THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
REGINO TORRES AND PABLO PADILLA, in criminal causes, it is not," the court said, and accordingly overruled the objection. The defense
Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS:
Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914, Regino
Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that
evening they stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short
while afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises;
that Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and
on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to
halt, and, as the latter continued to run, witness fired a shot into the air, whereupon Padilla
stopped, after he had thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the arrest of both defendants,
Walker and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins and found the one thrown by Padilla
inside the in closure, and the other two tins, about a meter from the place where Samson had
been holding Torres.
The other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when
questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his
pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he
was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the
defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he replied that he had not,
but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer.
That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of
opium, and they agreed that at 6 o’clock in the evening they would go to the house above
mentioned; that Padilla went to Torres’ house at 6 o’clock in the evening and hurried him up,
saying: "Eat in a hurry, for the owner of the opium needs money" ; that when they arrived at the
house of Franco’s widow, Padilla entered the door of the place where the automobiles were kept,
and five minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and there Padilla showed Torres a
tin of opium, at the same time saying that it was first class and cost P60 without haggling; that
witness replied that he would first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its class; that
Padilla agreed and they both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about ten brazas
from the door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla had run away and was being
pursued by Walker. The court asked Torres whether he had wished to investigate first and buy
afterwards, to which he replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced of the quality of the
opium he would have bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the
judge. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir."
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise entered by Regino and Walker is admissible as
evidence?
Ruling:
No.
The witness, Walker, testified, among other things, that Regino Torres endeavored to
compromise the case and that he (Walker) was willing to accept the compromise through the
payment of P1,500, but subject to the approval of his superiors. The defense asked that this
testimony be stricken out, alleging that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the
compromise in such cases must be made in writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper; but
excepted.
We have already seen above what Samson’s testimony was concerning this point and how
thereby he corroborated that given by Walker.
An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of
Civ. Proc., sec. 346). In a criminal cause for theft (U. S. v. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court
said that the weight both of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of
offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment
or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise
was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in
the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance
and private interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards
the penal action, however it may be with respect to the civil liability. But section 25 of Act No.
1761, under which this cause was prosecuted, expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal
Revenue to compromise a case after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or
prosecuting suit thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily
implies two elements, one of which is the offer and the other the acceptance, in order that the
penal action may be extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Of course
ordinarily it is the defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class
of prosecutions, — and because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the
maker, as occurs in other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not lawful
because it is a thing prohibited by law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the
annoyance of a prosecution, as sometimes happens in a civil case where a person involved in
the litigation is perhaps entirely in the right but prefers to lose a sum of money rather than
commence and prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with that of section 346
of the Code of Civil Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the conviction of the defendants it is
not necessary to consider and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative,
and it was not taken into account by the trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house
of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan
National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house
was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there
was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a
knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie
down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the
light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was
her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the
knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ
inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she
cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a
knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to
rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to
report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan,
Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant
might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house
of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit
funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was
constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following
behind appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was
empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant
threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset
Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for
three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not
allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and
constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she
was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and
locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994,
they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from
whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents
agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement
of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them,
Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with
the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the
prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha
testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha
was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later,
supposedly because of what happened.
Issue: Whether or not the settlement agreed by the parties is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
NO.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable
crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the
charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of
an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction
of the crime of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was
accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that
appellant had sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the
night of January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation
and contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house.
We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of
record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was
already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have
known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does
not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on
anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far,
aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established
nor even intimated by the prosecution.
On the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid
medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved.
On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not applied. He also
added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. The absence
of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's
consent to the act. While the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical
injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, the instant case is
clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that
charge against him.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need
not be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.We incline to the view,
however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence
sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should
go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak
and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except
for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of the
essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the
deliberate non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously
militate against the prosecution's cause.
The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an
admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim,
which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the
accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to
avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not
come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim
leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could
marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined
because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until
the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases.
Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were
herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of
said meetings.
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at
a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and
the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim
practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the
parties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-
appellant.
FACTS:
On 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk,
complainant Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino Flores Ambray and a mother of two
children, was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45
p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she
noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him
and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The complainant
recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision
was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride,
to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different
route. She got scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the
tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition.[11] When they reached Phase II of the same
subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle.
She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked
away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered
her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The
accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She
attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made noise. She fought to free
herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while
holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she
obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted
Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako, but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that
she could hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He
unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no
avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she
struggled and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she
tried to stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her
pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two
children. He warned her: Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita. The accused again tried to insert
his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The accused took her hand and let her
hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the accuseds sexual
advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled out
his penis and fingered her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to
tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family.He told her that she was
his third victim but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and
underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that
she was raped by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon
not to by Gildas mother.
At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony
Antonio, the President of the Homeowners Association and President of the National Press Club.
Antonio radioed the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt.
Saguisame responded to the alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3
Bautista saw Gilda with her mother. Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was
raped and described to him her assailant as a tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in
army cut. Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description of the accuseds tricycle, viz., blue in
color with the name Dimple at the back. The policemen left and went to the house of the
accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor wanted to talk to
him. The accused, together with P03 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the
accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the
accused as her rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail.
Issue: Whether or not the act of the defendant’s parents, wife and relatives, who had gone
to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise is admissible
as evidence?
Ruling:
YES.
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word
of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the Peoples
single witness of the actual occurrence.[33]
In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[34]
The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the
accused depend primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and
the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would
render the accuseds conviction inevitable.
A meticulous assessment of Gildas testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her
story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further
strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her
conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her
arrival she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she
reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners Association and President of the
National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonios
residence in response to the latters call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them
the description of the assailant. When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of
Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily
submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Pias Hospital and then to an examination
of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an
investigation[35] by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape
against the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.
Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved
by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from
Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre,
Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally,
despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was strongly established
by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her
forgiveness and to seek a compromise, the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion
as an error and his Appellants Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused
was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for
it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and
sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless
he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel
resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution
upon (an offender).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-
appellant.
Facts:
That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting
knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of AAA, against her will."[1]
The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or
about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was
cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine
months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He
approached AAA and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin
disease. AAA was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly
contracted from one of the children. AAA opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets
inside. As instructed by appellant, AAA took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak
and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She
tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck.
He ordered AAA not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top
of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. AAA cried
out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and
punched AAA in the stomach. She lost consciousness.
A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and
changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the
incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.[2]
AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one
month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA
in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions
such as dressing herself. In short, AAA became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal
Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer,
Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She
conducted a physical examination and also found that:
"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."[3]
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital
for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that
she was raped by appellant.[4]
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the
alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in
the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after
8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.
Issue: Whether or not an offer to compromise does require that a criminal complaint be first filed
before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror?
Ruling:
No.
The court find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of AAA, is
credible, reliable and trustworthy. AAA testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her
testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her
testimony was not contrived.
The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave
her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen
asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets
were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened AAA and prevented her from making any
resistance to appellant's lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect
AAA's credibility.[10] She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed
three months after AAA told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period
to file a complaint for rape.
AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration,
open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all.[12] AAA suffered psychologically from the incident.
Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses
actually found her to be a good worker.[14] When AAA returned to her family, however, she lost
her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric
treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive
and fabrication.
Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to her
mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB, fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When BBB refused, Mary
Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still BBB refused to accept
it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise
offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary
Ann herself testified that BBB told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first
offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed
before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such
offer is proved.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It
was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public
market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks,
appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.
HAWTHORNE v. ECKERSON CO. No. 401. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 3, 1935.
Facts:
The plaintiff was driving her own Marquette automobile and was accompanied by one Addie O.
Kellogg, her partner in an antique furniture business, who was sitting in the driver's seat with her.
As the car was rounding a curve in the highway leading from Middlebury to Brandon, Vt., it
collided with a Chevrolet automobile belonging to the defendant Eckerson Company, and driven
by A. J. Gassett, of Burlington, Vt., one of its traveling salesmen. The plaintiff and Miss Kellogg
were both injured and the Marquette car was damaged to the extent of about $125. The plaintiff
testified that when rounding the curve she kept well to the inside of the road and was driving at a
speed of only 18 miles per hour. She also showed that Gassett came around the curve at a
speed of 40 miles an hour, did not keep the Chevrolet on his side of the road, but had come over
to her side, and that because of this the collision occurred. After the plaintiff had put in her case
the defendant rested without introducing any proof.
Issue: Whether or not the court unlawfully permitted the plaintiff to prove a settlement by the
defendant with Miss Kellogg of her claim for injuries arising out of the accident in the present
case.
Ruling:
The defendant complains because the court permitted the plaintiff to prove the settlement with
Miss Kellogg, both in order to show that Gassett was its agent and also to show liability. We think
the rulings in this respect were erroneous. Compromises are not in themselves evidence as
admissions of liability, and the same rule applies when they are offered as proof of agency. It is a
quite different matter to allow in evidence independent statements contained in offers of
settlement as admission of liability. Since, irrespective of any inference arising from the
agreement of settlement, there was uncontroverted proof that Gassett was the agent of the
defendant, it may be argued that the error in admitting evidence of the compromise was not
prejudicial, for the judge charged the jury that the plaintiff could only recover compensatory
damages for her personal loss and injuries. But in the course of the testimony as to the
settlement, proof was elicited at the suggestion of the court itself, that Miss Kellogg had received
$4,750 in payment of her claim. Such evidence might have led the jury to allow the plaintiff a
recovery equivalent to that of Miss Kellogg, the other occupant of the car. It is true that the
testimony was only admitted on the theory that such a substantial payment as $4,750 would not
have been made merely to buy peace and that the making of it, therefore, justified the inference
that Gassett was the agent of defendant and that the latter was responsible for his acts. But the
evidence was legally inadmissible to prove agency, and we cannot say that knowledge by the
jury of the amount paid to Miss Kellogg might not have caused them to take her recovery into
account in estimating the plaintiff's damages. Tennant v. Dudley, 144 N.Y. 504, 507, 39 N.E. 644;
Mischner v. Thalheim, 184 App. Div. 883, 170 N.Y.S. 758.
"The rule against allowing evidence of compromise is founded upon recognition of the fact that
such testimony is inherently harmful, for the jury will draw conclusions therefrom * * * in spite of
anything which may be said by the judge in instructing them as to the weight to be given such
evidence."
That the jury may have been prejudiced by proof of the settlement seems especially likely
because the verdict for the plaintiff was for about the same sum as that paid Miss Kellogg,
though the latter's injuries seem to have been the more serious.
Settlements have always been looked on with favor, and courts have deemed it against public
policy to subject a person who has compromised a claim to the hazard of having a settlement
proved in a subsequent lawsuit by another person asserting a cause of action arising out of the
same transaction.
As proof of the settlement was erroneously received and may have prejudiced the result of the
trial, the judgment cannot stand.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROMEO H. LAMBID, appellant.
Facts:
October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan, Cebu City
together with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke
up and noticed her father lying beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the
same time warning her not to tell her mother what he was doing. After her father succeeded in
removing her panty, he went on top of her and started inserting his penis into her vagina. She
initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her father by kicking him and by moving her body
from left to right and vice versa. She stopped resisting when her father stared hard at her and
threatened to kill her (Lyzel). Her father succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The
following day, November 1, 1997, she was again roused from her sleep and noticed her father
lying beside her. Repeating what he did the previous day, her father removed her panty.
Thereafter, he successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out of fear. She
did not tell anybody about these two incidents.
However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened around
5:00 in the morning of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her sister Lyzel: Dont
tell this to your mother or else I will kill you. Their father was then lying beside Lyzel. Afterwards,
she saw him stand up and go to urinate. About 5:00 in the morning of the succeeding day,
November 1, 1997, she was sleeping beside her sister Lyzel. She was awakened while their
father was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking
him, she laid near the foot of her sister Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she
peeped through the blanket. She saw their father who was only wearing an underwear place
himself on top of Lyzel. Her father covered himself and Lyzel with a blanket, after which Mary
Ann saw their fathers whole body shake and heard him breathing hard. She again heard their
father warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother, otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).
On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she
witnessed. Their neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance
and on that same day their father was arrested.
Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3, 1997 and
found that Lyzels vagina had new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5 oclock position. The
doctor asserted that Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her
examination. The test for the presence of spermatozoa yielded negative results.
Issue: Whether or not the compromise offered by the father is admissible as evidence?
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked about
the truth of her daughters complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had committed the crimes
of rape against his daughter, he asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He
asked the court to impose upon him a lesser penalty considering that his children are still under
his care.
Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never
disowned the acts imputed against him.[28] Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he
asked for forgiveness from Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for compassion from the trial
court. In People vs. Alvero, we held that a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous
to an attempt to compromise and an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[29] Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has
admitted his guilt.
PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y
CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN,
defendants-appellants.
Facts:
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body
was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay
City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of
asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to
twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and
several cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered
on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was
then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was
taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was
later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in
the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining
how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the
killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement,
which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of
Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also
of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-
province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was
inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial
confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant
City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the
participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and
"Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and
Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his
declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an
Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against
Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario
Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one John Doe."
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the
trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot
be used as evidence?
Ruling: NO.
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and
"F-2"), on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan
committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof
against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general
rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far
as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the
facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their
purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio
Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay
City jail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL
and AMADO PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-
appellants.
Facts:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door,
declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a
man took her husbands gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2)
other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The
police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victims house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp.
8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel
were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the
police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp.
12-14, ibid.)
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.
Issue: Whether or not the res inter alios rule is binding to all the accused?
Ruling:
NO.
A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed
to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those exceptions do
not however apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence
whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato
that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment
using the name Dante Clementewas negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated
no person by the name of Danny Clemente.
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made
in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in
the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and
investigation section of their police station
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights,
both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
[G.R. Nos. 98494-98692. July 17, 2003]
ROGELIO ALVIZO, FLORITO MONTECILLO, POMPEYO ALMAGRO and CATALINO MAGNO,
JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 99006-20. July 17, 2003]
JOSELITO J. GENSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
[G.R. Nos. 99059-99259. July 17, 2003]
EFREN COYOCA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE [G.R.
Nos. 99309-18. July 17, 2003]
OSCAR BELCINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE [G.R.
Nos. 99412-16 & 99436-99636. July 17, 2003]
Facts:
Sometime in 1978, a team from the Commission on Audit (COA) was organized by Sofronio
Flores, Jr., the COA Region VII Director, to verify the alleged issuances of fake Letters of Advice
of Allotments (LAAs) and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs) during the
period of 1976-1978 in various Highway Engineering Districts (HEDs) of Region VII. The special
audit team was composed of auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth Paredes. Then President
Marcos also created a Special Cabinet Committee composed of the heads of the COA, Ministry
of Justice, Office of the Budget and Management, Bureau of Treasury and the National Bureau of
Investigation to investigate the fund anomalies in Region VII. This Special Cabinet Committee
created a Special Task Force made up of various teams, among others, Team II, headed by
Supervising Agent Amado de Coco to cover the Cebu 2nd HED. The task force worked with the
Audit team and retrieved documents and records from the Regional Office and the Cebu 2nd
HED. The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the year 1977
leading to irregular disbursements of public funds for the payment of ghost projects.
The investigations resulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan charging
certain officials and employees of the government as well as private contractors with violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the 198 cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 5585-5782, the accused were officials and
employees of Central Office of the then Ministry of Public Highways, Manila (MPH for brevity),
now Department of Public Works and Highways. They were all acquitted by the Sandiganbayan
for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: whether or not the rule on res inter alios acta is applicable?
Ruling:
No.
Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding upon the Court. However, this
general rule is subject to some exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; 5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based and 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganayan are premised on the absence of
evidence on record.
Petitioners claim that these cases are exceptions to the general rule because the findings of
Sandiganbayan are contrary to the established facts and based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures and the inferences made by it are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.
The scheme to defraud the government started with the issuance of 18 fake LAAs and 8
SACDCs to Cebu 2nd HED which were admittedly signed by Regional Accountant Rolando
Mangubat.
The evidence for the prosecution had clearly established the existence of these fake LAAs and
SACDCs which became the bases of the subject 199 general vouchers and checks issued to
contractors/suppliers in payment for the alleged deliveries of materials in the different project
sites. Prosecution witnesses Ruth Paredes and Felicitas Ona, both COA Auditors who were
tasked to investigate the issuances of these fake LAAs and SACDCs, had clearly identified the
badges of fraud in the issuances of these fake LAAs which were released to Cebu 2nd HED. It
was established among others that while the regular LAAs were recorded in the logbook
maintained by the Regional Office, the fake LAAs and SACDCs following their issuances were
not entered in the logbook. The entry in the logbook is an important safeguard against fraud;
thus, the failure to enter the LAAs and SACDCs in the logbook necessarily indicates irregularity
and fraud.
The COA findings were corroborated by no less than prosecution witness Delia Preagido, an
accused-turned-state witness, who had a first hand knowledge of how such falsification was
done.
The hearsay rule being put up by petitioners apply only if Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez
admission of guilt was testified to by another person or by means of affidavit. In this case the
three co-accused personally confessed their guilt during arraignment where petitioners were
likewise present. If petitioners wanted to dispute the circumstances surrounding the confession of
guilt of Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez, petitioners had the right to present the three as hostile
witnesses during the trial or petitioners could even have presented the three as their own
witnesses. And this fault should not be translated in terms of absence of opportunity to cross-
examine the three.
Petitioners invoke the rule on res inter alios acta alleging that the pleas of guilty of the three
should have not been given weight because they were made after the conspiracy had
terminated.This is erroneous because the Sandiganbayan did not convict petitioners on the basis
of the pleas of guilty. The Sandiganbayan merely said that the prosecutions case had been
amply supported and strengthened by the pleas of guilty entered by the three. The pleas of guilty
are in themselves evidence that the pleaders committed the acts mentioned in the Informations.
The pleas certainly have corroborative effect on the evidence-in-chief of the prosecution. There is
no rule violated by the Sandiganbayan when it considered the pleas of guilty.
The motive of the three in pleading not guilty is both speculative and insignificant. Petitioners
could imagine the motives of the three for pleading guilty, but the fact remains that the
consequence of their pleas is that they admitted the commission of the crimes charged.
Petitioners cannot escape the effects of this admission.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the portion of the Decision referring to the pleas of guilty
of Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez is not the basis for the conviction of petitioners. Even if said
portion is disregarded, the decision is still supported by evidence which proved petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, even if there were no pleas of guilty by Mangubat,
Gabison and Echavez, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
PEOPLE, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO, appellant.
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against
her will to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia
testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)[3]and
Kimberly (1 year old)[4] at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at
Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in
the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her
any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00
p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.[5]
Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30)
meters from their house.[6] She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her
legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her
forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed
her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns
private organ.[7]
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring,
a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and
parents of the appellant.[8] The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in
Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.[9] At about
10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant
pass by her house and take Remelyn.[10] At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal,
let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of
P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.[11] Police officers came and brought Amalia,
Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken.[12]
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia stated therein that Remelyn
had told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos. (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan
dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her,
Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their
area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way
home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a
fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.[19] He identified the little girl as
Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward
the ipil-ipil trees.
Issues: Whether or not the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet can be used as
evidence?
Ruling:
Appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant
to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against
him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of
compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of
no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a
party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can
only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of
compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of
testimony[48] of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet,[49] the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to
the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by
them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but
we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
EMMA S. ACENAS and ALBERTO E. ACENAS, spouses, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANGELA
SISON and TEOFILO SISON, spouses, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
In September, 1956, Angela Sison executed a promissory note, promising to pay Emma S.
Acenas the sum of P8,160 in 26 installments, the first falling due on November 30, 1956 and the
last on November 30, 1960. The note provided that failure to pay two consecutive installments
would make the balance due and demandable.
Mrs. Sison was able to pay up to August 31, 1957 only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the
note, alleged to be in the sum of P8,391.60, she was sued. Her husband, Teofilo Sison, was
joined as a defendant pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code.
In their answer, Mr. Sison denied liability on the ground that he had not signed the promissory
note.
Issue: Whether or not a Lawyer must be given a full authority to compromise his clients?
Ruling:
Yes.
As the trial court found, that Atty. Nicanor S. Sison, counsel for Teofilo and Angela Sison, agreed
to a judgment on confession against his clients, provided no writ of execution was issued until
June 30, 1960. But, the records do not show that Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment.
On the contrary, the decision of March 7, 1960 states that Atty. Sison "moved for the
postponement of the hearing hereof in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time
within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling this case." This indicates
that Atty. Sison lacked authority to confess judgment, otherwise, there would have been no need
for him to confer with his clients. This circumstance should have put the trial court on an inquiry
as to counsel's authority.
In the present case the attorney of the defendant was not endeavoring to collect or enforce his
client's claim, but was resisting a suit or claim against his client and consented to the credit in
favor of his client. . . .
In contrast, Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not
only to receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to
compromise their client's litigation.
Although an attorney at law, merely as such has strictly speaking no right to make a compromise,
yet a court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be
exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been
imposed on, or not fairly exercised in the case. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it
scarcely possible that, with a full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could be
fairly made, there can be no hesitation in saying that the compromise, being unauthorized and
being therefore itself void, ought not to bind the injured party. Though it may assume the form of
an award or of a judgment at law, the injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly
blameless, ought to be relieved against it. . . .
The court hold therefore that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by
counsel without ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. With
respect to Angela Sison, however, the judgment will be maintained, there being no claim in this
appeal that the confession of judgment made in her behalf was unauthorized. In fact her liability
is admitted here.
PEOPLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA,
Defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc, with John
Doe alias Ben and Peter Doe alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
holdup, take, rob and carry away with them a jeep with plate number 84-26 S’71, Bulacan, being
driven by Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo Santos, Jr., with a value of
P8,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P8,000.00; that
during the commission of this crime, and on the occasion thereof, the said accused in furtherance
of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab several
times with the said knives or ice picks the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was
abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which
caused his death after a few days of confinement in the hospital.
"At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to
proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned
person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn.,
May 11, 1972).
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz . He gave an ante
mortem statement. In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario
Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who
stabbed him and took his money and jeep . In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant
Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police. On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial
confession. In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as
the mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the
robbery and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified
companions.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the co –conspirator is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and
perpetrator, together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the
deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But said statement is
obviously inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection thereto.
There is no question that Cabrera’s inculpatory statements were made by her during the
investigation conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of
the incident in question. For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made during
the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed
conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities,
Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:
"Admission by conspirator — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."
There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the
judgment appealed from and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for
the People.
THE PEOPLE , petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN,
respondents.
Facts:
on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still
unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos. Trial
of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting
its evidence. During the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in
connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by
defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban
interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was
hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court below
ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by
a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial testimony of one of the accused is admissible as
evidence?
Ruling:
The lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of
the trial when the ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his
guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt
and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12
of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration.
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a
confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end
The confessions are not before the court and have not even been formally offered in evidence for
any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be
given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same
conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the
record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final
determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the
admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded.
THE PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA, VICTORIO
ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN DOES, accused, CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE
CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ, appellants.
Facts:
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo,
then an officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of
dollar smugglers, was found in his Borgward sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan.
Upon the advice of the NBI medico-legal officer, the cadaver was brought to Funeraria Quiogue,
Manila, for autopsy. Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased suffered three
gunshot wounds on the head: One, at the right temple, at a point above the external auditory
meatus right, the entrance wound directed from right to left; another, at the pre-auricular region
left, above the external auditory meatus left, directed from left to right; and the last, at the
temporal region, scalp, left, at a point on the above left external auditory meatus, directed from
left to right. The cause of death was shock, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds on the
head.
In the course of the investigation to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, Capt. Dionisio
Carasig, also a member of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee working with the deceased,
intimated to the PC authorities that the recent car deal of Crisostomo with Victorio Alvarez may
possibly have some connection with the killing. With that clue, an intensive investigation was
pursued by the police agencies, the Bulacan PC, the Marilao police, and the NBI agents joining
hands together. Fingerprint experts and photographers of the NBI examined the car where the
body of the victim was found, but no clear fingerprints could be detected. Upon an inspection of
the car, some specimen evidence were found, such as, one (1) cartridge case caliber .25; one (1)
unfired bullet, caliber .25; one (1) slug, caliber .25; two (2) metal jacketed bullets retrieved from
the head of the victim, caliber .25; and a bag.
Upon an examination of the bag, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.'s check in the
amount of P1,000.00, drawn by Victoria Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt
signed by the deceased acknowledging payment by Alvarez in the amount stated in the check,
with a further statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.
Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up
for questioning. Alvarez was taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for
fingerprinting and paraffin test for gun powder residue. The result of the test, as contained in the
report of Crispin Garcia, chief chemistry section of the PC, showed the presence of gun powder
residue on both hands of Alvarez.
On August 4, 1959, a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John
Does. The victim named in the complaint was Hector Crisostomo.
Victoria Alvarez was arrested on August 19, 1959. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was
investigated. He made a tape-recorded statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the
CIS at Camp Crame, admitting that he alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue,
Manila. (Vide question 68, Exhibit L, statement of Alvarez, August 21, 1959.)
On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS
in the office of the PC Alabang headquarters (Exhibit G). In this statement, he affirmed that a
certain Johnny was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same
day, Alvarez made another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating
substantially the facts contained in his handwritten statement. (Exhibit F.)
Still on the next day, August 21, 1959, Alvarez executed another statement before Capt. Rafael
Yapdiangco of the PC (Exhibit L), wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was the only one who
shot and killed Crisostomo at barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this statement, Alvarez gave a
detailed narration of the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime, as follows:
"At around 8:00 o'clock P.M. (July 14), the Borgward sedan car driven by Capt. Crisostomo was
approaching our car within a distance enough to call his attention. Johnny extended his arm and
called Capt. Crisostomo. Capt. Crisostomo's attention was attracted and he cut in and parked his
car in front of the Olds mobile where we were riding. When his car was properly parked, Capt.
Carasig and George Chua approached Capt. Crisostomo, and finally they got in; Capt. Carasig
first then followed by George Chua. After a few minutes conversation, the car driven by Capt.
Crisostomo with Capt. Carasig and George in it, left and we followed. They passed Taft Avenue
towards Isaac Peral to Otis, turned left towards Nagtahan bridge, turned right to Santa Mesa
Boulevard, turned left to Santol, turned left to Pararle St., turned left to Benito St." . . . and then
we proceeded "towards Bulacan."
Alvarez further declared that he was trusted by George Chua and was chosen to be the trigger-
man; that Chua promised to pay him P35,000.00 plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo;
that Chua was engaged in the business of dollar smuggling.
On September 1, 1959, the complaint was amended by including Chaw Yaw Shun @ George
Chua and Lim Bun Ping @ Johnny Yao, together with Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.
On the basis of Alvarez' confessions, and with him as guide, the CIS agents proceeded to Chua's
residence at 1834 M.H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila. Upon arrival at the house, they were received
by Chua's wife. Inquiring for Chua, the CIS agents were told by the wife that her husband was
not at home.
In the evening of August 24, 1959, George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, Jose Uy,
surrendered to General Isagani Campo of the PC at the D & E restaurant in Quezon City, in the
presence of newspaper reporters and photographers. Immediately thereafter, George Chua was
taken to Camp Crame and was investigated by Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents for three
hours, after which he was allowed to sleep. The next day, August 25, 1959, Chua was again
investigated by the CIS agents. The investigation was reduced to writing. Believing that Chua
was not telling the truth, because he would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator
destroyed the statements.
On August 28, 1959, while George Chua was detained in the provincial jail of Bulacan, he asked
the warden to summon the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, because he wanted to give a statement.
The assistant provincial fiscal, Pascual K. Kiliathko, interviewed George Chua in the provincial jail
on August 29, 1959. The interview was reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers
(Exhibit VVV) the pertinent portions of which are the following:
Q. — I understand from you that you sent for me?
A. — Yes, sir.
Q. — Are you ready to give the statement voluntarily and willingly?
A. — Yes, sir.
Q. — Now, Mr. George Chua, will you please state your name and other personal
circumstances?
A. — (Witness does so, and said) because I am accused of murder.
Q. — What is this murder charge that you have just stated?
A. — I was implicated by Alvarez to be one of those responsible for the killing of Crisostomo.
Q. — Now Mr. Chua, what is it that you would like to state, you stated that you sent for me to give
a statement, what is that statement you would like to give?
A. — Because I want to report to you that I was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign
a statement.
Q. — You stated that you were maltreated before, how were you maltreated?
A. — First I was taken to the 5th PC Co. at 12:00 o'clock midnight at Alabang, Rizal, on August
25, 1959, and there I was handcuffed, but before I was handcuffed, I was ordered to take off my
clothes and then I was handcuffed again and blindfolded me by wrapping a towel all around my
face and my head and some of the agents turned my head seven or eight times.
. — Now, is there something more that you still like to disclose before I ask you to sign this
statement?
A. — Yes, sir, I want to inform you that they also applied electric shock to my body and while
doing so, they forced me to answer the way they designed, two hours later they forced me to lie
down on the ground, then a stout agent sat on my stomach and another agent sat on my legs,
and then I almost lost consciousness.
On March 24, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio
Alvarez, Dionisio Carasig, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and two John Does, alleging that
said accused, acting in conspiracy, with the attendant qualifying and generic aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, use of motor
vehicle, nocturnity and by a band, killed Hector Crisostomo.
There is no evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the prosecution, other than the several
confessions of Alvarez, the confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would
tend to prove any overt act of Chua indicating some connection between him and the other
accused establishing a common criminal design to commit the crime.
At the trial, George Chua repudiated his confession and denied any participation in the
commission of the crime. With reference to his confession, he declared thus: "When he was
investigated by the CIS agents at Alabang PC headquarters on August 26, 1959, his eyes were
'tied' (blindfolded) with a wet towel for about six (6) hours and the bandage was removed only at
around 6:30 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of said date, but he cannot remember who tied his
eyes; that some agents used electric shock on his body for two (2) hours simultaneously on his
left upper back, left ear and knees; that the wire connected to his body is cranked; that he was
forced to lie down after which an agent sat on his stomach and another sat on his leg; that he
was ordered to undress, and remove his shoes and socks, then they applied the electric shock;
that he signed his confession under threat, the agents telling him that if he did not sign the
statement, he will be killed and his body will be thrown away; that nobody read to him the written
statement; that he was not allowed to read his confession, and to save his life, he just signed it.
Corroborating appellant's claim of maltreatment, Dr. Jose Eustaquio, a private physician,
declared that when he examined Chua on August 26, 1959, at the instance of the latter's lawyer,
he noticed some contusion on his left upper back, at the nape of the neck, and in the middle term
called linear abrasions also in the left upper back. His finding, however, was not put in writing. Dr.
Eustaquio examined Chua for the second time on August 27, 1959, and this time he put his
findings in writing (Exh. 19-Chua, Vol. 1). Being asked about the meaning of "multiple scratches
likeline" mentioned in his medical certificate, he said, it means linear abrasions, the cause of
which he could not determine. When he was pressed to explain the contents of his certificate, he
said these scratches could have been cause by wires, rough stones, pointed objects or similar
instruments applied by other persons; that the "reddish discoloration of the nape of the neck"
which is a "contusion" may have been caused by so called trauma or in common parlance, a
blow that may cause injury either by fist or objects; that the "reddish discoloration at the left upper
back which is medial of shoulder blade" is the same as the injury on the neck which may have
been caused by any kind of object, such as fist or hand blow; that the "pinhead spot on the left
leg and multiple scratches likeline", could have been caused by a pointed object applied to the
skin, but he does not know whether electrical shocking apparatus introduced in the body could
have produced the same.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
These findings of the three doctors, yielded one significant indication, the existence of "reddish
marks and scratch abrasions on appellant's body. True, that Dr. Arsenio Anastacio made a
remark in his medical certificate (Exh. 3-Chua) that there is "no sign of physical injury externally
which can be appreciated at the time of his examination," and Major Miguel Zarraga declared
that "the abdomen revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there any area of
tenderness in the whole body" of the appellant, these remarks, however, do not detract from the
fact, physically and scientifically recognized, that some forms of torture do not usually manifest
external injury on the body of the person maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the
use of electric shock, which incidentally are among appellant's complaints, do not necessarily
produce external physical injury.
The finding of the court that there was conspiracy among the accused, notwithstanding the fact
that on the same evidence, the court found one defendant not guilty, but sufficient to convict the
two others, on the court's finding and conclusion "As regards the testimony of Arturo Cayetano,
the court is inclined to give a margin of error in his identifying Carasig on the night in question . .
.," is indeed, somewhat illogical —
Since in the instant case, the widow appears also to be a star witness of the prosecution whose
testimony was given much weight in pinning liability on appellants, we wonder whether this could
be consistent and would be true to logic and fairness if it would hold that on the strength of the
same testimony which was discredited by the court, insofar as one of the appellants' co-accused
in the same case is concerned, would reach a verdict of conviction against said appellants.
Aside from the foregoing consideration, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence
other than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in
the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a
confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent
from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of
Alvarez which are not binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been
repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so
to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua
connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
THE PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.
Facts:
In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon
Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes
then gathered at the sala of the house of the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga,
that Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles
David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire
and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the
town of Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to
them his plan, Eulogio Serrano told them to go to sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his
house. In pursuance of the plan, the next day (17 October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes waited for Pablo
Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to
hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group waited
for him at the same places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon
Serrano alias Piping promptly invited him to a drink but Navarro declined saying that he was
going somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited for their quarry at the same places but
failed to make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of
20 October, the group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling
casino between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for
some drinks. Navarro ordered some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias
Piping drank. After drinking the contents of six bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoc
Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping whether what they had drunk was
enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more." Navarro left the gambling casino,
went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back accompanied by Simplicio
Manguerra bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine. Simplicio Manguerra
joined the party and all except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank the four bottles of wine. While
the spree was going on, Cenon Serrano alias Piping suggested to Pablo Navarro that they
should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which suggestion Navarro agreed. Cenon
Serrano alias Piping sent out Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cading returned with an
auto calesa jeep driven by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon
Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro,
Simplicio Manguerra and Anastacio Reyes boarded the jeep, the first and the last sitting at the
front with the driver and the rest inside. From the gambling casino the party repaired to Don Q
gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando. But before reaching San Fernando,
Cenon Serrano alias Piping remarked that "there is no use having a good time" in San Fernando
and suggested that they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which suggestion
Navarro approved. On the way to Angeles Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the driver to stop
at Tony's Place in San Fernando to buy some more wine. After buying another jar of San Miguel
gin, part of which Navarro who was already drunk was made to drink, the party resumed their
trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon Serrano
alias Piping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they arrived at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano alias Piping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At
barrio Dolores, the group passed by the house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to
come down and ordered him to call for some temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin
Tolentino at the house of Dizon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping beckoned and ordered Tolentino to
tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon Cenon Serrano's order Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard who
came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at Navarro. The latter asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping
why he was being tied and Cenon Serrano alias Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up
because you are against us." Navarro was brought to the stockade of the civilian guards where
he was questioned and accused Cenon Serrano alias Piping of bringing witnesses to the house
of Senator Pablo Angeles David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. As Navarro denied the
charge, Cenon Serrano alias Piping hit Navarro with his fist, struck him with the butt of his .45
caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as he was ordered
by beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter
long. As a result of the beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and
ordered him to rise, and as Navarro was rising Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell
down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping then told Filemon Cenzon to beat up Navarro and Cenzon
with the same piece of bamboo struck Navarro on his back about the waistline as he made an
effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano alias Piping returned to where the jeep was parked and
ordered Felipe Garcia to tie the hands of Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon
Serrano alias Piping, Simplicio Manguerra asked whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano
answered "I will also have you killed, you son of a whole." Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes
begging for mercy but the latter disengaged himself from him. Cenon Serrano alias Piping
pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat him up. Santiago Yumul hit Manguerra
with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon Serrano alias Piping
ordered Domingo Cadian and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the stockade.
At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and was ordered by Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill
Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in Dolores where De Guzman
dug a pit while Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra twice
and shoved Manguerra's body in the pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano
alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired
to the house of Eulogio Serrano in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two victims were
already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio Potrero at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As
Eulogio Serrano was not in his house when Cenon Serrano alias Piping arrived, the latter
boarded the jeep of the late Maximino Serrano and drove on it to the town of Bacolor together
with Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes. Upon reaching
the second bridge at barrio San Antonio on the way to Bacolor, Santiago Yumul alighted. The
rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano that the two men were already in barrio
Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang was left in the barrio
of San Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes
proceeded to the town of Bacolor.
In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian
guard, was in his house at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and
asked him to help him dig a pit at Sitio Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of
Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his request and helped Tolentino did it. After digging the pit he
went home and then proceeded to his post in Sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio Dolores. Upon reaching
his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was outside the stockade together with Atilano
Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking with another person inside the
stockade who he later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio Serrano ask "Ambo, are
you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was
not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to take Pablo Navarro out of the stockade
and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor
Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati
Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from
behind. Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro
fell down dead. Eulogio Serrano ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit
that Benjamin Tolentino and Emiliano Manalo had dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they
walked back to barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, Atilano Gopez
ordered Emiliano Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late Pablo
Navarro, put them in a sack and threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police
of Bacolor, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo,
accompanied by Constabulary soldiers, exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro.
On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra,
Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with
illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the
provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon motion of the assistant provincial
fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to testify as
witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was charged with the same crime in criminal case
No. 1819 but has not yet been apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same
crime was also at large but later on arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both
criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No. 1262) and for the death of Simplicio
Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his co-defendants
before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo
Navarro cannot overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at
the house of Eulogio Serrano in the evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure
Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and that they were together on 17, 18 and 19
October waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to barrio Dolores, and on 20
October when they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It is
difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with
him other persons who know nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime.
If they were not in the know, as they contend, they also would have been done away with right
then and there, in the same way Simplicio Manguerra, who was not to be killed, had been done
away with, to prevent him from reporting to the authorities or from testifying against them in
Court; or they also would have been sent away upon arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way
that Marcelino Sicat, the driver of the jeep on which they rode in going to the said barrio, was
sent away. The way the appellants were seated in the jeep in going to barrio Dolores-Anastacio
Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at the front seat with the driver and the three appellants
on the two parallel seats inside the jeep-belies the assertion that they were prevented by Cenon
Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that criminal act was
to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them at the
gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable,
because the gasoline station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where
the slightest commotion or any sign of distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby
traffic officer directing the traffic.
The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their co-defendants
were gathered at the house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and
temporary police organizations, who ordered them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to
kill him there, because he had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo
Angeles David to inform him about and to testify on the Maliwalu massacre; that pursuant to the
plan laid out by Eulogio Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined Cenon
Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino
and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to frequent; that they were actually with
Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to
Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and then to Angeles for a "good time" after a
drinking spree in bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the victim as he was hogtied and
rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after the incident together
with Cenon Serrano alias Piping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in league with
Eulogio Serrano and Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is,
therefore, guilty as co-principal.
The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence
other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to
be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone
testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in
finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the
lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration,
because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,"1 applies only to extra-judicial acts or
declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,2 where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or
confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted
source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent.
FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, ET AL.,
respondents.
Facts:
It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, filed an information against the said Catalino Fernandez and the herein respondents
Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and Rufino Maun, charging
them with having conspired together to kill, and that they did kill, one Gaudencio Vivar, with
evident premiditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the
trial of the latter, the former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged
conspiracy. Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did no permit the
witness Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on the ground that he being a
conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of
the Rules of Court. A written motion for reconsideration, supported with lenthy argument, was
filed by the fiscal to no avail. Hence the present petition for mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of
a conspirator relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This rule has a well-settled
meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents completely missed it. It is one of the
exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator —
not to his testimony by way of direct evidence. For illustration, let us suppose that after the
formation but before the consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez
and his five coaccused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his
coaccused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez's friend to
the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told him that he (Fernandez) and his coaccused
were going to kill Gaudencion Viviar would be admissible against Fernandez, but not against his
coaccused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first. It is admissible against
Fernandez because the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him (section 7, rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible
against Fernandez's coaccused because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter alios
as to his coaccused and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each
conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act of one conspirator is the act of all the
coconspirators.
To further explain the rule in the language of the jurisprudence on the subject, we add:
... The evidence adduced in court by the coconspirators as witnesses are not declarations of
conspirators, but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the discredit
which attaches to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the facts
to which they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to
introduce extrajudicial declarations and statements of coconspirators.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a witness to
testify what one or all of several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by coconspirators
as witnesses, which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify, is not within the rule
requiring a conspiracy to be shown as a prerequisite to its admissibility. ...
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and
WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants.
Facts: About 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo
Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro
Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila. They had just come from
Camp Claudio where they attended a birthday party. They were in civilian clothes.
While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them closely, about ten
meters away. The place was well-lighted. Gonzalo Penalver was carrying a clutch bag,
containing a Sanwa electric tester (Exhibit 1). They crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two
men following them.
On(e) of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter. Armando
Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver
kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked
Camat he became outbalanced. Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him
(Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid of somebody
who identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital despite the efforts of Dr. Vittorio Pantig to
save him. Dr. Pantig conducted an exploratory lapar(o)tomy on the abdomen of Nelson Sinoy
and found massive bleeding in the abdominal cavity, and partial damage to the kidney, pancreas
and the diaphragm. He tried to control the bleeding but despite blood transfusion, the blood
pressure of the patient went down to zero.
Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985 after his
wound was already sutured at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. At the AFP Medical Center, Dr.
Benedicto Mina took care of the patient. He gave blood transfusion to the patient. The patient
was discharged from the hospital only on March 15, 1986.4
In traversing the criminal charge, appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any
participation in the commission of the felony.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior to questioning, the
confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of
regularity of official acts does not apply during in-custody investigation. Trial courts should further
keep in mind that even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be
placed on the imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not
fall under the exceptions thereto, especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal
conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is hearsay.
However, even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment of
conviction rendered by the lower court stands and can be sustained. Worthy of consideration is
the trial courts conclusion that (a)lthough there is only one (1) eyewitness presented by the
prosecution in the person of Gonzalo Penalver, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the
prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable doubt.22
It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by
the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23 We also see
no reason to deviate from the trial courts observation that Penalver s testimony bore the
attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner.
We have scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same to be
categorical and candid, untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably
chronicles the material details in the commission of the crimes in question, and should
accordingly be given full credence.
PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ MADELO, JIM MERCENE y
BUSAR @ EMI, CARLITO DECENA y PARDELA, and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, and JOHN
DOES, accused,
RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ MADELO and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, accused-appellants.
Facts:
At around two oclock in the morning of August 27, 1993, Rodelo Palijon,[1] Carlos Decena,[2]
and Jim Mercene entered the yard of the residence in San Pablo City of the spouses Gonzalo
and Mellorequina Reyes. Both were elderly returnees (balikbayans), recently arrived from the
United States.
Decena entered the house by climbing a post and removing some glass panes from the jalousy
windows. Once inside, Decena and Mercene positioned themselves near the couples bedroom
door and waited for someone to open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the bedroom.
Palijon remained outside the house, as look-out.
Around four oclock A.M., Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. She did not
notice the intruders. Decena then followed her to the toilet where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs.
Reyes managed to shout for help before she fainted. Mr. Reyes rushed to assist his wife. Decena
met him, with a steel-edged stool and struck him hard several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on
the floor. The robbers ransacked the house then escaped.
Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes couple, who lived some
distance away, was roused from her sleep by a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A
hysterical Bicomong told Alvero that the latters parents were hospitalized and in critical condition.
Alvero dashed off to the hospital and was able to talk to her mother. Alvero then proceeded to the
house of her parents. An inspection of the bedroom of the spouses Reyes revealed that cash
amounting to P17,000.00 and various pieces of jewelry belonging to her mother, worth
P100,000.00 were missing.
At 10:55 A.M., Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was cardio-
respiratory failure caused by severe contusion hematoma of head (right side, liver, and chest wall
due to severe beatings, with suspicious multiple fractures, ribs, 5th and 7th, right.)[3]
In an Information dated October 14, 1993, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City
charged Rodelo Palijon, Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and several John Does, with
robbery and homicide, allegedly committed.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not
against persons, the homicide being a mere incident of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, it is essential that the robbery itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The onus probandi is, thus, upon the prosecution to prove the following: (1) the taking of personal
property with violence or intimidation against persons or by using force upon things; (2) that the
property taken belongs to another; (3) that the taking was characterized by animus lucrandi; and
(4) that on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.
The prosecution presented both object and testimonial evidence that personal property of the
victims were taken. Alvero testified that she was familiar with her mothers jewelry having
borrowed some of the items on past occasions. After she inspected her parents house she
discovered cash and valuable pieces of jewelry missing. Alvero also identified, in open court, the
broken jewelry box, some pieces of fancy jewelry and other items of her mother recovered at the
crime scene.[Under cross-examination, Alvero was categorical in her account that the more
expensive pieces of jewelry of her mother were missing. The trial courts assessment of the
credibility of Alvero is entitled to great respect. It is binding on this court in the absence of any
showing that the trial courts finding was not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.We also note that the physical evidence of the prosecution
corroborated Alveros account that her parents had been robbed. Physical evidence is mute but
an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
It is appellant Prias contention that the prosecutions evidence implicating her is weak and shaky.
She points out that when her co-accused planned the robbery in appellant Palijons house, she
was some distance from them and could not have heard their scheme. She also avers that she
was sleeping at the time of the incident, and did not participate in the robbery.
In the instant case, both prosecution witness Mercene and defense witness Decena admitted the
existence of a conspiracy to rob the victims. However, their versions as to the participation of
appellant Pria differ. Mercene testified that he and his co-accused agreed to enter and rob the
house of the Reyes couple during the wee hours of the morning of August 27, 1993. According to
Mercene it was appellant Pria who: (1) informed them of the arrival of the Reyes spouses from
abroad; (2) told them that the balikbayans had a lot of money being; and (3) told them how to
enter the house. Decena, admits that Pria was present when they plotted the robbery,but
vehemently insists that she had no participation in its planning. Decena claims that Pria was
there only to attend to their child, and she was sleeping when he and Mercene broke into the
house of the victims.To buttress Decenas testimony, the defense presented three of his letters to
Pria, written in prison, clearing her of any knowledge or participation in the crime.
After reviewing the transcripts and circumstances extant to the case, we find that the trial court
did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Mercene. The latter testified that Pria was only
1-1/2 meters away from them when they were plotting the robbery.The house of Palijon where
they hatched their plan is a small, one-room house with an area of approximately twenty (20)
meters only.Both facts clearly show that Pria could easily participate in the discussion of the
conspirators. Mercenes declarations are positive testimonial evidence. They outweigh Decenas
unsubstantiated denial of Prias participation in the criminal conspiracy. Denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.
In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is
as liable for robbery with homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing and killing.
At the instant that the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and pursue it,
each and every member of the conspiracy is criminally liable for the felony committed by anyone
of them.
Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial court erred in convicting
him on the basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be
taken against him under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet as formulated
in Sections 28[38] and 30,[39] Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the malefactors of the crime, their
actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose to attain their illicit ends. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate
the conspiracy once it has materialized.
PEOPLE, appellee, vs. CASIANO BUNTAG alias CIANO and DIEGO BONGO, appellants.
Facts:
Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,[3] a German national and a tourist, checked in at
the Alona Ville Beach Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal
Bonga,[4] assigned Otte to Room No. 9[5] and gave the latter his room key.
On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resorts restaurant. Bonga talked to him
regarding the disco which was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo
Chapel.[6]
At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the
tables.[7] She noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize.[8]
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno Ninoy Guigue were also at the disco. At
around 2:00 a.m. of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked
home, with their respective bicycles at their sides.[9] At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they
saw a man lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man.
When they were about twenty-five meters[10] away from the body by the road, they met Casiano
Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates.[11] Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and
simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought
refuge in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo.[12] In the process, they left their bicycles
behind. Aquilino Bongo then accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles.
Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator?
Ruling:
We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they
conspired to kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so
hold, after an incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime.[36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the
accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests.[37] It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and
killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is
the act of all.
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as
indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a
judgment of conviction if the following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible
only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. The same rule
applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased.
However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the
other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or
admission is admissible against both accused.The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission
when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts
by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or
of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the
evidence or truths charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in
itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts
of guilt.A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of
the crime charged.
In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn
statement, and not a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit. Such
admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the course of its
preliminary investigation, are high quality evidence. MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the
said sworn statement and counter-affidavit and was cross-examined. Moreover, some of the
extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant are identical with some of the extrajudicial
inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This corroborates and confirms their veracity.
Such admissions, made without collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They
are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the other appellant implicated therein to show
the probability of his participation in the commission of the crime and as corroborative evidence
against him. The Court rejects the appellants contention that they were deprived of their right to
cross-examine the other on the latters admissions against the other. Through their common
counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements by the
prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-
examine Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of their statements.
Facts:
In the regional level, the requisition of funds for public works purposes, especially in the matter of
road and bridge repairs, involves a graduated series of steps. As found by the respondent
Sandiganbayan, it begins with the Sub-Allotment Advices (SAAs), as well as the Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceilings (ACDCs), issued by the Ministry of Public Highways in favor of its
Highways Regional Offices. These serve as the Regional Offices' authority to obligate and
disburse funds. In turn, these become the sources of funds of the various Engineering Districts
apportioned throughout each region.
The Engineering District then requests for the release of these funds from the Regional Director
through a Program of Work. The Regional Finance Officer issues a Letter of Advice of Allotment
(LAA), certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant countersigned by the
Regional Director, and addressed to the District (or City, as the case may be) Engineer. At the
same time, he (the Regional Finance Officer) prepares a Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement
Ceiling (SACDC) for the Regional Director.
The LAA and SACDC are subsequently entered in a logbook. The funds requested are then
released.
On the strength of such LAA and SACDC, the District then prepares a Requisition for Supplies
or Equipment (RSE) as well as a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA), pursuant to the
Program of Work. Both are likewise certified as to availability of funds by the Regional
Accountant and approved by the Regional Director.
Thereafter, the Property Custodian or the Purchasing Officer, as the case may be, addresses
Requests for Sealed Quotations to various suppliers, usually through newspaper advertisements
or notices posted in conspicuous places in the District concerned. After ten days, the Sealed
Quotations are submitted to the Price Verification Committee which determines the lowest bid in
the presence of representatives of the District Engineer and the Auditor. An Abstract of Sealed
Quotations is then signed by the members of the Committee as well as the said local
representatives. Thereafter, and subject to the approval of the District Engineer, the proper
award is made in favor of the lowest bidder. On the basis thereof, the Property Custodian issues
a Purchase Order (PO) in favor of the winning bidder, again subject to the approval of the District
Engineer and certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant.
The supplies thus to be delivered are thereafter inspected (through Request for Inspection) by
the Property Custodian. The deliveries themselves are recorded in a Tally Sheet after which a
Record of Inspection, certified by the Property Custodian, is prepared by the representative of the
Auditor and the Property Custodian.
Payment to the supplier is evidenced by a General Voucher (GV). Among others, the GV
contains five parts; (1) a certification of receipt of supplies to be accomplished by the Property
Custodian; (2) a certification of correctness, that is, that the expenses are necessary and lawful,
and that the prices are not in excess of the current rates in the locality, to be accomplished by the
Project Engineer; (3) approval by the District Engineer; (4) a certification, to be accomplished by
the Auditor, that the GV has been properly approved, its account codes proper, and that it is
supported by the proper documents; and (5) a certification that the GV has undergone pre-audit,
to be accomplished by the Auditor.
The GV itself must carry with it the following: the RSE, ROA, Program of Work, Detailed
Estimates, Request for Sealed Quotations, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, PO, Delivery
Receipts, Request for Inspection, Record of Inspection, Test Reports, and Tax Clearance of the
supplier.
The process winds up with the issuance of the check by the Cashier in the name of the supplier.
Like the GV, the check is pre-audited and then released.
The District Accountant thereafter prepares a Report of Obligation Incurred (ROI) and a Report
of Checks Issued (RCI) to be submitted to the Regional Office and entered in the journals and
the General Ledger thereof. On the basis thereof, the Regional Accountant prepares a trial
balance to be recommended by the Finance Officer and approved by the Regional Director. The
same is then submitted to the Ministry of Public Highways.
It appears that from May through June, 1978, the Tagbilaran City Engineering Office (CEO)
embarked on certain projects involving the restoration of various roads and bridges in Tagbilaran
City. Pursuant to five LAAs addressed to the Ministry of Public Highways purportedly issued by
the Seventh Regional Highways Office on behalf of the Tagbilaran CEO, more specifically
described as follows:
Xxx
the Tagbilaran CEO prepared RSEs and ROAs for the procurement of materials and supplies,
specifically, anapog binder, for the projects aforementioned. All five LAAs were certified as to
availability of funds by Rolando Mangubat, allegedly on behalf of Angelina Escao, Finance
Officer of the Seventh Regional Highways Office (Mangubat signed over her typewritten name)
and countersigned by Jose Bagasao. The six SACDs were likewise signed by Mangubat for the
Regional Director. The materials requisitioned were supplied by JV Sand & Gravel &
Construction Supply, a private contractorship owned by James Tiu. Six GVs were prepared
therefor, as follows:
x xx
representing partial payments in favor of JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, which has
been named as a creditor therein. The GVs themselves were accompanied by various supporting
papers, among them, the RSEs and ROAs earlier referred to.
Eventually, the matter reached the Commission on Audit which constituted two teams to mount
an inquiry.
The investigation disclosed that the above mentioned LAAs as well as SACDCs were spurious
documents, and that the six GVs were in fact based on only two LAAs, Nos. 107-780-05-78 and
107-780-014-78. It was further established that the total sum requested under the said LAAs
P474,100.00 supposedly to cover the Tagbilaran CEO's unliquidated obligations were not in fact
supported by its statement of accounts, under which its total obligations totalled but P160,639.55.
Moreover, the payee, JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, was not listed in the City's books
as a creditor, for which it could have been entitled to the sums released.
The Audit Commission likewise observed certain discrepancies in the GVs in question, notably,
that the Programs of Work had been "split"; that they were dated after the dates of the RSEs; that
while the POs called for 9,369 to 9,375 cubic meters of anapog binder, the GVs specified but
3,123 to 3,125 cubic meters thereof apiece; that the Delivery Receipts had been issued "in lump
quantities," did not bear acknowledgment signatures or were not initialled by the auditor or dated
after the dates of the pre-audit; that the biddings were irregular; and that anapog had been short-
delivered.
The Commission on Audit moreover found that the Highways Regional Office, as of this period,
had in fact released "doubtful" allotments to ten districts, the Tagbilaran CEO among them, in the
total sum of P24,052,750.00 supposedly to cover unliquidated obligations, although the
statements of account thereof showed a total of only P2,735,181.98 as and for unliquidated
obligations.
The very books of the Regional Office appeared furthermore to have been doctored. For while
the total unliquidated obligations totalled only P2,586,306.78, the entry in the Regional Office's
general ledger was P35,509,002.99. And in payment of such doubtful obligations, the checks
issued exceeded the cash disbursement ceiling by P6,837,971.35. Apparently, it was Rolando
Mangubat who recorded these entries by way of seven Journal Vouchers (JVs).
It likewise turned out that James Tiu subsequently opened certain savings accounts at the Allied
Bank in favor of Nio Pilayre, Praxedes Lopena, and Miguel Bulac, although Lopena insists that as
far as she was concerned, she knew nothing about it.[9]
The Tanodbayan filed six Informations for estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents against nine public officials[10] and two private individuals[11] on the basis of
conspiracy. Later, additional public officials[12] were included in some of these Informations. It is
only in Criminal Case Nos. 195, 198 and 199 that petitioner Bolotaulo is a co-accused. Except for
the amounts involved, the quantities of anapog binder allegedly requisitioned and delivered, the
six Informations were uniformly worded as follows:
That, in or about and during the period from the months of April to June, 1978, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the public officials,
who by reason of the duties of their office, are accountable officers, and conspiring and conniving
among themselves, as well as with their private party co-accused, after having falsified or caused
to have falsified Letters of Advice of Allotment No. 107-780-05-78 and No. 107-780-014-78, both
dated April 24, 1978 and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling No. 193-78 dated April 28,
1978 and No. 222-78 dated May 2, 1978, which are all public documents, whereby said accused
made it appear that an amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) had been lawfully
allocated for the City of Tagbilaran from the MPH Regional Highway Office No. VII, Cebu City,
and made available For the maintenance of existing and unabandoned roads and bridges in the
City of Tagbilaran, which falsifications had been committed in connection with the functions of
their respective offices, then taking advantage of their official positions and committing in relation
to the functions of their respective offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify or cause to have falsified General Voucher,[13] covering the sum of Forty-Nine Thousand
Nine Hundred Eighty Pesos (P49,980.00) for the payment of road shouldering materials (anapog
binder), with the use of the aforesaid falsified Letters of Advice of Allotment and Sub-advices of
Cash Disbursement Ceiling to support thereof and other documents, such as the Program of
Work/Budget Cost for Roads and Bridges dated May 8, 1978, Request for Obligation of Allotment
dated May 16, 1978, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, Purchase Orders dated June 9, 1978,
Record of Inspection dated June 9, 1978, and other papers in support thereof, by making it
appear that the request for obligation of allotment was regularly prepared and approved, that the
bidding of materials was properly conducted, that the corresponding purchase order was
prepared in favor of the lowest bidder, and that the materials purchased were duly and fully
delivered in accordance with specifications and duly inspected, when in truth and in fact, as the
accused fully knew well, the foregoing transactions were false and simulated, except that, with
the amount of 3,123 cubic meters of anapog binder having been purchased for the sum of
P49,980.00 at the rate of P16.00 per cubic meter, accused Jimmy Tiu and his representative
accused Engracio Quiroz, by previous understanding with the accused officials, had caused the
delivery only of (quantity) cubic meters of anapog binders, hence causing the Government to lose
(quantity) cubic meters and worth (amount) at the rate of P16.00 per cubic meter; thus, the said
accused having in said manner in a narration of facts; and that, by means of the aforesaid
falsifications, the said accused were able to demand, collect and receive from the government
thru the Tagbilaran City Engineers Office, MPH Regional office No. VII, the value of the vouchers
in question although the amount due should have been only the value of the actual quantities
delivered, and that, after the accused after having demanded, collected and received, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to their own
personal use and benefit, and/or consent or, through negligence, permit other persons to take,
misapply, misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in convicting petitioners and the other
accused on the basis of conspiracy?
Ruling:
The prosecution had clearly established that because of the fake LAAs, SACDCs and the general
vouchers with all its supporting documents, the government through the Tagbilaran CEO had
disbursed funds for projects which were short delivered. Since there were short deliveries of
anapog binder to the alleged projects sites, it resulted to the government suffering losses. We
quote with approval the findings of the Sandiganbayan on this matter, thus:
It is only logical that, if funds are disbursed without any appropriation, there is actually a payment
of money out of the Treasury without any sanction in law. In such case, the Government suffers a
loss of so much as is disbursed. Of course, in the cases at bar, the People adopted a more
realistic approach to the situation. It opted to hold the perpetrators of the fraudulent transactions
liable only up to the amount of the actual loss sustained, evidently because it concedes that there
had been some deliveries, albeit minimal. And, there can be no question that, if a contract is
entered into with the Government for a given quantity of materials and the entire contract price is
paid but only a quantity less than that contracted for is actually delivered, the Government would
naturally be prejudiced to the extent of the value of the materials not delivered. This is precisely
what happened here. Therefore, it is altogether off-tangent for the accused to contend that,
because no statement of loss consequent to the transactions here involved had been presented
from the National Treasury or from the Philippine National Bank, no justifiable finding of damage
to the Government can be made. This would be closing ones eyes to reality. For, the stark reality
is that certain amounts have in fact been paid by the Government for materials that were short-
delivered. Accordingly, we hold that damage to the extent of the value of said short-delivery was
sustained. Considering that it is undeniable that the damage came about thru the deceitful
medium of the multiple falsifications here found to have been perpetrated, it is ineluctably clear
that said falsifications were the means to the perpetration of a crime of estafa. As correctly
formulated in the Informations herein, the crime committed in each of the cases at bar is estafa
thru falsification of public documents.
This ushers the Court to the determination of the extent of the damage caused to the
Government. On this score, the evidence bears looking into. Restituto Castro, testifying for the
People, detailed the volume of deliveries made to various sections of the roads and bridge
approaches covered by the projects here involved based on his counting of truckloads of anapog
extracted from the Belderol Co and Picmao quarries and brought to the restoration sites. On the
other hand, Assistant Provincial Engineer Sarmiento also made documented estimates of the
volume of anapog delivered and significantly, enough, even after reckoning with pertinent factors
bearing on the matter-including the time lapse between the date of spreading and the date of
inspection, the effect of erosion, and a shrinkage factor of 20% and 30% as the case may be-
came up with figures higher than those arrived at by Castro. So much so that, giving the defense
the benefit of the doubt, the Court elects to go by the figures furnished by Engineer Sarmiento as
bases for reckoning the damage caused. For this purpose, the amount to be considered as
starting point should be the face value of the respective checks actually paid to accused Tiu, that
is to say, deducting the amount paid to the City Treasurer for Mining Fees. And, the value of
anapog delivered should be taken at the price it was supposed to have been sold to the
Government, that is P16.00 per cubic meter.
It bears stressing that the fraudulent issuances of the LAAs, SACDCs, GVs and its supporting
documents and the journal vouchers and short deliveries are now settled issues. As we have
earlier stated, we upheld the findings of the Sandiganbayan in four petitions brought to us by the
four co-accused of herein petitioners which involved the same decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 195 to 200 covering the same transactions.[26]
Thus, the only issue now is whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in finding petitioner Bolotaulo
guilty of conspiracy in committing the crime charged.
Petitioner Bolotaulo was convicted for his signature in the RSEs, in the abstract of sealed
quotations and for signing the general voucher certifying that the expenses are necessary, lawful
and incurred under his direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable and not in
excess of the current rates in the locality. He, however, contends that he merely performed his
duties and responsibilities in affixing his signatures on those documents.
Petitioner, as the Senior Civil Engineer of the Tagbilaran CEO, was the one who prepared the
three Request for Supplies or Equipment (RSEs)which were all dated April 11, 1978 allegedly on
the basis of three programs of work he recommended for approval which were all dated May 8,
1978. Notably, however, the RSEs antedated the programs of work which is an anomalous
circumstance since the RSEs needed for the prosecution of the projects are only based on the
programs of work. In fact, petitioner, in his cross-examination, admitted that he cannot prepare a
RSE without an approved program of work and that it is the normal and regular procedure; that if
the program of work is prepared later than the RSE, there must be something irregular about it.
No satisfactory explanation was advanced by petitioner on why the RSEs antedated the
programs of work as all he could say was that it was not his concern which of these two came
ahead as long as that at the time he was signing the general voucher, the program of work was
there. As the Sandiganbayan found, it unmasks the RSEs and/or Programs of Work as
falsificiations since the former cannot be said to be O.K. as to program of work, as therein stated
since at the time of their preparation, no program of work was yet in existence and that the latter
can only be said to have been subsequently prepared to plug a veritable loophole.
In fact, the RSEs are not even in accord with the program of work. While petitioner recommended
the approval of the three programs of work each calling for the use of 3,123 cubic meters of
selected borrow (Item 108) as well as the detailed estimates which also called for the use of
selected borrow, the three RSEs which petitioner prepared called for the use of anapog binder.
No explanation was offered as to why there was such a discrepancy.
Notably, petitioner Bolotaulo recommended for approval three programs of work which all cost
not more than P50,000.00 each. As established by the testimony of prosecution witness, Miguel
V. Bulac, this was so since petitioner Bolotaulos co-accused City Engineer Castillo could not
approve program of work exceeding P50,000.00 because in excess of that amount, the program
of work has to be approved by the Regional Director.[33] In fact, Engr. Castillo admitted that
program of work in excess of P50,000.00 needs the approval of the region.[34] As we earlier
stated, we affirmed the conviction of City Engineer Castillo.
Petitioner Bolotaulo signed three GVs certifying that the expenses are necessary, lawful and
incurred under his direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable and not in excess
of the current rates in the locality. Attached to these GVs as supporting documents are the
programs of work, the RSEs, the requests for sealed quotations and the purchase orders among
others. He signed the GVs despite the fact that the RSEs antedated the programs of work. He
could not have failed to notice that there was only one set of request for sealed quotation for the
total of 9,369 cubic meters of anapog binders and one purchase order which supported the three
GVs all for amounts less than P50,000.00 each to the same contractor/ supplier James Tiu. The
issuance of three GVs for amounts less than P50,000.00 each was resorted to since a higher
amount would have required the vouchers to be forwarded to the Regional Auditor for action and
review. The RSEs and the GVs had been split into uniform amounts of not more than P50,000.00
each which is a clear case of splitting of requisitions and general vouchers prohibited by the
Commission on Audit Circular No. 76- 41 dated July 30, 1976.
As defined by the Circular, splitting in its literal sense means dividing or breaking up into separate
parts or portions, or an act resulting in a fissure, rupture, breach. Within the sphere of
government procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries
and payments.
Splitting may be in the form of (1) Splitting of Requisi3tions which consists in the non-
consolidation of requisitions for one or more items needed at about the same time by the
requisitioner; (2) Splitting of Purchase orders which consists in the issuance of two or more
purchase orders based on two or more requisitions for the same or at about the same time by the
different requisitioners; and (3) Splitting of payments which consists in making two or more
payments for one or more items involving one purchase order. These forms of splitting are
resorted to in order to avoid (a) inspection of deliveries, (b) action, review or approval by higher
authorities; or (c) public bidding.
There is also no truth to petitioner Bolotaulos certification in the general voucher that the price of
the materials requisitioned is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the
locality considering that it was established that there was irregularity in the bidding held on May
24, 1978.
Finally, petitioner argues that assuming that there were admissions from the other co-accused,
the alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other than the declaration of a co-
conspirator citing Section 27 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 27. Admission by conspirator- The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The argument is devoid of merit.
Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but
not to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.
ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appelle, vs. JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA,
provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this
case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled
under, the plaintiff as party in possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the
defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos. the plaintiff,
Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the defendant, Jose Perez Pastor,
to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion.
The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the
transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that
the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor
of Juan Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the court to declare that he himself is the
true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the plaintiff to surrender
possession to him.
The plaintiff claims by virtue of the document (Exhibit A), which purports to be a contract of sale
with the privilege of repurchase. It recites a consideration of P2,500 the payment of which is
acknowledged; and the stipulated period within which is acknowledge; and the stipulated period
within which the vendor may repurchase the property is fixed at two years. This documents is
signed by the two contracting parties (Juan Llenos and Eladio Alpuerto) and is attested by two
subscribing witnesses. It purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; just it was
not acknowledged before a notary until December 3, 1914.
Issue: Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been entered against Juan Llenos
in either instance?
Ruling:
Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following
passage is found in the Commentary of Manresa:
The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary
legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived form acts inter vivos, and for special
purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short,
he, who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical
relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal
rights and obligations, is a privy.
Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose
Perez Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos,
must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore
undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this
from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document-unless this result is
prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the
date on which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may
have been delivered to a public official by virtue of his office.
In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the
probative value of the document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to
lay down any rule concerning the efficacy of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (The
importance of the rule here declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation
where the document itself contains the only competent evidence before the court bearing upon
the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as a private document.
THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts:
This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located in
Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of
John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified
that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city .The next
witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza
Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to
whom it now belongs .
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the
Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his
testimony is at variance with that of the preceding witness, who testified that the land belonged to
the Central Government. Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had
learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced
by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the
owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph
11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the
"common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that
section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to
establish the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between
the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central
Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely
the streets on which the property abuts .
The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos to
her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the
property abutting on Calle Clavel. It appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from
Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in this case.
Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we
do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the
property.
The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the
land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced
by the plaintiff.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to
the "mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by him on
the 9th of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario in his testimony,
admitted the authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the municipality of Manila
to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first
document under the misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been
subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the
municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document
because the President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to
avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was not contradicted. We accordingly
hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case
at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence.
Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the
ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had
transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and
had it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If
this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the documents
mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act, or
omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made
while the latter holds the title."
the two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the defendant and Telesfora
Apostol y Perea, also introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, show that the defendant was in
possession of the land under a good title and with the status of owner of the land. In the first
instrument if is stated so many words that the defendant is the owner in fee simple of the land, he
having repurchased it from Liberio de Aurteneche y Menchacatorre, whose title had been
recorded in the property register.
From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its
claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the
plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the
land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents
introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900,
tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore,
the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle
Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since
February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land.
According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless
the contrary is shown.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL
FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS,
respondents.
Facts:
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the
Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos,
pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now
estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB,
as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using
various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes
which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M.
Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6]
dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently,
respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said
agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the
inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its
premises or whereas clauses the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356
million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich
District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners request for legal assistance.[7]
Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of
illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties
entitled to restitution.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s claim of lack of sufficient knowledge or information
regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts is
sufficient as evidence?
Ruling:
The general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they
were not privy to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are
the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the
acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs.
Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they
failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present
and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial
briefs which shall contain, among others:
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies.[49]
It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs
and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of
the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to
be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of
the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to
the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward
necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal
identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing
and submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the
action.[50]
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children,
merely stated:
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present
additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as
may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither
the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared
certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and
lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was
not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this
Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.
PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located along Tomas
Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses
Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window
grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of
the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood
Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their
bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door
to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her
nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept
money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed
her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth
P30,000.00.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the
bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the
two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho,
dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing
Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then
rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of
furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told
operatives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while
with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw
his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture
shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police investigators who also
learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident,
and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather
of his sister's child.
Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and
Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his
companions. From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar
Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez.
Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and
his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning
to leave.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses,
accused Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under
arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling.
However after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his
guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the
baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station
where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He
confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ
Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his participation as a
lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he would
be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil said that
his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in
Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit,
where they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for
Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the
prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing
evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the demurrer, found the
accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his
constitutional rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police
officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at
the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and
declare statements that can be used against him in any proceeding."2 And, the belated arrival of
counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not
cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory
statements from him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged
confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . . and . . . written
extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other witnesses"3 which are replete with
"serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an
interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then
brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way
to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he
confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those
instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed,
is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the
signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus we
said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to
the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the
records, the latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial
confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details
which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence
uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit
constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his
behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the
prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is
not essential to prove conspiracy which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and
after the commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community
of interest. Thus circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. And where conspiracy
exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the
others.
THE PEOPLE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE,
LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG,
CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused. WONG CHUEN MING and
AU WING CHEUNG, accused-appellants.
Facts:
Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, both British (Hongkong) nationals, together
with Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yang, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song,
Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun, all Malaysian nationals, were charged with
unlawfully transporting into the country Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Eleven (11)
separate criminal informations were filed against all of the accused individually, setting forth
similar allegations:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon in Pasay
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport without lawful authority [3.40
kilograms in Criminal Case No. 91-1524 filed against Wong Chuen Ming; 3.45 kilograms in
Criminal Case No.91-1525 to 91-1534 filed against all other accused individually], more or less of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, as (sic) regulated drug commonly known as SHABU.
On 7 September 1991, at about 1:000 clock in the afternoon, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR
No. 301 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City,
Metro Manila. Among the many passengers who arrived on board said flight were the eleven (11)
accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan
Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk
Sun. Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are the
only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their
passports also revealed that all the accused Malaysians (except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came
from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other
hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from
Hongkong to Manila. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung, an employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour
group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They
placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was
manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour
groups passengers manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports.
Gomez testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiners table
for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their
turn to be examined. Chin Kong Songs baggage was first to be examined by Gomez. Gomez put
his hand inside the baggage and in the course of the inspection, he found three (3) brown
colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The boxes were
marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them inside
the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next
examined the baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out two (2) boxes
of Alpen Cereals from said baggage and like in the previous inspection, he found nothing wrong
with them and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to
Lim Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another three (3) boxes of Alpen Cereals from said
baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside the
box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately
called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to
his discovery.[2]
Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance,
she immediately ordered the tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district
collectors office. Chin Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by
Gomez, were also brought inside together with the rest of the group. Inside the collectors office,
Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly
found that each baggage contained one (1), two (2) or three (3) boxes similar to those previously
found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of thirty
(30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered
from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their
respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed
them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of
accused as listed in the passengers manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape
placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at this
time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several
news reporters. A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job
Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison.[3]
Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, he
conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the
substance was indeed shabu. Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven (11) accused
that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which
were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame.[4]
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having
identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a
forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed
that the white crystalline substance recovered from accused was shabu.[5] The total weight of
shabu recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms.
Issue: Whether or not the accused were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when
their previous counsels also represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not
well-taken?
Ruling:
Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveal that
accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were
under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they
had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used
against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while
they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at
Camp Crame.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in
effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by
law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession
which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They
are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of
their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.[18] The fact that all accused are foreign
nationals does not preclude application of the exclusionary rule because the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
PEOPLE plaintiff-appellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at
large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and
Teresita Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont,
the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the
Barkers who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up,
opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet.
When she opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante.
She knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps
of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had
acquainted her on her chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her
face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side,
whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled
towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the
house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon
opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right
hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to,
accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door.
Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it
and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the
room, leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and
proceeded t, the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete
stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite
her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost
consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right hand. She
fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the
car. After a few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open
it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door.
When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to
prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker
and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise
stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of
dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a
waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away
from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two
men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand
and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on
his right shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following
would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger
jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting
shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above
mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of
the jeepney as he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified
through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as
the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room
where they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the
gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and
Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting
Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what
they had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road.
Issue: whether or not we can still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of
corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?
Ruling:
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled
that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta
Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on
his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence.
He should have focused his attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession —
the Sinumpaang Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the, verbal admissions to
Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to
convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a
distinction between. the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of
the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends
only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not
sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had
already benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued
by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation.
Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights
of a person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in
court. The trial court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had
the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to
have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully
well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise,
which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial
court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to
prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor
of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay .
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or
information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such
filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to
refuge to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If
this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is
deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would
also diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section
12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination
reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSUE MOLAS, accused-appellant.
Facts: The evidence for the prosecution established that Molas and Dulcesima Resonable, the
victim in Criminal Case No. 5811, were sweethearts. They were engaged to be married in May,
1983. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo Resonable and Soledad Resonable, the victim in
Criminal Case No. 5813. The couple had two (2) sons namely Nicolas and Abelardo, the victim in
Criminal Case No. 5812.
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, Bernardo Resonable arrived at his
house in Inas, Dobdob, Valencia, Negros Oriental, tired from work on his farm. He was surprised
to find his eight-year-old son, Abelardo, at the doorway of his house, bathed in his own blood. He
carried his son into the house and placed him on top of a table. Abelardo asked for hot water,
which his father quickly fetched, after which Abelardo informed his father that appellant, Josue
Molas, was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also stabbed his sister Dulcesima
and his mother Soledad (TSN of August 7, 1984 of Bernardo Resonable, pp. 7-15). Having been
informed of the stabbing, Bernardo looked for his daughter and wife. He found the lifeless body of
his daughter Dulce in a dried carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He
carried her into the house and looked for his wife whose corpse he found near the bench by the
door of the house. He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain (Labe) and sought help
from the authorities in the municipal building of Valencia. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought to
the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a house on higher
ground. Abelardo expired the next day.
At dawn of February 3, 1983, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman
Geronimo Vallega in the municipal hall of Pamplona, Negros Oriental. He also surrendered "the
hunting knife I used in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy" (p. 14 TSN, June 18, 1985; p.
160, Records in G.R. Nos. 97437-39). The guard forthwith lodged him in jail. Afterwards, he was
transferred to the Valencia Police Station, which had jurisdiction over the crime that was
committed in Sitio Inas, Dobdob, Valencia, Negros Oriental.
The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any
statement to the police. However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station
investigator at the Valencia Police Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely
and voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of counsel. When he was asked to "relate
the whole story" (pp. 36-38, TSN, October 16, 1984), he answered as follows:
A — In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this
Soledad Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay
makaboot nako ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can
stop me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter and
grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy,
I stopped Solidad by holding her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention,
Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went
back to Dulcesima and again boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on
the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-be and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to grab
the weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad hitting her first on the breast, then on the back after
which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother at my back holding and boxing my buttock. I
stabbed him on the breast and followed again at the back causing him to fall down on the ground,
leaving therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little finger and ran away
but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa akong
ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this
to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing such words, I responded, "papatay ka
diay kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated
weapon and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her breast and caused
her life to end. When I saw Solidad her mother walking towards the seat of their store and sat
down, I followed her and slashed her neck and stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home.
Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of
Valencia after the latter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into the
Cebuano dialect. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He
signed the document willingly, after which the judge affixed his own signature thereon.
Issue: Whether or not that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice
and assistance of counsel is admissible as evidence?
Ruling:
Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his
mother and sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from
stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was
indubitably a dying declaration.
To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under
a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d) that his
declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427). All
of these circumstances were present when Abelardo made his dying declaration.
While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission
of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted
the investigation of the accused
The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial
court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which
observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him credible.
Rage appeared to have triggered Molas' killing rampage, rage on seeing Soledad maul his
sweetheart, Dulcesima, rage when Dulcesima chided him instead of appreciating his effort to
stop her mother's attack against her, and rage at Abelardo for attacking him also. But even if that
motive may seem insufficient to persons not as easily provoked to violence, the absence of
motive only assumes determinative significance when the perpetrator of the crimes had not been
positively identified. In this case, however, both the crimes and Molas' participation therein were
definitely established.
At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even
if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction.
His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained
clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration,
and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he
admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he
who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable.