ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

THE EXECUTIVE DEPT

SECTION 1. THE EXECUTIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. Ceremonial Functions
He remains today, as he has always been, the ceremonial head of the government of the United States, and he
must take part with real or apparent enthusiasm in a range of activities that would keep him running and posing
from sunrise to bedtime if he were not protected by a cold-blooded staff. Some of these activities are solemn or
even priestly in nature; others, through no fault of his own, are flirtations with vulgarity. The long catalogue of
public duties that the Queen discharges in England, the President of the Republic of France, and the Governor
General of Canada is the President's responsibility in this country, and the catalogue is even longer because he is
not a King, or even the agent of one, and is therefore expected to go through some rather undignified paces by
a people who think of him as a combination of scoutmaster, Delphic Oracle, hero of the silver screen, and father
of multitude.
B. Immunity from Suit
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official
acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders." Article VII, Section 15,1973 Constitution”
The principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch
the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and
unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could
walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable
under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-
General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil
damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties.
The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly
warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo
any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person,
however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally
in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion
heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such
liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his
power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had
the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when
he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and
judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he
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is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not
honesdy differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual,
and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act."
Executive Privilege ( Senate v. Ermita)
Executive privilege was discussed extensively in Senate v. Ermitav which dealt with Executive Order 464 imposing
a gag on executive officials summoned to a Senate legislative investigation. In simplest terms, executive privilege
is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information from the courts, the Congress, and
ultimately the public
Section 2(a) of E.O. No. 464, upheld as valid by the Supreme Court, enumerated the following which are taken
from earlier decisions:
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive
order;
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged;
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements;
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings;
5. Matters affecting national security and public order.
"Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of
which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as
a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.”
One must also see executive privilege vis-d-vis the power of Congress to use compulsory process. "While the
executive branch is a coequal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.... Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President."
THE CABINET
Cabinet itself as an institution is extra-constitutionally created. It essentially consists of the heads of departments
who through usage have formed a body of presidential advisers who meet regularly with the President. Although
they are the principal officers through whom the President executes the law, the President, through his power of
control over them and his power to remove them at will, remains the chief of administration. Cabinet members
as individuals and the Cabinet as institution possess no authority over the President. They serve at the behest
and pleasure of the President.

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SEC. 2. No PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, A
REGISTERED VOTER, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION,
AND A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SUCH ELECTION.
1. Qualifications of the President.
To be elected President, a person must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of election for President, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
SEC. 3. THERE SHALL BE A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHALL HAVE THE SAME QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE
AND BE ELECTED WITH AND EM THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT. HE MAY BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE IN
THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT. THE VICE-PRESIDENT MAY BE APPOINTED AS A MEMBER OF THE CABINET.
SUCH APPOINTMENT REQUIRES NO CONFIRMATION.
1. The Vice-President.
The Vice-President is essentially a President in reserve. Attempts to give him a constitutional function other than
just being Vice-President failed. Hence, he has the same qualifications as a President, is elected with and to the
same term as the President, and may be removed from office in the same manner as the President; but, unless
he is appointed as a me In deference to his office, an appointment as department head extended to him does
not need the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But the President is not obliged to give the Vice-
President a Cabinet position because the President must be free to choose for his Cabinet people who are his
trusted personal choices.
SEC 4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM
OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE
ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. NO PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR
MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME.
No VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE
OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE
SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE REGULAR
ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE HELD ON THE SECOND MONDAY OF MAY.
THE RETURNS OF EVERY ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICEPRESIDENT DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF EACH PROVINCE OR CITY, SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS, DIRECTED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.
UPON RECEIPT OF THE CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE SHALL, NOT LATER THAN THIRTY
DAYS AFTER THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, OPEN ALL THE CERTIFICATES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JOINT PUBLIC SESSION, AND THE CONGRESS, UPON DETERMINATION OF THE
AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION THEREOF IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW, CANVASS THE VOTES.
THE PERSON HAVING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE PROCLAIMED ELECTED, BUT IN CASE TWO OR
MORE SHALL HAVE AN EQUAL AND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, ONE OF THEM SHALL FORTHWITH BE CHOSEN BY

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THE VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS, VOTING SEPARATELY. THE
CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.
THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR
THE PURPOSE.
1. Election of the President and Vice-President
The 1935 Constitution provided for a President elected by direct vote of the people. The 1987 Constitution has
preserved that concept. In like manner, the Vice-President is elected by direct vote of the people.
2. Term of the President and Vice-President.
The President is given a fixed term of six years to begin at noon on June 30th following the day of the election
and to end at noon also on June 30th "six years thereafter." It was argued that six years was long enough for a
good President to implement his programs and, rather optimistically, that with the constraints built around the
presidency, a bad one would not succeed in accomplishing his evil designs. The fixing of the exact time and date
for the start and ending of the term excludes the right to "hold-over." At noon on June 30 six years after the start
of the term, either the newly elected President takes over or the rule on filling of vacancies found in Section 7
becomes operative.
A less restrictive limitation is imposed on persons who serve as Vice-President. They may not serve for more than
two successive terms. But voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of a Vice-President's service. Moreover, if the Vice-President succeeds to the
presidency, if he serves for less than four years, he may run for election as President since in his case it would not
be a re-election.
3. The Congress as national board of canvassers
"Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make
said declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city board of canvassers."
The imposition on Congress of such ministerial and executive duty did not give to Congress the power "to
determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and,
incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and,
in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do."
When we used the words "authenticity" and "genuineness," the question refers to the problem of whether or
not the ministerial function is already non-ministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial but when we say
"authenticity and due execution," what it really means is that the National Assembly will look at the certificates
of canvass and find out from the face of the document whether there are flaws in the execution and authenticity
of the document. That is what it means.
4. Breaking a presidential or vice-presidential tie
" The tie is broken by "vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."
5. Presidential and Vice-Presidential election controversies

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When the question of jurisdiction arose under the 1935 Constitution in Lopez v. Roxas," the Court said that, since
the Constitution was silent on the matter, and in the absence of a statute empowering a judicial body to be judge
of such contests, any candidate for president or vice-president who believed "that he was the candidate who
obtained the largest number of votes for either office, despite the proclamation by Congress of another candidate
as the president-elect or vice-president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest a recount of the
votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on
this matter were not justiciable." For this reason, Congress passed Republic Act No. 1793 constituting the
Supreme Court as the electoral tribunal for presidential and vice-presidential contests.
The Rule in presidential contests is that only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. The
Rule effectively excludes the widow of a losing candidate.
The power of the Court as Tribunal includes the power to correct manifest errors on the statements of votes
(SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).
SEC. 5. BEFORE THEY ENTER ON THE EXECUTION OF THEIR OFFICE, THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, OR THE
ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL TAKE THE FOLLOWING OATH OR AFFIRMATION:
"I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY FULFILL MY DUTIES AS
PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT) OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESERVE AND DEFEND ITS
CONSTITUTION, EXECUTE ITS LAWS, DO JUSTICE TO EVERY MAN, AND CONSECRATE MYSELF TO THE SERVICE OF
THE NATION. SO HELP ME GOD." (IN CASE OF AFFIRMATION, LAST SENTENCE WILL BE OMITTED)
SEC 6. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE AN OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. THE SALARIES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW AND SHALL NOT BE DECREASED DURING THEIR TENURE. NO INCREASE IN SAID
COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF THE INCUMBENT DURING
WHICH SUCH INCREASE WAS APPROVED. THEY SHALL NOT RECEIVE DURING THEIR TENURE ANY OTHER
EMOLUMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER SOURCE.
SEC. 7. THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENTELECT SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR
TERMS. IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY, THE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL
THE PRESIDENTELECT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED. IF A PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE
VICEPRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL HAVE
BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT. WHERE NO PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED
OR BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL
HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW, PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL
BE SELECTED UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT
DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.
SEC. 8. IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE VLCE PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF DEATH,
PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND
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VLCEPRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SHALL
Sees. 5-8 ART. VII - EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 847 THEN ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-
PRESIDENT
SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED. THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW, PROVIDE WHO SHALL SERVE
AS PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABHITY, OR RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL
SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED, AND BE
SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS AS THE ACTING PRESIDENT.
1. Filling a vacancy in the presidency.
There are two sets of rules for filling a vacancy in the presidency. One set of rules, Section 7, applies when the
vacancy occurs at the start of the term, and another set, Section 8, applies when a vacancy occurs in mid-term.
A vacancy can also occur when an incumbent President dies, is permanently disabled, is removed from office, or
resigns. In such eventuality Section 8 applies.
The causes of vacancy enumerated in Section 8 are "death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation." Of the four causes, permanent disability is perhaps the most shrouded in obscurity. The difficulty
arises from two related questions: First what is "permanent disability" and, second, who decides whether the
President is disabled. Previous constitutions did not attempt to answer these questions. The 1987 Constitution
answers them in Section 11
[I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of
voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action.
The three part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one side
involuntarily accepted the other's terms; (2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3)
whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been
expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the
employer's conduct in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter.
Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to
resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the
employee was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the
effective date of resignation.
1. Vacancy in the office of Vice-President.
Section 9 is a new rule. The President is authorized to nominate a member of Congress from either the Senate or
the House of Representatives to fill a vacated office of the Vice-President. For the nomination to be effective, it
must be confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both Houses voting separately. An attempt to limit
the choice of the President to members of the Senate, on the argument that Senators are elected at large, was
defeated on the counter argument that the field of choice should not be restricted to the twenty-four members
of the Senate.
SEC. 10. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY AFTER THE VACANCY IN THE
OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT
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NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION TO ELECT A PRESIDENT
AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN FORTY-FIVE DAYS NOR LATER THAN SIXTY DAYS FROM THE
TIME OF SUCH CALL. THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH
2, SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION AND SHALL BECOME LAW UPON ITS APPROVAL ON THIRD
READING BY THE CONGRESS. APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED AGAINST ANY
CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 25,
ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION. THE CONVENING OF THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED NOR THE SPECIAL
ELECTION POSTPONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS WITHIN EIGHTEEN
MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
1. Vacancy in both the presidency and vice-presidency
SEC. 11. WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH
POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICEPRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT. WHENEVER A
MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO
DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUKES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDIATELY ASSUME THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN
DECLARATION THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL REASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.
MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT WITHES FIVE DAYS TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN
DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE
CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE, D7 IT IS NOT ES
SESSION, WITHES FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND WITHOUT NEED OF CALL. IF THE
CONGRESS, WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT ES SESSION,
WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINES BY A TWOTHIRDS VOTE OF BOTH
HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS
OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT; OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE EXERCISING
THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.

1. Incapacity of the President.

Section 11 deals with the thomy issue of deciding whether the President is still able to perform his functions or
not. If the President is able to make the decision and is willing to declare himself disabled, he certainly has the
power to declare so. This power was recognized in the agreement of March 1958 between President Eisenhower
and VicePresident Nixon which stated that "In the event of inability the President would — if possible — so inform
the Vice President" who would then exercise "the powers and duties until the inability had ended." But if the
President himself is unable to make the decision or, though able, is unwilling to admit his incapacity, can
somebody else decide for him? There was no clear answer to this question in previous constitutions. Section 11
attempts to supply the answer. It was tested in Estrada v. Arroyo already partly discussed above under Section 8.

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1. Serious illness of the President.
Illness that results in incapacity to perform the functions of the presidency is dealt with in Section 11. Section 12
presumably deals with serious illness that is not incapacitating because access to him is kept open for Cabinet
members in charge of the national security and foreign relations. The obvious purpose of such access is to allow
the President to make the important decisions in those areas of government; which suggests that this
contemplates a situation where the President is still able.
The purpose of the first sentence is to guarantee the people's right to know about the state of the President's
health, contrary to secretive practice in totalitarian governments.
SEC. 13. THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS
SHALL NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT
DURING THEIR TENURE. THEY SHALL NOT, DURING SAID TENURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER
PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY
FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENTOWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR
SUBSIDIARIES. THEY SHALL STRICTLY AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR OFFICE. THE SPOUSE
AND RELATIVES BY CONSANGUINITY OR
AFFINITY WITHIN THE FOURTH CIVIL DEGREE OF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT DURING HIS TENURE BE APPOINTED
AS MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OR AS SECRETARIES,
UNDERSECRETARIES, CHAIRMEN OR HEADS OF BUREAUS OR OFFICES, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.
1. Prohibition against holding another office or employment
In sum, therefore, except for the Vice-President who may be appointed to the Cabinet, and the Secretary of
Justice who is made ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council, the officials enumerated in Section 13 may
not hold another office. But they may be given additional functions which are intimately related to their primary
office.
An ex-ojficio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment.5' To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-ojficio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
Incidentally, when an Undersecretary sits for a Secretary in a function for which the Secretary may not receive
additional compensation, the prohibition on the Secretary also applies to the Undersecretary.54
It should also be noted that the stricter prohibition is imposed on "members of the Cabinet." It therefore applies
not just to department secretaries, but to any one who is a member of the Cabinet even if he or she is not a head
of a department.
Other prohibitions.
The second and third sentences of Section 13 say: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
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including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office." Prohibited participation in a contract with the government can include
being a member of family corporation which has dealings with the government.55
There are two reasons for these prohibitions, reasons which also apply to the first sentence: (1) to avoid conflict
of interest and (2) to force the officials to devote full time to their official duties.56
The second paragraph says: "The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree
of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries." This is essentially an anti-nepotism
provision which even in statutes. normally goes up to the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.57 If fourth
degree relatives, however, are already in office when a President assumes office, the relatives are not thereby
ousted from their positions. What is prohibited is appointment or reappointment and not uninterrupted
continuance in office.
Beyond the constitutional prohibitions there also is the rule on incompatible offices. Thus, since the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel has the duty of giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving other presidential
appointees, he may not occupy a position in any of the offices whose performance he must review. Such would
involve occupying incompatible positions. Thus he cannot be PCGG Chairman and at the same time head of the
PCGG since the PCGG answers to the President.
SEC. 14. APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE, UNLESS REVOKED BY THE
ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OR RE ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE.
SEC. 15. Two MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS
TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC
SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
1. Midnight appointments.
The prohibition found in this section applies even to appointments to the judiciary. The provision in Article VIII
which requires the President to make appointments to the judiciary within ninety days applies only to the period
not covered by Article VII, Section 15.It should also be noted that this provision is a limitation on the President's
power of appointment. There is no similar; limitation on the power of appointment of local executives.
SEC. 16. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
APPOINT THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS,
OR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS
OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM
HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER
OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS,
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS
DURING THE RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS

9
SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT
ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
1. Nature of the appointing power
Since the power to appoint is an executive function, the clear implication is that the legislature may not usurp
such function. The legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the person who may hold
the office, but it may neither specify the person who shall be appointed to such office nor actually appoint him.
The "appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed
by Congress except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on
Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointive office."65 For this reason, even the next-in-rank rule of the Civil Service Code cannot be read as binding
the appointing authority to choose the first in the order of rank when two or more possess the requisite
qualifications. Of essence to the appointing authority is the power to choose who among the various qualified
choices is the best suited.66 Similarly, the provision in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Book IV, Title III,
Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that "All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary" cannot be read as requiring the President to seek
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The power to appoint prosecutors is given to the President. The
Secretary of Justice is under the control of the President. Hence, the law must be read simply as allowing the
Secretary of Justice to advice the President.
Kinds of presidential appointments.
Sections 14,15, and 16 speak of four different kinds of presidential appointments. Section 14 deals with
appointments made by an Acting President. When the elected President assumes or reassumes office, he is given
ninety days within which to revoke appointments made by the Acting-President. If he does not revoke them, they
remain as if they had been made by an elected President.
Section 15 deals with appointments made by a President within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term. In order not to tie the hands of the incoming President through midnight
appointments,71 appointments made during that period can only be temporary and therefore revocable by the
next President.
Section 16, which had a counterpart in the 1935 Constitution, deals with regular presidential appointments, with
or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and with "recess" or "ad interim" appointments.
3. Scope of the power of the Commission on Appointments.
The restoration of the Commission on Appointments restores an executive limit on the appointing authority of
the President removed by the 1973 Constitution. Under the 1973 Constitution, no other entity could check the
President. The 1987 Constitution has restored the Commission on Appointments as a check on the President's
appointing authority. As will be seen, however, the scope of the power of the 1987 Commission on Appointments
is not as broad as that of the Commission in the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the general rule was that all presidential appointments needed the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This rule clearly comes out from the text of the 1935 Constitution whose Article
VII, Section 9(3) said:

10
The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the government whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments.
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
There are now three sentences. The first sentence speaks of a three step process: nomination, consent, and
appointment. The second sentence, beginning with the phrase "He shall also appoint . . .," speaks only of
appointment. What is the significance of the period between the two sentences which was inserted as a
deliberate amendment? Commissioner Regalado gives the answer in his acceptance of the amendment proposed
by Commissioner Foz to the original Committee proposal
The offices of Chairman and of members of the Conrmission on Human Rights are created by the
Constitution;however, the Constitution does not specify who should appoint them. Hence, they do not come
under the first sentence of Section 16 but under the phrase "all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law" in the second sentence. Hence, their appointments do not
need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase "all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law"
means that when a law creating an office does not specify who shall appoint the officer, the appointment must
be made by the President.
4. Appointment of officers "lower in rank”
"The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards." This sentence, which is a relic from
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has somewhat been blurred by the narrowing of the scope of the review power
of the Commission on A The view expressed by Father Bernas, to which no one objected, was an eversion of
traditional constitutional theory. Traditionally the power to appoint is essentially executive, and the legislature
may not interfere with the exercise of executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere appointments.
11
It should be remembered that, when the Commission on Appointments checks the appointments made by the
President, it is not strictly a case of the legislative department interfering with the executive department.
Although the Commission on Appointments is assembled by Congress and can meet only when Congress is in
session and, therefore, can, to that extent, be immobilized when Congress decides to adjourn,100 the
Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and not of Congress, and is not legislative but
executive in nature. As the Supreme Court said in Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.:m "Although its membership is confined to
members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress.... In fact, the functions of the Commissioner
are purely executive in nature."
6. "Recess" or "ad-interim" appointments and "temporary appointments."
The second paragraph of Article VII, Section 16 says: "The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
Article VI, Section 16(5) ("voluntary recess") or because, although in existence, it is not allowed by the Constitution
to be in session ("compulsory recess"). This compulsory recess can only refer to two situations: (1) the thirty day
period between sessions during which Congress may not meet, that is, thirty days before the fourth Monday of
July, according to Article VI, Section 15 or (2) the period between the beginning of a new term (noon of June 30
next following an election) and the beginning of a regular session (fourth Monday of July) referred to in Article
VI, Sections 7 and 15. Moreover, the voluntary recess starts the moment one of the two Houses adjourns because
Congress cannot be considered in session when only one of them is meeting.
For a recess or ad-interim appointment to be effective, it does not have to wait for action by the Commission on
Appointments. It becomes effective once it is delivered to and accepted by the appointee.103 However, if they
are of the type which require Commission concurrence, they are "effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." There are thus two modes of
terminating ad-interim appointments: (1) disapproval by the Commission and (2) adjournment of Congress prior
to Commission action on the appointment. Are these two modes of terminating an ad-interim appointment
independent of each other? But an ad interim appoinment is not a temporary appointment. It is permanent.
When, however, a vacancy occurs in the office of a Department Secretary while Congress is in session, a
temporary appointment may be made by the President to fill the vacant position. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book HI of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." But the
law may not tell the President which person to appoint.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
SEC 17. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, AND OFFICES. HE
SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
12
1. Power of control.
The President is given control "of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." His control is not just over
the department head but also over all the subordinate officers of the department.
This awesome power of control has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.""3 It is such power which has been given to the President over all executive officers
from Cabinet member to the lowliest clerk. It is at the heart of the meaning of "Chief Executive". In the oft-quoted
words of Justice Laurel in V7Zlena v. Secretary of Interior,"4 in our presidential system the President is "the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other [is]. The heads of the executive departments occupy
political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson 'should be of
the President's bosom confidence,' and, in the language of Attorney General Cushing, 'are subject to the direction
of the President.
2. Faithful execution clause.
In re Neagle,'42 illustrates the broad scope of this power. Neagle was assigned by the Attorney General as
bodyguard of Justice Field. When Terry attacked Justice Field, Neagle shot and killed Terry. There was no specific
law authorizing the assignment of Neagle to protect Justice Field the way he did. The American Supreme Court
appealed to Section 3 Article II of the American Constitution saying that the President "shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed." The Court said that this power of the President is not limited to the enforcement of
acts of Congress according to their express terms. The President's power includes "the rights and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of
the government under the Constitution."'43 Thus, it includes the power of the President "to take measures for
the protection of a judge of one of the courts of the United States."'44 Neagle saw as law that had to be faithfully
executed not just formal acts of the legislature but any duty or obligation inferable from the Constitution or from
statutes.
SEC. 18. THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE THE COMMANDER IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY, HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES TO PREVENT OR SUPPRESS
LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION OR REBELLION. IN CASE OF INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY
REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS, SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS ORPLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW. WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT
HOURS FROM THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT A REPORT IN PERSON OR IN WRITING TO THE CONGRESS. THE
CONGRESS, VOTING JOINTLY, BY A VOTE OF AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS IN REGULAR OR SPECIAL
SESSION, MAY REVOKE SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION, WHICH REVOCATION SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE BY
THE PRESIDENT. UPON THE INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS MAY, IN THE SAME MANNER, EXTEND
SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONGRESS, IF THE INVASION
OR REBELLION SHALL PERSIST AND PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.
THE CONGRESS, IF NOT IN SESSION, SHALL, WITHIN TWENTYFOUR HOURS FOLLOWING SUCH PROCLAMATION OR
SUSPENSION, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL.
THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW, IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING FILED BY ANY CITIZEN, THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
13
WRIT OR THE EXTENSION THEREOF, AND MUST PROMULGATE ITS DECISION THEREON WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM
ITS FILING.
A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOR SUPPLANT THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL COURTS OR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, NOR AUTHORIZE THE CONFERMENT OF
JURISDICTION ON MILITARY COURTS AND AGENCIES OVER CIVILIANS WHERE CIVIL COURTS ARE ABLE TO
FUNCTION, NOR AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT SHALL APPLY ONLY TO PERSONS JUDICIALLY CHARGED FOR
REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH INVASION.
DURING THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, ANY PERSON THUS ARRESTED OR DETAINED SHALL BE
JUDICIALLY CHARGED WITHIN THREE DAYS, OTHERWISE HE SHALL BE RELEASED.
1. Commander-in-chiefship.
The commandei-in-chiefship of the President raises two questions: (1) Is the President thereby a member of the
armed forces?What powers are embodied in his commander-in-chiefship?
The weight of authority favors the position that the President is not a member of the armed forces but remains
a civilian. As one commentator has pointed out, "The President's duties as Commander-inChief represent only a
part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. He is elected as the
highest civilian officer. His compensation is received for his services rendered as President of the nation, not for
the individual part of his duties; no portion of it is paid from sums appropriated for the military or naval forces.
The President does not enlist in, nor is he inducted or drafted into the forces; "he is not subject to court martial
or other military discipline."148 This position, in fact, is the only one compatible with Article II, Section 3, which
says: "Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military."
The net effect thus of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President holds
supreme military authority and is the ceremonial, legal, and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
commander-in-chief he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally,
he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his. "As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and
conquer and subdue the enemy."149
As commander-in-chief, therefore, the President has control and direction of the conduct of war, whether the
war be declared or undeclared.150 Article VII, Section 18, gives him the broad power to "call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." It may be gathered from this broad grant
of power that when he calls out the armed forces for this purpose, unlike in his suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, his action is not subject to judicial review.
Aside from the power to call out the armed forces, the Philippine Constitution, unlike its American counter part,
has also explicitly given to the President two other extraordinary powers: the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law. The power to suspend the privilege is discussed
under Article III, Section 15. It remains now to look into the President's power to impose martial law.

14
2. Three types of "martial law."
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war;
another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion
and civil war within the States or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised
in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the limits of
States maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise. The first
of these may be called jurisdiction under military law, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and
articles of war, or otherwise providing for the government of national forces; the second may be distinguished as
military government, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military
commander, under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while the
third may be denominated martial law proper, and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the
action of Congress cannot be invited, in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of
insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities whose ordinary law no longer
adequately secures public safety and private rights.
In the most comprehensive sense of the term, Martial Law includes all law that has reference to, or is
administered by, the military forces of the State. Thus it includes (1) Military Law Proper, that is, the body of
administrative laws created by Congress for the government of the army and navy as an organized force; (2) the
principles governing the conduct of military forces in time of war, and in the government of occupied territory,
and, (3) Martial Law in sensu strictiore, or that law which has application when the military arm does not
supersede civil authority but is called upon to aid it in the execution of its civil functions.
The distinction between the second type of martial law as military government and martial law in the third or
proper sense, has been expressed thus: "A military government takes the place of a suspended or destroyed
sovereignty, while martial law, or, more properly, martial rule, takes the place of certain governmental agencies
which for the time being are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the
sovereignty. The occasion of military government is the expulsion of the sovereignty theretofore existing, which
is usually accomplished by a successful military invasion. The occasion of martial rule is simply public exigency
which may rise in time of war or peace. A military government since it takes the place of a deposed sovereignty,
of necessity continues until a permanent sovereignty is again established in the territory. Martial rule ceases
when the district is sufficiently tranquil to permit the ordinary agencies of government to cope with existing
conditions.
Does martial law in the Constitution mean martial law in the third and proper sense? Yes; however, a modification
has to be made of Chief Justice Chase' definition in Milligan: Martial law in the Philippines jurisdiction is imposed
not by or through an authorization from Congress but by the Executive as specifically authorized and within the
limits set by the Constitution.
3. Martial law proper is essentially police power.
That martial law is essentially police power is a conclusion also borne out by the constitutional text which sets
down "public safety" as the object of the exercise of martial law. Public safety is the concern of police power.
What is peculiar, however, about martial law as police power is that, whereas police power is normally a function
of the legislature executed by the civilian executive arm, under martial law, police power is exercised by the
executive with the aid of the military and in place of "certain governmental agencies which for the time being are

15
unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty." In the language of
Justice Black, it authorizes "the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government.
It is the exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the government to preserve order and
insure the public safety in times of emergency, when other branches of the government are unable to function,
or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety— It is the law of necessity to be prescribed and
administered by the executive power. Its object, the preservation of the public safety and good order, defines
the scope, which will vary with the circumstances and necessities of the case. The exercise of the power may not
extend beyond what is required by the exigency which calls it forth.
What emerges from the above observations on martial law as police power as well as from the text of the
Constitution is that martial law is a flexible concept. Martial law depends on two factual bases: (1) the existence
of invasion or rebellion, and (2) the requirements of public safety. Necessity creates the conditions for martial
law and at the same time limits the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state of invasion
would be different from those created by rebellion. Necessarily, therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous
executive action needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all
conditions. They can only be analogous.
When one speaks of analogy one must necessarily speak of a common denominator. What is the common
denominator of varying degrees and kinds of executive action which makes such actions and exercise of martial
law power? The question must be answered in the context of the system of separation of powers. And the answer
is this: the common denominator of all exercise of martial law powers is the exercise by an executive officer of
the discretion and judgment normally exercised by a legislative or judicial body. The variable in the various forms
of martial law powers is the extent to which the executive assumes legislative and judicial functions. This variable
is determined by the necessities of the moment. The extreme case is the investment of one man with the power
of life and death over citizen and soldier alike in a given area of actual war. In this extreme case, the executive
officer is fully lawmaker, judge, and executive all rolled into one.
The new martial law doctrine: when, by whom, and how imposed?
It was under the shadow of this jurisprudential legacy of the Marcos regime that the 1986 Constitutional
Commission went about formulating the martial law doctrine of the 1987 Constitution. In sum, the 1987
Constitution (1) narrowed the grounds for the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, (2) limited the discretion of the President and put it under review powers of Congress and
of the Supreme Court, and (3) rejected the bulk of the martial law jurisprudence that had developed under
President Marcos.
Under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus could be suspended and
martial law could be imposed "in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it."209 The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the grounds to "[actual] invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it."
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the President could suspend the privilege and impose martial law for an
indefinite duration and Congress had no power to curtail him or to review his decision. Under the 1987
Constitution, the initial suspension of the privilege and the imposition of martial law is still for the President to
decide but they can only be "for a period not exceeding sixty days." Thereafter the provision continues:

16
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
Under the previous Constitutions, the role of the Supreme Court was not specified and jurisprudence did not
arrive at a definitive decision on the subject. In the new Constitution the role of the Supreme Court is set down
in unequivocal terms: "The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing."
The narrowing of the grounds for the suspension of the privilege and for the imposition of martial law is discussed
under Article in, Section 15 and will not be repeated here.
The new martial law doctrine: role of Congress and Court.
The power to initially suspend the privilege of the writ or to impose martial law has been left with the President,
or with the Acting President, since he too has all executive powers except those which the Constitution has
withheld from him.210 The 1987 Constitution, however, has placed the power to determine the duration of the
suspension of the privilege and of the effectively of martial law in the hands of Congress. The original committee
draft, very much influenced by the martial law experience under President Marcos, had proposed that the
extraordinary emergency powers of the President may not be exercised without the concurrence of Congress.
This was opposed largely on the argument that such limitation would hamper the President's capacity for quick
response. After intense debate, which had to be settled by nominal vote, the concurrence of Congress was
dispensed with.2" But the President must, within forty-eight hours from taking emergency action, submit a report
to Congress either in person or in writing. "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension.
The obvious purpose of asking for joint vote was to facilitate decision and avoid contrary decisions coming from
the Senate and the House of Representatives. This was opposed by Commissioner Rodrigo who said:212 "If the
two Houses vote 'jointly,' it would mean mixing the 24 Senators with 250 Congressmen. This would result in the
Senate being absorbed and controlled by the House. This violates the purpose of having a Senate." But
Commissioner Bernas argued for having a power that could balance the unilateral action which the President was
allowed to take.
While martial law or the suspension of the privilege may be cut short by Congress, it may also be extended by
Congress, for a period to be determined by Congress, by a joint vote of both Houses. The initiative for the
extension, however, can only come from the President. Authored by Commissioner Azcuna, what this
requirement means is that any extension of the emergency situation must have the concurrence of both the
President and Congress.

17
Over and above the action which Congress may take, the role of the Supreme Court has also been clarified: "The
Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing." Any citizen is given standing to bring
appropriate action to challenge the action taken by the President. This can be done even before Congress acts,
and the decision of the Supreme Court would also bind Congress. But since the object of the Supreme Court's
action would be the verification of "the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege," necessarily the Supreme Court's evaluation would be transitory if proven wrong by
subsequent changes in the factual situation.
The new martial law doctrine: effects of imposition
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise, he shall be released.
The May 2001 "state of rebellion" or "state of emergency
Both the declaration of the state of rebellion and the authorization for warrantless arrests were challenged in
Lacson, et al. v. Secretary Perez.224 Warrantless arrests will be taken up under Article III, Section 2. Suffice it here
to say that, if indeed there was rebellion, identifiable rebels can be arrested without warrant because rebellion
is a continuing offense. The matter of "state of rebellion," however, should be seen under the power of the
President to call on the Armed Forces to suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion under Section 18.
SEC. 19. EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT, OR AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE
PRESIDENT MAY GRANT REPRIEVES, COMMUTATIONS, AND PARDONS, AND REMIT FINES AND FORFEITURES, AFTER
CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT.
HE SHALL ALSO HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT AMNESTY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
Purpose of executive clemency.
That Section 19 gives to the President the power of executive clemency is a tacit admission that human
institutions are imperfect and that there are infirmities in the administration of justice. The power therefore exists
as an instrument for correcting these infirmities and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a
too strict application of the law. In recent years, it has also been used as a bargaining chip in the efforts to unify
various political forces.
Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is an executive function. Thus, it is that Article 5 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that whenever a strict application of the provisions of the law will result in undue harshness to the
offender, the duty of the judge is to impose the proper penalty, however harsh it may be, but he is enjoined to
recommend to the President the exercise of executive clemency.
18
The power of executive clemency is a non-delegable power and must be exercised by the President
personally.228 The case of Llamas v. Orbos,m discussed below, may give the impression that it was the Executive
Secretary who issued the pardon. The tenor of the decision, however, treated the matter as if the Executive
Secretary had merely acted as a conduit for the President.
Constitutional limits on executive clemency.
Section 19 sets down three limitations on the power of executive clemency: (1) it cannot be exercised over cases
of impeachment; (2) reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission of fines and orfeitures can be given
only "after conviction by final judgment;"110 and (3) a grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of "a
majority of all the Members of Congress." In addition, Article IX, C, Section 5 says: "No pardon, amnesty, parole,
or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the Commission [on Elections].
Pardon: nature and legal effects.
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to die individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him.
When a conditional pardon is extended and accepted and the condition is that the recipient of the pardon should
not violate any of the penal laws, who determines whether penal laws have been violated? In other words, must
the recipient of the pardon undergo trial and be convicted for the new offenses before he can be considered as
having violated the terms of his pardon. The rule that is followed is that the acceptance of the conditions of the
pardon imports the acceptance of the condition that the President will also determine whether the condition has
been violated.
Amnesty
Under the Constitution, amnesty may be given only with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. How, then, does one tell whether the act of clemency is one of pardon or of amnesty?
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon
is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence" (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

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When Barrioquinto says that pardon is a private executive act whereas amnesty is a public executive proclamation
which must be concurred in by the legislature, it does not answer the question whether what is given by a
proclamation concurred in by Congress may also be given through a private act of the executive. Similarly, that
pardon can be given only after conviction must be looked upon as a limit on the power of executive clemency
and not as a constitutive element of pardon; for, pardon, in the jurisprudence from which ours developed, may
be granted any time after an offense is committed. Nor does the number of recipients of executive clemency by
itself adequately distinguish pardon from amnesty; for, while an individual pardon is given to one, a general
pardon may be given to a class.249 Hence, it is submitted that what distinguish the two forms of executive
clemency are both the number of recipients of the acts of clemency and the nature of the offense which is their
object. As an early Philippine case noted, amnesty "coinmonly denotes the 'general pardon to rebels for their
treason and other high political offenses,' or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended by some breach of the law of nations."250
Amnesty may thus be defined as the grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction
or even before the charges are filed. It is this form of executive clemency which under the Constitution may be
granted by the executive only with the concurrence of the legislature. This is not to say, however, that political
offenders cannot be reached by pardon; they can, but by individual pardon, which does not need legislative
concurrence but which can be granted only after conviction.251
Tax amnesty is another matter. In answer to the question whether a tax amnesty, such as that granted by
Presidential Decree No. 1840, needed the concurrence of the then Batasang Pambansa, the Court, in Legaspi v.
Minister of Finance,252 said that such tax amnesty was not an act of executive clemency but a legislative act
which the President had the power to do under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution. This, however, was said
at the time when the President had legislative authority under the 1973 Constitution. But as a later case said, a
tax amnesty is a "general pardon or intentional overlooking of its authority to impose penalties on persons
otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of revenue or tax law, [and as such] partakes of an absolute forgiveness
or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it... "253 Which is it then? If it is
amnesty as act of clemency, it should need concurrence of the legislature; if pardon, it can be granted only after
conviction. But as a matter of fact it is granted before conviction. The better view therefore is that tax amnesty
can be a delegated administrative act when authorized by law.
In its treatment of amnesty, Villa v. Allen made this additional observation: "Where the pardoning power is vested
in the legislature and is exercised by legislative grant, and is in the nature of a general amnesty for strictly political
offenses, it has been considered in the nature of a public law, thus having the same effect on the case as if the
general law punishing the offense had been repealed or annulled."254 The present jurisprudence on amnesty,
however, does not go to the extent of saying that amnesty repeals an existing law. After all, it is essentially an
executive and not a legislative act. Amnesty, however, "so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense."255
The above statement on the purifying effect of amnesty must not be understood to imply that pardon does not
have a similar effect, although such in fact is the implication in Barrioquinto. This implication, besides being obiter,
is not borne out by jurisprudence. In Ex parte Garland, Justice Field said:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
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offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense ... it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity." This broad view of the pardoning power was followed by Justice Malcolm in In re
Lontok and by Justice Laurel in Cristobal v. Labrador™ and Pelobello v. Palatino.259 The pardoning power was
thus affirmed as reaching even residual disqualifications which may have been imposed by the legislature as part
of the penalty. In opting for this more liberal view, Laurel said that "the better view in the light of the
constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive
who, after enquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent
of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction."260
This more liberal view was also followed in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.,261 but with an added refinement.
Monsanto does not consider a person who has been pardoned as innocent. While pardon indeed erases the
penalty and the legal disabilities consequent on the penalty, where, upon a valid conviction, a person was
dismissed from office, the pardon does not entitle the person to reinstatement by right. He may, however, be
reappointed.262 Where, however, a person was pardoned because he been acquitted on grounds that he had
not committed the crime, reinstatement and back wages are due by right.263
Finally, how does one avail of the defense of amnesty? Must an accused confess guilt of the crime charged in
order to be able to avail of amnesty as a defense? In Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, the Court said:264
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court
or Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads
not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is
not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the
contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is
whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense
made by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty
thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political
motives.
Other forms of executive clemency.
Aside from pardon and amnesty, the President may also grant reprieves, commutations, and remission of fines
and forfeitures. These forms of executive clemency are, like amnesty, already implicit in the pardoning power:
but they have been made explicit by the Constitution. A reprieve "postpones the execution of an offense to a day
certain"270 and a commutation "is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for
the one originally imposed." Commutation does not have to be in any specific form. Thus, the fact that a convict
was released after six years and placed under house arrest, which is not a penalty, already leads to the conclusion
that the penalty had been shortened.Remission of fines and forfeitures is a self-explanatory term. However, it
should be noted that remission of fines and forfeitures merely prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation
of forfeited property; it cannot have the effect of returning property which has been vested in third parties or
money already in the public treasury. Moreover, although, as already noted in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, the
grant of executive clemency must be personally done by the Chief Executive, the constitutionality of statutes
delegating the power to remit fines and forfeitures to subordinate executive officers has never been challenged.

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SEC. 20. THE PRESIDENT MAY CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES WITH THE PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD, AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS
AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE MONETARY BOARD SHALL, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE END OF EVERY
QUARTER OF THE CALENDAR YEAR, SUBMIT TO THE CONGRESS A COMPLETE REPORT OF ITS DECISIONS ON
APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS TO BE CONTRACTED OR GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE FOREIGN
DEBT, AND CONTAINING OTHER MATTERS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
"Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority.
Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public."
The monetary authority referred to is that which Article XII, Section 20 commands Congress to establish.
SEC. 21. NO TREATY OR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT SHALL BE VALID AND EFFECTIVE UNLESS CONCURRED IN
BY AT LEAST TWOTHIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
Senate concurrence in international agreements.
Treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or multilateral, require Senate concurrence. Treaties, however, are not the
only forms of international agreements into which the Chief Executive may enter. The authority of the Executive
to enter into executive agreements without concurrence of the legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. "The concurrence of [the legislature] is required by our fundamental law in the making
of 'treaties', which are, however, distinct and different from 'executive agreements', which may be validly entered
into without such concurrence."280 However, as Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High Commissioner to the
Philippines noted: "The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise — begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment."281 The practice in fact was that agreements which were deemed
to require concurrence were embodied in treaties whereas those which were deemed as not requiring
concurrence were embodied in executive agreements. The following is an attempt, under the old Constitution,
to delineate what may be covered by executive agreements and what must be covered by treaties.
Treaty making involves two distinct phases: negotiation and the actual making of the treaty. In the negotiation
phase, the power of the President excludes the legislature. As Justice Sutherland put it:"He alone negotiates. Into
the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." However, the
fruit of the executive's negotiation cannot bind as law unless it has the concurrence of the Senate.
Ratification, as in the 1935 Constitution, is given by at least twothirds of all the members of the Senate.'
But if the President does not present a treaty to the Senate, the Senate has nothing to ratify. Thus, prior to his
ouster from the presidency President Estrada had signed the Treaty on the International Criminal Court but he
did not submit it to the Senate for concurrence. Neither did President Arroyo. Efforts to compel the Executive
Department by mandamus to submit the document to the Senate was rebuffed by the Court. The Court said that
the decision to enter or not to enter into a treaty is a prerogative solely of the President. Thus, unless the
President submits a treaty to the Senate there is nothing for the Senate to concur in.
The Visiting Forces Agreement.

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In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding
obligations upon nations. "Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity
and constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval.
Termination of treaty.
The termination of the life of a treaty may be arrived at by formal agreement of the parties. The treaty itself might
contain the manner of terminating its life. Likewise international law recognizes the right of one party to
terminate a treaty for breach by the other party or when the fundamental circumstances for which the treaty
was entered into have changed. This latter is the principle of rebus sic stantibus. But when the time for
terminating a treaty arrives, who does it? The president alone? The President with the Senate? Congress? The
Constitution is silent on the subject.
Since Congress has legislative power and since statutes and treaties are of the same rank, Congress can pass a
law effectively negating the terms of a treaty. But since a statute is only municipal law whereas treaties are
international law, under the theory of "dualism" the congressional act would only affect the domestic force of
the treaty.
Other foreign affairs powers
The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make
treaties, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the
Government of the Philippines.
There are three distinct foreign affairs powers in this article: (1) the power to make treaties; (2) the power to
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; (3) the power to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers duly accredited to the Philippines.
Another foreign relations power which has become a subject of occasional litigation is the deportation power.
The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is
vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject.There is no
provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the intention
of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country
is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon
which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
Beyond all these, of course, is the fact that by jurisprudence and in very general terms the President is the "sole
organ" of the state for foreign relations.299 He also draws power to make war in defense of the state from his
position as Commander-in-Chief.300 And since the general principles of international law are part of the law of
the land301 and the President has the duty to "ensure that the laws are faithfully executed,"302 he must of
necessity impact on foreign relations. Moreover, Congress may delegate to him the power to make rules and
regulations on matters touching foreign relations303 and even to legislate on matters touching trade relations
with other countries.

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SEC. 22. THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT TO THE CONGRESS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE OPENING OF EVERY
REGULAR SESSION, AS THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, A BUDGET OF RECEIPTS AND
EXPENDITURES AND SOURCES OF FINANCING, INCLUDING RECEIPTS FROM EXISTING AND PROPOSED REVENUE
MEASURE.
The Budget.
The budget, which becomes the basis of the general appropriations bill, is prepared by the President and
submitted to Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session. As already seen under Article
VI, Section 25(1), Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President for the operation
of the Government as specified in the budget. The phrase "sources of financing" has reference to sources other
than taxation foreign aid.
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the estimation of
government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by
available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure
levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management. Each
agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general
ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of fund
releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the
budget cycle.
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and initially approved
work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at
time the agency budgets were approved.
SEC. 23. THE PRESIDENT SHALL ADDRESS THE CONGRESS AT THE OPENING OF ITS REGULAR SESSION. HE MAY
ALSO APPEAR BEFORE IT AT ANY OTHER TIME.

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