International Criminal Justice Review 11:12004 College of Health and Human Sciences

Volume 14, 2004 Georgia State University

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DEATH PENALTY:

ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA
FROM 17 NATIONS*

Steven Stack

Research on public support for the death penalty has neglected comparative analysis. It is not clear whether the
results of past research based disproportionately on the United States will replicate in other nations with varied
institutional and cultural frameworks. The present article has two central aims: (a) to replicate U.S.-based findings,
based on the theoretical perspectives of instrumentalism (crime-centeredness) and broader, non-crime-centered symbolic
orientations, for a set of 17 nations, and (b) to partially test the elite leadership hypothesis. The latter refers to the notion
that legal abolition of the death penalty will substantially delegitimate capital punishment in a nation's cultural system
and will lead to a steady decline in death penalty support. Individual-level data are from the International Social Science
Program and refer to 17,725 respondents in 17 nations. A multiple logistic regression analysis largely confirmed U.S.-
based research. In particular, indicators from an instrumental approach that were found to be significant included
individuals' degree ofpunitiveness and nations' homicide rates. Measures ofsymbolic orientations that were found to
be significant predictors of death penalty support included authoritarianism and fundamentalism Some support was
found for the elite leadership hypothesis. Residents of abolitionist nations, especially if they resided in nations with a
long history of abolition, were significantly less supportive of the death penalty than residents of retentionist nations.
The full model explained 25 percent of the variance in support for capital punishment, providing systematic cross-
national evidence for U.S.-based theories of death penalty support.

The United States remains one ofthe few industrial nations that still have capital
punishment (Hood, 2002). Moreover, there has been a marked increase in the use
of the death penalty in the U.S. during the last 20 years. Currently, there are more
than 3,500 persons on death row, up from fewer than 1,000 in the U.S. in 1980. The
rate of execution has also greatly increased (beginning with the execution of Gary
Gilmore in Utah in 1977). There were 31 executions in the U.S. between 1977 and
1984, or 3.9 per year. During the most recent four years for which U.S. data are
available (1999-2002), this number increased to 320 executions, or 80 per year
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). The incidence of executions in the U.S. has
now returned to the high level of the 1950s. A 2003 Gallup Poll showed that 74
percent of Americans support the death penalty for those convicted of murder, a
percentage that is one of the highest in the world (see Appendix A). That support
drops to 53 percent when life in prison without parole is considered.'

'This article is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the annual meetings ofthe Law
and Society Association, Aspen, Colorado, in June 1998. Data were provided by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. This research was partially
supported by a grant from the Richard Barber Fund for Interdisciplinary Research, Center for Legal
Studies, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan.
[The Gallup Organization web site is at http://www.gallup.com.

69
70 Steven Stack

Public attitudes toward the death penalty may have policy implications. In
general, according to a meta-analysis of 20 studies, there is much evidence that
public opinion affects public policy on such matters as economic policy, civil rights,
defense spending, and war (Burstein, 1998, p. 37). For example, there was a strong
correlation between changes in military spending and public opinion between 1965
and 1990 (Jones, 1994). Unfortunately, the meta-analysis found no rigorous studies
on public opinion and criminological policy. Nevertheless, public opinion is often
cited in the ongoing debate over the desirability of the death penalty. Supporters
of capital punishment often cite public opinion to buttress their arguments.
Legislators often refer to public opinion to justify their views in both parliamentary
debate and public discussions (e.g., Kvashis, 1999; Vidmar, 1974, p. 338). Actors
in the policy debate often hold that in a democratic society, public opinion
regarding the death penalty should be a respected component of the decision-
making process (e.g., Durham, Elrod, & Kinkade, 1996).
Previous research on predictors ofdeath penalty support has been based dispro-
portionately on samples from one nation, the U.S. (e.g., Applegate, Cullen, &
Fisher, 2002; Borg, 1997, 1998; Cohn, Barkan, & Halteman, 1991; Durham et al.,
1996; Handberg & Unkovic, 1985; Keil & Vito, 1991; Longmire, 1996; Stack,
2000,2003; Steele & Wilcox, 2003; Thomas & Howard, 1977; Vogel & Vogel,'
2002; Warr & Stafford, 1984; Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000; see also review in
Lester, 1998). There are relatively few studies on death penalty support based on
data from other nations (e.g., Alston, 1976; Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Midgley,
1974; van Koppen, Hessing, & de Poot, 2002; Vidmar, 1974). Of the 45 studies
reviewed (see Appendix B), only 9 provided data on a nation other than the U.S.
Further, the existing comparative work often has limited or no theoretical models.
Some comparative work tests no hypotheses but is descriptive (e.g., Kvashis, 1999;
Stinchcombe, 1994). Most comparative work (6 of9 studies reviewed) concerns
just one nation (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990 [Australia]; Keil, Vito, & Andreescu,
1999 [Romania]; Kvashis, 1999 [Russia]; Midgley, 1974 [South Africa];
Stinchcombe, 1994 [Britain]; Vidmar, 1974 [Canada]). Ray (1982) presented data
on six large cities around the globe, but tests of theoretical hypotheses (bivariate
only) were performed for one city (Johannesburg). Most of the existing compara-
tive work reports only bivariate relationships and is weak theoretically (e.g., Alston,
1976; Ray, 1982; Stinchcombe, 1994; for exceptions see Keil et al., 1999, and
Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990). The net result of these shortcomings is that many
hypotheses from U.S.-based research have been either inadequately tested or not
tested at all in other parts of the world. For example, Alston (1976) presented a
briefanalysis ofthe relationship between demographic variables and death penalty
support in Japan, but he did not test any aspects of the symbolic orientations per-
spective, and his work also stopped short oftesting an instrumental, crime-centered
perspective for the Japanese. Typically, it is not clear that the relationships
documented in the context ofthe U.S. would replicate elsewhere. More generally,
 International Criminal Justice Review 71

the constructs used in the previous U.S. studies (e.g., symbolic orientations such as
fundamentalism and authoritarianism) may prove to be less useful as explanatory
tools in other nations. The utility of these constructs might vary over national and
cultural boundaries.
For example, from the standpoint ofthe elite leadership hypothesis and socializa-
tion (e.g., Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Zimring & Hawkins, 1986), in abolitionist
nations where the death penalty has long been abolished, it is possible that relatively
few people support the death penalty. The delegitimation ofthe death penalty in the
cultural system in abolitionist nations may overpower traditional predictors ofdeath
penalty support found in the U.S., a retentionist nation. For example, in a cross-
sectional sample of individuals from a set of nations, once we control for abolition
of the death penalty, traditional predictors of individual-level support such as
symbolic orientations and even demographic factors may weaken or become insig-
nificant. Abolitionist culture may be more important than factors such as funda-
mentalism, generalized punitiveness, and marital status in the prediction of death
penalty support among nations.
The present article fills two gaps in the literature. First, it performs an explora-
tory analysis of several major theoretical hypotheses, confirmed in U.s.-based
research, with data from a set of 17 nations with varied institutional and cultural
contexts. It focuses on several hypotheses taken from the two major theoretical per-
spectives on death penalty support: instrumentalism and symbolic orientations
(Stack, 2000, 2003; Tyler & Weber, 1982). Second, it focuses on one aspect ofa
nation's cultural system: the status of death penalty law. It performs a partial test
of the elite leadership hypothesis that the abolition and continued cessation ofthe
death penalty are associated with an erosion of death penalty support among
members of the public (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Zimring & Hawkins, 1986).

EXPLANATIONS OF DEATH PENALTY SUPPORT

This article first seeks to replicate, through an exploratory analysis, U.S.-based

theories of death penalty support with comparative data. Two broad theoretical
orientations have guided the literature on support for capital punishment: instru-
mentalism and symbolic orientations (Lester, 1998; Stack, 2000; Tyler & Weber,
1982). The instrumental perspective focuses on crime-centered concerns and pro-
cesses. It relates these categories to death penalty support. It omits greater
non--erime-centered concepts that also may affect support for capital punishment.
From the instrumental perspective, support for the death penalty is seen as a utili-
tarian consequence of a person's desire to control crime. For example, high crime
rates (real or perceived) may contribute to citizens' fear of crime and concerns for
social control, justice, stiffer sentences, and even the death penalty. In contrast to
the narrow focus on crime and justice per se in the instrumental perspective, the
symbolic orientations view (e.g., political conservatism, authoritarianism) links
72 Steven Stack

support for capital punishment to larger considerations. These orientations can also
be applied to an analysis of attitudes that have little to do with criminality and
criminal justice. For example, symbolic orientations have been applied to attitudes
on abortion and social welfare (e.g., D'Antonio & Stack, 1980; Perl & McClintock,
2001). In the symbolic orientation perspective, death penalty support is seen as a
consequence ofbroader ideological or personality orientations. These orientations
include conservatism, authoritarianism, and fundamentalism (Kelley & Braithwaite,
1990; Ray, 1982; Stack, 2000; Tyler & Weber, 1982). Support for the death penalty
is seen as one of the many symbols that emanate from these global perspectives.

Punishment as an Instrumental Response to Crime

A recurrent theme in the literature has been the tendency to view support for
capital punishment as an instrumental response to crime (e.g., Borg, 1998; Keil &
Vito, 1991; Stack, 2003; Thomas, 1977; Tyler & Weber, 1982; see also review in
Lester, 1998). Support for the death penalty is seen as primarily reflective of a
specific concern with crime control. This concern with crime as a salient social
problem that needs to be solved can come from various life experiences and beliefs
regarding crime and justice. These include an attitude supportive of generalized
punitiveness, personal experience as a crime victim, perceptions regarding the rate
of crime, the objective rate of crime; vicarious victimization such as the victimiza-
tion of friends or acquaintances, and fear of crime (e.g., Borg, 1998; Handberg &
Unkovic, 1985).

Punitiveness

Punitiveness involves a desire to punish offenders for crime. Although punitive-

ness (e.g., a desire to treat offenders more harshly) might be seen as having an
automatic relationship to death penalty support, this may not always be the case.
Punitiveness may fall short ofthe desire to take human life in retaliation for crime.
A person's desire to get tougher on crime may mean, for example, that a larger
proportion of juvenile offenders should be put under probationary supervision as
opposed to being set free, that more juveniles should be sent to juvenile detention
centers, that a higher proportion of offenders should be sent to prison, that there
should be more mandatory minimum sentences, that sentences should be longer,
that prisons are too comfortable and that various amenities (gyms, libraries, etc.)
should be removed or reduced, that we should bring back "real" punishment such
as hard labor on chain gangs, or that we should restore corporal punishment such
as caning. In certain contexts, punitive people may be held back from advocating
the death penalty. For example, if there is strong societal-level sentiment against
the death penalty, and it has been abolished for many decades, punitive people may
be constrained from advocating the death penalty. For example, Norway abolished
 International Criminal Justice Review 73

the death penalty in 1905. Only 17 percent ofNorwegians support the death penalty
today, a percentage well below the world average (see Appendix A). -In short,
punitiveness is conceptualized as a necessary but not sufficient condition for death
penalty support. For a further discussion of the desirability of including a general
index of punitiveness in predicting death penalty support, see Kelley and
Braithwaite (1990, pp. 539-540). There is an associated question concerning the
sources of punitiveness. The desire to punish can be based on a variety of motiva-
tions. These motivations can include a belief that punishment deters crime in
general, a beliefthat punishment will deter crime with respect to the offender who
is punished, and a belief that punishment is necessary for justice (retribution). In
addition, a punitive person may believe in the virtues of incarceration. Incarcera-
tion (and execution) can reduce crime (Cook, 1998; Ellsworth & Gross, 1997;
Gelles & Straus, 1975). Punitiveness has often been linked to an individual-based
(as opposed to a systemic or environment-based) attribution style (Grasmick,
Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993). Finally, these beliefs can all increase support
for the death penalty.
Most research on death penalty support does not include a measure ofgeneralized
punitiveness as an independent variable (e.g., Alston, 1976; Ray, 1982; Steele &
Wilcox,2003). However, research that does include punitiveness tends to find a
strong association between punitiveness and support for the death penalty (e.g.,
Cook, 1998; Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Rankin, 1979; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995;
Thomas & Foster, 1975; Thomas & Howard, 1977; Vidmar, 1974). A series of
local-level studies support the association between punitiveness and death penalty
support. A study of2,963 adults in the Daytona Beach, Florida area reported sub-
stantial correlations between indicators ofpunitiveness and death penalty support.
These correlations included those with death penalty support and the willingness
to employ punishment to stop crime (r = 0.781, P < 0.05) and those with death
penalty support and the perception that punishment is an effective deterrent (r =
0.772,p < 0.05) (Thomas & Foster, 1975). Similar results linking punitiveness to
death penalty support were found in Virginia in a study of3,334 adults (Thomas &
Howard, 1977), where the correlation between retributive sentiments and death
penalty support was r = 0.336; this association remained after controls were intro-
duced for other predictors of death penalty support. In a study of Indianapolis,
Indiana (Sandys & McGarrell, 1995), a measure of punitiveness (desire for stiffer
sentences) was the leading predictor, of 11 predictors, ofdeath penalty support. At
the national level, Rankin's analysis (1979, p. 202) ofGenera1Social Survey (GSS)
data indicated that persons who desired that the courts be tougher on criminals were
significantly more likely to favor capital punishment than others. Cook's analysis
of GSS data (1998) found that punitive people were 1.9 times as likely as non-
punitive people to favor an index of "just deserts" that included the death penalty.
Turning to cross-national research, only two studies have explored the link
between generalized punitiveness and death penalty support (Kelley & Braithwaite,
74 Steven Stack

1990; Vidmar, 1974). For example, a desire for stiffer sentences was found to be
a strong predictor of death penalty support in Australia. The association was
independent of21 control variables (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990). In a study of 144
adults in London, Ontario, Canada, an index of general punitiveness was signifi-
cantly associated with enhanced death penalty support (Vidmar, 1974, p. 348). In
still other investigations, a retributive motive underlying death penalty support has
been frequently noted (Keil & Vito, 1991; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Thomas, 1977;
Vidmar, 1974; Warr & Stafford, 1984). It is hypothesized that the greater the
generalized punitiveness the greater the support for the death penalty. Nevertheless,
it is unclear whether or not the association between punitiveness and death penalty
support will replicate beyond the U.S., Australia, and London, Ontario.

Victimization

If all else is equal, a high rate of crime victimization can make crime a more
salient social problem than it would be when the crime rate is low. The relationship
between victimization rates and death penalty support may proceed through both
personal and vicarious processes. First, crime victims might be more likely to favor
the death penalty because of a desire for revenge for their own exploitation by
criminals. Second, the friends and acquaintances of crime victims, and even
strangers who hear about heinous crimes, may be in favor of the death penalty
because of a desire for retribution.
However, the U.S.-based evidence is mixed. Three studies found that personal
victimization influences punitiveness or death penalty support through the promo-
tion of fear of crime (Keil & Vito, 1991; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Seltzer
& McCormick, 1987). That is, although victimization may not have a direct effect
on death penalty support, victimization may indirectly affect death penalty support
through its relationship to fear ofcrime, which in tum affects death penalty support.
One study found support for the association between victimization and death
penalty support for blacks, but not for whites (Taylor, Scheppele, & Stinchcombe,
1979). However, some research failed to find the expected positive link between
victimization and death penalty support (Cullen, Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985;
Dull & Wint, 1997; Durham et al., 1996).
One flaw in the research on the effect ofpersonal victimization on death penalty
support is that homicide victims themselves cannot be interviewed. The research
can be based on victims ofburglaries, larcenies, and many felonies, but these crimes
(unlike homicides) are typically not punishable by death. The homicide victims
themselves, who might be expected to favor the death penalty if they could be
interviewed, are dead. A study that addressed this problem-indirectly through the
concept of vicarious victimization-found that persons who knew a homicide
victim were more likely to support the death penalty than their counterparts (Borg,
1998). Possibly, in nations where there are relatively more homicides, and hence
 International Criminal Justice Review 75

more people who know homicide victims, there might be more support for the death
penalty through the process of vicarious victimization.
Citizen support for the death penalty has also been related to public perceptions
regarding the crime rate (Keil et aI., 1999; Rankin, 1979; Thomas & Cage, 1976;
Thomas & Foster, 1975; Thomas & Howard, 1977; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Vidmar,
1974). Crime rates, including homicide rates, may augment the desire for revenge
and retribution in the population. Further, high crime rates may reflect and intensify
the culture ofviolence (Borg, 1998; Gelles & Straus, 1975; Rankin, 1979). In turn,
this culture of violence may have an impact on the level of death penalty support.
In addition, high crime rates may increase the fear ofcrime, a factor related to death
penalty support that will be discussed in the next section.
In the case of homicide, given that the victims are dead, it may be desirable to
measure the effect of victimization on death penalty support through the use of
objective homicide rates. To the extent that perceptions of the homicide rate may
vary in proportion to the objective homicide rate, the homicide rate may affect death
penalty support.
In perhaps the only study on the link between homicide rates and death penalty
support, the homicide rates in the 50 American states were found to be strong
predictors of death penalty support (Handberg & Unkovic, 1985). Using Gallup
Opinion Poll data for 1935-1936,61.9 percent ofthe population in states with high
murder rates supported the death penalty, compared to 38.1 percent in states with
low murder rates (Handberg & Unkovic, 1985).
Apparently, no study has ever attempted to replicate the Handberg and Unkovic
(1985) analysis. This may be due to the fact that in the 1930s Gallup polls were
based on very large samples (100,000), which enabled them to calculate reliable
estimates of death penalty support in each of the 50 states. This is not possible in
today's surveys, because they are smaller and because state identifiers are often
stripped from data sets before they are disseminated to researchers (e.g., the GSS).
This article will fill this void and test the instrumental perspective on death penalty
support with data on homicide victimization rates for 17 nations.
Personal victimization as an individual-level correlate ofpunitiveness cannot be
measured in this article because ofthe lack of available data. However, victimiza-
tion needs to be at least partially controlled, because a part of any association
between punitiveness and death penalty support may be due to a relationship
between punitiveness and victimization.

Fear a/Crime

Other research on instrumental reactions to crime and death penalty support has
used fear of crime as a proxy for generalized punitiveness. Fear can act as a
motivator for desiring the control of crime. Fearful persons may perceive that the
enactment of stiffer penalties for crime would reduce their painful emotional state
76 Steven Stack

of fear. Three studies have found a link between fear and death penalty support
(Keil & Vito, 1991; Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986; Seltzer & McCormick, 1987).
Other research has been marked by mixed results, some of which confirm an
association between fear and death penalty support (Combs & Comer, 1982; Taylor
et aI., 1979). However, some research has found no relationship between fear of
crime and death penalty support (Aguirre & Baker, 1993; Barkan & Cohn, 1994).
Although the present article cannot measure fear ofcrime, any association between
punitiveness and death penalty support, or between a high homicide rate and death
penalty support, may be due to an association between punitiveness and fear.

Confidence in the Courts

In the U.S., jurors often advocate the death penalty because they have little
confidence that the courts will adequately punish homicide offenders. For example,
only 4 percent ofAmericans believe that a life sentence means that a murderer will
spend the rest of his or her life in prison. Jurors often advocate a death sentence
because they believe that it is the only way to guarantee that a murderer will be
adequately punished and spend the rest of his or her life in prison (Costanzo, 1997,
pp. 123-125). Research that measured the degree of trust in the courts found that
trust was unrelated to death penalty support in Detroit (Young, 1991). Neverthe-
less, citizens of other nations may trust their legal systems more than Americans
(Halim & Stiles, 2001; Stack & Cao, 1998). It is anticipated that citizens' greater
trust or confidence in the legal system would be correlated with lower support for
the death penalty. If citizens trust the courts to deal out a fair punishment (e.g., a
life sentence with no parole for heinous homicides), they may see less need for the
death penalty than their counterparts.

Symbolic Orientations and Death Penalty Support

A second theoretical point of departure in research on death penalty support has

emphasized generalized symbolic orientations. These are thought to affect attitudes
toward a number of social problems including, but not limited to, death penalty
support. These orientations include religious orientations such as fundamentalism
(Borg, 1998; Grasmick et aI., 1993; Young, 1991), racial prejudice (Barkan &
Cohn, 1994; Cohn et aI., 1991), a belief in free will (e.g., Tygart, 1994), political
conservatism (e.g., Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Mitchell & Sidanius, 1993; Stack,
2000), and authoritarianism (Lester, 1998; Ray, 1982; Stack, 1998,2003; Tyler &
Weber, 1982). Here instrumental concerns, such as whether or not a person
believes that the death penalty will deter crime, are not critical. Instead, a person
may support the death penalty because it is what a "good conservative" should do,
or what a "good fundamentalist" should do. Further, death penalty support may just
 International Criminal Justice Review 77

be one of many attitudinal consequences of a more basic personality orientation

such as authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is seen as a generalized personality orientation that encourages

support for the death penalty. It is thought to influence death penalty support
through promoting absolutist over relativistic thought (Lester, 1998; Stack, 1998,
2003; Tyler & Weber, 1982). That is, support for the death penalty may represent
a "final solution," an eye for an eye. For the authoritarian, the death penalty may
be perceived as the only appropriate punishment for the taking of another's life.
Further, authoritarians are thought to be more inclined to believe that punishment
is effective in deterring crime (Vidmar & Miller, 1980, p. 591).
In a review by Lester (1998), seven ofthe eight studies done on the subject found
a positive link between authoritarianism and death penalty support. Some of these
studies, however, were methodologically unsophisticated. For example, Ray's work
(1982) did not employ multivariate techniques. Further, unlike the case ofthe U.S.,
it is possible for a culture to be authoritarian and against the death penalty. In such
an authoritarian context, absolutist thought may simply tum toward a single-minded
opposition to the death penalty. Nevertheless, the present article tests the traditional
notion that the greater the authoritarian orientation, the greater the support for
capital punishment.

Beliefin Free Will

One's general orientation to the issue of "free will vs. determinism" may condi-
tion views on death penalty support. Persons who believe that people are masters
of their own fate, as opposed to products of their environment, are likely to hold
individuals responsible for their actions. In the case ofmurder, this belief can con-
tribute to death penalty support. In contrast, persons who believe in determinism
may blame the environment for a homicide. For example, believers in determinism
might be less likely than believers in free will to support the death penalty for a
homicide offender who was abused as a child, who was younger than 18, who was
currently impoverished, or who acted in a fit of temporary insanity. Believers in
determinism may blame the environment or forces beyond the control of the
individual. Analyses ofU.S.-based data tend to support this hypothesis (e.g., Cullen
et al., 1985; Tygart, 1994).

Fundamentalism

Some research on death penalty support has stressed a third generalized orienta-
tion: religious fundamentalism (Borg, 1998; Grasmick et al., 1993; Young, 1992).
78 Steven Stack

Such an orientation may influence death penalty support through a number of

mechanisms including the extent to which fundamentalists are (a) more inclined to
believe in free will, (b) more moralistic or more authoritarian than others (Young,
1992), or (c) more likely to foster the belieffor "an eye for an eye" found in the Old
Testament. Lester's review of the limited literature (1998) found that four out of
seven studies reported a positive link between religious fundamentalism and death
penalty support.
However, this relationship may not replicate outside u.s. culture; fundamen-
talism may have a different social-psychological meaning as it flows through
various religious denominations around the world. It can be a proxy measure of
religiosity per se. To the extent that the church in a nation opposes the death
penalty, fundamentalist adherence to religion in that church may reduce, not
increase, death penalty support. For example, a church may teach the New
Testament doctrine of "turn the other cheek." In Israel, in contrast, the New
Testament is not recognized as the word of God. Hence, in Judaism,
"fundamentalism" may mean an "eye for eye." Nevertheless, the present article
tests the notion from the U.S.-based research: Fundamentalists will be higher in
death penalty support than nonfundamentalists.
The three generalized symbolic orientations may not be independent of instru-
mentalism. Indeed, all three may affect death penalty support through their respec-
tive orientations to instrumental indicators such as punitiveness (e.g., Stack, 2003).
For example, fundamentalists may be more punitive than their counterparts. The
full impact offundamentalism may have two parts: its direct association with death
penalty support and its indirect effect on death penalty support through its
association with punitiveness.

Elite Leadership: Abolitionist vs. Retentionist Nations and

Death Penalty Support

According to the elite leadership hypothesis, the passage of a law against the use
of the death penalty has a negative impact on death penalty support. It has been
argued that when a national parliament or other governmental agency abolishes the
death penalty the death penalty is delegitimated. Further, as the number of years
that a population has lived under an abolitionist state increases, there can be further
decreases in death penalty support. This is accomplished through the socialization
process. In the case of West Germany, 74 percent of the public still favored the
death penalty when it was abolished in 1948 by the political elite. This support had
decreased to 22 percent in 1980 (Zimring & Hawkins, 1986, p. 22). Although part
of the decline in West German death penalty support was possibly due to an
increase in liberal symbolic orientations, as well as sociodemographic changes, it
seems likely that part of the change may have been due to elite leadership (Kelley
& Braithwaite, 1990, pp. 534-535).
 International Criminal Justice Review 79

A major problem with the research on West Germany was that it did not control
for socioeconomic predictors of death penalty support that covaried with the
abolition ofthe death penalty. This problem was corrected by a study in Australia
that controlled for 20 covariates ofdeath penalty law change (Kelley & Braithwaite,
1990). Research for the case of Australia has supported the elite leadership posi-
tion. Kelley and Braithwaite explored the relationship between the number ofaboli-
tion years experienced by an Australian state and death penalty support in that state.
The results ofa multiple regression analysis determined that individuals residing in
states that had abolished the death penalty early on were less supportive ofthe death
penalty than their counterparts. Controlling for 20 other variables measuring socio-
economic predictors of death penalty support, Kelley and Braithwaite found that
such residents of abolitionist states were 5 percent less apt to support the death
penalty. Hence, the abolition ofthe death penalty by a government may "lead" the
public to decrease their death penalty support. Laws against the death penalty may
function to delegitimate the cultural idea of the use of capital punishment.
Research on the effect of other legal changes on public opinion has also
supported an elite leadership model. For example, the findings of a study on the
effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973)
were consistent with the elite leadership thesis. After the 1973 Court decision, there
was a sudden increase in support for abortion in public opinion that was indepen-
dent of sociodemographic variables (D'Antonio & Stack, 1980). This drop was
independent of indicators of sociodemographic change.
The abolition of the death penalty does not, however, preclude the desire for
punitiveness. People can support stiffer sentences for criminals even though they
do not favor the death penalty. The desire for punishment may stop short of death.
The cultural system in an abolitionist nation may simply have stronger norms
against the taking of human life in response to a murder than the cultural system in
retentionist nations. In such abolitionist nations, however, the public may be in
favor of longer prison sentences for murder. Such a punitive response may, for
example, favor mandatory life sentences and sentences without any chance for
parole.
In short, the relationship between punitiveness and death penalty support would
be expected to be weaker in abolitionist nations to the extent that people have
learned to think that the death penalty is wrong. Punitive people in abolitionist
nations would be less likely than their counterparts in retentionist states to go to the
extreme offavoring the death penalty. In contrast, in retentionist states, the cultural
norms regarding the desirability of the death penalty are less rigid. Unlike aboli-
tionist states, retentionist states may, or may not, actually use capital punishment.
Laws abolishing a practice may be associated with more rigid norms against that
practice. Punitive people in retentionist states, then, may be freer to choose to be
in favor ofthe death penalty than punitive people in abolitionist nations.
80 Steven Stack

Demographic Controls

Following previous research, the present article includes demographic factors in

its model (Lester, 1998). Men tend to be more in favor of the death penalty than
women (Lester, 1998). Explanations for this differential include the notion that
men are more likely than women to be socialized into a subculture ofviolence. The
death penalty, as an act of violence, supports men's greater approval of violence.
A total of 31 out of41 studies found that men were higher in death penalty support
than women (Lester, 1998). These studies were, however, disproportionately based
on the U.S. The meaning of gender with respect to attitudes toward violence in
general, and the specific issue of death penalty support in particular, may be
different in other nations. Age is often linked to political conservatism, which is a
good predictor of death penalty support (Lester, 1998). Age may also affect death
penalty support through a positive association between age and punitiveness. How-
ever, only half of the relevant research studies (10 of 20) found a positive link
between age and death penalty support. The present article tests the dominant
position that the greater the age the greater the support for the death penalty. Of
course, the U.S.-based meaning ofage and its relationship to death penalty support
may not replicate in other cultures. Finally, a control is introduced for marital
status. Five studies have included marital status in their models and have found
mixed results (Lester, 1998). To the extent that married persons are more politi-
cally conservative, and more afraid of crime given a concern for the safety of their
children and their spouses, we might expect an association between marital status
and death penalty support.
The present article adds to the literature by performing a systematic test ofU.S.-
based theories of death penalty support. It also tests a neglected perspective, the
elite leadership hypothesis-again, in a cross-national context. Further, through its
multivariate modeling, it is able to weigh the importance ofthe instrumental factors,
including punitiveness, against the indicators of symbolic orientations theory and
elite leadership theory.

METHODOLOGY

Data are taken from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) (1994). The
ISSP is an ongoing program of cross-national collaboration formed in 1984.
Surveys are done in each participating nation. The ISSP program is headquartered
at the Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung in Koln (Cologne), Germany.
The database was obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research at the University of Michigan. Seventeen nations participated in
the 1991 survey: Austria (n = 800), Britain (n = 1,033), East Germany (n = 977),
Hungary (n = 897), Ireland (n = 890), Israel (n = 797), Italy (n = 951), the
Netherlands (n = 1,113), New Zealand (n = 833), Northern Ireland (n = 694),
 International Criminal Justice Review 81

Norway (n = 1,143), the Philippines (n = 1,163), Poland (n = 608), Russia (n =

2,110), Slovenia (n = 1,475), the United States (n = 1,114), and West Germany (n
= 1,078).
Multistage, stratified random/probability sampling procedures were used in 11
nations. The other nations used related random sampling techniques. For example,
researchers in Norway drew a simple random sample from the national registry of
persons. In New Zealand (where voting is compulsory) researchers drew a random
sample using national election rolls.
Response rates in the surveys ranged from a low of47 percent in West Germany
(where a mail questionnaire was used) to a high of 88.6 percent in the Philippines
(where personal interviews were used). The mean response rate was 64.9 percent.
Available information indicates that eight nations used personal face-to-face inter-
views to collect data. Five other nations used mail questionnaires. Three nations
(Britain, Poland, and the U.S.) used a brief interview followed by a written
questionnaire.
The surveys were mostly based on the adult (over age 18) noninstitutionalized
population. Two nations departed from this pattern; the Polish and Russian samples
consisted of people over age 15 and 16, respectively. Two nations reported using
upper limits on the age range: Poland (15-65) and Slovenia (18-70). In analyses
not reported here, the deletion of nations that departed from the normal methodol-
ogy of the ISSP surveys did not change the basic results reported in this article.
Some data were missing because of responses such as "Don't know" and
"Refused to answer." Complete data were available on 17,725 of the 22,767
persons surveyed (77.9 percent). For further information on the data see Inter-
national Social Survey Program (1994).

Death Penalty Support

Support of the death penalty is first measured by the item "People convicted of
murder should be subject to the death penalty" (l = strongly disagree through 5 =
strongly agree). This item is similar to the measure of death penalty support in the
American General Social Survey (GSS): "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty
for a person convicted ofmurder?" (Davis, 2003). Use ofa single-item measure of
death penalty support is common in previous research. For example, 12 of the
studies cited in Appendix B used the GSS's single item on death penalty support
(e.g., Smith & Wright, 1992; Stack, 2003). Evidence suggests that the effect of a
given independent variable (e.g., gender) on death penalty support can remain stable
across different measures of death penalty support (Durham et al., 1996).
The present study follows most previous research on death penalty support (e.g.,
Borg, 1998; Ray, 1982; Stack, 2000, 2003; Young, 1992) and measures death
penalty support as a binary variable (0 or 1). Support for the death penalty (coded
as 1) was measured by a response of"strongly agree" or "mildly agree" on the death
82 Steven Stack

penalty question, and all other 'responses were coded as zero. Because the depen-
dent variable is a binary variable, logistic regression techniques are appropriate
(Menard, 2001; Pampel, 2000). As a check on the present results, all analyses were
run using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with an ordinal measure ofdeath
penalty support. Some research has been based on OLS techniques applied to an
ordinal death penalty support variable (e.g., Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Vogel &
Vogel, 2002), and the ordinal dependent variable was not marked by skewness. The
skewness index was less than one (0.507), indicating no significant departure from
normality (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). The results of the
OLS regression analyses were essentially the same as the logistic regression results
reported here.

Instrumentalism

Three measures of instrumentalism are used. Two measures of an instrumental

response to crime are available in the ISSP. First, punitiveness is measured by the
item "People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences" (1 = strongly dis-
agree through 5 = strongly agree). Previous research on the relationship between
punitiveness and death penalty support has used this measure (e.g., Kelley &
Braithwaite, 1990; Sandys & McGarrell, 1995). The level of confidence in the
courts and legal system provides a second measure of a possible instrumental pre-
cursor to death penalty support. The level of confidence in the courts and legal
system is measured on an index from 0 (no confidence at all) to 5 (complete con-
fidence).

Victimization

A third measure of a crime-centered instrumentalism is the rate of homicide

victimization. No measure ofvictimization is available in the ISSP survey. Hence,
the present study uses the homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 population) as a
measure. Data are from the World Health Organization (1995). The homicide rate
distribution was marked by a problem of skewness (skewness index = 1.534). The
homicide rate was treated with a logarithmic transformation that reduced skewness
to the acceptable level of less than one (Neter et al., 1996).

Symbolic Orientations

Controls are included for three measures ofgeneral symbolic orientations (Kelley
& Braithwaite, 1990; Lester, 1998; Stack, 2000, 2003; Tyler & Weber, 1982;
Tygart, 1994). One, fundamentalism is measured in terms ofa positive response to
"The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word by word"
(1 = agree and 0 = all others). There were a small number of persons outside the
 International Criminal Justice Review 83

Judeo-Christian heritage (e.g., Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs; n = 88). The

results from an analysis not reported here that omitted this group were essentially
the same as the results reported in this article. Two, a beliefin free will is measured
by response to "There is little that people can do to change the course oftheir lives"
(1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). Three, authoritarianism is measured
as a positive response to the following item: "Politicians who do not believe in God
are unfit for public office" (0 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

Abolitionist VS. Retentionist States

Information on the status of the death penalty in 1991 was used to classify the
nations into two groups: retentionist and abolitionist (Bedau, 1997, pp. 78-83;
Hood, 2002). Retentionist nations are defined as having the death penalty in force
for ordinary crimes in 1991. Abolitionist nations are defined as those that had
abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes by 1991 (Hood, 2002). According
to these definitions, four nations were retentionists at the time ofthe survey in 1991:
the Philippines, Poland, Russia, and the U.S. Another four nations, Britain, Israel,
Italy, and Northern Ireland, had already abolished the death penalty for ordinary
crimes but retained it for other crimes (e.g., war crimes). These nations are classi-
fied as abolitionist nations. Most executions worldwide are for ordinary crimes, so
abolishing the death penalty for these crimes is often, in effect, abolishing it
altogether (Bedau, 1997; Hood, 2002). Details on the complete classification of
nations as abolitionist vs. retentionist are provided in Appendix A.
In addition to the presence or absence of the death penalty in 1991, the current
article also measures the number ofyears ofabolition. Data are from Hood (2002).
Because the years-of-abolition variable was marked by a problem of skewness
(skewness = 1.509), the variable had to be transformed. Because a log transforma-
tion was performed, and four nations had values of zero (the log of zero is
undefined), 1 was added to the number of years since abolition before the log of
years ofabolition was taken. The resulting log transformed variable had an accept-
able skewness index (skewness = 0.077).

Demographic Controls

Gender is measured as a binary variable (0 or 1) where male = 1. Age is recorded

in years. A control is introduced for marital status where married = 1 and all others
=0.
Finally, where possible, the current article employs a series of 16 binary variables
(0 or 1) that measure country of residence. The U.S. serves as the benchmark
category. These variables may capture the effects on death penalty support for
variables that cannot be included in the present analysis. They also help to control
for any effects of methodological differences in the national surveys. These vari-
84 Steven Stack

abIes had to be omitted from Tables 2,3, and 4 because ofa problem ofcollinearity
with the focal new variable ofinterest in each analysis. The new variable ofinterest
in Tables 2, 3, and 4 was also measured as a group or nation variable (homicide
rate, presence of death penalty, years death penalty in force) and was highly
correlated with the 16 country-of-residence variables. A correlation matrix of all
variables is provided in Appendix C.

ANALYSIS

The results of a multiple logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 1.

Controlling for the other predictor variables, the greater the punitiveness, the greater
the support for the death penalty. From the odds ratio, each unit of increase in
punitiveness raises the odds ofdeath penalty support by 2.09 (odds ratio). Further,
as anticipated, the greater the confidence in the courts the less the support for the
death penalty. A unit change in confidence in the courts lowers death penalty
support by 7 percent (1 minus the odds ratio [0.93]).

Table 1
The Influence ofInstrumentalism, Symbolic Attitudes, and Controls on Death
Penalty Attitudes and Punitiveness, 17 Nations, 1991: A Multiple Logistic
Regression Analysis (n = 17,725), Odds Ratios

Dependent variable Death penalty support Punitiveness

Instrumentalism
Punitiveness 2.09*
Confidence in courts 0.93* 0.09*
Symbolic orientations
Authoritarianism 1.06* 1.04*
Fundamentalism 1.16* 1.28*
Belief in free will 0.86* 0.91 *
Demographic controls
Age 1.00 1.01*
Married 1.03 1.22*
Gender 1.09* 0.93

Nagelkerke R2 0.25 0.13

Model X2 statistic 3,749.4* 1,713.4*

Note. For the purposes of brevity and clarity the coefficients for the 16 binary national residence
variables are not shown.

'Associated t-statistic significant (p < 0.05).

 International Criminal Justice Review 85

Turning to the three indicators of symbolic orientation, all are significantly

related to death penalty support. As predicted, both authoritarianism and funda-
mentalism have positive, independent effects on death penalty support. Each unit
increase in authoritarianism raises the odds of death penalty support by 6 percent
(odds ratio = 1.06). Fundamentalists were 16 percent more likely to favor the death
penalty than nonfundamentalists. However, the association between free will and
death penalty support has a direction that is the opposite ofwhat was predicted from
U.S.-based research.
One of the three demographic controls had a significant relationship with death
penalty support. Men were 9 percent more likely to favor the death penalty than
women. The Nagelkerke R2 indicates that 25 percent ofthe variation in individual-
level death penalty support is explained by the model.
Finally, in results not shown in the table, 15 out of 16 of the national residence
variables were significantly related to death penalty support. In all cases except
Russia, persons residing in these nations were less supportive ofthe death penalty
than Americans. It is noted that Russia is the only nation in the sample with a
higher homicide rate than the U.S. (World Health Organization, 1995).
It is possible that the independent variables might also have indirect effects on
death penalty support through their associations with the other independent vari-
ables. This issue is partially addressed in the third column of Table 1 where puni-
tiveness is the dependent variable. Punitiveness is selected because it has the
strongest association with death penalty support according to its standardized
coefficient (not shown in Table 1). Punitiveness is reduced to a binary variable in
the third column to meet the requirements of logistic regression analysis. Con-
trolling for the other independent variables, the analysis reveals that all three
symbolic orientations have significant effects on punitiveness. For example, a one-
unit change in authoritarianism is associated with a 4 percent increase in the odds
of punitiveness. Turning to the demographic controls, age was significantly and
positively related to punitiveness. Although age had no direct effect on death
penalty support, it had a significant indirect effect on death penalty support through
its association with punitiveness. Married persons were 22 percent more likely than
nonmarried persons to be punitive. Thirteen percent ofthe variation in punitiveness
is explained by the model in the third column.
Table 2 presents the analysis of the effect of the homicide rate in a nation on
individual-level death penalty support. Controlling for the other predictors, the
analysis indicates that the greater the homicide rate in a nation the higher the
individual's level ofdeath penalty support. A one-unit change in the homicide rate
increases the individual's odds of death penalty support by a factor 00.16. This
is a powerful association. In contrast, a one-unit change in punitiveness increases
the odds of death penalty support by a factor of 2.04 and a one-unit change in
authoritarianism is associated with an 11 percent increase in the odds of death
86 Steven Stack

penalty support. The equation explains 21 percent ofthe variation in death penalty
support.

Table 2

The Effect of the National Homicide Rate, Other Indicators of Instrumentalism,

Symbolic Orientations, and Demographic Controls on Individuals' Death Penalty
Support: Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis, 16 Nations (n = 16,563), Odds
Ratios

Variable Odds ratio

Instrumentalism
National homicide rate 3.16*
Punitiveness 2.04*
Confidence in courts -0.94*
Symbolic orientations
Authoritarianism 1.11 *
Fundamentalism 1.07
Belief in free will 0.87*
Demographic controls
Age 1.00
Married 1.03
Male 1.10*

Nagelkerke R 2 0.21
Model X2 statistic 2,797.4**

Note. Homicide data for the Philippines not available. For the purposes of brevity and clarity the coefficients for
the 16 binary national residence variables are not shown.

•Associated r-statistic significant (p < 0.05) .

••Associated Wald X2 statistic significant (p < 0.05).

Table 3 presents the analysis related to the elite leadership hypothesis. The first
measure of elite leadership relates death penalty support to residence in a reten-
tionist state. Controlling for the other variables, the analysis reveals that residence
in a retentionist nation significantly increases the odds of an individual supporting
the death penalty. Persons residing in a retentionist state are fully 2.88 times as
likely to support the death penalty as persons residing in an abolitionist nation. The
findings on the indicators of instrumentalism and symbolic orientations remain
similar to those in Table 2. The model here explains 20 percent of the variance in
death penalty support.
 International Criminal Justice Review 87

Table 3

The Effect of Residence in a Retentionist Nation, Instrumentalism, Symbolic

Orientations, and Demographic Controls on Individuals' Death Penalty Support:
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis, 17 Nations (n = 17,725), Odds Ranes

Variable Odds ratio

Residence in retentionist nation 2.88*

Instrumentalism
Punitiveness 2.09*
Confidence in courts 0.94*
Symbolic orientations
Authoritarianism 1.07*
Fundamentalism 1.06
Belief in free will 0.87*
Demographic controls
Age 1.00*
Married 1.03
Male 1.05

Nagelkerke R2 0.20
Model X2 statistic 2,875.1**

Note. For the purposes ofbrevity and clarity the coefficients for the 16 binary national residence variables are not
shown .

•Associated t-statistic significant (p < 0.05).

**Associated Wald X2 statistic significant (p < 0.05).

Table 4 provides the results ofthe analysis ofthe impact of the number ofyears
that the death penalty has been abolished in a nation on individual-level death
penalty support. Controlling for the other variables, the analysis found that each
year of abolition lowered the odds of an individual's death penalty support by 46
percent (1 minus 0.54). The model explains a similar amount of the variance in
death penalty support, 20 percent.

CONCLUSION

The present article performs a systematic, multivariate, comparative analysis of

death penalty support. The results largely confirm, with some exceptions, the
associations between predictor variables and death penalty support found in U.S.-
88 Steven Stack

based research. The research findings reported here, based on 17 nations, were
often consistent with previous work based on the U.S. or a single nation.

Table 4

The Effect of Years of Abolition of the Death Penalty, Instrumentalism, Symbolic

Orientations, and Demographic Controls on Individuals' Death Penalty Support:
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis, 17 Nations (n = 17,725), Odds Ratios

Variable Odds ratio

Years of abolition 0.54*

Instrumentalism
Punitiveness 2.03*
Confidence in courts 0.935*
Symbolic orientations
Authoritarianism 1.09*
Fundamentalism 1.06
Belief in free will 0.878*
Demographic controls
Age 1.00
Married 1.02
Male 1.04

Nagelkerke R2 0.20
Model X2 statistic 2,880.7**

Note. For the purposes ofbrevity and clarity the coefficients for the 16 binary national residence variables are not
shown.

"Associated r-statistic significant (p < 0.05) .

••Associated Wald "1.2 statistic significant (p < 0.05).

First, the article's findings on instrumentalism and death penalty support were
marked by considerable support for previous research. The results were most
consistent on punitiveness. As anticipated, the analysis found that the greater the
punitiveness the greater the support for the death penalty. Additional analyses, not
fully reported here, were performed for each nation taken separately. The
relationship between punitiveness and death penalty support held up in all ofthese
17 analyses. Further, generalized punitiveness was the variable most predictive of
death penalty support in all analyses. The recurrent finding of a significant link
between punitiveness and death penalty support is consistent with most previous
 International Criminal Justice Review 89

research on the subject, including that on the U.S. (e.g., Sandys & McGarrell, 1995;
Thomas & Foster, 1975; Thomas & Howard, 1977; Tyler & Weber, 1982) and the
work on other nations (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990). Previous research using an
index ofgeneral punitiveness has been almost entirely based on research at the local
level (e.g., a single city). The present article, based on 17 nations, is able to provide
firm cross-national support for the relationship between punitiveness and death
penalty support.
In results not fully reported here, an analysis was undertaken to test a hypothesis
that the strength ofthe association between punitiveness and death penalty support
would be weaker in abolitionist nations than in retentionist nations. Given the
strong condemnation ofthe death penalty in abolitionist nations, it was thought that
punitive people would be more constrained in going all the way to advocating the
death penalty. However, this hypothesis was not supported.
Some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the results of the present
article. Because the present article could not measure fear of crime, which is a
covariate of punitiveness, it is not clear whether the association between punitive-
ness and death penalty support would replicate under controls for fear of crime.
Future work is needed to address this limitation.
A second measure ofinstrumentalism also received strong support. The findings
on the association between homicide rates and death penalty support indicated that
support for capital punishment is higher in nations with high homicide rates. This
association was independent ofthe other socioeconomic variables in the equation.
This finding is consistent with a previous study based on the 50 American states in
the 1930s (Handberg & Unkovic, 1985). It is also consistent with what one might
expect from research exploring perceptions about the crime rate. U.S.-based studies
have found that individuals who perceive that the crime rate is high tend to be in
favor of capital punishment (Rankin, 1979; Thomas & Cage, 1976; Thomas &
Foster, 1975; Thomas & Howard, 1977; but see Tyler & Weber, 1982). Fortheone
comparative study available, which was based on a city in Romania, such an
association is also reported (Keil et al., 1999). However, it is not clear to what
extent the objective crime rates in the 17 nations are related to individual percep-
tions of crime. The present investigation cannot demonstrate an association
between crime rates and perceptions ofcrime rates because the relevant data are not
available. Future research is needed on this issue.
To the extent that homicide rates do affect perceptions, such perceptions can
contribute to fear of crime and, moreover, to a desire to be harsh on criminals in an
effort to control crime. Further, a high homicide rate can contribute to more public
support for punitiveness by producing a relatively large number of vicarious
victims: the friends and family members of the homicide victim, as well as the
general public that learns about homicide through the mass media. Such vicarious
victimization contributes to anger (Agnew, 2002), and such anger can be vented in
a desire for harsher punishments. These conditions, in tum, can foster higher public
90 Steven Stack

support for the death penalty. However, these linkages cannot be tested in the pres-
ent article because of the lack of data. Future work is needed on these issues.
Second, there is considerable confirmation for the link between symbolic
orientations and death penalty support. For example, authoritarianism, a neglected
construct, is positively related to death penalty support in all four tables. It also
affects death penalty support indirectly through its association with punitiveness.
The present article firmly reestablishes the importance of authoritarianism.
Eight classic works on the link between authoritarianism and death penalty
support have been based largely on the U.S. (Lester, 1998). The present results on
authoritarianism are similar but not identical to those of Tyler and Weber (1982),
the authors ofperhaps the most theoretically sophisticated study. Tyler and Weber
studied a single American community and found that only authoritarianism was
significantly related to death penalty support after 14 controls were incorporated for
measures of instrumentalism, symbolic orientations, and demographic factors.
Indicators of both instrumentalism and demographics were all unrelated to death
penalty support with authoritarianism controlled. In contrast to Tyler and Weber's
investigation based on one American city, the present article finds support for a
plurality of theoretical perspectives and indicators, including authoritarianism, in
a multivariate model based on 17 nations. Tyler and Weber may have minimized
the importance ofinstrumentalism and other symbolic orientations by not analyzing
their indirect effects on death penalty support and restricting their sample to a single
small city, which may not be representative of the general American population.
One comparative study ofthe city ofJohannesburg, South Africa, confirmed the
bivariate linkage between authoritarianism and death penalty support with data from
the 1970s, but it did not introduce any control variables to test for possible
spuriousness (Ray, 1982). Further, it was based on a small sample ofapproximately
100 persons. The present article was able to replicate the relationship even after
controlling for many other covariates ofdeath penalty support. Further, it used data
that were based on national representative samples, totaling 17,000 persons, and
included rural and suburban populations. The findings based on these national
samples suggest that the relationship found by Ray (1982) for one large city holds
for nonurban and suburban populations. The current investigation provides con-
siderable support for the authoritarianism-death penalty support relationship for a
more current sample and varied set of nations. It is suggested that, whenever
possible, authoritarianism should be included in models of attitudes toward the
death penalty. Otherwise, a model ofdeath penalty support may be marked by mis-
specification.
However, in contrastto previous U.S.-based research (Cullen et al., 1985; Tygart,
1994), a belief in free will was found to be negatively related to death penalty
support. An adequate explanation for this unanticipated finding will require more
research. However, in other cultures perceptions of free will may be applied to a
different context than perceptions in U.S. culture. The survey question reads that
 International Criminal Justice Review 91

"persons convicted of murder should be 'subject to' the death penalty." This may
imply to many respondents that the convicted person must receive the death penalty.
To the extent that this perception is so, we might expect a negative association
between death penalty support and belief in free will. The concept of "free will"
may not be applied to the offender's control over his or her actions at the time ofthe
homicide. Instead, the concept may be applied to the criminal justice process itself.
In other cultures, people who believe in free will may nevertheless be against the
automatic application ofthe death penalty, on the grounds that each offender should
be "free" to make as good a case as possible in court. Further, trial courts should
be "free" to determine the sentencing outcome for murder on a case-by-case basis.
A "free will" orientation in this sense advocates that offenders and courts be given
a good deal of flexibility in shaping the sentencing outcome and not be obligated
to apply the death penalty in all cases. To "be in favor of the death penalty for
murder" might be perceived in other cultures as a denial of free exchange in the
court or as a predetermined sentencing outcome. Outside the U.S., perceptions
regarding free will and death penalty support may refer more to the freedom to
make choices in the criminal justice system than to perceptions regarding whether
the offender was free to make choices regarding his or her aggressive behavior.
There was strong support found for the elite leadership theory. Persons residing
in nations that had not abolished the death penalty (retentionist nations) were more
than three times as likely as those living in abolitionist nations to support the death
penalty. Further, the longer the death penalty had been abolished, the stronger the
effect. The greater the number of years of abolition, the less support for the death
penalty. A year of abolition lowered the odds of support by approximately 50 per-
cent. These results are consistent with the previous research on the elite leadership
theory (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Zimring & Hawkins, 1986). The findings on
elite leadership refer to 17 nations. Previous work has relied on case studies, one
each for Australia and West Germany (Kelley & Braithwaite, 1990; Zimring &
Hawkins, 1986). The present article provides more generalized support for this
perspective.
Findings on the demographic control variables are mixed, as the findings from
U.S.-based studies have often been mixed on these predictors of death penalty
support. Age is related to 'death penalty support in only one of the four tables
(Table 3), but it does have a positive relationship to punitiveness in Table I, third
column. Marital status is related only indirectly to death penalty support through
the association between marriage and punitiveness (Table I, third column). Finally,
gender (male) is related to death penalty support in two of the four tables. The
meaning of demographic variables may vary by cultural context or meaning among
nations and also by differences in the covariates of demographic factors among
nations. Future work is needed on the role of demographic factors in explaining
cross-national variation in death penalty support.
92 Steven Stack

In summary, the present article, based on 17,000 individuals in 17 nations, pro-

vides a wide-sweeping, cross-national analysis of death penalty support: First, it
offers some support for U.S.-based theories on instrumentalism and death penalty
support, especially in the case of punitiveness and the case ofthe homicide rate. It
also confirms the symbolic orientations perspective, especially in the case of
authoritarianism. Second, it provides partial support for elite leadership theory.
Persons residing in retentionist nations are more apt to support the death penalty
than persons residing in abolitionist nations, and this effect is related to the number
of years of abolition. Future work is needed to sort out some of the unanticipated
findings, such as those on some of the demographic variables. This will perhaps
best be done on a nation-by-nation basis to uncover specific mechanisms or contexts
that mediate the nature of the relationships.

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 International Criminal Justice Review 95

Appendix A

Abolitionist and Retentionist Nations by Year That Death Penalty Was

Abolished for All Crimes, Year That Death Penalty Was Abolished for
Ordinary Crimes, and Percentage of Death Penalty Support in 1991

Death penalty
Year abolished, Year abolished,
Nation support, 1991
all crimes" ordinary crimes"
(percent)

Austria 1968 1950 38.9

Britain 1998 1965 55.6
East Germany 1987 1987 40.8
Hungary 1990 1990 73.5
Ireland 1990 1990 36.3
Israel 1954 48.6
Italy 1994 1947 38.8
Netherlands 1982 1870 32.6
New Zealand 1989 1961 46.0
Northern Ireland 1998 1973 47.4
Norway 1979 1905 17.0
Philippines 58.4
Poland 64.1
Russia 69.7
Slovenia 1989 1989 43.0
United States 75.4
West Germany 1949 1949 29.4

8From The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, by R. Hood, 2002, New York:
Oxford University Press.
96 Steven Stack

Appendix B

Previous Cited Research on Death Penalty Support by American and

Non-American Samples by Year of Publication and Location of Sample. 45
studies (listed by first author)

Author Year Population Sample size

American Samples (35 studies)

Applegate 2002 Ohio 1,000
Borg 1997 US GSS 1990
Borg 1998 US GSS 1988
Britt 1998 US GSS 1991
Cohn 1991 US GSS 1987
Combs 1982 US GSS 1972-1978
Cook 1998 US GSS 1988
Cullen 1985 Galesburg, 1L 156
Durham 1996 Tampa,FL 366
Grasmick 1993 Oklahoma City, OK 395
Halim 2001 US GSS 1972-1994
Handberg 1985 US 1935-1936 Gallup Polls
Keil 1991 Kentucky 811
Langworthy 1986 US ABC Poll 1982
Longmire 1996 US 2,000
Mitchell 1993 Los Angeles, CA 7,870
Perl 2001 US 974 (National Election Study)
Rankin 1979 US GSS 1972-1976
Sandys 1995 Indianapolis, IN 514
Seltzer 1987 Maryland 610
Smith 1992 US GSS 1974-1988
Stack 2000 US GSS 1990
Stack 2003 US GSS 1985,1990
Steele 2003 Ohio 309
Taylor 1979 US GSS 1972-1978
Thomas 1975 Daytona Beach, FL 2,963
Thomas 1976 Virginia 3,334
Thomas 1977 Virginia 3,334
Tygart 1994 Los Angeles, CA 800
Tyler 1982 Evanston,IL 200
Vogel 2002 California 554
Warr 1984 Seattle, WA 339
Whitehead 2000 Tennessee 390
Young 1991 Detroit, MI 640
Young 1992 US GSS 1988
 International Criminal Justice Review 97

Appendix B continued

Author Year Population Sample size

Non-American Samples (9 studies)
Alston 1976 Japan 2,498
Keil 1999 Bucuresti, Romania 400
Kelley 1990 Australia 3,012
Kvashis 1999 Russia Not given
Midgley 1974 South Africa 104
Ray 1982 Johannesburg, South Africa app. 100 per city
London, UK
Glasgow, UK
Los Angeles, CA
Manilla, Philippines
Stinchcombe 1994 3 towns, UK 100
van Koppen 2002 14 nations Not given
Vidmar 1974 Ontario, Canada 144

Note. GSS = American General Social Survey.

 '0
00

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Appendix C
~
l:l
~
Variable Correlation Matrix, Variable Means

DPS DPR Dyrs Pun Conf LHR Auth Fund Free Age Mar Male
DPR .236*
Dyrs -.253* -.740*
Pun .300* .035* -.088*
Conf -.056* -.067* .067* -.047*
LHR .253* .826* -.640* .092 -.093*
Auth .122* .252* -.219* .066* .020* .147*
Fund .081* .138* -.136* .070* .039* .059* .323*
Free -.135* -.121* -.139* -.110* .015 -.080* -.210* -.165*
Age .046* -.079* .048* .122* .015 -.046* .145* .060* -.102*
Mar .028* .002 -.018* .063* .004 .001 .003 -.011* -.028* .165*
Male -.007 -.001 -.006 -.041 .005 -.022* -.055* -.062* .045* -.010 .044*

Means 0.49 0.28 25.8 3.11 2.06 0.36 1.20 0.178 3.47 42.4 0.66 0.48

Note. DPS = supports the death penalty (0,1). DPR = resides in a retentionist nation. Dyrs = number of years of abolition. Pun =
punitiveness. Conf = confidence in the courts. LHR = log homicide rate in nation of residence. Auth = authoritarianism. Fund =
fundamentalism. Free = belief in free will. Age = age in years. Mar = married. Male = male gender.