Padiernos vs.

People

Facts: Padiernos, Roxas and Mesina were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of
lumber, in violation of PD 705. Petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use
as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The information states: That at about 6:00
o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their possession
and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at P133,289.00
loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz
without any permit, license or documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon on the following day, November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take
and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as
evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the
crime, [emphasis and italics supplied] CONTRARY TO LAW. Petitioners plead not guilty as accessories to
the crime. Prosecution’s evidence: DENR officer approached a truck loaded with lumber in a national
highway in Aurora. Truck bore name of JEROME. The driver of the truck was FREDERICO, and the truck
helper was MOSTERA. Officers asked for supporting documents but failed to produce any. Officers
decided to transfer the truck and lumber to the police station. They transferred the lumber first and left
the truck at the highway. The truck was then seized by the petitioners. The Army blocked the road with
a 50-caliber gun.

Defense: Mesina testified that he was at home with his wife and children. Santiago asked him to bring
the truck but Mesina refused. However, Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago’s car and they fetch
Roxas. Roxas was resting in his house. They were on their way to the truck when they saw Padiernos,
and the latter hitched a ride. They also alighted from the car and Santiago talked to the officers.
Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina. Mesina took the driver’s seat, Padiernos sat in front with
Santiago and Roxas. They alleged that they didn’t reach the area where the Army was. They did not hear
the commotion, and also raised the defense that they did not intentionally take the truck. RTC ruling:
Petitioners were guilty. RTC did not entertain the defense that they did not intentionally take the truck.
RTC also disregard the petitioner’s claim that they did not hear the warning shot. CA: Affirmed RTC but
modified penalty. Also the subject truck as an “instrument” in the commission of the crime, connected
to the petitioners being accessories. The violation was a mala prohibita, and the defense of not
intentionally taking the car was not entertained at all.

Issue: W/N petitioners are liable as accessories

Held: NO -Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts: xxx the aforesaid
accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-
747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government
as tool or instrument of the crime. -Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners
is not the allegation that they were accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's
conclusion of law or the technical name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of the
RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for
which they should stand trial. -Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for
the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. -In the present case, the crime punishable under
P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of lumber - had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took
the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15,
2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation. In these lights, the
petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of
the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that
serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners. HOWEVER!!!! The factual allegations in the
Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 The factual
allegations in the Information, while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article
19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is
defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders." P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct
or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders. Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts: Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: (b) altering, destroying,
suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official
proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal
cases; Information alleges all elements of Section 1(b). -First, the factual allegations in the Information
clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence
and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the
crime. In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence
that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly,
the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the
seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the
lumber. According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered
with supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter. -Second, the petitioners
deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. The term "suppress" means to
subdue or end by force. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with
the intent to impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or
proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial. It is undisputed that
Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of the seized lumber.
Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck,
Santiago could be exculpated and the forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of
P.D. 705 would be frustrated. The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by
their knowledge of the status of the truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Angeles vs Gaite

Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece
Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the girl’s
grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the
tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and
attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated
the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael
Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s
generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day
to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a
very important errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from
then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at
petitioner’s residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his
half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s custody. Michael used to have free access to the
undersigned’s house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought
Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts
of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal relatives in Sta.
Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the
303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl.
Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner and her
friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with police officers from the said place. The group
failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given the run-around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes
Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter’s wife Camilia to
Casiguran, Quezon Province.
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the
Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law,
Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth
from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive
from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her recite a
concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to
withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt
himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from
the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused
undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were
greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829.
She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria
Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld
(sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but recommended that only one Information be filed against
Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to
uphold the petitioner’s complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution
dated 28 April 2000.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also
filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of
Justice, denied the petition for review. The undersigned’s Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April
2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15 October
2001.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President. The
petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on
Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or death.[4]
On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review[5] before the CA assailing the Order of the
Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of the President erred in not addressing the merits
of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is
an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the
Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.[6] Moreover, petitioner contended
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael
Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829[7] (PD No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act
No. 7610[8] (RA No. 7610).[9]
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[10]
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine of qualified political
agency, to wit:
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt petitioner’s case from the application of
Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself.[11]
Moreover, the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not warrant the filing of
a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829.[12] Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ
did not err when it dismissed the complaint for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not attended
by grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated September 16, 2004.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY
OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF
VIOLATION OF R.A. 7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.[14]
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in
law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.[15] This argument is absurd. The President's act of
delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the
purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”[16] The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the
President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it
should be.
As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,[17] this Court has recognized and adopted from
American jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing
with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments
occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas
Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of
the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30;
272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[18]

Memorandum Circular No. 58,[19] promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum
Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of
resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of
criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office
of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of
cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary
of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or
abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion[20] is purely speculative to say the least.
Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate
whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of
justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution
provides for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional
powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person
and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law
(par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11,
idem).[21]
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are
certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives
over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.[22] The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive
exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.[23] The list is by no means exclusive, but
there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.[24]
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing
with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional
class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.
In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,[25] this Court discussed the predicament of imposing upon the President
duties which ordinarily should be delegated to a cabinet member, to wit:
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of
the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and
cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and
defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.[26]
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s position asking this
Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which
she charges respondent are not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of
Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the government’s principal law agency. As
such, the Department serves as the government’s prosecution arm and administers the government’s
criminal justice system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional
system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise.[27] These are known functions of the
Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the Chief Executive's
power of control.
Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1,
Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive
departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was
promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.[28] Memorandum
Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said
Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
Anent the second ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the
same is quoted hereunder as follows:
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or
disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x
Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed the service of a
court process, particularly the warrant of arrest.[29]
This Court does not agree.
There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding
petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees
with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on
"obstruction of justice,” in the wise:
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that unserved
warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like
saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of “obstruction of justice” if
and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or
returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction of
justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved
during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second
charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued
on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or
should be filed against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for
"obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested or
voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent
and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x[30]
As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the
filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the
CA that based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s
to arrest the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a
commission of another offense of obstruction of justice.[31]
Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it is applicable only
to another person and not to the offender himself.[32] Petitioner thus contends that where the “law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”[33]
Again, this Court does not agree.
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to
be liberally construed in favor of the accused.[34] Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a
law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made
so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within
them.[35] Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.[36]
 Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the offender himself,
this Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In any case, this Court agrees with the
discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the
case at bar.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610. Said Section reads:
Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, including those covered by Article 59 of PD No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period.
On this note, the Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor to file the information for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610, gave the
following reasons:
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA #
7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The affidavit of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the
effect that she found happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the company of
her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can her joining the brother be
prejudicial to her with such statement?[37]
Said finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez
et. al,[38] where this Court emphasized the executive nature of preliminary investigations, to wit:
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive
function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the
Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the
Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail only if they can show that the CA erred in not
holding that public respondent’s resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[39]
Were the acts of the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
not at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.[40]
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice did
not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their conclusion of lack of probable cause was based on the
affidavit of the alleged victim herself. The reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and
sufficiently. Was their reliance on the victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This
Court does not think so.
While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by respondent into executing the
affidavit,[41] this Court finds no conclusive proof thereof. Besides, even if their reliance on the victim’s
affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of
discretion.[42] As such, this Court will not interfere with the said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor
and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The determination of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and
ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of
which is a matter that this Court will not pass upon absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and September 16, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Posadas vs. Ombudsman

Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People
Facts:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when he arrived at his residence, he
immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-
up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed
persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver
and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. They were made to lie face down on the floor and
thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties
including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He
was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police
and an entrapment was made with their participation. He and his wife posed as a buyer and were able
to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan.
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items were
part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private
complainants. That the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused and she was not able
to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that the stall is owned by one
Fredo. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but set aside the penalty imposed.

Issue: WON the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft.

Held:

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft."

The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the RPC or under
P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in
the crime of fencing. The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code
or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing
is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds
of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A
robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who afterwards
reported the incident to the authorities and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry
that were later displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the
petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that
the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable
for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the fundamental law.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even
disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo.
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or
supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles
dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town
or city where such store, establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and
Regulations promulgated to carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers
to any person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not
licensed by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand
articles," which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used.

Ong vs. People

FACTS:
→ Information: Charged with the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law.

→ PROSECUTION: − Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires of which
6 were sold and 38 tires remained inside the warehouse. Private complainant marked the tires using a
piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse − All thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen
from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with
caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery. − Private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store
selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant
was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the
affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as
one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon.
− Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to the police. − A buy-bust team was
formed and the appellant was arrested and the a total of 13 tires were confiscated.

→ DEFENSE: − The appelant alleged that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires
for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in
Jong Marketing.

→ RTC: The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found
in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.

→ CA: The CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612 or Anti-
Fencing Law.

HELD: → SC: Affirmed the conviction of the accused. → Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D. 1612
as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

→ The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: − a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; − the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; − the accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and − there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.

→ The prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of
fencing are present in this case: − First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar
(Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal — the caretaker of the warehouse where the
thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen — testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17
February 1995. − Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery,
he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13)
out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. − Third, the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. − Finally, there was evident intent to gain for
himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires
in his store, Jong Marketing.

→ In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may
be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this case, the
validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold
Link and its address were fictitious. 24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie
presumption under Section 5 of P.D.

→ Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

Dimat vs People

Facts:

• The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the AntiFencing Law before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC)
• Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a
1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the
vehicles engine number as TD42126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60 YO3553.
• Ramirez and other officers of the Traffic Management Group spotted the Nissan Safari on E.
Rodriguez Avenue, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle,
they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought
it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered
owner, Jose Mantequilla.
• Matequilla affirmed that the 1997 Nissan Safari is his and was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at
Robinson’s Galleria parking area.
• Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith
and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number
as TD42126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60YO3553.
• Dimat sold the vehicle to Delgado. He claimed that although the Nissan Safari that he sold and the
one in custody of the police officers had the same plate number, they were actually no the same
vehicle.
 • In 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the AntiFencing Law and sentenced him to an
imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Also ordered to pay P850,000.00 for actual damages and P50,000 for exemplary damages.
• CA affirmed the decision but modified it to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, as maximum

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision of convicting of Anti-Fencing?

Held: The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took
no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the
deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

The defense presented by Dimat is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when
stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of
the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main
defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.

People vs. De Guzman

In 1985, a robbery was committed in Quezon City where jewelries worth millions were stolen. The said
jewelries were later found in the possession of a certain Danilo Alcantara in his house in Antipolo, Rizal.
Subsequently, a Quezon City prosecutor filed an information against Alcantara for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. The criminal case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Alcantara filed a
motion to quash the said information on the ground that the QC-RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Judge Jose De Guzman ruled in favor of Alcantara.
The Solicitor General argued that what the judge did was wrong because the crime of fencing is a
continuing crime; that an ingredient of the crime, that is, the robbery, happened in Quezon City, hence,
Quezon City courts have jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not fencing is a continuing crime.
HELD: No. A “continuing crime” is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In this case, there are actually two separate crimes which
are robbery and fencing. They are independent of each other. The law on fencing does not require the
accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on
an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated. Alcantara should be prosecuted in Antipolo because
that’s where the crime of fencing was allegedly committed.
Tan vs People

FACTS
 • The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, convicting petitioner of the crime
of fencing.
• Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats.
• Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991,
Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company.
• The complainant (Lim) noticed that some items amounting to, more or less P48, 000 were missing.
• Lim then informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito and the one who referred him to Lim, regarding
the loss.
• Subsequently, Manuelito was arrested in Visayas and admitted the he and his companion
(Gaudencio Gayop) stole the items and sold it to Ramon Tan. Manuelito asked for Lim’s
forgiveness and was thereafter forgiven.
• Lim then did not file a case against Manuelito and his companion.

• Afterwards, Lim filed with the RTC of Manila Branch 19, an information against Ramon Tan
charging him with violation of PD No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
• According to Lim, that on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly
receive, keep, acquire and possess several spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at
P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of theft. Contrary to law.”
• Manuelito then presented her testimony stating that they delivered said stolen items to Ramon
Tan, who paid for them in cash in the amount of P13,000.00. Further, he stated that the stolen
items from the warehouse were placed in a sack and he talked to Mr. Tan first over the phone
before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr. Tan himself who accepted the stolen items in the
morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 o’clock and paid P13,000.00 for them.
• On rebuttal, Ramon Tan denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of
the delivery of the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for every
time goods are delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not possible
for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00 o’clock in the morning, because he usually reported
to his office at 9:00 o’clock. In connection with this case, he executed a counteraffidavit
• Then the RTC rendered a judgment adverse to Tan and found him guilty of violating PD No. 1612.
• Ramon Tan then filed an appeal to CA, however CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC. The
motion for reconsideration filed by Tan was likewise denied by CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not herein petitioner violated PD No. 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law.

HELD:
 1. No, the Court held that herein petitioner did not violate PD No. 1612. According to the Court, the
prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all the elements
of the crime charged. Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.

In this case, the guilt of the complainant and the elements of the crime of fencing were not duly
established. First, the complainant Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police.
She admitted that Manuelito confessed to the unlawful taking but did not prosecute him. Theft
is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de officio, or even without a private complainant, but it
cannot be without a victim. As complainant Lim reported no loss, the first element of the crime
of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed.

Also, the extrajudicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel,
hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extrajudicial confession be considered
evidence against accused.

There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus
delicti means the “body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that
the crime has been actually committed.”

The “essential elements of theft are

(1) the taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking away wasdone with intent of gain; (
4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).”

Moreover, there was no showing at all that the accused have knowledge or should have known
that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. Knowledge refers to a mental state of
awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt
acts of that person. Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be
guilty of “fencing.”

Hence, the Court reverses and sets aside the decision of CA and the petitioner is hereby
acquitted.

Francisco vs. People

Dunlao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business
name “Dunlao Enterprise.”
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of
Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, to go to petitioner’s premises together with some police
officers to verify information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes
Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioner’s compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner’s shop and
another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and
had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police
station.
Subsequently a case was filed accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY. Trial ensued and the trial court rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty of the said crime which was then affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not intent to gain is necessary in order for the accused to be found guilty of violation
of Republic Act 1612?

HELD:
Under Presidential Decree 1612, “fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell,
or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called “acts mala in se,” and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called “acts malaprohibita.”[6] This
distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts malaprohibita, the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated?[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:

“On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly
established by the People’s evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court
seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that
intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person
(Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner
showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances
were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which
he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the
commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up
(People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules
on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing
Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone,
irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577
[1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52).”

DM Consunji vs Esguerra

Facts:

Upon inventory, petitioner discovered that there was systematic pilferage of company properties by
stock clerks and drivers for almost a year amounting to “not less than” P6,500,000.00. The pilfered
materials were diverted and sold to hardware stores in Cubao, Quezon City, identified as the MC Industrial
Sales and the Seato Trading Company, Inc., owned by private respondents, Ching and Spouses Say,
respectively.
Pursuant to search warrants, a search was conducted in the premises of Eduardo Ching and in the
premises of the San Juan Enterprises/Seato Trading Inc. Seized from Ching were 3 pieces of phenolic
plywood, and from the Spouses Say, 615 pieces of such plywood with an estimated aggregate value of
P1,000,000.00 which were later identified by petitioner corporation as among those stolen/pilfered from
its warehouse in Cainta, Rizal.
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the Quezon Prosecutor’s Office recommending the
prosecution of private respondent Eduardo L. Ching and private respondents Anthony Say and Cecilia Say
for violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law on different dates. Both complaints
were later consolidated and assigned to public respondent Asst. City Prosecutor Semana for preliminary
investigation. The NBI also recommended the prosecution of several employees of the petitioner for
qualified theft.
Subsequently the investigating prosecutor in his Resolution recommended dismissal of the case
against private respondents for the reason that respondents didn’t have a reason to be suspicious that
the ply woods were allegedly a subject of thievery since they bought it from a legitimate business
enterprise and were issued with the proper receipts making their transaction legitimate. This
recommendation was approved by the Asst. City Prosecutor Gerona to which petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice which was denied on October
18, 1994 by respondent Undersecretary. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents know or should they have known that the phenolic plywood
were the subjects or proceeds of crime? Whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
respondent Investigating Prosecutor in dismissing, and by the Undersecretary of Justice in upholding the
dismissal of the anti-fencing case against private respondents.
HELD:

Petitioner retorted that, contrary to the contention of the Solicitor General and private respondents,
mere possession by private respondents of the stolen phenolic plywood constituted prima facie evidence
of fencing, according to Section 5 of P.D. 1612. Further, the sales invoices presented by respondent
Spouses Say did not exculpate them because such invoices cannot overcome the presumption in Section
5.
Petitioner’s position is clearly untenable and cannot be sustained. In Dizon-Pamintuan vs.
People, we discussed the elements of the crime of fencing:

“(1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

(2) The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes or buys
and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

(3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

(4) There is, on the part of accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

In the instant case, the first and second elements were duly established. Qualified theft had been
committed. Quantities of phenolic plywood were stolen and were discovered in the premises of private
respondents. The question is whether the third element exists. Did private respondents know or should
they have known that the phenolic plywood were the subjects or proceeds of crime?
Dizon-Pamintuan[21] gives us the guidelines:

“One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof,
or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within
the mind’s grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence unless he actually believes that it does not exists. On the other hand, the words “should know”
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate
the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such
knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of
cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Since Section 5 of P.D. 1612 expressly provides that ‘[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object,
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing,’ it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in
her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural
or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. x x x.”

In the aforementioned case, the accused was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption by failing
to present her supplier/dealer, who allegedly was the source of the stolen jewelry; neither did she
establish that the latter was a licensed supplier/dealer of jewelry.[22]
This is not so in the case at bar. It is uncontested that private respondents presented sales receipts
covering their purchases of the subject phenolic plywood. In respondent Ching’s case, he alleges that he
purchased the phenolic plywood from agents of Paramount Industrial which is a known hardware store
in Caloocan City and that his purchases were covered by receipts.[23] On the other hand, the Spouses Say
likewise claim that they bought the plywood from MC Industrial Sales which is a registered business
establishment licensed to sell construction materials and that their purchases too were covered by
receipts.[24] Thus, the prima facie presumption was successfully disputed. The logical inference follows
that private respondents had no reason to suspect that said plywoods were the proceeds of qualified theft
or any other crime. Admittedly, there is no jurisprudence to the effect that a receipt is a sufficient defense
against charges of fencing. But logically, and for all practical purposes, such receipt is proof -- although
disputable -- that the transaction in question is above-board and legitimate. Absent other evidence, the
presumption of innocence remains. Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be successfully imputed upon
public respondents.
At the risk of being repetitious, we reiterate that public respondents had sufficient and substantial basis
for the dismissal of the complaint as against private respondents.

WALA NA FINISH NA HAHAHA