 contested ERs.

While the court was willing to overlook the procedural lapses, there is still no evidence that
the ERs were falsified or tampered with
- MBOC did not err is proclaiming the private respondent, since the unsubstantiated issues
raised by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. Claims that
contested ERs are obviously manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the
said documents themselves. Contrary to petitioner’s remonstrations, there is absolutely no
indication that the contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. As such, there was no
valid ground to delay the proclamation.
- Unlike a pre-proclamation controversy, the annulment proceedings before COMELEC
were not summary in character. Petitioner had every opportunity to ventilate and
substantiate his allegations before COMELEC but failed to present any evidence to
overcome the presumption that the contested ERs were valid.
 ARNADO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164; August 18, 2015
Eligibility and Qualifications Requirements

DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. | For those who
avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Sec 5(2) thereof provides
the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their Certificate of Candidacy.

FACTS:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after
he was naturalized as a US citizen. Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for
public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the
Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of
Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. However, his co-candidate filed a petition to
disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from
the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation. While the petition for
disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein Arnado garnered the
highest votes and was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.
Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the
application of the rule on succession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by
virtue of his subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

HELD: Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
executing said affidavit. Since then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not
cured the defect in his qualification.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time
he filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections. o Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual
citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. This refers to dual
allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire their
Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political rights.
Hence, they may now run for public office provided they: a.) Meet the qualifications for
holding such public office, and b.) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or
at the time of filing their COC .

REPUBLIC v DACLAN
G.R. No. 197115; March 23, 2015
Corporate Powers of the Local Government

DOCTRINE: Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power
and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

FACTS:
The Agoo Breeding Station was established by the Department of Agriculture (DA), through
the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be
distributed to the intended beneficiaries, pursuant to the livelihood program of the
national government.
In support of said project, the Daclans executed deeds of donation donating 4 parcels of
land. The deeds uniformly stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the
establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in
case of nonuse, abandonment, or cessation of the activities of BAI, possession or ownership
shall automatically revert to the Daclans.
Subsequently, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of
the DA, were devolved to the LGUs. Thus, the Province of La Union (Province) assumed the
powers and functions of the DA in the operation of the breeding station.
Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was
constructed within a portion of the donated properties.
The Daclans demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that BAI has ceased
the operations of the breeding station and that the land has been abandoned. The Province
refused, alleging that the breeding station still existed, although this time it is being
operated by the Province, pursuant to the devolution program. The Daclans countered that
the donated land cannot be assigned by the Republic to the Province as the deeds did not
include Republic’s successors or assigns as intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the breeding station by the Republic to the Province
violated the stipulations of the deeds of donation.

HELD: NO, the conditions of the donation were not violated as the breeding station
remained operational. It is not violated by way of a valid devolution.
While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province as a consequence of
the policy of devolution adopted by the government under the LGC, it remained operational
and continued to function as a breeding station. The activities of BAI did not cease even
after it was dissolved. Thus, the purpose for which the donations were made remained and
was carried out. o Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans
to the Republic. As defined, “devolution refers to the act by which the national government
confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.”
It includes the transfer to the LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions, and responsibilities.
Besides, the deed of donation did not specifically prohibit subsequent transfer of the
donated lands by the donee to the Republic.
The argument of Daclan with regard to the supposed failure of the Province to provide
“agricultural extension and onsite research services and facilities” as required under the
IRR of the LGC cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands. On the
contrary, to allow such would condone undue interference by private individuals in the
operations of government. The deeds of donation never stipulated that the Daclans may
interfere in the management and operation of the breeding station. They could not even
directly participate in the operations of the breeding station.
Even if BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, the deeds of donation may not be
nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct. Its activities continued when its
functions were devolved to the LGUs, such as the Province of LU herein.
With regard to LUMC: The portion in which it occupied was not donated by the Daclans, but
by donors who are not parties in this case. Whatever the Daclans donated still remained
part of the breeding station. Hence, no right of reversion accrues to them.

Catipon, Jr. vs Japson

GR No. 191787; June 22, 2015
Powers and Functions of Each Constitutional Commission

Doctrine: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a

party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself
or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort
to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's
judicial power can be sought.

Facts:

Respondent Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS

Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the CSC-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
Petitioner Catipon made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he
obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after
removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Education. Petitioner was charged with
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.

Petitioner Catipon was exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official

Documents and Grave Misconduct. However, he is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CSC-CAR
sustained its judgment.

Petitioner prayed for injunctive relief and the reversal of the CSC-CAR decision in a Petition
for Review docketed with the CA.

CA denied the petition for lack of merit and held that instead of filing a petition for review
directly with it, petitioner should have interposed an appeal with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.

Issue:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have
jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for
review.

Held:

Yes. As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service
Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil
Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43,
"decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of
fifteen days from receipt thereof.” "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service
Commission-Central Office.

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition
for review, under Section 50 of MC 19.

NAPOCOR v. SPS. ZABALA

G.R. No. 173520; January 30, 2013
Just Compensation

DOCTRINE: Just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government and statutes and executive issuances fixing or
providing for the method of computing just compensation is not binding on courts and, at
best, are treated as mere guidelines.
FACTS:
Respondents Sps. Zabala et. al. were owners of different parcels of land in Balanga City,
Bataan. Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) needed an easement of right of
way over the affected areas for its 230 KV LimayHermosa Transmission Lines.
NAPOCOR repeatedly negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of right of way
easement over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement. Thus, it filed a
complaint for expropriation of such lands alleging that it has the right to take or enter upon
the possession of the subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3, RA 6395 can restrict/limit NAPOCOR’s liability.

HELD: No, Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts
to determine just compensation.
Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s
loss. ‘Just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby
the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.” The payment of just compensation for private property taken
for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights.
As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from
determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been
violated. It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government.
Courts have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for
the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are
treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Since the hightension
electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the
property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require
NAPOCOR to recompense them for the full market value of their property.

CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. CONTRERAS-BESANA

G.R. No. 168957; February 12, 2010
Just Compensation

DOCTRINE: When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.

Facts:
Petitioner was issued the writ of possession of two parcels of land on the basis of the
P40,000 it allegedly deposited as just compensation. Sixteen years later, private
respondent discovered that payment was never deposited. Attempts at an amicable
resolution and a negotiated sale having failed, he filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and, subsequently, a motion/manifestation for the condemnation of the
property. He insisted that the fair market value of the subject property should be reckoned
from the date when the court orders such condemnation, and not the date of actual taking.

Issue(s):
What is the correct reckoning point for the determination of just compensation?

Held:
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the
action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the filing of the complaint.
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to
be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint."

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO

G.R. No. 170685; September 22, 2010
Eminent Domain

DOCTRINE: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three
important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of
actual taking.

FACTS:
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of sugarland located in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. He offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The
DAR referred Livioco’s offer to the Land Bank of the Philippines for valuation. Livioco was
then informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been
“kept in trust pending his submission of ownership documents.” It appears, however, that
Livioco did not act upon the notices given by both agencies. LBP issued a certification to the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for Livioco’s sugarland. It was only after
two years that Livioco requested for a revaluation of the compensation on the ground that
it has already appreciated from the time it was offered for sale. The request was denied by
the DAR Director on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. The DAR
proceeded to take possession of Livioco’s property. The DAR awarded Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Livioco’s property to 26 farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco
filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same
proved to be futile. Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes
is an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco filed for a determination of just
compensation against the DAR, LBP, and CLOA holders before the RTC of Angeles City.
He maintained that the area where his property is located has become predominantly
residential, hence, he should be paid for his property’s value as such.

ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just compensation was proper

HELD: No, it is reminded to adhere strictly to the doctrine that just compensation must be
valued at the time of taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic. The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has
changed from agricultural to residential because there is no allegation or proof that the
property was approved for conversion to other uses by the DAR. It is the DAR that is
mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversion to prevent fraudulent
evasion from the agrarian reform coverage.
As to the price of the property, we find that LBP did not sufficiently substantiate its
valuation. While LBP insists that it strictly followed the statutory provision and its relevant
implementing guidelines in arriving at its valuation, the Court notes the lack of evidence to
prove the veracity of LBPs claims. LBP merely submitted its computation to the court
without any evidence on record, whether documentary or testimonial, that would support
the correctness of the values or data used in such computation.