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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: (b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in
the amount of P8,496.55.[4]
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,[1] dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26,
Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1991, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law. The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam.
He testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga
The factual background of the case is as follows: became his regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City,
Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8]
Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as follows: sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
issued by Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another,
No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the
checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11]
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and
when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No.
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there
they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
amount of the check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature;[13]
of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in
of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the issuance thereof.[14]
the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters
Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount. spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The
Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the
reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
imprisonment and fine, as follows: violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not
make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
each of them, and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of
of UCPB Check No. 284743; Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be
held to be the act of the other.
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to
one (1) year and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals
Check No. 284744; and, denied the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22]
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for Hence, the present petition.
each of them and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB
Check No. 106136; Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE
reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00 DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED
representing actual expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTERS
P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount of P30,302.10 which is the total ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without subsidiary PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
With Costs against the accused.
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN
SO ORDERED.[15] VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE
LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand, WHICH STATES:
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC
erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; are or in the future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
issuance thereof.[17] unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE
petitioner.[18] It held that the provisions of the penal code were made COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF
applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court in People vs. PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE SUPPLETORY
Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs.
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases
issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven involved the suppletory application of principles under the then Penal Code
by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S.
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code,
provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks. crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No.
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal 1461, the Opium Law.
Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg.
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33]
provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to
such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of
clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
legal provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the
generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter
should specifically provide the contrary. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed
any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the
lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was
merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of weakness of the evidence for the defense. The proof against him must survive
Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid
not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the
crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co- act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption
present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be of innocence.
stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral
conclusive evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must
conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite
is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.[39] All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with
moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners
Mandao:[40] innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision,
accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443
specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting
considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET
may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
judgment of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence. The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from
which we quote:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the
12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos.
are AFFIRMED. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the
Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
SO ORDERED.2
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T.
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion ROMUALDEZ
in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R.
Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases Nos. 143618-41, entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The
which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.)" promulgated on July
February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June
first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the
thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because the
Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the said
Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription. Decision has become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these
cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in archives.
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter
exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June
investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash,
on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the
aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. Sandiganbayan, we held that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for
defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in
certification in the information was found inadequate, or in People v. sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.
Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed
cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos.
proceedings.8 28031-28049 x x x.13
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-
Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v.
the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence void. Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared therein that:
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it
applicable. Thus: abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that
prosecution; exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary
based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i) 10 of this Rule. investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its
criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another objective of affording petitioner his right to due process. 15
information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v.
Court of Appeals11 that: Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first
resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the assailed
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or against the petitioner"16 and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered
substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the prescribed."17 We reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. x Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before
x x.12 he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 19 which ground
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised
the instant cases was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally
charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases investigated by the extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the
Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which have already merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of
been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. prescription.
As we have previously stated:
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal
cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision,
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21 In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may
failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 be read as:
during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the
period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of "Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
Foreign Affairs. of the violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof;"
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall
prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of or as:
People v. Pacificador22 that:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was proceedings for its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis
only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, supplied)25
as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to
being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be
run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the
given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the
or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23 petitioner with the PCGG.
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses
Desierto26 this Court already took note that:
allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982
until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides: were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for on Behest Loans.27
its investigation and punishment.
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the
informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting
the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus:
silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326
did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
of Article 91. Thus, as previously held: cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is
no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. 34
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez
the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is
judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation, judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body
not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary
attention has been called to the omission.28 investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in
the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of
PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan prescription.
to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already prescribed. PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the
such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the
prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him. latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the
prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
investigation of cases not falling within its competence.30 This Court, in its Archipelago."
resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioner’s cases in the Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –
Sandiganbayan to take"31declared invalid –
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 [special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary."
offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article
assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.32 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in
Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run only There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of
after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000. the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the
decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest
has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the
applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised
reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People. Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matteras evident
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:
Majority Opinion and argues that –
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of
prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the State’s violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the
jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced
fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the
jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
the accused to the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The
prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the
Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or special law.
prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction
to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of
unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice. the Revised Penal Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and
"accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
With all due respect, we beg to disagree. Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although it referred to
the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not
the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines
"special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not
as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases.
As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that – included in the Penal Code".
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in ruling that – investigation and punishment.
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those against the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies. are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the accused is
3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No.
prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can 3326.
be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326,
did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To
elaborate, -
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code
suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
"special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be the term "special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to
legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to Philippines. Thus –
those expressly mentioned.41
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes
Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning
laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x
point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the legislature made It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in
its intention clear and was thus categorical that – the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In
fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a
general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the
All violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply
years.
says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other
law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the provisions of
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the said code.43
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant
3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind
contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly and the nature of prescription of penal offenses –
states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a ground for
the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a "We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in
situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that
directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of
special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two
legal provisions must prevail over general ones. contending parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is
no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling right to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is,
of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute,
our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained – and declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.'
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion
such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to
the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and
judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute,
not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed
attention has been called to the omission.44 and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently
of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril
limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural
lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that
retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or extending the
prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such
prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony committed
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts
vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the
of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot be
utilized to support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the prescriptive period activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
in a special law continues to run while the accused is abroad. evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes.
Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause of
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply be implied nor
cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly
while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on
and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused. investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring
the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner
prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily implied. The prescriptive Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before
period may only be prevented from operating or may only be tolled for reasons the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
explicitly provided by the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that: GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation
of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the
accused is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the SO ORDERED.
nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty
and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case
of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute
of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence
inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of
records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the
manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is
counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated
evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to
cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.49
participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to
the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment the do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any fabrication.
peradventure of doubt.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest
was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society The penalties for offenses under Sections
and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by involved is in any of the following
Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience quantities:
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve. xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows: shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the
xxx xxx xxx quantity.
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, 1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four
Distribution and Transportation of tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact,
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article
as a broker in any of such transactions. 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and
shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The
xxx xxx xxx execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses
since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is falsification.55
hereby amended to read as follows:
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary
Confiscation and Forfeiture of the question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be
imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus: correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be 3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty
the accused has applied for it, just as would also all shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
penalty. complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them
penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the
executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, maximum period.58
procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the
matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
habeas corpus.56 aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty
appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship. transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code
and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal
further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby,
fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity. It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context
of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph
penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, later.
another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article
and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to aggravating circumstance.
be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability 5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in
should be taken into account. the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the
the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the
Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws American regime.
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code
in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code. and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall prima
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer
special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses
where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and
special law against, such supplementary application. fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in manner as therein provided.63
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and
of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic
speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto
mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold
penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which
the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, could never have been the intendment of Congress.
reclusion perpetua or death.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974),
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that
when committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon —
things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when
committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the
the carnapped vehicle is killed. Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed
which is in terms of the classification and duration of
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is
are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear. subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104
of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties
the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated
in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in . . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions
the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to
special laws of the same formulation. special laws, this Court held that where the special law
expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other application of the provisions of the Code . . . .
statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the
Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in
1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the
the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties
under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of
experience in the administration of criminal laws." prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree
(Emphasis ours.)66 lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and censure remain in the scale.
prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained. Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut
the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the
lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the
rational limits. concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently 6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the ascertained.
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
contemplated by the legislature. indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article
71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature
of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws
the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion,
holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.72 The "minimum"
expositio.69 sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and
not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his
in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now minimum sentence.
in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even
the offense." (Emphasis ours.) A divergent pedantic application would not involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in
only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui the judicial teapot.
haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only
skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of
of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should
death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the correccional, as the maximum thereof.
law states is "life imprisonment".
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that
under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have
been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related vs.
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the
accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
QUISUMBING, J.: convicted as follows:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in xxx
CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the
Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for 5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces
violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3 her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under
Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering
the 1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the
Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next
petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads: degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B.
Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right
during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, of suffrage.
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member- Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders
Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of from the court.
Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, No pronouncement as to costs.
did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six IT IS SO ORDERED.5
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. modification the RTC Decision, thus,
008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of affirmed with modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by
Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
SO ORDERED.6
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE of criminal intent be valid defenses?
RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they
WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE. other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the
other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not
II inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they
are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
III
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa
WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE
DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD. xxx
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of
corresponding machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected
the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As
listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was
the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes. to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
appearing in all Statement of Votes.
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received
by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any
senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section
27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by
a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.20
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of Violation of Anti- On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the
Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential Decree 1612), committed as follows: Regional Trial Court of Davao city, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY.
above-mentioned accused, with intent to gain for himself, wilfully, Trial ensued and on May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the
unlawfully and feloniously purchased and received dismantled farrowing dispositive portion of which reads:
crates made of GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00, knowing the same to be
the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of fencing, in violation PREMISES CONSIDERED and the evidence being sufficient, this Court
of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice of the finds ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., GUILTY, beyond reasonable
owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Lourdes Du. doubt of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 and hereby sentences
him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years, Eight (8) Months, One (1) Day as
Contrary to law. minimum to Seven (7) Years and Four (4) Months as maximum of
Prision Mayor with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
Davao City, Philippines, January 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.[2]
(SGD.) ANTONINA B. ESCOVILLA
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On May
4th Asst. City Fiscal[1] 10, 1993, the appellate court promulgated its decision[3] affirming the
judgment of the trial court.
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao
City using the business name Dunlao Enterprise. Hence, this petition.
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Petitioner states that the appellate court erred:
Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its
proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioners premises together with (A) IN NOT FINDING THAT AT LEAST TWO (2) ELEMENTS OF
police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify THE CRIME CHARGED, NAMELY, THE ALLEGED PURCHASE BY
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE GI-PIPES AND HIS
from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BEING STOLEN ITEMS, In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao succeed in rebutting
WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE; this presumption?
Q. Now, did you have a talk with that person whom you said arrived The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed[13] on
aboard the jeep which was carrying G.I. pipes? petitioners shelves inside his compound.If petitioner were merely keeping
the farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did
A. We had a talk requesting me that they will just unload the G.I. pipe but he display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that
we have never talked that I am going to buy those G.I. pipes. he is doing so with the intention of selling them.
Q. Can you recall what did the man tell you as he asked you to allow him Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not even bother
to unload those G.I. pipes? to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who deposited the
articles with him. We quote with approval the trial courts observation
A. He told me that he would just leave them temporarily and he will come that:
back but it took a long time, he failed to come back.
The narration of how the items were simply dumped at the compound of
Q. What time, more less, of the day was that when the unloading of the the accused; the fragile and vague statement that the unidentified party
G.I. pipes was made, was it in the morning or afternoon? unloading the items would bring more items at some indefinite date; x x x
that accused caused the pipes to be brought inside the compound of his
A. I can remember it was in the afternoon but I am not certain as to the own volition without any such arrangement with the strangers; that the
time. latter did not return thereafter; that some of the items delivered by the
strangers were distributed in and around the compound and in cabinets
Q. Can you estimate the time in the afternoon? inside the building already cut in short pieces; that accused cannot
produce any proof of ownership by the persons who simply unloaded the
items then left without coming back these are matters which common
sense and sound business practices would normally clarify in the face of The trial court, however, based its decision on the amount of P20,000.00
the express provisions of the Anti-fencing Law.x x x And when the as alleged in the information, instead of the appraisal of P59,000.00 made
accused took it upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound by Mr. Catog. The Court believes that P20,000.00 is a more realistic
items unloaded by total strangers without any agreement as to how the estimate of the value of the stolen pipes. Petitioners claim that the pipes
items would be sold or disposed of nor how soon agreement would be were worth only P200.00 is not credible considering that it took a truck to
compensated, a rather dubious aura of illegitimacy envelopes and taints haul off the entire load from petitioners premises, as testified to by
the entire transaction. Lastly, petitioner questions the value of the stolen Fortunato Mariquit.[15]
articles as found by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. He contends that the pipes were worth only P200.00, not the Q. How did you bring the G.I. pipes from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the
P20,000.00 alleged in the Information. police station?
Prosecution witness Carlito Catog testified on the value of the stolen A. We loaded them in a dump truck owned by Federico Jaca.
pipes stating that, as he worked as purchaser for Lourdes Farms, he was
knowledgeable about their true worth. He also explained the basis of the Q. Now, what was the quantity of the pipes that you were able to bring
estimate of the said articles:[14] from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station?
Q. Now, those G.I. pipes which you said you saw in the premises of Mr. A. Almost a truckload.
Dumlao and which you earlier mentioned as having been identified by
you as coming from Lourdes Farms, can you tell the Honorable Court, Q. What did you say, it was a dump truck?
more or less, how much did you buy those pipes?
A. Almost a load of a dump truck.
A. I arrive at the amount of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) as my
estimate. Q. After reaching the police station, what happened?
Q. Fifty Nine? A. We unloaded it in the police station and we went home.
A. Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00). In line with our ruling in the Lim case,[16] petitioner should pay Lourdes
Farms, Inc. represented by its owner Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of
Q. And can you tell the Honorable Court what is your basis of making P20,000.00 minus the value of the pipes and farrowing crates recovered
this estimate? and in the custody of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
A. The G.I. pipes were made into piggery crates, we use the 3 / 4 inch by hereby AFFIRMED.Petitioner is ordered to pay Lourdes Farms, Inc.,
20 feet G.I. pipes in fabricating. We use 6 lengths of those pipes at the represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value
cost of P80.00 per crate. So, we arrive at the amount of P480.00 of the of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary
materials, the G.I. pipes used in fabricating crates, plus the cost of imprisonment in case of insolvency.
fabrication which we paid to the one making at P700.00 per crate, so we
arrive at P1,180.00 per crate and the number of crates per estimate, which PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORIEL
we recovered from the premises of Mr. Dumlao is about more or less 50 LACERNA y CORDERO & MARLON LACERNA y ARANADOR,
crates. So, we arrive at Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00). accused.
MARLON LACERNA y ARANADOR, accused-appellant. Eighteen (18) blocks of marijuana
The unrelenting and pervading war against illegal drugs has absorbed the When the case was called for arraignment on October 7, 1992, appellant
attention of all branches of government, both national and local, as well as and his co-accused appeared without counsel but they alleged that they
media, parents, educators, churches and the public at large. This case is had engaged the services of a certain Atty. Kangleon. Thus, the trial court
one more intrepid battle in such all-out war. Herein appellant seeks provisionally appointed Atty. Rodolfo P. Libatique of the Public
acquittal on the ground that his acts did not constitute the crime of giving Attorneys Office as counsel de oficio, in case Atty. Kangleon did not
away prohibited drugs penalized by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, appear for the arraignment on October 28, 1992.[5] Because the alleged
as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act). Nonetheless, he cannot escape counsel de parte failed to show up during the arraignment on that date,
the law because the very same deeds, which appellant admits to have Atty. Libatique assisted the accused who pleaded not guilty.[6]
performed, show his culpability for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
-- penalized in Section 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended -- which is necessarily After trial on the merits, the court a quo promulgated the assailed
included in the crime charged in the Information. Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:[7]
On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a Appellant and co-accused, and the plastic bag containing blocks of
member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District marijuana were brought by PO3 Valenzuela and PO3 Camero to the WPD
(WPD), was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area Headquarters on UN Avenue, Manila.[10] At about 9:00 p.m. of the same
somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street. day, both appellant and co-accused were turned over to PO3 Rafael
The assignment to monitor strategic places in the city and barangays of Melencio for investigation while the blocks were turned over to Lt. de
Manila was a direct order from General Nazareno. Thus, he and his Soto (tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 3-5. 20).
companion PO3 Angelito Camero went about cruising the area in their
Mobile Patrol car, with PO3 Valenzuela at the helm. At about 2:00 p.m., Lt. de Soto counted the blocks of marijuana, numbering eighteen (18) in
appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3 all. Each block was wrapped in newspaper. After seeing what the contents
Valenzuelas place of assignment, which was then heavy with traffic, of the blocks were, the specimens (Exhs. B to B-19) were brought to the
looking suspicious (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4; Nov. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further examination.[11] On
20, 1992, pp. 2-7). the other hand, PO3 Melencio investigated appellant and co-accused,
informing them of their constitutional rights during a custodial
Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated investigation. Thereafter, he prepared the Affidavit of Apprehension and
at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhs. A, G, List of Exhibits, pp. 1,
occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing 15; tsn., PO3 Melencio, Dec. 11, 1992, pp. 15-24).
to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his
companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to park by the side of NBI Forensic Chemist Aida A. Pascual examined the eighteen (18)
the road (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, pp. 3-4). confiscated blocks which tested positive of containing marijuana (Exhs.
C, F to F-9. List of Exhibits, pp. 2-14; tsn., A. Pascual, Dec. 2, 1992, pp.
PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the 2-5).
vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers went about
searching the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a Version of the Defense
dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents of
the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered Appellant sets up the defense of denial, alleging that the blue plastic bag
that the bag contained his vomit (t.s.n., PO3 Valenzuela, Nov. 11, 1992, was owned by his uncle who requested him to bring it to Iloilo. He also
pp. 4-5). denied knowing that it contained marijuana. In his Brief prepared by the
Public Attorneys Office, he narrated his version of the factual
Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the circumstances of this case, as follows:[12]
contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and
On September 12, 1992, at about 2:00 P.M., accused Marlon and Noriel his (uncle) personal belongings upon learning that he (Marlon) is leaving
Lacerna were riding in a taxicab on their way to (the) North Harbor to for Iloilo city the next day, September 12, 1992. He told his uncle to bring
board a boat bound for Iloilo City. While plying along Pier 15 their his personal belongings either in the evening of that day or the following
taxicab was flagged down by a patrol mobile car. Accused Marlon day at the (Grand) Central (Station), Monumento because he was going to
Lacerna (appellant herein) was sitting in front while accused Noriel buy a ticket for Noriel as he intend (sic) to bring the latter with him in
Lacerna was at the back of the taxicab. The accused carried two bags. going home to the province. His uncle already gave a ticket for him.
One bag contained their personal belongings and the other bag contained When he and Noriel (arrived) at the Grand Central at about 10:00 oclock
things which their uncle Edwin Lacerna asked them to bring along. When A.M. on September 12, 1992, their uncle was already there. The latter
their taxicab was stopped, the two policemen in the Mobile car requested placed the plastic bag besides their baggages. They no longer inspected
them that they and their baggage be searched. Confident that they have the contents of the bag as the same was twisted and knotted on top. After
not done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched. During the getting a ticket from the office of Don Sulpicio Lines, Marlon told Noriel
(search), the two accused were not allowed to alight from the taxicab. The to hail a taxi and then they proceeded to the pier.
knapsack bag which contained their clothes was first examined in front of
them. The second bag was taken out from the taxi and was checked at the (Appellants) purpose in going home to Iloilo was to get all the
back of the taxicab. The accused were not able to see the checking when requirements needed in his application to enter the Marines.
the policemen brought the plastic bag at the back of the taxi. After
checking, the policemen told them its positive. The accused were (asked) Accused Noriel just arrived in Manila three days before September 12,
to alight and go to the patrol car. They were brought to the WPD 1992 to look for a job and was staying with (appellant) at Caloocan City.
Headquarters at United Nations. While there, they were brought inside a In the evening of September 11, 1992, (appellant) requested him to come
room. They asked what wrong they have done but the policemen told xxx with him to Iloilo and assured him that he (would) be the one to pay
them to wait for Major Rival. At about 8:00 oclock P.M., Major Rival for (Noriels) fare. (TSN., January 6, 1993, pp. 3-23; January 8, 1993, pp.
talked to them and asked them where the baggage came from and they 2-12; January 11, 1993, pp. 2-18; January 20, 1992, pp. 2-6; January 22,
answered that it was given to them by their uncle. Then Major Rival 1993, pp. 2-14)
asked them to hold the marijuana and pictures were taken. Later, they
were brought inside the cell where they were maltreated by the Kabo. The Ruling of the Trial Court
Kabo forced them to admit ownership of the marijuana. Noriel was boxed
on the chest, blindfolded and a plastic (bag) was placed on his neck and The court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of
was strangled. The mauling took place for about 30 minutes inside the delivering prohibited drugs because the Information did not allege that he
toilet. They refused to sign the Booking and Arrest Report but they knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of
impressed their fingerprint on a white bond paper. They were brought by transporting or dispatching in transit such prohibited drugs because these
Melencio to the Inquest Prosecutor at the City Hall. On the way to the acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused further that
Inquest Prosecutor, Melencio told them to admit the charge against them appellant could not be convicted of selling marijuana because the
before the Inquest Fiscal, because if they will deny, something (would elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the
happen) to them in the afternoon and Melencio even uttered to them vulva Information charged appellant with giving away to another prohibited
of your mother. Because they were apprehensive and afraid, they admitted drugs, a charge which was different from delivery defined under Section 2
the charge before the Inquest Fiscal. (f) [13] of R.A. 6245, as amended. Citing People vs. Lo Ho Wing,[14] the
trial court ruled that giving away to another is akin to transporting
(Appellant) Marlon Lacerna first met his uncle Edwin Lacerna at Munoz prohibited drugs, a malum prohibitum established by the mere
Market. The second time was on September 11, 1992, when his uncle
went to his brothers house in Caloocan City and requested him to bring
commission of said act. Thus, the court a quo convicted appellant of as contradistinguished from the term deliver; where knowledge is
giving away marijuana to another on the following premise:[15] required.
Give Away the Prohibited Drug? Further, adopting the trial courts interpretation would lead to absurd
conclusions. Following the trial courts line of reasoning, Noriel should
The trial court justified the conviction of appellant for giving away to have been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to
another the prohibited drugs, because he literally handed to Noriel the PO3 Valenzuela for the latters inspection. And yet, the trial court
plastic bag containing marijuana, manually transferring the plastic bag inexplicably acquitted him. Valenzuela would similarly be criminally
from the front seat to the backseat of the taxicab. We hold, however, that culpable as he testified that he turned over the plastic bag to his superior,
this is not the act penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Lt. de Soto. It is a well-settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to give effect to the legislative intention and to avoid an identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a
unjust or an absurd conclusion.[35] condition sine qua non.
of Illegal Possession? From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases
adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as
Appellants exoneration from giving away a prohibited drug to another follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act does not, however, spell identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
freedom from all criminal liability. A conviction for illegal possession of law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited
prohibited drugs, punishable under Section 8 of the same Act, is clearly drug.[41]
evident.
The evidence on record established beyond any doubt that appellant was
In People vs. Tabar,[36] the Court convicted appellant of illegal in possession of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs, without the
possession under Section 8 of said Act, although he was charged with requisite authority. The NBI forensic chemists identification of the
selling marijuana under Section 4, Article II thereof.[37] marijuana or Indian hemp was conclusive.
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the Appellant protests the trial courts finding that he knew that the plastic bag
sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession contained marijuana. The lower court ruled that appellant could not have
of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in possibly missed the pervasive pungent smell emitted by marijuana which
the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use was duly noted when the marijuana was exhibited in open court. This
by the seller.[38] reasoning, however, is not supported by the evidence; the plastic bag, at
the time of the search and seizure, was twisted and tied at the top, and
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of thus airtight. PO3 Valenzuela did not even notice this pervasive
prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the characteristic smell until he poked a hole in the plastic bag and
sale be identified and presented in court.[39] That the corpus delicti of unwrapped the newspaper covering one of the marijuana bricks.
illegal sale could not be established without a showing that the accused
possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution
possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in of acts mala prohibita. On grounds of public policy and compelled by
cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another. necessity, courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, as
the greater master of things, to forbid certain acts in a limited class of
In People vs. Manzano,[40] the Court identified the elements of illegal cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent
sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a of the doer.[42] Such legislative enactments are based on the experience
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of
delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the the dealers knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely
Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited accomplish their purposes; besides, the prohibited act is so injurious to the
drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and
public welfare that, regardless of the persons intent, it is the crime a denial which by itself is insufficient to overcome this presumption.[48]
itself.[43] Besides, this defense, unless substantiated by clear evidence, is invariably
viewed with disfavor by courts, for it can just as easily be concocted.
This, however, does not lessen the prosecutions burden because it is still Verily, it is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions
required to show that the prohibited act was intentional.[44] Intent to involving dangerous drugs.[49]
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he Further, the trial court did not give credence to appellants denial. It is
did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, axiomatic that appellate courts accord the highest respect to the
the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.[45] assessment of witnesses credibility by the trial court, because the latter
Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the
prohibited by the special law must be shown. In Bayona, the Court witness stand.[50] The defense failed to present sufficient reasons
declared:[46] showing that the trial court had overlooked or misconstrued any evidence
of substance that would justify the reversal of its rejection of appellants
xxx The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the defense of denial.
intent with which he violated it is immaterial. x x x x The act prohibited
by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters Appellant is, therefore, liable for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element under Section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[51]
of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver,
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
intended to intimidate the voters. is CONVICTED of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8
of R.A. 6425; SENTENCED, in accordance with the Indeterminate
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in Sentence Law, to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as
those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally maximum; and ORDERED to pay a fine of twelve thousand pesos
done. Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the (P12,000.00). Costs de oficio.
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. * * * (U.S.
vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128).
In the case at bar, appellant was found to have in his possession a plastic
bag containing 18 kg of marijuana formed into 18 bricks which were
separately wrapped. His possession thereof gives rise to a disputable
presumption under Section 3[j], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[47] that
he is the owner of such bag and its contents. His bare, unpersuasive,
feeble and uncorroborated disavowal -- that the plastic bag was allegedly
given to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents -- amounts to
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE
The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship
with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child.
Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs
showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB
Decision[2] dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated February was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support,
10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted.
which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional This notwithstanding, Melgar still refused to give support for her and
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386 BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case
finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond against Melgar.[10]
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
9262,[5] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to
Children Act of 2004." provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle
with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled
The Facts in. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the
amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation for P8,000.00 as support.[11]
Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable evidence due to his repeated failure to appear during trial.[12]
Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial
support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of The RTC Ruling
economic abuse against one [AAA,[6]] and her minor son, [BBB] (12
years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental In a Judgment[13] dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son. beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and,
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7] indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement[8] on the civil maximum.[14]
aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement
on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA
dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the
June 24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from
agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar 2001 to 2010.[15]
sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the
support-in-arrears of his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their Melgar moved for reconsideration,[16] which was, however, denied in an
compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal Order[17] dated May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed[18]
aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.[9] to the CA.
The CA Ruling woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:
In a Decision[19] dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's
conviction. It held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.[20] As 1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging
such, when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
support, he committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment
based on compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right
son; and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned
was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his in common;
son from 2001 to 2010.[21] Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has
clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation 3. destroying household property;
to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]."[22]
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling
Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,[23] which was, however, the conjugal money or properties.
denied in a Resolution[24] dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.
xxxx
The Issue Before the Court As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include
the deprivation of support of a common child of the man-accused and the
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.[26] This
upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:
The Court's Ruling Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
The petition is bereft of merit. any of the following acts:
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262
inter alia, that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia,
the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People,[34]
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.[30] the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed
penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,[35] otherwise
Melgar's contention is untenable. known as the Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,[31] punishes Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is
the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's landmark mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239
child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although the offense is
defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects
under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily
apply to the speciallaw.[36]
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence
will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the
RPC.[37]
Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on
Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a
mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report
compliance to the court.[38]
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed
Ombudsman’s action but the latter denied the same;10 hence, this petition. under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.16 Since
Maria Clara L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.11 the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A.
The Issue Presented 3019, as originally enacted.17
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents’ alleged violation Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed. computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326,18 which provides:
The Court’s Ruling Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial
its investigation and punishment. law since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the
SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the
prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the
of the violation of the law, if such commission is known; and second, from its UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element—
discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial proceedings for that the action could not have been instituted during the 10-year period
its investigation and punishment.19 Petitioner points out that, assuming the because of martial law—does not apply to this case. The last day for filing
offense charged is subject to prescription, the same began to run only from the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after
the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions
the charge could be filed as late as 1996. In the prosecution of cases of behest for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period
loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery of such of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.
loans.1âwphi1 The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party,
could not have known that those loans existed when they were made. Both Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the
parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the beginning of organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the
government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the
Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior defendant, through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who
to that date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have
the loans.20 been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of
witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.
questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be
concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to
documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPB’s investment in show probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of
UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, UNICOM’s capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was ₱5 million. When these
have been withheld from the curious or from those who were minded to know shares were converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value
like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that of such shares remained at ₱5 million. But, the action having prescribed,
respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB connived with there is no point in discussing the existence of probable cause against the
UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment. respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. WHEREFORE, the
Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 14,
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of
rooms when UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible prescription the subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
government clearing house for increases in corporate capitalization, to against respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R.
accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M.
the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona,
submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request. Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB’s Jaime Gandiaga.
investment in UNICOM during martial law at the President’s or anyone
else’s instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the
PANGILINAN On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting,
N recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against private complainant before the
Promulgated: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
June 13, 2012
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition
to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the
x-------------------------------------------------- Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency
-x of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads: On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed
the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the
218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The
DISMISSED. estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other
checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts: were, however, dismissed.
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on
Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC,
respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two
Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
dishonored upon presentment for payment. Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of
extinguished by reason of prescription. BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent]
criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City. sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the
[respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted
218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section
pertinent portion of the decision reads: 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of
1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February proper court.
2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on
07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic)
latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore,
the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the clearly prescribed.
proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16
September 1997 yet. xxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes the Supreme Court held that the
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are
Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or
Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87. information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
In a resolution dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section
to the CA for appropriate action. 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance,
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition. this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs
the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation
is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is
the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction
of the offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances
by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases. The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
Jr. that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period of We find merit in this petition.
prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, the CA allegedly failed to consider
the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling. Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to
the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by
the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken
City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four by the Docket Division of the OSG.
years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in
accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended. With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA
reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish
petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
before the City Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
special law.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg.
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of
its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the the investigating agencies.
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of
1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this Court ruled that the violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent
on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. when it held that the filing of on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil
the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
prescriptive period of a criminal offense. suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The
matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the
involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of
between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for
Company Limited v. Lim, cases involving special laws, this Court held accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the proceedings only in 2000. As laid down in Olarte, it is unjust to deprive
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al., the Court even that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to
ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
DOJ in criminal cases. ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
the respondent.