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PERSONS

Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBM’s
failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount of the loan with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”

HELD:
No. Petition is DENIED.
The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their being stockholders of the said company. The
debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

Adoption

Republic vs Elepano
G.R. No. 92542, October 15, 1991

Tamargo vs CA
209 SCRA 518

Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
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PERSONS
In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November
1982 that is after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since
Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo’s petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

Held:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: “Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under
their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law.”
In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident
happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the
time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Libi vs IAC
209 SCRA 754

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978, Julie Ann decided to break up
with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14,
1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie Ann’s house. Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).
Apparently, Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of damages based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?

HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in safekeeping their gun. Wendell
gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their son had possession of said gun. They only found out
about it when the shooting happened. Further, they were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local
Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and were not acting with the diligence required by
law (that of a good father of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause damages against other persons.
What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases like this is not merely subsidiary.
Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a
criminal act. This is also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that they have acted with the
diligence required by law because if their liability is merely subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good
father of a family.
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