Accounting OrganizationsandSocieCy,Vol 17, No 6, pp. 511-533, 1992. 0361-3682/92 $ 5.

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THE RHETORIC AND RATIONALITY OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH*

C, E D W A R D A R R I N G T O N
Louisiana State University
and
WILLIAM SCHWEIKER
The University o f Chicago

Abstract

This essay suggests the value of a rhetorical understanding of accounting research practice Rhetoric reminds
us that despite the methodological dtfferences across various accounting research communities, there is a
ubtquity to argument m scholarly practice. No matter what kinds of questions accounting researchers
address, no matter what methods they apply to those questions, no matter what languages they evoke, and no
matter what purposes and values they attach to the research enterprtse, nothing counts as accounting
knowledge until it ts argued before one's peers Thus, while rhetoric as not going to substitute for the many
and different substanttve ways m which accounting researchers produce accounting knowledge, neither can
those substantive methods substitute for rhetorm An understanding of rhetoric's role within research is
thereby necessary to understand the practice of accounting research and, m turn, the knowledge such
practice produces

A c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h is a p u b l i c , s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . claim that "Scientific knowledge, like language,

W h i l e m u c h s c h o l a r l y l a b o r is s p e n t a l o n e
contemplating, calculating, reading and writing
n o t h i n g c o u n t s as a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e
u n l e s s i t is a c c e p t e d b y a n a u d i e n c e , u s u a i l y
one's peers. Some papers get published; others
do not. Some workshops are persuasive; others
are not. Some students assent to our lectures;
others, often the best students, provide good
reasons for doubting the validity of our claims.
The pubfic character of knowledge leads Thomas
Kuhn to conclude his landmark study, The
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, w i t h t h e
is i n t r i n s i c a l l y t h e c o m m o n p r o p e r t y o f a g r o u p
o r e l s e n o t h i n g a t all" ( K u h n , 1 9 7 0 , p. 2 1 0 ) .
Kuhn helped inspire a substantial literature
that describes the deeply social and political
c h a r a c t e r o f k n o w l e d g e a n d its p r o d u c t i o n .
Seen from this perspective, the idea of the
ascetic lonely scholar producing ostensibly
"objective" knowledge without subjective or
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e s is w i t h o u t c u r r e n c y :
knowledge, reason, rationality, and even empir-
ical legitimacy are now seen to depend upon
practical intersubjective relations that inform

* The first draft of this essay was written some five years ago Many people therefore deserve our apprectation. Anthony
Hopwood, Marilyn Netmark and Jerry Salamon have taught us much about our own rhetoric Ewa Bardach, Dick Boland,
Jere Francis, Trevor Hopper, Bill Kinney, Don McCloskey, Barbara Merino, Peter Miller, Tony Puxty, K. Raghunandan, Teri
Shearer, Iris Smart, Mike Welker and Paul Williams have helped tremendously. We would also like to thank participants at
the annual meetings of the American Accounting Association and the European Accounting Assoctation, as well as
workshop participants at The University of North Texas. We also thank Jay Semel, Lorna Olson, and our colleagues at the
Center for Advanced Studies at The University of Iowa. Two anonymous revtewers have had thetr pattence limitlessly
stretched; our debts to them are excessive

511
512 c E ARRINGTONand W. SCHWEIKER
m e m b e r s o f r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s ( s e e Diesing,
1962; Brown, 1987; Garfinkel, 1967; Latour &
W o o l g a r , 1979). A n d w h i l e a c c o u n t i n g re-
s e a r c h e r s have s h o w n c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t in
p l a c i n g accounting in its social c o n t e x t , t h e y
h a v e d o n e little to d o t h e s a m e for a c c o u n t i n g
research ( s e e B u r c h e l l et al., 1985). I n q u i r y
into t h e social c h a r a c t e r o f a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h
would open onto a variety of interesting
q u e s t i o n s - - s o m e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , s o m e his-
torical, s o m e political, a n d s o m e e t h i c a l - - as
a c c o u n t i n g m e t h o d o l o g i s t s c o m e t o focus u p o n
t h e d y n a m i c s o f social creativity, social con-
straint, a n d d i s c u r s i v e i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t give rise
to a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e . T h e s e q u e s t i o n s
n e e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n as a c c o u n t a n t s b e g i n to
move away from strong conceptions of object-
ivity, c o n c e p t i o n s that e i t h e r i g n o r e o r d i m i n i s h
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ( s e e Lavoie, 1987; Chua, 1986;
Boland, 1989; Morgan, 1988).
This essay isolates r h e t o r i c as o n e salient
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e social c h a r a c t e r o f a c c o u n t -
ing r e s e a r c h a n d t h e k n o w l e d g e that it yields.
R h e t o r i c is u b i q u i t o u s to a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h ,
a n d any a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h e r w h o has t r i e d to
p u b l i s h a s t u d y o r c o n v i n c e a c o l l e a g u e in a
w o r k s h o p o r a s t u d e n t in a c l a s s r o o m a l r e a d y
k n o w s that h e o r she n e e d s an "art o f
argumentative persuasion", a rhetoric. Indeed,
accounting researchers perhaps must be among
t h e m o s t skilled o f r h e t o r i c i a n s . That is b e c a u s e
editors, r e v i e w e r s , c o l l e a g u e s , a n d g r a d u a t e
s t u d e n t s are b y t r a i n i n g a n d p e r h a p s b y n a t u r e
skeptical, critical, a n d informed. T h e y are o f t e n
m o r e difficult t o p e r s u a d e t h a n most, t h o u g h o f
c o u r s e i d e a s are a c c e p t e d a n d p a p e r s p u b l i s h e d
for r e a s o n s o t h e r t h a n p e r s u a s i v e force.
G i v e n t h e u b i q u i t y o f r h e t o r i c t o r e s e a r c h , it
is r a t h e r o d d that m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n
r a r e l y m a k e s r e f e r e n c e to r h e t o r i c o r a r g u m e n t .
But i n d i f f e r e n c e to o r e v e n d i s d a i n for r h e t o r i c
is c e r t a i n l y n o t new. It is as o l d as S o c r a t e s a n d
his rants against t h e Sophists, t h e " p r o f e s s o r s o f
oratory", the "counterfeiters of knowledge"
( s e e Plato's Gorgias). R h e t o r i c is o f t e n v i e w e d
as t h r e a t e n i n g t o r e d u c e k n o w l e d g e to " m e r e "
p e r s u a s i v e effect, to s o m e t h i n g that s u c c e e d s
b e c a u s e it " p l e a s e s " r a t h e r t h a n b e c a u s e it is,
a p o d i c t i v e l y , "true". Thus, in t h e m a s t e r dis-
c o u r s e s , f r o m P l a t o n i s m to positivism, t h e r e is
little d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n i n g f o r c e t h a t
rhetoric exerts over knowledge
But b e c a u s e s c h o l a r s d o p r a c t i c e r h e t o r i c s ,
an i n t e r e s t in s c h o l a r l y r h e t o r i c has w a x e d a n d
w a n e d historically, As Left ( 1 9 8 7 ) explains:
The study of rhetoric occupies an equivocal place
vcathm the Western mtellectual tradition Its history ts
long and contmuous, but It co-exists with an equally
persistent strain of anttrhetorical thought At times
the discipline surfaces against the friction of the
antirhetorical current and serves as an orgamzmg force
in education and culture More often it succumbs to this
friction, its ideals are denounced, its elements frag-
mented and distorted Yet however attenuated its form,
the rhetorical tradition survives to mingle with and
trickle through the mainstream of thought And so it
remmns available for periodic rediscovery, for direction
into a channel of its own, and for use as a corrective to
the prevailing drift of mainstream ideology (p 19)
O u r o w n p e r i o d is o n e o f t h o s e t i m e s w h e n a
r e n a s c e n t i n t e r e s t in r h e t o r i c surfaces. R h e t o r i c
n o w has a c e n t r a l p l a c e in i n t e l l e c t u a l m o v e -
m e n t s as d i v e r s e as d e c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e ( d e
Man, 1986), romanticist h e r m e n e u t i c s (Gadamer,
1981, pp. 1 1 3 - 1 3 8 ) , o n t o l o g i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s
( R i c o e u r , 1977, pp. 9--64) a n d critical social
t h e o r y ( H a b e r m a s , 1987, pp. 1 8 7 - 2 1 1 ) . O n e
s u c h m o v e m e n t , t h e " r h e t o r i c o f inquiry",
f o c u s e s e x p l i c i t l y u p o n r h e t o r i c a n d t h e con-
d u c t o f a c a d e m i c r e s e r c h , a n d is thus o f
p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to this essay. T h e c o r p u s
i n c l u d e s m o r e t h a n a h u n d r e d s t u d i e s in fields
as diverse as e c o n o m i c s , theology, mathematics,
p h y s i c s a n d w o m e n ' s s t u d i e s ( s e e Simons,
1989, 1990; N e l s o n et al., 1987, for c o l l e c t e d
essays). W h i l e taking q u i t e different t h e o r e t i c a l
and practical routes, rhetoricians of inquiry
s h a r e in c o m m o n t h e d e s i r e to infuse t h e
"official" m e t h o d o l o g i e s o f t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e s
w i t h an a p p r e c i a t i o n for t h e s a l i e n c e o f r h e t o r i c
to research. The claim of the rhetorician of
i n q u i r y is that, s i n c e a r g u m e n t a n d p e r s u a s i o n
are ubiquitous to research, w e ought to critically
reflect u p o n h o w o u r r h e t o r i c s c o n d i t i o n t h e
c o n d u c t o f r e s e a r c h as w e l l as t h e c o n t e n t a n d
quality o f its p r o d u c e - - k n o w l e d g e . In short,
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING
the r h e t o r i c i a n of inquiry argues that w e ought
to argue about o u r arguments since it is
p r e c i s e l y those arguments that d e t e r m i n e w h a t
d o e s and w h a t does not c o u n t as knowledge.
That is to say, no m a t t e r w h a t m e t h o d s o n e
uses, no m a t t e r w h a t research questions one
asks, no m a t t e r what kind of "data" w e deploy,
no m a t t e r w h a t w e judge the value and p u r p o s e
of research to be, no m a t t e r w h a t "motives" are
p r e s u m e d to drive the researcher, nothing
counts as k n o w l e d g e until it is argued before
and assented to by a research community.
Rhetoric is thus of epistemological as well as
social import.
There are many questions that c o u l d be
p l a c e d on the agenda for a r h e t o r i c of account-
ing research, an agenda that w e h o p e to ignite.
What, for example, can r h e t o r i c c o n t r i b u t e to a
descriptive a c c o u n t of accounting research
methodology? By m e t h o d o l o g y , w e mean w h a t
accounting r e s e a r c h e r s do in o r d e r to p r o d u c e
a c c o u n t i n g knowledge. W e do not m e a n cri-
teriology; that is, a set of r u l e - b o u n d prescrip-
tions about h o w to do research, p r e s c r i p t i o n s
specified in advance. H o w do different kinds of
a c c o u n t i n g research c o m m u n i t i e s p r a c t i c e dif-
ferent rhetorics? For example, a r h e t o r i c cast in
a language of p-values, reductivism, and p r i c e
t h e o r y is p e r h a p s necessary to p e r s u a d e capital
markets researchers, b u t it will n o t get a
k n o w l e d g e claim very far in a c o m m u n i t y of
a c c o u n t i n g historians o r critical theorists. N o r
will a critical social t h e o r y c o n v i n c e m a r k e t
researchers. Relatedly, h o w do these different
a c c o u n t i n g r h e t o r i c s differ from those in o t h e r
disciplines? H o w are they the same? What might
different research c o m m u n i t i e s learn by com-
paring their rhetorics? Can an a c c o u n t i n g
researcher, for example, do research b e t t e r b y
reflecting u p o n w h a t his or h e r arguments share
in c o m m o n with a literary critic, o r p e r h a p s a
physicist? w h a t can r h e t o r i c c o n t r i b u t e to
epistemology; that is, to u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t
The blurring of reason and power is what makes attempts to ground accounting knowledge in a "market", all the whtle
foregoing discusston of the soctologtcal and historical features of that market, suspect (see Watts & Zimmerman, 1979,
Kinney, 1986). We discuss thts msue later m the essay.
513
warrants a k n o w l e d g e claim as knowledge? One
quite p r e c i s e p u r p o s e of scholarly argument
and d e b a t e is to d e c i d e w h i c h k n o w l e d g e
claims are w a r r a n t e d a s k n o w l e d g e and w h i c h
are not, to resolve epistemological questions.
What is r h e t o r i c ' s role in the invention of
k n o w l e d g e claims, in d e v e l o p i n g research ques-
tions, selecting theories, generating evidence,
p r e s e n t i n g conclusions, writing papers, etc.?
H o w does r h e t o r i c participate in the sociology
of knowledge? This last question r e m i n d s us
again that scholarly argument is a social prac-
tice, that it has ethical, political, and social
i m p o r t for b o t h the scholars w h o p r o d u c e it
and the b r o a d e r p u b l i c to w h o m accounting
k n o w l e d g e is offered. We are also r e m i n d e d
that research communities, like any other, are
subject to forces that can constrain possibilities
for innovation, argument, and even action. To
the e x t e n t that these constraints are influences
over scholarly argument, it is difficult to discern
w h e t h e r a b o d y of k n o w l e d g e is a p r o d u c t of
reason or of power. 1
Because this is an "issue-raising" essay, it
does not address all of these questions nor does
it e x p l o r e any o n e of t h e m in detail. Our
p r i m a r y p u r p o s e is to convince the r e a d e r of
r h e t o r i c ' s ubiquity to accounting research, to
s h o w in a quite b r o a d w a y how, at every stage
of the research process, argument conditions
the shape and c h a r a c t e r of accounting know-
ledge. But there is a s u b t e x t to this essay, a
s u b t e x t related to the relation b e t w e e n the
politics of accounting research and the quality
of accounting k n o w l e d g e as such quality is
m e d i a t e d by rhetorical praxis. To p u t it bluntly,
and w i t h o u t argument, our o w n view is that
accounting research is d o m i n a t e d by a positi-
vistic and economistic o r t h o d o x y that constrains
b o t h the d o m a i n of accounting k n o w l e d g e and
the scholars w h o w o r k to p r o d u c e it. There is
then a disruptive, iconoclastic force at w o r k
against w h a t Chua ( 1 9 8 6 ) describes as the
 514 c E ARRINGTONand W. SCHWEIKER
"mainstream" of accounting research through-
o u t this essay, an essay that has its o w n
" r h e t o r i c a l " strategy, a s t r a t e g y n o t u n r e l a t e d to
t h e a u t h o r s ' o w n i n t e r e s t s a n d desires. N o n e -
the-less, w e t r u s t t h a t r e a d e r s s u s p i c i o u s o f this
d i s r u p t i v e s u b t e x t m i g h t find t h e essay a useful
a c c o u t r e m e n t to m e t h o d o l o g i c a l understanding.
We begin with a brief discussion of rhetoric's
salience to the invention of accounting know-
l e d g e claims. W e t h e n t u r n a t t e n t i o n to t h e
relation between rhetoric and epistemology;
that is, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n r h e t o r i c a n d t h e
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e claims as knowledge.
T h e essay c o n c l u d e s w i t h an all t o o b r i e f
d i s c u s s i o n o f h o w o u r focus u p o n t h e r h e t o r i c
o f a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h c a n b e s i t u a t e d in t h e
c o n t e x t o f c o n t e m p o r a r y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l dis-
c u s s i o n a n d d e b a t e b o t h inside a n d o u t s i d e o f
accounting, debate about the philosophy of
science, hermeneutics, and the sociology
of knowledge.
T w o c a v e a t s a r e in o r d e r . First, this is a
t h e o r e t i c a l essay c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y to m a k e
claims a b o u t s c h o l a r l y p r a c t i c e r a t h e r t h a n
claims a b o u t e i t h e r a c c o u n t i n g o r t h e r e l a t i o n
between research and accounting. Accounting
r e s e a r c h e r s are, after all, m e m b e r s o f t h e
broader community of scholars quite separate
and apart from their attachment to accounting.
It is this s c h o l a r l y i d e n t i t y that p r i m a r i l y
c o n c e r n s us here. W h e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y arises,
w e t r y to s e l e c t a c c o u n t i n g e x a m p l e s to
support our argument, but we are more
i n t e r e s t e d in t h e r e s e a r c h p r o c e s s t h a n t h e
s u b s t a n t i v e p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s o f a c c o u n t i n g . An
essay m o r e d i r e c t l y f o c u s e d u p o n h o w t h e
p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s o f a c c o u n t i n g influence s c h o l a r l y
r h e t o r i c is c e r t a i n l y p r o m i s i n g , b u t it is n o t a
task that w e set for this essay. S e c o n d , r h e t o r i c
is a b r o a d a n d diffuse field t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s
sophistic, stylistics, a r g u m e n t , politics, a n d
ethics. O u r f o c u s u p o n r h e t o r i c as a r g u m e n t is
t h u s q u i t e partial. W e s i m p l y c a n n o t in a single
essay finely d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f
2 Burke (1969), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca(1969), Ricoeur (1977), and, of course, Aristotle'sRbetortc are useful sources
for systematic study of rhetoric
r h e t o r i c , n o r c a n w e p r o b l e m a t i z e r h e t o r i c in
r e l a t i o n t o its i n t e l l e c t u a l cousins, d i a l e c t i c a n d
sophistic. 2
RHETORIC AND THE INVENTION O F
A C C O U N T I N G KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS
P r i o r t o p e r f o r m i n g r e s e a r c h , at t h e m e t h o -
d o l o g i c a l level o f i n v e n t i o n , s c h o l a r s w o n d e r
a b o u t m a n y different things: w h a t q u e s t i o n s to
ask, w h a t c o m p e t e n c e t h e y h a v e t o p u r s u e
those questions, consequences of doing one
study rather than another, economic resources
available to t h e m , a n d t h e likely a u d i e n c e to
whom a knowledge claim will be submitted.
R h e t o r i c f o c u s e s u p o n this last q u e s t i o n , t h e
q u e s t i o n o f a u d i e n c e , an a u d i e n c e that m a y b e
real ( p a r t i c u l a r colleagues, e d i t o r s , d i s s e r t a t i o n
committees, etc.) or imagined (images of a
p r o t o t y p i c a l r e a d e r w h o is a s s u m e d r a t h e r t h a n
k n o w n ) . Lyne ( 1 9 9 0 ) e x p l a i n s h o w r e f l e c t i o n
u p o n an a u d i e n c e c o n d i t i o n s k n o w l e d g e f r o m
t h e outset; that is, at t h e level o f i n v e n t i o n , a
l e v e l a b o u t w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e has
h a d e m b a r r a s s i n g i y little to say:
The invention of a discourse [e.g a knowledge clatm]
produces an actual performance (the path chosen)
which can be seen and judged against a field of possible
ones (the accesstble inventory) A relationshtp between
the two artses from the mediatmg role of the audtence,
because rhetorical choices are made m constderauon of
an audience To sever the processes of invention from
those of persuaston would be to lose the natural force of
attractton that a real or tmagmed audience can have
over the processes of invention and understanding
(Lyne, 1990, p 51).
An a u d i e n c e for r e s e a r c h , a r e s e a r c h c o m -
munity, takes shape t h r o u g h this identity relation
b e t w e e n a r e s e a r c h e r a n d others. R e s e a r c h e r s
k n o w s o m e t h i n g a b o u t a n d identify w i t h o t h e r
s c h o l a r s t o w h o m t h e i r r e s e a r c h is p r i m a r i l y
a d d r e s s e d . T h e s e i d e n t i t i e s are p r o d u c t s o f
m a n y different factors; a m o n g t h e m , values,
 RHETORICOF ACCOUNTING
training, beliefs, perspectives on a subject
matter, departmental identities, or what Crane
( 1 9 7 2 ) calls "invisible colleges" that serve as
national or even international consortia of
scholars, etc. Research communities can be
identified in different ways: substantively (per-
spectives taken on the accounting phenomenon);
linguistically (the languages and methods in
which researchers write and speak); institu-
tionally (e.g. a particular school, a special
interest section of professional organizations,
specific conferences, or a particular journal in
which a c o m m u n i t y publishes).
Research communities are interesting both
sociologically and rhetorically. A research com-
munity, as an anticipated audience, conditions
the invention of knowledge inasmuch as a
researcher's reflections on audience influence
the kind of knowledge claim that he or she
produces as well as the style of presenting that
knowledge claim. That is not to say that a
researcher can anticipate all readers; nor is it to
say that knowledge claims are products of
nothing but anticipation of an audience. But it is
to say that research takes place against a
background assumption about w h o the likely
readers are, and that assumption conditions
knowledge production in at least three different
ways. It influences the subject m a t t e r of
accounting research; that is, the way in which
the p h e n o m e n o n of accounting gets configured
in a knowledge claim. It influences the com-
p o s i t i o n of accounting research: the languages
chosen, the style of writing, the voice and
personae that an author enacts. Third, anticipa-
tion of an audience influences the values w i t h
which research is aligned in two ways: choices
about the ends and purposes of accounting as
well as of scholarship. We discuss each of these
three in turn.
Rhetoric a n d the subject m a t t e r o f a c c o u n t i n g
research
Accounting, like any other social practice, is
rich in meaning: complex, multifaceted, his-
torically fluid, and variant with the particulari-
ties of individuals, values, interests, institutions,
histories, modes of practice, and consequences
515
in which accounting acts are situated (see
BurcheU et al., 1985; Morgan, 1988; Hopwood,
1989; Arrington & Puxty, 1991). Accounting
can thus be configured across so very many
different experiential dimensions that any in-
telligible knowledge claim about accounting is
irredeemably partial. That partiality is an arti-
fact of h o w researchers construct accounting as
a p h e n o m e n o n (see Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988).
The empirical diffuseness of the accounting
phenomenon, though certainly no more diffuse
than other fields, is one reason w h y there are
many different accounting research communi-
ties working to p r o d u c e many different bodies
of accounting knowledge (though the influence
of these different communities over accounting
knowledge certainly varies substantially, a
variance somewhat attributable to differential
control over the training of Ph.D. students, over
curricula, and over journals).
Morgan ( 1 9 8 8 ) speaks in this sense of various
metaphors for research throughout the social
sciences. Among the dominant metaphors that
he identifies as influential over accounting
knowledge are accounting as history, as infor-
mation, as language, as politics, as mythology, as
ideology, and as domination and exploitation.
Boland ( 1 9 8 9 ) adds others. These metaphors
are not just literary devices; they are, as Morgan
explains, necessary because of the empirical
richness of social practices like accounting:
All these metaphors have been developed to form
competing interpretations regarding the nature and
significanceof accounting . Interestingly,they all grasp
stgnificant elements of what accounting is all about, and
often suggest~ interesting principles for accounting
design. However, no one metaphor grasps the total
nature of accounting as a social phenomenon, for
accounting, like other aspects of social life, is inherently
complex, multi-dimensional and paradoxical (p 481 ).
As Lyne ( 1 9 9 0 ) notes, this sort of empirical
pluralism is not necessary to understanding
rhetoric's role in methodology. But it is a
posture with which rhetoricians of inquiry are
comfortable inasmuch as its proponents share
with rhetoricians an appreciation for the her-
meneutical character of social science. But
516 c. E ARRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER

r h e t o r i c ' s r e l a t i o n to a s u b j e c t m a t t e r is q u i t e Researchers, like p o e t s a n d physicists, w o r k

i n d e p e n d e n t of w h e t h e r o n e takes the sort of
social c o n s t r u c t i v i s t v i e w that informs a c c o u n t -
ing m e t h o d o l o g i s t s like Morgan ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Hines
( 1 9 8 8 ) a n d Boland ( 1 9 8 9 ) . Even the m o s t
s t r i d e n t of poitivists c a n n o t a d v a n c e k n o w l e d g e
claims a b o u t a c c o u n t i n g w i t h o u t a great deal of
r h e t o r i c a l effort. Why?
T h e a n s w e r to that q u e s t i o n resides i n carry-
ing o u t the implications of Watts & Z i m m e r m a n ' s
( 1 9 8 6 ) c o r r e c t claim that " e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h
is n o t a q u e s t i o n of d i s c o v e r i n g facts a b o u t
a c c o u n t i n g a n d auditing" (p. ix). T h e indeter-
m i n a c y of the "facts" o f a c c o u n t i n g relates to
r h e t o r i c t h r o u g h r e c o g n i t i o n of the linguistic
c h a r a c t e r of k n o w l e d g e . A c c o u n t i n g , as a
p h e n o m e n o n in the worM, refers to a b r o a d
array o f actions, institutions, histories, a n d
c o n s e q u e n c e s that are e c o n o m i c , political,
social, a n d moral. But a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e
c a n o n l y b e a linguistic p r o d u c t , m a d e u p of
words, sentences, paragraphs, symbols, numbers,
equations, a n d statistics that organize them-
selves into theories, hypotheses, narratives, a n d
r e s e a r c h papers. Language, n o t "facts", is thus
the e m p i r i c a l stuff of k n o w l e d g e . This simple,
all too obvious, fact - - that k n o w l e d g e c a n o n l y
b e linguistic - - avoids a great deal of c o n f u s i o n
a n d a bit of positivistic scholarly p r e t e n s e a b o u t
the n a t u r e of a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e Rorty
( 1 9 8 9 ) explains:
Truth [or knowledge] cannot be out there - - cannot
exast mdependently of the human mmd - - because
sentences cannot so extst, or be out there. The world ts
out there, but descriptions of the world are not Only
descrtptions of the world can be true or false The world
on its own - - unaided by the describing activities of
human bemgs - - cannot (p 5)
then to describe a c c o u n t i n g through the m e d i u m
of language, a n d a targeted a u d i e n c e influences
h o w that w o r k p r o c e e d s in t w o ways. First,
different a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s
speak different languages, o f t e n highly special-
ized languages like, say, t o p o l o g y o r F r e n c h
poststructuralism. 3 More i m p o r t a n t l y , different
c o m m u n i t i e s have different h e r m e n e u t i c a l
p o s t u r e s o n the a c c o u n t i n g p h e n o m e n o n - -
different ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d u n d e r s t a n d -
ing w h a t a c c o u n t i n g is a n d w h a t it is not. A
k n o w l e d g e claim, if it is to p e r s u a d e an
a u d i e n c e that it d e s e r v e s the honorific status of
k n o w l e d g e , m u s t configure a c c o u n t i n g i n a w a y
r e s p o n s i v e to the h e r m e n e u t i c a l shape of its
i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e , a p o i n t that w e e x p a n d in
the t h i r d s e c t i o n of this essay. For now, suffice it
to say that t h e r e is an infinity of h e r m e n e u t i c a l
p o s t u r e s that c o u l d b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n
d e c i s i o n s a b o u t h o w to configure a c c o u n t i n g as
a s u b j e c t matter. Any a c c o u n t i n g event, a n d a n y
k n o w l e d g e claim a b o u t a c c o u n t i n g , c a n b e
m a d e to look g o o d o r b a d b y t r a d i n g b e t w e e n
those h e r m e n e u t i c a l p o s t u r e s - - b y selecting
this or that p e r s p e c t i v e o n e c o n o m i c s , o n
organizations, o n ethics, etc., as a p o i n t of
d e p a r t u r e for i n q u i r y i n t o a c c o u n t i n g . In mak-
ing r e f e r e n c e to a c c o u n t i n g as a s u b j e c t matter,
r e s e a r c h e r s identify w i t h w o r k w i t h i n o n e of
these h e r m e n e u t i c a l postures, t h o u g h the
b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n such p o s t u r e s are them-
selves fluid a n d b l u r r e d . K n o w l e d g e claims are
d i r e c t e d t o w a r d an a u d i e n c e w h o shares that
posture.
As a q u i t e b r o a d example, p a r a p h r a s i n g Lyne
( 1 9 9 0 ) , c o n s i d e r h o w a c c o u n t i n g , as a s u b j e c t
matter, m a y b e c o n f i g u r e d s u b s t a n t i v e l y o r

3 Somettmes, scholars beheve that there ts some single language that ts not just another way of descrtbing and redescribmg
accounting but the best language. We cannot debate the various clatms and counter-claims that surround such behef, but
we doubt that there is any such language avatlable to accounting We doubt, for example, that accounting knowledge
would be enhanced by trying to render the multtphcttous consequences for those affected by tt intelhgible through, say,
mathematics To paraphrase Rorty (1979), attempts to grant eplstemtc ptaority to a single language are based on the rather
odd notion that the '~orld", or "reality", or "accounting" has some language of its own: "Nature's Own Vocabulary" Geertz
(1988) makes a simdar point in parodying the" strange idea that reahty has an idiom m whtch it prefers to be descrtbed,
that tts very nature demands we talk about tt without fuss" (p 140)
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING 517

f a c t o r i a l l y In t h e first case, a c c o u n t i n g is s e e n h e r m e n e u t i c a l m o v e s available to t h e r e a d e r i f

as an a c t i v i t y p r a c t i c e d b y a p a r t i c u l a r , identifi-
a b l e g r o u p at p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e s a n d times.
Kdnney's ( 1 9 8 6 ) c l a i m that a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h
is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f " a c c o u n -
tants" is an e x a m p l e o f a s u b s t a n t i v e configura-
tion, an e x a m p l e that m a k e s a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h
a branch of occupational sociology by drawing
t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f a c c o u n t i n g a r o u n d an o c c u -
p a t i o n a l ~lite. Alternatively, a c c o u n t i n g m a y b e
c o n f i g u r e d factorially r a t h e r t h a n substantively;
that is, as an a s p e c t o f m a n y f o r m s o f social
i n t e r a c t i o n i r r e s p e c t i v e o f w h o p r o d u c e s it.
Smith's ( 1 9 8 7 ) i n q u i r y i n t o a c c o u n t i n g as an
inexorable aspect of contemporary experience,
as s o m e t h i n g p r a c t i c e d b y e v e r y o n e , is an
e x a m p l e . She d o e s n o t m e n t i o n " a c c o u n t a n t s "
( a p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e d 61ite) o r t h e i r institutions,
b u t is i n s t e a d r e f e r r i n g to t h e r e l e n t l e s s n e s s a n d
u b i q u i t y w i t h w h i c h so m u c h o f o u r d i s c o u r s e ,
whether ordinary conversation, journalism, or
financial s t a t e m e n t s , is o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e
p r o v i s i o n o f e c o n o m i c accounts. Roberts' ( 1991)
essay, The Possibilities o f Accountability, is
a n o t h e r e x a m p l e o f a factorial c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f
a c c o u n t i n g as a s u b j e c t m a t t e r , o n e that
e x p a n d s t h e d o m a i n o f w h a t a c c o u n t i n g is a n d
w h a t it is n o t b e y o n d t h e n a r r o w confines o f a
practicing profession.
H o w accounting gets rhetorically shaped
takes m a n y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l directions. Examples
are e v e r y w h e r e , and w e list a f e w o f them. Early
o n in r e s e a r c h p a p e r s , a s s u m p t i o n s are m a d e
e x p l i c i t a n d c a v e a t s offered. T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s
and caveats have the negative function of
excluding those perspectives on accounting
that a r e s e a r c h e r is n o t a d d r e s s i n g a n d d o e s n o t
w i s h to argue. T h e o r i e s a r e e v o k e d . T h e y h a v e
the positive function of choreographing the
h e o r s h e d e s i r e s to f o l l o w t h e n a r r a t i v e c o u r s e
t h r o u g h a c c o u n t i n g that a r e s e a r c h e r is taking.
P a r t i c u l a r a u t h o r i t i e s are s o l i c i t e d t h r o u g h
c i t a t i o n s a n d l i t e r a t u r e reviews. T h e w o r k o f
t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s is k n o w n to t h e r e l e v a n t
a u d i e n c e ; and, if t h e y a r e m a j o r a u t h o r i t i e s
to whom research communities acquiesce,
c i t a t i o n a l u s e o f t h e m signals an a u t h o r ' s o w n
a c q u i e s c e n c e . Since c i t e d w o r k has a l r e a d y
s i t u a t e d a c c o u n t i n g in a p a r t i c u l a r way; and, to
t h e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h w o r k has a c h i e v e d t h e
assent o f a r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y , t h e n s o m e
a r g u m e n t s d o n o t n e e d to b e r e v i v e d in t h e
c o n t e x t o f a p r e s e n t study. 4 Definitions a r e
fixed o p e r a t i o n a l l y o r assertorically, effacing
terminological debate. Only certain kinds of
"data" are s e l e c t e d f r o m a m o n g t h e available
i n v e n t o r y o f p o s s i b l e f o r m s o f e m p i r i c a l evi-
d e n c e . T h e s e d a t a are t h e n s t r u c t u r e d t h r o u g h
r e s e a r c h design, narrative, o r analytical m o d e l s
s u c h that " a c c o u n t i n g " takes o n a p a r t i c u l a r
e m p i r i c a l a r c h i t e c t u r e . P a r t i c u l a r interdisci-
p l i n a r y n a r r a t i v e s a r e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n
accounting, narratives about economics, or
history, o r i n f o r m a t i o n , o r e n g i n e e r i n g , o r
ethics, o r s o c i o l o g y , o r politics, o r linguistics.
T h e s e n a r r a t i v e s are t h e m s e l v e s q u i t e p a r t i c u l a r
r e n d e r i n g s w i t h i n t h e i r o w n disciplines.
T o illustrate this l a t t e r p o i n t , c o n s i d e r h o w
" e c o n o m i c s - b a s e d " a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h can
and does draw from a range of economic
t h e o r i e s a n d narratives, s o m e Marxist, s o m e
neoclassical, s o m e p r i c e - t h e o r e t i c , s o m e insti-
tutional, s o m e n e w classical, e t c As an e x a m p l e ,
o n e a m o n g m a n y p o s s i b l e illustrative e x a m p l e s ,
Table 1 contrasts neoclassical economics with a
more sociological perspective on economics.
( T h e r e a d e r is a s k e d t o i m a g i n e h o w t h e s h a p e

4 Required modes of cttation mfluence argumentative practice and therefore the quahty of knowledge In a fascmatmg
essay, Bazerman (1987) shows how the sctentlstic style of the current Amertcan Psychologtcal Association's Publication
Manual forces research into behavioristic paradigms through requtrements about how papers are to be organized into
various sections and subsections, what is to be included in each section, and string citations He maps the historical
development of such "requtred" forms to different bodies of knowledge that have dominated psychology in the twentmth
century, showing how each required "form" is differentially compatible with bodtes of psychological knowledge This
hlstormal mappmg provides concrete ewdence on the interrelattons between rhetoric and knowledge, and it would be
interesting to attempt such an essay in accounting See also Bourd~eu (1988)
518 C E. ARRINGTON and W SCHWEIKER

TABLE 1. Two ways of construing e c o n o m i c frameworks for a c c ount i ng research*

Neoclassical Alternative
Economic agents Individuals, households, and Individuals, groups, and firms,
firms, each construed as an each construed as a social actor
individual utihty maxtmizer
Arena of action Arenas of chome and scarcity, The economic system as
preferably markets situated wtthm society (social
economy)
Types of economic action Strategtc, governed by the Intersublecttve; governed by
telos of individual utfltty background assumptions about
maxlmizatton normative expectations and
obligations wtthm a polity
Result of economm action Equihbrmm, soctal stasis Institutionahzation and conflict,
soctal change and reststance to it
Vww of the researcher Objective outsider. Producer Citizen Producer of moral-
of "scientific" results political posstbilities
* Adapted, wtth sigmficant modLfication, from Swedburg et ai (1990, p 57)

o f k n o w l e d g e c l a i m s is d e t e r m i n e d b y a n t i c i p a -
tion of two very different audiences that may be
loosely aligned with one or the other of these
perspectives.)
T h r o u g h t e c h n i q u e s like t h o s e d i s c u s s e d
a b o v e , an i n t e l l i g i b l e s e n s e o f a c c o u n t i n g as a
s u b j e c t m a t t e r t a k e s s h a p e . B u t w h a t is intelli-
g i b l e as a c c o u n t i n g t o o n e r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y
is s o m e t i m e s c l o s e r t o u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o a n o t h e r .
I n d e e d , t h e r e is p r o b a b l y m o r e d i s a g r e e m e n t
a b o u t w h a t a c c o u n t i n g is a n d w h a t it is n o t
a m o n g a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h e r s t h a t t h e r e is in
the broader polity. But however one configures
accounting, rhetoric helps describe methodology
i n a s m u c h as a n y c o n f i g u r a t i o n is c o n d i t i o n e d
b y an i m p l i e d a u d i e n c e a n d t h e n e e d t o
persuade them.
Rhetoric a n d composition: the q u e s t i o n o f
style
T h e f o r m as w e l l as t h e c o n t e n t o f a
k n o w l e d g e c l a i m c o n d i t i o n s its a c c e p t a b i l i t y t o
an a u d i e n c e . A n e l e g a n t r e s e a r c h d e s i g n , o r
e q u a t i o n , o r h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e , like an e l e g a n t
c h a r a c t e r ( J a n e A u s t e n ' s E m m a ? ) , affects an
audience positively. Put strongly, accounting
r e s e a r c h e r s n e e d a l i t e r a r y c o m p e t e n c e inas-
m u c h as h o w t h e y c o m m u n i c a t e has s o m e f o r c e
o v e r t h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s a n d i n d e e d t h e in-
t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a k n o w l e d g e claim. A n a c c o u n t -
i n g r e s e a r c h e r p r a c t i c e s an art o f c o m p o s i t i o n ,
figuration, stylistics, a n d a r r a n g e m e n t , a n d h e o r
s h e finds r a w m a t e r i a l in t r o p e s , m e t a p h o r s ,
figures o f s p e e c h , a n d g r a m m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s .
M c C l o s k e y ( 1 9 8 5 ) p u s h e s t h e s t y l i s t i c p o i n t so
far as t o s p e a k o f t h e " l i t e r a r y c h a r a c t e r " o f his
own discipline, economics:
The workaday methods of economic scientists .. are
literary, an inescapable remark when one recognizes
that the scientific paper ts, of course, a literary genre
with an actual author, an implied author, an imphed
reader, a history, and a form. When an economist says,
as he frequently does, "The demand curve slopes
down", he ts using the Englmh language; and ff he is
usmg it to persuade, as he frequently ts, he ts a rhetor,
whether he knows or likes it or not A scienttfic paper,
and an assertion wtthin it . does literary deeds.
Sctentific assertions are speech acts m a scene of
sctenttfic tradition by the scmntist-agent through the
agency of the usual figures of speech for purposes of
describmg nature or mankand better than the next
fellow (p. 57)
T h i s is n o t t o say t h a t e c o n o m i c s , o r
a c c o u n t i n g , is e n h a n c e d b y m i m i c r y o f t h e
l i t e r a t i ( t h o u g h , as M c C l o s k e y n o t e s , M a d a m e
B o v a r y is a m o r e b e l i e v a b l e e c o n o m i c b e i n g
than "that great stick of a character Homo
economicus", p. 6 5 ) . It is t o say t h a t o n e is n o t
g o i n g t o g e t v e r y far w i t h an a u d i e n c e ,
academic or otherwise, without a great deal of
h a r d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l w o r k in a t t e n d i n g t o
c o m p o s i t i o n a n d style.
Different accounting research communities
 RHETORICOF ACCOUNTING
prefer different styles. Consider character
development. Some e m b r a c e H o m o econo-
micus. Others find such one-dimensional and
emotivistic characters something o t h e r than
human; not descriptive, not explanatory, not
real. These communities give great weight to
the complexities of subjectivity, even in settings
w h e r e private wealth appropriation is an in-
teUigible goal of action. Or consider plot. Some
research communities value reductive parsimony
two-person games are the limit; narratives
must be reducible to samples, h o m o g e n e o u s in
every way e x c e p t one (a treatment effect).
Some research communities take the produc-
tion of accounting as a given, beginning their
plots at s o m e putative "use-level" of accounting
output. Others, critical theorists or positive
theorists, for example, are m o r e interested in
the historical processes that give rise to account-
ing, though they have quite different under-
standings of what those historical processes are.
Others, "normative" income theorists, trans-
cendentalize accounting by distancing them-
selves from the concrete, empirical constraints
of accounting's production, in order to write
purely in the domain of the ideational - - of
w h a t accounting ought to be in light of their
beliefs about the "best" of all possible worlds.
The notion of various genres of accounting
research makes sense in the context of style and
composition. Kinney ( 1 9 8 6 ) p r o m o t e s a hyper-
reductive style w e d d e d to the g r a m m a r of
agricultural statistics and linear variance split-
ting, oddly and hyperbolically suggesting this
style as a "generic" approach to empirical
accounting research. Normative theorists pro-
m o t e a transcendental genre, a speculative style
s o m e w h a t like romantic p o e t r y inasmuch as it
expresses a longing for an idealized accounting
without confronting the e c o n o m i c and social
constraints o n such ideals. Marxist accountants
often write like Charles Dickens or American
realists in the 1930s; stories of ordinary humans
suffering for economic (and accounting) reasons,
though often their claims to "realism" are
suspect. Some, those w h o write for practitioners,
stay in the genre of the technical engineering
manual, construing accounting as if it w e r e
519
governed by a technicist rationality with ends
given and unproblematic.
Each of these genres appeals to different
research communities - - the different ques-
tions that c o n c e r n them, the different levels of
complexity within which they situate account-
ing, the different languages they speak, the
different values and purposes that they set for
accounting research demand different styles,
different genres. To the extent that these
various styles are conditioned by anticipation of
an audience, they are rhetorical.
Rhetoric a n d the value o f accounting research
Any c o m m u n i t y that honors its values takes
available opportunity to celebrate those values,
and research communities are no different.
Different communities embrace different values,
both for accounting and for accounting research.
And such values are, for several reasons, of
rhetorical interest. First, situated within the
h u m a n sciences, the accounting p h e n o m e n o n
is morally diffuse; that is, there is no singular
interest, value, or good that resides at the
moral-ontological origin of the accounting
p h e n o m e n o n (see Hopwood, 1989), nor is
there a kind of "teleological map" that would
objectively prioritize values within which
accounting is intertwined (see Arrington &
Puxty, 1991). For example, in making a claim
about accounting, one might grant moral priority
to private wealth appropriation, to production,
to any of a n u m b e r of social welfare criteria, to
the interests of the profession, or managers, or
investors, or even those ordinary laborers
subjected to accounting practice (laborers
who, w e might add, are usually forgotten in
arguments about the value context of account-
ing). An accounting researcher may b o r r o w a
value-context from a range of discourses about
rights, wealth, responsibilities, accountability,
etc. The selection of any one of these contex-
tual fields of value is always both contingent
and a candidate for critique inasmuch as each
value-perspective can provide a normative
f r a m e w o r k for problematizing the others.
The multiplicity of value-contexts for account-
ing has as its corollary the p r e s e n c e of a n u m b e r
520 C E ARRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER
of accounting research communities that can
be differentiated in terms of the value choices
and preferences that inform their knowledge
claims. We are now, hopefully, beyond the
infantile stage of belief that accounting research
communities can proceed in a "value-free" way.
At least Watts & Zimmerman (1990), prime
advocates for an ostensible "positive" theory of
accounting, n o w confess the normativity of
their own research, belated, partial and con-
fused as such confession might be (see also
Tinker e t al., 1982). Such confessions open
accounting research to moral evaluation both
within particular research communities and
between them (see Williams, 1987).
The same point, a point about the richly
diffuse value-field in which accounting is con-
strued, can be made through attention to the
way in which accounting research discourse is
saturated with moral terms, vocabularies of
rights, responsibilities, welfare, progress, wealth,
etc., terms which are broadly contestable
within their "home" disciplines of ethics,
political philosophy, law, economics, and the
humanities. Different research communities
understand these terms differently, and that
different understanding forces a researcher to
create a particular moral character for a
knowledge claim, a character that appeals to
s o m e audience though not to others. Thus,
rhetorically, an accounting researcher antici-
pates the value preferences of an audience in
the same way that he or she anticipates their
empirical perspective on the accounting phe-
nomenon. A knowledge claim is conditioned by
that anticipation. Knowledge claims are i n t e n -
t i o n a l l y aligned with certain interests, values,
and moral speculations on accounting
As with accounting values, research com-
munities understand scholarly values differently.
Positivists, for example, embrace prediction as
t h e telos of research. But prediction is morally
contestable inasmuch as identifying ways to
intervene in the lives of other people is the only
reason that positivists are interested in predic-
tion in the first place (see MacIntyre, 1984).
Others prefer scholarly values - - purposes for
research - - like control, emancipation, historical
understanding, disruption, idealized speculation;
or, indeed, the monetary value of a knowledge
claim in some putative "market" for knowledge
(see Watts & Zimmerman, 1979; cf. Socrates in
Gorgias). Thus, claims about the purpose and
value of research are, at best, empty compli-
ments that a particular research community
pays to the scholarly value that it has embraced.
That does not make such values less important;
indeed, they are the moral fuel that gives
accounting research whatever value it has in
the broader sphere of public life. But they are
contingent values: each specification of the
value and purpose of research is conditioned by
an array of e x a n t e beliefs, opinions, desires,
and bodies of knowledge that gives rise to it.
(Just as an example, our own interest in
rhetoric emerges out of a background of value
commitments motivated by our desire to
disrupt the hegemony of the "mainstream" in
accounting research.) But whatever scholarly
values inform a community, a researcher w h o
addresses that community works rhetorically to
write ( o r speak) in a way that promotes those
values and either ignores, discounts, or prob-
lematizes other values which do, from other
perspectives and within other research com-
munities, have much to c o m m e n d them.
This section of the essay has suggested three
broad ways in which the invention of an
accounting knowledge claim is conditioned by
the rhetorically grounded relation between a
researcher (author) and an audience. Rhetoric
is seen to mediate ( 1 ) h o w accounting gets
configured as a subject matter; ( 2 ) the lan-
guage, style, and genre in which a knowledge
claim is composed; and ( 3 ) the value-context in
which a knowledge claim is situated. But a
knowledge claim, once invented, is merely a
c a n d i d a t e for knowledge. The transition from a
knowledge claim to knowledge depends upon
scholarly argument, argument which, we pre-
sume, is oriented toward the formation of a
consensus-of-belief within a research com-
munity with respect to which knowledge
claims deserve t h e honorific status of know-
ledge and which do not. This shift from
invention to justification gives rhetoric a salient
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING 521

p l a c e i n t h e c o n t e x t o f e p i s t e m o l o g y ; t h a t is, critical, argumentative practices of the scholars

inquiry into the way in which knowledge
c l a i m s a r e j u s t i f i e d as k n o w l e d g e .
RHETORIC AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE
The justification of knowledge, the putative
p r o v i n c e o f e p i s t e m o l o g y , is n o t p h i l o s o p h i c a l
b u t s o c i a l . T h a t is b e c a u s e o n l y h u m a n s c a n
d e c i d e w h a t c o u n t s a n d w h a t d o e s n o t c o u n t as
knowledge, and only humans can give reasons
for and arguments about those decisions. The
centrality of reasoned argument to scholarly
p r a c t i c e is w h y P o p p e r ( 1 9 7 2 ) g r a n t s c r i t i c a l
discussion (argument) priority in theories of
science with the claim that, with the advent of
s c i e n c e , w e find:
A tradition of a higher order replaces the traditional
presentation of the dogma: In place of the myth - - we
find the tradition of criticizing t h e o r i e s . . . It is only tn
the course o f this critgcal discussion that observation is
called as a witness Thus it seems to me that it is the
tradition of criticism which constitutes what is new in
science, and what is characteristic of science (pp
347-348, emphasis added) 5
This section of the essay both advances and
problematizes rhetoric's role in the justification
of knowledge, taking quite seriously the fact
that, in Popper's terms, "science" or any other
i n t e l l e c t u a l p r a c t i c e is o n l y as g o o d as t h e
w h o p r o d u c e it.
Rhetoric and the justification of knowledge: a
descriptive view
T h e r e is a n i n e x o r a b l y s t r a t e g i c c h a r a c t e r t o
scholarly discussion and debate. Researchers
are interested in winning an argument, in
making other people assent to a knowledge
c l a i m , a n d r h e t o r i c a l skill is o n e o f t h e m e a n s
t h r o u g h w h i c h t h a t s t r a t e g i c m o m e n t is a c c o m -
p l i s h e d . As t h e p h i l o s o p h e r Robert Nozick
(1981) notes:
The terminology of philosophmal art is coercive
arguments are powerful and best when they are
knockdown, arguments force you to a conclusion, if you
believe the premisses you have to or must believe the
conclusion, some arguments do not carry much punch,
and so forth A philosophical argument is an attempt to
get someone to believe something, whether he wants to
believe it or not A successful philosophical argument, a
strong argument, forces someone to a behef (p 4). 6
The economy of rhetoric. Nozick's (1981)
description of scholarly argument presupposes
a space of contestability that can be understood
as a k i n d o f " e c o n o m y " o f k n o w l e d g e . A c c o u n t -
i n g k n o w l e d g e is, l i k e a n y o t h e r p r o d u c t t h a t
h u m a n s p r o d u c e , a n e c o n o m i c g o o d - - i t is a
p r o d u c t o f h u m a n l a b o r ; i t is p r o d u c e d as a
response to human needs, interests, desires, and
purposes; and it circulates in an economy and
takes on more or less value depending upon the

5 Two points about Popper's claim are interesting He attributes this advent of science to the ancient Greeks, not to
modernist methods. Second, if Popper ~s correct, then it is difficult to tell the difference between those disciplines typically
called "scientific" as opposed to "unscientific" That is because all scholars practice non-dogmatic and critical dmcusslon
McCloskey (1985) and Rorty (1987) may just be taght m claiming that the distraction between "science" and "non-
science" has lost point What seems to matter more than some "hierarchy" of disciplines is the fact that scholars m every
field are trying to generate useful beliefs through critical argumentation. That is a point that follows from Popper's claim,
but a point that he conveniently overlooks as be discusses an "open" society that, oddly, has little place for "fustoricists",
"Marxksts", "theologians" and other sorts of scholars to "openly" participate m "critical discussion and debate" (see
McCloskey, 1985) As a caveat, we are not like Popper interested in promoting some scholarly discourses as "science" and
others as "non-science", a move which often functions rhetorically to relegate many disciphnes to "second-rate" status We
discuss this point later in the essay

6 Nozlck is not endorsing such a view on scholarly argument, he is merely descrtbmg the character of such argument as
practiced.
522 c E ARRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER
e-valuations that o t h e r s a s c r i b e to it. T h e
"value" o f a k n o w l e d g e claim, e v e n w i t h i n a
g i v e n r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y , is r a d i c a l l y c o n t i n -
gent. Different individuals p e r c e i v e different
i n t e r e s t s at stake in a k n o w l e d g e claim, for b o t h
m o t i v a t i o n a l a n d i n f o r m a t i o n a l reasons. F o r
example, the producer of a knowledge claim
t y p i c a l l y has m o r e at stake t h a n his o r h e r
interlocutors m reputation, monetary income,
p r o m o t i o n , t e n u r e , p r i d e , etc. P e r h a p s e d i t o r s
'~¢orry" about the "consequences" of publish-
ing a p a p e r m o r e so t h a n d o a u t h o r s o r
r e v i e w e r s ; or, at a m i n i m u m , t h e y p e r c e i v e
t h o s e c o n s e q u e n c e s differently. Ph.D. s t u d e n t s
w o r r y a b o u t "pleasing" t h e i r m e n t o r s ; t h e i r
m e n t o r s w o r r y a b o u t h o w d i s s e r t a t i o n s will b e
" r e c e i v e d " b y o t h e r universities. T h e r e are
countless other motivational differences among
m e m b e r s o f a r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y , a n d all o f
them help explain the contestability of know-
l e d g e claims b y s u g g e s t i n g that different e-
v a l u a t i o n s w i l l b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n it.
T h e r e are informational as w e l l as motivational
a s y m m e t r i e s b e t w e e n r e s e a r c h e r s a n d inter-
locutors. For example, the researcher knows
m o r e a b o u t t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h a k n o w l e d g e
claim was p r o d u c e d ( h o w it transpired, obstacles
p l a c e d b e f o r e its p r o d u c t i o n , etc.). Likewise,
e d i t o r s h a v e " p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n " as t h e y
"broker" correspondence between authors and
r e v i e w e r s , e v e n if s u c h " b r o k e r i n g " is n o t h i n g
more than receiving personal letters from each
camp. Authors and interlocutors have read
different b o o k s a n d articles and, in general,
h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d different a c a d e m i c histories.
Thus, t h e y b r i n g different c o m p e t e n c i e s a n d
s o m e w h a t different h e r m e n e u t i c a l p o s t u r e s to
b e a r u p o n a k n o w l e d g e claim. F o r t h e s e and
o t h e r reasons, t h e "value" o f a k n o w l e d g e c l a i m
as it c i r c u l a t e s w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f a
r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y is r a d i c a l l y c o n t i n g e n t a n d
s u b j e c t to differential e-valuations, all o f w h i c h
fuel a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e . As Smith ( 1 9 8 7 )
explains, this t r a n s p i r e s as a k i n d o f r h e t o r i c a l
e c o n o m y w h e r e k n o w l e d g e claims circulate.
Any evaluation . no matter what its manifest syntactic
form, ostensible "vahdtty clatrn", and putative proposl-
ttonal status, may be of social value in the sense of bemg
appropriable by other people The actual value of a
parttcular evaluatton, however, will itself be highly
contangent, depending on such variables as the specific
social and institutional context in which tt is produced,
the specific social and instituttonal relatton between the
speaker and his/her listener(s), the spectfic structure of
mterests that motivates and constrains the entire social/
verbal transaction in which the evaluation figures, a vast
and not ultimately numerable or ltstable set of variables
relatmg to, among other things, the soctal, cultural and
verbal histories of those involved and, of course, the
particular perspective from which that value is being
figured (p. 5)
T h e r e are m a n y " c u r r e n c i e s " , m a n y m e d i a for
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a n d influence o v e r k n o w l e d g e
production, within economies of research:
p o w e r , r e p u t a t i o n , a c c e s s to grants, p o s i t i o n
w i t h i n an e d u c a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y ( p r o f e s s o r ,
assistant p r o f e s s o r , d o c t o r a l s t u d e n t , etc.),
f o r m a l a p p o i n t m e n t s as editors, r e v i e w e r s , etc.
( s e e B o u r d i e u , 1988; M c G e e & Lyne, 1987;
O v e r i n g t o n , 1977; Williams, 1985). R h e t o r i c is
o n e s u c h " c u r r e n c y " o f this c o m p l e x e v a l u a t i v e
e c o n o m y i n a s m u c h as t h e "value" o f a k n o w -
l e d g e c l a i m rises a n d falls w i t h t h e a p p e a l o f
a r g u m e n t s m a d e t o s u p p o r t o r to refute t h a t
claim. As w e h a v e a l r e a d y seen, t h e i n v e n t i o n o f
a k n o w l e d g e c l a i m is c o n d i t i o n e d b y a k i n d o f
r h e t o r i c a l " i n v e s t m e n t " that a r e s e a r c h e r m a k e s
at t h e o u t s e t t h r o u g h a n t i c i p a t i n g w h a t p e r -
s p e c t i v e s o n a c c o u n t i n g , w h a t d i s c u r s i v e styles,
a n d w h a t values a " m a r k e t " / r e s e a r c h c o m -
m u n i t y are likely to find a p p e a l i n g a n d w o r t h y .
But a r g u m e n t s r e m a i n to b e m a d e , a n d t h o s e
arguments are the substance out of which
" m a r k e t s for k n o w l e d g e " are m a d e .
A t t e n t i o n to t h e " e c o n o m i c s " o f k n o w l e d g e
m a k e s this essay b o t h like a n d u n l i k e t h e
p o s i t i o n o f W a t t s & Z i m m e r m a n ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Like
t h e m , w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t r e s e a r c h is t o s o m e
e x t e n t a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d pursuit. That is s i m p l y
b e c a u s e r e s e a r c h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in a d i s c i p l i n e
like a c c o u n t i n g t h a t is m a d e u p o f l a r g e l y
bourgeois rather than aristocratic academics,
must, like a n y o n e else, earn livelihoods. Research
is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t salient m o d e o f p r o d u c t i o n
for s u c h livelihoods.
H o w e v e r , a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m o t i v e is m e r e l y
 RHETORICOF ACCOUNTING
one among many causal forces at work in the
e c o n o m y of research. At a psychologistic level,
the level at which Watts and Zimmerman
position their argument, choices and actions
are influenced by any n u m b e r of "motives" and
desires. Indeed, it would be quite easy to name
accounting researchers w h o (like Socrates)
k n o w that their research has negative economic
consequences for them. They know, for example,
that ideologically motivated deans exercise
arbitrary p o w e r to monetarily punish them for
the research that they do. They, like Socrates,
"value" the scholarly life as a calling; not as a
job, and they k n o w that the price that they pay
for responding to that calling is high indeed.
Romantic and archaic as that might sound, we
believe it ardently, from experience.
But it would be a mistake to think that con-
trasting the Socratic ethos with the economism
of Watts and Zimmerman sets up some kind of
d i c h o t o m y such that researchers could be
classified on one side or the other. Each of us
hopefully reflects upon the tensions between
the necessary economism of our research and
the threats that such economism poses to
Socratic ideals. We doubt, for example, that
positive theorists would lie about their data,
even if they knew that they could get away with
it. We are also suspicious of those w h o might
claim that their research is strongly indepen-
dent of their economic self-interests.
The problem with a position like Watts and
Zimmerman's is not that it is without truth-
value; rather, it is that they take an emotivistic
posture on other people. Emotivism is a claim
to k n o w other people and w h y they do what
they do better than they know themselves (see
Booth, 1974; MacIntyre, 1984, for discussion of
the moral arrogance of emotivistic positions). If
some researchers desire to discuss their o w n
motives for being "scholars" as "cash equiva-
lents", they can certainly refrain from attribut-
ing those motives to the rest of us. While
e c o n o m i c consequences are one aspect of
reflection u p o n research practice, they at best
provide a partial and limited view of the reflec-
tive activity of deciding u p o n a course and direc-
tion for one's research. The e c o n o m y of research
523
practice is far richer and more complex than a
simple emotivistic theory can accommodate.
The sociology of rhetoric. Research com-
munities, like any other, have their own
traditions, customs, mores, institutions, lan-
guages, hierarchies, systems of governance, and
even geographies (e.g. the "Chicago" school).
Nelson ( 1 9 9 0 ) places these sociological attri-
butes under the rubric of "animating myths"
that identify and sustain research communities.
As we have already seen, the invention of
knowledge is conditioned by an author's desire
to respond to the particularities of a research
community (an audience). But these particu-
larities also intervene to influence the shape
and character of justification. They are of
rhetorical relevance to the extent that they are
influences over the course of scholarly argu-
ment. We discuss, in an all too brief way, a few
of the positive and the negative consequences
of them.
Positively, the social character of research
communities adds efficiency to accounting
research within particular research communi-
ties. Because the expanse of possible account-
ing knowledges is great, it is impossible for any
knowledge claim to defend itself against all of
the available inventory of arguments that could
be made against it. Members of particular
research communities know themselves and
their fellow citizens as having already com-
m i r e d to particular empirical perspectives on
accounting, particular value judgments about
both accounting and accounting research, par-
ticular (and often quite specialized) languages
c o m m o n to them but not necessarily to others,
and a c o m m o n body of canonical texts that
form the background knowledge for their
community but not for others. The upshot is a
c o m m o n social identity among members, an
identity that lets them argue only those points
that are immediately relevant to them as an
intellectual community confronting a particular
knowledge claim. What such arguments lose in
generalizability, they gain in particularity,
nuance, and subtlety. A corollary to this within-
group point about rhetorical efficiency is that it
makes it possible for many different groups to
524 c E ARRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER

w o r k at p r o d u c i n g m a n y different k i n d s o f
accounting knowledges simply because each
g r o u p c o n c e r n s itself w i t h a b o u n d e d a n d
p a r t i a l c o n t e x t o f justification. As a result,
a c c o u n t i n g , as a s u b j e c t m a t t e r , at least in
t h e o r y gets t h e s o r t o f p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f q u i t e
different s c h o l a r l y d i s c o u r s e s that its e m p i r i -
cal r i c h n e s s d e s e r v e s , t h o u g h in p r a c t i c e t h e
hegemony of the "mainstream" impedes such
proliferation.
M o r e negatively, o r at least q u e s t i o n a b l y ,
social f o r c e s w i t h i n r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s c a n
c o n s t r a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s for a r g u m e n t , i n n o v a t i o n ,
a n d e v e n action. Scientific c o m m u n i t i e s are
p a r t i c u l a r y v u l n e r a b l e to b u r e a u c r a c i e s , to
t e x t s that are p l a c e d b e y o n d t h e p a l e o f
criticism, to r e v i e w p r o c e s s e s t h a t a r e n o t as
" b l i n d " as t h e y s e e m , t o institutional i d e o l o g i e s
t h a t a r e i n f l u e n c e d b y things o t h e r t h a n t h e
quality o f r e s e a r c h c o n t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t o activi-
ties o u t s i d e o f t h e s c h o l a r l y c o m m u n i t y that
influence t h e r e s e a r c h a g e n d a ( s e e B r o a d &
W a d e , 1982; Brym, 1980; Ashcraft, 1977; Crane,
1972; M c G e e & Lyne, 1987; O v e r i n g t o n , 1977).
T h e r e is a p e r s i s t e n t , a l m o s t m e d i e v a l c o n s e r -
vatism at w o r k in scientific c o m m u n i t i e s . "[A]
n e w scientific truth", w r i t e s Max Planck, " d o e s
n o t t r i u m p h b y c o n v i n c i n g its o p p o n e n t s a n d
m a k i n g t h e m s e e t h e light, b u t r a t h e r b e c a u s e
its o p p o n e n t s e v e n t u a l l y die, a n d a n e w genera-
t i o n g r o w s u p t h a t is familiar w i t h it" ( 1 9 4 9 , pp.
3 3 - 3 4 ) . Ph.D. s t u d e n t s q u i c k l y l e a r n that it is
less i m p o r t a n t t o d e v e l o p n e w ideas t h a n it is to
" i n c u l c a t e t h e n o r m s , traditions, a n d beliefs o f
t h o s e m a s t e r s to w h o m o n e is a p p r e n t i c e d "
( O v e r i n g t o n , 1977, p. 147). 7 W e c a n n o t discuss
the b r e a d t h o f issues that s u r r o u n d the sociology
o f k n o w l e d g e here. W h i t l e y ( 1 9 8 6 ) , W i l l i a m s
( 1 9 8 5 ) , a n d Lavoie ( 1 9 8 7 ) have p r o b e d s o m e
o f t h e s e issues in t h e c o n t e x t o f a c c o u n t i n g
research, but, o n t h e whole, a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h
has b e e n r e m a r k a b l y i m m u n e f r o m r e f l e c t i o n
o n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f its p r a c t i c e .
F o r t h e s e a n d o t h e r reasons, w e h a v e o u r
suspicions about those who would promote a
" m a r k e t " for a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h as an i n d e x o f
"quality" all t h e w h i l e f o r g o i n g i n q u i r y i n t o t h e
s o c i o l o g i c a l s h a p e a n d c h a r a c t e r o f that osten-
sible "market".
The justification o f knowledge: a n o r m a t i v e
view
T h e e c o n o m i c and social factors t h a t w e
discuss, as w e l l as m a n y o t h e r s that w e h a v e n o t
a d d r e s s e d , a r e i m p o r t a n t to r h e t o r i c i n a s m u c h
as t h e y influence a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e w h i c h ,
in turn, d e t e r m i n e s w h a t c o u n t s as a c c o u n t i n g
k n o w l e d g e That r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e socio-
economic aspects of scholarly argument and
k n o w l e d g e raises an i n t e r e s t i n g , critical ques-
t i o n for scholars. If t h e telos o f s c h o l a r s h i p is to
p r o d u c e t h e best k n o w l e d g e p o s s i b l e , t h e n c a n
t h e s e e c o n o m i c a n d social f o r c e s w h i c h are
p r e s e n t to r e s e a r c h i m p e d e t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f
that telos? In short, s h o u l d w e reflect u p o n a n d
exercise vigilance toward that ancient proble-
matic -- securing knowledge from the patholo-
gies o f p o w e r ? W e certainly, in a N i e t z s c h e a n
key, d o n o t h a v e to a n s w e r "yes" to this
q u e s t i o n . W e c a n s i m p l y s e t t l e for k n o w l e d g e
a s p o w e r , refusing t h e o b l i g a t i o n to reflect
upon the ethical comportments of scholarly
a r g u m e n t . In that key, w e w o u l d s i m p l y a c c e p t
an e x t a n t " m a r k e t " for k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t
reflection upon the structural and political
c o n d i t i o n s that a r e d e s c r i p t i v e o f that market.
But o n t h e o t h e r hand, if w e d o a n s w e r yes,
t h e n it is i m p o r t a n t t o a v o i d t h e i d e a l i s m o f

7 While the role of the educator as an intellectual mentor lS certainly important, there is a delicate balance between
mentormg, sttthng creativtty, and serving as an intellectual censor Kanney (forthcommg), for example, suggests that Ph D
students stay away from interesting but "risky" studies Why~ What makes them risky, and why should some calculattve
"rtsk factor" override intellectual rtchness~ Need we examine the soctological causes that make "risk" override intellectual
richness m a view hke Kinney's; Could such rtsk have something to do with challenging orthodoxy, wtth challenging the
"mainstream" of which Kanney is himself so much a part~ What are, for example, the conditions that would make a
dissertation toptc "unacceptable"~ Should that "risk" perhaps be borne by the professoriate /f the option ts, put stmply,
repression of the pursuit of good tdeas~
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING
b e l i e v i n g t h a t w e can, as a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r ,
secure knowledge from the pathologies of
power. Despite intentions, research communi-
ties are, like any other, arenas that are influenced
b y b o t h strategic h u m a n actions and institutions
t h a t h a v e an i n e l u c t a b l y c o e r c i v e a n d p e r h a p s
morally suspect character to them. To be aware
o f t h e i n e l u c t a b i l i t y o f p o w e r is t o r e c o g n i z e
that r e s e a r c h is a d e e p l y h u m a n a n d fragile
practice, a practice consequentially mediated
b y a c t i o n s that a r e n e v e r r e a l i z a t i o n s o f o u r
i d e a l i z e d p e r s p e c t i v e s o n w h a t t h e y o u g h t to
be. But that in n o w a y d i m i n i s h e s t h e v a l u e o f
articulating such idealized perspectives. They
a r e useful as c r i t i c a l - m o r a l p r e c e p t s for reflec-
tion, a n d w e p r o v i d e o n e s u c h p e r s p e c t i v e
below, a perspective adapted from the work of
Jiirgen Habermas (1984, 1987b) and merely
g l o s s e d in this essay.
H a b e r m a s is i n t e r e s t e d in s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
explaining the conditions under which com-
municative action can produce a form of
knowledge that can be called rational know-
ledge. T h o s e c o n d i t i o n s p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a for t h e
conduct of argumentative practice, and they
e n t a i l r e m o v i n g all c o e r c i v e c o n s t r a i n t s o n
s c h o l a r l y d i s c o u r s e , c o n s t r a i n t s that w o u l d
i m p e d e , in H a b e r m a s ' terms, " t h e u n f o r c e d
force of the better argument".
Like rhetoricians o f inquiry ( a n d pragmatists ),
H a b e r m a s a g r e e s t h a t k n o w l e d g e c l a i m s be-
come knowledge when a consensus-of-belief
f o r m s a r o u n d t h e m ; but, u n l i k e m o s t r h e t o r i -
cians of inquiry (and pragmatists), provides
e x p l i c i t m o r a l c r i t e r i a for t h e f o r m a t i o n o f s u c h
c o n s e n s u s . F o r him, "... t h e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h
[or r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e ] is n o t t h e fact that s o m e
c o n s e n s u s has b e e n r e a c h e d , b u t r a t h e r that ...
a c o n s e n s u s c a n b e a r r i v e d at u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s
which show the consensus to be grounded"
(transl. in M c C a r t h y , 1979, p. 308). W h i l e it is
b e y o n d t h e s c o p e o f this essay t o e x p l a i n
SThts ts a paraphrase taken from the work of Alexy (1978, pp 40--41), as translated m Whtte (1988, p 56)
9 Indeed, Habermas is himself a critac of rhetortc. But that crlttctsm IS based upon certain aspects of rhetoric that we have
excluded from this essay in order to focus upon argument Construing rhetortc as argument, it is possible to read Hahermas
as a theorist of rhetortc, a pomt that Stmons (1990) correctly notes
525
H a b e r m a s ' m o d e l in a d e t a i l e d way, w e offer t h e
salient f e a t u r e s o f t h a t m o d e l as o n e m e a n s for
reflection on the argumentative practices of
accounting researchers.
First, H a b e r m a s b i n d s p a r t i c i p a n t s in argu-
m e n t to a singular, f o r m a l t e l o s ~ to r e a c h
u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y a c t i n g in a m a n n e r w h i c h
g r a n t s a b s o l u t e p r i o r i t y to t h e d e s i r e to co-
o p e r a t i v e l y s e a r c h for t r u t h as r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h
t h e f o r c e o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t ( 1 9 8 4 , p. 25).
T h e " f o r c e " o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is m a d e
e x p l i c i t in t w o m e d i a o f n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d
practice, one social-political and the other
discursive.
The social-political medium coheres within
w h a t H a b e r m a s calls an "Ideal S p e e c h Com-
m u n i t y " . Such a c o m m u n i t y has t h e following,
practical properties:
( 1 ) E v e r y s u b j e c t w h o so d e s i r e s is a l l o w e d
to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e d i s c o u r s e .
( 2 ) E v e r y s u b j e c t is a l l o w e d to offer a n y
proposal.
( 3 ) E v e r y s u b j e c t is a l l o w e d to q u e s t i o n a n y
proposal.
( 4 ) N o s u b j e c t is c o e r c e d b y f o r c e s e i t h e r
i n s i d e t h e d i s c o u r s e o r o u t s i d e t h e d i s c o u r s e in
using t h e rights e x p r e s s e d in ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) . 8
We cannot discuss the implications of these
p r o p e r t i e s in any d e t a i l h e r e , a n d w e r e f e r t h e
r e a d e r to H a b e r m a s ( 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 8 7 a , b ) as w e l l as
to P o w e r & Laughlin ( 1 9 9 0 ) a n d A r r i n g t o n &
P u x t y ( 1 9 9 1 ) for d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e m in an
a c c o u n t i n g c o n t e x t . 9 But a f e w r e m a r k s are in
order. First, Habermas' m o d e l d o e s n o t diminish
t h e u n i q u e i n t e r e s t s a n d d e s i r e s that i n f o r m
individual subjects as t h e y participate in scholarly
a r g u m e n t . It m e r e l y specifies a p r o c e d u r a l
m o d e l , a d i s c o u r s e ethic, w i t h r e s p e c t to h o w
such interests and desires enter into scholarly
d e b a t e . S e c o n d , it p r o v i d e s a p o s i t i v e s e n s e o f a
public interest within research communities
i n a s m u c h as it o r i e n t s d i s c u s s i o n a n d d e b a t e
526 c E A1LRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER
t o w a r d the collective, c o n s e n s u a l c h a r a c t e r of
the t r a n s i t i o n from k n o w l e d g e claims to know-
ledge. How? By b i n d i n g m e m b e r s of r e s e a r c h
c o m m u n i t i e s to the telos of collectively u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g k n o w l e d g e as a p r o d u c t of collective
assent to the b e t t e r a r g u m e n t s , w h e t h e r those
a r g u m e n t s are their o w n or others. Thus, w h i l e
a b o d y of k n o w l e d g e is n o t g o i n g to c o r r e s p o n d
to the private p r e f e r e n c e s a n d desires of
a n y o n e , t h e r e is a p r e s u m p t i o n that, g i v e n a n
a r e n a of m a x i m u m c o n t e s t a b i l i t y like that
i m p l i e d i n a n Ideal Speech C o m m u n i t y , the
o u t c o m e of scholarly a r g u m e n t is a c c e p t a b l e b y
all, e v e n if s u c h o u t c o m e s carry d y s f u n c t i o n s
for the "private" interests of i n d i v i d u a l partici-
pants. In this way:
the consequences and side-effects [of knowledge] for
the satisfaction of the interests of every individual,
which are expected to result from a general confor-
mance .. can be accepted without compulsion by all
(Habermas, 1982, p 257).
The discursive, rather t h a n social-political,
c o n d i t i o n s of H a b e r m a s ' m o d e l focus o n an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of rationality as c o m m u n i c a t i v e .
Aligned s o m e w h a t w i t h t h e Aristotelian tradi-
t i o n of practical reason, a n d certainly aligned
with pragmatism, Habermas' n o t i o n of rationality
is adequately summarized by T h o m p s o n ( 1 9 8 3 ) :
When we use the term "rational", observes Habermas,
we assume that there is a close connection between
rationality and knowledge We assume, tt seems, that
actions or symbolic expresstons are "rational" insofar as
they are based on knowledge whtch can be crtticlzed.
[This] hnks the term "rational" to the notion of
mtersubjective assessment and thereby points towards a
broader concept of communicative rationality m e n a c t i n g p o w e r - - rational k n o w l e d g e c a n b e
which various parucipants overcome their merely
subjective vtews and, by virtue of the mutuality of
rationally motivated convmtion, assure themselves of
both the umty of the objective world and the
mtersublectavlty of their life relations" (Habermas,
1984, p 28, Thompson, 1983, p 282)
The process through which communicatively
rational k n o w l e d g e is p r o d u c e d is a r g u m e n t a -
tive, a n d t h e r e b y rhetorical. It is the raising a n d
c o n t e s t i n g o f w h a t H a b e r m a s calls validity
claims that s u p p o r t o r refute k n o w l e d g e claims;
and, u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n s of Ideal Speech, s u c h
a r g u m e n t s lead to a rational consensus-of-
belief a b o u t w h i c h k n o w l e d g e claims s h o u l d
c o u n t as k n o w l e d g e a n d w h i c h s h o u l d not.
T h u s Habermas, at least in a c r i t i c a l - r a t i o n a l
sense, surpasses rhetoric, w h i c h s e e m i n g l y
holds that k n o w l e d g e is j u s t c o n s e n s u s , b y
offering a m o d e l of a r g u m e n t a t i o n that makes
explicit the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to distinguish
b e t w e e n rationally g r o u n d e d k n o w l e d g e a n d
m e r e consensus-of-belief. This u n e a s y alliance
b e t w e e n r h e t o r i c a n d rationality is e v i d e n t in
H a b e r m a s ' ( 1 9 8 4 ) e x p l a n a t i o n of a r g u m e n t :
We use the term argumentation for that type of speech
m whtch parttctpants themattze contested valtdtty
claims and attempt to wndicate or criticize them
through arguments An argument contains reasons
or grounds that are connected in a systemattc way wtth
the validity claim of a problematic expression. The
"strength" of an argument is measured m a gtven
context by the soundness of the reasons, that can be
seen m, among other things, whether or not an
argument is able to convmce the parUctpants in a
discourse, that Is, to motivate them to accept the
vahdity clatm in question (p 18)
T h e difference b e t w e e n H a b e r m a s a n d rhetori-
cians is that a r g u m e n t , for him, m u s t b e
" i m m u n i z e d against r e p r e s s i o n a n d inequality"
t h r o u g h the n o r m a t i v e - r e g u l a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s of
an ideal s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y ( 1 9 8 4 , p. 26). As
w e have already seen, t h e r e are aspects of
r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s that have t e n d e n c i e s
t o w a r d r e p r e s s i o n a n d inequality. T h r o u g h
H a b e r m a s ' m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality,
the process of p r o d u c i n g k n o w l e d g e c a n b e
formally differentiated from the process of
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h reflec-
t i o n u p o n the a r g u m e n t a t i v e m o d e o f its
p r o d u c t i o n . That differentiation r e q u i r e s m o r a l
c o m m i t m e n t ; n o t e p i s t e m i c rules.
H a b e r m a s ' regulative m o d e l of a r g u m e n t a t i v e
p r a c t i c e is fraught w i t h difficulties, a n d n u m e -
rous critics have b e e n relentless i n p o i n t i n g
t h e m o u t (see, e.g. Smith, 1987; Bernstein,
1985). W e c a n n o t engage those criticisms
h e r e in any c o m p l e t e sense. Broadly put, t h e y
are criticisms of b o t h t h e a t t e m p t to i m p o s e a
 RHETORICOF ACCOUNTING
neo-Kantian set of deontological rules upon dis-
course and the attempt to ground social choice
in a perhaps overly intellectualized regard for
communicative transparency, a transparency
that perhaps pays insuflficient attention to the
material manifestations of p o w e r and coercion
in public life. But for our purposes, Habermas'
model of Ideal Speech seems a useful schema
for reflection upon the intersubjective relations
b e t w e e n accounting researchers. Ideal Speech
is not a practical mandate; it is a quasi-
transcendental medium for moral reflection
upon h o w w e o u g h t to treat each other in
communicating with respect to accounting
knowledge and its production.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A RHETORIC OF
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH IN RELATION
TO OTHER ASPECTS OF RESEARCH
PRACTICE
The intention of this essay is to announce the
relevance of rhetoric to accounting research
practice; and, hopefully, w e have suggested
numerous ways in which the discursive relation
between a researcher and an audience can add
to methodological understanding and debate
among accounting researchers. We are in no
sense suggesting that rhetoric can substitute for
the substantive methods and perspectives on
accounting that inform various research com-
munities. What rhetoric can do is twofold. First,
it can claim a ubiquity that other methodo-
logical c o m p o n e n t s of research do not have,
inasmuch as every accounting research com-
munity depends u p o n argument and debate in
order to p r o d u c e knowledge, irrespective of
the methodological particularities of that com-
munity. A critical focus upon the c o n d u c t of
argument thus has some accurate claim to
generalizability across research communities.
Second, rhetoric can take its place alongside
other methodological concepts such that a
fuller, richer sense of accounting research
practices comes into view. It is this latter place
of rhetoric that w e briefly discuss in this section
of the essay as w e isolate some non-rhetorical
527
aspects of accounting research methodology
and situate rhetoric in relation to them.
The philosophy of science is frequently
evoked in methodological discussion both
inside and outside of accounting. Philosophers
of science, like other scholars, write texts that
can be useful to accounting researchers trying
to understand methodology. But it is somewhat
remarkable that philosophers of science are so
frequently invoked as the "thought police"
in methodological discussion in accounting.
Christenson's ( 1 9 8 3 ) use of Popper is exemp-
lary. Such appeals to authority are disturbing
inasmuch as the philosophy of science is itself a
discipline where disagreement about what
science is and what it is not, h o w science is or
ought to be produced, and h o w science fits
within the broader concerns of intellectual
practice is rampant. There is no consensual
"philosophy" of science, particularly in a post-
empiricist, post-positivist age like ours. The
upshot of this diversity is that an accounting
methodologist of any persuasion can find an
"authority" within the philosophy of science to
sustain whatever view he or she wishes to take,
including the view that the distinction between
"science" and "non-science" lacks point (see
Feyerabend, 1978; Rorty, 1979). There seems
to be a sort of "fishing for authority" as
accounting researchers appeal to the philosophy
of science, a practice that sociologists of science
have called "ontological gerrymandering"
making one "science" problematic by making
some other unproblematic. It is evident in
accounting studies like Christenson (1983),
Chua (1986), and Abdel-Khalik & Ajinkya
(1979), all studies which take different views
on science and use those views as criteria to
reject others because they are (per such
criteria) not "science". From our perspective, it
seems that if philosophers of science cannot even
agree on minimal implicatures for what science is
and what it is not, h o w science ought to be
conducted, and h o w it fits within the broader
intellectual enterprise, then they are hardly in a
position to "police" the rest of us. Gerrymandering
rhetorical authority from them (as earlier
versions of this essay did) is at best suspicious.
528 c E ARRINGTONand W SCHWEIKER
But t h e r e is a m o r e i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n to b e
suspicious o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e appeals to the philo-
s o p h y of s c i e n c e in m e t h o d o l o g i c a l discussion.
A c c o u n t i n g researchers, n o t p h i l o s o p h e r s of
science, s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e h o w to d o a c c o u n t -
ing r e s e a r c h as w e l l as w h a t c o u n t s a n d w h a t
does n o t c o u n t as a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e . That
is because a c c o u n t i n g researchers have arduously
e a r n e d a c o m p e t e n c e in raising a n d investigat-
ing i n n u m e r a b l e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t a c c o u n t i n g .
That c o m p e t e n c e is n o t expressible in a n y
c o m p l e t e sense; it is m o r e akin to Polanyi's
( 1 9 5 8 ) n o t i o n of "tacit knowledge". The ex-
p a n s e of q u e s t i o n s a b o u t a n d k n o w l e d g e s of
a c c o u n t i n g , as w e l l as the t a l e n t to address
them, n o m o r e correlates w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n s
a n d texts o f p h i l o s o p h e r s o f s c i e n c e t h a n it does
with, say, the q u e s t i o n s a n d texts of historians,
e c o n o m i s t s , m o r a l philosophers, organizational
theorists, o r a n y n u m b e r of others. A c c o u n t i n g
r e s e a r c h e r s c a n a n d do l e a r n h o w to do b e t t e r
r e s e a r c h from all of them. T h e y learn n e w
arguments.
At risk of a r h e t o r i c of "authority", w e w o u l d
recall P o p p e r ' s claim a b o u t w h a t is characteris-
tic of "science" - - critical d i s c u s s i o n a n d
debate, critical rhetoric. But "critical discussion
a n d d e b a t e " is c o m m o n to all a c c o u n t i n g
r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s , just as it is c o m m o n to
h u m a n i s t s , physicists, a n d any o t h e r scholarly
field. Seen in this light, a p e r h a p s startling claim
seems attractive: the distinction b e t w e e n science
a n d n o n - s c i e n c e in a c c o u n t i n g lacks point,
t h o u g h the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n critical argu-
m e n t a n d o t h e r forms of d i s c o u r s e retains
point. Rorty ( 1 9 8 7 ) s e e m s to give r e a s o n a b l e
advice here, advice that pragmatists have b e e n
offering for q u i t e s o m e time, a n d advice that
calls a t t e n t i o n to rhetoric:
We [pragmatists]would like to disabuse social scientists
and humanists of the idea that there is somethmg called
"scientific status" which is a desirable goal On our view,
"truth" is a umvocal term It apphes equally to the
judgments of lawyers, anthropologists, physmtsts, phdo-
log~ts, and literary critics There ts no point m assigning
degrees of "objectivity"or 'q'lardness"to such disciplines.
For the presence of unforced agreement in all of them
gives us everything in the way of "oblective truth" that
one could possibly want namely, lntersublecttve agree-
ment (p 42)
T h e d e m i s e of positivism, a n d the fragmenta-
t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h y of science, has led to a
r e n a s c e n t i n t e r e s t in h e r m e n e u t i c s - - i n q u i r y
into the p r a c t i c e of i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g texts, w h e t h e r r e s e a r c h texts or other-
wise. This r e n a s c e n t i n t e r e s t has surfaced in
a c c o u n t i n g . Boland ( 1 9 8 9 ) speaks of a " h e r m e -
n e u t i c a l t u r n " in a c c o u n t i n g research, and
d e s c r i b e s that t u r n as
an acceptance and appreciation of ordinary language
with all its attendant ambiguity as the only basts we have
for all we can know [and a] reahzation of our own
deep, personal involvementm interpreting our inherently
symbohc and multvvocal everyday language m con-
structlng all we know (p 216)
Boland's d e s c r i p t i o n is b r o a d a n d attitudinal; he
is c o n c e r n e d to p r o m o t e a p o s t u r e for self-
reflection o n the research e n t e r p r i s e that is
d i s t a n c e d from the urge t o w a r d c e r t i t u d e and
o b j e c t i v i t y that has i n f o r m e d t h e positivistic
tradition s i n c e the late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
A regard for h e r m e n e u t i c s trades in the
m o d e l of the r e s e a r c h e r as a d e t a c h e d o b s e r v e r
of "facts" for the m o d e l of the r e s e a r c h e r as a
r e a d e r w h o brings a particular h e r m e n e u t i c a l
c o n s c i o u s n e s s to a c c o u n t i n g , a c o n s c i o u s n e s s
i n e x t r i c a b l y b o u n d u p w i t h the history of a
s u b j e c t ' s subjectivity, a historically d y n a m i c
a n d p a r t i c u l a r subjectivity that takes shape
t h r o u g h o t h e r b o o k s o n e has read, o t h e r p e o p l e
w i t h w h o m o n e has interacted, traditions a n d
i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h o n e is intellectually,
politically, a n d socially situated, a n d a h o r i z o n
of desires for a n d s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t future
possibilities for a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e as well
as a c c o u n t i n g e x p e r i e n c e . I n Paul Ricoeur's
terms, w h a t a r e a d e r appropriates from a text
( o r a r e s e a r c h study), w h a t he o r she c o m e s to
u n d e r s t a n d , to know, e t c , is d e t e r m i n e d b y the
q u i t e p a r t i c u l a r a n d c o m p l e x d y n a m i c s that
these a n d o t h e r factors d o n a t e to the activity
of reading. Because readers are different, be-
cause t h e y are c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e i r s u b j e c t i v i t y
differently, the meanings, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING
understandings, and knowledges produced
t h r o u g h r e a d i n g are, for each reading, different.
That is the c o r e of H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r ' s oft-
c i t e d claim that to u n d e r s t a n d is to always
understand differently.
Boland ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Lavoie ( 1 9 8 7 ) , a n d A r r i n g t o n
& Francis ( 1 9 8 9 ) have i n v e r y different ways
c o n s t r u e d t h e i m p o r t o f h e r m e n e u t i c s for
a c c o u n t i n g research. W e w o u l d like to add a
few c o m m e n t s o n the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n her-
m e n e u t i c s a n d rhetoric, as w e see h e r m e n e u t i c s
as a w o r t h y alternative to the p h i l o s o p h y of
s c i e n c e as a n a c c o u t r e m e n t to u n d e r s t a n d i n g
the role of r h e t o r i c in a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h
practice.
Rhetoric helps r e c o v e r the role of the a u t h o r
in h e r m e n e u t i c a l t h e o r y i n a s m u c h as it calls
a t t e n t i o n to t h e a u t h o r ' s task of a n t i c i p a t i n g a n
a u d i e n c e , a c o m m u n i t y o f r e a d e r s ( s e e Lyne,
1990). As w e have already seen, this anticipa-
t i o n c o n d i t i o n s the t e x t i n its v e r y p r o d u c t i o n .
Thus, w h i l e r e a d i n g is always a t r a n s a c t i o n
b e t w e e n a r e a d e r a n d an a u t o n o m o u s text, that
text is itself a p r o d u c t of an a u t h o r ' s efforts to
o r c h e s t r a t e the h e r m e n e u t i c a l m o v e s that a
r e a d e r will make. Particularly in a c o n t e x t like
a c c o u n t i n g research, a u t h o r s k n o w a great deal
a b o u t w h o the d e s i r e d r e a d e r s are. T h e y thus
k n o w a great deal a b o u t w h a t h e r m e n e u t i c a l
p o s t u r e s will b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n t h e text.
And, to the e x t e n t that the n e e d to p e r s u a d e
an a u d i e n c e g o v e r n s t h e l a b o r o f p r o d u c i n g
r e s e a r c h texts, the ability to p r e d i c t these
h e r m e n e u t i c a l p o s t u r e s a n d to e x p l o i t those
p r e d i c t i o n s i n s h a p i n g a text is a significant
d e t e r m i n a n t o f the success or failure of a
k n o w l e d g e claim i n b e c o m i n g k n o w l e d g e . W e
w o u l d agree t h e n w i t h Lyne's ( 1 9 9 0 ) claim that
r h e t o r i c r e m i n d s h e r m e n e u t i c s of the ineluct-
ably strategic m o m e n t i n reading, a m o m e n t
d e s c r i b e d b y t h e m e d i a t i n g role o f the a u t h o r in
p r o d u c i n g a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f text, p r o d u c i n g it
for a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of reader, a n d p r o d u c i n g it
w i t h the i n t e n t i o n to p e r s u a d e that reader.
T h e a n a l o g y b e t w e e n a b o o k store a n d
accounting research seems reasonable w h e n
o n e c o n s i d e r s the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h e r m e n e u -
tics a n d rhetoric. A n y b o o k i n a b o o k store c a n
529
b e read b y a n y o n e . Thus it is t r u e that t h e r e are
n o formal limits o n h e r m e n e u t i c a l possibilities.
But a u t h o r s d o n o t i n t e n d to p r o d u c e b o o k s
available to a n y o n e . T h e y w r i t e for aficionados
of t h e i r c h o s e n g e n r e w lovers of mysteries,
travelogues, philosophy, fiction, etc. A c c o u n t -
ing r e s e a r c h studies are n o different. T h e y c a n
he read b y a n y o n e ; t h e y are w r i t t e n for
someone.
If a c c o u n t i n g research is addressed to parti-
c u l a r audiences, p a r t i c u l a r r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i -
ties, t h e n the adjective " e t h n o c e n t r i c " s e e m s an
a p p r o p r i a t e modifier for s u c h research. This
essay has d e s c r i b e d a v i e w o f r e s e a r c h that
is d e c i d e d l y e t h n o c e n t r i c ; that is, w e have
a d v a n c e d the n o t i o n that k n o w l e d g e claims in
a c c o u n t i n g are a d d r e s s e d to a n d a d j u d i c a t e d b y
p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t i e s , often q u i t e small com-
munities. This has epistemological consequences:
w e are thus settling for a v i e w of a c c o u n t i n g
k n o w l e d g e that is parochial, limited, a n d sub-
ject to all of the frailties, prejudices, a n d biases
that i n f o r m p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s of scholars. T h e
likely charge against us is relativism. W e a c c e p t
that charge, r e c o g n i z e the limits that c o n f r o n t
us, b u t are suspicious of the alternative for the
following reasons.
R o r t y ( 1 9 8 7 ) , a self-professed relativist, sug-
gests s o m e i m p l i c a t i o n s for a v i e w like ours, a n d
w e cite h i m at l e n g t h as a w a y to add s o m e
clarity a n d positivity to the n o t i o n of relativism
as w e p r o m o t e it:
It [relativism]can name any of three dtfferent views The
first is the silly and self-refutingwew that every belief ts
as good as every other. The second ts the wrong-headed
vtew that "true" is an equivocal term, having as many
meanmgs as there are contexts of justtfication The third
is the ethnocentrtc vtew that there is nothing to be satd
about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions
of the familiar procedures of justificatton which a given
society - - ours - - uses in one or another area of inquiry
The pragmatist does hold this third, ethnocentrtc, vtew
But he does not hold the first or the second (p. 42)
I n the c o n t e x t of a c c o u n t i n g research, the first
v i e w is "silly" b e c a u s e a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h is
a n d o u g h t to b e a highly d i s c r i m i n a t o r y prac-
tice o f j u d g i n g t h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s of different
k n o w l e d g e claims: of p u b l i s h i n g s o m e p a p e r s
 530 c E ARRINGTONand W. SCHWEIKER
b u t n o t o t h e r s for e x a m p l e . It is a "self-refuting"
v i e w b e c a u s e it is itself a c o m p a r i s o n o f
different beliefs, a c o m p a r i s o n that t r e a t s t h e m
as u n i f o r m l y valuable. (As an analogy, c o n s i d e r
h o w an e c o n o m i s t ' s p r o h i b i t i o n o n i n t e r p e r -
sonal utility c o m p a r i s o n s is itself an i n t e r p e r -
sonal utility c o m p a r i s o n . ) T h e s e c o n d v i e w is
' ~ ¢ r o n g - h e a d e d " b e c a u s e different p r o c e d u r e s
for "justification" a r e t h e m s e l v e s c a n d i d a t e s for
evaluation. H a b e r m a s , for e x a m p l e , h e l p s us to
s e e h o w different m o d e s o f a r g u m e n t a t i v e
p r a c t i c e - - different p r o c e d u r e s o f justification
c a n b e m o r a l l y evaluated. W e relativists
b o t h p r e f e r a n d d e f e n d t h e i d e a that, for
e x a m p l e , civil a r g u m e n t is a b e t t e r w a y o f
justifying k n o w l e d g e ( o r " t r u t h " ) than vio-
lence, shouting, c o e r c i v e p o w e r , etc. T h e t h i r d
a n d c o r r e c t v i e w o f r e l a t i v i s m h o l d s that t h e r e
is n o t h i n g o u t s i d e o f a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s
w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y that
c a n p o s s i b l y justify k n o w l e d g e m t h e r e is n o
p a r t i c u l a r language, n o e x a n t e rules o f m e t h o d ,
n o singular "logic" to w h i c h " t r u t h " o r " k n o w -
ledge" universally corresponds.
It s e e m s t o us that t h e partial, p a r o c h i a l , a n d
e t h n o c e n t r i c v i e w is p r e f e r a b l e to t h e alterna-
tive, t h e b e l i e f that s o m e r e s e a r c h e r s have a
u n i v e r s a l l y better, m o r e " t r u t h - i n d u c i n g " , m o r e
"scientific" m o d e o f p r o d u c i n g a c c o u n t i n g
k n o w l e d g e . But an e t h n o c e n t r i c i t y like o u r s is
n o t w i t h o u t p r o b l e m s . M o s t simply, it c a n l e a d
to an insularity s u c h that r e s e a r c h e r s isolate
t h e m s e l v e s w i t h i n small r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s ,
n o l o n g e r d e s i r o u s o f s p e a k i n g w i t h , w r i t i n g to,
o r arguing w i t h m e m b e r s o f o t h e r communities.
T r u l y h e r o i c efforts surface w h e n different
r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t i e s ( d i f f e r e n t t r i b e s to p u s h
t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l m e t a p h o r s ) try t o inter-
pret, understand, problematize, and critique the
k n o w l e d g e t h a t e a c h has just finished c o n s t i t u t -
ing. That is a p r o c e s s n o t u n l i k e t h e p r o g r e s s
m a d e w h e n c o l o n i a l i s t - m i n d e d E n g l i s h m e n de-
c i d e d t o listen t o t h e natives, to t h o s e like
Gandhi, to those who persuaded them that the
w o r l d a n d k n o w l e d g e a b o u t it d i d n o t c o r r e -
s p o n d t o t h e A n g l i c a n u n i v e r s a l i t y that t h e y
s o u g h t t o a t t r i b u t e t o it. T h a t is w h a t h a p p e n s in
feminist t h e o r y w h e n m e n start to listen to
w o m e n . It is w h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n w h i t e s
s t a r t e d t o listen to p e o p l e o f c o l o r in t h e 1960s.
It is w h a t c a n h a p p e n w h e n positivists, her-
m e n e u t s , m a t h e m a t i c i a n s , Marxists, n e w classi-
cal e c o n o m i s t s , sociologists, c r i t i c a l theorists,
n o r m a t i v e theorists, a n d a p p l i e d a c c o u n t i n g
researchers read each other's work and bring
different p e r s p e c t i v e s to b e a r u p o n w h a t re-
m a i n s o t h e r w i s e s t r i c t l y "tribal" d i s c o u r s e . That
is t h e m e d i a o f l e a r n i n g , o f b e i n g e x p o s e d to
a n d p e r h a p s p e r s u a d e d b y t h e beliefs a n d
o p i n i o n s o f t h o s e u n l i k e ourselves. It r e q u i r e s
w h a t R o r t y ( 1 9 8 7 ) calls " a b n o r m a l d i s c o u r s e "
( a k i n to K u h n ' s " a b n o r m a l s c i e n c e " ) m listen-
ing to t h o s e w h o first a p p e a r o d d , e c c e n t r i c ,
different, w h o s p e a k different languages:
To say that we must be ethnocentric may sound
suspictous, but this will only happen if we identify
ethnocentrism with pig-headed refusal to talk to
representaUves of other communities In my sense of
ethnocentrism, to be ethnocentric is simply to work by
our own lights The defense of ethnocentrism ts simply
that there are no other hghts to work by Beliefs
suggested by another mdtvidual or another culture must
be tested by tt-ymg to weave them together with beliefs
whtch we already have We can so test them, because
everything which we can identify as a human being or as
a culture will be somethmg which shares an enormous
number of behefs with us. (If it did not, we would
stmply not be able to recogmze that it was speaking a
language, and thus that tt had any behefs at all ) (p 43).
To c o n c l u d e , it is c e r t a i n l y w o r t h c o n s i d e r -
ing t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e r e is n o t h i n g b u t t h e
fragile, political, a n d m o r a l l y v u l n e r a b l e a c t i v i t y
o f discourse w i t h o t h e r s that justifies and g r o u n d s
t h e k n o w l e d g e that a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h e r s
p r o d u c e . It is c e r t a i n l y w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t
t h e s e a r c h for a sure-fire m e t h o d o f p r o d u c i n g
k n o w l e d g e , o r t h e s e a r c h for a h i e r a r c h y t h a t
would subordinate some modes of knowledge
p r o d u c t i o n (unscientific?) to o t h e r s (scientific?),
o r t h e s e a r c h for s o m e " o b j e c t i v e " p o s t u r e that
would divorce our knowledge from both our
s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d o u r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a r e all
s e a r c h e s that w e w o u l d b e b e t t e r off a b a n d o n -
ing. It m i g h t b e n i c e if w e h a d f o u n d s u c h
g r o u n d s for c e r t i t u d e in k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c t i o n ,
b u t t h e fact is w e h a v e n ' t ( s e e Rorty, 1979).
 RHETORIC OF ACCOUNTING 531

P e r h a p s all t h a t w e h a v e g o t is a r g u m e n t w i t h
e a c h o t h e r . T h a t m a y n o t b e a b a d state o f
affairs. After all, a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e o u g h t to
sink o r s w i m b a s e d u p o n w h a t it c a n c o n t r i b u t e
to t h e m o r a l q u a l i t y o f h u m a n lives as s u c h lives
are i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e p r a c t i c e o f a c c o u n t i n g .
The question of the moral desirability of
a c c o u n t i n g is a q u e s t i o n b e s t a d d r e s s e d t h r o u g h
free, o p e n , a n d u n c o e r c e d a r g u m e n t . Scholars,
like citizens, a r e a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e " r h e t o r i c s "
that t h e y d e p l o y in t h e c o u r s e o f such arguments.
A m a j o r w e a k n e s s o f this essay, a w e a k n e s s
justified b y t h e c o n s t r a i n t s i m p o s e d o n a single
essay, is t h a t w e h a v e f o c u s e d p r i m a r i l y u p o n
r h e t o r i c ' s p l a c e in a n s w e r i n g w h a t h a v e tradi-
t i o n a l l y b e e n t h o u g h t o f as e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l
q u e s t i o n s , q u e s t i o n s a b o u t h o w k n o w l e d g e is
justified as knowledge. W e have n o t d o n e justice
to an e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t area: t h e s o c i o l o g y o f
accounting knowledge and rhetoric's relation
to it. D e s p i t e its p r o m i n e n c e in t h e b r o a d e r
social s c i e n c e s , t h e r e is v e r y little w o r k o n t h e
sociology of accounting research. Williams
( 1 9 8 5 ) a n d W h i t l e y ( 1 9 8 6 ) a r e t h e only t w o
s t u d i e s t h a t c o m e i m m e d i a t e l y to mind. But
t h e r e is a g r e a t d e a l o f "unofficial r h e t o r i c "
a b o u t t h e s o c i o l o g y o f a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h - - it
takes p l a c e in hallways, c o n f e r e n c e h o t e l lobbies,
o v e r t h e t e l e p h o n e , a n d o v e r b e e r . It o u g h t to
b e d i s c u s s e d o u t in t h e o p e n - - in t h e
literature. If o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s h a v e t h e m a t u r i t y
to d o t h a t ( a n d t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s h a v e d o n e a
g r e a t d e a l o f that), t h e n a c c o u n t i n g c a n as well.
W e h a v e p r o v i d e d s o m e r e f e r e n c e s that c a n
s e r v e as m o d e l s ( s e e p a r t i c u l a r l y B o u r d i e u ,
1988; M c G e e & Lyne, 1987; B r o a d & W a d e ,
1982; Crane, 1972; O v e r i n g t o n , 1977). Such
w o r k is i m p o r t a n t to a d v a n c e t h e q u a l i t y o f
a c c o u n t i n g k n o w l e d g e since, as w e have already
seen, t h e k n o w l e d g e that a r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y
p r o d u c e s is o n l y as g o o d as t h e a r g u m e n t s t h a t
t h e y e n g a g e in. T h o s e a r g u m e n t s a r e v u l n e r a b l e
to t h e f o r c e s o f c o e r c i o n , p o w e r , institutions,
a n d ideologies. T h e y o u g h t to b e " u n f o r c e d "
a r g u m e n t s ; t h e y usually a r e not. That is an issue
for f u t u r e essays, essays w h i c h m a y find it
a t t r a c t i v e to take a critical p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e
s u b t e x t o f t h i s essay: t h e stifling h e g e m o n y o f
" m a i n s t r e a m " a c c o u n t i n g r e s e a r c h w i t h its
p o s i t i v i s t i c p r e t e n s i o n s , e m o t i v i s t i c m o r a l arro-
gance, e c o n o m i s t i c serf-understandings, a n d
i n d i f f e r e n c e to t h e a r g u m e n t s o f others.

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