1. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.

vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

November 6, 2010

175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid
Classification

Eminent Domain – Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are
less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific
amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this
violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation.
This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds
and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of
money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress
is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even
without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation
through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is
merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything
is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e.,
shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
 2. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16

Facts:

Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System,
which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports
diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil

Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a
depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro
Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West
Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July
10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its
Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to
the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.

What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the
sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of
contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.

Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23,
2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the
present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in
representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati

City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their
intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues... involved.[1]

On November 19, 2010, the Cou... rt issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of
Directors to file their respective verified returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and
desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of
the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward
incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from
receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a
Joint Compliance[5] submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that
they neither own nor operate the pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to report on the
structural integrity of the pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no
capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the
Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.

On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on Pipeline Integrity
Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”

Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has
ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a
query of the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the

Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its
BOPL System.

To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).
By this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14] the appellate court was required to conduct
hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and... recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the
parties’ memoranda.

On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19] of the CA’s Report
praying that (a) instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal
Industry Research and Development Center; (b) a trust... fund be created to answer for future
contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.

On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and
Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the
WOPL may resume its operations.

Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the
state of the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties
during the March 21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for... adjudication

Issues:

Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and
whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real
parties-in-interest;

Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to
perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected
environment;

Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies;
and

Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
environmental protection order.
Ruling:

Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39] Generally, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real... parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by
the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[41] Alternatively, one who
has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for
it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium
unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the
morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit
owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no
gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners
and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium
corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The

Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the
condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may
affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or... users.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang
Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala

Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the
Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013
Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule
7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly
affected by an environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation.

Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court,
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the
WOPL.

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions.
Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise,
concurs with the other recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.
II.

Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s
Commercial Viability

To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a
Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent

FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently
address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning
scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known
as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;

(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook
the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known
as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e)
inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.[47] Furthermore, in
August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct
ILI... inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall
thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for
purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution
and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for
commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL
is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with
due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor
sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and
sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain
the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said
certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized
knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October 25,
2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later,
however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos

Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of
the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and
FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts
the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by
FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should,
therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter.
Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall
issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the
probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the WOPL may
be... ordered.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline
structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the
basis of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of
the numerous findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s
present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.

Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the
resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed
activities and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the

DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully
determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical
state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the
factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural
integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.

Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ
of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating
or restoring the environment.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the
creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a
special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already
suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer
is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a
special trust fund is misplaced.

The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse,
however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases
filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.

Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the

IV. Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found
FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-
256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint

(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed
against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual
capacities.

The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a
petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to individual petitioners
under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA,
the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings
to ventilate and... determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate
powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of
petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.

Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.

Principles:

Said proviso... pertinently provides:

SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation... expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the... court.
(emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits
the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the
court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners.

The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with
Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee
on Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by
CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations embodied in the permits issued by
the DENR, and to get a certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is the
government agency tasked to implement the state policy of

“maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment”[57]
and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution.”[58] It is
indubitable that the DENR... has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation
of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.

With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in the
pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the
environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it... fitting that the pipeline be closely
and regularly monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the
affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the
future generations to come.

Petitioner’s January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA’s Report need not be
discussed and given consideration. As the CA’s Report contains but the appellate court’s
recommendation on how the issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this

Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.

As to petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, the matters
contained therein have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case.
With all these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised by the... parties.

3. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

Facts: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional
Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

Held: Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with
this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.

4.MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48

December 18, 2008

FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen
way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit
for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-
up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific
pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes
as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction
or indifference.
 5.Donald Mead vs. Hon. Manuel Argel, CFI July 20, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against
him for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created
under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING: The filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the
Commission on the matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway
canal)(Sec 9). The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not ‘pollution’ did exist
is vested in the Commission, who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized
knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or
of those sitting in a court of justice (Sec 8).

Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the
Commission on the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had
been violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.

6.G.R. 93891

Pollution Adjudication board vs. Court of Appeal and Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

March 11, 1991

Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication
Board on the ground that the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for
the said Order is remiss. Petitioner reasoned that under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal
authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie
evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence
that the respondent corporation has waste discharge beyond the allowable standards set by the NPCC
(Sec5, Effluent Regulations of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD 984). If it has not yet been subject to the allowable
standard, the Board may still issue ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the
effluent pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The
court held that the Board, as the government entity tasked to determine whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions, has the authority to issue the order as it may see fit. This is, after all, allowed by law to
address relevant pollution issues as an immediate recourse.

7.G.R. No. 94759

Technology Developer, Inc. vs. CA

January 21, 1991

Petitioner Technology Developer, Inc. sought to annul the Mayor’s order in closing the petitioner’s Plant,
assailing the latter’s power in denying the former a mayor’s permit on the basis of environment violation.

RULING:

The lower courts were right in upholding the mayor’s order, reasoning that although the NPCC of the
Ministry of human Settlements (now Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources) has the task to determine the existence of pollution and violations of environmental
laws, the mayor by virtue of his police power has as much responsibility to protect its constituents from the
same and regulate the operation of establishments which pose relative threat to the community.

The Court, in considering the evidence presented, upheld the respondent, stressing the importance of the
general welfare of the community over and above the potential economic return of investment but is
detrimental to many.

8.G.R. No. 79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc

October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development
which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356
subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the
President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s
prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public
respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without need
of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to
determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata
which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to develop
and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to
regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court
further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court
ruled that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.

9.G.R. No. 104988

Mustang Lumber vs. CA

June 18, 1996

Petitioner lumber corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products by respondents.

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not mentioned
in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised Forestry Code)
must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a processed log or
timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction between raw or processed timber, neither
should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged
with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as it falls
under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure was a valid exercise of
the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held that
Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the Lumber since
petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of
the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

 10.G.R. No. 111107

Leonardo Paat vs. CA

January 10, 1997

The truck of private respondent was seized and confiscated by the DENR because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Private respondents
filed before the courts a suit for replevin (recovery of personal property) despite the pending administrative
resolution. Private respondents contended that the DENR had no legal authority to seize the items and that
said authority lies on the court as provided for in Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

RULING:

The Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Private respondents
could not say they were deprived of due process, knowing that an administrative proceeding is pending
before the DENR, who was yet to render a resolution on the controversy.

The Court also ruled that private respondents miserably failed to prove the wrongful detention of the subject
truck confiscated. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.705
as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation
as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence,
no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

The Court clarifies that with the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705,
the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes
a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.

11.Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture,
co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity
of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent
and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel
claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an
organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition
assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications
for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211,
is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however,
has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional
mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211,
the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to
operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of
mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws,
still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining
leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 12.EN BANC

[ GR No. 68474, Feb 11, 1986 ]

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION +

RESOLUTION

225 Phil. 266

PLANA, J.:

I. In G.R. No. 70632, (1) petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC Commissioners to
pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 (PNPP-1) in PAEC Licensing
Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster from office, although "proven competence" is
one of the qualifications prescribed by law for PAEC Commissioners. (2) Petitioners also assail the
validity of the motion (application) filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC)/or the conversion of its
construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it contained no
information regarding the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of nuclear fuel, and insurance
coverage for nuclear damage. (3) Petitioners finally charge respondent PAEC Commissioners with bias
and prejudgment.

1. The first issue must be resolved against the petitioners. Where the validity of an appointment is not
challenged in an appropriate proceeding, the question of competence is not within the field of judicial
inquiry. If not considered a qualification the absence of which would vitiate the appointment, competence
is a matter of judgment that is addressed solely to the appointing

power.

2. As regards the legal sufficiency of the NPC motion for conversion, petitioners contend that the
deficiencies they have indicated are jurisdictional infirmities which cannot be cured. The Court believes
however that said deficiencies may be remedied and supplied in the course of the hearing before PAEC.
For this purpose, respondent-applicant NPC may submit pertinent testimonies and documents when the
PAEC hearing is re-opened, subject to controversion and counter-proof of herein petitioners.

3. There is merit in the charge of bias and prejudgment. The PAEC pamphlets particularly Annexes "JJ",
"KK" and "LL" of the petition (G.R. 70632) clearly indicate the prejudgment that PNPP-1 is safe.

Exhibit "JJ" is an official PAEC 1985 pamphlet entitled "The Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1." It gives an
overview specifically of PNPP-1, lauds the safety of nuclear power, and concludes with a statement of the
benefits to be derived when the PNPP-1 starts operation.

"x x x When the PNPP-1 starts operating, it will generate a power of 620 megawatts enough to supply 15
percent of the electricity needs in Luzon. This is estimated to result in savings of US$160 million a year,
representing the amount of oil displaced.
"Aside from being a reliable source of electricity, nuclear power has an excellent safety record and has
been found to result in lower occupational and public risks than fossil-fired (coal or oil) stations." (p. 6,
Emphasis supplied.)

The second pamphlet (Exh. "KK") is entitled "NUCLEAR POWER - SAFE CLEAN ECONOMICAL AND
AVAILABLE." On the surface, it merely propagates the use of nuclear power in general. But its numerous
specific references to the PNPP-1 "which will be operational in 1985" and its advantages give credence to
the charge that Exhibit "KK" was in reality designed to project PNPP-1 as safe, among others.

When Exhibit "KK" was published, PNPP-1 was the only nuclear plant under construction in the
Philippines. It is the Philippine nuclear plant specifically mentioned therein that was to be operational in
1985. Therefore, when the pamphlet states that nuclear power is working now in other countries and "it
should work for us too" because it is "safe" and "economical", it is logical to conclude that the reference is
to no other than the nuclear power to be generated at the PNPP-1.

Also worth quoting is the following passage in Exhibit "KK" which sweepingly vouchsafes all nuclear
power plants, including the PNPP-1:

"No member of the public has ever been injured during the last 25 years that commercial nuclear reactors
have been generating electricity. As is to be expected in any complex system as nuclear power plants,
there have been failure of equipment and human errors. However in every instance, the safety
equipment designed into the nuclear reactor self terminated the accident without injury to the operators or
the public. The Three Mile Island Incident, serious as it was, did not result in the loss of life nor did it
result in the exposure of anyone beyond permissible limits.

"The designers of nuclear plants assume failure to occur, and provide multiple safeguards protection
against every conceivable malfunction." (p. 7, Emphasis supplied.)

The third pamphlet (Exh. "LL") is entitled NUCLEAR POWER PLANT and ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY.
Speaking specifically of the PNPP-1, it categorically states that the Bataan nuclear plant will not adversely
affect the public or the flora or fauna in the area. One of the stated reasons in support of the conclusion
is ?

"And environmentally, a nuclear power plant emits only insignificant amount of radioactivity to the
environment. It does not cause chemical pollution of air or water, it does not emit sulfur dioxide or
nitrogen oxides like plants fired by fossil fuels such us coal and oil. Besides, even coal fired plants may
emit radioactive particles of uranium and thorium because these may be found naturally associated with
coal deposits.

"Comparatively therefore, a nuclear power plant is the cleanest and the safest, environmently no other
technology in modern times has been developed with so dominant concern for public safety as nuclear
power." (p. 8)

Respondent PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility for these official pamphlets. Exhibit "JJ"
was published in 1985, when respondent Commissioners had already been appointed to their present
positions. Exhibits "KK" and "LL" were issued earlier, but the majority of respondent Commissioners even
then were already occupying positions of responsibility in the PAEC. Commissioner Manuel Eugenio was
Acting Chief of the PAEC Department on Nuclear Technology and Engineering from June, 1980 to July,
1984, Commissioner Quirino Navarro was PAEC Chief Science Research Specialist from May, 1980 to
September, 1984; and Commissioner Alejandro Ver Albano was PAEC Deputy Commissioner from
March, 1980 to September, 1984. Additionally, the stubborn fact remains unrebutted that Exhibits "JJ",
"KK" and "LL" continued to be distributed by PAEC as late as March, 1985. In other words their official
distribution continued after the filing of NPC's motion for conversion on June 27, 1984 and even after
PAEC had issued its order dated February 26, 1985 formally admitting the said motion for conversion.

At any rate, even if it be assumed that there are some doubts regarding the conclusion that there has
been a prejudgment of the safety of PNPP-1, the doubts should be resolved in favor of a course of action
that will assure an unquestionably objective inquiry, considering the circumstances thereof and the
number of people vitally interested therein.

Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1, respondent PAEC Commissioners would be acting with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of
the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.

The Court therefore Resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners from further acting in
PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.

II. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to order PAEC to reconsider
its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for mandatory injunction and/or restraining order
dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent motion for mandatory injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the
various pleadings and other documents submitted by the parties relative thereto, and considering the
paramount need of a reasonable assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk to
the health and safety of the people, which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects
of PNPP-1 be characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by
technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section 34), and in keeping with the requirements of due
process in administrative proceedings, the Court Resolved to ORDER respondent PAEC (once
reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to give petitioners sufficient time to complete their
cross-examination of the expert witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-examine the witnesses that
petitioners have failed to cross-examine on and after August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of
their evidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the production of relevant
documents. For the said purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a time schedule which shall reasonably
assure the parties sufficient latitude to adequately present their case consistently with the requirements of
dispatch. It is understood that the PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies
in its application or evidence in support thereof.

13.G.R. No. L-51773 May 16, 1980

LT. COL. RODRIGO S. DE GUZMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE MARCELINO M. ESCALONA, FLORENTINO RODRIGO, and

MARIANO DAYDAY.

Facts:
The defendants Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday were charged with "Illegal Possession of
Explosive locally known as 'dinamita'.” While in the seawaters of the Cebu, confederating and mutually
helping with one another, without authority of the law and without proper permit from authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA' in
their banca purposely for use of illegal fishing and three (3) bottles of explosives, two (2) paddles, two (2)
fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and one (1) banca were recovered from their possession and control,
which acts of the above-named accused is a gross violation of PD No. 1058. Both were found guilty of
said accusation.

However, the judge only submitted possession of explosives in connection with subversion is covered by
Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal possession of explosives, Act 3023, has not been
completely repealed; that having found that the possession by the two accused of two bottles of home-
made explosives was solely for fishing purposes and had no connection with subversion, the illegal act
should fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but under Act 3023.

Petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated National Police
Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these certiorari proceedings alleging
mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing under
Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not for violation of Act
3023 which had long been repealed by several laws and decrees; that the penalty provided for by current
legislation is one which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that
respondent Judge's Decision has no legal basis.

Issue:

W/N the responded judge erred in rendering judgment even though the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

Held:

Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the criminal complaint against the accused respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for certain forms of
illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree No. 704 or the "Fisheries
Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or
cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1),
(m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent to
use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ...
(Emphasis supplied).

Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058, correspondingly provides:

(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of
mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ... (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People of the
Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for, indeed, there is
no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the Complaint.

14. Republic of the Philippines vs. Honorable Roman Cansino, Jr. et. al.

G.R. No. L-17923

Facts:

On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint for replevin against
Commander Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon the filing by Ramirez of a P2,
000 bond, Judge Roman Cansino ordered the court sheriff to take possession of the 85 tubs of fish for
five days and release it to Ramirez. Commander Ocampo filed a petition to return the fish for the same
fish were caught in TONY LEX I boat. Here, the fish were caught through the use of dynamite, which is a
violation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for prohibition and injunction were filed by Ocampo against the
Judge and the sheriff.

Issues:

Whether respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizure

Whether Ramirez violated R.A. 428

Held:

Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioner is the R.P and
the same is exempt from the obligation to post such a bond.

Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite in fishing which the
Bureau of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the said law.

15. G.R. No. L-13678 November 20, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MOISES CUBELO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: appellant Moises Cubelo was charged with the crime of illegal fishing with explosives, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of March, 1955, within the jurisdictional waters of the municipality and
province of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jursidiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously explode one stick of dynamite without permit to do so as
a result of which a certain kind of fish locally called tamban valued at P10.00 was disabled, killed and/or
stupefied in violation of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471 and further amended by
Republic Act No. 462.

He was arraigned on March 25, 1957, the information being read and translated to him in local dialect. to
the charged, he pleaded him guilty of illegal fishing with the use of explosives as defined in Act. No. 4003,
as amended and considering his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, sentenced him —

.. to undergo the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and six (6) months, as minimum, to two (2) years,
as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P1,500, or to serve subsidiary imprisonment which shall
not be more than one-third (1/3) of the principal penalty or in any case to not more than one year; and to
pay the costs.

Appellant contends that he may not be convicted of illegal fishing with dynamite because the information
fails to allege the intention to fish with explosives.

Defendant in support of his contention, relies upon the phrase "use explosives in fishing", claiming that in
order to hold him criminally liable, the information should make it clear that the explosives or dynamite
was used in fishing and not for any other purpose.

However, in spite of his spontaneous plea of guilty, Cubelo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which certified the case to us on the ground that it involved only question of law.

Appellant contends that he may not be convicted of illegal fishing with dynamite because the information
fails to allege the intention to fish with explosives.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant violated Act 4003.

HELD: Defendant in support of his contention, relies upon the phrase "use explosives in fishing", claiming
that in order to hold him criminally liable, the information should make it clear that the explosives or
dynamite was used in fishing and not for any other purpose. The act charged in the information against
Cubelo that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exploded one stick of dynamite, which explosion
resulted in disabling, stupefying and killing a certain kind of fish, known as tamban valued at ten pesos,
comes under the provisions of Section 12 and par. 2 of Republic Act 462.

16. PEOPLE v. LEONCIO LIM

G.R. No. L-14432, July 26, 1960

FACTS: On November 19, 1955, the Chief of Police of Sumarraga and two other policemen, while aboard
a motorboat, observed two other fishing boats obviously engaged in trawl fishing. The policemen pursued
the two boats and while one fishing boat escaped, they apprehended the other boat and accosted herein
accused who was on board. A criminal complaint was filed against the accused for violation of Sec. 2 of
Fishery Administrative Order (FAO) No. 37 promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Defense now contends that said Sec. 2 is void because it is contrary to the provisions and
spirit of the Fisheries Act because whereas the prohibition prescribed in said Fisheries Act was for any
single period of time not exceeding five years duration, FAO No. 37-1 fixed no period, that is to say, it
establishes an absolute ban for all time. Furthermore, defense also claims that FAO No. 37-1 is
discriminatory in that the prohibition is made applicable only to trawl fishermen and not to other persons
engaged in fishing. Finally the accused contends that FAO No. 37-1 is invalid for the reason that FAO No.
37 which amended it was not shown to have been approved by the President; at least it does not bear
and state the date said approval.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 2 of FAO No.37 is contrary to the Fisheries Act

RULING: SC: This discrepancy between Act No. 4003 and FAO No. 37-1 was probably due to an
oversight on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Of course, in case of
discrepancy, the basic Act prevails, for the reason that the regulation or rule issued to implement a law
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. It is possible that the Secretary contemplated the
ban for the same period prescribed in Act No. 4003, but failed to state it in Section 2 of FAO No. 37-1. But
should he have intended to make the ban for all time, then said FAO No. 37-1 would be inoperative in so
far as it exceeds the period of five years for any single period of time; but it does not necessarily render
void FAO No. 37-1.

17.PEOPLE VS. RENERIO VERGARA

FACTS: Appellant was caught throwing into the sea a bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing
ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could
explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish within a certain
radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the sea, the explosion
occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagaño and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on
board to tend to the air hose for the divers.

Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the
"Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its
paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. The accused, however, refused
to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor. Vergara was charged, together with his
three co-accused of the crime of Violation of Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058. Accused, without any authority of law, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally catch,
take and gather fish belonging to the anchovies species known locally as "bolinao", with the use of
explosives contained in a bottle and called in the vernacular as "badil", which bottled explosives after
being ignited and hurled to the sea, produced explosion and caused the death of the said fish which were
hit or affected by such explosion.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty under Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058

RULING: The decision of the court a quo appealed from is affirmed in toto.

Thus, Renerio Vergara is sentenced to a penalty of Twenty (20) years to, life imprisonment as punished
under Sec. 2, of PD 1058.
The Court further orders the confiscation of the fishing boat of Mario Moraleta including the following
equipments: 1 air compressor, 3 sets of air hoses, and the 3 pieces of "sibot" having been found to be
instruments of the crime.

SO ORDERED

18. G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine

Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

vs.

HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY

Facts:

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats, Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta.
Winnie and Srta. Agnes, were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite
and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.

It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in
legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated
September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled.
However, the ships were apprehended without warrant for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated there under.

Respondent filed with the Court against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and
impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The court dismissed the
complaint for failure of the petitioner to prosecute and failure of the defendant to appear.

It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.

The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex
VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted definition of vessel includes
"every description of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water"
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.

Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest and the seizure of the vessel,
as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an incident to a lawful arrest was held to be
lawful.

19. THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL.

Facts:

In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary
capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil service exam. In July
1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen. Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is
being replaced by a civil service eligible. In September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil
service exam he took in 1950; he passed. He then appealed his separation from service.

ISSUE:

W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.

HELD:

No. In fact, he should have been separated from the service even before 1951. Under the law, he was
supposed to only hold such temporary appointment for three months while the appointing power is still
looking for a civil service eligible. His extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing
power. Further, there is no law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to a permanent
one. When he met the civil service eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a permanent position in
the PVD. The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case
the head of the department. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive position in the
Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an appointment. The Civil
Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only certifies an eligible to be possessed of the
qualification as required for a position classified under its rules.

20. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC.
and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
Facts:

This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an exclusive power on
the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen engage in the Laguna de bay. The
power to issue a permit was then transferred to the office of the mayor on the different municipalities of
Laguna thus making the Laguna de bay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources and danger
to the livelihood among the folks of Laguna.

Issue:

Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of Laguna Lake
Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen permits and other related activity
involving Laguna de Bay.

Ruling:

No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over
Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that
there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in
statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided
for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken
as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.

21. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the
plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of
the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that
GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51%
shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court
also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands
of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-
Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that
the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the
rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

22. ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners,

vs.

GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No.
15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: “AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF.

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

“In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known
as ‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A
MAYOR’S PERMIT” and “City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto
Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via
aircraft or seacraft.

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: “A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS
(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS
AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL,
OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,

and,

ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993

Entitled, “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus
(Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning),
4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other
species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or
Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and
coming from Palawan Waters.

Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province
of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation
and trade.

Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order
No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied;
in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit and; that
Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan “altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was
caught or gathered through lawful fishing method,” the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering “into
contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.”

And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and void,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with
the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to
have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.

Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it
imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan
the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing… and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance.”