Respondent 2010 D M Harish Memorial Moot Competition PDF

TEAM CODE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE,
T H E H A G UE , N E T H E R L A N D S

G E N E RA L L I S T N O .
Y E A R 2010
C A S E C ON CE R N IN G T H E B L OC K A D E O N R ON I S T A N B Y J OT R I A A N D T H E A T T A CK S O N
J OT R I A N I N S T I T U T I O N B Y T H E UC

D.M. HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL M O O T C OU R T
C OM P E T I T I ON
(2010)

R E P U B L I C O F R ON I S T A N / R E P U B L I C OF J O T R I A
THE APPLICANT STATE T H E R E S P ON D E N T S T A T E

S U B M I T T ED I N T H E R E G I S T R Y OF T H E C O U R T
ON B E H A L F O F T H E R E S P ON D E N T S T A T E
R E P U B L I C O F J O T R I A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I N D E X O F A U T H O R I T I E S ...........................................................................................I
S T A T E M E NT O F J U R I S D I C T I O N ..............................................................................XII
S Y N O P S I S O F F A C T S ............................................................................................XIII
S U M M A R Y O F A R G U M E N T S ...................................................................................XVI
B O D Y O F A R G U M E N T S …......................................................................................1-20
-C ON TE N TI ON S -
1. The Applicant State is Responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its Actions
Amounted to State Sponsored Terrorism……………………..………………………………………...1
1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as International terrorism……………………….1
1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in this attack………..1
1.3. In Arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism…..………………………….…..2
1.4. The Applicant state was involved in state-sponsored terrorism………………………………………….2
A. The Applicant state provided “State Support” to the terrorist activities……..………………………..…3
B. The Applicant state provided “State Tolerance” to the terrorist activities…………………………………4
1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of state-sponsored terrorism……4
2. The Applicant State Violated the Duty to Cooperate Assigned by the Binding Security Council
Resolution and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.......................................................................6
2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution.......6
2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII it is yet binding...................6
2.3. The Applicant state violated the doctrine of aut dedre aut judicare...................................................7
3. The arrests during Emergency by the Applicant State was in violation of International Law......8
3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right…………….……………………….8
3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid…………….….8
4. The Changes Brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State Lead to the Suppression of Civil
Liberties which is a Violation of International Law.………………………….……...….............…10

TABLE OF CONTENTS WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
4.1. The Applicant State has an obligation under International Law to provide for civil and political
rights................................................................................................................................................10
4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim………………………….………………………..11
4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility……………………….……………………..…11
-D EF EN C E S -
1. Applicant State’s Claim to Challenge “Effective Economic Blockade” is Inadmissible..............12
1.1. The Applicant state’s claim to challenge the Respondent states economic policy is inadmissible.....12
1.2. Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible , the changed Economic policy is in
compliance with international law.............................................................................................................13
1.3. Arguendo, “Effective Economic Blockade” is justified as Economic Sanctions under International
Law.........................................................................................................................................................14
A. Economic Sanction is a justified response to Increase in Military Expenditure.................................15
B. Economic Sanctions are Justified as a Countermeasure under International Law...........................15
2. The Respondent State is not Responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State..........17
2.1. Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent
State....................................................................................................................................................17
2.2. Arguendo, the Attack is an Act of Self-Defence and Thus in Compliance with International Law...17
A. Exercise of Self-Defence in Response to an armed attack..................................................................17
B. The Respondent State was in a State of ‘Distress’ and ‘Necessity’....................................................18
3. The government of the Respondent State is sovereign and is in compliance with international
law.......................................................................................................................................................19
3.1. The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State........................19
3.2. In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law……….19
4. There is No “Threat of War” by the Respondent State and the Request was a Means to Peacefully
Settle the Situation...................................................................................................................................20
P R A Y E R & C O N C L U S I O N ...................................................................................XVIII

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
1. A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67 6
2. A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth 4

Committee available at http:// www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/html
3. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International 5
Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989)
4. Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631, 14
634-39 (2000)
5. Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57 10
6. Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. “An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in the 20

criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes”, Human Rights
Quarterly, Vol 26, 2004
7. Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83 11
8. American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 9
123
9. Amnesty International, The United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms 2002 15
10. Andre Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 Revue beige 20
de droit international 58, 68 (1984-85)
11. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. 9
Rev. 1823 (2002)
12. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the 1
Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002) 48
13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 11
Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595
14. Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.1751 8
15. Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965) 9
16. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33 11
17. Bassiouni, Cherif, “Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for 20
accountability”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol 59, No 4, 1996
18. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing 19
Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1997-98)
19. British Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 1
20. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. & 1
Op. of Com.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION I

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
21. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931),Further Dec. & Op. of 1
Com, 297, Commission (1922)
22. British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber 1
Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292
23. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. of 3
Com.,p.33
24. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim 3
(1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.100
25. British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926:Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. of 3
Com.,p.20
26. Case of Ireland against the United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978, 12
¶159
27. Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ 6
Rep 163
28. CFE Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 15
I.L.M. 1 (1991), art. XIX, ¶ 2, 30 I.L.M. at 22
29. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly 12, 13,19
resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX)
30. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 6, 15 17, 20
31. Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 3,8,10,13
1953, p.323
32. Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed. 12
2004)
33. Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) 8
No.17, at p.87
34. Commission on Human Security, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, p. 135 15
35. Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991), 7, 12
467-82
36. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 7
Punishment
37. Convention for the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 18
Other Matter (1972), 1046 U.N.T.S. 138
38. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 9
(European Convention on Human Rights) (“ECHR”)
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION II

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
39. Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 1, 17
40. D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123 15
41. David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002) 16
42. David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 6
UN Charter (2001) 6
43. Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. 5
No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970)
44. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 5, 12
Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981)
45. Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General Assembly 1
Resolution 49/60, Adopted 17 February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60.
46. Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum. 10
Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997)
47. Doswald-Beck, Legal Validity; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 19
the Domestic Affairs of States (1965)
48. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 18
U.N. Doc. A/56/10
49. E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal 14
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) at 1166
50. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90 11
51. Elettronica Sicula SpA ( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15 12
52. Emanuel Gross, “Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against Terrorism-- 1
the Israeli Experience” 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161,
53. European Convention on Human Rights 12
54. Exparte Ferhut Butt 116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15 (High Court) and 619 (Court of 12
Appeal)
55. Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8 12
56. Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism 1
of June 2002, Official Journal of the European Committee L 164, 22 June 2002
57. France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralston’s Report, 3
pg.5
58. Free Zones Case (Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J. 8
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION III
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
(Ser. A) No.24
59. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 113 10,16,18
10,16,18
60. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey j. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 14, 15
History and Current Policy 4 (1985) p. 2
61. George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 9
AJIL 541 (2005)
62. Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in United Nations 15
Sanctions and International Law 32 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001)
63. German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7, 8
at p.30
64. Great Britain v. Russia, Report of February 26, 1905, The Hague Court Reports 403 20
(James Brown Scott ed. 1916) cited in international law casebooks
65. Great Venezuelan Railroad Case, 1903, Ven. Arb 632 13
66. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal 5

Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 177, 180-81 (1987)
67. Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 4,18
18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000)
68. Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970) 9
69. Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965) 9
70. I. A. Shearer, Stark’s International Law 31 (1994) 9
71. Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2 7

(1994)
72. ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, 4, 11, 18
(2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10
73. ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009 7
74. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 12
75. Interhandel case, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27 12
76. International Convention for the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1963), 18
327 U.N.T.S 3
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 9,19
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171(“ICCPR”)
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IV

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
78. into force on 1 July 1978 12
79. J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: 10

International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in
Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003)
80. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 9
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999)
81. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on Customary International 11
Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001)
82. Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under 5
International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002)
83. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964) 8
84. John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State- 1
Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002)
85. John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and 4
Economic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989)
86. John Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in Dilemmas of 14
Economic Coercion 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983)
87. Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to 15
Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L.193, 196(Fall 1994)
88. Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian at 39-41 12
89. Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, pg.3 13
90. Keiver, The Pacific Salmon War: The Defense of Necessity Revisited, 21 Dalhousie 18
L.J. 408 (1998)
91. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4, 191-2, 196-201 12
92. Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of 14

Economic Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics 781, 783, 789 (1987)
93. Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J. 2,5
Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987)
94. Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR 533 9
95. Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30 9
96. Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in 6
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION V

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276

(1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 53
97. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 20
Territory, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph
163
98. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226 11
99. Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10 19
100. Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law 9
101. Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in 9

Realism in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen
231 (1986)
102. Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional 1
Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41 (1995)
103. Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law- 1
Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L. Rev. 159, 161 (1986).
104. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and International 7
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii, Rodrigo Yepes- Enríquez & Lisa Tabassi
eds., 2002
105. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented 2
Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83, 91 (2002), at 84.
106. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A 7
Theoretical Framework, ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York:
Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999)
107. Magalidis Case, (1928) 8 T.A.M 386, at 395 8
108. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005) 16
109. Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et 7

Obligation pour les États de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe de l’Universalité,
2000
110. Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueil 9
des Cours 155 (1998)
111. Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262 8
112. Mexican-United States General Claims Com 9
113. Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American 10
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION VI

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op. of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29

114. Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923) 17
115. Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Hatton Case, Op. of Com. 1929, 3
p.6
116. Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Kling Case (1930), Op. of Com. 3
1931, p.36, at p.49
117. Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Melczer Mining Co. Case (1929), 3
Op. of Com. 1929, P.228
118. Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923):Daniel Dillon Case (1928), Op. of 3
Com. 1929, p.61, at p.65
119. Mexico-U.S. Special Claims Commission (1923) 3
120. Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution, Max Planck 6

Yearbook of United Nations Law
121. Michael Walzer, Arguing About War 147 (Yale Univ. Press 2006) 20
122. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 20
Illustrations (Basic Books 4th ed. 2006) (1977) at 81, 85
123. Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits), 14
[1986] ICJ Rep 9,10,12,13,16
, 17
124. Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, in 15
Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 2 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983)
125. Mufson, Sanctions Could Be Two-Edged Sword, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A17, 15
col. 1
126. Namoi Russell Case (1931), Op. of Com. 1926-1931, p.44, at p.88 3
127. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AJIL 321 (1972) 19
128. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human 11
Rights Violations in International Law, (1990) 78 California Law Review 449
129. New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), OAU, NEPAD Doc. (2001) 19
130. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/ 9,10
Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 3
131. Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway), [1957] ICJ Rep 9 11.12
132. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm] 9
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION VII
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
133. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in 10

Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003)
134. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253 10
135. Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 4510 10
136. Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global 10
Health Challenges At Century's Dawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603
137. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10 7
(A/59/10)
138. Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. 2001, pg 382,¶118 19
139. Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 12
140. Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63 8
141. Parker Case, 1926 17
142. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State 11

Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002)
143. Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2 12
144. Portendick Case (1843) 14
145. Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2 UNRIAA, p.101 1
146. Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I. 2
147. Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996) 6
148. Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon, 53 AJIL (1959) 19
149. R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding 7
under Article 25 of the Charter, (1972) 32 ICLQ 269
150. R.A.Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (1968) 19
151. Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), [1987] 23 ILM 1346 18
152. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509- 12
25
153. Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of International Law (1964) 9
154. Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military 15

Expenditures, UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980
155. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987) 10, 11
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION VIII
INDEX OF AUTHORITY
156. Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold 14
War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo
Against Cuba, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l l. 901, 918 (1995)
157. Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force in 18
the New International Order 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.
1991)
158. Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and 1,2,3,4,14
Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [‘Beck &
Clerk’]
159. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 25 (1996) 9
160. Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal 7

Perspective, (Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No.
5, 2002)
161. Rosenne, Law and Practice, vol. 11, pp. 778-82 12
162. Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 12
163. Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale 4
J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999)
164. S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the International Law Commission: 83 5,12
AJIL, 1989, p. 937 Declaration on Inadmissibility
165. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. 5
S/RES/1373 (2001)
166. Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (David Cortright 14
and George A. Lopez eds., 1995)
167. Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001, adopted at the 4370th Meeting on 12th 18
September, 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001)
168. Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All ER 820 19
169. Singh v. Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 3317, ¶16 1
170. Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case 1
(1924), 2 UNRIAA, p.615
171. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law 18
126 (1996) at 188-201 Christine Gray, International law and the use of force 161 (2d
ed. 2004) at 126-29
172. Statute of the ICJ (1945), Art. 38(1)(b) 9
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IX

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
173. Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 6
AGIL 175
174. Stephen M. Schwebel & J. Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local 12
Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966)
175. Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in the United Nations and 14
International Law 279 (Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997)
176. T. Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL, 12
1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the North American Dredging Co. claim, 4 RIAA, p.
26 (1926) 3 AD, p. 4
177. Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801 1
178. The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Mooer Lecture, 34 9
Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984)
179. The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1 All ER 719 19
180. The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7 9
181. The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep 9
42
182. The SS Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10. 9
183. The State (Duggan) v Tapley, [1951] 18 ILR 109 9
184. Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 11

(1986)
185. Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at ¶35. 1
186. Trail Smelter Arbitration, Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.1963 10
187. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United 15
States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503art. XV, ¶ 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3446,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12 on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), June 18,
1979, United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 18 I.L.M. 1112, 1134-35
188. Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962) 9
189. UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980 15
190. United States Code, 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d) (1) 1
191. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979) 7
192. Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital 7
Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000)
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION X

INDEX OF AUTHORITY
193. Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v. 8
Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55
194. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,1969 20
195. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An 11
Economic Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006)
196. Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis, Current Development: The Work 20
of the Sixth Committee At The Forty-Eighth Session of The UN General Assembly,
88 A.J.I.L. 343 (1994)
197. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 161-70 (4th ed. 1981) at 127 19
198. Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167 8
199. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of the 14
Political Economy of International Sanctions, in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft
162 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds. 2000)
200. William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on 5
State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162
201. Wimbeldon Case, (),()1923, PCIJ (Ser. A) No.1 at 37 13
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Ronistan on one side and The Republic of Jotria on the other, have submitted by special
agreement the differences between the states case concerning the blockade on Ronistan by Jotria and the
attacks on Jotrian institutions by the UC and transmitted a copy there of to the registrar of the court pursuant
to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. Therefore both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ
pursuant to article 36(1) of the Statute of the court.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XII
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
-I-
Ronistan and Jotria are both developing countries that share a common history and a common boundary. In
the 75 years of post colonial history, relations between the two countries have by and large been friendly and
the governments of the two nations invested considerable financial and other resources to ensure that the
historical social and economic ties continue.
-II-
Ronistan had a model of local democratic governance wherein its Constitution guaranteed its people (and
indeed, all human beings) a number of rights and civil liberties.
Jotria, on the other hand, had a centralized form of democratic governance and its Constitution also
guaranteed a number of rights and civil liberties to its citizens.
-III-
Historical ties between the two countries, provided that people regularly travelled between the two countries
and Ronistan natural resources (local communities had rights to these resources) were actively sourced by
large businesses in Jotria, in effect creating a situation where payments by Jotrian businesses were made to
local communities feeding local development in Ronistan.
-IV-
Sharian Ami, a Jotrian by birth and Ronistani by residence, created a human network to drive significant
social, economic and most importantly, cultural change and form the HOTWA Political Action Congress
(HPAC), a political party.
-V-
HPAC decided to use a provision in the Ronistan Constitution that in effect transformed Ronistan from a
country of decentralization to a centralized system. Citizens enjoyed absolute rights when it came to
enjoying their cultural and religious freedoms but civil liberties such as free speech and expression could be
suspended by the Government if they felt that it was necessary to protect the overall religious and cultural
fabric of the country. Ronistan quickly ramped up its annual military expenditure to almost 10% of GDP.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XIII
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
-VI-
On the other hand, Ronistan, around 10 years ago went through a massive financial crisis. This affected the
credibility of its political class and using the groundswell of emotion in the country, the military of the
country staged a coup, temporarily suspended the Constitution for a maximum of 6 months.
-VII-
6 months later, the military rulers lifted the suspension of the Constitution and called for elections. The
military supported a number of civilian candidates in these elections; most won and formed a government.
-VIII-
The government of Jotria did not have a favourable view of the developments in Ronistan and decided to de-
focus the long term cultural ties between the nations and worked to move away from their economic
dependence on the natural resources of Ronistan which was termed as an "effective economic blockade" of
the country by Ronistan.
-IX-
Jotria merely maintained that they had the right to take decisions in their economic national interests and
believed that "the cocktail of religion, culture and a military in Ronistan" compelled them to take such a
decision.
-X-
All of this lead Sharian Ami decided to use the emergency provisions of the Constitution and arrested a
number of people in the country (including leaders of the opposition and a number of Jotrian citizens) in
order to "protect the basic structure of Ronistan, the religious and cultural freedom of its people and their
way of life".
-XI-
In August 2007, Sharian Ami retired from active politics and his successor Darsh Panikhet took over. Darsh
was famous in Ronistan for a simple political slogan: "Destroy Jotrian economic imperialism." He gave
financial support to a number of popular social, economic and cultural groups including a group popularly
known as UC. UC believed that Ronistan's success as a country was inversely proportional to the success of
Jotria.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XIV
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
-XII-
After a series of violent attacks on Jotrian institutions (its Supreme Court and Parliament), UC’s Leadership
Council openly announced that they had knowledge that these attacks would take place but disclaimed any
specific involvement in the actual attacks
-XIII-
Certain allegations were made against UC for the attacks by Jotria and international community. The Prime
Minister of Jotria announced that based on its investigations, it had declared UC as a terrorist group. He
called upon Ronistan to arrest and handover the UC leadership within 72 hours, the failure of which would
be considered an act of war by Ronistan to which Darsh Panikhet reacted immediately and said that he was
powerless to act in the absence of any specific evidence linking UC to these attacks and that he would be
willing to act if he was provided evidence.
-XIV-
The 72 hour deadline passed after which due to involvement of international community, the Security
Council passed a resolution asking Ronistan to cooperate with Jotria in every way possible and called upon
Jotria to exhaust all means available for a peaceful resolution.
-XV-
24 hours later, in a bizarre incident, a public rally (being held by the UC Leadership Council to protest
against the "war mongering actions of Jotria") was bombed and the half the leadership of the Council were
killed. UC immediately announced that Jotria was behind the attacks based on unconfirmed sightings of
Jotrian military personnel crossing the borders of the two nations a few hours earlier.
-XVI-
Darsh Panikhet also made an announcement that Jotria had violated the territorial integrity of Ronistan and
that the attack on the public rally amounted to an armed attack on Ronistan.
-XVII-
Fearing that war was inevitable, the Security Council passed a resolution asking the parties to resolve
matters expeditiously and in a peaceful manner. On the intervention of the Secretary General of the United
Nations, the leadership of Jotria and Ronistan decided to submit the dispute before International Court of
Justice.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XV

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
CONTENTIONS
1. The Applicant State is responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its actions amounted
to State sponsored terrorism.
The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism. Appreciation of
circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack .In arguendo, the UC group
aided and abetted international terrorism. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism.
The Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities. The Applicant State provided “State
tolerance” to the terrorist activities. Thus State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for State-
sponsored terrorism.
2. The Applicant State has violated the duty to co-operate assigned by the binding Security Council
resolution and has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.
The Security Council resolution asking is a resolution under Chapter VII. Thus it was a binding resolution.
Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding. The Applicant
State has also violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare i.e. the principle which provides that the State
was under an obligation either to prosecute or extradite.
3. The arrests of citizens of the Respondent State and other citizens during emergency by the Applicant
State were in violation of international law.
The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right.The emergency was declared in violation of
international law and hence was not valid. Thus, arrests were not justified.
4. The changes brought into the Constitution of the Applicant State lead to the suppression of civil
liberties which is a violation of international law.
The Applicant State has an obligation under international law to provide for civil and political rights.The
Respondent State has a right to bring this claim.Violation of this obligation entails State responsibility.
DEFENSES
1. Applicant State’s claim to challenge “effective economic blockade” is inadmissible.
The Applicant State’s claim to challenge the Respondent State’s economic policy is inadmissible.Assuming
but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in compliance with
international law. Arguendo, “effective economic blockade” is justified as economic sanctions under
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XVI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
international law as Economic Sanction is a justified response to increase in military expenditure and
Economic Sanctions are justified as a countermeasure under international law.
2. Respondent State is not responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State.
Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State.
In Arguendo, the attack is an act of self-defence and thus in compliance with international law.
Exercise of self-defence is in response to an armed attack.The Respondent State was in a state of ‘distress’
and ‘necessity’ so as to justify self-defence.
3. The government of Sovereign State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law.
The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State.
In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law.
4. There is no “threat of war” by the Respondent State and the request was a means to peacefully settle
the situation in accordance with the well-settled principle of international law.
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION XVII
CONTENTION I
THE APPLICANT STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AS
ITS ACTIONS AMOUNTED TO STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM.
It is the humble submission of the Respondent State before this Hon’ble Court that the UC group was
involved in international terrorism and by supporting and tolerating its activities the Applicant State
undertook state sponsored terrorism.
1.1. The attacks in the Respondent State can be classified as international terrorism.
If the core of war crimes is extended to peacetime, acts of terrorism may simply be defined as peacetime
equivalents of war crimes.1 Keeping this in mind, along with definitions of various States2 and UN
resolutions,3 international terrorism incorporates four elements4: (1) use of force or threat of force, (2) in an
attempt to cause fear, (3) to bring about a political objective, and (4) targeting of civilians.5
1.2. Appreciation of circumstantial evidence proves the involvement of the UC group in the attack.
The instant case in an apt example, where circumstantial evidence should be taken into consideration by this
Hon’ble Court. In cases where direct evidence of fact is not available, it is a general principle of law that
proof may be administered by means of circumstantial evidence.6 Many a times in disputes of international
character, exclusive territorial control exercised by one State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the
method of proof available to the victim State to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. It has
been held by this Hon’ble Court that such a victim State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to

1
Singh v. Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 3317, ¶16.
2
United States Code, 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d) (1); British Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, at Part 20; Framework
Decision of the Council of the European Union on Combating Terrorism of June 2002, Official Journal of the
European Committee L 164, 22 June 2002; Emanuel Gross, “Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against
Terrorism--the Israeli Experience” 35 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, at p.1165
3
Declaration on the Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Adopted 17
February 1995, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60.
4
Tomuschat Report prepared by Christian Tomuschat, at ¶35.
5
Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and Forcible State Responses to
Terrorism, 12 Wis. Int'l L.J. 153, 162 (1994) [‘Beck & Clerk’]; John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State's Response to
Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law
and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter Framework, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002); 48; Louis Rene Beres,
The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 240-41
(1995); Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 Naval L.
Rev. 159, 161 (1986).
6
Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 [‘Corfu Channel Case’]; British-Mexican Claims
Commission (1926): Mcneill Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.96, at pg.100; British-Mexican Claims
Commission (1926):The Sonora (Mexico) Plant and Timber Co. Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com., pg.292, at
pg. 296; British-Mexican Claims Commission (1926):2 Case (1931), Further Dec. & Op. of Com, pg. 297, at pg. 298;
Hague Commission of Inquiry: The Tubantia (1922) 2 H.C.R., p.135; Germany-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission
(1922): Taft Case (1926), Dec. & Op., p.801; Portugo-German Arbitration (1919): The Cysne Case (1930), 2
UNRIAA, p.1011, at p.1056; Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (1923): Claim I: Rzini (Tetuan Orchards) Case (1924),
2 UNRIAA, p.615, at p.654
DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 1
CONTENTION I BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
inferences of facts and circumstantial evidences.7 It is an admitted position that it would be going too far for
an international court, in such situations, to insist on direct and visual evidence and to refuse to admit, after
reflection, a reasonable amount of human presumption with a view of reaching that state of certainty with
which a Court of Justice must be content.8
1.3. In arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism.
The actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance,
encouragement or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.9 Moreover,
such assistance ‘need not constitute an indispensable element that is a condition sine qua non, for the acts of
the principle.’10
It is not necessary for an accomplice to share the mens rea, that is ‘knowledge of the assistance he was
providing in the commission of the actual offense’11, of the perpetrator, in the sense of a positive intention to
commit the crime. Instead, the threshold requirement is merely that the accomplice has knowledge that his
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.12
1.4. The Applicant State was involved in State-sponsored terrorism.
It is contended in the present case that the Applicant State provided state support and state tolerance. Non-
state actors carry out "State-sponsored terrorism" with the support, tolerance or sponsorship of a State
government.13 State sponsorship of terrorism can range from a State being directly behind the terrorist
attacks, to less direct State involvement such as providing training, financing or support one way or another,
to even less direct State involvement by "tolerating", while not specifically supporting or approving, a
particular terrorist group. Using a State's territory as a location from which to launch terrorist attacks is
something that, if tolerated, suggests that the State involved has, in effect, aided and abetted the terrorist
group by looking the other way.14

7
Supra [6]
8
Supra [6]
9
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T (ICTY, Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) [ ‘Furundzija’];
Prosecutor v. Musema, IT-96-13-A (ICTR, Jan. 27, 2000) [‘Musema’]; Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I.
10
Ibid.
11
Musema, Ibid., p.181
12
Furundzija, Supra [9].
13
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83,
91 (2002), at 84.
14
Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 289, 298 (1987) [‘Keneth’].
A. The Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities.
It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State is responsible for providing “State support” to UC Group.
"State support" requires a less significant level of assistance than sponsorship, but includes supply of
intelligence, weapons, diplomatic assets, funds, or rhetorical endorsement.15 Sometimes in view of its
particular nature, conclusive proof of certain fact is impossible. All that a court can reasonably require in the
way of proof in such cases, is prima facie evidence sufficient to satisfy the court, leaving it open to the
respondent State to rebut the presumptions by producing evidence to the contrary.16 In case where proof of a
fact presents extreme difficulty, a tribunal may thus be satisfied with less conclusive proof, which is prima
facie evidence.17 If the Judges acting as reasonable man of the world and bearing in minds the fact of human
nature, do feel convinced that a particular event occurred or state of affairs existed, they should accept such
things established.18 The absence of evidence in rebuttal is an essential consideration in the admission of
prima facie evidence.19 The non-production of countervailing evidence may be taken into account in
weighing evidence before a court,20 and in an appropriate case a reasonable adverse inference can be drawn
from such a non-production of evidence.21 A claimant’s case should not necessarily suffer by the non-
production of evidence by respondent.22 While it is an admitted position that it is not a function of the
respondent government to make a case for the claimant government, certain adverse inferences, could be
drawn from such a non-production of evidence, solely in the possession of the former.23 Where counter
proof can be easily produced but its non-production is not satisfactorily explained, it may be assumed that
such evidence as could have been produced on this point would not have refuted the charge in relation
thereto.24 It is a general principle of law that the situation, as established, by prima facie evidence, coupled
with adverse presumption arising from the non-production of available counter evidence, is sufficient to
create a moral conviction of truth of an allegation.25 Thus, evidence produced by one party in litigation may

15
Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 165
16
British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926:Lynch Case (1929), Dec. & Op. of Com.,p.20 [‘Lynch Case’]
17
Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 1953, p.323 [‘Cheng’]
18
British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926); Mexico City Bombardment Claim (1930),Dec. & Op. of Comm., p.100
19
Lynch Case, Supra [16]; British-Mexico Claims Commission (1926):Cameroon Case (1929) Dec. & Op. of
Com.,p.33
20
France-Venzuela Mixed Claims Commission (1902): Burn Case, Ralston’s Report, pg.5
21
Mexico-U.S. Special Claims Commission (1923): Namoi Russell Case (1931), Op. of Com. 1926-1931, p.44, at p.88
22
Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Kling Case (1930), Op. of Com. 1931, p.36, at p.49
23
Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Hatton Case, Op. of Com. 1929, p.6
24
Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923): Melczer Mining Co. Case (1929), Op. of Com. 1929, P.228
25
Mexico-U.S. General Claims Commission (1923):Daniel Dillon Case (1928), Op. of Com. 1929, p.61, at p.65
be supported by legal presumptions, which arise from the non-production of information exclusively in
possession of another party.26
In the present case there is prima facie evidence that the Applicant State provided financial aid to the UC
Group. Though there is no evidence regarding the knowledge of the Applicant State as to the activities of the
UC Group the same can established by prima facie evidence of financial aid coupled with the non-
production of countervailing evidence of lack of knowledge by the Applicant State. Thus, it is established
that the Applicant State provided “State support” to the terrorist activities.
B. The Applicant State provided “State tolerance” to the terrorist activities.
It is submitted that the complete absence of State action by the Applicant State against the UC Group, even
after the attacks in the Respondent State, makes it evident that the Applicant state provided “State tolerance”
to the terrorist activities. If the host government has no interest in controlling terrorists under its jurisdiction,
the failure to respond could be construed as state sponsorship.27 "State toleration" recognizes an even weaker
level of involvement, existing when the State acquiesces to the terrorist group's presence without providing
sponsorship or support.28 A host government also engages in State-sponsored terrorism where it merely
tolerates the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist attacks and refuses requests to shut down those
operations when it could do so.29 The State tolerates the terrorists operating as such within its borders by
making no effort to arrest or oust them, although it does not actively support them. By not ejecting or
arresting the terrorists, the State is enabling them to carry on their activities.30
1.5. State responsibility is assigned to the Applicant State for this act of State-sponsored terrorism.
Regardless of the limitation imposed by the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, 2001, general international law principles of State responsibility provide that States assume
responsibility for all violations of international law.31 Therefore, where States violate primary international
law, such as the U.N. Charter, they may be held responsible for sponsorship and support of terrorism under

26
Ibid
27
A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth Committee available at http://
www.un.org/law/cod/terroris/htm; John F. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and
Economic Dimensions, 32-33 (Westview Press) (1989).
28
Beck & Clerk, Supra [5]; at 165
29
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 559, 565 (1999).
30
Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 144, 150 (2000)
[‘Travalio’].
31
ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, (2001), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [ILC
Articles] Article 1
traditional principles of State responsibility.32
Resolution 1373,33 prohibits States from providing terrorists with financial support or protection, and
furthermore creates State accountability for acquiescence to a terrorist organization's presence within a
State's borders.34 In Resolution 748, the U.N. Security Council recognized that State support of terrorism
presents a threat to international peace and security and stated that in accordance with the principle in UN
Charter,35 every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts.36 Thus, the international community now recognizes accountability extending to a
State whose involvement is limited to tacit approval of terrorist activity within its borders.37
In the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 38 applying the principle that a State's demonstration of force, in
any form of aggression,39 violates both international law and the U.N. Charter,40 and creates responsibility
under international law,41 to terrorism, the U.N. concluded that international law imposes a duty on States to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.42 U.N. Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States acknowledges the
duty of a State to prevent the use of its territory as a means to threaten the integrity of another State and
creates State accountability for State provision of territory to terrorist organizations. It also outlaws all State
sponsorship, support, and tolerance, for terrorism. 43 Thus, it identified State action supporting terrorism as a
violation of the U.N. Charter.44

32
Ibid, Article 55
33
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
34
William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 105, 107-08 (2002), at 162.
35
Article 2(4)
36
S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); Kenneth Supra [14]
37
Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 559, 582 (2002); at 579
38
Declaration on Friendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625
(1970) [‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’].
39
Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the
National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 98 (1989), at 93.
40
Supra [38]
41
Ibid
42
Supra [38]
43
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981) [‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility’].
44
Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.
177, 180-81 (1987)., at 195
CONTENTION II
THE APPLICANT STATE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO COOPERATE ASSIGNED BY THE BINDING
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE.
2.1. The Security Council resolution being a resolution under Chapter VII was a binding resolution.
It is humbly submitted that the measures taken by the Security Council (“SC”) under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, fall under the category of binding decisions.45 Under Article 24 of U.N. Charter, SC has the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by virtue of which it can impose on
States an explicit obligation of compliance by issuing an order or command under Chapter VII. Such
measures are binding upon all the parties and require them to cease the happening of such events.46 The
resolutions passed under Chapter VII by SC are issued once it has determined the existence of any threat to
peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression.47
The concept of threat to peace and security is a political concept. The determination of threat to peace
requires more than mere normative considerations; it necessitates an analysis of political realities.48 The
understanding of what constitutes a threat to peace is broadened considerably from the narrow concept of the
absence of the use of armed force to the wider concept of the situation that may lead to use of armed force.49
In cases where SC does not mention the chapter under which a resolution is passed, interpretation is
required.50 One of the sources of interpretation of SC resolution is the circumstance of its adoption.51
2.2. Assuming but not conceding that the resolution was not under Chapter VII, it is yet binding.
Article 25 of the Charter, states that the members of the U.N. agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the SC in accordance with the Charter.52 It has been settled by ICJ that Article 25 of the Charter applies to
other parts besides Chapter VII of the Charter.53 The interpretation that limits the domain of binding
decisions to those decisions taken under Chapter VII would render Article 25 superfluous.54 Therefore, it is
necessary to look at the wordings and context of a resolution and not the chapter it is issued under, in order

45
David Schewigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (2001)
[‘Schewigman’]
46
Certain Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, (1962) ICJ Rep 163
47
Article 39, UN Charter
48
Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996)
49
Stefan Talmon, Note and Comment: The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AGIL 175
50
Schewigman, Supra [45]
51
Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law
52
UN Charter, Article 25.
53
Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ Rep 113 at 53
54
Ibid.; A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67
CONTENTION II BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
to determine whether SC intended to issue a decision or recommendation.55 The language of the SC
resolution should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In order to
determine as to whether the power under Article 25 have in fact been exercised regard must be given to all
circumstances that led to the resolution of the SC.56
2.3. The Applicant State violated the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.
It is humbly submitted that Applicant State’s inaction against UC constitutes a violation of the customary
principle aut dedere aut judicare. A State must investigate any allegation that there is a person in its territory
who has committed the offence and, if the circumstances so warrant, ensure the person’s presence for the
purpose of extradition or prosecution.57 This principle of aut dedere aut judicare is a universally recognized
principle and provides an obligation on a State either to extradite or prosecute the offender.58 Under this rule,
a State is required either to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with principles of international law for a
person suspected of terrorism or to extradite the person to a State able and willing to do so.59 The essential
principle on which this doctrine rests is that an alleged offender should not find safe haven in the territory of
any State. 60 If detaining State does not extradite, it is under an obligation ‘without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its own authorities for the
purpose of prosecution.’61
This principle of aut dedere aut judicare aims to eliminate any hiding place in the territory of any of the
parties for persons accused of terrorism.62 The requirement is not to prosecute but ‘to submit the case to its
own authorities for the purpose of prosecution’.

55
R. Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are binding under Article 25 of the Charter,
(1972) 32 ICLQ 269
56
Supra, [53]
57
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, at vii,
Rodrigo Yepes- Enríquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002
58
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No.10 (A/59/10) para.362.
59
ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009; Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de
l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et Obligation pour les États de Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe
de l’Universalité, 2000; Article 7, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework,
ed., International Criminal Law 3, 5 (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2nd. ed. 1999).
60
Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham
Int'l L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000).
61
Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal Perspective, (Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for
Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2002)
62
ILC Report on aut dedere aut judicare, Amnesty International Publications, 2009; United States v. Columba-Colella,
604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2
(1994).
CONTENTION III
THE ARRESTS DURING EMERGENCY BY THE APPLICANT STATE WAS IN VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right.
It is humbly submitted that the Applicant State has fictitiously exercised its sovereign right under the cloak
of emergency declaration. The principle of good faith is considered to be the foundation of all laws.63 The
principle of good faith ought to govern international relations.64 It cannot be that good faith is less obligatory
upon nations that upon individuals in carrying out agreements.65
A State must fulfil its obligations bona fide.66 Good faith thus governs the exercise of rights. These rights
must not be exercised fictitiously so to evade such obligations or rules of law, or maliciously so as to injure
others. Violations of these requirements of the principle of good faith constitute abuse of rights, prohibited
by law.67 The principle of good faith requires every right to be exercised honestly and loyally. Any fictitious
exercise of right for the purpose of evading a rule of law is not tolerated under international law. Such an
exercise constitutes an abuse of right, prohibited by law.68 Ex re sed non ex nomin is a principle of good
faith.69 This principle inter alia precludes the form of law from being used to cover the commission of what
in fact is an unlawful act. If international law prescribes certain rights to a State, which can be exercised
under certain circumstances for a specific purpose, it is not permissible for that State to exercise such a right
under the pretext of that purpose, to achieve a completely distinct unlawful purpose.70 Such an exercise of
right would lead to invasion of law amounting to fictitious exercise of right constituting an abuse of rights
and thus violating the principle of good faith.71
3.2. The emergency was declared in violation of international law and hence was not valid.
It is well established that there are two essential elements of custom in international law, namely, State
practice and opinio juris sevi necessitates72. For this purpose, practice must be general, and not completely

63
Magalidis Case, (1928) 8 T.A.M 386, at 395
64
Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (1904) (Germany, Great Britain, Italy v. Venezuela et al), 1 H.C.R 55,at p.60
65
Metzger & Co. Case (U.S. v Haiti), 1901 U.S.F.R 262, at 271
66
Award (1937) 3 UNRIAA p. 1719, at p.1751
67
German Interests Case (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.7, at p.30; Free Zones Case
(Second Phase): Order (France v. Switzerland), (1930) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.24, at p.12
68
Cheng, Supra [17], p.123
69
Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) (Germany v. Poland), (1928) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No.17, at p.87 [‘Chorzow Factory
Case’]
70
Ibid
71
Walter F. Smith Case, (1929) P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 46, at p.167; Oscar Chinl Case (Belgium v. U.K.), (1934)
P.C.I.J.(Ser. A/B) No. 63, at p.86
72
Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 226 (1964).
CONTENTION III BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
universal, in order to constitute an international custom.74 Passage of time is not critical.75 Thus, a practice
73
does not have to be observed as law, either tacitly or expressly, by every State.76 Further, in order for State
practice to constitute the necessary opinio juris, the acts concerned must amount to settled practice coupled
with the evidence of the belief that it is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.77
This subjective element can be deduced from various sources including the conclusion of bilateral and
multilateral treaties.78 The concept of "derogation", which means that States could legally suspend their
obligation to respect and enforce the rights contained in the human right convention during times of war,
was extended to “other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” only in 1950.79 All the three
leading instruments i.e. ECHR, the introducer of the concept; ACHR and the ICCPR, prescribe, broadly
speaking, inter alia, two procedural restrictions, on the use of emergency powers.80 These treaties are signed
and ratified by majority of the nations. All the nations therefore recognise these controls over State
emergency and thus these controls constitute a part of customary international law. The procedural controls
relevant in the present situation is a requirement that the details of such emergency, as well as the precise
nature of any derogations involved, must be notified to all states through a prescribed authority or atleast to
the State which will be affected by the derogation.81

73
Nicaragua, Ibid, at 98; Restatement of Foreign Relation Laws of the United States § 102 cmt. c (1987) [Restatement].
74
George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AJIL 541 (2005); Maurice
Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 Recueil des Cours 155 (1998); Robert Jennings and
Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 25 (1996)[ Oppenheim] ; I. A. Shearer, Stark’s International Law 31
(1994).
75
Restatement, Supra [73], Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in Realism
in Law-Making: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem Riphagen 231 (1986) ; Louis B. Sohn, Speech: The
Law of the Sea: Customary International Law; The American University Washington College of Law Edwin A Mooer
Lecture, 34 Am.U.L.Rev. 271(1984).
76
Triska and Sussler, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (1962); Ramudo, The (Soviet) Socialist Theory of
International Law (1964); Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965); Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965);
Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970).
77
North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.] 6, pp. 3, 44; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not
defined.], at 109; The Rights of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Portugal v India), [1966] ICJ Rep 42; The SS
Lotus Case (France v Turkey), [1972] PCIJ Rep Series A No. 10.
78
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm]; Lagos v Baggianini, [1955] 22 ILR
533 at 536-7; Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30; The State (Duggan) v Tapley,
[1951] 18 ILR 109; The Italian National Re-extradition Case, [1970] 70 ILR 374 at 376-7; North Sea, Supra [Error!
Bookmark not defined.], at 25; Nicaragua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.].
79
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human
Rights) (“ECHR”); American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123 (“ACHR”);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171(“ICCPR”)
80
ICCPR, Article 4; ACHR, Article 27; ECHR, Article 15.
81
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) ;
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002)
CONTENTION IV
THE CHANGES BROUGHT INTO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE APPLICANT STATE LEAD TO THE
SUPPRESSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
It is humbly submitted that the sovereign right of the Applicant State does not give it the right to violate
international norms. The interdependence of rights and obligations applies not only to treaty obligations but
also to obligations derived from general law. Every right is subject to such limitations as are necessary to
render it compatible both with the parties’ contractual obligation and with their obligations under general
law.82 In this sense, rights can no longer be regarded as absolute,83 but are essentially related.84 The principle
of good faith by recognising their independence harmonises rights and obligations of every person as well as
within legal order as a whole.85
4.1. The Applicant State has an obligation under International Law to provide for civil and political rights
International obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law.86 The delineation of
civil and political rights as "first generation human rights" has become standard terminology.87 Through
treaty and customary international law, first generation human rights are binding on all nation-states.88 First-
generation rights are negative rights, or "immunity claims" by citizens towards the State, in the sense that
they limit the power of a government to protect peoples' rights against its power. They relate to the sanctity
of the individual and his rights within the socio-political milieu in which he is located. They imply that no
government or society should act against individuals in certain ways that would deprive them of inherent
political or personal rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and security of person, freedom of speech,
press, assembly, and religion.89 First generation human rights are superior to economic, social, and cultural
rights i.e. second-generation human rights.90 Though human rights, second-generation rights are considered

82
Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op.
of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29; Trail Smelter Arbitration, Award 2 (1941), 1935 UNRIAA, p. 1905, at p.1963
83
Ibid, at p.29; Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57, at 79
84
Cheng, Supra [17], p.132
85
Ibid
86
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253; Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 457 [collectively referred as “Nuclear Test Cases”] ; North Sea, Supra [Error! Bookmark not
defined.] at pp. 38-39, para. 63; Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.].
87
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 113 [Gabcikovo];
88
Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1997);
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987)
89
J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-
State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa, 18 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 851, 852 (2003); Nsongurua J.
Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1224 (2003).
90
Obijio for Aginam , Global Village, Divided World: South-North Gap And Global Health Challenges At Century's
Dawn, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 603.
CONTENTION IV BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
secondary in order of their importance for protection by and against the State.91 Thus there is an
unconditional obligation on the Respondent State to provide for first-generation human rights.
4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim.
All States are entitled to invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations to the international community as
a whole.92 First generation human rights, because of its negative character, represent commitment to the
entire international community by each State because all the States have an interest in the former they are
obligations erga omnes, thus making them a proper subject for international concern and justifying sanctions
and initiation of proceedings by other States, individually and collectively, for violations thereof.93 The ICJ
and ILC have also considered first generation human rights as peremptory norms of International Law.94
Thus the Respondent State though not an Injured State has a right to assign responsibility.
4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility.
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with
what is required of it by that obligation.95 Violation of an unequivocally recognised norm of customary
international law being a legal obligation will constitute an internationally wrongful act.96 State
responsibility entails for such an internationally wrongful act.97 Further the Applicant State cannot preclude
this wrongfulness because nothing precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.98
The fact that the constitutional amendments made in the Applicant State gave them the right to usurp civil
liberties show that their actions were in violation of international law and thus entails responsibility.

91
Theodore Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1986)
92
ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 48
93
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33 [‘Barcelona Traction’]; Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, (1990)
78 California Law Review 449.
94
Barcelona Traction, Ibid , at p. 32, para. 34. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, at p. 102,
para. 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at p. 258, para. 83;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections,
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, at pp. 615-616, paras. 31-32.
95
ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 12
96
Restatement, Supra [73]; Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation Theories: An Economic
Analysis, 2 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 201 (2006); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on
Customary International Law, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 191 (2001); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States:
International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 839 (2002).
97
ILC Articles, Supra [31],, Art. 1 r/w Art. 28 r/w Art. 33; Ambateilos Arbitration (Greece v UK), [1956] 12 RIAA 83;
Barcelona Traction, Supra [93], [1970] ICJ Rep 4; Norwegian Loans Case (France v Norway), [1957] ICJ Rep 9
[Norwegian].
98
ILC Articles, Supra [31]1,Article 26.
DEFENCE I
APPLICANT STATE’S CLAIM TO CHALLENGE “EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE” IS

INADMISSIBLE.
1.1. The Applicant State’s claim to challenge the Respondent State’s economic policy is inadmissible.
It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Applicant State’s claim to challenge the “effective
economic blockade” imposed by the Respondent State over Applicant State should be held inadmissible on
the grounds of non-exhaustion of local remedies.99
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies is a customary principle of international law,100 which provides that
all local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted.101 The rule of
exhaustion of local remedies in such cases poses a question of admissibility.102 It has been stated that matters
within the domestic jurisdiction 'as determined by' that particular State are automatically excluded from the
purview of the international tribunals.103 Respect for State sovereignty provides a principal rationale for the
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.104 Matters within the competence of States under general
international law are said to be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction of the States.105 It has
been held by this Hon’ble Court that every State has the sovereign right to choose freely, their political,
economic, social and cultural systems and the formulation of foreign policy.106 Thus, the matters, such as
framing of economic policy fall within the well-established internal framework of a nation. Thus any claim
with respect to it should be dealt at first by domestic courts of Respondent State.

99
Article 79, Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 and entered
into force on 1 July 1978
100
Elettronica Sicula SpA ( E L S I ) Case (U.S. v. Italy) Case, ICJ Reports, 1989, p, 15; Stephen M. Schwebel & J.
Gillis Wetter, Arbitration and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 484, 500 (1966)
101
Interhandel case, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27; Pleadings, Israel v. Bulgaria, ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 531-2, and T.
Meron, 'The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies', 25 BYIL, 1959, p. 95. Note, in addition, the
North American Dredging Co. claim, 4 RIAA, p. 26 (1926); 3 AD, p. 4; Exparte Ferhut Butt 116 ILR, pp. 607, 614-15
(High Court) and 619 (Court of Appeal); Article 35, European Convention on Human Rights; Article 46, Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights; Article 5, Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and Article 295 of the Law of the Sea Convention;
102
Fawcett, 31 BY (1954), 452-8; Judge Lauterpacht, Sep. Op., Norwegian, Supra[97] at 39-41; Case of Ireland against
the United Kingdom, ECHR: ILR 58, 190, Judgment, 1978, ¶159.
103
Rosenne, Law and Practice, vol. 11, pp. 778-82.
104
Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 200 (2d ed. 2004)
105
Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (2nd Edn., 1961),pp. 407-48, 509-25; Conforti, Bedjaoui (ed.),
International Law: Achievements and Perspectives (1991), 467-82; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, pp. 62-4,
191-2, 196-201.
106
Nicaragua Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.] at pp. 14, 108; S. McCaffrey, 'The Forty-First Session of the
International Law Commission: 83 AJIL, 1989, p. 937; Declaration on Inadmissibility, Supra [43], p. 1021; Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted in General Assembly resolution 1974 3281 (XXIX) [Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties]
DEFENCE I BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
1.2. Assuming but not conceding that the claim is admissible, the changed economic policy is in
compliance with international law.
It is humbly submitted that economic decision taken by Respondent State is targeted to protect the interest of
the nation in light of huge economic loss suffered by it.107 It is often difficult to differentiate between the
normal economic controls that a State exercises over its economy and economic sanctions designed to
coerce a foreign State.108 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its
sovereignty.109 State control over its domestic economy is an accepted exercise of its sovereignty.110 Every
State has a duty to decide such economic goal and to take such measures which are in its best interests and
lead to the development of the nation.111
The right of a State to adopt the course which it considers best suited to the exigencies of its security and to
the maintenance of its integrity is a very essential right.112 This right possessed by all the nations, which is
based on generally accepted usage, cannot lose its raison d’être, simply because it may in some cases be
abused.113 The overriding interest of self-preservation of State has been considered mutadis mutandis and
invoked by international tribunals as the principle of solus populi suprema lex esto.114 This well known
maxim is regarded as one of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, within the
contemplation of Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute.115 When an act of self-preservation is carried out by
the State in territory subject to its authority, forms part of the territorial application of the principle of self-
preservation which is distinct from the commonly applied external application of the principle of self-
preservation.116 In the former case, the principle of solus populi suprema lex esto permits the welfare and
security of the nation as a whole to override the rights and interests of aliens.117 With regard to international
obligation the right of a State to adopt measures necessary to ensure welfare and security of the community
in exceptional circumstances cannot be considered as being impaired even by general provision contained in

107
Para 9, Compromis
108
Andre Beirlaen, Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstances, 18 Revue beige de droit international 58, 68
(1984-85) [Beirlaen]
109
Justin D. Stalls, Economic Sanctions, 11 U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, pg.3
110
Ibid
111
Nicaragua Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at pp. 14, 108;Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, Supra
[106]
112
Wimbeldon Case, (),()1923, PCIJ (Ser. A) No.1 at 37
113
Ibid, at 36
114
Cheng, Supra [17], p.30; Great Venezuelan Railroad Case, 1903, Ven. Arb.,, p.632
115
Cheng Ibid, p.31
116
Ibid
117
Ibid
treaties.118 For welfare and safety of the community, a State is permitted to adopt a variety of measures
appropriate to the needs and circumstances of the case, even though such measures may amount to an
encroachment upon private rights, which ordinarily must be respected. The determinations of existence of
the need and the methods best calculated to meet the contingencies are, however, left to the discretion of the
State.119 International tribunals only require the State to proof the existence of the contingencies warranting
the exercise of this discretion.120
1.3. In Arguendo, “Effective Economic Blockade” is justified as Economic Sanctions under international
law.
It is humbly submitted that the “effective economic blockade” imposed by Respondent State over Applicant
State, if considered as economic sanctions, are justified as a tool to protect the human rights and control
military expenses.
It is well settled that customary international law does not prohibit economic sanctions.121 In a program of
unilateral economic sanctions, the sending State determines whether the economic sanctions are justified or
not.122 A violation of international law is a justification for the enactment of economic sanctions, which can
be take any shape.123 When a State violates international law, other States may act like an international
police force and attempt to enforce the law.124 Modern economic sanctions are defined as economic
measures taken by the sending State against the target State to persuade a change in the policies and
practices of the target States that are not in compliance with international law.125 States have endeavoured to
protect human rights and to halt excessive military expenses through the use of economic sanctions.126

118
Portendick Case (1843)
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality
and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 918 (1995)
122
Beirlaen, Supra [108], p. 63; William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenber, A Public Choice Analysis of the Political
Economy of International Sanctions, in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft 162 (Steven Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds.
2000)
123
Stephen Zamora, Economic Relations and Development, in the United Nations and International Law 279
(Christopher C. Joyner ed. 1997)
124
Beirlaen, Supra [108], p. 58, 62
125
Refer Contention IV; E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987) at 1166[Carter]; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey j. Schott, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 4 (1985) p. 2 [‘Hufbauer and Schott’]; Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and
Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of Economic Sanctions, 19 New York University Journal of International
Law and Politics 781, 783, 789 (1987); John Galtung, On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in
Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 17, 19 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983); Sanctions: Panacea or
Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (David Cortright and George A. Lopez eds., 1995); Adam Packer, Nuclear
Proliferation in South Asia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 631, 634-39 (2000).
126
Hufbauer and Schott, Ibid, at 6
Taken as a whole, these expanded objectives show that sending States have begun to use economic sanctions
to enforce legal norms.127 Considering economic measures as illegal only because of their inflicting damage
upon another State can hardly be accepted since all economics are competitive.128 Perhaps the use of
economic sanctions merely demonstrates that there are no better alternative means available to the policy
makers of sending States.129
A. Economic Sanction is a justified response to increase in Military Expenditure.
It is humbly put worth before this Hon’ble Court that economic sanction are a response to the threat posed a
sudden increase in the military expenditure by the Applicant State. Every UN member is under an obligation
to reduce its military expenditure with a view to reduce armament and promote development.130 Instrument
for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures provides that the military expenditure in a
country should not exceed 10% of the total expenditure in a fiscal year.131 National security interests
continue to motivate policy makers to implement economic sanctions and to change their economic
policies.132 A State may typically withdraw from an arms regime when its supreme national interests have
been or are expected to be jeopardized by developments related to arms and military.133 Economic sanctions
or other international pressures have proved beneficial to check the disarmament on the targeted State.134
B. Economic Sanctions are justified as a countermeasure under international law.
It is humbly submitted that even if the economic sanctions imposed by the Respondent State are not in
conformity with the international law, they are justified as a countermeasure, since international law justifies
an act of countermeasure in such cases. Wrongfulness of an act is precluded if and to the extent that it
constitutes a countermeasure.135 A lawful countermeasure can be taken in response to a prior wrongful act

127
Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in United Nations Sanctions and International
Law 32 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001); Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT: Does the United Nations' Use of Collective
Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.193, 196(Fall
1994)
128
Beirlaen, Supra [108], pp. 68-69
129
D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123; Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion
and Foreign Policy, in Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 2 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds. 1983)
130
UNGA Resolution 25/142B in 1980
131
Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, UNGA Resolution
25/142B in 1980; Commission on Human Security, 2003, Human Security Now, New York, p. 135; Amnesty
International, The United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms 2002
132
Hufbauer and Schott, Supra [125], p. 5
133
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503art. XV, ¶ 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12; on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms), June 18, 1979, United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, 18 I.L.M. 1112, 1134-35 at 1158; CFE Treaty, Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991), art. XIX, ¶ 2, 30 I.L.M. at 22.
134
Carter¸ Supra, [125]; Mufson, Sanctions Could Be Two-Edged Sword, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A17, col. 1.
135
ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 22 r/w Chap. II; Commentary, supra note 1, at 180.
and directed against the State committing the wrongful act.136 There is no requirement that countermeasure
should be with regard to the same obligation breached by the State acting wrongfully.137
As the actions of the Applicant State were in violation of customary international law,138 and applicable
treaty obligations,139 enforcement actions of the Applicant State are also lawful under the doctrine of
countermeasures.

136
Gabcikovo, .Supra [97], pp 55-7; Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 102; David J. Bederman,
Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002).
137
Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005).
138
Contentions raised by Agents to the Respondent State.
139
Refer Contention IV.
DEFENCE II
RESPONDENT STATE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS ON UC RALLY IN THE APPLICANT
STATE.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Respondent State is not responsible for the attacks on
UC rally in the Applicant State.
2.1 Burden of Proof is on the Applicant State to prove that UC Rally was bombed by the Respondent State.
It is submitted that in order to establish the responsibility of Respondent State, it is Applicant State’s duty to
discharge the burden of proof. It is a well established general principle of law that the burden of proof is
upon the claimant.140 Burden of proof implies something more than merely the duty to produce evidence.141
It means that a party having the burden of proof must not only bring evidences in support of its allegations
but must also convince the tribunal of their truth.142 It is hereby submitted that in the instant case, the
responsibility cannot be assigned in light of unconfirmed sightings of Respondent State’s military personnel.
2.2 In Arguendo, the attack is an act of Self-Defence and thus in compliance with international law.
It is humbly submitted that even if it is proved that the attack was done by Respondent State, such attack was
in exercise of its inherent right to self-defence in response to the terrorist attack by UC in Jotria.143
A. Exercise of Self-Defence is in response to an armed attack.
It is submitted that the attack by UC on Respondent State constitutes an armed attack for which there exists a
right to self-defence. Article 51 provides that the right to self-defence may be exercised by any state subject
to an armed attack until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.144 Article 51 authorizes a victim State to attack in self- defence and does not limit this inherent
right to attacks by other States. This Hon’ble Court has defined armed attack as including the substantial
involvement of a state in sending of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack
conducted by regular forces. This description may be taken to reflect customary international law.145 That,

140
Parker Case, 1926
141
Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923)
142
Corfu Channel Case Supra [6]; Mexico-U.S General Claims Commission (1923)
143
Refer Contention I.
144
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, at Article 1 [Charter], Article 51.
145
Nicargua, Supra [Error! Bookmark not defined.], at 103-04.
DEFENCE II BODY OF PLEADINGS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

evidently, is why Resolution 1368146 classifies terrorist attacks as an armed attack and clearly identifies
international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security against which individual self-defence
may be exercised.147 The defence in the context of terrorist attacks acts as a defence for limited incursions
into the sovereign territory of another state.148
B. The Respondent State was in a state of ‘distress’ and ‘necessity’ so as to justify self-defence.
Distress as a general principle under the rubrics of international law, is recognised in conventions,149 and
judgments of international tribunals.150 It permits departure from an international obligation when there is a
serious threat to life or physical integrity of persons entrusted to a State’s care and there is no other
reasonable way to overcome that situation.151
Necessity is a situation of political or economic survival, the maintenance of conditions in which the
essential functions can survive, inter alia, the survival of parts of its population.152 It is invoked when it is
the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.153 Essential
interest includes the particular interests of the state.154 A peril is imminent when it is certain and
inevitable.155

146
Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001, adopted at the 4370th Meeting on 12th September, 2001, UN Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001).
147
Ibid.
148
Travalio, Supra [30] (citing Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism, 8 Whittier L. REV.
711, 716-17 (1986)) at 160-61; Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-defense against the use of force in international law 126
(1996) at 188-201; Christine Gray, International law and the use of force 161 (2d ed. 2004) at 126-29; ." Richard N.
Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in Law and Force in the New International Order 52 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds. 1991).
149
International Convention for the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1963), 327 U.N.T.S 3; Convention for
the Preservation of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972), 1046 U.N.T.S. 138.
150
Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France), [1987] 23 ILM 1346
151
Ibid; ILC Articles, Supra [31], Art. 24.
152
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.
153
ILC Articles, Supra [31],; Keiver, The Pacific Salmon War: The Defense of Necessity Revisited, 21 Dalhousie L.J.
408 (1998).
154
Gabcikovo, Supra[97] , 41-42.
155
Ibid.
DEFENCE III
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RESPONDENT STATE IS SOVEREIGN AND IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL LAW.
3.1. The Applicant State has no locus to challenge the government of Respondent State.
It is humbly submitted that Respondent State’s government cannot be challenged by Applicant State since it
will interfere with the principles of sovereignty existing under the auspices of international law. All states
are under an international legal obligation not to commit any violation of the independence or territorial or
personal authority, of any other state.156 It is an accepted principle of international law that every state has
the right to choose its form of government and that other states do not intervene in any way since,
intervention is forbidden by international law as a principle of customary international law.157
3.2. In Arguendo, the Respondent State’s government is in compliance with international law.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the government of Jotria is a legitimate government
under international law. The principles of good governance, transparency and human rights are essential
elements for building representative and stable governments and hence for their legitimacy.158 Recognition
of the government has been interpreted in the sense that the new government must be supported by will of
the nation, substantially declared and that there must be evidence of popular approval, adequately expressed
of a revolutionary change.159 In the instant case, the government existing in the State of Jotria is a
democratic form of government and is recognised by its institutions like judiciary.160 The factors to be taken
into account in deciding whether a government exists as the government of a state are whether it is the
constitutional government of the state; the degree, nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that
it of itself exercises over the territory of the state and in marginal cases the extent of international
recognition that it has as a government of the state.161

156
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed. 2001, pg 382,¶118
157
Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, ICJ Rep (1986); UN Charter; VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS
161-70 (4th ed. 1981) at 127; Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AJIL 321 (1972); ICCPR; Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties, 1974; Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, p.18
158
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), OAU, NEPAD Doc. (2001); Benedict Kingsbury, The
Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1997-
98)
159
Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon, 53 AJIL (1959); R.A.Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, (1968);
Doswald-Beck, Legal Validity; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
(1965).
160
Refer Para 10, Compromis
161
Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All ER 820; The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] 1
All ER 719.
DEFENCE IV
THERE IS NO “THREAT OF WAR” BY THE RESPONDENT STATE AND THE REQUEST WAS A MEANS
TO PEACEFULLY SETTLE THE SITUATION.
It is humbly submitted that the request made by the Respondent State to submit UC leadership to it, cannot
be termed as a “threat of war” but was a method to ensure a peaceful settlement of the dispute which is an
obligation placed on every UN member.162
UN Charter imposes an obligation upon the member nations to settle the disputes by peaceful means. The
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security are under an obligation to seek a solution by by peaceful means of their own choice.163 These
means can be made flexible relying on the appreciable harm or the significant harm caused to the State.164
States are obliged to not to recognise an illegal situation,165 and to take positive measures to ensure the
cessation of violations and to demand and facilitate the parties to comply with international law.166
Negotiation by using diplomatic channels for the commissions of inquiry to resolve international disputes
has been recognised as a peaceful means of settlement of international disputes.167 A threat to retaliate, thus,
has been recognised as a means of pacific settlement of disputes, if not quantified by the parameters which
requires: (1) a manifest intent to injure; (2) active preparation that makes the intent a positive danger; and (3)
a situation where waiting to eliminate the threat magnifies the risk.168
Thus in the instant case, the request put forth by the Respondent State was designed to ensure the Applicant
State’s compliance with international law inter alia to provide cooperation under the customary principle aut
dedere aut judicare.

162
Article 26, “Pacta Sund Servanda”, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,1969.
163
Article 33, UN Charter.
164
Virginia Morris and M.-Christiane Bourloyannis, Current Development: The Work of The Sixth Committee At The
Forty-Eighth Session of The UN General Assembly, 88 A.J.I.L. 343 (1994)
165
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of
Justice Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, paragraph 163.
166
Bassiouni, Cherif, “Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for accountability”, Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol 59, No 4, 1996; Bassiouni, Cherif. “Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions”, Journal of
Law and Policy, Vol 5, No 35, 2001; Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. “An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in
the criminal process to curtail impunity for state-sponsored crimes”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 26, 2004
167
Great Britain v. Russia, Report of February 26, 1905, The Hague Court Reports 403 (James Brown Scott ed. 1916)
cited in international law casebooks. See Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes, International Law, Cases and Commentary
221 (1997).
168
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic Books 4th ed. 2006)
(1977) at 81, 85; Michael Walzer, Arguing About War 147 (Yale Univ. Press 2006)
PRAYER AND CONCLUSION
In light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel for the Respondent
State most humbly and respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Court, that it may be pleased to adjudge and
declare that the:
1. The Applicant State is responsible for the violation of United Nations Charter as its actions amounted to
state sponsored terrorism.
2. The Applicant State violated the duty to cooperate assigned by the binding Security Council Resolution
and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.
3. The arrests during emergency by the Applicant State was in violation of international law.
4. The changes brought into the constitution of the Applicant State lead to the suppression of civil liberties
which is a violation of international Law.
5. Applicant State’s claim to challenge the changed economic policy is Inadmissible.
6. The Respondent State is not Responsible for the attacks on UC Rally in the Applicant State.
7. The government of the Respondent State is sovereign and is in compliance with international law.
8. The actions of the Respondent State did not classify as a threat of war.
The Respondent State thus prays for the following reliefs from the court:
1. Compensation for the loss to life and property caused to Respondent State.
2. Extradition of the suspected terrorists as a means of satisfaction.
3. Compensation to the citizens of the Respondent State whose rights were violated.
4. Cessation of the violation of human rights in the Applicant State and guarantee of non-repetition.
The Court may also make any such order as it may deem fit in terms of equity, justice and due conscience.
And for this act of kindness the Applicant State shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.
Respectfully submitted,
…………...….……...……………………
(Counsel for the Respondent State)
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TEAM CODE

Amounted to State Sponsored Terrorism……………………..………………………………………...1

1.3. In Arguendo, the UC group aided and abetted international terrorism…..………………………….…..2

1.4. The Applicant state was involved in state-sponsored terrorism………………………………………….2

A. The Applicant state provided “State Support” to the terrorist activities……..………………………..…3

B. The Applicant state provided “State Tolerance” to the terrorist activities…………………………………4

Resolution and the Doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare.......................................................................6

3.1. The declaration of emergency was a fictitious exercise of right…………….……………………….8

Liberties which is a Violation of International Law.………………………….……...….............…10

4.2. The Respondent State has a right to bring this claim………………………….………………………..11

4.3. Violation of this obligation entails State Responsibility……………………….……………………..…11

1. Applicant State’s Claim to Challenge “Effective Economic Blockade” is Inadmissible..............12

compliance with international law.............................................................................................................13

A. Economic Sanction is a justified response to Increase in Military Expenditure.................................15

B. Economic Sanctions are Justified as a Countermeasure under International Law...........................15

A. Exercise of Self-Defence in Response to an armed attack..................................................................17

B. The Respondent State was in a State of ‘Distress’ and ‘Necessity’....................................................18

Settle the Situation...................................................................................................................................20

1. A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligation, (1987) 47 ZaoRv 67 6

2. A/52/653, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth 4

5. Admission of U.S. to U.N., Advisory Opinion, (1948) ICJ Rep. 57 10

6. Aldana-Pindell, Raquel. “An emerging universality of justiciable victims rights in the 20

15. Baade, The Soviet Impact of International Law (1965) 9

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION I

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION II

40. D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft 13-14 (1985) at 123 15

41. David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AJIL 817 (2002) 16

66. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal 5

69. Higgins, Conflict of Interest (1965) 9

70. I. A. Shearer, Stark’s International Law 31 (1994) 9

71. Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle Of International Criminal Jurisdiction 2 7

74. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 12

75. Interhandel case, ICT Reports, 1959, p. 27 12

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IV

78. into force on 1 July 1978 12

79. J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: 10

92. Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communication: Frameworks for Evaluation of 14

95. Lauritzen et al v Government of Chile, [1956] 23 ILR 70 at 715-16, 729-30 9

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION V

Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276

99. Lotus Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10 19

101. Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law in 9

108. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 709 (2005) 16

109. Marc Henzelin, Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et 7

112. Mexican-United States General Claims Com 9

113. Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (1923): North American 10

DM HARISH MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION VI

Dredging Company of Texas Case, Op. of Com. 1927, p.21, at p.29

120. Michael C. Woods, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution, Max Planck 6

127. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AJIL 321 (1972) 19

132. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatamela), [1955] ICJ Rep 22 [Nottebohm] 9

133. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in 10

135. Nuclear Tests(New Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 4510 10

139. Optional Protocol I, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 12

141. Parker Case, 1926 17

142. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: International Relations, State 11

144. Portendick Case (1843) 14

146. Prosecutor v. George Ruggio, ICTR-97-32-I. 2

147. Prosecutor v. Tadic , Appeal on Jurisdiction, 35 ILM 32 (1996) 6

148. Q.Wright, US Intervention in the Labanon, 53 AJIL (1959) 19

154. Reporting Form, Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military 15

160. Roda Mushkat, Fair Trial as Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal 7

162. Rules of International Court of Justice (1978) adopted on 14 April 1978 12