GET1029/GEK1067

LIFE, THE UNIVERSE, AND

EVERYTHING
A/P Loy Hui Chieh
Department of Philosophy
AY2018-19, Semester 1
 Consciousness

GET1029/GEK1067 LECTURE 10
 Topics for the Second Half
Topic Sub-Field
• Topic 6: Does God exist? Pro: The • Philosophy of Religion (Metaphysics &
Cosmological Argument for the Epistemology)
existence of God
• Topic 7: Does God exist? Con: The
Problem of Evil as an argument against
the existence of God
• Topic 8: Is justification and knowledge • Epistemology
possible in face of disagreement?
• Topic 9: What is the nature of • Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness? An argument against
Physicalism
• Topic 10: What is the nature of reality? • Metaphysics
An argument for the idea that we live
in a computer simulation
 Agenda
• Three Theories about the Mind
– Mind-body Dualism
– Physicalism
– Dual Aspect Theory

• Nagel’s Argument against Physicalism

• Note: There’s quite a bit more in the lecture compared to the

reading, especially for the characterization of Physicalism, and for
fleshing out Nagel’s argument.
THREE THEORIES ABOUT MIND
 Philosophy of Mind
• The contrast between things with mind—
things that are conscious, capable of
sensations (e.g., pleasure and pain), has
intelligence, etc., vs. things that are not so.

• Some questions for philosophy of mind:

• Q: What kind of a thing is a mind?
• Q: How do words that refer to mind-related
things (e.g., “pain”) have meaning?
• Q: Do we know whether other people think,
or that they have minds?

• (Psychology and neuroscience connections.)

 Mind and Brain
• “…there is also a philosophical question about the
relation between mind and brain, and it is this: Is
your mind something different from your brain,
though connected to it, or is it your brain? Are your
thoughts, feelings, perceptions, sensations, and
wishes things that happen in addition to all the
physical processes in your brain, or are they
themselves some of those physical processes?”
(Nagel, 28)
Thomas Nagel
(1937-)
• Note: “Brain” standing in for all the physical stuff that
goes on in our body; “chemical and electrical changes”
included. (Sometimes, I’ll just say “Body”.)
• Assumed that Brain and Mind affect each other.
 Three Answers in the Reading
• Dualism
• Mind (Soul) and Body (Brain) are two distinct things; each of us
consist of “a body plus a soul”.

• Physicalism (or Materialism)

• Mental life consists of physical processes in Body (Brain); it’s
ultimately all Body.

• Dual Aspect Theory

• Mental life goes on in Body (Brain), but does not consist in only
physical processes. Body has both physical and mental aspects.
 Three Theories of the Mind
Dualism – Mind (Soul) and Body
(Brain) are two distinct things; each of
us consist of “a body plus a soul”.
Dualism (Soul + Body)
Non-Dualism (Body)

Physicalism (Materialism) Dual Aspect Theory

Mental life consists of
physical processes in Body
(Brain); it’s ultimately all
Body.
Mental life goes on in Body
(Brain), but does not consist
in merely physical processes.
Body has both physical and
mental aspects.
 Old Fashion Dualism
• An ancient thought:
• For something to have a mind is for it to have a
soul (psuchē in Greek), an immaterial or purely
mental thing that is distinct from body.
• The soul as the seat of the mind.
• The person as soul plus body.
René Descartes
(1596-1690)
• Mind-Body Dualism: Mind and Body are two
distinct kinds of things; (“Substance Dualism”).

Descartes in
• René Descartes as a famous Mind-Body Dualist
shades (link)
Philosopher.
 Dualism vs. Non-Dualism (2)
• Mind-Body Dualism – The “C” box is occupied. An “A” box item is
really a composite of a “B” box item plus a “C” box item.

• Mind-Body Non-Dualism – Everything that has mental properties

also have physical properties, i.e., the “C” is not occupied (Only the
“A” and “B” boxes are occupied.)

Tall, dark, handsome

Tall, dark, handsome Just happy?
and happy

A B C
 Why Opt for Non-Dualism?
• Problem with explaining the causal Entities must not
interaction of a purely mental thing be multiplied
with material things… beyond necessity…
• …beginning with our own bodies.

• Difficulty with the idea of a purely

mental thing existing…
• …especially given context of modern
physical sciences. (See also Nagel, 31.)

• A theory that posits the existence of

only one kind of thing is simpler than
one that posts two, and is, all else being
equal, to be preferred (Occam’s Razor).

• (Q: God? We are talking about humans.) William of Occam (1287-1347)

 Are You Some Sort of Physicalist?
• Q1: Do you believe that everything that has mental properties also
have physical properties, i.e., nothing* is such it is purely mental
and has no physical properties? Yes/No?
– (*Ignoring complication with God; stick to humans, etc.)

• Q2: Do you believe that what mental properties a thing has

depends on what physical properties it has? Yes/No

• Answering “Yes”, “Yes” = Basic Physicalism

• (a) Mind-Body Non-Dualism (“Yes” to Q1).
• (b) Mind-Body Dependence (“Yes” to Q2).
– A has the mental property X because A has physical property Y, but
not the other way round; Y is more fundamental than X.
– Analogy: The beauty of the painting depends on the configuration of
colors, textual, light and shadow, on a canvas.
 Going Beyond Basic Physicalism
• So let’s say you accept:
• (a) Mind-Body Non-Dualism
• (b) Mind-Body Dependence
• As stated previously, with (a) and (b), you have already accepted a
basic form of physicalism.

• But there’s more:

• (c) Mind-Body Reductionism: Mental properties are really just
(configurations of) physical properties, with other names.

• If you hold to (a)-(c)…

• …you are a full fledged Physicalist about the Mind.
 Water and H2O
• Proposed theory about how water is
transparent…

• H2O has a certain molecular structure such

that a homogeneous mass of H20 molecules
in a fluid (i.e., liquid) state will not absorb
light in the visible wavelength, but rather,
delay, diffuse, refract, etc., its passage
through the mass, etc., etc.

• Reduction: All facts about the transparency

of water are just are facts about H2O, the
behavior of light, etc…
• …There is nothing left over (all “reduced”).
Headaches and Brain States
• I am feeling a headache…

• Facts about the mass of matter that makes

up my brain and the larger nervous system,
the molecules and larger configurations
involved, chemical reactions and electrical
discharges, etc., etc.

• http://science.howstuffworks.com/life/insi
de-the-mind/human-brain/pain.htm

• Mind-Body Reduction entails that all the

facts about my feeling of pain just are facts
about the physical state of my brain, etc.
• There is nothing left over…
 What About “Dual Aspect Theory”?
• Which of the below does the Dual Aspect Theorist agree with?
• (a) Mind-Body Non-Dualism
– Agree…
• (b) Mind-Body Dependence
– ?
• (c) Mind-Body Reductionism
– Disagree; mental properties aren’t just (configurations of) physical
properties with other names.

• Nagel left the question of Dependence open… no reason why what

Nagel called “Dual Aspect Theory” can’t agree with (b).

• (What Nagel called “Dual Aspect Theory” is actually a whole family

of theories, some of which are ok with Basic Physicalism, others,
not so much…)
Three Theories of the Mind, Redux
Dualism – Mind (Soul) and Body
(Brain) are two distinct things; each of
us consist of “a body plus a soul”.
Dualism (Soul + Body)
Non-Dualism (Body)

Physicalism (Materialism) “Dual Aspect Theories”*

Mind-Body Non-Dualism Agree: Mind-Body Non-Dualism
Mind-Body Dependence Maybe/Maybe not: Mind-Body
Mind-Body Reductionism Dependence
Disagree: Mind-Body Reductionism

*In the literature, such theories go by the name of “property dualism”, “dual aspect
theory”, “double aspect theory”, etc. I don’t need you to know about these names
for the purposes of this class.
THOMAS NAGEL’S ARGUMENT
AGAINST PHYSICALISM
 Note on the Argument
• The following argument as formulated makes use of ideas scattered
across your assigned reading, and also partly inspired by a more
famous Nagel article: “What is it like to be a bat?” (also in IVLE Files
as “Optional”).
 Consciousness vs. Intelligence
• Intelligence—The ability to acquire and apply knowledge.
• Consciousness—Moment by moment awareness of other objects
or of the conscious being itself.

Intelligent and conscious Intelligent but not conscious

• (Normal) human beings. • A self driving car.

Conscious but not intelligent Neither intelligent nor

• Human being with (certain conscious
types of) brain damage. • A rock.
Consciousness and Qualia
• The main bulk of consciousness = our
experience of qualia.

• Qualia = The subjective qualitative

(‘what-it-feels-like’) aspects of
conscious experience, the way
sensations feel to those who are
having them.

• There’s something it is like for you to

feel that pain—and it’s different from
how it is like for you to feel tickled…
• …or how chocolate tastes like.
 The Importance of Qualia
• Our feeling that we have free
will, our tasting chocolate,
being happy or sad, or angry,
or ashamed, or elated, etc…

• An important type of mental

phenomenon; a complete
theory of the mind will have to
account for it.

• Q: Would the Problem of Evil,

or Norcross’ Puppy Argument,
be as compelling if there is not
such thing as the qualitative
feeling of pain and suffering?
 Nagel’s Argument (1)
• Premise 1: There are facts about conscious experience that
are essentially subjective and can only be accessed from
the first-person point of view of the conscious subject.

• Premise 2: To give a physical characterization of

consciousness, we need to abandon the first-person point
of view of the conscious subject and adopt a third person,
objective point of view, given our present stock of concepts.

• Conclusion 1: There are facts about conscious experience

Thomas Nagel that cannot be captured in any physical characterization,
(1937-) given our present stock of concepts.

(…con’t)
 Nagel’s Argument (2)
• Conclusion 1: There are facts about conscious experience
that cannot be captured in any physical characterization, at
least given our present stock of concepts. (Previous slide)

• Premise 3: Physicalism as a theory of the mind purports to

tell us what consciousness really is by providing a
completely physical characterization of consciousness.

• Conclusion 2: There are facts about conscious experience

that cannot be captured by Physicalism as a theory of the
Thomas Nagel mind, given our present stock of concepts.
(1937-)
• Conclusion 3: Physicalism is either false as a theory of the
mind, or if it is a true theory, we don’t know how it can be
so, given our present stock of concepts.
 Objective vs. Subjective
Objective
• A fact is objective if it is
accessible from no point of view
in particular.
• To adopt an objective viewpoint
on something is to see it from
third-personal point of view,
using concepts accessible from
no where in particular.
Subjective
• A fact is subjective if it is
accessible only from a singular
point of view.
• To adopt a subjective viewpoint
on something is to see it from
first personal point of view, using
concepts accessible only from a
singular point of view.

Note: the Objective-Subjective distinction can refer to a number of different

contrasts. Nagel’s argument is counting on the above distinction.
 Tasting Chocolate
• Premise 1: There are facts about conscious experience that are
essentially subjective and can only be accessed from the first-
person point of view of the conscious subject.

• “If a scientist took off the top of your skull and looked into your
brain while you were eating the chocolate bar, all he would see is a
grey mass of neurons. If he used instruments to measure what was
happening inside, he would detect complicated physical processes
of many different kinds. But would he find the taste of chocolate?
…” (Nagel, 29)
 Hence, Premise 1
• The scientist can give an accurate account of the
physical processes that go on when I am tasting
chocolate. But he cannot find the taste of chocolate
in my brain. Not even if he tastes my brain! (Nagel,
29-30)

• There is a “special insideness” to my conscious

experience of tasting chocolate—it involves my
accessing essentially subjective facts.
Thomas Nagel • Those facts exist—the taste of chocolate is not the
(1937-) same as the taste of fried noodles.

• Therefore: There are facts about conscious

experience that are essentially subjective and can
only be accessed from the first-person point of view
of the conscious subject, i.e., Premise 1.
 Hence, Premise 2
• Premise 2: To give a physical characterization of
anything, we need to abandon the first-person
point of view of the conscious subject and adopt a
third person, objective point of view, given our
present stock of concepts.

• A physical characterization of lightning or hearing

thunder vs. a first-personal experience of seeing
lightning or hearing thunder.
Thomas Nagel
(1937-) • And with Premise 1 and Premise 2, we can derive:
• Conclusion 1: There are facts about conscious
experience that cannot be captured in any physical
characterization, given our present stock of
concepts.
 Hence, Premise 3
• Mind-Body Reductionism: Mental properties just are
(configurations of) physical properties with other
names.
• Hence, Premise 3:
• Physicalism (not just the basic, but the full fledged
version) as a theory of the mind purports to tell us
what consciousness really is…
• …by giving us a completely physical characterization
of all mental phenomena, including consciousness.
Thomas Nagel
(1937-) • With Premise 3 and Conclusion 1:
• Conclusion 2: There are facts about conscious
experience—an important type of mental
phenomena—that cannot be captured by Physicalism
as a theory of the mind, at least given our present
stock of concepts.
 Nagel’s Modesty
• Conclusion 3: Physicalism is either false as a
theory of the mind, or if it is a true theory, we
don’t know how it can be so, given our present
stock of concepts.

• Note the relatively modest conclusion that

Nagel draws—Physicalism is either false as a
theory of the mind, or if it is true, our belief
that it is true is not justified.

• Nagel also leaves open the possibility that we

will come up with conceptual innovations to
explain essentially subjective facts in purely
objective, physicalist terms. (Analogy: “Matter
Thomas Nagel (1937-) is Energy”—in the 17th Century, vs. in today’s
physics.)
 An Escape Valve?
• Dual Aspect Theory or Dualism?

• Did Nagel’s Argument disprove the more basic form of

Physicalism?
– Q: Does the argument given us reason to affirm, that purely
mental things that have no physical properties exist?
– Q: Does the argument show that what mental properties a thing
has does not depend on what physical properties it has?

• Nagel’s Argument does not give us reason to prefer Mind-

Body Dualism over a form of Dual Aspect Theory, nor does
it settle what sort of Dual Aspect Theory should we prefer.
 Other Modules
• PH2241 Philosophy of Mind (recognized for PL Major)
• PH3241 Consciousness
• PH4212 Issues in Philosophy of Mind
 Topics for the Second Half
Topic Sub-Field
• Topic 6: Does God exist? Pro: The • Philosophy of Religion (Metaphysics &
Cosmological Argument for the Epistemology)
existence of God
• Topic 7: Does God exist? Con: The
Problem of Evil as an argument against
the existence of God
• Topic 8: Is justification and knowledge • Epistemology
possible in face of disagreement?
• Topic 9: What is the nature of • Philosophy of Mind
Consciousness? An argument against
Physicalism
• Topic 10: What is the nature of reality? • Metaphysics
An argument for the idea that we live
in a computer simulation