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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
INDUCTIVE PROCEDURES DEDUCTIVE PROCEDURES
(Bottom-Up Analysis) (Top-Down Analysis)
Pick Upper Level
Failure in Component
Flow
down
Summarize
causes
upward
PROBABILISTIC
RISK ASSESSMENT
CRITICAL ITEMS
LIST (CIL)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT
ANALYSIS
(09 con’t)
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
DEFINITION
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
Benefits of FMEA
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
OBJECTIVES:
• Be able to answer (or perform):
• Explain terminology: FMEA, CIL, REDUNDANCY,
COMMON MODE FAILURE, etc.
• What are the benefits of FMEA and when should
they be applied in the design program?
• Be able evaluate levels of criticality & redundancy.
• Be able to perform a components FMEA and a
system FMEA.
• Know how to apply the results of a FMEA.
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT
ANALYSIS
• PURPOSE/TYPES/USES.
• PROCEDURE.
• DATA REQUIREMENTS & TERMS/TYPES.
• WHY AND HOW DO THINGS FAIL?
• PERFORMING A FMEA.
• ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
– Critical Items List
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
System Engineering: FMEA
CONCEPT PRELIM. FINAL DESIGN PRODUCTION SYS.
DESIGN DESIGN COMPONENTS/ INSPECTION TEST
ASSY, TEST & ACCEPTANCE
INSPECTION TESTS
• Functional
• Hardware
• FMEA with Criticality Analysis
(FMECA)/Critical Items List
• Other variations.
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
USES--Short Term
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
USES--Long term.
PERFORM
ESTABLISH DETERMINE
GET SYSTEM FMEA, FAILURE CRITICALITY
OVERVIEW ID FAILURE EFFECT
MODES
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
TERMS: FMEA WORKSHEET
Title:_________________________________
System:______________________________ Page ___ of ____
Analyst:_____________ Date:__________
Corrective Action Crit./
Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of Failure Detection Rank
FAILURE TERMS REVIEW:
THE PROCESS OF FAILURE
OBSERVED
PROBLEM
FAILURE
STRESSES
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
WHY DO THINGS FAIL?
(Failure Mechanisms)
• fatigue/fracture material removal
• structural overload radiation
• electrical overload ________________
• wear (lube failure) ________________
• wear (contamination) ________________
• wear ________________
• seal failure ________________
• chemical attack ________________
• oxidation ________________
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
HOW DO THINGS FAIL?
(Failure Mode)
• In what ways can they fail?
• How probable is this failure?
• Do one or more components interact to
produce a failure?
• Is this a common failure?
• Who is familiar with this particular item?
• PROBLEM--VALVE(P)
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
CONCLUSION--BENEFITS OF
FMEA
• Identify critical or hazardous conditions.
• Identify potential failure modes
• Identify need for fault detection.
• Identify effects of the failures. END>MORE
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
CRITICALITY CATEGORIES (TYP.)
• 1 Single failure point that could result in loss of vehicle or
personnel.
• 1R Redundant items, where if all failed, the result is loss of
vehicle or personnel.
• 1S A single failure point of a system component designed
to provide safety or protection capability against a potential
hazardous condition or a single point failure in a safety
monitoring system (e.g. fire suppression system).
• 1SR Redundant components, where if all failed, the result is
the same as 1S above.
• 1P A single failure point which is protected by a safety
device, the functioning of which prevents a hazardous
condition from occurring.
• 2 Single point failure that could result in loss of critical
mission support capability.
• 3 All other. 24
NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
Analyze Critical Items
• Redesign item, add redundant unit, etc.
• Prepare retention rationale for item.
– What current design features minimize the
probability of occurrence.
– What tests can detect failure modes during
acceptance tests, cert. tests, prelaunch and/or on-
orbit checkout.
– What inspections can be performed to prevent the
failure mode from being mfg, into hardware.
– What failure history justifies the CIL retention.
– How does operational use of the unit mitigate the
hardwares failure effect.
– How does maintainability prevent the failure mode.
END 25
NASA Lewis Research Center
r1
PROBLEM--VALVE
8-BACK-UP RING
7-O-RING (lg)
10-O-RING (small)
IIIII
2-POPPET 3-SPRING
4-GUIDE
1-END VALVE 6-HOUSING
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NASA Lewis Research Centerr1
FFF
RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM of ___________
FFF FMEA WORKSHEET
Title:_________________________________
System:______________________________ Page ___ of ____
Analyst:_____________ Date:__________
Corrective Action
Description Function Failure Mode Cause of Failure Effect of Failure Detection Crit