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1. Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery Co.

and on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real


Williamson., 37 Phil., 644, No. 11658 February 15, property.
1918
Ponente: CARSON, J.
Setting: Cavite
2. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44
Compañía Agrícola Filipina" bought a considerable quantity Phil. 630, No. 20329 March 16, 1923
of rice-cleaning machinery from the defendant machinery STREET, J.
company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to Setting: City of Manila
secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the
mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, was the lessee of a
machinery was installed, without any reference to the land parcel of land situated in the City of Manila and owner of the
on which it stood. It was registered in the chattel mortgage house of strong materials built thereon, upon which date she
registry. Thereafter, Compañía Agrícola Filipina" executed a executed a document in the form of a chattel mortgage.
deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the petitioner caused the same to be presented to the
machinery company, but this deed of sale, although respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the
executed in a public document, was not registered. City of Manila. Upon examination of the instrument, the
However, "Compañía Agrícola Filipina" executed another respondent was of the opinion that it was not a chattel
mortgage to the plaintiff upon the building, separate and mortgage, for the reason that the interests therein
apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of mortgaged did not appear to be personal property, within the
the balance of its indebtedness to the plaintiff under a meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was
contract for the construction of the building. refused on this ground only.

Issue: Whether the rice-cleaning machine is personal Issue: Whether or not said property is real
property
Held: No. Articles 334 and 335 of the Civil Code supply no
Held: No. By its express terms, the Chattel Mortgage Law absolute criterion for discriminating between real property
contemplates and makes provision for mortgages of and personal property for purposes of the application of the
personal property; and the sole purpose and object of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Those articles state rules which,
chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry of considered as a general doctrine, are law in this jurisdiction;
"Chattel mortgages," that is to say, mortgages of personal but it must not be forgotten that under given conditions
property executed in the manner and form prescribed in the property may have character different from that imputed to it
statute. The building of strong materials in which the rice- in said articles. It is undeniable that the parties to a contract
cleaning machinery was installed by the "Compañía Agrícola may by agreement treat as personal property that which by
Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact that the parties nature would be real property; and it is a f familiar
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant,
considered personal property. Other situations are a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right,
constantly arising, and from time to time are presented to unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
this court, in which the proper classification of one thing or
another as real or personal property may be said to be 4. Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil., 663,
doubtful. No. 41643 July 31, 1935
Ponente: VILLA-REAL, J
Setting: Mabalacat, Pampanga
3. Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil., 709, No.
40411 August 7, 1935 Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central
Ponente: MALCOLM, J. situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the
Setting: Davao defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first
mortgage constituted on two parcels of land "with all its
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
concession. However, the land upon which the business telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part
was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the or is a necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel
sawmill company erected a building which housed the railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future
machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used exist in said lots.
were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the capacity
machines which were placed' and mounted on foundations of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and
of cement. equipment, so that instead of milling 150 tons daily, it could
In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional
Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., was machinery and equipment was approximately P100,000. In
the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the order to carry out this plan, B. A. Green, president of said
plaintiff in that action against the def endant in that action; a corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B. H. Berkenkotter, to
writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said
question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No machinery and equipment, promising to reimburse him as
third party claim was filed for such properties at the time of soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the
the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.
plaintiff herein.
Issue: Whether or not subject machines are considered
Issue: Whether or not machines are considered personal permanent
property
Held: Yes. The installation of a machinery and equipment in
Held: Yes. Machinery which is movable in its nature only a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the industrial
functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes as personal or movable property if so stipulated in the document
a permanent improvement on said sugar central and of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for foreclosure,
subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of
constituted thereon. the parties to the contract of mortgage.
The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and
equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him
the purchase money to hold them as security for the
payment of the latter's credit, and to refrain from mortgaging
or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the permanent
6. Lavarro vs. Labitoria, 54 Phil. 788, No. 32030 July 2, 1980
character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment
with the central. Ponente: OSTRAND, J. Lavarro vs. Labitoria

@Allisson Lindayag Setting: Barrio of Mangilag, municipality of Candelaria,


17. Bacharach (64 phil 681) Province of Tayabas.
19. US vs Carlos (21 SCRA 553)
In 1916 a tract of coconut land was registered in favor of Sofia
and the defendants in the present action. Subsequently, in the
same year, the herein defendants brought an action for the
5. 9 SCRA 631, No L-18456 November 30, 1963
partition of the land with its improvements. The action was finally
Ponente: PAREDES, J. terminated in 1927 and S was awarded 68,877 square meters of
land and 850 coconut palms as her share. Shortly afterwards, the
Setting: Bo. San Roque, Tarlac, Tarlac present action was brought by Sofia and her two daughters to
recover compensation for improvements consisting of coconut
Facts: Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales (married
palms and alleged to have been planted by Sofia and her first
to Gregorio Pineda), borrowed from plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro.
husband.
As security,y defendants executed deed of real estate mortgage
his two-story residential house, having a floor area of 912 square Issue: Whether the coconut land is property of the persons to
meters, erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Vicente Castro and his whom the land is adjudicated.
one motor truck. Because of failure to pay, plaintiff filed a
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages. Held: Yes. Trees and plants annexed to the land are parts thereof
and unless rights or interests in such trees or plants are claimed
Issue: Whether the subject property belonging to another is in the registration proceedings by others, they become the
considered movable property property of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated. By timely
proceedings in equity, matters of that character, if fraudulent, may
Held: Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to
sometimes be corrected, , but in the present case, the plaintiffs
another person, it may be the subject-matter of a chattel mortgage
Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara did not prosecute their alleged superior to and cannot be made subject to the said materialman's
rights until eleven years after the registration of the property, and lien.
it is obvious that whatever rights they may have had are now lost
by prescription.

7. Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc., 103 Phil. 98,
No. L-10817-18 February 28, 1958 8. Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. vs. Wearever Textile
Ponente: FELIX, J. Mills, Inc., 122 SCRA 296, No. L-58469 May 16, 1983

Setting: Balayan, Batangas Ponente: DE CASTRO, J.

López delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of Setting: Rizal
the Plaza Theatre. Due to failure of Vicente Orosa and
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the private respondent
corporation to pay the lumber, Lopez filed before a complaint Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and assigned several
praying that defendants be sentenced to pay him jointly and receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase
severally the sum of P41,771.35, with legal interest from the filing Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned,
of the action; that in case defendants fail to pay the same, that the
private respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw
building and the land covered by OCT No. O-391 owned by the materials inventory as well as a machinery described as an Artos
corporation be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
applied to said indebtedness.
Upon private respondent’s default, petitioner filed a petition for
Issue: Whether the land can be made subject to the said extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it. The CA
materialman's lien. held that machinery in suit cannot be the subject of replevin, much
Held: No. Materialman's lien attaches merely to the immovable less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant
property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was to Article 415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to
incurred and in the case at bar, the lien in favor of appellant for the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from
the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the respondents plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete
building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of floor.
the obligor. Thus, the interest of the mortgagee over the land is
Issue: Whether subject machinery permanently attached to the high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel
ground the machinery is to be considered as personal property towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its
hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila.
Held: Yes. Examining the records of the instant case, We find no Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon
logical justification to exclude and rule out, as the appellate court City, on land belonging to it. On 15 November 1955, City
did, the present case from the application of the abovequoted Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for
pronouncement. If a house of strong materials, like what was real property tax under Tax Declaration 31992 and 15549. After
involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as denying Meralco’s petition to cancel these declarations an appeal
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage was taken by Meralco to the Board of Assessment Appeals of
thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no Quezon City, which required Meralco to pay the amount of
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the
no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and years 1952 to 1956. Meralco paid the amount under protest, and
becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals which
likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so rendered a decision on 29 December 1958, ordering the
agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel cancellation of the said tax declarations and the City Treasurer of
mortgage. Quezon City to refund to Meralco the sum of P11,651.86. The
motion for reconsideration having been denied, on 22 April 1959,
the petition for review was filed.
9. Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R. No. L-
15334. January 31, 1964.] Issue: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company
constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax.
Facts: On 20 October 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted
Act 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a Held: The steel towers of an electric company don’t constitute
franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street real property for the purposes of real property tax. Steel towers
railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article
Manila and its suburbs to the person or persons making the most 415. The steel towers or supports do not come within the objects
favorable bid. Charles M. Swift was awarded the said franchise on mentioned in paragraph 1, because they do not constitute
March 1903, the terms and conditions of which were embodied in buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not
Ordinance 44 approved on 24 March 1903. Meralco became the constructions analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As
transferee and owner of the franchise. Meralco’s electric power is per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and
generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which
Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna place to place. They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as
to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and
they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Each of which may not be so considered immobilized by destination
these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal.
strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by In the case at bar, the tools and equipment in question are by
screwing the same. These steel towers or supports do not also fall their nature not essential and principal elements of petitioner’s
under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks.
instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not They are merely incidentals.
intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not
engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel
supports or towers are constructed. The Supreme Court affirmed 11. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF
the decision appealed from, with costs against the petitioners. ASSESSMENT APPEALS (114 SCRA 273)

FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel


plates wielded and assembled on the spot. Their bot toms
10. MINDANAO BUS COMPANY V. CITY ASSESSOR rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad
AND TREASURER as immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks
6 SCRA 197 merely sit on its foundation. The municipal treasurer of
Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks,
FACTS: based on the report of the Board of

Petitioner is engaged in a public utility business, solely Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose this assessment as
engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor they averred that the tanks are not real properties.
trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main
office and branch offices. To be found in their offices are ISSUE: Are the Tanks Real Properties?
machineries and equipment, which were assessed by the City HELD: While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the
Assessor as real properties. land, they ma y nevertheless be considered as improvements
ISSUE: Are Machineries and Equipment Real Properties? in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. For purposes of taxation, the term real property may
HELD: Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of include things, which should generally be considered as
law must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or personal property. it is familiar phenomenon to see things
works without which such industry or works would be unable classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on
to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was general principle may be considered as personal property.
established. We may here distinguish those movables, which
are essential and principal elements of an industry, from those
12. CALTEX PHILS. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals
ASSESSMENT APPEALS (114 SCRA 296) of the Province of Zambales. However, the appeal was dismissed
mainly on the ground of the petitioner's failure to pay the realty
FACTS: The City Assessor characterized the items in gas taxes that fell due during the pendency of the appeal.
stations of petitioner as taxable realty. These items included
underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water The petitioner elevated the matter to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, one of the herein respondents. In its
tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, etc. These items are
decision dated March 22, 1990, the Board reversed the dismissal
not owned by the lessor of the land wherein the equipment of the appeal but, agreed that the tailings dam and the lands
are installed. Upon expiration of the lease agreement, the submerged thereunder shall be subject to realty tax.
equipment should be returned in good condition.
For purposes of taxation the dam is considered as real
ISSUE: whether the gas station equipment and machinery property as it comes within the object mentioned in Article 415 of
permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement the New Civil Code, It is a construction adhered to the soil which
should be subject to the realty tax? cannot be separated or detached without breaking the material or
causing destruction on the land upon which it is attached. The
HELD: Yes. The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to immovable nature of the dam as an improvement which
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and which determines its character as real property, hence taxable under
Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which have Issues:
been attached and fixed permanently to the gas station site or 1. Whether or not the tailings dam is subject to realty tax?
embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery 2. Whether or not it be considered as immovable property?
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property
Tax Code.
HELD:
Yes, it is subject to realty tax and it is considered an
immovable property.
13. ENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF The petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may
ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF ZAMBALES, PROVINCIAL be considered realty within the meaning of Article 415. It insists,
ASSESSOR OF ZAMBALES, PROVINCE OF ZAMBALES, and however, that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MARCELINO, respondents. separate and independent property because it does not constitute
[January 29, 1993, G.R. No. 106041] an "assessable improvement" on the mine although a
considerable sum may have been spent in constructing and
maintaining it.
Facts:
On 1985, Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of
said properties in issue as taxable improvements. The "real property" and simply says that the realty tax is imposed on
"real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax
improvements affixed or attached to real property." In the absence Code.
of such a definition, applying Article 415 of the Civil Code, which
states that the following are considered immovables: Section No. Hence, petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
1 Lands, buildings and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil; Section no. 3 Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. 14. SIBAL v. VALDEZ
50 PHIL 512
Even without the tailings dam, the petitioner's mining
operation can still be carried out because the primary function of
the dam is merely to receive and retain the wastes and water FACTS: The Deputy Sheriff, through a writ of execution, attached
coming from the mine. There is no allegation that the water the personal properties of Sibal, including the sugar cane in
coming from the dam is the sole source of water for the mining question in the 7 parcels of land described in a complaint. The
operation so as to make the dam an integral part of the mine. In personal properties were then sold in public auction, including the
fact, as a result of the construction of the dam, the petitioner can sugar canes. Included also in those attached were real properties
now impound and recycle water without having to spend for the wherein 8 out of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin were
building of a water reservoir. bought by Valdez through the public auction. He also bought the
sugar cane in question.
And as the petitioner itself points out, even if the
petitioner's mine is shut down or ceases operation, the dam may ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real
still be used for irrigation of the surrounding areas. property.

From the definitions and the cases cited in relation to this HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products.
case, it would appear that whether a structure constitutes an The Supreme Court of Louisiana provided that standing crops are
improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would depend considered as part of the land to which they are attached but the
upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and immovability provided for is only one in abstract. The existence of
use, The expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a
does not imply that the improvement must be used perpetually but gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable
only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has quoad the right acquired therein.
been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is
intended to remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is -A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the
still used for the said purpose. immovable. It belongs to the lessee and may be sold by him.
-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as
The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within personal property.
the definition of an "improvement" because it is permanent in
character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's – Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when
mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its produced by annual cultivation, is not part of realty.
character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code and
⁃ Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been
modified by Sec. 450 of Code of Civil Procedure and Act 2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description
no. 1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and contained in the document is sufficient. The law (sec. 7, Act 1508)
execution and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall be
have the nature of personal property. such as to enable the parties to the mortgage, or any other
person, after reasonable inquiry and investigation, to identify the
⁃ same. In the case at bar, “his half interest in the drug business
known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123
15. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER and 125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is
V. RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 September 1922) sufficient.
1. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to
mortgage property in possession Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of
FACTS: the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was neither the debtor, nor himself, is in possession of the
mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of
registered in due time in the registry of property, while another the mortgage has been, legally in possession of the surety
mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September company
1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, 2. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon
the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. property - In no way can the mortgage executed be given
entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as
mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but there was a mere stipulation about personal security
Ramirez did. during said date, but not a mortgage upon property, and
much less upon the property in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property

16. CHUA GUAN v. SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA


RULING: Yes. 62 PHIL 472(1935)
TOPIC: Collateral Transfers
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to PONENTE: Butte, J.
the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in
the business, such interest is a personal property capable of FACTS
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the 1. On June 18, 1931, Gonzalo H. Co Toco, the owner of 5,894
subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. shares of the capital stock of Samahang Magsasaka Inc.
(Sec. 7, Act 1508.) represented by 9 certificates having a par value of P5 per share
mortgaged said shares to Chua Chiu to guarantee the payment of 8. As special defense, the defendants refused to cancel said
a debt of P20,000 due on or before 19 June 1932. certificates (Co Toco’s) and to issue new ones in the name of
Chua Guan because prior to the date of the latter’s demand (4
2. The said certificates of stock were delivered with the mortgage February 1933), 9 attachments had been issued and served and
to the mortgagee, Chua Chiu. The said mortgage was duly noted on the books of the corporation against Co Toco’s shares
registered in the office of the registered of deeds of Manila on 23 and Chua Guan objected to having these attachments noted on
June 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on 30 the new certificates which he demanded.
September 1931.
9. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from,
3. On 28 November 1931, Chua Chiu assigned all his right and holding that the attaching creditors are entitled to priority over the
interest in said mortgage to the Chua Guan and the assignment in defectively registered mortgage of the appellant.
the office of the register of deeds in the City of Manila on 28
December 1931, and in the office of the said corporation on 4 ISSUE:
January 1932. Whether or not the registration of said chattel mortgage in the
registry of chattel mortgages in the office of the register of deeds
4. Co Toco defaulted in the payment of said debt at maturity and of Manila, under date of July 23,1931, give constructive notice to
Chua Guan foreclosed said mortgage and delivered the the said attaching creditors.
certificates of stock and copies of the mortgage and assignment HELD:
to the sheriff of the City of Manila in order to sell the said shares YES. The attaching creditors are entitled to priority over the
at public auction. The sheriff auctioned said shares on 22 defectively registered mortgage of the appellant.
December 1932, and the plaintiff having been the highest bidder RATIO:
for the sum of P14,390, the sheriff executed in his favor a 1. Section 4 of Act No. 1508 provides two ways for executing a
certificate of sale of said shares. valid chattel mortgage which shall be effective against third
persons:
5. The plaintiff tendered the certificates of stock standing in the
a. The possession of the property mortgage must be
name of Co Toco to the proper officers of the corporation for
delivered to and retained by the mortgagee
cancellation and demanded that they issue new certificates in the
b. Without such delivery, the mortgage must be recorded in
name of Chua Guan. The officers (the individual defendants)
the proper office or offices of the register or registers of
refused and still refuse to issue said new shares in the name of
deeds.
Chua Guan.
2. As to the proper place of registration of such a mortgage. -
6. An action for writ of mandamus was filed with the CFI Nueva Section 4 provides that in such a case the mortgage resides at
Ecija, praying that the defendants transfer the said 5,894 shares the time of making the same or, if he is a non-resident, in the
of stock to the plaintiff by cancelling the old certificates and province in which the property is situated; and it also provides
issuing new ones in their stead. that if the property is situated in a different province from that in
which the mortgagor resides the mortgage shall be recorded both
7. The parties entered into a stipulation in which the defendants in the province of the mortgagor's residence and in the province
admitted all of the allegations of the complaint and the plaintiff where the property is situated.
admitted all of the special defenses in the answer of the 3. With respect to a chattel mortgage of shares of stock of a
defendants, and on this stipulation they submitted the case for corporation - Registration in the province of the owner's domicile
decision. should be sufficient, those who lend on such security would be
confronted with the practical difficulty of being compelled not only intention and to consummate the juristic act without necessity for
to search the records of every province in which the mortgagor registration.
might have been domiciled but also every province in which a
chattel mortgage by any former owner of such shares might be CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
registered. It was not the intention of the legislature to put this 1. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution,
almost prohibitive impediment upon the hypothecation of shares attachment and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the
of stock in view of the great volume of business that is done on owner of a certificate but the domicile of the corporation
the faith of the pledge of shares of stock as collateral. which is decisive.
4. It is a general rule that for purposes of execution, attachment 2. Loans upon stock securities should be facilitated in order
and garnishment, it is not the domicile of the owner of a certificate to foster economic development. The transfer by
but the domicile of the corporation which is decisive. endorsement and delivery of a certificate with intention to
5. The only safe way to accomplish the hypothecation of share of pledge the shares covered thereby should be sufficient to
stock of a Philippine corporation is for the creditor to insist on the give legal effect to that intention and to consummate the
assignment and delivery of the certificate and to obtain the juristic act without necessity for registration.
transfer of the legal title to him on the books of the corporation by
the cancellation of the certificate and the issuance of a new one
to him.
6. To the debtor, this may be unsatisfactory because it leaves the 18. G.R. No. L-16218
creditor as the ostensible owner of the shares and the debtor is
forced to rely upon the honesty and solvency of the creditor. The ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO
mere possession and retention of the debtor's certificate by the BICERRA, CAYETANO BICERRA, LINDA BICERRA,
creditor gives some security to the creditor against an attempted PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA BICERRA, plaintiffs-
voluntary transfer by the debtor, provided the by-laws of the appellants,
corporation expressly enact that transfers may be made only vs.
upon the surrender of the certificate. TOMASA TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, defendants-
6. Section 35 of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) - shares of appellees
stock "may be transferred by delivery of the certificate endorsed
by the owner or his attorney in fact or other person legally Ponente:Justice Makalintal
authorized to make the transfer." The use of the verb "may" does Date: November 29, 1962
not exclude the possibility that a transfer may be made in a Place: Lagangilang, Abra
different manner, thus leaving the creditor in an insecure position
even though he has the certificate in his possession. Moreover, Facts:
the shares still standing in the name of the debtor on the books of
the corporation will be liable to seizure by attachment or levy on The appellants (bicerra) were the owners of the house,
execution at the instance of other creditors worth P200.00 built on land owned by them situated in the said
7. Loans upon stock securities should be facilitated in order to municipality Lagangilang. In January 1957, appellees(teneza &
foster economic development. The transfer by endorsement and barbosa) forcibly demolished the house and claimed to be the
delivery of a certificate with intention to pledge the shares owners. Such resulted to dismantling of the materials of the house
covered thereby should be sufficient to give legal effect to that and were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant of the
place as a result of appellate's(teneza & barbosa) refusal to Engineer of Marikina City, vs.ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE
restore the house or to deliver the material appellants(bicerra. and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY -MARIKINA, INC.,

Upon such appellants (bicerra) filed a complaint for they Ponente: Jose Catral Mendoza (associate Justice)
have suffered actual damages. In such complaint the relief prayed Date : March 12, 2013
for is that "the plaintiffs be declared the owners of the house in Place: Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
question and/or the materials that resulted in its dismantling and
that the defendants (teneza & barbosa) to be ordered to pay the Facts:
sum of P200.00, plus P600.00 as damages, the costs."
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land
However, the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissed the measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina
complaint filed upon the motion of (teneza & barbosa) defendants- Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No.
appellate on the ground that the action was within the exclude and 91537. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the
original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation
Lagangilang, of the same province. Hence, appellants(bicerra) house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly
filed an appeal. sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter
fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along
Issues: the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.

Whether the action involves title to real property and The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of
therefore is cognizable by the Court of First and whether it Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
pertains to the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. of Marikina City 192, enacted Ordinance No. entitled “Regulating
the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Ruling: Marikina.” In 1995 and 1998, 2175 2006 Ordinance Nos. and
were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance
The order appealed from is affirmed. The dismissal of the No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
complaint was proper. A house is classified as immovable
property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five
(Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front
regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, establishments and educational and religious institutions
as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character
as an immovable likewise ceases. Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose
20. G.R. No. 161107 existing
fences and walls do not conform to the specifications herein are
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this
Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her Ordinance
capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City within which to conform, as follows:
Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City (1) Residential houses – eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years The petitioners’ contention that the parking space was for the
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years benefit of the students and patrons of SSA-Marikina is immaterial
(4) Educational institutions – five (5) years8 for the respondents were already providing for sufficient parking in
(public and privately owned) compliance with the standards found that. While the 80% see-thru
fence requirement could run counter to the respondents’ right to
Upon such ordinance the respondents filed petition for prohibition privacy.
with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Ordinance No. 192, as amended, provided for retroactive
Marikina, Branch 273. They argued that the petitioners were application. It held, however, that such retroactive effect should
acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, not impair the respondents’ vested substantive rights over the
asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 perimeter walls, which would be destroyed by the demolition of
Constitution and that demolishing their fence and constructing it the walls and the seizure of the strips of land.
six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at least 1,808.34
square meters and permanent loss of their beneficial use. Ruling of the CA

The implementation of the ordinance on their property would be CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC
tantamount to an appropriation of property without due process of decision did not justify the exercise of police power, as it did not
law; goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the
criminality did not exist. Petitioners, on the other hand, countered respondents’ property without due process of law. It, thus, ruled
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it
of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of clearly invaded the personal and property
public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public rights of the respondents and “for being unreasonable, and undue
convenience and general prosperity petitioners. restraint of trade.

Ruling of the RTC The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter setback
Grant the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition provision for parking was a legal easement, the use and
commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing ownership of which would remain with, and inure to, the benefit of
or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property the respondents for whom the easement was primarily intended. It
and held petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or found that the real intent of the setback provision was to make the
implementing Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994. parking space free for use by the public, considering that such
would cease to be for the exclusive use of the school and its
RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners students as it would be situated outside school premises and
to demolish the fence at the SSC property in Marikina and to beyond the school administration’s control.
move it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of
property which could only be done through the exercise of Upon such petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under
eminent domain. It held that the petitioners could not take the Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
respondents’ property under the guise of police power to evade December 1, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
the payment of just compensation.
Issues: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002
declaring that city ordinance no. 192, Series of 1994 is not a valid Decision of the Regional Trial Court in SCA Case No. 2000-381-
exercise of police power but an exercise of the city of the power of MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
eminent domain and such implementation is violative of Due WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is
Process clause hereby issued commanding the respondents to permanently
desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of
SUPREME COURT EN BANC Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the
RULING: petitioners' property in question located in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila.
The petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private 21. Serg’s v. PCI Leasing
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705.
August 22, 2000
The court used rational relationship test to determine whether
there is a valid exercise of police power. (1) the interests of the FACTS:
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably an application for a writ of replevin.
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and
oppressive upon individuals. Upon such the court held that the deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5
petitioners lack concurrence of these two requisites, the police days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one
private rights and a violation of the due process clause. machinery, with word that he would return for other machineries.
Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective
They may contend that the ultimate goal of this objective is clearly order to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties
However, the means employed by the petitioners, is unduly were still personal and therefore can still be subjected to seizure
oppressive to private rights and is not reasonably necessary for and writ of replevin.
the accomplishment of this purpose. Iit is clear that the petitioners Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were
were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.
No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in affirming Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the
petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the Agreement of the parties,
and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in held that the subject machines were personal property, and that
Marikina City. they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled
that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the true intention of the contracting parties."
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by
virtue of immobilization. The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects
of the Writ of Replevin
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory
were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because
they were in fact real property.

Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs 22. G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007
of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only. FELS Energy, Inc.
vs Province of Batangas and the Office of the Provincial
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, Assessor of Batangas
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in
a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet Facts:
the needs of the said industry or works January 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar
Energy over MW diesel engine power barges in Batangas for a
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the period of 5 years. Subsequently, Polar assigned its rights under
Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on the agreement to FELS. NPC initially opposed.
their own land.They were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry.Hence, although each of them was August 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become taxes on the barges. FELS referred the matter to NPC reminding
“immobilized by destination because they are essential and it of its obligation under the agreement to pay the real estate
principal elements in the industry.” taxes. NPC sought for reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied.
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such NPC filed a petition to the Local Board Assessment Appeals. The
stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming provincial Assessor averred that the barges were real property for
otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is the purpose of taxation. LBAA still denied the petition filed by NPC
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact and ordered FELS to pay the taxes.
found therein.
LBAA Ruling: power plant facilities are considered real property
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The because they are installed at a specific location with a character
PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal of permanency. The owner of the barges-FELS is a private
property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof corporation-is the one being taxed, not NPC. The agreement will
may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or not justify the exemption of FELS.
attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to FELS then appealed to Central BAA. CBAA rendered s decision
what is permanent.” finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.
entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under
CBAA Ruling: the power barges belong to NPC since they are Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:
actually used by it. FELS appealed before the CA but was denied
as well. “OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the
Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and
Held: equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges
YES. The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and which have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall
are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the inevitable operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose
conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was dismissed for of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity.”
failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Tax assessments
by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment
with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A.
Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be
acquired expertise in their field, are generally binding and actually, directly and exclusively used by the government owned
conclusive upon the Court; we will not assume to interfere with the or controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still
sensible exercise of the judgment of men especially trained in cannot find solace.
appraising property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a
sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. We find no
reason to depart from this rule in this case. 23. Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009)
Case Digest
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that Personal Property
“docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or Facts:
coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges
are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a
the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the complaint for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call
needs of said industry or work. their friends and relatives in the Philippines using PLDT's
facilities and equipment.
Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are
exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. Issue:
7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively used by
petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing
engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of electric telecommunication services is a personal property under Article
power. 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of Held:
the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is the
No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties
not a personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal which the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the
Code. properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to
Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both be alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
tangible and intangible properties but must be considered with the The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the
word "take" in the law. There is "taking" of personal property, and case of Republic v Hebierto.
theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be
possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if such allowed
property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The
statutory definition of "taking" clearly indicates that not all personal Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we
properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is would need to dissect them. The case settles down the correct
that only movable properties, which have physical or material interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper
subjects of theft. Movable properties under Article 308 of the It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48
Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or (b) vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its
interest to which they relate to. While the rights or interests are prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights.
properties, they are not considered personal properties under One did not repeal the other.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
and not the proper subjects of theft because they are without form The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is
or substance. Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a
case where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the
original registration. Thus:
24. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
August 6, 2017Light The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is
G.R. No. 179987 satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already
classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents
Facts: fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for presumption of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative,
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an
Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he independent state.
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
than 30 years. property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
by his great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the The Director of Forestry, Hon. Teofilo Santos and The
reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the District Forester, Mr. Ambrocio Junio vs. Judge Mariano
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. V. Benedicto, Presiding Judge Branch V, Court of First
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a Instance of Nueva Ecija and The New Timberland
mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of Corporation, represented by Nicanor Abes
the New Civil Code.

It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the 61 Phil 644, G.R. No. L-29956 May 5, 1981
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can
be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Gen. Tinio, Nueva Ecija
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial Facts: The issue arose when respondent The New
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Timberland cut and haul 417 pieces of logs absent the
Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or required approval of a proposed license by the Secretary of
legislative declaring lands to be such. Agriculture and Natural Resources. The logs were deposited
Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a in defendant’s log ponds under the care of Nicanor Aves.
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and The Secretary of Agriculture disapproved the proposed
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired
license and such decision was communicated to
through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar: respondent. However, respondent Judge rendered judgment
disregarding such lack of approval by the then Secretary of
Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations Agriculture and Natural Resources.
presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was Issue: Whether or not the respondent may commence
presented. logging operations without the required license.
Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was Held: The respondent Judge’s ruling is erroneous since no
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no license was issued to respondent. Such license was not
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use issuable upon the sole authority of the Director of Forestry
service or for the development of the national evidence, but is subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification and Natural Resources. Such view is supported by the
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
Forestry Administrative Order No. 11, Section 14 which
public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is requires that for a licensee to do what was done by private
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. respondent there must be an approval of the Secretary of
Petition Denied. Agriculture the proposed timber license involving the cutting
of 1,000 cubic meters or more for a period not exceeding 4
years.
In this case since the license proposed to be issued to
respondent corporation was not approved it ia not a license
granted in accordance with the regulation. It is a mere
proposal conferring no right upon the respondent to reclassification that the land in question is disposable or
commence the conduct of logging operations. alienable. Simplicio Binalay, Ponciano Gannaban, Nicanor
Macutay, Domingo Rosales, Gregorio Argonza,
Eustaquio Baua, Florentino Rosales, Teodoro
Republic of the Philippines vs. IAC Mabborang, Patricio Mabborang and Fulgencio Mora v
209 SCRA 90, GR No. 73015 Guillermo Manalo and CA
June 4, 1990 195 SCRA 374, GR No. 92161
Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras, Bo de Ayuti, Lucban March 18, 1991
Quezon Tumauini, Isabela

Facts: Private respondents filed an action against petitioner Facts: Judge Taccad owned a parcel of land – on the west,
for quieting of title over said property located in Sitio de bordering on the Cagayan river, on the east, the national
Malapianbato alias Arras Bo. De Ayuti Lucban Quezon road. The western portion would occasionally go under the
containing an area of 1,600,000 square meters or 166 waters and reappear during dry season. Manalo purchased
hectares. Respondents claimed that they acquires said the land. A relocation survey was conducted during the rainy
property by virtue of a document which they alleged to be a season so the survey didn’t cover the submerged land. The
Spanish titlw originally issued in the name of Bernardo sketch would show that the river branches through the west
Merchan. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that and the east, leaving a strip of land. The land was then
trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter surveyed into 2 lots. One of these is being claimed by
because the land is part of a forest reserve established by Manalo through accretion.
Proclamation No 42 which declared the areas as part of the
Mts. Banahaw – San Cristobal National Park. Issue: whether or not the submerged land forms part of the
disposable or alienable land.
Issue: whether or not the subject parcel of land declared part
of the forest reserve in 1921 and later on national park in Held: According to the Law of Waters the natural bed or
1941 may be subject of private appropriation and channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its
registration. waters during the highest floods. This being the case, the
subject land couldn’t have been sold to Manalo, being part
Held: The land in question was proclaimed part of forest of public domain.
reserve by virtue of Proclamation 42 dated Oct. 14, 1921.
This proclamation was superseded by Proclamation 716
dated May 26, 1941 establishing the Mts. Banahaw – San
Cristobal National Park. It is settled rule that forest lands or
forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession unless reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable. In this case there is no proof or
Teofilo and Margarita Villarico v CA
309 SCRA 193, GR No. 105912; June 28, 1999
Ubiha, Meycauayan, Bulacan

Facts: Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title


over a parcel of land to which they allege that they
absolutely own the land. This was opposed by a person who
posed himself also to be the rightful owner of the land, as
well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject
land is part of forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial
and appellate court dismissed application of petitioner.
Issue: whether or not said property still forms part of public
domain.
Held: There has been no showing that a declassification has
been made of the land in question as disposable or
alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants
have not introduced any evidence which would have led the
Court a quo to rule otherwise.
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.
Possession thereof, no matter how long, doesn’t ripen to
registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable and disposable portions of the public
domain.

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