Sources

Protecting the identity of Togo’s citizens
CBN introduces a new National ID system
Togo’s National Identification Program (National ID) registers all Togolese and entitles nationals to hold
an ID Card. The Card is used as proof of ID and enables people to apply for all government and financial
services including obtaining a Passport or Driver’s License, writing national educational examinations
and obtaining a bank loan, among others.
After a successful partnership with CBN on its passport program, the Directorate General for National
Documentation (DGDN) engaged us to strengthen its National ID Program. Prior to our involvement, this
ID was a paper-based document that was issued manually.
Our work started with a comprehensive requirements analysis. We documented business processes, and
then created a detailed technical specification for a National Identification System. Our solution
included:
 A central registry that holds the data of all citizens;

 A system that is deployed and operated at 39 locations across the country;
 A biometric to ensure that each individual is enrolled in the system only once;
 Interface with other databases to authenticate individual identities;
On-line and ‘store and forward’ capabilities to allow for efficient operations in locations where
infrastructure is a challenge;
An ongoing training program to ensure a high standard of operators;
The design of a secure ID document; and
Secure manufacture and print of all National ID Cards.
Today, the National ID Card is the most trusted form of ID in Togo. Since the launch of the system, CBN
and the DGDN have collaborated on a number of initiatives to extend and enhance the program to serve
the evolving needs of the Togolese Government and its citizens. These include a mobile enrollment and
image capture to serve citizens anywhere in the country, new professional and police ID cards and
leveraging the system to support identification for elections.
Administrative Order No. 308, s. 1996
Signed on December 12, 1996
MALACAÑANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic services and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services and social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security
providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized

Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.
SEC. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-

up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created,
chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System
Administrator, Social Security System
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC
and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall
serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the
standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned
agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office
of the President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Six.
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) RUBEN D. TORRES

Executive Secretary
MALACAÑANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 278 August 24, 1973
INSTITUTING A NATIONAL REFERENCE CARD SYSTEM AND CREATING THEREFOR THE NATIONAL
REGISTRATION COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WHEREAS, there is a pressing need for the government to establish a system of positive identification of
all Filipino citizens and foreign nationals in the Philippines, a system essential to insuring national
security and affording convenience in the transaction of official business with government and private
offices and agencies;
WHEREAS, the various identification systems currently in existence are generally agency-oriented,
specific in purpose and non- complementary:
WHEREAS, among the objectives of such a National Reference Card System would be the replacement of
all existing identification systems currently prescribed by government agencies to afford convenience to
the general public.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers in me
vested by the Constitutions as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, Proclamation No. 1104 dated January
17, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, in order to achieve the aforesaid
objectives, do hereby decree that:
1. All citizens of the Republic of the Philippines shall be assigned a Reference Number and issued
a National Reference Card in a manner prescribed by the National Registration Coordinating Committee:
2. Citizens or nationals of foreign countries resident in the Philippines shall likewise be assigned
a Reference Number and issued a National Reference Card in the manner prescribed by the National
Registration Coordinating Committee:
3. The National Reference Card shall serve as the official identification of the person to whom it
is issued;
4. The penalty of imprisonment from five to ten years shall be imposed upon and offender
found guilty of any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) The willful submission of or causing to be submitted a fictitious name and other false
data in the application form for a National Reference Card by any person;
(b) The unauthorized printing, preparation or issuance of a National Reference Card by

any person;
(c) Willful falsification, mutilation, alteration of or tampering with a National Reference

Card by any person;
(d) The use of unauthorized possession of a National Reference Card by any person
other than the one to whom it was issued or the possession of a fake, falsified or altered
National Reference Card; and
(e) Willful failure to apply for and secure National Reference Card as prescribed by the
National Registration Coordinating Committee.
5. There is hereby created a National Registration Coordinating Committee composed of the

following or their respective representatives;
The Secretary Department of Local Governments and Community Development Chairman
The Secretary Department of National Defense Co-Chairman
The Secretary Department of Education and Culture Member
The Chairman Commission on Election Member
The Director Bureau of the Census and Statistics Member
The Commissioner Bureau of Internal Revenue Member
The Commissioner Commission on Immigration and Deportation Member
The Managing Director National Computer Center Member
6. The National Registration Coordinating Committee is hereby designed and authorized to

prescribed rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Decree.
7. Repealing Clause. All laws, executive orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with this decree are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.
Done in the City of Manila this 24th day of August in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1973/pd_278_1973.html
National ID to benefit unemployed, unbanked Filipinos
Chris Schnabel
The majority of unbanked Filipinos are unemployed. A national ID would remove a key barrier to
opening a bank account that would allow them to fully enjoy financial technology.
MANILA, Philippines – Digital innovation could be the key to getting every Filipino banked, but the
country needs to set up the proper infrastructure before that could happen, according to experts
brought together by the Asian Development Bank to discuss financial inclusion in the Philippines.
“One of the key barriers to financial inclusion in the country is the lack of a universal national ID and
private industry has also identified it as one of the major costs in getting people on-board the financial
system,” said Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Inclusive Finance Advocacy officer Rochelle Tomas.
At the moment, there is no one national ID issued to every individual regardless of status, and this is a
problem because of the BSP’s tough regime of requiring at least one Photo ID to open a bank account.
While government employees are all issued IDs and private sector employees can obtain SSS IDs and
company IDs, those who are unemployed have no access to an ID and being unemployed is the major
characteristic of financially excluded markets, Tomas explained.
“There is hope, however, as there is a draft bill passing through both houses that pushes for the creation
of nation ID called the Filipino Identification System Act (FISA)," she said.
“The passage of the bill could be an important milestone for financial inclusion in the Philippines,”
Tomas said.
Scaling up inclusion
The benefits of a national ID system have precedents, particularly in India, said Carol Realini, a
celebrated author and Silicon Valley entrepreneur who has founded numerous startups focused on
financial inclusion including Obopay and Chrodiant.
“Financial Inclusion hasn’t scaled in the Philippines like it has in India and Kenya and a lot of that had to
do with infrastructure, especially a lack of national ID. Put these things in place and I think it will
transform the inclusion in the country,” she said.
The Philippines has made major strides in financial inclusion and in particular micro-loanswhich have
surged 333% since 2002. Despite this, only 31.3% of Filipino adults have a formal bank account while
only 4 out 10 report that they save money, according to the BSP’s 2015 report on financial inclusion.
A secure cloud-based ID system can be scaled quite quickly with Realini pointing out that “the Indian
government only began issuing the ID in 2007 and now they have 1 billion IDs." She added: "It's so
exciting to build infrastructure like that practically overnight."
It also can also be used for a variety of applications with banking just the tip of the iceberg.
“It creates a bigger vision for what’s possible once once everyone has a simple ID. You could use it to
keep medical records, food subsidies and allow for digital transfers. Basically it allows for people to be
full digital participants” she said.
Fintech game-changer
Getting people to become digital participants is crucial as the future of financial inclusion lies in financial
technology, or fintech, Realini said.
Due to innovations and changes in the enabling environment, the number of financially excluded adults
across Asia and the Pacific has dropped to about 1 billion. The emergence of new fintech players are
accelerating the process much more rapidly than at any other time in history, she added.
Realini highlighted one such emerging player in the Philippines, the payment mobile app PayMaya of
Smart Communications.
The service creates a virtual credit card that can be reloaded and used immediately for online shopping,
peer-to-peer transfers, to pay for mobile phone load and to pay any merchant worldwide that accepts
Visa.
It also highlights a crucial step for digital inclusion in the country; the new focus on interoperability, as
the system can be used by anyone regardless of his or her mobile network operator.
It’s important to allow non-bank actors to have a role because they will be the key enablers of financial
inclusion, Realini said, adding that they will even affect traditional banking as the world grows
increasingly digital.
“What we’re going to see in the near future is that solutions focused on the bottom of the pyramid will
create breakthroughs that are so effective that even mainstream banks are going to start adopting
them,” she said. – Rappler.com
https://www.rappler.com/business/industries/209-banking-and-financial-services/134125-national-id-
benefit-unemployed
EN BANC
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, G.R. No. 167798
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG
MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
EMILIA P. DAPULANG,
SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and
ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and
costly redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be
holding several identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification
cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business
with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and
reliability of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of
laws involving false names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by

virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to
adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing
the same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing
of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under
this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the
participating agencies shall be limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference
number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above,
including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall
appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to

Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic
Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority. In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID
system containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the
identity of the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or
mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the
government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to
streamline the ID systems in government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical working
groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its
functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of

this executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the
pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the
right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards
shall, as a minimum, include the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity
of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy
shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology; and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or
revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification
card shall prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management
shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent
with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification
(ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court
in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the
Social Security Act of 1997.
2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO
420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for
that purpose.
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.
4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued
without public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the
discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID.[2]
Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of
legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right
to privacy.
Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming
that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the
circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The
petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government
entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners
claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this
executive order. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior
to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayors
Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus,
all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt
a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the
uniform data collection and format, namely:
the same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those
availing of government services;
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by
government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14
specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of
Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14)
Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government
entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to
the LTO all these 14 specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for
identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID
databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for
identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either
expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing
ID systems, some government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At
present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue
are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court, the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the
Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5)
ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person
to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can
generally also show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in
Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific
data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far
more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats
uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of
procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for all
government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their
data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government
entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly
within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already
authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and
optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under
the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in
the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format
to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does
not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not
apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID
cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed
to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has
not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the
President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO
420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does
not require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public
schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards
to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a
person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition
for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student
or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the
implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens
whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection
and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that
the citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card
systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is
not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a
very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the
confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the
data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID
card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and
issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues
an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will
contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number,
and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and
reliability of identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should
undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems,
and provide user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are
day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its
own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying
to unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan
and Court of Tax Appeals.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same
is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the
Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to
achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any
legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards
in the performance of their governmental functions.There have been no complaints from citizens that
the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no
complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to
EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis
to complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID
system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight
specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data
to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and
record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can
show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID
shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on
the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the
identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy
be allowed or tolerated under this order;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
cryptographic technology;
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can
be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the
prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some
one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain,
France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have
national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic
Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. Even with EO 420,
the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but
allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform
effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system,
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false
names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID
system.
The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v.
Connecticut, U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Whalen v.
Roe. The last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the
present case.
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the
bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. Because the facts and
the issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive
bearing on the present case.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on
individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from
the press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a
central database information on citizens gathered from public records across the country. In fact, the
law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal
identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such
information with officials of States, cities and other institutions. The Department of Justice treated such
information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the
criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the information demanded falls
under that category of exempt information.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only
strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside
the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as
strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data
cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not
collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.
Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over
information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required
doctors to furnish the government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that
have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized database containing the
names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was
assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep
their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:
Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,

and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)
Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14
specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive
and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems,
unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription
drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-
violative of the right to privacy.
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth,[16] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors
performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such
records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly
respect a patients confidentiality and privacy are permissible.
Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,[17] the U.S. Supreme

Court upheld a law that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that
included the doctors name, the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the
woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the marital
status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information publicly
available. in Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The collection of information with respect to actual
patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no
purpose other than to make abortion more difficult
Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld
in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under
EO 420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires
disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or
humiliate anyone.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such
violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection,
recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not authority
to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance,
broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation.As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation,
and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance
in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID
card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance
system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
DecNsion had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/april2006/G.R.%20No.%20167798.htm
Executive Order No. 420, s. 2005
Signed on April 13, 2005
MALACAÑANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 420
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification system in government have created unnecessary and
costly redundancies and higher costs and to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to
be holding several identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification
cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business
with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and
reliability of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of
laws involving false names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by

virtue of the power vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. – All
government agencies, including government-owned controlled corporations, are hereby directed to
adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
the same or related information.
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing
of government services;
Section 2. Coverage. – All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data Requirement for the Unified ID System. – The data to be collected and recorded by the
participating agencies shall be limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference
number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above,
including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stores, shall
appear on the face in back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority to

Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. – The Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and Responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority. – In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a. Adopt within (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID system
containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity
of the card holder;
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or
mayors, the Commission Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the
government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to is effort to
streamline the ID systems in government;
c. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical working
groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its
functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this
executive order.
Section 6. Safeguards. – The Director General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the
pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguards as may be necessary and adequate to ensure the right to
privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as
minimum, include the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity
of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a person’s right to privacy
shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for the access and disclosure of data;
cryptographic technology; and
Section 7. Funding. – Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this Executive Order.
Section 8. Repealing Clause. – All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are
inconsistent with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. – This Executive Order shall take effect (15) days after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) EDUARDO R. ERMITA

Executive Secretary
http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2005/04/13/executive-order-no-420-s-2005/
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security
providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized

Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-

up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created,
chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC
and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall
serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the
standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned
agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise
public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office
of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO.
308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per
se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System
(SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID)
card. 6 Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the
GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals from
the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308
establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make
laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and
cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will
be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. 14 The
executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he
has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or
interfere with the discretion of its officials.19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has
the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that
A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general
law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to
serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General
Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on
the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions,
Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and
offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions
and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for
the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers
both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on
private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security,
the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President
to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject
that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation
and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the
established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher:
". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must
he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the
general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the
United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right
has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees
that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married
persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to
privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, 38the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, 41 the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the
individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print,
signature and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin
number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual
holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and
turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is
stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This
technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another
method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary
pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger
print. 51 Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the
unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list of
biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using
infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat
and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It
is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an
individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek
its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the
fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the
dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the documentary
file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base
through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other
basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O.
No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms
how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the
data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the
privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is
broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose,
or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way
for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology
are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on
his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the
Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an

individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a
privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. 66Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its
danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a
laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if
it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the
fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the
reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings
and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of
biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant
technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only
on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer
technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of
privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations
merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual
to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS
employment records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and
the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming
part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason
why its enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using
the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and
speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication
of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these
purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the
end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the
law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his
sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No.
308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not
narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court
will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for
the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it
enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if
not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the
presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude
abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect
human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards
the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a
centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required
physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a
recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients
can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who
were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of
their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that
once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded
a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an
aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an
orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed
commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn
and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated
who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing
penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy
was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital
safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use
of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek.
Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social
objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management
of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making
accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key
decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the
internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the
individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of
information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict
scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats
emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th
case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of
Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his
past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too
quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., I join Justices Kapunan and Mendoza in their dissents.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., In the result and I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the dissents of Justices Kapunan and Mendoza.
Vitug, J., See separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., I join in dissenting opinion of JJ. Mendoza and Kapunan.
Purisima, J., I join in Justice Mendoza's dissenting.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be DISMISSED.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/jul1998/-gr_127685_1998.html
SEC bats for national ID system vs dirty money
By: Doris Dumlao-Abadilla - Reporter / @philbizwatcher
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 02:02 AM April 01, 2016
Besides easing the bank secrecy law, the Philippines should legislate a national identification system to
combat money laundering more effectively and to improve government delivery of services, according
to the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
SEC Chair Teresita Herbosa, also cochair of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), on Thursday
agreed with the proposal of the Foundation for Economic Freedom (FEF) that the implementation of a
biometrics-based national ID system would prevent the easy creation of fictitious accounts as what had
happened to the case of the recent $81-million money-laundering case via the Jupiter branch of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC).
Together with sound bank practices, such as the know-your-client rule, a biometrics-based national ID
system could be used as an additional safeguard to prevent money laundering in banks and other
financial institutions, FEF said.
Herbosa said she was advocating the implementation of a national ID system, which however would
need a separate legislation.
No national system
Although the Commission on Elections has adopted a biometrics-based ID system, the country has yet to
institutionalize a national ID system. Human rights advocates and militant groups fear that the
introduction of such an ID system would violate a citizen’s right to privacy and would be prone to abuse
by the state.
Herbosa, who also chairs Credit Information Corp. that operates a national credit registry, said,
“Theoretically, each Filipino should have an account there that would show credit history but the fact
that we don’t have a national ID system compelled us four years ago to guarantee or at least to be sure
to get a system that will merge data subjects.”
At present, she said it was difficult to merge data on people who may end up using different names
when they borrow from different institutions.
“If you had a national ID system, all you have to do is put in your number and right there we know that
all those loans belong to you. So it’s really much easier for tracking and all,” she said in interview at the
Philippine Dealing System.
In the United States, Herbosa said there was no national ID system as well but its Social Security System
assigned ID numbers to all, even to minors.
Many unbanked people
“For us, we really don’t have any and [there are] so many unbanked [people]—almost 80 percent. For
me, it’s really a pressing need to be really able to identify each and every person—whether adult, minor
or newly born baby—for availment of government services… It’s imperative,” she said.
FEF has also argued that a biometrics-based national ID system could help in the targeted delivery of
public assistance and in the promotion of financial inclusion.
Herbosa earlier called for the easing of the bank secrecy law and the strengthening of AMLC’s mandate
to combat money laundering. Apart from the inclusion of casinos, real estate and art dealers among the
institutions covered by the antimoney laundering law, Herbosa said the body would need authority to
look into and immediately freeze suspicious bank accounts.
At present, AMLC needs to ask for an order from the Court of Appeals to be able to freeze suspicious
transactions. In the case of the $81-million stolen money from the central bank of Bangladesh that
slipped into the country, bank accounts used for money laundering along with related accounts were
frozen only by March 1 or almost a month after the dirty money had been wired to the bank accounts at
RCBC.
The $81-million remittance from Bangladesh came in on Feb. 5 and was reported as “fraudulent” by Feb.
9.
Error in judgment
Herbosa said the money had shown how people on the ground should be more vigilant, citing some
“error in judgment” in the RCBC case.
“So, it’s really your frontline people who should be able to discern whether an STR (suspicious
transaction report) should be filed. Any covered person or institution should really try and strengthen
the ones who deal with the potential offender or money launderer,” Herbosa said.
Even in international meetings, Herbosa said the best formula would really be the strict enforcement of
the rules along with trying to change people’s attitude.
“I don’t want to say there must be distrust all the time. But if you’re there and you’re part of any
institution that’s part of the Amla (Anti-Money Laundering Act), you should be mindful and try to look at
all circumstances and make a decision on how you will act.
“If you’re not mindful, all these things will go past by you and when you look at it, realize how come
your intuition failed and you didn’t realize where it’s going. If it’s just always hindsight (that you rely on),
that’s bad,” the SEC chief said.
Reforms at RCBC
RCBC, the bank at the center of the $81-million money laundering controversy, has announced new
measures to guard against money laundering.
“Down the road, RCBC intends to implement best practice policies and procedures gained from
international institutions for rigorous strengthening of compliance with antimoney laundering measures.
This is meant to comply with all regulations while continuing to protect the interest of customer
accounts,” the bank said.
For instance, RCBC has reduced its straight-through processing threshold amount for both inward and
outward remittances. Previously, only amounts in excess of P1 billion or its US dollar equivalent would
be brought to the attention of senior management while people on the ground were given authority to
decide on small amounts.
New threshold amounts have been established for corporate and individual accounts but these were not
disclosed.
In addition, RCBC has also increased the frequency of after-posting reviews. “There will be greater focus
on unusual transactions, which will be escalated to the group head via separate and frequent operations
reports. Further, activities are also being programmed to ensure early and timely tracking and action on
any suspicious transaction, with controls in place for higher level action,” the bank said.
RCBC said it had also taken action on strengthening the account opening process. All in-branch account
opening will be signed by two officers, each reporting to different units of the bank.
Photos will be taken of walk-in clients, who are opening accounts. Unusual transactions will be escalated
to the regional and/or national higher level officers for independent verification. All know-your-
customer procedures are also being reviewed for strengthening.
“These are immediate steps that are being implemented with even more studies to be made and
activated in the next months to ensure compliance and protect customer accounts,” RCBC said.
https://business.inquirer.net/209073/sec-bats-for-national-id-system-vs-dirty-money#ixzz5RePWkDIT
National ID system needed to locate disease carriers, says ONA
By: Bobby Lagsa - @inquirerdotnet

Inquirer Mindanao / 08:54 PM May 02, 2014
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY – Health Secretary Enrique Ona said he wished the country had a more extensive
database that would make it easier for the authorities to track down Filipinos suspected of being carriers
of deadly diseases.
Ona made this statement here Wednesday as he admitted that the absence of such a database made
the search for passengers of an airliner that had flown home a Filipino male nurse who had tested
positive for the virus that causes the deadly Middle East respiratory syndrome, or MERS, a long and
arduous one.
ADVERTISEMENT
He said it took the Department of Heatlh a full week before it was able to track down most of the
passengers of the Etihad flight that brought home the Filipino nurse from Abu Dhabi last month. The
Filipino subsequently tested negative for the corona virus.
But even nearly a month after the plane landed, Ona said, 10 passengers had yet to be accounted for.
“We know their names, we know where they came from, but we don’t know where to look for them,”
said Ona, who was here Wednesday following a visit to Marawi City.
He said one week was too long a period to track down possible carriers of a deadly virus, especially one
that could be transmitted to others quickly.
If the government had a national ID system, with vital information about each Filipino, the contact
tracing would have been easier, Ona added.
Despite the experience, he said, the government was still prepared to respond to any outbreak of
illnesses in the country, “excluding what we see in the movies.” He was referring to make-believe
contagions that were the central plots of a number of movies.
He said the country had adequate isolation solation facilities and it had institutions such as the Research
Institute for Tropical Medicine in Pasay and the Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital in Cebu for testing
specimens.
Ona said as part of prevention, the government also sent epidemiologists and medical specialists to
countries affected by MERS.
“We don’t have health attachés in countries affected by the MERS-CoV so we sent them to study and
make coordination to protect our citizens,” Ona said.
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/599110/national-id-system-needed-to-locate-disease-carriers-says-
ona#ixzz5RePdrVco
FilSys: What Are The Financial Implications Of A National ID System?
Written by Marc Adrian
Perhaps, the only country in Southeast Asia that hasn’t imposed a national ID system yet is the
Philippines. Neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have had one in place for
a long time now, which is not just used for their identification but also for keeping track of their a
citizen’s information deemed as necessary.
What is the National ID system all about?
The bill that was recently passed states that the national ID system of the country will be called the
“Filipino Identification System” or “FilSys.” It’s a single ID card that can be used as a proof of
identification for all transactions in the country, whether it’s by a government agency or a private
institution. Once this is implemented, Filipinos both here and abroad will be required to register.
How does it work?
In this national ID system or the FilSys, the person should declare his or her name according to his or her
birth certificate, photograph, gender, blood type, and signature. The ID will come with its own unique
serial number, which will be called the Common Reference Number (CRN). The reference number will be
issued by the Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA).
What information will be stored here?
This tamper-proof ID will be housing a smart chip that contains unique information associated to a
person like his biometrics, iris scan, facial image reception code, and many other distinguishing features.
Other government-issued identification numbers such as the following will also be associated with the
person’s designated CRN:
SSS
Pag-ibig
PhilHealth
Passport number
Voter’s registration
Driver’s license number
Data privacy and confidentiality
Legislators who opposed this move by the government were concerned about the safety of everyone’s
personal information from data leaks and other security attacks. However, Sol Aragones, the committee
chairperson assured the public that the only agency that will have access to the information will be the
PSA.
The bill made it clear that the information in the FilSys, despite being in the safekeeping of the PSA,
cannot be disclosed to any requesting agencies without the consent of the ID holder, unless it falls under
the following situations:
In cases of accidents or disasters, where the ID holder’s medical history is needed by medical workers
When the interest of public health or safety requires the data
A court orders the data to be divulged
The bill also states that PSA, the Department of Information and Communications Technology, and the
National Privacy Commission must implement measures that will guarantee the safekeeping of the
information.
The benefits of a national ID system
The main goal of this ID system is to streamline transactions, lower the cost of government-related ID
application, and ease and convenience for all transactions. How does it work?
1. Streamlined information
With a single ID for everything, all the information about a citizen are associated to his or her national ID
number or CRN. From the basic personal information like birthday, address, phone number to your
driving records, criminal records, and loans, a national ID system will provide access to these
information to relevant agencies authorized by the person. This will not only streamline information, but
also transactions be it with the government or private organizations.
2. No need for other “valid IDs”
Currently, we have separate IDs for SSS, Philhealth, Pag-ibig, and even for our tax and voter registration.
While it makes sense to have a separate ID for each because they are after all different agencies of the
government, it would be practical and more efficient if they’re all associated to a single ID.
Once a national ID system is in place, government and private agencies will no longer need other IDs to
verify a person’s identity. Verification can already be done easily through the automated system which
will come together with the implementation of the FilSys. From airports to banks, there’s no need for
you to stress about bringing a number of valid IDs just to get your transactions going (which is a typical
scenario in the country).
3. Faster ID verification
The provision of the FilSys will guarantee a fool-proof and highly secured process of identification
according to Arnie A Teves Jr, a congressman. This will be made possible with the government’s initiative
to gradually install biometric machines in all of its relevant agencies. Your trip to SSS, Philhealth, Pag-
ibig, or whatever government agency will be less of a hassle once the national ID system is in place.
How will it impact your banking experience?
Identification plays an important role in managing your finances through your bank account. When you
pay using your credit card, establishments will ask for a valid ID before running your card to charge you.
When you do a transaction in a bank, you’ll need various IDs to verify your identity. With a more
streamlined process of verifying a person’s identity through the FilSys, the experience will be more
seamless.
1. Prevention against identity theft and fraud
It has been made clear that together with the national ID system, biometric machines will be installed in
relevant government agencies. Also, state of the art technology is used for the national ID to make sure
that it cannot be replicated or used by others.
The smart chip embedded in the ID will contain unique information associated to a person like his
biometrics, iris scan, facial image reception code, and many other distinguishing features.
This will reduce identity theft, especially when it comes to availing banking or credit products, which can
have dire consequences for the victims.
This security measure may not happen immediately once the FilSys is implemented, but once the
system, its infrastructure, and the technology have been fully established, people will surely reap the
security benefits that come with it.
2. Financial inclusion for everyone
During the summit on Financial Inclusion in the Digital Economy hosted by the ADB, according to
Rochelle Tomas, the Inclusive Finance Advocacy officer of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), “One of the
key barriers to financial inclusion in the country is the lack of a universal national ID and private industry
has also identified it as one of the major costs in getting people on-board the financial system”
Currently, BSP has a very strict policy when it comes to opening a bank account in the country. It
requires at least one photo ID together with other proofs of identification. While employed individuals
could easily obtain valid photo IDs such as an SSS ID or UMID, and other official documents to verify
their identity; the unemployed population on the other hand does not have access to those. With a
national ID system coming close to its implementation, it will be a lot easier for the unemployed and
unbanked Filipino to start banking.
As the country’s ID system heads towards a streamlined and automated process, everyone will benefit
from it in a number of ways. Not only will it cut the unnecessary bureaucratic process in many public
and private agencies short, it will also make many services from the private sector more inclusive to
more Filipinos. At the end of the day, FilSys will make day-to-day transactions of Filipinos less of
headache.
https://www.imoney.ph/articles/filsys-financial-implications/
OCTOBER TERM, 2008

FLORES-FIGUEROA V. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FLORES-FIGUEROA v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
No. 08–108. Argued February 25, 2009—Decided May 4, 2009
A federal statute forbidding “[a]ggravated identity theft” imposes a mandatory consecutive 2-year
prison term on an individual convicted of certain predicate crimes if, during (or in relation to) the
commission of those other crimes, the offender “knowingly … uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person.” 18 U. S. C. §1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). After petitioner Flores-
Figueroa, a Mexican citizen, gave his employer counterfeit Social Security and alien registration cards
containing his name but other people’s identification numbers, he was arrested and charged with two
immigration offenses and aggravated identity theft. Flores moved for acquittal on the latter charge,
claiming that the Government could not prove that he knew that the documents’ numbers were
assigned to other people. The District Court agreed with the Government that the word “knowingly” in
§1028A(a)(1) does not modify the statute’s last three words, “of another person,” and, after trial, found
Flores guilty on all counts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Section §1028(a)(1) requires the Government to show that the defendant knew that the means of
identification at issue belonged to another person. As a matter of ordinary English grammar,
“knowingly” is naturally read as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime. Where a
transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as “knowingly”)
that modifies the verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the
object. The Government does not provide a single example of a sentence that, when used in typical
fashion, would lead the hearer to a contrary understanding. And courts ordinarily interpret criminal
statutes consistently with the ordinary English usage. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419.
The Government argues that this position is incorrect because it would either require the same language
to be interpreted differently in a neighboring provision or would render the language in that provision
superfluous. This argument fails for two reasons. Finally, the Government’s arguments based on the
statute’s purpose and on the practical problems of enforcing it are not sufficient to overcome the
ordinary meaning, in English or through ordinary interpretive practice, of Congress’ words. Pp. 4–11.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/646/
The Advantages of National ID Cards
By Charles Pearson
ID cards are becoming common throughout the world. Many countries are implementing them with the
claim that these ID cards will help improve national and international security. These cards have also
been important in the fight against identity theft. To ensure that these cards are 100 percent accurate,
many of these cards incorporate biometrics, which are physical characteristics that identify the
individual, which makes these cards increasingly more difficult to forge.
Information Association
ID cards help associate a lot of information with a particular person. For example, an ID card might carry
information such as health risks that the individual holds, according to the University of Miami. This card
can be scanned and searched on a national database when the individual has a medical emergency and
suddenly has to go to a hospital. If the patient is difficult to identify, such as when the patient is badly
hurt or unconscious, the only way that the patient can probably be identified is through the card.
National Security
National ID cards are implemented for national security reasons. Government officials can prevent
individuals who are not supposed to be in a certain area, such as individuals who have been deemed
national security threats, from performing certain actions such as flying. ID cards also help law
enforcement identify an individual who is a suspect of a crime, according to the University of Miami. The
ID cards can help individuals owning the card in a law enforcement situation, since these individuals can
show their ID cards to demonstrate that they are in fact who they say they are.
Identity Theft
ID cards help combat identity theft. If a country has universal standards for ID cards and is able to
prevent forgery of these cards, conducting identity theft can be more difficult because the owner of the
ID card can prove his identity. Many businesses require that customers show their ID card when using a
debit card or a credit card. With state-issued identification cards, some states might not use the most
fail-safe measures against card forgery.
Illegal Employment
National ID cards will likely be used to fight illegal employment. Those who are undocumented
immigrants are not allowed to work within many countries. Authentic national ID cards will help
employers identify if a job applicant is actually a citizen of the country.
Voting
Some citizens might try to vote in elections more than once. Many times, they come up with fictional
characters so that a candidate can get additional votes. National ID cards prevent forged identities,
according to Oxford Journals.
https://legalbeagle.com/7285969-advantages-national-id-cards.html

Sources

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Sources

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Protecting the identity of Togo’s citizens

CBN introduces a new National ID system

 A central registry that holds the data of all citizens;

An ongoing training program to ensure a high standard of operators;

The design of a secure ID document; and

Secure manufacture and print of all National ID Cards.

Signed on December 12, 1996

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 308

ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized

SEC. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-

Head, Presidential Management Staff

SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

(Sgd.) RUBEN D. TORRES

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 278 August 24, 1973

(b) The unauthorized printing, preparation or issuance of a National Reference Card by

(c) Willful falsification, mutilation, alteration of or tampering with a National Reference

5. There is hereby created a National Registration Coordinating Committee composed of the

The Secretary Department of Local Governments and Community Development Chairman

The Secretary Department of National Defense Co-Chairman

The Secretary Department of Education and Culture Member

The Chairman Commission on Election Member

The Director Bureau of the Census and Statistics Member

The Commissioner Bureau of Internal Revenue Member

The Commissioner Commission on Immigration and Deportation Member

The Managing Director National Computer Center Member

6. The National Registration Coordinating Committee is hereby designed and authorized to

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, G.R. No. 167798

MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),

MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and

and THE SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

Two index fingers and two thumbmarks

Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others

Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to

d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,[17] the U.S. Supreme

Executive Order No. 420, s. 2005

Signed on April 13, 2005

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 420

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED

WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority to