CALALANG VS WILLIAMS
The paradox lies in the fact that the
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
DasmariñasStreet from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to
530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the
provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of
Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade
and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at
the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order
to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To
this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
LABOR STANDARDS
individual will fall into slavery.
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring
its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least
be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare
of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
saluspopuliestsupremalex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
ALALAYAN VS NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
AGABON VS NLRC
Facts:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in
the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction
materials. It employed petitioners VirgilioAgabon and Jenny Agabon
as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until
February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims
Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the
other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work.NLRC ruled there was just cause and
petitioners were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The
CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have
abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held:
Accordingly, petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had
abandoned their employment and were already working for another
employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a
just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
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Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a
just cause for termination of employment by the employer.
After establishing that the terminations were for a just and valid
cause, we now determine if the procedures for dismissal were
observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule
I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of
termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in
Article 282 of the Code:
A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side;
A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with
the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut
the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the
employee’s last known address.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices
and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the
employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the
grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to
be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized
causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written
notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1)
the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons
under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal
is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3)
the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no
due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but
due process was not observed.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The
dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company.
Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements
and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses
would have been useless because they did not reside there
anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid
excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to
the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modifications.
LABOR STANDARDS
PAL VS NLRC
Facts:
On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely
revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among
the employees and was immediately implemented, and some
employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures
embodied therein.
On August 20, 1985, the Philippine Airlines Employees Association
(PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice with the following
remarks: “ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL’s Code of
Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by
Management”. In its position paper, PALEA contended that PAL, by
its unilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor
practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article
253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had
been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in nature the
Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient publication,
and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the
rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code be
held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code
with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated
and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be
declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay
damages.
PAL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting its prerogative
as an employer to prescibe rules and regulations regarding
employess’ conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and
alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor
Code.
Labor Arbiter Isabel P. Ortiguerra handling the case called the parties
to a conference but they failed to appear at the scheduled date.
Interpreting such failure as a waiver of the parties’ right to present
evidence, the labor arbiter considered the case submitted for
decision. On November 7, 1986, a decision was rendered finding no
bad faith on the part of PAL in adopting the Code and ruling that no
unfair labor practice had been committed. However, the arbiter held
that PAL was “not totally fault free” considering that while the
issuance of rules and regulations governing the conduct of
employees is a “legitimate management prerogative” such rules and
regulations must meet the test of “reasonableness, propriety and
fairness.”
PAL appealed to the NLRC. On August 19, 1988, the NLRC through
Commissioner Encarnacion, with Presiding Commissioner Bonto-
Perez and Commissioner Maglaya concurring, found no evidence of
unfair labor practice committed by PAL and affirmed the dismissal of
PALEA’s charge.
PAL then filed the instant petition for certiorari charging public
respondents with grave abuse of discretion
Issue:
Whether the management may be compelled to share with the union
or its employees its prerogative of formulating a code of discipline.
Held:
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It was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No.
6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly
considered it a State policy “(t)o ensure the participation of workers in
decision and policy-making processes affecting the rights, duties and
welfare.” However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law,
the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered
boundless.
San Miguel Brewery vsOple: So long as a company’s management
prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them.
UST vs NLRC: All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of
managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by
limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or the
general principles of fair play and justice.
A line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding
business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the
employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its
employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes
action. PAL asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies
of the Code. Public respondents found to the contrary, which finding,
to say the least is entitled to great respect.
The collective bargaining agreement may not be interpreted as
cession of employees’ rights to participate in the deliberation of
matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies
relative thereto. And one such mater is the formulation of a code of
discipline.
Industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied
their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their
rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the labor Code (P.D. 442) was
amended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already declared a policy
of the State, “(d) to promote the enlightenment of workers concerning
their rights and obligations . . . as employees.” This was, of course,
amplified by Republic Act No 6715 when it decreed the “participation
of workers in decision and policy making processes affecting their
rights, duties and welfare.” PAL’s position that it cannot be saddled
with the “obligation” of sharing management prerogatives as during
the formulation of the Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been
enacted (Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot thus
be sustained. While such “obligation” was not yet founded in law
when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a harmonious
labor-management relationship and the then already existing state
policy of enlightening workers concerning their rights as employees
demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial
moves affecting employees’ rights.
MANILA ELECTRIC VS SECRETARY OF LABOR
QUISUMBING
PAL EMPLOYEES SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION VS
NLRC
INNODATA PHILIPPINES INC. VS QUIJADA-LOPEZ
Facts:
LABOR STANDARDS
Innodata Philippines, Inc., is engaged in the encoding/data
conversion business. It employs encoders, indexers, formatters,
programmers, quality/quantity staff, and others, to maintain its
business and do the job orders of its clients.
Estrella G. Natividad and Jocelyn L. Quejada were employed as
formatters by Innodata Philippines, Inc. They [worked] from March 4,
1997, until their separation on March 3, 1998. They believed that
their job was necessary and desirable to the usual business of the
company which is data processing/conversion and that their
employment is regular pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code,they
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for damages as well as for
attorney’s fees against Innodata Phils., Incorporated.
Innodata contended that their employment contracts expired, having
a fixed period of one (1) year. Since the period expired, their
employment was likewise terminated applying the ruling in the Brent
School case.
Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto rendered a judgment in favor of
complainants holding complainants Estella G. Natividad and Jocelyn
Quejada to have been illegally dismissed by Innodata Philippines
Incorporated and Innodata Processing Corporation and ordering
reinstatement to their former position without loss of seniority rights,
or to a substantially equivalent position, and to pay them jointly and
severally, backwages computed from the time they were illegally
dismissed on March 3, 1998 up to the date of this decision in the
amount of P112,535.28 EACH, or in the total amount of P225,070.56
for the two of them; and further ordered to pay them attorney’s fees in
the amount equivalent to 10% of their respective awards.
Innodata appealed to NLRC which reversed and set aside the Labor
Arbiter’s decision declaring that the contract was for a fixed term and
therefore, the dismissal at the end of their one year term agreed
upon was valid. An MR was filed but was denied.
The CA ruled that respondents were regular employees in
accordance with Section 280 of the Labor Code. It said that the fixed-
term contract prepared by petitioner was a crude attempt to
circumvent respondents’ right to security of tenure.
The disputed contract reads, as follows:
“TERM/DURATION
The EMPLOYER hereby employs, engages and hires the
EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE hereby accepts such appointment
as FORMATTER effective March 04, 1997 to March 03, 1998, a
period of one (1) year.
x xxxxxxxx
“TERMINATION
7.1 This Contract shall automatically terminate on March 03, 1998
without need of notice or demand.
x xxxxxxxx
7.4 The EMPLOYEE acknowledges that the EMPLOYER entered
into this Contract upon his express representation that he/she is
qualified and possesses the skills necessary and desirable for the
position indicated herein. Thus, the EMPLOYER is hereby granted
the right to pre-terminate this Contract within the first three (3)
months of its duration upon failure of the EMPLOYEE to meet and
pass the qualifications and standards set by the EMPLOYER and
Page3
made known to the EMPLOYEE prior to execution hereof. Failure of
the EMPLOYER to exercise its right hereunder shall be without
prejudice to the automatic termination of the EMPLOYEE’s
employment upon the expiration of this Contract or cancellation
thereof for other causes provided herein and by law.”
The contract provided two periods. Aside from the fixed one-year
term set in paragraph 1, paragraph 7.4 provides for a three-month
period during which petitioner has the right to pre-terminate the
employment for the “failure of the employees to meet and pass the
qualifications and standards set by the employer and made known to
the employee prior to” their employment. In effect, the paragraph 7.4
is a probationary period.
Innodata claims that it was constrained by the nature of its business
to enter into fixed-term employment contracts with employees
assigned to job orders. It relies on the availability of job orders or
undertakings from its clients. Thus, the continuity of work cannot be
ascertained.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the alleged fixed-term employment contracts are valid.
Held:
No, “Art. 1700 of the Civil Code provides that the relations between
capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on
labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Innodata’s contract of employment failed to comply with the
standards set by law and by this Court. “ A contract of employment is
impressed with public interest. For this reason, provisions of
applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract. Hence, the
“parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply
contracting with each other.” Moreover, in case of doubt, the terms of
a contract should be construed in favor of labor.”
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
CIRTEX EMPLOYEES LABOR UNIONS- FFW VS CIRTEX
EMPLOYEES
Facts:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics,
Inc., of the Court’s Decision dated November 15, 2010.
Respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot
insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by
the parties; and that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union
had already filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free
Workers resulting in the latter’s lack of personality to represent the
workers in the present case.
Issue:
LABOR STANDARDS
WON petitioner lost its personality to represent the workers because
of its disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers.
Held:
The issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be
resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or
both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor organization, not the
employer.
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may
disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing
that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such,
however, does not result in it losing its legal personality altogether.
Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng
MgaManggagawangNagkakaisaSa Manila Bay Spinning Mills At J.P.
Coats enlightens:
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed
to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the
employer and their employee-members. A local union does not owe
its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the
will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the
local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only
gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in
representation of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
MR denied.
MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE
VS VIRGILIO CAGALAWAN
PEOPLE VS VERA REYES
Facts:
The defendant was charged with a violation of Act No. 2549, as
amended by Acts Nos. 3085 and 3958 The information alleged that
from September 9 to October 28, 1936, and for the some time after,
the accused, in his capacity as president and general manager of the
Consolidated Mines, having engaged the services of Severa Velasco
de Vera as stenographer, at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully
and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer
corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time, which was
long due and payable, in spite of her repeated demands.
The accused interposed a demurrer on the ground that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute any offense, and that
even if they did, the laws penalizing it are unconstitutional.
After the hearing, the court sustained the demurrer, declaring
unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. 2549 as last
amended by Act No. 3958, which considers as an offense the facts
alleged in the information, for the reason that it violates the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and
dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.
In this appeal the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in
declaring Act No. 3958 unconstitutional.
Issue:
Page4
Whether the said constitutional provision is unconstitutional.

Held:

No. The last part of section 1 considers as illegal the refusal of an

employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or
laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of
every week, with only two days extension, and the nonpayment of
the salary within the periods specified is considered as a violation of
the law.

The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer

who, having failed to pay the salary, should prove satisfactorily that it
was impossible to make such payment.

The court held that this provision is null because it violates the
provision of section 1 (12), Article III, of the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.

We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly

applied in this case. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act
No. 2549, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958, will show that its
language refers only to the employer who, being able to make
payment, shall abstain or refuse to do so, without justification and to
the prejudice of the laborer or employee. An employer so
circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another, by
refusing to pay his just debt. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the
essential element constituting the offense. The first case is a violation
of Act No. 3958, and the second isestafa punished by the Revised
Penal Code. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

Another doctrine:

Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws,

within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society. (12 C. J., p. 904.) In the
exercise of this power the Legislature has ample authority to approve
the disputed portion of Act No. 3958 which punishes the employer
who, being able to do so, refuses to pay the salaries of his laborers
or employers in the specified periods of time.

Undoubtedly, one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible

abuses on the part of employers who hire laborers or employees
without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus
causing them financial difficulties.

Without this law, the laborers and employees who earn meager
salaries would be compelled to institute civil actions which, in the
majority of cases, would cost them more than that which they would
receive in case of a decision in their favor.

LABOR STANDARDS Page5