TABUENA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.

103501-03, FEBRUARY 17, 1997

FACTS:
The President Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) over the phone to pay directly the President’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation. The verbal notice was reiterated in a Presidential Memorandum.
In obedience to the President’s instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, the
Assistant General Manager and the Acting Finance Manager of the MIAA, respectively, caused the release of
P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, private
secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. Later, it turned
out that PNCC never received the money.
The case involves two (2) separate opinions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appealed
the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
HELD:
Tabuena acted strictly in compliance with Marcos Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes
the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to
act swiftly without question.

PEOPLE V. GENOSA, G.R. NO. 135981, JANUARY 15, 2004

FACTS:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately
led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night
and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said that she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and
abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The
appellant, after being interviewed by a specialist, has shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime
of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant acted in self-defense.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
Battered Woman Syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final
acute battering episode preceded the killing of the batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life, and (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily
immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former
against the latter.
GARCIA V. DRILON, G.R. NO. 179267, JUNE 25, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also
unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not
get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in
light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.

PEOPLE V. DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 184343, MARCH 2, 2009

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, attempted
murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house when
Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a
kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant
to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na”. Two of her children died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime, appellant
suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill.
Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and
he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as evidence
that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and
or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The
doctor could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia
which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center
examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

HELD:
Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind
immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at
bar, what was presented was proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but
not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence
of mind to respond to Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko
na.”
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to kill people,
while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an
absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a
crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt
that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.