OCA v Judge Floro

RTJ-99-1460

It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
psychological evaluation on him then by the SC Clinic revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration"
and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June
1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-
esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness,
and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to
be a judge. But because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to seek
a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving
the way to atty. Floro's appointment as RTC judge.

An administrative complaint was filed against him by court administrator Alfredo L.

Benipayo. Then he recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension
for the duration of the investigation against him. In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court
en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1460, in view of the commission of the acts or omissions as reported by the audit team.

One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that
he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon
3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the
members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning
detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their
bonds during the pendency of their cases.

Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention
prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a
permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no
single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the
accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under
oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in
the presence of his PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with
them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-
in-law of so many unfounded offenses.

Issue: W/n Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

Held: Yes. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means
that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-
accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint
dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir
up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes
public confidence in the judiciary.

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent

judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of
unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the
public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
 Oca vs. Reyes

THE EVALUATION OF JUSTICE ROMULO S. QUIMBO

By Consolidated Report of June 27, 2004,[73] Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo evaluated the first
five administrative cases, viz:

Migrino presented a certificate that there is no case against him pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. He admits, however, that a case for
illegal gambling was filed against him. That the same may have been dismissed
does not totally exempt him from administrative liability considering that gambling
within the courts premises is proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1-
99[74] issued by the Supreme Court. His act of playing tong-its with two others
within the court premises makes him punishable under said circular.

xxxx

The acts which appear to have been committed by respondent Judge against Asst.
City Prosecutor R[o]m[a]na A. Reyes and Andree K. Lagdameo were clearly
unjustified and unwarranted. The respondent Judges orders to declare them in
contempt and issuing warrants for their arrest betray an abysmal lack of
knowledge of the rules governing contempt. Her fixing an atrociously
excessive bail is a clear manifestation that respondent Judge wanted to exhibit her
authority and fixing such a ridiculous amount of bail was designed to prevent the
complainants from obtaining temporary release. Her obvious ignorance of the rule
governing contempt and the jurisprudence that mandates that it be exercised as
a protective not a vindictive power makes us wonder how, despite the rigorous
screening of candidates by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), a lemon such as the
respondent Judge managed to be nominated for appointment to such exalted
position. How she was able to elude the psychiatric and psychological tests under
which she went is remarkable for it resulted in the appointment of one grossly
ignorant of the law and more importantly devoid of the temperament required of
a judicial arbiter.
In the two cases mentioned above (A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623 and A.M. No. 06-
1627), the acts of respondent Judge reveal a flaw in her psychological
makeup that disqualifies her from holding the position of Judge. She appears to
be unaware of the jurisprudence that has given meaning to the power of contempt.

xxxx
The Order dated 13 October 2004 (Exhibit G, Rollo, p. 27, A.M. MTJ-06-
1623), betrays not only her gross ignorance as regards the Rule on Contempt of
Court, but it also shows her capricious arrogance and despotic nature, the
antithesis of an ideal arbiter. It betrays a flaw in her psychological makeup that
disqualifies her from presiding a court and dispensing justice.

Respondent inofficiously demanded that complainant conduct an inquest at the

police station for the purpose of preventing the release of Timoteo Migrino who
had earlier been arrested while allegedly engaged in illegal gambling and had
posted the required bail. Notwithstanding the explanation of complainant Reyes
that she was not authorized to conduct said inquest outside her office and the
crime of malversation allegedly committed two years earlier could not be the
proper subject of an inquest, respondent could not be denied. She demanded and
the police acquiesced to hold Migrino in jail over the weekend.

The prosecution of Prosecutor Reyes was not based on any law or rule but was
purely the whim and caprice of the respondent. After respondent Judge has held
Prosecutor Reyes in contempt and ordered her arrest (Exhibit [F], A[.]M[.] No.
MTJ-06-1623, p. 24.) she required an unconscionable amount of Php236,000.00
as bail knowing that it was practically impossible to meet.
Complainant R[o]m[a]na R. Reyes charges respondent Judge with falsification of
public documents. It appears that respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest
of complainant. Since no case had been filed against complainant, respondent
Judge conveniently issued the warrant under Criminal Cases Nos. 02164 to 02173
(10 counts) which pertained to cases filed against various persons during the year
1985. The Order of 13 October 2004 (Exhibit [G], Rollo, A.M. MTJ-06-1623)
conveniently omitted to show any case numbers.

The travails suffered by complainant Lagdameo likewise prove that respondent

Judge was not guided by law or rule but rather by whim and caprice. The record
does not show any reason why respondent Judge could order the arrest of
complainant. Assuming that she had uttered the words I am going because I may
be declared in contempt, this could not be the basis for declaring her in direct
contempt because the court was no longer in session and she ma[d]e the remark
outside the courtroom. It was not misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same. Neither could it
be considered disrespect towards the court. It is probably for this reason that
respondent Judge did not issue any commitment order but orally commanded the
police to arrest Lagdameo. As can be seen from excerpts from the police blotter
(Rollo, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1627, p. 9) Lagdameo was brought in on December 7,
2004 at 12:30 P.M. and was released on December 8, 2004, at 11[:]50 AM (ibid.
p. 10). The same blotter states: Note: Detained w/o written commitment
order & released w/o written released.[sic] (Emphasis and italics in the
Report)

Respondents verbal order directed to members of the PNP to arrest and jail
Lagdameo who languished in said jail for a day is clearly a violation of Article 124
of the Revised Penal Code and respondent Judge is a principal by inducement.

The complaint filed by three personnel of Br. 69 charges respondent Judge with
conduct unbecoming a judge which could be considered pecadillos and are covered
 by circulars and other issuances of the Court and are punished by either fines or
suspensions or admonitions.

Considering respondent Judges acts complained of by complainants R[o]mana R.

Reyes and Andree K. Lagdameo, together with the acts committed by respondent
Judge and subject of other administrative cases assigned to the undersigned, there
can only be one conclusion that respondent Judge is suffering from some
undiagnosed mental aberration that makes her totally unfit to hold the position
she now occupies. Not only was her gross ignorance established but her
resort to falsification was also proved.

The records show that respondent Judge was suspended and has abandoned her
office of presiding Judge. She did this probably because she felt guilty and could
not find any justification for her actions so she fled.

In A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the harassment and ill treatment of complainant

Migrino was clearly established. The fact that respondent Judge followed Migrino
to the police station and demanded that he be kept in custody despite the Order
of Release issued by Judge Morallos upon Migrinos filing his bail both clearly shows
her to be whimsical and capricious. The continued detention of Migrino after he
was ordered released under bond is likewise arbitrary and in violation of Article
124 of the Revised Penal Code and respondent Judge is a principal by inducement.

In OCA-IPI No. 04-2048-P, the record reveals that the respondent Migrino was
indicted for illegal gambling having been allegedly caught en flagrante by
complainant Judge Julia A. Reyes. The record also reveals that a certificate was
issued by the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City that there is no
pending case against Migrino. Even if we assume that the illegal gambling case
which was filed against Migrino and for which he had to file his bond was
dismissed, it still remains that Migrino was seen gambling within the court
premises, an act which is proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1-99[75] earlier
mentioned.[76] (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied; italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Justice Quimbo thereupon RECOMMENDED that Judge Reyes be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all her retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and that Migrio be fined in an amount equivalent to his one month
salary.

Meanwhile, in A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, Justice Quimbo, by Report of September 25,

2006,[77] reiterated his recommendation after coming up with the following evaluation:

The complaint mentions acts of respondent Judge which are similar, if not
identical to those complained of in the following cases, to wit: A.M. No. MTJ-06-
1623 (Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-
 1624 (Timeteo A. Migrino, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625
(Armi Flordeliza, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1627 (Andree
Lagdameo vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes) which the undersigned had earlier investigated
and reported on. Our conclusion remains firm that respondent Judge is
unfit to hold the position of Presiding Judge of a Metropolitan Trial
Court.

In the present case, she is charged with ignorance because she had issued a bench
warrant against the complainant and his wife for their failure to appear on a date
that respondent Judge fixed for the continuation of the trial. While she may be
correct in assuming that she had the authority to issue such warrant, said act was
clearly unjustified. Firstly, it does not appear in the record of the case that
complainant or his wife received notice of said hearing. Neither does it appear that
their counsel received a copy of the Order of 15 August 2003 which contained the
said setting.Secondly, there was no longer any trial to speak of because the case
had already been submitted for decision and the complainant (accused therein)
had no longer any need for appearing.[78](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

THIS COURTS RULING

The Court finds that Judge Julia Reyes should indeed be dismissed from the service.

As early as 1949, this Court emphasized that the administration of justice is a lofty function.

The administration of justice is a lofty function and is no less sacred than a religious
mission itself. Those who are called upon to render service in it must follow that
norm of conduct compatible only with public faith and trust in their impartiality,
sense of responsibility, exercising the same devotion to duty and unction done by
a priest in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of a religious liturgy.[79]

By judges appointment to the office, the people have laid on them their confidence that
they are mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, members of the judiciary are expected to be fearless in their pursuit to render justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in their office.[80] Unfortunately, respondent Judge
failed to resist the temptations of power which eventually led her to transgress the very law she
swore to protect and uphold.

To constitute gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the subject decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of official duties should be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence. Most importantly, the judge must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption.[81]

Judge Reyes bad faith is clearly apparent from the above-related facts and circumstances
in the consolidated cases. This Court cannot shrug off her failure to exercise that degree of care
and temperance required of a judge in the correct and prompt administration of justice, more so
in these cases where her exercise of the power of contempt resulted in the detention and
deprivation of liberty of Migrio, Andree, Sebastian and Alicia, and endangered the freedom of the
other complainants. Tiongco v. Salao[82] is instructive:

Thus, the carelessness and lack of circumspection on respondent Judges

part, to say the least, in peremptorily ordering the arrest and detention
of complainant, warrant the imposition of a penalty on respondent Judge
as a corrective measure, so that she and others may be properly warned about
carelessness in the application of the proper law and undue severity in ordering
the detention of complainant immediately and depriving him of the opportunity to
seek recourse from higher courts against the summary penalty of imprisonment
imposed by respondent Judge.

It is also well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in

all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the
administration of justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such
power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end
view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity
of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication. The salutary rule is that
the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise. Only occasionally should the court invoke the inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail.[83] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a lady judge at that, should have demonstrated finesse
in her choice of words. In this case, the words used by her was hardly the kind of circumspect
language expected of a magistrate. The use of vulgar and curt language does not befit the person
of a judge who is viewed by the public as a person of wisdom and scruples.[84] Remarks such
as Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka-robe lang, pwede kaya?; Hayaan
mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!; and Alam mo na ang dami
intriga dito; nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano kaya masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin
nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA! have no place in the judiciary.
Those who don the judicial robe must observe judicial decorum which requires magistrates to be
at all times temperate in their language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or
from resorting to the language of vilification.[85]
Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction, however. Her inability to control her emotions her act
of walking out of the courtroom during hearings, and her shouting invectives at her staff and
lawyers indicate her unfitness to sit on the bench. They betray her failure to exercise judicial
temperament at all times, and maintain composure and equanimity.[86]
Judge Reyes questioned actions reflect her lack of patience, an essential part of dispensing
justice; and of courtesy, a mark of culture and good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence
and lack of self-restraint and civility have no place in the government service.[87]

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct),
which took effect on June 1, 2004, mandates:

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.[88]
Respecting Judge Reyes frequent nocturnal gimmicks, suffice it to state that her presence in the
above-mentioned places impairs the respect due her, which in turn necessarily affects the image
of the judiciary. A judge is a visible representation of the judiciary and, more often than not, the
public cannot separate the judge from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing some of her
staff to her weekday gimmicks, that causes them to be absent or late for work disrupts the speedy
administration of service. She thus also failed to heed the mandate of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, viz:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.[89]

As for Judge Reyes act of borrowing money from her staff, the same constitutes conduct
unbecoming a judge. While there is nothing wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be borne
in mind that she exerted moral ascendancy over her staff, who may not have had the means but
may have been forced to find a way in order not to displease her.
Judge Reyes comments like Armie, ang hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si Leah.
Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano, sabihin mo at least P2,000.00 and Sino pa ba ibang
pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw Oswald, sheriff smack of commercialism. This is not expected
of a judge, knowing that the aim of the judiciary is to deliver speedy and inexpensive justice.[90]

Respecting Judge Reyes failure to put into writing her judgment, she having merely required the
accused to read it from the computer screen in camera without the presence of counsel, she
violated the Constitution. She could have simply printed and signed the decision. Offering to a
partys counsel a diskette containing the decision when such counsel demands a written copy
thereof is unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment is, in contemplation of law, in esse,
ineffective.[91] If Judge Reyes was not yet prepared to promulgate the decision as it was not yet
printed, she could have called the case later and have it printed first. A party should not be left
in the dark on what issues to raise before the appellate court.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it

was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered
in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he
may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to in point
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.[92]

If judges were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond the boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then the law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under
its authority.[93]

IN FINE, this Court finds Judge Reyes unfit to discharge her functions as judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
69, Pasig City, is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo A. Migrio is, for violation of Administrative Circular No. 1-99, by
gambling in the court premises, FINED in the amount equivalent to his one-month salary. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same act or the commission of a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
 REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the
subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment
if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international
arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record
on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of
her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth
SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the
existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief
Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among
which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and
“SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement
further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will
not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as
coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time
she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it
infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC
should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite
this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August
2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno,
alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was
said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete
SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000,
that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent
years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG,
invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the
petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing
actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to
question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of
committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office,
citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG
maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section
11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment
proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”)
or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous interest in
ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the
one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG
will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created
a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints
involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending
that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that
she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because
OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains
unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified
Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot
be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are
special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or
criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be
removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that
will prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of
government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies
the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends
that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case
because the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than
impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court
the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President
and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on
the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised
disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in
rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the
SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
 Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated
by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a
petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not
from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was
regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO
that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a
political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give
rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an
inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she
possessed the integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or
not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a
constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors
likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable
while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere
subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is
impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of
separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political
question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly
and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such
ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve
a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not
a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first
requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to
protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken
away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo
warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any
private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public
question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in
a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the
right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced
with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven
with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the
Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can
brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on
speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the
Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing
seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court
are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated
the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly
met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates
without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with
the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and
SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is
empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal
of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a
clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before
it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies.
This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment
court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the

eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined
rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust.
In quo warrantoproceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the
legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but
only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public
wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or
a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions
for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the
matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing
and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively
availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of
the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno
legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first
place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed
impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal
of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible
to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and
cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the
House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause.
The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before
the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The
process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion
and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal
by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are
required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility
of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that
the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from
office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be
availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she
has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a
qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo
warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative
of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and
decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be
emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress
from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft
and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear
out the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another
remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically
intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under
existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even
if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot
be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes
an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the
petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period
has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the
instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it
is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in
issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed
by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by
proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.
There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there
be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead
as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an
action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no
statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would
allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the
Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for
office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has
not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s
appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered
obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means
“overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their
duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions
beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more,
the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is
neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory
and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom
as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred
from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to,
or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court
must be a person of provencompetence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019
and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the
SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with
such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal
liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement
is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to
hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in
her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a
burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits.
They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto,
and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not

merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined
by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the
Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such
evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied,
because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of
the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as
the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the
records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the
repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither
established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover,
the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN
filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This
leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification
from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her
burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different
when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing
her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that
Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a
government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on
RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the
period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The
ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from
the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty
of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited
only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in
the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement.
Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor
supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset.
Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it
does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body.
Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not
estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises
where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance
founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if
the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The
suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only
filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were
the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on
intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious
increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate
Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act
of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The
Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials
whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for
nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed,
much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it
appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit
a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away
with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared
that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement,
and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no
longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed
government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P.
cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3
SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s
part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs
during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the
concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of
the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but
there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which
is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties
with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons,
the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her
false representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she
was counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of
her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully
declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land
Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public
bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La
Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELECcontrary to the Supreme Court’s
internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the
Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the
grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits
to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude
then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national
security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the
position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero
proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid
what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means
that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or
propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the
confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to
submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in
the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured
by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s
finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief
Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has
ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take
judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo
warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an
office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject

to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While
the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all
other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible
to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de
facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of
Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never
attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State
is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY

HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and
Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not
be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial
Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the
Members of the Supreme Court.