2ac OBOR Addon

Immigration restrictions give China the opportunity to attract talent – that’s key to
Chinese innovation and successful completion of OBOR
Wang, 17 – Wang Huiyao, researcher for the Center for China & Globalization,a leading Chinese global
think tank dedicated to the areas of China and globalization studies, the globalization of Chinese talent
and the globalization of Chinese enterprises (“Seize Timing of USA Tightening Restrictions on
Immigration” Feb, http://en.ccg.org.cn/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CCG-Report%EF%BC%9ASeize-
Timing-of-USA-Tightening-Restrictions-on-Immigration-Adopt-More-Open-Policies-to-Attract-
InternationalTalent-.pdf

Since the Sept. 11th terrorist attack, the US government has tightened up immigration policies, and the
situation was even exacerbated by the financial crisis afterwards. After President Donald Trump was
sworn in, he rolled out more policies against globalization and focused on America’s interest.The US
President believes immigrants are a key reason for terrorism that threatens the US homeland security
and also for the unemployment problem. On January 27th, 2017, President Trump signed an Executive
Order titled “Protecting the Nation from foreign terrorists entry into the United States” (the socalled
“Muslim ban”). The measure prohibited for a period of three months the entry into the US of citizens
from seven countries. The ban halted the Refugees Admission Program for 120 days, and suspended
indefinitely the reestablishment in the USA of a Syrian refugee program launched by the Obama
administration. Besides, the US media revealed that Trump government also intended to issue a decree
to cancel the H1-B Visa Lottery system that prioritizes foreign students graduating from the US higher
education institutions. The Draft Decree also was reported to revoke the Obama administration’s policy
to extend from 12 to 36 months the STEM OPT (Optional Practical Training for students with Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics degrees). These new immigration policy measures
encountered strong opposition both at home and abroad, especially the science and technology
community. Even though the American Federal Judiciary has blocked the “Muslim ban”, Trump’s
attitude against globalization leads us to believe that the restrictions on immigrants might still be
enacted one day in the future.

On the contrary, China is currently reforming the immigration policies with an aim to establish a more
open and flexible system to attract international talents. In December, 2012, the Organization
Department of the Central Committee of CPC, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and
other 25 government agencies jointly issued the “Administrative Measures on Entitlement of Foreigners
with Chinese Permanent Residence”. In June, 2015, the Ministry of Public Security expanded the fields in
which foreigners who apply for a Chinese Permanent Residence (Chinese Green Card) can work, based
on the regulations of the “Measures for the Administration of Examination and Approval of Foreigners’
Permanent Residence in China”. Since then, Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong, among other
places, adopted new policy measures for the issuance of visa and residence permits to foreigners, to
build a more open and flexible environment for them to live and work in China. In March, 2016,
Zhongguancun became the first area to pilot the 20 new entry and exit policies for foreigners adopted
by the Ministry of Public Security to support mass innovation in Beijing. These measures are expected to
make it easier for foreign talent to enter and exit China to start their own business.
On Feb. 6th, 2017, the central government made a step forward in the immigration policy reforms and
required the effort to improve the permanent residence permit system, as it is required by the national
talent development strategy.

The recent US policies that impose more restrictions on immigration is closing the door to many
international talent. However, America’ s loss could be China’s gain. China can seize the opportunity to
attract more outstanding talent to tackle the problems of its aging population and to find more
resources for its development initiatives, such as mass innovation and “One Belt, One Road”.

Successful OBOR allows China to extend their military reach into the Indian Ocean but
its not too late
Johnson and De Luce 18 — (Keith Johnson, Dan De Luce, 4-17-2018, "One Belt, One Road, One
Happy Chinese Navy," Published by Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/17/one-belt-one-
road-one-happy-chinese-navy/, Accessed 6-5-2018, JWS) Note: Belt and Road project = OBOR

Chinese leaders tout their trillion-dollar Belt and Road project, especially in the Indian Ocean, as a win-win commercial proposition
meant to bring modern infrastructure and prosperity to an underdeveloped part of the world. In reality, Beijing’s acquisition of more than a
dozen ports across the Indian Ocean is a state-directed effort to bolster Chinese political influence and extend its
military reach from Indonesia to East Africa, according to a detailed new study released Tuesday. The report,
conducted by C4ADS, an American data-driven research nonprofit, examined 15 Chinese port deals across the Indian
Ocean region. It concluded that, contrary to Beijing’s public rhetoric, the economics of the deals are questionable,
political control is nearly absolute, and one of the main drivers is to give the Chinese navy the possibility of
far-reaching logistical support under the cover of seemingly innocuous commercial operations. “The trends
across the ports we looked at seem to indicate that China is not upholding a ‘win-win’ idea, but is pursuing an
ulterior motive,” says Devin Thorne, one of the report’s co-authors. The accumulation of similar projects from Cambodia to Pakistan
reinforces concerns that Beijing is using business bridgeheads for political and military purposes. “It’s more a layering of one deal after another
— one by itself is not nefarious, but taken all together…” says Ben Spevack, another co-author. Most important, what a few years ago appeared
a distant fear now seems to be coming to pass. The
Chinese government is using state-owned companies and politically
linked private firms to
create a network of facilities designed to provide logistical support to Chinese warships
patrolling the Indian Ocean, the report says, citing a Chinese analyst who lays out a “first civilian, later military” approach to port
development across the region. Chinese warships are already taking advantage of the dual-use possibilities of commercial ports, bolstered by
laws that oblige Chinese transportation firms working overseas to provide replenishment for navy vessels. In 2016 in Thailand, the dock landing
ship Changbai Shan relied on a Chinese company operating there to get “one-stop” replenishment services, the C4ADS report notes. “We have
deepened the integration of military and civilian forces, given full play to the advantages of our commercial resources abroad, and provided
quality services to the warships of the motherland,” said the general manager of an unnamed Chinese company that serviced the Changbai
Shan, according to a Chinese-language article. The ship’s captain said that anywhere there are Chinese companies, there are advance
transportation guarantees for warships. It’s not just Thailand. While developing the so-called Maritime Silk Road, Chinese firms have snapped
up control of ports in Cambodia, Indonesia, the Strait of Malacca, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. Adm. Harry Harris, the head of
U.S. Pacific Command, warned Congress earlier this year that China’s naval “presence and influence are expanding” thanks in large part to the
commercial network created by the Belt and Road Initiative. One former U.S. military officer who served in the U.S. Pacific Command, who
spoke on condition of anonymity, sees a historical parallel in Beijing’s acquisition spree. “It looks like coaling stations for the Dutch or British
Empire, the way they set these up,” the former officer says.“It looks like coaling stations for the Dutch or British Empire, the way they set these
up,” the former officer says. China’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean includes its first formal overseas base, in Djibouti, which has raised
concern among U.S. officials, including Adm. Harris. But commercial ports that can do double duty are arguably just as important
for a navy seeking to transform itself into a true global force that can police the trade lines critical to
China’s economy. “China is pursuing a ‘places, not bases,’ strategy,” says retired U.S. Rear Adm. Mike McDevitt, a senior fellow at CNA, a
nonprofit research organization. It’s the outgrowth of the Chinese navy’s first overseas mission in centuries, the anti-piracy patrols off the coast
of Somalia that began exactly a decade ago. The only way to keep the ships supplied, Chinese leaders realized, was to rely on the existing port
operations of state-owned China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company, or COSCO, one of the world’s biggest shipping outfits. “COSCO primed the
pump to make them realize the advantage of commercial entities,” McDevitt says. Chinese leaders remain deeply concerned that hostile
foreign powers could cut off critical supplies of energy that must cross the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, McDevitt notes. “What
they’re doing is putting in place facilities that will enable them to have warships do protective operations” like the anti-piracy patrols. Despite
periodic hand-wringing in Washington and New Delhi about Chinese efforts to build a “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s
ambitions in the region were still unclear for much of the last decade. China got control of a deepwater port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and strong-
armed the Sri Lankan government into control of ports there. But it was unclear how those projects meshed with Beijing’s stated goal of
becoming a first-class naval power. “It wasn’t yet the coherent and cohesive strategy that it’s become,” says Evan Medeiros, who oversaw Asia
policy in the Barack Obama White House and is now at the Eurasia Group. Now that strategy is coming into focus, the C4ADS
report concluded after scouring corporate registries and years of writing by Chinese analysts and
military officers. “Chinese analysts, particularly those with military backgrounds, describe port investments as
discreetly enabling China to enhance its military presence in the Indo-Pacific,” the report notes. It’s still a
work in progress. Nearly all the port projects include plans for some type of Chinese-led industrial development nearby, including
shipbuilding and metallurgical facilities, which could eventually make the ports more useful as logistic hubs, though few have been developed.

Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean sparks a great power war

Lintner 17 — (Bertil Lintner, 6-19-2017, "A New Cold War in the Indian Ocean?," Published by National
Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/new-cold-war-the-indian-ocean-21227?page=show,
Accessed 6-5-2018, JWS)

A new Cold War is brewing in the Indian Ocean, with an informal alliance of the United States, India,
Australia, Japan on one side and China on the other. While tensions in the ocean are not yet as pitched as in the hotly
contested South China Sea, the potential for conflict is unmistakably rising in the high stakes strategic theater.
More than 60% of the world’s oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean, largely from the Middle East’s oil fields to China, Japan and other
fuel-importing Asian economies, as does 70% of all container traffic to and from Asia’s industrialized nations and the rest of the world. While
traffic across the Atlantic has diminished in recent years and that which crosses the Pacific is mainly static, trade through the Indian Ocean is
fast growing. Maintaining the security of that trade and other navigation is the ostensible reason for the annual Malabar naval exercises
between India, Japan and the United States. For the first time in modern history, China
is making its own inroads into the
Indian Ocean region to protect its trade routes and energy supplies. Although this may appear innocuous on the
surface, it is has put China on what could become a collision course with the US and its regional allies — hence the
new informal, anti-China oriented alliance in the region. Strategic ripples are gathering. At Obock in Djibouti, situated on the Horn of Africa and
overlooking the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, China has established its first foreign military base, ostensibly to fight
piracy. Yet the facility is located next to a key US military facility, also in Djibouti. More importantly, it is also close to other bigger US bases in
the region, including a huge facility at Diego Garcia just south of the Equator in the Indian Ocean, as well as US installations in Gulf countries.
China’s main regional rival, India, has
always considered the Indian Ocean as its “own lake” in South Asian sphere of
influence. As such, New Delhi is known to be extremely worried about China’s growing forays into the
region, especially as security officials have observed Chinese submarine activity uncomfortably close to its Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In
2001, India created a new Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) based on those archipelagos to protect its interests in the region. The plan for its
establishment was reportedly hatched in 1995 after a closed-door meeting in Washington between India’s then prime minister P. V. Narasimha
Rao and US president Bill Clinton. The plan was finalized when Clinton visited India in 2000. As Indian journalist Sudha Ramachandran wrote in
Asia Times on October 19, 2005: “FENC will have state-of-the-art naval electronic warfare systems that can extend as far as Southeast Asia.”
FENC is also India’s first and only joint command that includes the army, the navy and the air force with two naval bases, 15 ships, four air force
and naval air bases, and two army brigades. Australia, which controls the strategically situated territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos
(Keeling) Islands, appears equally concerned about China’s recent emergence in the Indian Ocean. Australia’s signals intelligence facility on the
Cocos closely monitors movements in the maritime region. If superpower rivalry between the US and China, or increased tension between
China and India, comes to a head in the Indian Ocean, then Australia will be well-placed to defend its interests and aid allies. And then there is
France, which does not take part in joint naval exercises but is a US partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the least
prominent of the regional powers, because of its possession of small islands scattered across the maritime region, its exclusive economic zone
in the Indian Ocean measures 2.5 million square kilometers. Apart from its overseas departments of Mayotte and Réunion, France controls the
huge, non-inhabited island of Kerguelen and nearby Crozet Archipelago and Ile St Paul et Ile Amsterdam, as well as smaller uninhabited islands
around and east of the African island nation of Madagascar. There is a satellite tracking facility on Kerguelen and about a hundred “scientists”
based on the Crozet Archipelago and St Paul-Amsterdam on a rotation basis. The French military also has an infantry regiment on La Réunion,
and the French Foreign Legion is present on Mayotte to help guard its far-flung regional interests, many rooted in its past colonial era.
China’s new and highly touted “One Belt One Road” (Obor) initiative, unveiled in October 2013 to extend the region’s infrastructure and
promote more trade, underlines Beijing’s intention to become a global power. “The Silk Road Economic Belt” alludes to
the old Silk Road, which in ancient times connected the East and the West along trade routes from Europe through Central Asia to China. But
given conflicts and political instability in countries along that route, “the Maritime Silk Road” through the Indian Ocean is bound to become the
more important of the two initiatives. Not since Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch from China’s southwestern province of Yunnan, sailed his fleets
through the Indian Ocean in the 15th century — and then explored and mapped the region in a bid to impose imperial control over trade, win
favor with the areas’ peoples, and extend the empire’s tributary system — has China been as present in the region. That empire eventually fell
with wars at home, and in subsequent centuries China was not even remotely a naval power. The republic, which was established in 1912,
concentrated mainly on riverine warfare and was no match for the then Imperial Japanese Navy, which fortified Tokyo’s occupation of Chinese
territories in the 1930s and 1940s. Until the late 1980s, the navy of the People’s Republic of China, was also a brown-water force, meaning it
did not have the deep water reach of the US and other naval powers. It was not until the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union and a shift
towards more assertive foreign and security policies, that China’s leaders looked past land border disputes and turned their attention towards
the oceans. By then, China was also becoming an economic power that needed a strong military, including a navy, to protect its trade and other
maritime interests. Today, as
China’s forays in the Indian Ocean and countering joint naval exercises show,
potential great power battle lines are forming. While the situation is still far removed from open
confrontation, the Obor initiative and China’s new military facility at Obock are threatening to break the calm. And
while China is in the Indian Ocean to stay, the emerging alliance designed to counter that influence may not for much longer remain informal
and hidden behind joint naval exercises without any officially stated geopolitical purpose.
 AT Reallocation CP

1. CP can’t solve - Increasing total number of green cards is necessary to respond

to growing economic and technological needs
Bier, 17 --- immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity
(8/9/17, David, “Ten Irrational and Infuriating Aspects of U.S. Legal Immigration,”
https://www.cato.org/blog/ten-irrational-infuriating-aspects-us-legal-immigration, accessed on 6/9/18,
JMP)W

1) Employment-based quotas haven’t changed since 1990, even as the economy doubled in size. Unlike
many other countries, the legislative branch establishes hard ceilings on immigration, rather than
flexible targets or administratively determined limits. In 1990, Congress passed the Immigration Act of
1990, which established the current limit at 140,000 visas for immigrants whom employers sponsor for
legal permanent residency. Since then, U.S. real Gross Domestic Product increased from 8.9 trillion to 17
trillion. At the same time, the computer and Internet revolutions transformed the economy, yet the
quota remained the same.

Congress should double the 1990 employment-based quota to at least 280,000 and index the quota to
GDP growth. Senators Ron Johnson and John McCain incorporate GDP indexing in their State-Sponsored
Pilot Program Act, which would allow states to sponsor temporary workers (see p. 24).

2. Brain drain is good – cross apply OBOR leads to Sino Indian war.
3. Can’t solve our advantage – Trageting high skill visas solves on 2 fronts. One we
have the best talent for AI – cross apply Conrad and Barhart from the 1AC.
Second, draining China slows them down while letting us catch up – that’s
Barhart
4. The perception of restrictionist US immigration policy means China will win the
war for talent
Des Moines Register, 17 – editorial (“Editorial: Could U.S. lose global war for talent?” 6/7,
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/06/07/editorial-could-u-s-lose-
global-war-talent/378050001/
America has prospered as a beacon for the best and brightest, a destination for doers and dreamers. This was true for German scientists fleeing
Nazism, Cuban entrepreneurs escaping Communism and Indian engineers avoiding poverty. We cannot expect this to always be true. Today,
immigrants are getting the message that they’re unwelcome in the United States. And other nations see
opportunity to attract that talent. The Trump administration has sent this message through several policies and
statements, including by pushing the now-blocked Middle East travel ban; by signing an executive order reviewing the H-1B high-skilled visa
program; by creating uncertainty for “DREAMers,” who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children; and by declaring “America First” as an
overarching philosophy. These actions threaten to put America behind. Rajshree Agarwal, a professor in entrepreneurship at the University of
Maryland, warns that top students are rethinking studying or working in America, and Canada and Europe are courting
tenure-track professors affected by U.S. immigration policy. Canada has also started targeting foreign tech experts in Silicon Valley. The world’s
second largest economy and the United States’ growing rival — China — also sees
an opportunity. It’s stepping up
recruitment of the approximately 330,000 Chinese studying in the U.S., as well as many more working here. The
country is also relaxing visa rules for high-skilled foreigners, and prominent voices are calling on Chinese leaders to do more. Robin
Li, the CEO of Baidu, China's version of Google, said President Donald Trump's stance on immigration offered China "a great
opportunity" to attract skilled workers. Kenn Yu said more native Chinese like himself are considering returning after studying in
the U.S. Yu received his bachelor’s in finance and master’s in accounting at Drake University and worked for about five years in Des Moines. He
returned in 2015. Fortunately, that helps both China and the U.S.: He’s a senior product manager for Des Moines-based Principal Financial
Group, which is tapping into the growing retirement market in China. “Personally, I didn't plan to move back because I was afraid the package
and the working environment, especially for entry-level job seekers, will not be satisfactory. Until I was convinced by my employer about this
opportunity to move back with the company to help grow their business in China made me change my mind,” he said. His peers are
reconsidering because of better pay in China. “The biggest difference between now and then is before, most top-tier Chinese students studied
abroad would like to remain working in the U.S., while now some of them, even with a steady job already in the U.S., are willing to take the risk
to move back,” Yu said. The Center for China and Globalization, an independent think tank in Beijing, has proposed establishing a dedicated
national immigration bureau to handle visa applications and take other actions to recruit talent. Henry Wang, the center’s president, told a
Register editorial writer that the war for global talent requires a new version of the WTO — a “World Talent Organization” that could
coordinate labor flows between nations. He said China
lacks enough global talent, but it could get ahead because of
Trump’s policies. “It’s damaging the core competence of U.S.,” he said. Attracting talent is “what really makes
America No. 1.” It’s not too late to reverse course. University officials and business leaders are calling on Trump to change the debate over
immigration, to recruit foreign scholars and skilled workers and to encourage DREAMers to go to college and to create a pathway to citizenship
for them and other immigrants. We can reassert our position as the land of opportunity for all.

Boosting skilled immigration is the critical variable to maintain U.S. technological

leadership
Zhao, 18 --- president of the Asian American Coalition for Education (1/29/18, YuKong, “Commentary:
Missing priority in immigration reform: high-skilled workers,”
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-high-skilled-workers-forgotten-immigration-reform-
20180129-story.html, accessed on 5/23/18, JMP)
The recent government shutdown underscores the difficulty of immigration reform. It is absolutely right to debate how to improve border
security, and how to solve the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals issue in a humane way. However, one important immigration agenda has
largely been ignored in this debate: how to enhance and increase high-skilled labor — H-1B visa immigration. More important, how does
our nation continuously attract the world’s talents that are essential to maintaining America’s
technological leadership in the world? It is unfortunate that when many politicians passionately talk about the economic
contribution of DACA recipients, they do not even mention the very immigrant group that has made the largest contribution to the American
economy: H-1B visa recipients. Since the inception of the program in 1990, the United States has granted about 2.5 million H-1B visas to highly
educated foreign immigrants. Many of them were educated in the United States and decided to stay in America to support science, education
and especially high-tech industries. With
the decline of STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education,
America is failing to educate enough home-grown engineers to support the rapidly growing high-tech
firms, which are the No. 1 growth engine of the American economy in recent decades. In my view, many
of the engineers in these companies are foreign born, as are many professors in STEM departments of
American colleges. Today, high-skilled immigrants have become the backbone of American ingenuity.
These high-skilled immigrants also contribute significantly to the American economy. According to a 2016 report issued by National Science
Foundation, median salaries of immigrant engineers and scientists were, on average, higher overall than that of their U.S.-born counterparts,
$72,000 compared to $64,000. They are important contributors to American tax revenue. Equally important, highly educated immigrants
embrace American values and observe the laws, and rarely commit crimes. Even though H-1B visa recipients have been making tremendous
contributions to American society, they are not reasonably embraced by our outdated immigration policies. Each year the U.S. grants green
cards to more than 1 million new immigrants, but only 85,000 get H-1B visas, less than 10 percent of the total immigrants. Because the quota is
far less than applicants (236,000 in 2017), the H-1B visa program is currently implemented through a lottery, departing from its original purpose
of serving the needs of American firms. For many foreign students who have the right skill-set and willingness to contribute to America,
obtaining an H-1B visa is a challenging and emotional process. Many American companies do not sponsor working visas for foreign students, so
they have to apply for jobs from the limited companies that do. If they’re lucky, after demonstrating unique qualifications and overcoming
language and cultural barriers, some foreign students are able to find jobs. Even with that, they have to go through another emotional torture
— waiting for the H-1B visa lottery. If they fail to both find jobs and obtain an H-1B visa, they have to face the heartbreaking choice of leaving
America. Some graduate students might have American-born children they must take when they leave America. Simply because most foreign
students respect American laws, they rarely complain or demonstrate when they face the legal deadline to leave America. As a result, our
politicians, who tend to be swayed by emotions, often ignore the most valuable people America should keep. It is true that the H-1B visa policy
has some loopholes that need to be addressed. However, the right way is to reform and enhance the policy. Complaints, in response, from
either the left or the right are often short-sighted, and should not become the primary basis for America’s policymaking. History has proved
that one of the major cornerstones of American exceptionalism is her magnetic ability to attract the
most talented and hard-working immigrants from all over the world to build America into the greatest nation on
Earth. In the 21st century, America has lost its technology dominance in too many industries, from auto
manufacturing and consumer electronics to consumer drone technologies. We need talented and
hard-working immigrants more than ever. As the world is rapidly transitioning into a knowledge-based
economy, America’s immigration policy should primarily focus on how to continue attracting the world’s
talents, instead of just responding to political influences.
 AT: China Not a Threat / Not Seeking Leadership

China is seeking global leadership --- official documents prove and technological
leadership is critical
Heath, 18 --- Senior International Defense Research Analyst with the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation (1/5/18, Timothy R., “China’s Endgame: The Path Towards Global Leadership,”
https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-endgame-path-towards-global-leadership, accessed on 6/4/18, JMP)

Dueling high level strategy documents in both the United States and China portend an intensifying
competition for leadership and influence at the global systemic level. The coming years are likely to see
a deepening contest in the diplomatic, economic, cyber, and information domains, even as the risks of
major war remain low. Although the U.S. strategy has garnered considerable scrutiny, less attention has
been paid to the directives outlined in key official Chinese strategy documents.

The National Security Strategy recently released by the Trump administration surprised many in its stark
depiction of China as a “revisionist power” that seeks to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific
region.” The strategy’s striking tone has drawn widespread commentary, but in many ways it reflects a
grim, but realistic recognition of the realities of a deepening rivalry. Indeed, a closer look at
authoritative Chinese documents suggests that preparations are well underway in that country to
compete with the United States at the global level.

In the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress report, China’s most authoritative strategy
document, Beijing articulated for the first time an ambition to contend for global leadership. It stated
that by mid-century, China seeks to have “become a global leader in terms of composite national
strength and international influence.” Given that China already has the second largest economy and one
of the largest militaries in the world, this phrasing strongly suggests that, over the long term, China is
mulling competition with the United States for the status of global leader.

Beyond reasons of prestige, global leadership affords a country the opportunity to reap considerable
economic and security benefits by shaping international norms, rules, and institutions, as the United
States has done since World War II. And if trends that narrow the gap in national power continue, global
competition between the two giants could become unavoidable in any case. To be sure, the future
remains undetermined and there are many reasons why China may never succeed in mounting such a
challenge, but the report’s contents suggest China’s leaders are positioning the country to seize such
an incredible opportunity should it present itself.

China’s interest in global leadershipa

Clues as to the sort of preparations underway can be seen in the sections of the 19th Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Congress report that outline policy objectives for 2035, a new category designed
to serve as an intermediary point between the two well-known centenaries of 2021 (centenary of the
founding of the CCP) and 2049 (centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China). The
objectives reflect a much stronger awareness of the need to compete globally than was the case in
previous CCP Congress reports. The shifting emphasis reflects the reality that China has grown into a
great power with global interests, and that consequently elements of domestic and international policy
increasingly overlap. Underscoring this point, the 19th CCP Congress report describes China’s ambitions
as interlinked with the world. It observed, “The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with
the dreams of the peoples of other countries.” Not coincidentally, the 19th CCP Congress elevated the
role of the Foreign Ministry in policy making.

The goals outlined for 2035 hint at the need for global competition. But as a public document, the report
unsurprisingly features diplomatic and elusive terms on sensitive topics, such as foreign policy. Some
clues about Beijing’s intentions can nevertheless be deduced through careful study of the report’s
entire contents, however. For example, the report directs officials to avoid war and maintain peaceful,
cooperative relations with the United States and other great powers. It also highlights the need to
safeguard core interests of sovereignty and territory, as well as protect the resources, markets, and
citizens abroad needed for national development. These imperatives are not new, but they will probably
remain essential for years to come. The report does introduces new requirements, however, such as the
need to achieve technological leadership, build a network of strategic partnerships, and expand China’s
international influence and involvement in global governance.

Technological leadership

The 19th CCP Congress report stated that by 2035, China seeks to have “become a global leader in
innovation.” This ambition is important for three reasons. First, leadership in technological innovation
increases the likelihood that a country will enjoy higher productivity and wealth than its peers. Second,
the transferability of military and civilian technology means that a technologically advanced country is
better positioned to build a premier military – an idea captured in the report’s directives for “military-
civilian fusion.” Third, technological leadership enhances a country’s international influence, or “soft
power,” because others tend to emulate the world’s technological leader and the lifestyle changes it
affords. Indeed, some experts regard the contest for technological leadership as
among the most consequential for deciding global leadership.

Even if short-term, direct conflict is less likely, China will use technological advances to
undercut U.S. leadership
Heath, 18 --- Senior International Defense Research Analyst with the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation (1/5/18, Timothy R., “China’s Endgame: The Path Towards Global Leadership,”
https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-endgame-path-towards-global-leadership, accessed on 6/4/18, JMP)

Overlapping, parallel globalizations?

Fearing the risks of an escalating rivalry, China and the United States have for years faced the prospect
of competition with well-founded apprehension. China attempted to head off rivalry by proposing a
“new type of great power relationship,” while the United States emphasized cooperation with China,
even as it bolstered its military position and presence in Asia under President Obama’s “Rebalance to
Asia.” But the 19th CCP Congress report’s directions and the Trump administration’s designation of
China as a strategic competitor signals the competition may be evolving into a more intense stage.

Thankfully, the risks of military conflict remain low, owing principally to the fact that globalized
production, trade interdependence, mobility of populations and the spread of transnational threats
continue to provide powerful incentives for the two countries to maintain cooperative relations. Nor is
there any serious domestic or international support for global conflict.

Beneath the placid surface of cooperative relations, however, the two countries appear poised to step
up the struggle for advantage. The struggle could intensify in the shadowy worlds of diplomatic
maneuvering, influence operations, elite politics and cyberspace. Incapable of challenging U.S. power
openly, China will likely instead focus on increasing its national competitiveness in technology,
commerce, diplomatic influence and military strength. In geopolitical terms, China is likely to prioritize
efforts to further Eurasia’s integration. If it succeeds, the result could be the emergence of parallel,
interpenetrating globalized orders that share some institutions in common, but reflect divergent values,
norms, and standards. To retain its leadership position and the immense benefits that it confers, the
United States will require global vision, foresighted policies to bolster technological advantage,
energetic and skillful diplomacy, adept intelligence operations, and savvy management of alliances and
partnerships, especially in Asia and Europe. The challenge of managing an intensifying contest in a stable
manner will test the leaders of both China and the United States – and bear directly on the prospects for
peace and prosperity for the entire world.
 Sino-India War Impact

Sovereignty claims because of OBOR could lead to miscalculation between India and
China
Malik 17 — Malik is a professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Mohan Malik, 9-12-2017,
"China and India: The Roots of Hostility," Published by Diplomat,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/china-and-india-the-roots-of-hostility/, Accessed 6-5-2018, JWS)

Though a war has been averted, Beijing has not compromised on its sovereignty claims. As the entire Sino-
Indian border from Kashmir to Burma remains undemarcated and unsettled, Zhao Gancheng, director of South Asian studies at the Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies, believes that “it
is unrealistic to expect China and India to have high political
trust or to exclude the possibility of another incident.” India’s army chief, General Bipin Rawat, agrees and cautions against
complacency because Doklam-style encroachments are likely to “increase in the future.” But two weeks after the standoff appeared to end,
Indian and Chinese troops remain on the plateau, separated by 150 meters, according to Indian media reports. The reports also claim that
Chinese troops have built bunkers on a ridge near the disputed area and there are concerns that the standoff could resume. Neither
side
is going to lower its guard by pulling troops back too far. Reputational costs weigh heavily. New Delhi cannot
abandon Bhutan — India’s only treaty ally in South Asia — to Beijing’s bullying and blandishments. For Beijing, the central message of India’s
defiance — “China will stop only when it’s stopped” — could encourage further acts of defiance by other adversaries. Having been
outmaneuvered and outwitted by Delhi, Beijing may seek to bolster its military capabilities in Doklam. Whether imperial or communist, China
has a long history of lashing out at states that hurt its pride and interests. It seems the so-called Pacific Century may turn out to be just another
hundred bloody years in Asia. In fact, skirmishes
and military face-offs have been a regular feature on their
contested borders, rife with disputed histories. Numerous pacts and border management mechanisms established over the decades
have failed to maintain peace and Asia’s giants have come close to fighting for a second round along their long, disputed Himalayan border at
least once a decade since the late 1960s. Never close, a chill has descended on Sino-Indian ties in recent years over a
whole range of issues including India’s membership in global institutions, territorial disputes, Pakistan-based terror groups, water, trade,
maritime, and India’s
public opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also ‘One Belt, One Road,’ or OBOR) as China
embarked upon a path to regional hegemony. From New Delhi’s perspective, China’s BRI narrative in a
sense seeks to rewrite Asian history and shape Eurasia’s future without recognizing India’s historical,
cultural, religious, and commercial links to the world. Thus, at a time when the whole world is China’s oyster, India is the
only Asian country standing athwart China’s march to glory and greatness. Not surprisingly, the enemy most often spoken of in Beijing’s
strategic circles today is India. The censors encourage alarmingly frank discussion of the merits of another war against India. In particular, China
has been concerned about India moving too close to the United States and Japan for Beijing’s comfort. From Beijing’s perspective, as long as
India understands that China is the preeminent great power in Asia, and New Delhi keeps its subordinate place in the hierarchy, both will enjoy
a mutually beneficial relationship. However, should India challenge or aspire to emerge as China’s equal or peer competitor — and to do so
with help from Japan and the United States — then the entire gamut of contentious bilateral issues are open for review and recasting.
Convinced that India has opted for the latter course, the Chinese government has hardened its stance and unleashed a
shrill media campaign against India. Not very accustomed to weaker powers pushing back, Chinese official statements have been
among the most belligerent and contemptuous since the 1960s. China’s defense ministry spokesman repeatedly called on
India to “correct its mistakes and stop its provocations.” This campaign — unusual in its sarcasm and ridicule of Indian
aspirations with daily threats and warnings — has mobilized Chinese public support for punitive action against its southern rival at an
appropriate time and place. It
is worth remembering that several military stand-offs and skirmishes eventually
culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The periodic Himalayan standoffs have their origins in the deep-seated hostility
and suspicion that China and India have for one another. My book China and India: Great Power Rivals argued that given the fundamental clash
of interests rooted in their history, strategic cultures and geopolitics, the threat of another war is ever present. For Asia has
never known both China and India growing strong simultaneously in such close proximity with overlapping spheres of influence. India perceives
itself in southern Asia much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to eastern Asia — as the preeminent power. Both aspire to the
same things at the same time on the same continental landmass and its adjoining waters. As their need for resources, markets and bases grows,
Asia’s rising powers are also increasingly running into each other in third countries. China’s global clout is manifesting itself in a millennia-old
sense of superiority in Chinese behavior as Beijing seeks to recast the world in its own image. India’s rise presents serious
challenges to China. Their power rivalry and their self-images as natural great powers and centers of civilization
drive them to support different countries and causes. Since India was never part of the Sinic world order, but a civilization-
empire in and of itself, it remains genetically ill-disposed to sliding into China’s orbit without resistance. It is the only Asian power that has long
been committed to balancing China. Economic, military and demographic trends over the long term tend to favor India. Compared with the
United States, Russia and Japan — all in relative decline, India is the only country whose power and influence vis-à-vis China is increasing over
time. New economic prosperity and military strength is reawakening nationalist pride in India, which could bring about a clash with the Chinese,
if not handled skillfully. The emergence of a democratic, but at-times chaotic, India as the fastest growing world economy undercuts “the China
model” of development-without-democracy. Add to this mix India’s growing military cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia,
and growing strategic ties with countries that fall within China’s sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and
Myanmar). All of these “new irritants” reinforce Beijing’s fears about India’s growing role in the U.S.-led containment of China. Furthermore,
Chinese diplomats have discerned a certain degree of assertiveness, confidence and arrogance in their Indian counterparts that was missing in
the 1980s and 1990s. When Chinese and Indian leaders meet, there is little meeting of the minds. Many analysts believe that growing power
asymmetry, in particular Beijing’s global economic clout, is the reason for Chinese derision and bellicosity toward India. However, I argue that
the roots of Chinese hostility toward its southern rival are deep-seated and actually pre-date Beijing’s acquisition of economic and military
muscle. An understanding of Chinese perceptions of India insofar as they influence policy is important because the present tensions may or
may not erupt in a hot war, but will surely make their cold war colder. These perceptions have led five successive generations of post-Mao
Chinese leadership to contemplate “teach[ing] India a lesson again” at least once every decade since the 1962 War (Zhou Enlai in 1971, Deng
Xiaoping in 1987, Jiang Zemin in 1999, Hu Jintao in 2009 and Xi Jinping in 2017). India is “an artificial British creation” Since Mao’s days, Chinese
leaders have entertained doubts about the historical authenticity of the Indian nation. They have shown contempt for India’s great power
ambitions, perceived their southern rival as a pawn in Western designs to contain China, and worried about the strategic ramifications of India’s
power with regard to Tibet’s future. Official rhetoric of Asian solidarity or millennia-old civilizational bonds notwithstanding, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) stereotype of India is of a loathsome, backward neighbor that sold opium to China, sent soldiers to crush the Boxer
rebellion, provided Sikh policemen for the pre-1949 international settlements in Shanghai, copied British parliamentary democracy, adopted
English as its official language, gave refuge to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan “splittists,” and, last but not least, pursued British India’s expansionist
policies. The 1962 War and the Sino-Pakistan military nexus helped to tilt the regional power balance in China’s favor. If anything, the gulf
between the two countries — in terms of their perceptions, attitudes, and expectations of each other — has widened in recent years. Despite
growing economic ties, there is little or nothing positive about India’s history, economy, or society in Chinese school textbooks. Official media
portrays India as “a backward country full of horrific stories.” Amid reports of an Indian consumer boycott of Chinese goods, many Chinese
netizens joked that they could find nothing produced by India that they could boycott. When he was vice-foreign minister, Wang Yi described
India as “a tribal democracy whose long-term existence was far from a certainty.” Many Chinese analysts maintain that “India as a nation never
really existed in history,” and urge Beijing to remove an emerging security threat by initiating the balkanization of India into 20-30 independent
states with the aid of friendly countries. A Huanqiu commentary on July 28, 2017, warned India not to mess with China: “China has the capacity
to make each of India’s northeastern states independent.” Many believe that “China and India cannot really deal with each other
harmoniously” because “there cannot be two Suns in the sky.” The opinion pieces in Renmin Ribao, Xinhua, China Daily and nationalistic Global
Times provide invaluable insights into Chinese elite thinking on India. Some may argue that the war-mongering rhetoric is not representative of
China’s official policy and that sensational press articles represent the shrill voice of those who advocate a tougher line toward India. After all,
similar commentaries have appeared against Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and the Philippines in the recent past. The most plausible
explanation is that Chinese government encourages this nationalistic outpouring to pressure New Delhi to comply with its demands. It also
reflects a new consensus on hardline policy toward rising India. In short, there exists in the Chinese commentariat a deep distrust and dislike of
India — with the converse also holding true. “India cannot compete with China” Another dominant Chinese belief is that there is more hype
than substance to India’s rise, generated mostly by the Western media. While Indians benchmark themselves against China, the Chinese see
their country as not just an Asian power but a global power on par with the United States while making disparaging comments about India’s
“unrealistic and unachievable big power dreams” (daguomeng). Whilst China already struts the world stage as a superpower, India remains far
behind in all indices of power. Official China loathes being spoken of in the same breath as India. India plays no part in the vision projected by
Beijing of the 21st century as a Chinese one — albeit except as a junior partner. Given China’s growing global footprint and the West’s current
disarray, Beijing feels no need to play the anti-West, Asian solidarity card, or make any concessions to keep India on its side. Traditionally, China
has long looked at India merely as an upstart wannabe that likes to punch above its weight and needs to be constantly reminded of its place.
Much of Beijing’s strategic penetration deep into South Asian and the Indian Ocean has clearly been at India’s expense. What irks the Chinese
elite apparently is the international praise showered on India’s democratic model. China’s economy and military are both nearly five times the
size of India’s. The Chinese contend that their economic success proves the superiority of “the China model.” The PLA judges the Indian military
inferior to the Chinese in combat, logistics, equipment, and war-fighting capability. Meanwhile, the potential emergence of India as an
alternative pole worries Beijing. A main objective of China’s Asia policy is to prevent the rise of a rival to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific’s
sole “Middle Kingdom.” China’s strategic culture necessitates a distrust of strong, powerful neighbors and a preference for small, weak, and
subordinate or client buffer states. Few, if any, of China’s strategic thinkers hold positive views of India for China’s future. India’s efforts to take
counter-balancing measures are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Much to China’s chagrin, India’s “Act East” policy and naval
activism have encouraged many countries to “view India as a counterweight to China in Southeast Asia.” The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to
promote growth and connectivity proposed together by India and Japan has drawn negative media commentary for “trying to trip China’s
OBOR.” Those who see India’s rise as China’s “Thucydides Trap” favor nipping it in the bud before it’s too late. Others favor leveraging mistrust
and conflict in relations between India and its smaller South Asian neighbors and engaging in long-term strategic competition to sap India’s will
and prevent it from spreading its wings. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative seeks to integrate Asia’s natural resources, markets, and bases into China’s
national development strategy. Moderate voices who want Beijing to accommodate a rising India in order to leverage its economic growth and
partner with it to build a multipolar world are often drowned out by more hawkish voices. Chinese
leaders seem confident that
China’s growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish a Sino-
centric a hierarchical order as the United States remains disoriented and Japan shrinks economically and demographically, while
India is subdued by Beijing’s “all-weather relationships” with its South Asian neighbors. For Chinese diplomats and strategists, some resistance
(“frictions” or “nuisances” from pesky neighbors, as Global Times put it) in China’s march toward glory and greatness is to be expected, but
resistance will eventually give way to accommodation followed by reconciliation on China’s terms. As such, the goal is to convince neighboring
countries that the overall balance of power has shifted in Beijing’s favor, and their long-term interests lie in cutting bilateral deals with China.
The kowtowing of Filipino, Thai, Cambodian and Malaysian leaders vindicates this approach. Chinese officials openly talk of buying off smaller
countries instead of invading them. Strategically-located countries with resources, markets and naval bases are usually the largest recipients of
Chinese largesse. Whether imperial, nationalist or communist, the aim of Chinese policy has been that neighbors must be respectful, obedient,
and in areas immediately adjacent to the Chinese lands, preferably impotent and sufficiently weak. Overawed by China’s growing wealth and
power, India and other Chinese neighbors are expected to acquiesce to China’s primacy and accept Beijing as their “benevolent big brother.”
Those who seek to contain China by banding together or aligning with the United States and allies would invariably incur Beijing’s wrath. The
policy of using territorial disputes to seek subservience creates contradictions that lead Beijing to support the 1890 Qing-British Treaty that
demarcated borders with Sikkim and Tibet but to oppose the 1914 Simla Convention, to uphold the watershed principle on the Sikkim boundary
demarcation but oppose it on the China-India border in Arunachal Pradesh. Xi’s Dream: China as Number One Last but not least, China has
always seen itself as a superior, unrivaled civilization-state. The CCP leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China’s imperial legacy,
often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. From primary school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled
media has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of nationalist bluster and imperial China’s grandeur. One lesson Chinese school textbooks
teach is that “strength leads to expansion and weakness to contraction.” That is why Beijing no longer feels constrained by bilateral or
multilateral pacts or treaties that it signed on to “when China was weak.” A common refrain is that “other countries need to ‘get used to’ its
assertive posture and Chinese maritime forays, whether they like it or not.” So “history” battles over territorial disputes are essentially about
the future of regional order: Pax Sinica versus Pax Americana. Beijing’s assessment of the United States as being distracted internally, and
weakened diplomatically, has emboldened Chinese leadership to be aggressive. In the past six months alone, Beijing has threatened war with
Vietnam, the Philippines, and India. As Martin Jacques puts it: “Imperial Sino-centrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.” The
CCP’s version of history — a benign and benevolent China at the center of Asia — commanding obeisance from less civilized is imagined, self-
serving version, and constructed to serve the Party’s domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals. Hyper-nationalism, a belief in Han
exceptionalism, and of the inevitability of a post-American Sino-centric world now shape Beijing’s India policy. Chinese leaders are cautious but
also known risk-takers. And the PLA’s proclivity to tolerate risk on the border with India is much greater. As in the late 1950s, rising India is once
again being viewed by PLA generals as an ambitious power with whom China may have to have a day of reckoning. Chinese strategic thinkers
feel that a limited war with India would send a resounding message to those who are again courting and counting on India as a balancer or
counterweight to China in the 21st century. The demonstrative effect of a short and swift victory over India would buttress the need for other
Asian countries to accommodate China’s growing power by aligning with, rather than against China. Instead of challenging China, Indian leaders
will then be much more deferential. Even more tantalizing is the prospect of several weak and warring states in South Asia — all vying for
Chinese aid and support. In short, even
though neither side wants a war, small skirmishes ending in a military
confrontation due to miscalculation or hubris cannot be completely ruled out. Short of a hot war, Beijing could
make the line of actual control (LAC) as “hot” as India’s line of control (LOC) is with Pakistan. For the foreseeable future, the China-India cold
war will continue to be characterized by incursions, tensions and scuffles, interspersed with endless talks until both sides work out new rules of
engagement and mechanisms to enforce them.

Yes war and escalation

Chan 17 — (Minnie Chan, 8-1-2017, "China and India on brink of armed conflict over border dispute,"
Published by South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2106493/china-and-india-brink-armed-conflict-hopes-resolution, Accessed 6-5-2018,
JWS)

However, Indian defence experts warned that once the first shot is fired, the conflict may escalate into
full-scale war. That in turn could result in New Delhi blockading China’s maritime lifeline in the Indian Ocean. “Any Chinese military
adventurism will get a fitting reply from the Indian military,” Dr Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, a research
associate at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, told the Post. “Certainly, it will be detrimental
for both, but if Beijing escalates [the conflict], it will not be limited. Perhaps, it may extend to the maritime domain as well,” he said. “If China
engages in a military offensive against India, New Delhi will take all necessary measures ... [and will] respond to
Chinese actions in its own way. Why only a border war? It could escalate to a full-scale India-China war,” he said.
 OBOR => Expands Chinese Influence

China is using to OBOR to squeeze out U.S. influence in Eurasia

Heath, 18 --- Senior International Defense Research Analyst with the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation (1/5/18, Timothy R., “China’s Endgame: The Path Towards Global Leadership,”
https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-endgame-path-towards-global-leadership, accessed on 6/4/18, JMP)

Deepen regional dependence through integration.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to deepen “connectivity” in policy, infrastructure, trade, financial,
and inter-personal contact across the Eurasian landmass. Chinese officials and scholars explain that the
BRI will grant China the advantage of extending its influence by expanding the number of countries
that depend on standards of technologies and infrastructure set by China. As Wang Yiwei, a scholar at
People’s University, explained (in Chinese), the BRI provides the advantage of “interoperability based on
infrastructure construction” and standards set by China. Wang cited in particular areas such as high-
speed rail, nuclear power, energy, electricity grid, and information technology connectivity in which
Chinese companies will gain advantage. “If Eurasia forms an interoperable whole” under presumably
Chinese leadership, Wang concluded, “then there will not be much left for the United States.”

OBOR expands Chinese soft power

Crabtree and Ming 17 — (Justina Crabtree, Cheang Ming, 5-22-2017, "Why soft power could be the
real value of China's massive Belt and Road project," Published by CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/22/one-belt-one-road-why-the-real-value-of-chinas-project-could-like-
in-soft-power.html, Accessed 6-14-2018, JWS)

The real value of "One Belt, One Road"

The real benefits of OBOR to China could be the international clout it stands to gain as its attempts to spearhead
international policy and improve relations with OBOR partner countries. Tim Summers, senior consulting fellow of the Asia
Programme at Chatham House, said that China's soft power push with emerging economies grappling
similar aspirations towards development were most likely to be successful. Chinese leaders appear to recognize
the country's public image problem. Liu Yanhua, a counsellor of the State Council, acknowledged in a speech at an OBOR seminar earlier in the
week that China had faced backlash despite investing billions in infrastructure in some countries due to its lack of attention to the environment
and local communities. Soft power was first openly acknowledged as a part of China's agenda in 2007, when then-President Hu Jintao called for
the country to employ the concept at a party congress. Soft power is as important in the OBOR equation as investing in hard infrastructure, said
Gong Xue, senior analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. TheChinese
government knows it has a shortfall of soft power and has invested in think tanks, scholarships, culture and the media in a
bid to correct this, Gong said. "The Chinese government has sensed the international investment environment is changing … (This has led)
them to pay attention to details such as the response from civil society, the role of business actors,
language and cultural barriers in their investment plans," Gong said in an email. "(T)he metaphor of Silk Road is
itself a sort of soft power, conjuring images of a past age of openness, connectivity, peaceful trade,
cultural exchange ... in which China was a central player," Summers added.
Encouraging regional connectivity through OBOR exports soft power
Du 17 — (Karen Du, 10-7-2017, "Does China have the soft power necessary to become the global
hegemon?," Published by Australian Institute of International Affairs,
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/resource/china-soft-power-necessary-become-global-
hegemon/, Accessed 6-14-2018, JWS)

In more recent times, China

has been attempting to export its approach to development through the “One Belt,
One Road” (OBOR) initiative which encourages regional connectivity. This initiative is clearly a vehicle for soft
power as it will promote economic integration between Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The
OBOR initiative is not the only evidence of China’s willingness to cooperate. It has also been pursuing its own trade
agenda through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an agreement that encourages cooperation between 16 signatory
nations. This agreement will account for almost 50% of the world’s population, and over 30% of the global GDP. This is demonstrative of China
taking over the role of defending the global trading system, in the face of the US’ protectionist tendencies, as well as its latest effort to expand
its international soft power.

OBOR boosts soft power through economic power and cooperation with regional
countries
Hsu 18 — Hsu is an Associate Professor of Economics at the State University of New York (Sara Hsu, 1-
5-2018, "China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative Promotes China Over US," Published by No Publication,
http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=26212, Accessed 6-14-2018, JWS)

Focus on infrastructure allows China to employ its construction firms abroad and generate investment
opportunities, both for itself and for other countries. Excess capacity in cement and steel enterprises can be used to
provide materials for OBOR projects. OBOR will also help China gain access to trade with less developed countries by
reducing trade costs due to improved transportation networks and enhanced trade agreements between
nations. Politically, the project strengthens China’s soft power abroad, boosting China’s stature as a global
power. China earns political points for providing assistance to poor countries. The deliverables specified
during China’s May 2017 Belt and Road Forum provide an intense work agenda for China, but also promise to massively bolster
China’s involvement in Asia and beyond. These include: coordinating development strategies and infrastructure development,
expanding industrialisation and trade, increasing financial cooperation, and focusing on people to people exchange.2 All of these items
require negotiations with neighbouring governments, understandings based on mutual respect and
benefits.

OBOR builds soft power through tying countries to China more deeply
Shirata 17 — (Tim Shirata, 5-12-2017, "They Want to Be the Greatest World Power," Published by
Guild Investment Management, https://guildinvestment.com/china/8190/, Accessed 6-14-2018, JWS)

The outward focus is more apparent: obviously, OBOR is intended to boost China’s regional power. As a very public display of
ambition, it may indicate that the Chinese leadership believes that the time has come for the fulfillment of a dictum of Deng Xiaoping, the
leader who opened China in the 1980s and set it on its current development path. Deng famously said, “Hide your strength and bide your
time.” Xi Jinping clearly believes that China’s time has come. OBOR will secure and
expand China’s regional leadership by
tying lesser-developed regional powers more deeply to Chinese capital, Chinese markets, and Chinese
infrastructure networks. Indeed, China has been pursuing this kind of “soft power” for some time; we’ve
written about how China has ingratiated itself with various African governments by providing infrastructure capital when Western lenders were
more reticent. This year we got the first evidence of what usually follows “soft power” as China began construction of its first foreign military
base, in Djibouti. Not surprisingly, this base is near the strategically critical Mandeb Strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of the
eight global chokepoints for seaborne crude oil shipments.
 OBOR Allows China to Undermine U.S. Global Influence

OBOR allows China to undermine U.S. influence globally --- doubling down on our
innovation is critical
Mosbacher, 17 --- former president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, chairman of
Mosbacher Energy Company (11/9/17, Robert, “United States has to keep pace with China and its
economic power plans,” http://thehill.com/opinion/international/359652-united-states-has-to-keep-
pace-with-china-and-its-economic-power-plans, accessed on 5/31/18, JMP)

The Chinese Communist Party Congress, which recently concluded in Beijing, gave President Xi Jinping a
second five-year term and embraced his ambitious plans to turn the country into a global superpower.
While it will take time for China to match U.S. military capability and surpass the United States in the
overall size of its economy, the strides it has made in driving international economic development in
strategically important parts of the world are at once impressive and alarming. It is impressive because
it entails hundreds of billions of dollars invested in critical infrastructure such as roads, railroads, port
terminals, and power plants. It is alarming because with that development comes increased economic
and political influence, the ability to dominate, if not control, access to economic markets, and
hostility towards Western values.

Indeed, Xi makes the argument that China offers a new model for development that does not require a
country to imitate Western values. One must assume that means that deals can be “negotiated” behind
closed doors rather than through open and transparent bids, and that there is no pressure on host
governments to move toward more political or economic freedom for their citizens. As Xi has said, “It
offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while
preserving their independence.” Yet, the day a host government agrees to let the Chinese build a huge
infrastructure project in their country, which the Chinese will finance and the host country will pay over
time, is not a day of independence, but rather a day of long-term debt dependence on China.

The centerpiece of the strategy is the “One Belt, One Road” initiative launched by Xi four years ago. It is
focused primarily on connecting and integrating the economies of China and its Eurasian neighbors.
Since inception, it has expanded to include some 60 countries in Asia and Europe and has been
augmented by the economic corridor of China, Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar, and the economic
corridor between China and Pakistan The latter consists of infrastructure project commitments totaling
$57 billion. Although the United States has struggled to maintain a productive relationship with
Pakistan, particularly given their strategic importance as a nuclear power, the breadth and depth of
Chinese investment in Pakistan over the last few years cannot help but diminish U.S. influence in that
pivotal country.

China also has moved aggressively into Africa. At the present time, China is Africa’s number one trading
partner, its number one infrastructure financier, and its number one source of foreign direct investment
growth, according to a recent study by McKinsey & Company. There are currently more than 10,000
Chinese firms operating on the continent, over 30 percent of which are in manufacturing, and roughly
90 percent are privately owned Chinese businesses. Some 89 percent of the employees are local
Africans. So their Africa strategy is about more than just infrastructure projects, large state owned
enterprises, and exporting Chinese workers. It is also about dominating economic markets, often at the
expense of U.S. and European firms.

Some may take comfort in the fact that the West has won the battle of political ideologies and that few,
if any, nations aspire to adopt a communist system. However, in the global marketplace of today, money
talks and economic strength is a critically important soft power tool. If China were merely engaged in a
benign effort to expand its own economy, increase trade, and address the enormous need for
investment in the developing world, it would represent a challenge to the West, but not necessarily a
threat. However, Xi’s description of a “new era” in which he “sees China moving closer to the center
stage,” backed up by a “world class” military, sounds more like a threat than a challenge, particularly for
those who value freedom and democracy, and work for open, transparent, and competitive markets.

The question is how best to contain and compete with China’s plans for economic expansion. It is not to
imitate or replicate its development approach, but rather to dramatically modernize and upgrade our
own economic diplomacy and development toolkit, and work much more collaboratively with our allies
in Europe and Japan. A new economic development strategy led by the United States should play to our
strengths of entrepreneurship, technological innovation, and private capital investment. It should rely
more on encouraging and enabling private sector investment than on foreign assistance.

The U.S. government agency with the responsibility for what is called development finance is the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Although it makes money every year, this agency should be
replaced with a new development finance corporation that consolidates various programs spread across
different parts of the executive branch. It should have the same tools as its European and Asian
counterparts. With the same tools for facilitating private capital investment in high risk developing
countries, the United States should lead an initiative to leverage and blend financing with our European
and Japanese allies to provide the scale necessary to compete with China.

The United States should also work more closely with the multilateral development banks that share our
commitment to private sector driven economic growth and level playing fields for competitive markets.
When the United States reduces its support for those institutions, the Chinese are happy to fill the void.
This is no time to retreat, or think small. If we want to maintain a level of influence in the world
commensurate with our economic and military might, we must engage quickly and smartly.